Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of an Order Closing File by William F. Quattlebaum, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to Petitioner’s Notice of Voluntary Dismissal With Prejudice, a copy of which is attached and incorporated by reference in this order. The Department hereby adopts the Order Closing File as its Final Order in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that this case is CLOSED. Filed October 1, 2010 4:40 PM Division of Administrative Hearings. DONE AND ORDERED this / & day of October, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Y , CARL A. FORD, Director Division of Motor Vehicles Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Motor Vehicles this_/st day of October, 2010. loos y Nalini Vinayak, Dealer ‘Administrator NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. CAF/vlg Copies furnished: Dean Bunch, Esquire Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough LLP 3600 Maclay Boulevard South, Suite 202 Tallahassee, Florida 32312 Jason T. Allen, Esquire Bass, Sox & Mercer 2822 Remington Green Circle Tallahassee, Florida 32308 William F. Quattlebaum Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Administrator
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is male and Cuban. He is a member of a protected group and a qualified individual. Petitioner was employed by the Fleet Manager for Orange County, Florida in February, 1981, as a Mechanic I. He was later reclassified as a Mechanic II as part of an internal reorganization. Petitioner's duties require him to drive County vehicles to various locations to repair other County vehicles. The parties stipulated that Petitioner is a good mechanic and has always performed mechanical repairs competently. Orange County is a subdivision of the state. It employs a substantial number of people. The Fleet Manager maintains Orange County vehicles, operates and maintains the County's refueling system, and operates and manages emergency rescue vehicles and emergency generators for the County. The Fleet Manager is responsible for all personnel matters for County employees assigned to the fleet system. Mr. James Brock is the Fleet Manager who took the employment actions on behalf of Orange County that are the subject of this proceeding. Orange County employed Mr. Brock as a traffic engineer in 1987 and promoted him to Assistant Fleet Manager and Fleet Manager, respectively, in 1989 and 1992. Orange County and the Fleet Manager are referred to hereinafter as "Respondent." Respondent maintains a progressive discipline policy. Discipline progresses from counseling or verbal reprimand, to written reprimand, suspension, and then termination. The purpose of the progressive discipline policy is to make individual employees productive workers by modifying their behavior from inappropriate to appropriate behavior. The purpose of the progressive discipline policy is not to punish employees. Respondent prohibits discrimination, including that based on national origin. Respondent prohibits the implementation of its progressive discipline policy in a manner that discriminates against employees. Petitioner has a long history of discipline that began in his first year of employment. In November, 1981, Petitioner wrecked at least three vehicles. He received a written reprimand. In 1982, Petitioner ran over a battery charger. In 1985, after repeated warnings and notices, Petitioner was suspended for approximately three days for refusing to follow County policies. In 1991, Petitioner wrecked a County vehicle in an automobile accident with another vehicle driven by a member of the public. The truck driven by Petitioner was totally destroyed. The employment actions at issue in this proceeding began in April 1993. Respondent received information that Petitioner kept his County vehicle at his house on work days and used it for personal purposes, including hauling bricks to build a fence. Respondent convened a meeting with Petitioner, Petitioner's foreman, and an interpreter. Respondent and the foreman advised Petitioner that it was a violation of County policy to take a County vehicle home, to take the vehicle outside of the County where Petitioner resides, and to falsify work records. In September 1993, Respondent issued a written reprimand to Petitioner for threatening a co worker with Petitioner's vehicle. Respondent concluded that Petitioner drove his vehicle toward a co worker at a rapid speed and stopped just before impact. In October 1993, Respondent received repeated telephone calls from a third party that Petitioner was home during work days with his County vehicle. Respondent verified the reports with its own investigation and charged Petitioner with insubordination, taking a County vehicle home, and falsifying work records. Respondent conducted a predetermination hearing in accordance with due process requirements. Respondent notified Petitioner of his right to have a representative, attorney, or union steward present and to appeal any adverse determination. Petitioner attended the predetermination hearing. Both Petitioner and Respondent presented evidence including the testimony of witnesses under oath. The hearing was recorded. Respondent suspended Petitioner for four days without pay. In February 1994, Petitioner wrecked another County vehicle. He backed over a County lawn mower while backing his own vehicle out of the heavy equipment shop. Respondent counseled Petitioner after the incident. Petitioner does not have a good driving record. He has numerous speeding tickets. In August 1994, Respondent required Petitioner to attend a cultural awareness course. The course teaches cooperation among individuals from diverse cultural or ethnic backgrounds. Respondent requires all employees to attend the course. Petitioner argued with the instructors and refused to stay in the course. In September 1994, Respondent issued a letter of direction requiring Petitioner to attend the course. In September 1994, Petitioner took his County vehicle home again. Respondent counseled Petitioner for the violation and conducted an investigation that was still pending in October 1994. On October 14, 1994, Petitioner responded to a request for emergency repair of another County vehicle. Respondent drove his County vehicle recklessly and made an obscene gesture to another motorist. Petitioner followed the motorist up an access ramp on the East West Expressway at a speed of 35 40 mph, made an obscene gesture, and passed the motorist improperly. Petitioner followed the motorist at a distance of less than one foot. Petitioner then turned on the yellow warning lights on his County vehicle. When the motorist did not pull over and allow Petitioner to pass, Petitioner made an obscene gesture and passed the motorist while on the access ramp. The motorist pulled up beside Petitioner and wrote down the number of the vehicle. The motorist reported the incident to Respondent on the same day. Respondent investigated the incident and conducted a predetermination hearing on November 2, 1994. Petitioner participated in the predetermination hearing. Respondent terminated Petitioner on November 11, 1994. While Petitioner was employed by Respondent, Petitioner applied for promotion to Mechanic III approximately three times. Respondent never promoted Petitioner. Promotions are determined by a board composed of four mechanics who sit for a prescribed period and then are replaced by other mechanics. The mechanics are appointed to the board by management. The board is racially diverse. It typically includes Hispanics. The board conducts a separate interview of each candidate for promotion. The board members ask each candidate identical questions and score the responses from each candidate. The board then recommends the candidate with the highest score. The board never recommended Petitioner for promotion. Respondent has never deviated from the recommendation of the board. The candidates recommended by the board are racially diverse. They include Hispanics. Respondent has never taken any employment action against Petitioner on the basis of Petitioner's national origin. Respondent has never taken any employment action against Petitioner for a discriminatory reason.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a Final Order finding Respondent not guilty of discriminating against Petitioner on the basis of his national origin. RECOMMENDED this 9th day of June, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of June, 1997 COPIES FURNISHED: Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission On Human Relations Building F. Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399 0700 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission On Human Relations Building F. Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399 0700 Peter T. Hickey, Esquire Post Office Box 1323 Orlando, Florida 32802 Jeffrey J. Newton, Esquire Orange County Attorney's Office Orange County Administration Center Post Office Box 1393 Orlando, Florida 32802 1393
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Petitioner should be licensed as an independent motor vehicle dealer in Florida.
Findings Of Fact By stipulation of fact, the parties agreed: Petitioner applied for a motor vehicle dealer's license for a dealership to be operated at 2401 Central Avenue in St. Petersburg, Florida. The application was denied by the Department because it appears the applicant has no experience in the motor vehicle business and, in fact, applied for the license to allow an individual by the name of Lloyd Blocker to operate and have continued involvement in the motor vehicle business. Petitioner was aware at the time of his application that Mr. Blocker had been denied a motor vehicle license in Florida in February 1994 and had been convicted of a felony in Alaska involving the unlawful rolling back of odometers in motor vehicles. In addition, Mr. Rinier was aware that the Department of Motor Vehicles would not allow Mr. Blocker to hold a license to deal in motor vehicles in Florida. Mr. Rinier and Mr. Blocker have an ongoing business dealing with the sale of motor vehicles. Mr. Rinier knows and knew at all times pertinent hereto that Mr. Blocker could not operate such a business on his own. The Department of Motor Vehicles contends that Mr. Blocker cannot operate or be involved in any facet of the motor vehicle business in any capacity. If Mr. Rinier were to provide written assurances that Mr. Blocker would not be involved in any way with a business operated under a license if issued, it would issue a license, assuming Mr. Rinier were otherwise qualified for licensure. Mr. Rinier is unwilling to provide that assurance in writing. However, Petitioner contends his sole desire is to make money from the operation of a dealership. If the license were issued, ownership of the business would be and remain in the Petitioner's name. He had already paid lease costs and all other costs relating to the business, and he will not operate it without Mr. Blocker's participation in some form. The present relationship with Mr. Blocker involves sale of the buildings where the dealership would operate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles enter a Final Order denying a motor vehicle dealer license to Petitioner, Harvey G. Rinier. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of September, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: John L. Waller, Esquire John L. Waller, P.A. 467 Second Avenue, North _ ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September, 1997. St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Gabrielle L. A. Taylor, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A-432 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0504 Charles J. Brantley, Director Division of Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Room B-439 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Enoch Jon Whitney General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500
Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of an Order Closing File by E. Gary Early, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to the Petitioners’ Notice of Settlement, a copy of which is attached and incorporated by reference in this order. The Department hereby adopts the Order Closing File as its Final Order in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED. Filed October 10, 2011 3:07 PM Division of Administrative Hearings DONE AND ORDERED this 7 day of October, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Sandra C. Lambert, Director Division of Motorist Services Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A435, MS 80 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Motorist Services this__7_ day of October, 2011. Nalini Vinayak, Dealer oe Administrator NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within 30 days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. SCL:vlg Copies furnished: Mark L. Ornstein, Esquire Killgore, Pearlman, Stamp, Omstein & Squires, P.A. Post Office Box 1913 Orlando, Florida 32801 Gerie L. Clayton Suckerpunch Sally’s LLC 14982 North 83" Place, Suite 100 Scottsdale, Arizona 85014 E. Gary Early Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Administrator
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner lacks good moral character in violation of Section 539.001(4)(a)1., Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996). 1/
Findings Of Fact Petitioner and her husband own and operate Seminole Antiques and Pawn ("Seminole Antiques") at 6115 Seminole Boulevard in Seminole, Florida. The business of Seminole Antiques includes pawnbroking. Petitioner first engaged in the business of pawnbroking in 1990. On November 28, 1995, officers from the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office (the "Sheriff's Office") arrested Petitioner on charges of dealing in stolen property and failing to maintain adequate records. On March 4, 1995, Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to both charges. The court accepted Petitioner's plea, withheld adjudication of guilt, assessed costs of $144, and placed Petitioner on probation for two years. On March 14, 1997, the court entered an order terminating Petitioner's probation. Registration And License Prior to October 1, 1996, pawnbrokers had been required by former Chapter 538, Part I, Florida Statutes (1995). 2/ to register with the Department of Revenue ("DOR") as secondhand dealers. From 1990 through 1996, Petitioner was continuously registered with DOR as a secondhand dealer. In relevant part, former Section 538.09(4) provided: . . . registration may be denied . . . or any registration granted may be revoked, restricted, or suspended . . . if the applicant or registrant: (f) Has, within the preceding 5-year period, been convicted of, or has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to, a crime . . . which relates to registration as a secondhand dealer or which involves . . . dealing in stolen property. . . . The registration provisions in former Section 538.09 did not include a requirement that a pawnbroker be of good moral character. Effective October 1, 1996, Section 539.001 transferred responsibility for licensing and regulating pawnbrokers from DOR to Respondent and prescribed license eligibility requirements. 3/ The license eligibility requirements in Section 539.001 include a requirement that an applicant be of good moral character. On October 1, 1996, the eligibility requirements in Section 539.001 did not prohibit a plea of nolo contendere to a criminal charge of dealing in stolen property within a five year period. However, Sections 539.001(4)(a)3. and 4. did prohibit a conviction in the last 10 years of any felony or any other crime that directly relates to the duties and responsibilities of a pawnbroker ( a "related crime"). In 1997, the legislature amended Sections 539.001(4)(a) and 4. to prohibit a plea of nolo contendere to a felony or related crime. The amendments took effect on June 3, 1997, approximately 36 days after the hearing in this case. As amended, Section 539.001 provides inter alia: (4) ELIGIBILITY FOR LICENSE-- (a) To be eligible for a pawnbroker's license, an applicant must: 1. Be of good moral character; Not have been convicted of, entered a plea of . . . nolo contendere to, or had an adjudication withheld for a felony within the last 10 years . . . . Not have been convicted of, entered a plea of nolo contendere to, or had adjudication withheld for a crime that involves dealing in stolen property . . . within the last 10 years. * * * (6) SUSPENSION, REVOCATION, AND SURRENDER OF LICENSE . . . (a) The agency may, after notice and a hearing, suspend or revoke any license upon a finding that: The licensee . . . has violated this section . . . . A condition exists that, had it existed when the original license was issued, would have justified the agency's refusal to issue a license. . . . (emphasis supplied) The underlined provisions became effective June 3, 1997. Pawnbrokers already in business had six months from the date Section 539.001 became effective to comply with the "registration . . . provisions" of Section 539.001. 4/ Section 539.001(21) provides, in relevant part: (21) TRANSITION PERIOD FOR LICENSING--Each pawnbroker operating a pawnshop in business of the effective date of this section shall have 6 months from the effective date of this section to comply with the registration . . . provisions before the agency may initiate any administrative . . . action. (emphasis supplied) Section 539.001 became effective on October 1, 1996. Petitioner, had until April 1, 1997, to comply with the registration provisions in Section 539.001. Prior to April 1, 1997, Respondent was statutorily prohibited from initiating any administrative action against Petitioner. On October 8, 1996, Petitioner applied for a pawnbroker license. On December 4, 1996, Respondent initiated administrative action by denying the application. Notice In the letter of denial dated December 4, 1996, Respondent stated several grounds for denying Petitioner's application. In relevant part, the letter stated: Section 539.001(4) . . . provides that to be eligible for a pawnbroker's license, an applicant must be of good moral character and must not have been convicted of a felony within the last 10 years . . . that directly relates to the duties and responsibilities of a pawnbroker. Our background investigation has revealed that you were found guilty of or pleaded nolo contendere to dealing in stolen property and failure to maintain records, case number CRC9519648CFANOB in 1996 (sic). Based upon these findings, your application for a pawnbroker license is hereby denied for failure to meet the eligibility requirements of s. 539.001(4) . . . . (emphasis supplied) Consistent with Section 539.001(4), Respondent's letter of denial listed as separate and distinct requirements the requirement for good moral character and the requirement of no felony conviction within the last 10 years. However, Respondent's letter of denial deviated from the statute that was in effect at the time, by expanding the definition of a conviction to include a plea of nolo contendere. Petitioner timely requested an informal hearing with Respondent. Respondent conducted the informal hearing by telephone conference. During the telephone conference, Petitioner testified that she was not guilty of dealing in stolen property. She testified that law enforcement officers, posing as consumers, had tried, unsuccessfully, to get her husband to purchase a watch. The transaction was not completed, and Petitioner was not present at the time. Nevertheless, Petitioner was charged with dealing in stolen property and failure to maintain records. Petitioner further testified that she chose to enter a plea of nolo contendere in order to quickly resolve the issue. Respondent disregarded Petitioner's testimony. On January 13, 1997, Respondent issued a letter overruling Petitioner's objections and denying Petitioner's application. Respondent based its administrative action on the ground that Petitioner was not of good moral character. Respondent did not make an independent determination that Petitioner was guilty of dealing in stolen property. Respondent determined that Petitioner lacked good moral character solely on the basis of the criminal charge and plea of nolo contendere. In relevant part, Respondent's letter of January 13, 1997, stated: The facts set forth in the . . . denial letter dated December 4, 1996, are undisputed. As part of the . . . review of your application, a criminal background check . . . by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement . . . revealed that you pled nolo contendere to dealing in stolen property and failure to maintain records. Adjudication was withheld. During the proceeding, you stated that law enforcement officers, posing as consumers, had tried, unsuccessfully, to get your husband to purchase a watch. Although according to your testimony the transaction was not completed and your were not present at the time, you were charged. Subsequently, you chose to enter a plea in order to quickly resolve the issue. . . . Pursuant to Section 539.001(4) to be eligible for a pawnbroker license the applicant must be of good moral character. Based upon your criminal arrest and plea discussed herein, you fail to meet the eligibility requirements set forth in the Florida Pawnbroking Act. Therefore, your objections to the denial of your application for a license are hereby overruled. (emphasis supplied) Petitioner retained counsel. On February 5, 1997, Petitioner's counsel sent a letter to Respondent requesting a formal hearing. In relevant part, the letter stated: . . . my client . . . received a letter indicating that she had been turned down for her license because of a criminal matter where she had been charged with dealing in stolen property and received a withhold of adjudication and probation. It is my understanding that her probation is now complete. . . . Mrs. Garafolo received a letter from Geoffrey G. Luckemann informing her that she was not eligible for a pawn broker's license because she was not of good moral character. . . . I . . . believe that the ends of justice would be honestly met by allowing . . . a Formal Hearing. . . . (emphasis supplied) On February 24, 1997, Respondent referred the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for assignment of an Administrative Law Judge to conduct the administrative hearing. From February 24 through April 28, 1997, Petitioner's counsel did not file a request for discovery. On April 11, 1997, Respondent voluntarily served Petitioner's counsel with a copy of its administrative file. The administrative file contained numerous exhibits, including the exhibits Respondent submitted for admission in evidence at the administrative hearing. On April 15, 1997, the parties entered into a Prehearing Stipulation that included a list of Respondent's witnesses. The only witnesses listed by Respondent were the two undercover investigators Respondent called at the hearing. The Prehearing Stipulation stated that the issue for determination at the administrative hearing was whether Petitioner lacked good moral character. The parties did not stipulate that Respondent was limited to evidence of Petitioner's ". . . criminal arrest and plea . . .". In relevant part, the Prehearing Stipulation stated: . . . the application for a pawnbroker license was denied by respondent on the basis petitioner did not have good moral character. * * * The issue of fact to be determined is the good moral character or lack thereof by Nella Garafolo. At the administrative hearing, Respondent stated, for the first time, that it intended to prove Petitioner's lack of good moral character by evidence other than evidence of her ". . . criminal arrest and plea . . .". Respondent sought to prove that Petitioner actually dealt in stolen property and failed to keep adequate records. Petitioner's counsel objected to the admissibility of any evidence other than the ". . . criminal arrest and plea . . ." and moved to suppress any other evidence. Petitioner's counsel stated numerous grounds for the objection and motion, including due process requirements for adequate notice. The objections by Petitioner's counsel were overruled, and the motion was denied. Petitioner's counsel had adequate notice of the nature and scope of evidence Respondent intended to present at the administrative hearing. Even if Respondent had been required to file an administrative complaint in this case, due process would not require the complaint to satisfy the technical niceties of a legal pleading. 5/ Due process requires a specific accusation in the charging document or a procedure for disclosure, but not both. 6/ Respondent's letters of denial specifically charged that Petitioner lacked good moral character. Petitioner's counsel had adequate time from January 13, 1997, through April 28, 1997, to seek disclosure of the nature and scope of the evidence Respondent intended to adduce at the hearing. Petitioner's counsel declined to avail himself of the benefit of any procedure for disclosure. Petitioner's counsel had notice that Respondent intended to call the undercover investigating officers as witnesses in the administrative hearing. Neither Petitioner's arrest nor her plea were disputed issues of fact. The testimony of the undercover investigators was unnecessary to prove the criminal arrest and plea. It was reasonable to conclude that the undercover investigators were going to testify to facts other than Petitioner's ". . . criminal arrest and plea . . .". The notice to Petitioner's counsel was timely. On April 11, 1997, Respondent served Petitioner's counsel with a Notice of Filing Discovery. The notice listed the two undercover investigators as Respondent's only witnesses. On April 15, 1997, Petitioner's counsel signed the Prehearing Stipulation with a list of Respondent's witnesses attached as Exhibit 1. The Prehearing Stipulation identified the undercover investigators as Respondent's only witnesses. Petitioner's counsel had approximately 17 days from April 11, 1997, until the hearing on April 28, 1997, to inquire into the scope of the witnesses' testimony and to either prepare his case accordingly or to request a continuance to allow him time to do so. Petitioner's counsel chose not to avail himself of that opportunity prior to the hearing. There was no material error in procedure that impaired the correctness of Respondent's action. Respondent followed prescribed procedure. 7/ Good Moral Character In support of the allegation that Petitioner lacked good moral character, Respondent submitted evidence of an investigation and arrest that took place in November, 1995. On November 7, 1995, two undercover investigators for the Sheriff's Office began an investigation of Seminole Antiques. They were supported by four more officers at remote locations who monitored the conversations of the two undercover investigators. One or both of the undercover investigators visited Seminole Antiques on November 7, 14, 17, 20, 22, and 28. The investigation concluded on November 28, 1995, when Sheriff's deputies arrested Petitioner and her husband. The evidence submitted by Respondent consisted of the testimony of two undercover investigators, their arrest reports, tapes of visits they made to Seminole Antiques on November 14 and 17, 1995, transcripts of those two tapes, and transcripts of the tapes of the other visits. The evidence also included other miscellaneous documents. The tapes and transcripts purport to evidence conversations between the investigators, Petitioner's husband, and Petitioner. The two tapes submitted by Respondent are copies of the original tapes made by Sheriff's office personnel who monitored the conversations of the undercover investigators from outside Seminole Antiques. The original tapes were destroyed by the Sheriff's Office in accordance with department policy for cases in which a nolo contendere plea is entered. One of the undercover investigators made copies of the original tapes for November 14 and 17, 1997. Both copies are in evidence in this proceeding, without objection. Transcripts exist for the original tapes for each of the six visits that the undercover investigators made to Seminole Antiques. None of the transcripts are verbatim transcriptions. Each transcript is a summary prepared by one or the other of the two undercover investigators. Each summary contains only that portion of the recorded conversations which, in the opinion of the author of the transcript, are inculpatory. 8/ Respondent did not provide Petitioner with the notice of intent to use summaries that is required in Section 90.956. Similarly, Respondent did not make available to Petitioner the data from which the summaries were prepared because the data had been destroyed by the Sheriff's Office. The undercover investigators did not conduct business transactions every time they visited Seminole Antiques. On each occasion that the undercover investigators did conduct business, they used stolen property that the Sheriff's Office had recovered, inventoried in its log books, and stored. For the initial transaction conducted on November 7, 1995, the undercover investigators used two rings. One ring was a 14 karat gold ring with an onyx stone. The investigators placed a wholesale value of approximately $30 on the ring. The other ring was a gold ring with four diamond chips. The investigators placed a wholesale value of $35 on the second ring. On November 7, 1995, the undercover investigators pawned the two rings to Petitioner for $30. 9/ Petitioner completed the required paperwork evidencing the transaction. One of the undercover investigators returned to Seminole Antiques on November 14, 1995. He carried a bag containing two gold rings, two gold bracelets, and a gold necklace. One ring was a 10 karat gold ring with one sapphire stone flanked by two small diamond chips. The undercover investigator estimated its retail value at $40. The other ring was a 14 karat gold ring. The undercover investigator estimated its retail value at $39. One bracelet was a seven inch, 14 karat, bracelet. The undercover investigator estimated its retail value at $27. The other bracelet was also a seven inch, 14 karat, bracelet. The investigator estimated its retail value at $54. The necklace was an 18 inch, 14 karat, necklace. The undercover investigator estimated its retail value at $108. When the undercover investigator presented the bag of items to Petitioner, she and her husband were standing behind the counter at Seminole Antiques. Petitioner opened the bag and appraised the items inside while the undercover investigator conducted simultaneous conversations with Petitioner and her husband. Petitioner did not agree with the value placed on the goods by the undercover investigator. Petitioner gave the undercover investigator $30 for all of the items. She completed the required forms. The investigator terminated the transaction and returned to the Sheriff's Office. The same undercover investigator returned to Seminole Antiques on November 17, 1995. He did not conduct a transaction. He described to Petitioner and her husband a fictitious transaction on the previous day in which the investigator said he sold a gold Rolex watch to a competing pawn shop for $600. Petitioner was upset and told the investigator she would have given him more money. The investigator stated that Seminole Antiques was closed and that he needed the money. On November 20, 1995, both investigators returned to Seminole Antiques with unopened video cassettes. The investigators placed an aggregate value on the cassettes of $340. The investigators conducted a transaction with Petitioner's husband and agreed to take $60 for the cassettes. Petitioner paid the investigators $60 and completed the required forms. The investigators returned to the Sheriff's Office. On November 22, 1995, the two undercover investigators returned to Seminole Antiques with a video cassette recorder and remote control. They valued the two items at $149. The investigators conducted a transaction with Petitioner's husband and agreed to $55 for both items. Petitioner paid the investigators $55 and added the VCR to the pawn ticket for the previous transaction. On November 28, 1995, the two undercover investigators returned to Seminole Antiques with two Rolex watches. One watch was a stainless and gold watch. The other was an 18 karat gold watch with a 14 karat gold band. The undercover investigators valued each watch, respectively, at $2,995 and $6,995. The investigators first offered to sell the watches to Petitioner for $300 each. The investigators conducted the balance of the transaction with Petitioner's husband. The investigators agreed to accept $600 for the watches. Law enforcement officers from the Sheriff's Office arrested Petitioner and her husband. They took Petitioner and her husband to the Sheriff's Office and questioned them. Petitioner stated that she did not know any of the items had been stolen. She said that she was going to do the paper work on the watches and then resell them in the store. Petitioner did not have actual knowledge that the items she purchased were stolen. The investigators never represented to Petitioner that the items were stolen. As one of the investigators explained during his testimony: . . . at some time . . . it has to be represented as stolen. And that's hard to do sometimes because a lot of stores and pawn shops are fully aware of the law, and once you say something is stolen, they'll throw you right on out. * * * I did not say stolen. Transcript ("TR") at 40, 68. Respondent failed to show that Petitioner should have known that the items were stolen. Much of the evidence submitted by Respondent consisted of opinion testimony by the undercover investigators and hearsay statements by Petitioner's husband. The investigators opined that Petitioner paid them amounts far below the fair market value of the property. When asked how he determined the fair market value for each item, one investigator testified: . . . we've been taught by jewelers how to appraise and pawn brokers, and we give, at the Sheriff's Office, an incredibly low retail value. Wholesale and retail very low so that this way there's never no error. TR at 41. The investigators are not qualified experts in appraising property as diverse as jewelry, video equipment, VCRs, and watches. Respondent offered evidence that the investigators were dressed to portray someone who, in the opinion of the investigators, Petitioner should have known was of bad character. When questioned on this issue, one investigator testified: I had a goatee. I would wear a hat that I've got that's a very scrubby hat. I've got several of them that are scrubby. Holes in my pants. . . . I cut my grass. I don't shower. I get real sweaty. You can see the sweat stain on my shirt, and I walk in looking crummy. Pretty crummy. . . [t]o portray someone of bad character. TR at 42. Respondent offered evidence that the investigators conducted themselves in a manner which, in the opinion of the investigators, Petitioner should have known was typical of bad guys. When questioned on this issue, one investigator testified: I pulled the second [ring out of my pocket], which is typical of bad guys because they want to see how much money they can get for an item. TR at 47. The transactions conducted with Petitioner on November 7 and 14, 1997, do not show that Petitioner should have known she was dealing in stolen property. The investigators did not conduct a transaction on November 17. The transactions of November 20, 22, and 28, 1997, were conducted primarily with Petitioner's husband. Respondent relied on hearsay statements allegedly made by Petitioner's husband in the same room with Petitioner. Those statements are not competent and substantial evidence that Petitioner should have known she was dealing in stolen property. Petitioner maintained adequate records. The investigator who was at Seminole Antiques on each occasion originally testified that Petitioner did not complete the required records. He later testified that Petitioner completed the required paperwork after every transaction but did not give the investigator a copy of the paperwork.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order granting Petitioner's application for a pawnbroker license. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of August, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of August, 1997.
Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of an Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction by William F. Quattlebaum, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to Petitioner’s Letter of Dismissal, a copy of which is attached, and incorporated by reference, in this order. The Department hereby adopts the Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction as its Final Order in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that Respondent, Larkin Motorworks, LLC d/b/a St. Pete Scooter, be granted a license to sell motorcycles manufactured by Guangdong Qingxin Liantong Industry Co. Ltd. (QNGX) at 3029 Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Street North, St. Petersburg Filed November 28, 2012 4:25 PM Division of Administrative Hearings (Pinellas County), Florida 33704, upon compliance with all applicable requirements of Section 320.27, Florida Statutes, and all applicable Department rules. DONE AND ORDERED this Aq day of November, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Bur€éau of Issuance Oversight Division of Motorist Services Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A338 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Motorist Services this a! I day of November, 2012. NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. JBijc Copies furnished: Ronald Larkin Larkin Motorworks, LLC 3029 Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Street North St. Petersburg, Florida 33704 Brett Moorer Parallel Intelligent Transportation, Inc. 6950 Central Highway Pennsauken, New Jersey 08109 Peter M. Spoto Worldwide Scooters, Inc. 457 Highland Avenue Dunedin, Florida 34698 William F. Quattlebaum Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Administrator
The Issue Whether Respondent's certification as a correctional officer may be revoked or otherwise disciplined pursuant to Section 943.1395(5), Florida Statutes, for failure to maintain the qualifications set out in Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, requiring such officer to have good moral character. At formal hearing, Petitioner presented the oral testimony of Benny Morse Platt, D. H. Coburn, Gerald Abdul-Wasi, and Diane P. Enfinger, and had one exhibit admitted in evidence. Respondent presented the oral testimony of his wife, Frances W. Ping, and testified in his own behalf. One Hearing Officer Exhibit (the Prehearing Stipulation) was also admitted in evidence. Thereafter, Petitioner filed the transcript and submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law within the extension of time granted by order. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are ruled upon, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, in the appendix to this Recommended Order. Respondent submitted no post-hearing proposals.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on November 4, 1974, and was issued certificate number CORR/C-0148. Respondent was first employed by the Florida Department of Corrections on November 4, 1974, as a correctional officer at the Hendry Correctional Institution. At all times material to the issues in the case, the Respondent was so employed and held the rank of lieutenant. During early August of 1984, Benny Platt was incarcerated at the Hendry Correctional Institution as an inmate. Platt was acquainted with Respondent Ping, who approached Platt during this period of time requesting a $10,000 loan to defray Respondent's wife's doctors' bills. Another inmate at the prison, Mark Krebs, was a friend of Platt. On August 10, 1984, Krebs was being held in solitary confinement as a punishment for Krebs' violation of prison rules by drinking and fighting. Platt was interested in helping Krebs to be released from solitary confinement so that Krebs would be eligible for work release. Platt approached Lieutenant Coburn, another correctional officer at Hendry, to obtain some relief for Krebs after Krebs had been in solitary confinement for 2 days. It was common practice for inmates to approach Respondent Ping or any other lieutenant for these types of requests, however, at the particular time Platt approached Lt. Coburn on August 10, 1984, Ping was either on suspension or on some variety of leave due to Ping's two previous heart attacks. Lt. Coburn had worked at Hendry Correctional Institution since 1979 and knew Respondent Ping by virtue of their common employment. Respondent had been Lt. Coburn's superior for some period of time in the past. On August 10, 1984, when Platt requested that Lt. Coburn help Krebs, Lt. Coburn said he did not know if he could help but he would look into the situation. Lt. Coburn then asked Platt what Platt could do for him in return. Platt asked Lt. Coburn if he wanted one of the lieutenants, and Lt. Coburn replied, "For what." Platt told him it was for trying to borrow money from inmates. (TR 25-26) On August 11, 1984, as part of a planned investigative technique to verify Platt's story, Lt. Coburn had Platt place a collect telephone call to the Respondent at the Respondent's home. The Respondent accepted Platt's collect telephone call, and with Platt's permission, Lt. Coburn taped their conversation. Platt told the Respondent that he could not get the Respondent $10,000, but could get $5,000 to $6,000 at low interest with no problems. The Respondent replied that this amount would do. Platt then asked about Krebs' release from solitary confinement. The Respondent stated that he did not know what he could do, but as soon as he got back to Hendry, he would see what he could do. This is basically the reply made by Lt. Coburn when Platt had approached him earlier. On August 14, 1984, Respondent returned to work at Hendry. That day, Platt, under instructions from Lt. Coburn, approached Respondent at the prison and engaged him in conversation, which Lt. Coburn again taped with Platt's permission. Platt told Respondent Ping that he had arranged to get a $5,000 loan for Ping and told Ping to meet with Platt's niece at a place in La Belle, Florida, to pick up the money. Platt used the fictitious name "Sylvia Cox" as his niece's name. On August 17, 1984, Florida Department of Corrections Inspector Diane Enfinger, posing as Platt's niece, "Sylvia Cox," telephoned Respondent at his home. By arrangement, the two met on August 20, 1984, at the Crossroads Restaurant a/k/a White's Restaurant in La Belle, Florida. Prior to Respondent's arrival at the restaurant on August 20, 1984, Lt. Coburn provided Inspector Enfinger with $1,000 in cash loaned for the purpose by the Sanibel Police Department, and Lt. Coburn and Inspector Gerald Abdul-Wasi, a Tallahassee Department of Corrections internal inspector, placed recording and receiving equipment in the restaurant's supply room in order to be able to overhear and record the transmissions of a microphone concealed on Inspector Enfinger's person. Lt. Coburn and Inspector Abdul-Wasi concealed themselves in the kitchen where they had a clear view of the table designated for the money transaction. At the appointed time and date, Inspector Enfinger, masquerading as Sylvia Cox," arrived. Eventually, she approached Respondent Ping at his table and he asked her to join him and his wife and a female dinner guest who were with him. Mrs. Ping suggested that Respondent and "Sylvia Cox" go outside to get some papers. Mr. and Mrs. Ping described Mrs. Ping's intent in making this suggestion as a ruse to see if a promissory note or other record of the transaction would be required so that the Pings would know if the transaction constituted a legitimate loan or a "set up." Respondent and Mrs. Ping had plausible, if not probable, reasons for their state of mind and belief that some plot against them by Department of Corrections personnel was afoot, and Respondent had good probable cause not to trust inmate Benny Platt's several representations to him. Respondent Ping knew Platt's relatives were not from La Belle. Platt had dressed unusually on August 14, 1984 so as to cover the concealed microphone given him by Lt. Coburn and Platt's solicitation of Ping both by telephone and in person had followed warnings received by Mr. and Mrs. Ping concerning attempts to oust Ping from employment due to his heart condition and resultant excessive absences. Although the content of these warnings is pure hearsay, the evidence of the warnings has not been accepted for the truth of the content asserted, i.e. that there was any such plot afoot. It is admissible and has been considered only to show the Respondent's and Respondent's wife's state of mind. Respondent Ping testified that he never intended to accept the loan offered by Platt but that if there were loan papers to sign, he planned to explain to "Sylvia Cox" what he had suspected about a plot before he declined the loan, since in his view, a loan agreement would make the transaction legitimate. Otherwise, he was going to cry "foul" and accuse his superiors of trying to trap him. "Sylvia Cox" and the Respondent went outside to the parking area, but since the authorities' plan was for Cox/Enfinger to remain at a specific table inside the restaurant for her safety and for surveillance purposes, she requested that they return inside. Inspector Enfinger and the Respondent then sat at the designated table. Cox/Enfinger told Respondent that she was unable to get all the money, but had $1,000 with her and would get $4,000 to him later in the week. She produced no papers, but counted out ten one-hundred dollar bills onto the center of the table. Respondent picked up the stack of bills, holding it in both hands, then dropped the money, said he had "changed his mind" and did not need any money, and attempted to leave the table. Lt. Coburn and Inspector Abdul- Wasi came out of the kitchen and arrested Respondent for the offense of unlawful compensation by a public official, Section 838.016, Florida Statutes. There are several inferences that can be drawn from Respondent's dropping of the money, but it is immaterial that Respondent maintains he dropped the bills as part of his intent to unmask a "set up" and could not see the kitchen, or that Lt. Coburn and others believed Respondent fled upon seeing Lt. Coburn and Abdul-Wasi out of the corner of his eye. What is material is that a loan, not a gift, was always contemplated by Platt, Cox/Enfinger, and Respondent. According to Platt, Respondent's original request for a $10,000 loan occurred nearly two weeks before Krebs was confined. This renders it impossible for Respondent's original loan request to have been on a quid pro quo arrangement for promised aid to Krebs. Indeed, Platt testified that, "I needed some favors done, so I told [Coburn] if I could talk to Lt. Ping I could get them done." (TR 11). Platt was clearly attempting to ingratiate himself with Lt. Coburn by his attempts to solicit Ping in order to persuade Lt. Coburn to secure Krebs' release from solitary confinement. Platt, at Lt. Coburn's urging, initiated the idea of releasing Krebs when Platt first phoned Respondent, but Respondent, no more than Lt. Coburn, ever agreed to a quid pro quo arrangement. No witness ever directly stated that the loan was conditioned on such an arrangement between Platt and Respondent. Platt vaguely termed it a "money situation," but Lt. Coburn confirmed that the money transaction between Platt and Respondent was to be a loan (TR 29,32). Respondent Ping never indicated to Cox/Enfinger what the money was for (TR 75). Further, it strains reason that since accommodations were made on a regular basis between corrections officers and inmates to get other inmates out of solitary confinement, that anyone involved in this "money situation" could have believed the real $1,000 (let alone the promised sum of $5,000) was being paid by Platt to Respondent in exchange for getting Krebs out of solitary confinement. Additionally, absent any proof that Krebs would have remained in solitary confinement for what seems an extraordinary length of time (August 9 - August 20) or that Respondent released Krebs, or that Lt. Coburn did not release Krebs, all of the "money situation" seems totally separate and apart from any services, illicit or otherwise, which Respondent may have been asked by Platt to perform. Further, Respondent's behavior, while rather extreme and based on suspicion, is adequately explained by his state of mind. His belief that he was being "set up" is not incredible under the foregoing facts as found. On August 21, 1984, Respondent was terminated from his employment at the Hendry Correctional Institution. On January 21, 1986, the Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere in absentia to the charge of acceptance of unauthorized compensation pursuant to Section 944.37, Florida Statutes, with knowledge that same is a misdemeanor of the first degree and upon the assurance of the Court that adjudication would be withheld. (P-1). Such a plea is not admissible in a civil proceeding or in an administrative penal proceeding for any recognized purpose. See Sections 90.410, 90.610, Florida Statutes; Section 610.4, Ehrhardt, Evidence (1984); Barber v. State, 413 So.2d 482 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), United States v. Georgalis, 631 F.2d 1199,1203 (5th Cir. Unit B, 1980) reh. den. 636 F.2d 315 (1981) and Holland v. Florida Real Estate Commission, 352 So.2d 914 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). However, Respondent admitted the plea and waived any objections to admission of the plea. (TR-77).
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing this cause as against Respondent. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 18th day of December, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of December, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-2143 Respondent filed no post-hearing proposals. The following constitutes specific rulings upon Petitioner's proposed findings of fact (PFOF) pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes: Covered in FOF 1. Covered in FOF 2. 3, 4, 7. Covered in FOF 3. Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the credible evidence as a whole as found in FOF 4. Covered in FOF 4. Rejected as mere recitation of testimony, as subordinate and unnecessary, as largely not credible and as not supported by the greater weight of the credible evidence in the facts as found. Except as subordinate and unnecessary, covered in FOF 6. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the credible evidence as a whole as found in FOF 5 and 7. Except as subordinate and unnecessary, covered in FOF 8. Rejected as unnecessary. 14, 15, 16. Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the credible evidence as a whole as found in FOF 9. 17-18. Rejected as unnecessary. 19, 20, 21. Covered in FOF 10-11, and 14. 22. Rejected as unnecessary. 23, 24. Covered in FOF 12. 25. Rejected as unnecessary. 26, 27. Except as subordinate and unnecessary, covered in FOF 13. 28, 29, 30. Except as subordinate and unnecessary, covered in FOF 14. Covered in FOF 16. Except as subordinate and unnecessary, covered in FOF 17. 33, 34, 35, 38 and 39. To the extent supported by the credible evidence as a whole, covered in FOF 17. 36, 37. Rejected as largely subordinate and unnecessary and otherwise as immaterial and as not supported by the greater weight of the credible evidence as found in FOF 17-18. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in FOF 20. Except as subordinate and unnecessary, covered in FOF. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Gerald T. Ping 6690 Southwest 88th Trail Okeechobee, Florida 34574 Robert R. Dempsey, Executive Director Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Rod Caswell, Director Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Respondent was certified as a law enforcement officer on April 6, 1984, and has been continuously so certified since that time. After the Tampa police arrested Doug Jernigan in August, 1986, on charges of armed robbery committed between January and July, 1986, including bank robberies, the Tampa police learned that on July 18, 1986, Jernigan rented a limousine and visited several bars with one of his companions being a police officer. When this information was passed to the Bureau of Internal Affairs, an investigation was started, and it was learned that Respondent was the police officer involved with Jernigan on the evening of July 18-19, 1986. Thereafter, the investigation centered on Respondent's knowledge of Jernigan and any criminal offenses of which Respondent may have been aware. During this investigation, Respondent cooperated fully with the investigators, including the taking of a polygraph test, and two or more taped interrogations. In addition, the investigator interrogated the chauffeur of the limousine, Jernigan, and at least one other passenger who was in the limousine on July 18, 1986. All of these witnesses denied that any drugs were used in Respondent's presence, stated that the party continued for several hours during which time the four people involved consumed a large quantity of alcohol, and that all were quite intoxicated. Respondent was only casually acquainted with Jernigan who he had seen as an employee of the Temple Terrace Bar on previous occasions. On July 18, Respondent encountered Jernigan at the Temple Terrace Bar as a patron who told Respondent that he had hired a limo for the evening and invited Respondent to join him for some drinks. Jernigan had a large roll of bills which he told Respondent he had won at the gambling table at Atlantic City. Respondent joined Jernigan, and they proceeded to another bar where a third and perhaps fourth companion was picked up. The limo then drove the new companion (McGahee) to his residence to change clothes, and while McGahee and Jernigan were let off, the driver took Respondent to Respondent's apartment to change clothes, waited for him, returned to pick up Jernigan and McGahee, and then they proceeded on the bar hopping escapade. The investigation by the Internal Affairs Division disclosed that Respondent had no knowledge of the crimes Jernigan had committed between January and July, 1986. During a second interrogation of Respondent which continued for two hours by an experienced investigator, Respondent was repeatedly told that the other occupants of the limo had acknowledged use of drugs during the night of July 18-19, and that the polygraph exam showed Respondent was not telling the whole truth about his knowledge of Jernigan's criminal activities and of the use of drugs on July 18. Respondent, after earlier denying that any drugs were used in his presence, finally acknowledged that maybe a joint (of marijuana) was passed around in the limo, but that he never took a puff. Once Respondent acknowledged during this two hour interrogation that maybe marijuana was smoked that evening, this became a fact in all further questioning of Respondent regarding his knowledge of Jernigan's criminal activities and further questioning regarding the use of cocaine on that evening. Respondent steadfastly denied any knowledge of any other activities of Jernigan or that he ever saw anyone use cocaine on July 18-19, 1986. James McGahee was one of the passengers in the limo July 18-19. Either he or Jernigan had some that evening, and when they were dropped off at McGahee's apartment for McGahee to change clothes, they ingested some cocaine. McGahee does not smoke marijuana, and to his knowledge, no marijuana was used in the limo that evening. McGahee operated a heavy duty wrecker and had seen Respondent on several occasions at the scene of an accident to which McGahee and his wrecker had been called. He had never socialized with Respondent prior to or since July 18- 19, 1986. Respondent denies that, to his knowledge, any marijuana or other drugs were used in his presence on the evening of July 18-19, 1986, and that his sworn statement taken during his two hour interrogation that a joint had been passed around in the limo was not true. He gave the statement because the interrogator had convinced him the other passengers had admitted using drugs, and he assumed they had done so. To Respondent marijuana was deemed less serious than cocaine.
The Issue Did the Department of Transportation (Department) improperly deny a refund to Petitioner of a penalty assessed pursuant to Chapter 316, Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The Department is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility of enforcing the provisions of Chapter 316, Florida Statutes. On June 7, 1999, the Department's Inspector Clemente Igracio stopped Petitioner's truck for an inspection. After inspecting Petitioner's truck, Inspector Igracio issued a Safety Report Citation numbered 0862152 wherein Petitioner was cited for the alleged violations of Sections 316.515(1) and (3) and 316.550, Florida Statutes. The total fine imposed was $1,600.00 which included a fine of $1,250.00 for the alleged violation of Section 316.515(3), Florida Statutes. However, since the maximum fine imposed for a Section 316.515(3), Florida Statutes, violation is $1,000.00, the total fine imposed was $1,350.00, which Petitioner paid. Subsequently, due to mitigating circumstances, the Department refunded Petitioner the $100.00 that it had paid for the alleged violation of Section 316.550, Florida Statutes. Petitioner does not protest the Section 316.515(1), Florida Statutes violation nor does it protest the Section 316.550, Florida Statutes violation. Petitioner stipulated that the combined length of the truck and trailer was 65 feet, 9 inches. Petitioner also stipulated that the length of the trailer was 42 feet, 10 inches. Inspector Igracio categorized the truck as a "straight- truck" because it had two axles and load-carrying capacity on the power unit. The vehicle in question is a two-axle vehicle with the cargo unit and motive power unit located on the same frame so as to form a single, rigid unit. The subject vehicle and trailer combination was 65 feet, 9 inches in overall length. The subject trailer was 42 feet, 10 inches in length. Petitioner did not have a permit to be over the legal length.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department enter a final order denying the refund sought by Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th of June, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Peter Byra West Coast Towing 124 South Berkley Road Auburndale, Florida 32823 Kelly A. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 James C. Myers, Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
