The Issue Whether or not Respondent, Dixie Growers, Inc., is indebted to Petitioner, Leah Raulerson, for agriculture produce purchased and not paid for in the amount of $3,722.49.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, and the entire record compiled herein, I make the following relevant factual findings. During times material, Petitioner, Leah Raulerson, was an agricultural producer within the meaning of Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes and concentrated primarily in the production of peppers. During times material, Respondent, Dixie Growers, Inc., was an agricultural dealer within the meaning of Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes, and wholesaler and purchased peppers from Petitioner during May and June, 1992. Respondent, U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company, issued a surety bond to Respondent Dixie during times material. During late May and June, 1992, Petitioner sold various types of pepper including hungarian wax, finger hots, long hots, bell pepper, fancy cubanelle and jalopeno to Respondent Dixie. During times material, Petitioner inquired of one of Respondent Dixie's owners, Charles Lawton, what the wholesale market was bringing for the type of peppers that she produced and desired to sell. Respondent Dixie advised that the average wholesale price was $8.00 per box. Petitioner told Respondent Dixie, that she could sell her peppers for that price but if the market deteriorated to the point where the price was $4.00 or less per box that she should be advised whereupon she would cease picking the peppers as her labor and other related costs would be below her breakeven point of $4.00 per box. Respondent Dixie, advised Petitioner that he (Charles Lawton) would let her know if the market declined. The agreement was struck and Petitioner was advised by Respondent Dixie to "bring the peppers on." Based on their agreement, Petitioner continued picking the peppers. Petitioner delivered to Respondent Dixie, a load of the various types of peppers that she produced and expected to be compensated at the rate of an average of $8.00 per box for her produce. Petitioner was not paid for the peppers at that time nor was she told that she should not bring any more peppers to Respondent's warehouse. Approximately two weeks from the date of delivery, Petitioner was paid an average of $1.03 per box by Respondent Dixie. Petitioner provided copies of the wholesale market reports for the types of peppers that she produced and sold to Respondent, Dixie, during May and June, 1992. The reports reflect an average wholesale price of $8.00 per box. Petitioner is owed by Respondent Dixie, the sum of $3,722.49 for nonpayment of produce (peppers) that she delivered to Respondent Dixie during May and June, 1992. Respondent Dixie, has countered that Petitioner's produce was bad and that the market had declined to the point whereupon they (Dixie Growers) were only able to obtain approximately $1.03 per box for the produce that Petitioner sold to Respondent Dixie. However, Respondent Dixie, failed to present any credible evidence which would establish that either Petitioner's produce was bad or that they were only able to obtain $1.03 as contended. No evidence was presented that the market declined or situation was anything different from the prices Petitioner was quoted and as reflected by the prices shown in the wholesale market reports. It is more probable than not that Respondent Dixie received the amounts reflected in the wholesale market reports for the produce that it purchased from Petitioner during May and June, 1992.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Department of Agriculture, Bureau of License and Bond, issue a Final Order requiring that Respondent, Dixie Growers, Inc., pay to Petitioner the sum of $3,722.49 as claimed for agricultural produce purchased from Petitioner. In the event that Respondent Dixie fails to pay Petitioner, within 30 days of the date of the Department's Final Order, the sum of $3,722.49, that Respondent, U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company, as surety, remit to the Department that sum which should then be timely remitted to Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda Terry Lawton P. O. Box 1686 Plant City, Florida 33564 U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company Legal Department P. O. Box 1138 Baltimore, Maryland 21203-0000 Richard Tritschler, Esquire Department of Agriculture The Capitol - PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing and Bond Department of Agriculture 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Dixie Growers, Inc. P. O. Box 1686 Plant City, Florida 33564 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol - PL 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 0350
Findings Of Fact Appellant, Nostimo, Inc. (Nostimo), owns lots 8, 9, 10 and 11, Block 8, revised plat, in a Clearwater Beach subdivision located at 32 Bay Esplanade, Clearwater, Florida. Appellant, Pick Kwik Food Stores, Inc. (Pick Kwik), operates a Pick Kwik convenience store at the location. The subject Pick Kwik store is located on the western side of the intersection of Bay Esplanade and Mandalay Avenue in Clearwater Beach, an elongated strip of land to the west of the mainland portion of the City of Clearwater and separated from the mainland by Clearwater Harbor. Mandalay Avenue runs north and south through the heart of Clearwater Beach and is a principal traffic artery in that part of the community. Mandalay narrows from four to two lanes just south of the subject location. From the point at which it narrows to two lanes, Mandalay furnishes the only access to the primarily residential neighborhoods to the north. Bay Esplanade is a much shorter street that runs in an east-west direction between the Gulf of Mexico and Clearwater Harbor. Before the Pick Kwik store began to do business at the location, the premises were once occupied by a hotel, apartments, hot dog shop and a small lounge that offered both on- and off-premises consumption of alcohol. The lounge did not generate substantial numbers of customers and associated traffic. It was very small, and a congregation of four or five customers at any one time was a large crowd. In general terms, the location is surrounded by mixed uses, including a 7 rental apartments, a restaurant, retail businesses and resort facilities, residences, public areas and a city fire station. In addition to a number of commercial establishments within the immediate area, there are tennis courts, a parking area, community boat ramp, soccer field, playground and public park. In the area, there are apartments, rental units and condominiums, including some directly behind the subject location. There is a church a block away, and there is a playground next to the church that is used by area young people, many of whom use bicycles as their means of transportation. On April 25, 1989, Nostimo and Pick Kwik applied for a conditional use permit to sell beer and wine, for off-premises consumption, at the location. The application was heard at a meeting of the City of Clearwater Planning and Zoning Board (the Board) on June 14, 1989. The Board denied the application, and Nostimo and Pick Kwik appealed under Section 137.013 of the Clearwater Land Development Code (the Code). The appeal was heard by a Division of Administrative Hearings Hearing Officer, who entered a Final Order on October 9, 1989, upholding the denial. The Hearing Officer found in his Final Order in part: At both the Board hearing and final hearing in this cause, the City Police Department offered testimony in opposition to the issuance of the requested permit. According to the uncontradicted testimony of Lt. Frank Palumbo, who is the Clearwater Beach police department district commander, additional noise, vandalism, traffic congestion and congregation of younger people are expected if the permit is issued. This opinion was based upon his law enforcement experience with other convenience stores on the Beach side that sell beer and wine, including another Pick Wick [sic] convenience store. Further, Mandalay Avenue is an important north-south traffic artery in Clearwater Beach, and there are no alternative streets for residents and visitors to use to avoid the traffic build-up that will occur around the store. Lieutenant Palumbo disputed the assertion that the lounge that once occupied a portion of the subject property generated substantial numbers of customers and associated traffic and that the new enterprise is actually a downgrade in use. He pointed out that the former lounge was very small, and a congregation of four or five customers at any one time was a "large crowd." In contrast, the police officer distinguished that situation from the proposed store where the sale of beer and wine around the clock is expected to generate larger volumes of traffic and customers, particularly during the evening hours. Finally, it has been Lt. Palumbo's experience that convenience stores that sell beer and wine attract the younger crowd, including minors, during the late hours of the night, and they create noise and sanitation problems for the adjacent property owners. The witness concluded that all of these factors collectively would have a negative impact on "community services" by placing a greater demand on police resources. This testimony was echoed by a city planner who gave deposition testimony in this cause. The nexus between the sale of alcoholic beverages and increased traffic and noise was corroborated by Daniel Baker, the manager of another Pick Wick [sic] store and a former employee of the 7 when beer sales stopped at that store at midnight, the noise and traffic also came to a halt. In this regard, it is noted the proposed store will operate twenty-four hours per day. To the above extent, then, the proposed use is incompatible with the requirements of section 137.011(d)(6). On November 7, 1989, Nostimo and Pick Kwik filed a two-count complaint in circuit court: Count I, a petition for common law certiorari review of the Hearing Officer's decision; and Count II, attacking the constitutionality of Section 137.011(d)(6) of the Code. On November 19, 1990, the circuit court entered orders (1) denying the petition for common law certiorari and (2) granting a motion to dismiss Count II. It was represented that a Final Judgment of Dismissal, addressed to Count II, was entered on March 22, 1991, and that Nostimo and Pick Kwik appealed the final judgment to the District Court of Appeal, Second District of Florida, where it remains pending. On April 16, 1991, Nostimo and Pick Kwik filed another application for a conditional use permit to sell beer and wine, for off-premises consumption, at the 32 Bay Esplanade location. The application is identical to the one filed on April 25, 1989, except in one respect: the second application provides that sales of alcoholic beverages at the location would not begin until 9:00 a.m., whereas the April 25, 1989, application was for a permit to begin sales of alcoholic beverages at the location at 8:00 a.m., as authorized by local ordinance. During the staff review of the April 16, 1991, application, the applicants also offered to agree to other conditions or restrictions in response to staff concerns: (1) the applicants would provide a security guard to patrol its three Clearwater Beach establishments between the hours of 8:00 p.m. and 2:00 a.m. on Friday and Saturday nights, with monitoring reports submitted to the City Planning and Development Department not less than quarterly; 2/ (2) the applicants would obtain the requisite alcoholic beverage separation distance variance from the City Commission; 3/ (3) the applicants would obtain the requisite occupational license within six months of the date of the public hearing on the application; and (4) the applicants would restrict the hours of operations for alcoholic beverage sales to 9:00 a.m. until 12:00 midnight Monday through Saturday and 1:00 p.m. until 12:00 midnight on Sunday. At the Board hearing, the human resources manager for Pick Kwik outlined Pick Kwik's procedures and guidelines for the sale of alcohol. There is a policy manual in each store as well as a handbook provided to each employee outlining the procedures to be followed regarding the sale of alcohol, including procedures to prevent sales to minors and disciplinary action if the procedures are not followed. All employees also attend an orientation which includes responsible vendor training. These policies are enforced by Pick Kwik through monthly inspections. There are 17 existing establishments fronting on Mandalay Avenue that sell alcoholic beverages. Just three are north of Bay Esplanade, including the 7 There are another three establishments selling alcoholic beverages south of Bay Esplanade fronting on streets other than Mandalay. There also is one fronting on Bay Esplanade. There is one restaurant on Mandalay north of Bay Esplanade that has a pending application for a permit to sell alcoholic beverages. At the Board hearing on the April 16, 1991, application, held on July 30, 1991, opponents of the application introduced in evidence the record of the hearing held on June 14, 1989, on the April 25, 1989, application filed by Nostimo and Pick Kwik. Included in the record of the prior hearing was the testimony of Lt. Palumbo, who expressed concerns about increased traffic, loitering and rowdy behavior if the conditional use permit were issued. Opponents of the application also introduced in evidence at the Board hearing the Final Order entered by the Hearing Officer in the prior proceeding. See Finding of Fact 6, above. The Board considered the record of the prior proceeding in evaluating the April 16, 1991, application. But the Final Order in the previous proceeding seemed to be based on a misapprehension that the Pick Kwik store would be open for the sale of beer and wine 24 hours a day. See Finding of Fact 6, above. In addition, given the existance of the 7 street, the evidence presented in the hearing on the April 16, 1991, application put in perspective Lt. Palumbo's testimony that allowing the sale of beer and wine at the Pick Kwik would "generate larger volumes of traffic and customers, particularly during the evening hours" and would "have a negative impact on 'community services' by placing a greater demand on police resources." At the Board hearing, the staff of the City Planning and Development Department recommended approval. 4/ The City's Planner, Scott Shuford, testified that traffic no longer was considered to be a substantial problem. The City Traffic Engineer did not anticipate a substantial increase in traffic as a result of granting the application. The traffic experts had difficulty differentiating between a convenience store selling beer and wine, and one that does not, primarily because they were unaware of any other convenience store that does not sell beer and wine. But the evidence was clear that, since the 7 and wine across the street from the Pick Kwik location, there would be only a slight increase in traffic resulting from selling beer and wine at the Pick Kwik location. Two convenience stores located across the street from one another generally share the available business in the market area. The addition of a store across the street from an existing store would be expected to generate perhaps 12 percent more aggregate revenue. (This approximates the new store's capture of the "leakage" that resulted when potential customers driving on the opposite side of the street chose to bypass the preexisting store.) Beer and wine sales make up approximately 7 to 8 percent of a convenience store's gross revenue. Assuming that two stores across the street from each other also would generate 12 percent more aggregate revenue from the sale of beer and wine than a single store, and also assuming that the percentage of additional gross revenue represents additional trips to one of the two stores, the impact of allowing the sale of beer and wine at the Pick Kwik location would be 7 to 8 percent (representing the beer and wine percentage of gross revenue) of 12 percent (representing the aggregate increase in gross revenue from adding a convenience store across the street from another one), or between 0.84 and 0.96 percent, at most. The staff's recommendation to grant the April 16, 1991, application was subject to the addition of a fifth condition or restriction prohibiting sales of single containers of alcoholic beverages (other than bottles of beer and wine containing less than 750 ml). The evidence was clear that this condition would present enforcement problems. In addition, imposition of this condition or restriction at Pick Kwik without imposing the same condition or restriction at the 7 contrary, it might increase traffic problems as a result of customers wanting to buy single containers at the Pick Kwik subsequently crossing the street to make the purchase at the 7 On the other hand, tying the duration of the conditional use benefitting the Pick Kwik location to the duration of the conditional use benefitting the 7 proceeding that implementation of Section 137.011 of the Code will result inexorably in an increase in the number of establishments selling beer and wine, for off-premises consumption, in Clearwater Beach and, particularly in the north end of the Beach. This would result, at an appropriate future date, in the simultaneous consideration of the compatibility of the sale of beer and wine at both the Pick Kwik and the 7 condition or restriction.
Findings Of Fact Willie J. Woods is a farmer. He entered into an agreement with W. R. Ward, Jr., President of Growers Marketing Service, Inc. (GMS) concerning the disposition of watermelons which he had grown. The testimony of Woods and Ward concerning the nature of the agreement is conflicting. In the absence of a written contract, the nature of the agreement must be determined from the other documents surrounding their transactions. From these documents, it is determined that the agreement between the parties was not for the purchase of Woods' watermelons by GMS. The documentation surrounding the transactions by GMS, show that GMS was acting as a broker or middle man in introducing Woods' watermelons into the stream of commerce. According to Mr. Ward's records, each shipment was assigned a transaction number, and each sale from a lot of watermelons was also assigned a transaction number. The record of each of these transactions was examined in detail. Below each of these transactions is discussed, and where portions of the record are particularly pertinent, they have been copied and attached to this order for ease of reference. In some instances, the settlement statement has been reproduced and corrected to reflect what the actual charges should have been based upon the underlying record. A handwritten explanation of the adjusting entries has been added to these statements. Transaction number 1439: On June 4, 1991, Woods delivered 43,750 pounds of watermelons to GMS The documentation surrounding this transaction shows that GMS, sold the load of watermelons FOB Brooksville, Florida for a price of 14 cents per pound.The purchaser's driver transported the load from Brooksville to Canada where the purchaser "rejected" the load because the melons were immature. By purchasing the watermelons FOB Brooksville, the purchaser waived any right to reject the melons upon their arrival at their destination. Further, the only evidence of immaturity is an inspection report which states that the inspection was limited and may not reflect the condition of the whole load. The inspection report itself is hearsay. The dollar value of this load as stated in the Bill of Lading/Customs Declaration was $6,125.00. The cost of freight was not shown in the file because it was delivered FOB Brooksville and the costs were borne by the purchaser. The GMS's handling fee was 1 cent per pound or $438.00. GMS owed Woods $5,687.00 on transaction number 1439. GMS paid Woods $2,879 on this transaction. GMS still owes Woods $2,808 on this transaction. Transaction number 1424: On June 4th, GMS sold in behalf of Woods $4,320 pounds of watermelons for 20.25 cents per pound. W. R. Ward stated that the price was reduced from 15 to 5 cents per pound, and was a bookkeeping error. The file reflects the sales price for the 46,320 pounds of watermelons was $9,380. The file reflects that transportation on this load of watermelons was $1,683.00, and GMS, was entitled to 2.5 cents per pound for packing and 1 cent handling for a total of $1,621. The total expenses were $3,304.00 for transaction number 1424. GMS owed Woods $6,077.00 for transaction 1424, but only paid him $1,844. GMS still owes Woods $4,233 on this transaction. Transaction number 3534: On June 4th, GMS, handled a load of yellow meat watermelons weighing 4,071 pounds for Willie J. Woods. Subsequently, GMS sold portions of this load of watermelons in transactions number 1565, 1507, 1461, 1403, and 1476. On June the 6th, GMS sold 13,337 pounds of watermelons at 17 cents a pound for a total sales price of $2,267.29 in transaction 1461. On June 6th, Growers Marketing Service sold 18,909 pounds at 14 cents a pound for a total of $2,647.26 in transaction number 403. On June 7th, Growers Marketing Service sold 1,945 pounds at 22 cents a pound for a total of $427.90 in transaction 1476. On June 14th, Growers Marketing Service sold 5,347 pounds on transaction 1565 which were subsequently rejected because of severe decay. See, Dump Report dated July 5 in Transaction 1565. Growers Marketing Service showed no income nor expense to the grower on transaction 1565. Because these melons were not sold until June 14, it is possible that they decayed. GMS's treatment of the transaction on the settlement statement is contrary to the notes on transaction 1565 which treat is as a wash with no income or expense to Woods. The assessment of freight and handling charges was not inappropriate under the circumstances, and are disallowed. See, Corrected Invoice 3534 attached to this Order. The total revenue from the remaining transactions was $6,142. The expenses on the various loads total $2,285. GMS owed Woods $3,857 on this load, but only paid him $1152. GMS still owes Woods $2705 on this transaction. Transaction number 3541: On June 7, 1991, Growers Marketing Service handled 9,997 pounds of watermelons for Willie J. Woods on transaction number 1565. This load was sold to Castellini Produce on transaction 1565, discussed above, where it was rejected for excessive decay. The assessment of the freight charges and handling charges on this load which was handled 10 days after it was picked was inappropriate, and is disallowed. It is treated also as a wash in this transaction just as it was in 3534, and just as GMS treated it in transaction 1565. Transaction number 3546: On June 11th, Growers Marketing Service received 4,949 pounds of yellow meat watermelons from Woods. It subsequently sold these watermelons for Woods in transactions 1589, 1607, and 1613. Regarding transaction 1589, the Growers Marketing Service's settlement statement to Woods reflects that this transaction is subject to PACA Audit; however, GMS included the 14,121 pounds of watermelons in its settlement at a expense to Woods of 5 cents per pound on a sales price of 1.67 cents per pound. Because this transaction is still subject to audit, it was inappropriate to settle with the farmer. For purposes of this accounting, 1589 is not considered. In transaction 1607, GMS sold 16,775 pounds of yellow meat watermelons received from Woods on transaction 3546. Transaction 1607 and the funds received from the transaction are discussed in full below with regard to transaction 3548; therefore, it is not discussed or accounted for as part of transaction 3546. In transaction 1613, Growers Marketing Service sold 10,053 pounds of watermelons at 11.6 cents per pound for a total of $1,069.00. Expenses attributable to transaction 1613 were $554.00. Woods was entitled to $614.00 on transaction 1613; however, he was paid nothing on this transaction; GMS owes Woods $614 on this transaction. Transaction 1475: On June 11th, Growers Marketing Service received 45,050 pounds of watermelons from Woods. Growers Marketing Service asserts that the original price of these watermelons was dropped from 15 cents to 12 cents; however, the checkstub attached to the invoice shows a total payment to GMS of $7,298.10 at the original purchase price of 17.2 cents per pound. Growers Marketing Service's costs in this transaction were $2,358. Because this transaction clearly shows the original price was paid, it reflects adversely on creditability of the witnesses for Growers Marketing Service with regard to their testimony in other transactions that the original price was reduced due to fall in the market. Growers Marketing Service owed Woods $4,940 on transaction 1475, and paid him $4,484. GMS still owes Woods $456 on this transaction. Transaction number 1508: On June 11, 1991, Growers Marketing Service received 46,000 pounds of watermelons from Willie J. Woods. Growers Marketing Service sold these melons at a price of 10.25 cents per pound. Growers Marketing Service received $4,715.00 on transaction 1508 and had expenses in the amount of $2,259.00. Growers Marketing Service owed Woods $2,456.00 on transaction 1508, and paid Woods $2,284. GMS still owes Woods $172 on this transaction. Transaction number 1497: On June 11, 1991, Growers Marketing Service received 45,340 pounds of watermelons in this transaction. Growers Marketing Service sold these watermelons at 16.35 cents per pound and deducted freight of 4.35 cents per pound, showing a net sales price of 12 cents per pound. This resulted in sales revenue of $5,441 from which GMS deducted its 1 cent handling charge and an additional $4,750 listed as a harvesting advance. GMS paid Woods $204. GMS introduced no proof of a harvesting loan; however, Woods' complaint admits this loan. Nothing is owed to Woods on this transaction. Transaction number 3548: On June 12, 1991, Growers Marketing Service received 41,132 pounds of watermelons from Willie J. Woods. Subsequently, Growers Marketing Service sold watermelons received from Woods on this transaction in its transaction numbered 1613, 1607 and 1627. Growers Marketing Service asserts that 24,457 pounds of watermelons were rejected and destroyed on transaction 1607. The records regarding transaction 1607 show handwritten notation on the invoice that Growers Marketing Service received a total after expenses of sale of $3,286.00 on transaction 1607. In transaction 1613, Growers Marketing Service sold 10,032 pounds of watermelons at 11 cents a pound and in transaction 1627 Growers Marketing Service sold 7,899 pounds of watermelons at 7 cents a pound. The original settlement statement reflected incorrectly that Woods owed GMS $810. A corrected settlement statement on transaction 3548 is attached to this Order and reflects that Willie J. Woods was owed the amount of $1,019.00 in transaction 1607, $624.00 in transaction 1613, and $1,019.00 in transaction 1627. GMS paid Woods no money on this transaction, and owes Woods a total of $1,873. Transaction number 1527: On June 12, 1991, Growers Marketing Service received 50,080 pounds of watermelons from Willie J. Woods. Growers Marketing Service sold these watermelons for 17.35 cents per pound receiving a total of $8,689.00 less expenses of $2,441.00. GMS owed Willie J. Woods $6,248.00 on transaction 1527, and paid Woods $247. GMS owes Woods $6,001. Transaction number 1536: On June 12, 1991, Growers Marketing Service received 41,320 pounds watermelons from Willie J. Woods. Growers Marketing Service consigned these watermelons and received $2,078.00 less expenses of $1,473.00. Woods owed $605.00 from Growers Marketing Service on transaction 1536, and paid Woods $307. GMS still owes Woods $298. Transaction number 1535: On June 12, 1991, Growers Marketing Service received 43,240 pounds of watermelons from Willie J. Woods in this transaction. Growers Marketing Service subsequently sold these watermelons at 16.45 cents per pound receiving a total of $7,113.00 less expenses of $2,357.00. Growers Marketing Service owed Willie J. Woods $4,856.00 on transaction 1535, and paid Woods $2,802. GMS still owes Woods $2,054. Transaction number 1505: On June 13, 1991, Growers Marketing Service received 44,950 pounds of watermelons from Willie J. Woods on this transaction. Subsequently, Growers Marketing Service sold these watermelons for a total of $6,967.00 to a dealer in Canada. The dealer in Canada rejected the watermelons upon their receipt serving that they were overripe on June 15, 1991, when they were received. A Canadian agricultural inspection was ordered and conducted on June 21, 1991, which revealed that 28% of the melons showed decay. However, the inspection was not timely and the report is hearsay. GMS failed to exercise due diligence in obtaining a prompt inspection and seeking recovery in behalf of Woods. Therefore, after absorbing expenses of $2,747.00, Growers Marketing Service owed Woods $4,220.00 for his loss in this transaction. GMS paid Woods $1,250 salvage on the load; however, it still owes him $2,970. Transaction number 1520: On June 13, 1991, Growers Marketing Service received 45,940 pounds of watermelons from Willie J. Woods in this transaction. The front of the folder shows that Growers Marketing Service sold this load of watermelons to Winn Dixie in South Carolina for 12 cents per pound, or $5,513. Upon receiving the watermelons on June 15 1991, Winn Dixie rejected the melons because they were "cutting white, green fresh." See copy of front of file. Growers Marketing Service asked another broker to move the load, and that broker and Growers Marketing Service arranged to have the load inspected at its next destination, Staunton, Virginia. The truck broke down in route to Staunton, Virginia and did not arrive until June 18, 1991. The other broker described the melons as looking "cooked" on arrival. Growers Marketing Service charged Woods with freight on this load. Because Growers Marketing Service had a legitimate freight claim against the trucking company, yet charged the loss and freight charges to the grower, GMS owes Woods $5,940 less the salvage, freight and expenses totaling $2,125. GMS owes Woods $3,816. Transaction number 3553: On June 13, 1991, Growers Marketing Service received 29,478 pounds of watermelons from Willie J. Woods on transaction 3553. Subsequently, Growers Marketing Service sold these melons to various concerns realizing $3,450.76 on these sales. GMS's settlement statement with Woods on this transaction reflects a deficit on transaction 1505 of $822.50. According to the records reviewed by the Hearing Officer there was no deficit in transaction 1505; therefore, the deduction of $822.50 was inappropriate. Adding this money back into the amount due Woods, Woods should have received $1,615.74 on transaction number 3553. GMS paid Woods $675, and still owes Woods $941. Transaction number 3552: On June 13, 1991, Growers Marketing Service received 32,769 pounds of watermelons from Willie J. Woods on this transaction. A review of the records reflects that Growers Marketing Service subsequently sold 10,403 pounds of these melons at three cents a pound, realizing $312.09. Growers Marketing Service also sold 19 bins of these melons weighing 22,366 pounds for nine cents a pound for a total of $2,012.94. Growers Marketing Service's settlement statement reflects a packing charge of two and a half cents per pound for 22,366 pounds of melons that were in bins. This is excluded as an expense because the adjustment for packing charges was included in the Hearing Officer's recomputation of the price of nine cents per pound. Similarly, the price adjustment of one and a half cents per pound was included in the recomputation of the price and is therefore excluded. The settlement statement which is attached to this Order reflects total receipts of $2,325 and total expenses of $750. Growers Marketing Services owed Willie J. Woods $1,575 on transaction number 3552, and paid Woods $1,551. GMS owes Woods $24 on this transaction. Transaction number 3549: On June 13, 1991, Growers Marketing Service received 32,564 pounds of watermelon from Willie J. Woods on this transaction. Subsequently, Growers Marketing Service sold 4,008 pounds of watermelons at three cents a pound on transaction 1669, realizing $120.24 on the sale. Growers Marketing Service sold seven bins of watermelons weighing 8,400 pounds at $217.66 for each bin, realizing a total of $1,523.66 on transaction 1532. Growers Marketing Service sold 1,346 pounds of watermelon at eight cents a pound, realizing $107.68 on transaction 1678. Growers Marketing Services sold 18,810 pounds of watermelons at sixteen and a half cents a pound, realizing $3,104 on transaction 1530. The Growers Marketing Services' settlement statement on transaction 3549, corrected as indicated above, shows that Growers Marketing Services received a total of $4,855 on this transaction. Growers Marketing Services' statement reflects packing charges of four cents per pound for 24,164 pounds. This packing charge was not applicable because the melons are indicated to have been in bins, not in cartons. Further, the price adjustment of one and a half cents per pound on 18,810 pounds was included in the Hearing Officer recomputation of the price per pound. Taking into account these corrections, total revenue was $4,855, and the total expenses of Growers Marketing Services were $1,613. Growers Marketing Services owed Woods $3,242 on transaction 3549, and paid him $1,690. GMS still owes Woods $1,552. Transaction 3556: On June 13, 1991, Growers Marketing Services received 32,898 pounds of watermelons from Willie J. Woods on this transaction. Subsequently, Growers Marketing Services sold 2,086 pounds of these watermelons for 12 cents a pound on transaction 1622. Growers Marketing Services sold 2,096 pounds of these watermelons at 10 cents a pound realizing $210 on transaction 1575. Growers Marketing Services sold 1,983 pounds of these watermelons at 10 cents a pound realizing $198 in transaction 1647. Growers Marketing Services' settlement for transaction 3556 is attached to this Order and reflects an original price for these melons of 4 cents per pound; however, Growers Marketing Services sold 1,029 of these watermelons at 11.6 cents a pound in transaction 1613. The settlement statement, a copy of which is attached, is corrected to reflect the sales price of 11.6 cents a pound, and the resulting change in the monies received from $41.16 to $119. GMS sold 2086 pounds of melon for 12 cents per pound realizing $250 on transaction 1622. GMS sold 3,841 pounds of watermelons for 10 cents per pound realizing $384 on transaction 1707. Growers Marketing Services sold 21,862 of these watermelons at 7 cents a pound realizing $1,530 on transaction 1627. The total received by Growers Marketing Services was $2,691 less expenses of $1,952. Growers Marketing Services owed Willie J. Woods $739, and paid him $662 on transaction 3556. GMS still owes Woods $77. Transaction number 3557: On June 14, 1991, Growers Marketing Services received 20,013 pounds of watermelons from Willie J. Woods on this transactions. Subsequently, Growers Marketing Services sold 9,214 watermelons at 12 cents a pound on transaction 1616. Growers Marketing Services 3,418 pounds of watermelons at 3 cents a pound in transaction 1669. Growers Marketing Services sold three bins of watermelons weighing 3,525 pounds at 16.5 cents a pound and an additional 3,852 pounds of watermelons at 16.5 cents a pound in transaction 1530. This is a total of 16,162 pounds of watermelons. The Growers Marketing Service's settlement statement, which is attached, is corrected to show the correct number of pounds sold and the correct amounts of money received by Growers Marketing Service. Growers Marketing Service received a total of $3,301.50 for the sell of these watermelons. Concerning the expenses shown by Growers Marketing Service, the number of pounds handled is adjusted to show that 16,162 pounds was handled. In addition, the 4 cent packing charge for 16,484 pounds of watermelons is deleted since these melons were not packed in cartons but in bins. In addition, the 1.5 cent price adjustment for 3,525 pounds of watermelons handled in transaction 1530 is in the recomputation of the price. The corrected expense total is $254. Growers Marketing Service owes Willie J. Woods $3,048 on transaction 3557. GMS paid Woods $643; however, it still owes Woods $2,405. The total of the sums still owed Mr. Woods by GMS is $32,999.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the parties be notified of these findings, and GMS permitted the opportunity to pay to Willie J. Woods $32,999 within 30 days, and if GMS fails to settle with Mr. Woods, Mr. Woods should be permitted to obtain settlement from the Respondent's bond in the amount of $32,999, or to the limits of the bond. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Bob Crawford, Commissioner Department of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Willie J. Woods 1022 Piercewood Point Brooksville, Florida 34602 W. R. Ward, Jr., President Growers Marketing Srevice, Inc. Post Office Box 2595 Lakeland, Florida 33806 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Department of Agriculture Division of Marketing, Bureau of Licensure and Bond Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
Findings Of Fact The Petitioners own and operate a farm in St. Johns County, Florida. During the 1991 potato-growing season, they grew atlantic chipping potatoes on their 400-acre farm, as well as on approximately 30 acres leased from another party by their daughter and son-in-law. The Petitioners' business is known as Pacetti Farms. Rubin is an Illinois corporation licensed to do business in Florida as a broker or dealer in agricultural products. Rubin customarily purchases potatoes from growers throughout the country at the appropriate season for resale, typically to various potato chip manufacturing companies. Mr. Rubin appeared at the hearing and testified on behalf of Rubin and as an adverse witness on behalf of the Petitioners. Rubin is licensed and bonded with a surety bond from Continental in accordance with the statutory authority cited below, enforced and regulated by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services ("Department"). On December 22, 1990, the Petitioners and Rubin entered into a written contract for the sale and purchase of 50,000 CWT of Florida atlantic chipping potatoes. That contract is in evidence as Exhibit 3 and is also known as the "set price contract". The contract called for shipment of the potatoes at a stated price of $6.35 per CWT, although the parties have stipulated and agreed that the actual contract price was intended as $6.00 per CWT. That figure is not in dispute in this proceeding. Shipment was to be made during the harvesting season between the dates of April 27, 1991 and June 15, 1991. The contract contained an escape clause or exception for "acts of God", with an explanatory parenthetic clause indicating that that was intended to mean circumstances beyond the control of the parties, such as flood, freeze, hail, etc. On or about February 15, 1991, severe cold weather struck the potato- growing area of St. Johns County, Florida. Temperatures ranged from 25 degrees to 19 degrees on that day, with a high wind blowing and very dry conditions. This resulted in soil being blown away from the newly-set potatoes under very cold temperatures. Because of this, the Petitioners had to work with tractors and cultivators far into the night to turn the blown-away soil back into the potato "sets". The Petitioners feared that this would cause some "dry eyes" and, therefore, lowered potato plant and potato production. In fact, however, upon observing the maturing plants during April of 1991, it appeared that the Petitioners would have a healthy, normal crop. The prior year the Petitioners had grown 133,000 CWT of potatoes on their 400 acres (excluding the Kirkers' 30 acres). With this background of an apparently-healthy crop in mind, the Petitioners were approached by Rubin on April 25, 1991 and negotiations ensued which resulted in the sale and purchase from Petitioners to Rubin of six additional loads of potatoes at the open market price of $19.50 per CWT. The six additional loads were in addition to the 50,000 CWT of potatoes agreed upon in the main contract entered into on December 22, 1990. This separate oral agreement for the six loads of potatoes at the market price of $19.50 per CWT was entered into prior to the Petitioners initiating delivery under the terms of the written contract of December 22, 1990. The parties thus agreed for the sale and purchase of six loads of potatoes at that market price to be delivered on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday of the following week, April 29th, April 30th, and May 1, 1991. Part of the consideration for that oral contract was the Petitioners' ability to furnish the six truckloads of potatoes on short notice, on the dates that Rubin required them. In other words, Rubin needed them in a hurry; and it was apparently worth $19.50 per CWT for him to get the potatoes delivered immediately on the dates requested. In the process of negotiating this oral contract, the Petitioners assured Rubin that he would have sufficient potatoes to meet his 50,000 CWT obligation under the written contract of December 22, 1990. This was not a misrepresentation on the part of the Petitioners, at this time, because the Petitioners, in good faith, believed they would be able to meet the 50,000 CWT set price contract and the oral contract for six additional truckloads, because of their belief concerning their crop estimate. This belief was based upon their observance of an apparently healthy crop and their knowledge that on their 400 acres, the year before, they had grown 133,000 CWT, as well as upon their knowledge that a normal crop estimate for the entire 430 acres at this location, under all of the prevailing circumstances, was 120,400 CWT. In fact, the Petitioners only contracted for 116,650 CWT of potatoes which, based upon a reasonable and appropriate crop estimate for this site and circumstances, would have allowed them to meet all their contracts, including the 50,000 CWT contract between the Petitioners and Rubin, although not all of the market sales for the Kirkers. After having thus assured Mr. Rubin that they could meet the contract of December 22, 1990 and still perform the oral contract for the six truckloads at market price, the Petitioners proceeded to carry out that oral agreement. It was a separate and distinct contract from the written contract dated December 22, 1990. Under the separate oral contract, they delivered the six truckloads of potatoes requested by Rubin. Rubin received them and paid $19.50 per CWT for them. On May 2, 1990, the Petitioners began delivering potatoes to Rubin under the terms and conditions of the written contract of December 22, 1990 and continued the deliveries throughout the remainder of the harvesting season. The first was shipped from Pacetti Farms on May 2, 1991 and the last load delivered to Rubin on that contract was shipped on June 1, 1991. During the 1991 growing and harvesting season, the area, including St. Johns County, experienced substantial crop damage due to excessive frost, rain, hail, and wind, which occurred during February of 1991 and then after April 25, 1991, with particular regard to excessive rainfall in May of 1991. This resulted in the area being declared an agricultural disaster area by the United States Department of Agriculture for that growing season. The Petitioners suffered damage to their crop as a result of these elements in February of 1991, as described above, and by excessive rainfall during May of 1991. Excessive rainfall caused root damage to their crop, which resulted in a lowered yield even though the plants viewed above ground appeared to be normal. This was aggravated by the fact that the Petitioners and other growers were legally unable to use the pesticide "Temik", for control of nematodes, during that growing season. Because of the nature of the crop involved, which grows underground, the potato yield is difficult to estimate at any given point in harvesting. The exact nature and extent of damage caused by weather conditions to a single crop is hard to estimate in advance. This difficulty is further compounded by differing soil types and climate conditions present within a particular growing area, especially with regard to farmers such as the Petitioners, who have their crops spread over multiple fields and farms. In mid-May of 1991, the Petitioners realized that there would be a crop shortage. The crop was damaged due to the weather-related factors mentioned above. The Petitioners notified Rubin that they expected their potato crop to fall short of expectations and that they would probably be unable to completely fill the contract with Rubin for the entire 50,000 CWT contracted for on December 22, 1990. In the meantime, before the 1991 planting season began, the Petitioners and Renee and Keith Kirker had entered into an agreement, whereby the Kirkers initiated their own farming operation on 30 acres of potato-growing land. The Kirkers leased that acreage from Diane Ross and received operating assistance from the Petitioners in the form of advances of all their operating costs, pursuant to an agreement between the Petitioners and the Kirkers, whereby the Petitioners would be repaid the estimated production costs for that 30-acre crop in the amount of $1,776.85 per acre, upon the sale of those 30 acres of potatoes. Potatoes are planted and harvested in the same sequence. Since the Petitioners assisted the Kirkers in planting their potatoes prior to the planting and completion of their own fields, the Petitioners borrowed some of the Kirkers' potatoes to fill their own contracts because those potatoes matured earlier, with the understanding that the Kirkers would be repaid in kind from the Petitioners' own fields during the remainder of the harvesting season. This is a common practice according to Ronald Brown, who testified for the Petitioners as an expert witness on farming practices. However, after the heavy rains in May of 1991, the Petitioners discovered that it would be necessary, in their view, to retain a portion of their last acreage in order to have potatoes to pay back the Kirkers for the potatoes borrowed. These potatoes would be sold by the Petitioners at market price, as agreed with the Kirkers. Upon discovering that their crop would not meet their contract obligations, the Petitioners attempted to prorate their remaining potatoes between their remaining contract customers in what they considered a fair and reasonable manner. On behalf of the Kirkers, the potatoes allocated for repayment to them were offered to Rubin, who, through its President, Mr. Rubin, declined to purchase them at the market price at which they were offered (higher than the contract price). The Petitioners' expert, Ronald Brown, established that, based upon accepted growers practices and his experience in the Hastings area, the Petitioners should have anticipated the yield for their 1991 crop at no more than 280 CWT per acre for the Petitioners' 430 acres (30 acres of which was the Kirkers' land). It is customary farming practice in the area, according to Brown, to enter into contracts for no more than 80% of the maximum anticipated yield of potatoes. The anticipated yield on the entire 430 acres of the Petitioners' and the Kirkers' land was, therefore, 120,400 CWT of potatoes. The principle of contracting no more than 80% of a maximum anticipated yield is designed to protect contracting parties in the event a smaller than anticipated yield occurs. A 280 CWT per acre yield is the generally-accepted yield amount under good growing conditions, according to Mr. Brown. The year before, the Petitioners had produced a total yield of 133,000 CWT on only 400 acres. The Petitioners entered into a total of six separate contracts for delivery of a total of 116,650 CWT of potatoes out of a reasonably anticipated maximum yield for the 430 acres of only 120,400 CWT. Thus, the Petitioners contracted 97% of the customary, accepted, anticipated maximum yield for the 430 acres for 1991. Thirty (30) of those acres, however, represent the potatoes which the Petitioners were obligated to the Kirkers to sell on their behalf at market price, rather than contract price. In spite of the fact that the Petitioners contracted 97% of the accepted, projected crop yield for 430 acres, the Petitioners, in fact, produced 117,000 CWT (approximate) on those 430 acres. Therefore, had they not diverted a certain amount of the crop to open market sales, they could have met their 116,650 CWT contractual obligations to the six contracting parties, including Rubin. It is also true, however, that that 117,000 CWT actual yield included the 30 acres of potatoes which the Petitioners were separately obligated to sell at open market price to repay the Kirkers. Notwithstanding the fact that the Petitioners had contracted 97% of the commonly-accepted, projected maximum yield, the Petitioners diverted 10,301.6 CWT of the 1991 crop on the entire 430 acres from contract sales to open market sales at much higher prices. Of those open market sales, 2,789.5 CWT were sold at market price after the last contract sales were made to Rubin. Had the Petitioners sold the entire 10,301.6 CWT of potatoes on contract, instead of at open market, all of the Petitioners' contractual requirements could have been met, including the contract with Rubin, although they would not then have been able to meet their obligations to the Kirkers. Based upon the above Findings of Fact supported by competent evidence, it is found that the preponderant evidence in this case does not support the Petitioners' contention that the Petitioners were unable to fulfill their contract obligation to Rubin due to an act of God. Although it is true that the Petitioners established that poor weather conditions, coupled with the absence of the ability to use the pesticide "Temik", had a deleterious effect on their crop production. The record shows that in spite of this, the Petitioners had the ability to fulfill their contract with Rubin if only approximately 5,000 CWT of the 10,301.6 CWT of potatoes sold on the open market had instead been allocated to the Petitioners' contract with Rubin to fill out the difference between the approximately 45,000 CWT honored under the contract and the contractual obligation to supply 50,000 CWT. The Petitioners produced on their own 400 acres 108,000 CWT. The remainder of the 117,582.5 CWT of potatoes from the total crop represented the potatoes grown on the Kirkers' 30 acres. Thus, the Kirkers' land produced approximately 8,600 CWT. The Petitioners supplied approximately 3,000 CWT under the separate, oral contract at market price and which were delivered to Rubin on April 29th, 30th, and May 1st (six loads at approximately 500 CWT per load). Then, the Petitioners sold the remainder of the total of 10,301.6 CWT of the entire Pacetti/Kirker crop or approximately 7,301.6 CWT on open market sales to others. The remainder of the 108,000 CWT grown on the Petitioners' own 400 acres, not sold to Rubin under the contract of December 22, 1990 or under the oral contract of April 25, 1991 (the six loads at market), were contracted out to other buyers. The ultimate effect of these contracts was that the Petitioners had contracted for 116,650 CWT. Thus, the Petitioners had imprudently contracted approximately 97% of the accepted, projected crop yield of 120,400 CWT, knowing that they were obligated to sell the Kirkers 8,600 or so CWT at market price and not on contract. Thus, the Petitioners clearly over- contracted the crop yield which they reasonably should have expected on the total 430 acres under the generally-accepted method of calculation of crop yield, under good growing conditions, of 280 CWT per acre, established by expert witness, Brown. This over-contracting practice, together with selling an excess amount of potatoes at market price (over and above those sold at market by the separate, oral contract with Rubin at the initial part of the harvesting season), is what actually prevented the Petitioners from fulfilling Rubin's contract of 50,000 CWT, rather than an act of God, predetermined condition for claiming impossibility of performance on that contract due to the above- described weather conditions. Even though the Petitioners were obligated to sell the Kirkers' entire 30 acres of yield, approximately 8,600 CWT, at market price, the Petitioners would still have had enough potatoes, even with their less-than-expected yield of 108,000 CWT represented by their own 400 acres, to have filled out the Rubin contract if they had not contracted out so many potatoes to other contracting buyers and had not sold as many potatoes at market price off contract as, indeed, they sold. Since the act of God condition is not what prevented the Petitioners from filling the written contract with Rubin for 50,000 CWT, it is clear that the Petitioners thus breached that contract. In this connection, it should be pointed out that the written contract with Rubin was entered into before any of the other contracts for the potato crop in question. The two contracts with Rubin are, however, separate contracts. The Petitioners established that there was a separate oral agreement entered into on April 25th between the Petitioners and Rubin and that the consideration flowing from the Petitioners to Mr. Rubin was that he needed the six loads of potatoes on short notice delivered on specific dates, April 29th, 30th, and May 1st, for which he was willing, therefore, to pay the $19.50 market price, knowing that it was for other potatoes that he contracted at $6.00. The Petitioners performed by providing the loads of potatoes when he wanted them and he paid for them in full. Thus, that contract was executed by consideration passing from each party to the other, and the contract was completed. The written contract with Rubin dated December 22, 1990 for the 50,000 CWT was the contract which the Petitioners breached for the above-found reasons. Rubin would, therefore, be entitled to damages for that breach based upon the facts proven in this case. There is no counterclaim or other action pending in this forum by Rubin against the Petitioners, however. Consequently, any damages proven by the breach of the written contract can only, at best, be applied against the amount due and owing the Petitioners for the billed, but unpaid, loads; that is, against the amount in controversy of $40,015.20. Rubin, however, has not produced any evidence to show what his damages might be. The record establishes, as found above, that, of the 48,361 CWT of potatoes delivered to Rubin, approximately 3,000 of which were delivered under the separate oral contract for six loads, Rubin only received approximately 45,000 CWT under the 50,000 CWT written contract. Thus, Rubin would appear to be entitled to damages caused by failing to get the last approximately 5,000 CWT of potatoes. The record, however, does not establish what those damages might be because it is not established whether Rubin had to purchase potatoes from another source at a higher price to meet the remainder of the 50,000 CWT amount, or, conversely, whether Rubin was able to purchase them from another source at a lower price than the $6.00 per CWT contract price, so that Rubin would actually benefit by the Petitioners' breach of that contract. Neither does the record reflect another possible scenario whereby Rubin might have simply accepted the approximate 5,000 CWT shortage and simply lost customers and potential profits represented by that amount of potatoes, or, finally, whether he simply did not purchase the shortage of 5,000 CWT from another source and had no missed sales for that amount of potatoes anyway and, therefore, no loss and no damage. The record simply does not reflect what Rubin's damages might have been because of the shortage under the written contract deliveries. In any event, the record evidence establishes that the oral contract was fully performed, with consideration flowing to each of the parties and that those potatoes were fully paid for at the market price. Then, the Petitioners delivered the written contract loads at $6.00 per CWT to Rubin represented by the claimed $40,015.00. That remains unpaid by Rubin. Rubin is obligated to pay that amount because Rubin was obligated to, and received those potatoes at the $6.00 contract price. Rubin would then appear to be entitled to claim damages if, indeed, any were suffered, for the breach of that written contract by the Petitioners' failure to supply the last (approximate) 5,000 CWT due Rubin under that contract. That resolution of their dispute, however, cannot be performed in this forum because of insufficient evidence, as delineated above, and remains to be resolved by another action by Rubin in another forum.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Respondents, Jack Rubin & Son, Inc. and Continental Casualty Co., Inc. be found jointly and severally liable for payment of $40,015.20 to the Petitioners for potatoes delivered to the Respondent, Jack Rubin & Son, Inc., for which payment has not yet been made. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of November, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of November, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-548A Petitioners' Proposed Findings of Fact 1-16. Accepted. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1. Accepted, in part, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter because the evidence establishes that 30 acres of potatoes belonged to the Kirkers even though Pacetti Farms was responsible for all operations with regard to planting and harvesting those 30 acres, furnishing costs, operational expertise, equipment and labor as an advance against the Kirkers' crop sale. 2-5. Accepted, except that it is not found that the entire 430 acres of potatoes were the Petitioners' potatoes. 30 acres of potatoes belonged to the Kirkers. Rejected, as not entirely in accordance with the preponderant weight of the evidence and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and not entirely in accordance with the preponderant weight of the evidence, to the extent that the 97% of the accepted projected crop yield contracted for by the Petitioners represents an inclusion of the 30 acres of the Kirkers' potatoes in that percentage of crop yield projection. This is erroneous because the 30 acres were the Kirkers' potatoes which the Petitioners were handling for them. Accepted in concept, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and not entirely in accordance with the preponderant evidence of record. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as not entirely in accordance with the preponderant weight of the evidence and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, Esq. General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 John Michael Traynor, Esquire Charles E. Pellicer, Esquire 28 Cordova Street St. Augustine, Florida 32084 C. Holt Smith, III, Esquire 3100 University Boulevard So. Suite 101 Jacksonville, FL 32016
Findings Of Fact The Southland Corporation is a corporation engaged in the operation of convenience food stores under the name "Seven Eleven Food Stores." Petitioner, Richard V. Ballard, was employed by Southland in March of 1984. Michael Jones, Supervisor of Southland, hired Ballard. Jones interviewed Ballard and reviewed his application prior to hiring him. At the time he interviewed Ballard, Jones noticed a gap on the application in Ballard's employment which he asked Ballard about. Ballard stated he had some operations on his arm and leg and that he had omitted a job with Huntley Jiffy Foods Stores where he had been terminated unfairly and had filed a handicap complaint against them. Jones asked him if he had left anything else out, to which Ballard replied no. Ballard had been previously employed part-time at Citgo, another convenience food store, and failed to reveal this on his application. He also failed to tell Jones about this previous employment when Jones questioned him prior to his being hired by Southland. Southland was aware that Ballard was handicapped when he was hired. In fact, Jones had a discussion with Ballard at the time he was hired about any possible limitations which would have an affect on his job performance. Ballard has cerebral palsy. Jones hired Ballard knowing that he was handicapped and knowing that he had filed a handicap complaint against Huntley Jiffy Foods. After he was employed, Ballard received two raises including a $0.20 merit increase, which was the highest increase for which he was eligible, and the increase was approved by Jones on May 25, 1984, effective May 11, 1984. Subsequent to his receiving the merit increase, Ballard was counseled for several incidents involving his job performance. On September 14, 1984, Jones became aware through a conversation with a former supervisor of Ballard's that Ballard had worked for Citgo previous to his working with Southland. Jones double-checked Ballard's application and found that he had omitted his employment with Citgo from his application and he had failed to disclose the Citgo employment to Jones during the interview. Ballard was suspended on September 14, 1984, pending a meeting with Jones on September 17, 1984. At the meeting on September 17, 1984, Ballard admitted that he had worked for Citgo and that he had omitted it from his application because he did not think he would be hired if he put it on his application because he would have been terminated from two previous jobs. Ballard had omitted two previous jobs in his application, Huntley Jiffy Foods and Citgo. The application which Ballard filled out contained the statement "I certify the facts set forth in my application for employment are true and complete. I understand that, if employed, false statements on this application shall be considered sufficient cause for dismissal." Southland has a policy prohibiting falsification of applications and providing for termination of employees for falsifying their applications. Southland had terminated employees other than Ballard for falsification of applications. While Ballard alleges that he was terminated because he had filed a discrimination complaint against Citgo, in fact, Jones had no knowledge at the time he terminated Ballard that Ballard had filed a charge against Citgo. Southland did not learn that Ballard had filed a discrimination charge against Citgo until sometime in October, 1984, after it terminated Ballard. Southland learned of the charge against Citgo from the documents Ballard filed charging retaliation in this case. Southland purchased a part of City Service (Citgo) in September, 1983, including the Kwik Mart facilities where Petitioner had worked previously. However, it did not incur liability for charges filed against City Service. The discrimination charge filed by Ballard against City Service is being defended by City Service. Southland is not involved in the that matter in any way.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits received in evidence at the hearing, I hereby make the following findings of fact: On February 27, 1984, the premises operated by Tony's Sea, Inc., were inspected by two inspectors of the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services. On that date the inspectors observed, among other things, four boxes of frozen lobster tails which had been processed and packed by Tony's Sea, Inc. The four boxes of frozen lobster tails which came to the attention of the inspectors were sealed and labeled. The label on each box stated that the net weight of the contents was ten pounds. None of the labels contained the name of a dealer or responsible firm, nor did the name of a dealer or responsible firm appear elsewhere on the boxes. The inspectors removed the ice from the frozen lobster tails in each of the four subject boxes and weighed the lobster tails without ice. The net weight of the frozen lobster tails was approximately six pounds per box. The Administrative Complaint served on the Respondent contained the following opening paragraph: You are hereby notified that the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services intends to take disciplinary sanction authorized by Section 500.121, F.S., and seeks to impose an administrative fine of $1,000 for violation of certain laws of the state applicable to food processors and certain rules of the department.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing it is recommended that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a Final Order ordering the Respondent, Tony's Sea, Inc., to pay an administrative fine in the amount of $1,000.00, such fine to be paid within 15 days of the issuance of the Final Order. DONE and ORDERED this 10th day of May, 1985, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of May, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Antonio Martinez-Malo President, Tony's Sea, Inc., 7716 N.W. 76 Avenue Medley, Florida 33166 Frank A. Graham, Jr., Esquire Resident Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Room 512, Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Honorable Doyle A. Conner Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether, under the provisions of sections 604.15 - 604.34, Florida Statutes, Lester Towell Distributors, Inc., is entitled to recover $2,098 for agricultural products ordered by and delivered to VBJ Packing, Inc
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made. Lester Towell is a dealer in Florida-grown agricultural products. VBJ is a dealer in Florida-grown agricultural products. On May 22, 1995, VBJ placed an order with Lester Towell to purchase a quantity of extra-large green bell peppers. Lester Towell delivered 200 boxes of such peppers to VBJ on May 23, 1995. To fill this order, Lester Towell purchased 63 boxes of peppers from producer Ott Farms, Inc., in Estero, Florida, and 137 boxes from producer Thomas Produce, in Boca Raton, Florida. Lester Towell did not act as agent for these producers; it purchased the products outright. On May 22, 1995, VBJ placed an order with Lester Towell to purchase a quantity of yellow corn. Lester Towell delivered 100 boxes of such corn to VBJ on May 24, 1995. To fill this order, Lester Towell purchased 100 boxes of corn from producer Wilkinson-Cooper, in Belle Glade, Florida. Lester Towell did not act as agent for this producer; it purchased the products outright. On May 24, 1995, VBJ placed an order with Lester Towell to purchase a quantity of jalapeno peppers, white corn, and red radishes. Lester Towell delivered two boxes of jalapeno peppers, 26 boxes of white corn, and 20 boxes of red radishes to VBJ on May 25, 1995. To fill this order, Lester Towell purchased 2 boxes of jalapeno peppers from producer Ott Farms, Inc., in Estero, Florida, and 26 boxes of white corn and 20 boxes of red radishes from producer American Growers in Belle Glade, Florida. Lester Towell did not act as agent for these producers; it purchased the products outright. Lester Towell filed its complaint with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services ("Department") pursuant to the provisions of section 604.21(1), Florida Statutes, because VBJ did not pay for the products identified above. There is, however, no evidence to establish that Lester Towell was a producer or the agent or representative of a producer with respect to the products for which it seeks payment. It is, therefore, not a "person" entitled to file a complaint with the Department against VBJ and its surety.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order dismissing the complaint of Lester Towell Distributors, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 3nd day of July 1996 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of July 1996
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner is owed the sum of $4,787.00 representing 14 shipments of cucumbers supplied to the Respondent for which the Petitioner has allegedly not been paid. Consequently, it must be determined whether the Petitioner is entitled to recompense from the bond posted by the Respondent, through its surety, in accordance with the provisions of Sections 604.15-604.34, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Long & Scott Farms, Inc., is a grower of cucumbers for the commercial market. The Respondent, Mo-Bo Enterprises, Inc., is a buyer and broker of such agricultural produce. During the fall 1994 harvesting and shipping season for cucumbers, a problem arose in the business relationship between the Petitioner and the Respondent, which had not previously occurred. On October 21, 1994, the Petitioner sold and shipped to the Respondent, or to its consignee, a shipment of 84 crates of dill-pickle-sized cucumbers, at a price of $15.00 per crate. Thus, the invoice billing for that shipment was $1,260.00. The payment for that shipment was delayed for a long period of time; but finally, on February 15, 1994, a partial payment of $1,071.00 was made for that shipment and invoice. The Respondent's representatives assured the Petitioner that the remainder of that bill would be paid promptly, but no payment has ever been made. Between the dates of October 21, 1994 and November 8, 1994, some 13 other shipments of cucumbers were made on the order and purchase of the Respondent, sold and shipped by the Petitioner, for which the Respondent has never paid any amount to the Petitioner. The 14 shipments resulted in a balance due to the Petitioner from the Respondent of $4,787.00. That amount includes the deficiency in payment for the shipment of October 21, 1994, for which the above-referenced partial payment was made. The Petitioner and the Respondent had a business arrangement, whereby the Respondent would notify the Petitioner of any problem with any shipment, such as deficient quality, rot, or other deterioration, shortage in amount shipped, and the like. This arrangement, whereby notification of any problem with a shipment should be provided to the Petitioner within eight hours of the shipment's arrival, was printed on each invoice form, which forms were submitted to the Respondent upon the dispatch of each shipment. The Respondent never informed the Petitioner of any problems with any of the shipments involved in this proceeding. The shipments were all duly and timely made to the Respondent and received by it or its consignees. Moreover, in their prior discussions and negotiations concerning the relevant unpaid bill, the Respondent has never denied owing that amount. It simply has not paid the amount due, although it or its representatives have offered to negotiate some sort of payment arrangement. The unrefuted evidence thus shows that the Respondent and its surety company, Armor Insurance Company, are indebted to the Petitioner in the amount of $4,787.00 and that payment for that amount has not been made.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department ordering the Respondent to pay the above-referenced sum of $4,787.00 to the Petitioner and in the event of failure of the Respondent to remit such payment, that the Respondent, Armor Insurance Company, pay over to the Department the amount herein found to be due and owing from the bond posted by that surety company for the Respondent dealer, which sum should then be remitted over to the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of October, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Frank D. Scott Post Office Box 1228 Zellwood, FL 32798 Charles D. Barnard, Esq. 200 S.E. 6th St., Ste. 205 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 Mark J. Albrechta, Esq. Armor Insurance Company Box 15250 Tampa, FL 33684-5250 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, Esq. General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810
The Issue Whether or not Petitioner (complainant) is entitled to recover $1,340.50 or any part thereof against Respondent dealer and Respondent surety company.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a grower of watermelons and qualifies as a "producer" under Section 604.15(5) F.S. Respondent Steve Helms Fruit Co., Inc. is a broker-shipper of watermelons and qualifies as a "dealer" under Section 604.15(1) F.S. Respondent Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. is listed as surety for Steve Helms Fruit Co., Inc. The amount and period of the bond have not been established. The time material to the amended complaint is June, 1994. Two or three weeks before Petitioner's melons were ready for harvest, Steve Helms personally came to Petitioner's home and requested to ship Petitioner's melons for ultimate retail sale. Petitioner requested to be paid "up front." Mr. Helms would not agree to pay all the money "up front" but agreed to pay some. He also agreed to pay within 14 days of the first shipment. Petitioner had had a bad experience two years previously, so he got Mr. Helms to promise to "clean up" his field. This expression is subject to some interpretation, and although Petitioner initially stated that the agreement was for Respondent broker-shipper to buy all his melons regardless of condition, Petitioner later modified his statement to say that Mr. Helms only promised not to take the best melons and leave the rest. Harvesting began May 15, 1994. Until June 10, 1994, Petitioner's usual contact with Respondent broker- shipper was Frank Favuzza, who oversaw all weighing and loading and assessed the Petitioner's melons on behalf of Respondent broker-shipper. On June 10, 1994, Mr. Helms was again personally in the field. Petitioner told Mr. Helms that he had to get the remainder of the melons off the field by Sunday, otherwise the heat would ruin them. Mr. Helms said he would wait until Monday. Petitioner believes that if the melons had been harvested by Sunday, June 12, 1994, three truckloads could have been harvested. On Monday, less than a full truckload was in good enough condition to be loaded onto a truck. A lot of melons were going bad and were left in the field to rot. On Tuesday, June 14, 1994, Petitioner's melons were weighed at Romeo, Florida and the poundage established at 29,330 pounds. Frank Favuzza estimated to Petitioner that his melons would only bring $.04/lb. From this conversation, related by Petitioner, it may be clearly inferred that Petitioner knew he would not be paid until after Respondent broker-shipper received payment from the ultimate retailer at the other end of the transaction. Petitioner's amended complaint alleged the amounts due as follows: "On June 1, 1994, #92111, 700 lbs. at $.07 equals $49.00, not $490.00; June 3, 1994, #92117, 900 lbs. at $.07 equals $63.00, not $630.00; and June 3, 1994, #92120, 790 lbs. at $.07 equals $55.30, not $553.00. Therefore Item (12) Complaint Total is amended to $1,340.00." The amendments did not alter the original claim for 6-14-94, invoice 92157 for 29,330 lbs. of melons at $.04 for $1,173.20. There was no claim for the melons that rotted in Petitioner's field. Weight tickets and Respondent's corresponding broker-shipper's bills of lading were admitted in evidence. These showed the following amounts were received by Respondent broker-shipper: 6/1/94 INVOICE 92111 46,020 net weight melons 6/3/94 INVOICE 92117 45,580 net weight melons 6/3/94 INVOICE 92120 44,720 net weight melons 6/14/94 INVOICE 92157 29,330 net weight melons Petitioner testified, without refutation, that he was present at each weighing and that he had agreed to take $.07 per pound on all loads except for the June 14, 1994 load for which he was claiming $.04 per pound. The bills of lading support Petitioner's testimony as to the price per pound. The bills of lading also clearly show that the price per pound was "to farm minus labor." This notation means that the net amount to be paid Petitioner by Respondent was subject to a prior deduction for labor, but it cannot reasonably be inferred to include a deduction for shipping. Petitioner's last load of 29,330 lbs. of melons weighed on June 14, 1994 was less than a full truckload, so Respondent added melons from another farm to that truck to make up a full load. Respondent broker-shipper did not pay Petitioner for 700 pounds of the June 1, 1994, invoice 92111 truckload; for 900 pounds of the first June 3, 1994 invoice 92117 truckload; for 790 pounds of the second June 3, 1994 invoice 92120 truckload; or for any (29,330 pounds) of the June 14, 1994 invoice 92157 truckload, upon grounds that those melons were not saleable at their destination. Petitioner put in evidence Exhibit P-3 which is an accounting Respondent had sent him. It shows that Respondent broker-shipper had deducted $690.30 for labor on invoice 92111 and claimed 700 pounds could not be sold; had deducted $683.70 for labor on invoice 92117 and claimed 900 pounds could not be sold; had deducted $670.80 for labor on invoice 92120 and claimed 790 pounds could not be sold; and had paid Petitioner nothing on a June 14, 1994 truckload, invoice 92159. Invoice 92157, which corresponds to Petitioner's June 14, 1994 partial truckload of 29,330 pounds of melons, is not listed or otherwise explained in the exhibit. The exhibit is conclusionary and inexplicably is dated 1993. There is no back-up evidence to support Respondent's making these deductions. No inspection certificate or labor charges are in evidence. Petitioner's initial complaint, which he put in evidence as P-1, constitutes an admission by him. In the complaint, Petitioner contended (1) that he was selling "direct" to Respondent broker-shipper; (2) that he was selling "f.o.b."; and (3) that he was selling "Fob shipping point excectance (sic) after final inspection." Petitioner also stated therein that he was given an inspection sheet showing 46,310 lbs. of watermelons had failed inspection and he did not feel the melons that failed inspection were his melons because Frank Favuzza approved of all melons loaded from Petitioner's field and the inspection sheet did not say that the bad melons were Petitioner's melons. Somewhat contrariwise, Petitioner testified at formal hearing that he had asked Respondent broker-shipper for a government inspection certificate showing that his melons were bad and never got it. From the credible evidence as a whole, it is inferred that Petitioner sold his watermelons on the June 14, 1994 truckload at $.04 per pound contingent upon the melons arriving at their ultimate destination in saleable condition per a federal inspection. It is further inferred that the prior three loads at issue also were sold contingent upon their arriving in saleable condition. The evidence as a whole also supports a finding that Petitioner's melons left the weigh station in a condition capable of being sold for the respective prices agreed upon between Petitioner and Respondent broker-shipper. Any deterioration of melons between June 10, 1994 when Petitioner requested that the broker-shipper take the last load and June 14, 1994 when the last load actually was weighed and shipped is attributable to Respondent broker-shipper, but that fact is not significant since the lesser rate of $.04/lb. was agreed upon prior to shipping and after Respondent broker-shipper had seen and approved the loaded melons. Petitioner's foregoing evidence of delivering saleable quality melons to Respondent broker-shipper is unrefuted. The presumption is thereby created that but for some failure of Respondent broker-shipper, the melons would have arrived at their ultimate destination in saleable condition. There is no evidence of record to support Respondent's deductions for "labor," or for melons which allegedly could not be sold upon delivery at the ultimate destination. Petitioner moved ore tenus to further amend his complaint to include a prayer for reimbursement for the cost of the melons which rotted in his field and became unsaleable between June 10 and June 14, 1994 due to Respondent broker-shipper's delay in loading and to assert a claim for interest on the $1,340.50 claim. This motion was denied as too late.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture enter a final order awarding Petitioner $1,340.50, and binding Respondents to pay the full amount of $1,340.50, which in Ohio Casualty Insurance Co.'s case shall be only to the extent of its bond. RECOMMENDED this 2nd day of June, 1995, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of June, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER 94-6189A The following constitute specific rulings, pursuant to S120.59(2), F.S., upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF). Petitioner's PFOF: 1-2 Accepted. Rejected as unnecessary Rejected as subordinate and mere argumentation. 5-6 Rejected as mere argumentation. Rejected as these were not the dates testified. Rejected as mere argumentation. Respondent Steve Helms Fruit Co., Inc.'s PFOF: 1 Accepted. 2-4 Rejected as not proven. Accepted as to the June 10-14, 1994 load. Rejected as not proven. Not proven in whole. Covered to the extent proven. While one inference might be that a different invoice number was assigned to the combined load, that is not the only reasonable inference based on the evidence submitted. Likewise, although Petitioner apparently got some inspection certificate, that certificate is not in evidence. There is no record evidence as to what it covered. It is not reasonable to infer or guess that it covered four loads on four trucks on three dates or that there is any way to calculate from it that the only bad melons were Petitioner's melons and not those mixed in from another farm on June 14, 1994. See FOF 19-20. 8-15 Rejected as not proven. Respondent Ohio Casualty Insurance Co.'s PFOF: None filed COPIES FURNISHED: Frank Favuzza, President Steve Helms Fruit Co., Inc. Post Office Box 1682 Auburndale, Florida 33823 Tom Morton Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. Post Office Box 94-5010 Maitland, Florida 32794-5010 L. C. Stevenson 333 NW 46th Avenue Ocala, Florida 34482 Richard Tritschler, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Hon. Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399
The Issue The issue in this case concerns whether the Petitioner should issue a cease and desist order and/or impose sanctions against the Respondent on the basis of allegations that the Respondent, by failing to have its books, accounts, and documents available for examination and by refusing to permit an inspection of its books and records in an investigation and examination, has violated Sections 520.995(1)(a), (f), and (g), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Sometime during the month of February of 1991, Ms. Jennifer Chirolis, a Financial Investigator from the Department of Banking and Finance, visited the offices of the Barat Company. She spoke with Mr. Roque Barat and determined that the Barat Company was conducting retail installment sales without being licensed to do so under Chapter 520, Florida Statutes. Mr. Chirolis advised Mr. Roque Barat that he needed a license and asked him to cease operations until he obtained the necessary license. The Barat Company thereafter obtained the necessary license and was still licensed as of the time of the formal hearing. Thereafter, the Department received a complaint about the Barat Company from a customer. The customer's complaint was to the effect that the Barat Company had made misrepresentations concerning the fee paid by the customer. The Department initiated an "investigation" of the customer's complaint and also decided to conduct an "examination" of the Barat Company. On April 22, 1992, a Department Examiner, Mr. Lee Winters, went to the office of the Barat Company to conduct the "examination" and "investigation". The Barat Company is operated out of a small office with two employees and a few filing cabinets. When Mr. Winters arrived, employees of the Barat Company were conducting business with two customers. Mr. Winters identified himself to the employees and informed them that he had been assigned to conduct an "examination" and "investigation" of the Barat Company. A Barat Company employee, Mr. Fred Vivar, said that he could not produce the company's records without express authorization from Mr. Roque Barat, that Mr. Roque Barat was out of the country, that he could not get in touch with Mr. Roque Barat at that moment, but that when he did get in touch with him, he would advise Mr. Roque Barat of Mr. Winter's desire to examine the company's books and records. Following a number of telephone calls over a period of several days, on May 1, 1992, Mr. Vivar advised Mr. Winters that he had received authorization from Mr. Roque Barat for the Department to inspect the books and records of the Barat Company. An appointment was made for the Department to inspect the books and records on May 6, 1992, beginning at 10:00 a.m. On May 5, 1992, a letter from an attorney representing the Barat Company was hand delivered to Mr. Winters. The letter included the following paragraph: It is my understanding that you have requested the opportunity to view the records of the above-referenced company, said inspection to take place on May 6, 1992. Please be advised that if this "inspection" is purportedly being done by your agency's authority, pursuant to F.S. 520.996, that no records will be produced absent compliance by your department with F.S. 520.994 including, but not limited to, the Barat Company exercising its right to challenge said subpoena. The Department concluded from the letter of May 5, 1992, that the Barat Company not only refused to produce records without a subpoena, but that, even if served with a subpoena, the Barat Company would resist compliance with the subpoena unless and until ordered to comply by a court. For that reason the Department did not pursue the issuance of a subpoena. Mr. Winters has been involved in over one hundred "examinations" under Chapter 520, Florida Statutes. In the course of those "examinations" there have been only two licensees that did not produce their records. Those two licensees were the Barat Company and another company known as Phase One Credit. Mr. Roque Barat is an officer and director of both Phase One Credit and the Barat Company. The license of Phase One Credit was revoked for its failure to produce its books and records. The refusal to produce the books and records of the Barat Company was occasioned by an effort on the part of Mr. Roque Barat to avoid payment of "examination" fees authorized by Section 520.996, Florida Statutes. In the summer of 1992, the Barat Company filed for bankruptcy, closed down its business operations, and is currently winding up the business.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Banking and Finance issue a Final Order in this case to the following effect: Dismissing the charge that the Barat Company has violated Section 520.995(1)(a), Florida Statutes; Concluding that the Barat Company has violated Sections 520.995(1)(f) and (g), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Administrative Complaint; Imposing a penalty consisting of: (a) an administra-tive fine in the amount of one thousand dollars, and (b) revocation of the Barat Company's license; and Ordering the Barat Company to cease and desist from any further violations of Chapter 520, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of February, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of February, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-5620 The following are my specific rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Proposed findings submitted by Petitioner: Paragraph 1: Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law, rather than a proposed finding of fact. Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 5: Accepted in substance, with the exception of the last five words. The last five words are rejected as irrelevant to the issues in this case and as, in any event, not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Paragraph 6: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 7: First sentence accepted in substance. Second sentence rejected as irrelevant to the issues in this case. Paragraph 8: First sentence accepted. Second sentence rejected as inaccurate description of letter. (The relevant text of the letter is included in the findings of fact.) Last sentence rejected as subordinate and unnecessary evidentiary details. Paragraph 9: Rejected as irrelevant to the issues in this case. Paragraph 10: First two sentences rejected as irrelevant to the issues in this case. Last two sentences accepted in substance. Paragraph 11: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 12: First sentence accepted in substance. Second sentence rejected as irrelevant to the issues in this case. Paragraph 13: Accepted. Proposed findings submitted by Respondent: As noted in the Preliminary Statement portion of this Recommended Order, the Respondent's proposed recommended order was filed late. The Respondent's proposed recommended order also fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 60Q-2.031, Florida Administrative Code, in that it fails to contain citations to the portions of the record that support its proposed findings of fact. A party's statutory right to a specific ruling on each proposed finding submitted by the party is limited to those circumstances when the proposed findings are submitted within the established deadlines and in conformity with applicable rules. See Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, and Forrester v. Career Service Commission, 361 So.2d 220 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), in which the court held, inter alia, that a party is not entitled to more than a reasonable period of time within which to submit its proposals. Because the Respondent submitted its proposals late and because those proposals fail to comply with the requirements of Rule 60Q-2.031, Florida Administrative Code, the Respondent is not statutorily entitled to a specific ruling on each of its proposed findings and no such specific findings have been made. (As noted in the Preliminary Statement, the Respondent's proposed recommended order has been read and considered.) COPIES FURNISHED: Ron Brenner, Esquire Office of the Comptroller 401 Northwest 2nd Avenue Suite 708-N Miami, Florida 33128 Louis J. Terminello, Esquire 950 South Miami Avenue Miami, Florida 33130 Michael H. Tarkoff, Esquire 2601 South Bayshore Drive Suite 1400 Coconut Grove, Florida 33133 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Copies furnished continued: William G. Reeves, General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
