Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all relevant times, respondent, Passport Internationale, Inc. (Passport or respondent), was a seller of travel registered with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department). As such, it was required to post a performance bond with the Department conditioned on the performance of contracted services. In this case, petitioner, Drewes R. Rogge, has filed a claim against the bond in the amount of $1060.00 alleging that Passport failed to perform on certain contracted services. In July 1990, petitioner purchased a travel certificate from Raka Concepts, a telemarketeer authorized by Passport to sell travel certificates on its behalf. Raca Concepts filed for bankruptcy shortly after the transaction occurred, but a Passport representative assured petitioner that it would honor all travel promised by its agent. The certificate, which cost $399.00, entitled the holder and a companion to lodging for four nights in the Bahamas, two nights in Orlando, and two nights in Daytona Beach. Also, the certificate included transportation to and from the Bahamas by a cruise line. After paying for meals on the ship, taxes and additional charges for his children, petitioner's total cost was $634.00. In his claim, however, petitioner has requested a refund of $1,060.00, which includes the cost of upgrades to better accommodations, extra meals, a "VIP package," taxi fares, and a tip. The derivation of this amount is found in petitioner's exhibit 1 received in evidence. All transportion and lodging arrangements were booked by Passport. During the trip, petitioner experienced numerous difficulties, which are described in detail in exhibit 1. Among other problems, he says the cruise ship was overcrowded and dirty, and the original accommodations in Freeport did not meet his expectations (i. e., they were unsafe) causing him to upgrade to better accommodations at a price higher than was represented by Passport's agent. The total cost of the hotel upgrade was $164.85. Also, he was not notified that his scheduled transportation via cruise line from Freeport to Fort Lauderdale was cancelled at the last minute causing him to spend an extra night in the Bahamas. The cruise line, however, paid for his additional night's lodging. When the cruise line returned the following day it sailed to Miami rather than Fort Lauderdale. Petitioner was then taken by bus to Fort Lauderdale at no charge. Finally, before the trip began, petitioner discovered that he was booked into a hotel in Haines City rather than Orlando. After petitioner lodged a protest, Passport agreed to change his accommodations to Orlando. Mainly because of these problems, petitioner has asked for a refund of virtually all of the money spent on the package. Except for the mispresentation regarding the quality of the originally assigned accommodations in Freeport and the price of the upgraded accommodations, which cost petitioner an extra $164.85, there was no showing that Passport was guilty of misrepresentation in its handling of this transaction or otherwise failed to substantially perform the contracted services. Therefore, petitioner should be reimbursed $164.85.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the claim of petitioner against the bond of respondent be granted in part and he be paid $164.85 from the bond. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of December, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Drewes R. Rogge 5804 Chesterfield Drive Chester, Virginia 23831 Michael J. Panaggio 2441 Bellevue Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Robert G. Worley, Esquire 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard D. Tritschler, Esquire The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
Findings Of Fact Cruises Unlimited Travel/Tours, Inc. (Petitioner), is a "seller of travel", as that term is defined by Section 559.927(1)(2), Florida Statutes. 2/ Elaine Scola is Petitioner's owner. As of 1988, sellers of travel were required to register with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Division of Consumer Services (Respondent), and it was a violation of Section 559.927, Florida Statutes, for any person to conduct business as a seller of travel without registering annually with Respondent. Any such violation subjected the offending party to civil and criminal penalties. Petitioner did not register with respondent and, in or around November 1993, Respondent notified Petitioner of its (Petitioner's) obligation to register with Respondent. Around or on February 23, 1994, Petitioner, by and through Ms. Scola, made application for registration as a seller of travel and requested Respondent to waive the annual performance bond requirement. Petitioner included with the application, among other things, a registration fee and a 1993 unaudited financial statement. Around or on March 16, 1994, Respondent requested additional information: an audited financial statement or latest income tax return, and documentation showing five or more consecutive years of business ownership experience as a seller of travel in Florida (occupational license or tax returns). Around or on March 21, 1994, Petitioner provided Respondent a copy of its occupational licenses for the past seven years and a copy of its 1992 income tax return. Petitioner indicated that its 1993 tax return was not, as yet, completed. Petitioner's occupational licenses dated back to 1986. For a brief period from September 30, 1988, to March 29, 1989, Petitioner did not have an occupational license. Around or on April 7, 1994, Respondent denied Petitioner's request for a waiver of the bond requirement, contending that Petitioner had failed to satisfy the waiver requirements of Section 559.925(10)(b), Florida Statutes, on two grounds. One was that Petitioner had failed to submit an audited financial statement. The second was that Petitioner had failed to show that it had "five or more consecutive years of experience as a seller of travel in Florida, while in compliance with the law." The second reason presented by Respondent is based upon its interpretation of Section 559.927(10)(b)5, Florida Statutes, to require that the "five or more consecutive years of experience as a seller of travel" must have been lawful, i.e. that it have occurred while the person was duly registered with Respondent, with appropriate security. By waiving the requirement for an annual performance bond, Respondent contends the statute was designed to reward sellers of travel who have complied with the registration and bond requirements. Respondent has not promulgated any rule evidencing its interpretation. However, it has begun the rulemaking process. Prior to Petitioner making application for registration as a seller of travel, it had never registered with Respondent as a seller of travel or posted a performance bond.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order DENYING Cruises Unlimited Travel/Tours, Inc.'s, request for a performance bond waiver. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 31st day of October 1994. ERROL H. POWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October 1994.
Findings Of Fact In January 1984, Respondent Department of Transportation (DOT) published a Request for Proposal for travel services (RFP). After receiving proposals, Respondent reconsidered its financial statement requirement and returned all proposals. DOT then published a second RFP deleting the financial statement requirement. In its second RFP, Respondent stated: The Department intends to award the contract to the responsive and responsible proposer whose proposal is determined to be the most advantageous to the Department. A responsive proposer is one who has submitted a proposal which conforms in all material respects to this Request for Proposal . . . As the best interest of the State may require, the right is reserved to reject any and all proposals or waive any minor irregularity or technicality in proposals received. Proposers are cautioned to make no assumptions unless their proposals have been evaluated as being responsive. The RFP directed that all proposals include a resume of the travel agency, explaining the abilities that make it best qualified to perform the required services and information relating to years of experience, ownership, minority ownership, volume of business, proof of membership in Air Traffic Conference (ATC) and International Air Transport Association (IATA), number of persons employed, number of persons to be assigned to DOT business, and computer/communications facilities. The required minimum services specified in the RFP included: 1) planning fares and itineraries; 2) scheduling and arranging airline and rental car reservations; 3) issuing and delivering airline tickets; 4) processing unused tickets; 5) providing sufficient direct communications to DOT; 6) providing rental car confirmation numbers; 7) ensuring social security numbers recorded on tickets; 8) providing copies of used tickets for billing reconciliation purposes; 9) providing a monthly financial statement in a prescribed format, and 10) providing monthly summary analysis of travel trends and patterns. Each travel agency was also required to list any additional services it proposed to provide that were not included in the minimal travel service requirements and to list the additional services to be incorporated in the executed contract. In order to determine the proposal which offered the most advantageous combination of services, Respondent developed a rating scale for the assignment of points to each additional service proposed according to its value (zero points for no value, one point for limited value, two points for reasonable value, and three points for significant value). Respondent intended that the agency proposing the most advantageous combination of services would receive the highest number of points and therefore award of the contract. Proposals were submitted by eight travel agencies. The proposals were evaluated by Respondent and points were assigned on the zero to three point rating scale. Intervenor's score was highest with 24 points. Petitioner's proposal was second with 14 points. Respondent initially announced its intention to award the contract to Intervenor, but thereafter advised proposers that it intended to reject all proposals and withdraw the intended award. Respondent's intent to withdraw is based on its admitted failure to announce criteria. This failure allowed bidders to obtain points for services of questionable or non-existent value. Petitioner, for example, received one point for Telex service which was not available when the proposal was submitted and still not installed at the time of final hearing. The ratings were highly subjective as indicated by the disagreement of witnesses over the value of various services. Intervenor, for example, received several points for such questionable services as a newsletter, proposed workshops and staff visits. However, Respondent's principal rater supported his reasons for assignment of points on a rational basis. He conceded only a one point change in Petitioner's score and no change in Intervenor's score. Both Intervenor and Petitioner claim advantages for the reliability and range of services provided by their computer systems. Respondent lacked the expertise necessary to resolve these competing claims with the precision demanded by Petitioner. However, the evidence offered at hearing by Petitioner in support of its claims of system superiority was largely self serving and unsubstantiated by any studies or performance data.
Recommendation From the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order denying the petition of Universal Travel and Tours, Inc. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of August, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of August, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas M. Beason, MOYLE, JONES & FLANIGAN 118 North Gadsden Street, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mark A. Linsky, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William L. Grossenbacher, Esquire BORNE, RHODES, & JAFFRY Post Office Box 1140 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Paul N. Pappas, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent, a “seller of travel,” owes Petitioners a refund for misrepresentation of travel services offered pursuant to an agreement between the parties.
Findings Of Fact Axis is a “seller of travel” and at all times material to this matter, was located in St. Augustine, Florida. On or about October 8, 2017, Petitioners attended a presentation that was conducted by Axis. Petitioners were enthusiastic about the travel service and were impressed by the presentation. Petitioners frequently traveled to trade shows and believed the services would help reduce travel costs. They were particularly interested in vacation packages because they intended to travel to Cancun, Mexico. During the presentation, they were told of the bonus week fee of $97.00. Ms. Page asked specific questions about the costs for a vacation package for Cancun and whether there would be any hidden or additional fees. The presenter assured Petitioners there would be no hidden or additional fees. After the presentation, Petitioners jointly executed a Reservation Services Agreement (Agreement) for a non-exclusive license to access the travel network for a fee of $4,394.00. The fee was paid in two installments of $2,000.00 and one installment of $394.00. The agreement provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Customer desires to enter into this Agreement reservation services applicable to vacation packages, nightly stays, bonus weeks, fantasy getaways, activities and excursions, cruises, car rentals, golf discounts, dining discounts, hotels and luxury condominium and villa rentals (“Network Benefits”). The Customer acknowledges that the Network Benefits may be changed from time to time. * * * 8. Discount Variation All benefits and discounts conferred through this Agreement vary greatly based on the characteristics of the vacation unit or type, the time of year, space availability, and/or the rates charged by those parties listing the accommodations for rent through the Network. Customer acknowledges that he/she has been advised that while some discounts may be significant, these same accommodations may not enjoy deep discounts at other times and that deep discounts are not available for some vacation units or types at any time. Customer acknowledges that the value in this License is expected to be realized over time contingent on the frequency of the use and that the Purchase Price is not guaranteed to be recovered on a single vacation, the first year, if Customer does not take vacations, or if the vacation choices are not tailored offerings. * * * 17. Member Best Price Guarantee Customer shall receive the Best Price Guarantee if Customer finds lower prices on Equal Arrangements through a competing vendor. To access the guarantee, Customer must secure a confirmed reservation through the Network that displays the Member Price Guarantee checkmark, pay for the reservation in full and receive a valid confirmation number. The sections on the website included in the Best Price Guarantee are vacations (i.e. Accommodations, Cruises, Vacation Packages, and Worldwide Tours) and vacation add-ons (i.e. Car Rentals, Activities and Golf). Airfare not included. Eligible claims must be submitted within 24 hours from the time the original fully paid reservation is made and meet all the Terms and conditions listed in full on the Website, must be in US dollars, must be an identical comparison to what was purchased and must be publicly viewable via the internet (i.e. the general public must be able to view the rate on a website, as it does not apply to consolidator fares, fares that have been acquired through auction or bid, or any Internet fares that cannot be independently verified as to the price and exact itinerary) and available and bookable (i.e. the rate is currently available and can be reserved online). Equal Travel Arrangements shall be defined as the exact same arrival and departure dates, the exact same property, the exact same room or cabin classification, the exact same room or cabin size, the exact same cruise line, and the exact same itinerary. Reservations excluded from the Best Price Guarantee include Non- Refundable reservations, Airfare and reservations made or purchased with Reward Credits in full or in part. If the claim is found to be valid, Customer will be credited with 110% of the difference to (sic) in the form of Reward Credits. * * * 25. Entire Agreement This instrument contains the entire agreement of the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof and supersedes all prior agreements, written or oral, with respect to such subject matter. It may not be changed orally but only by an agreement in writing signed by the party against whom enforcement of any waiver, change, modification, extension or discharge is sought. * * * By signing below, the parties to hereby execute this Agreement on the Execution Date of this Agreement as identified herein. The Licensee acknowledges and agrees that this Agreement is subject to all terms and conditions set forth herein. The Licensee further acknowledges having read the entire Agreement and agreed to each of its provisions prior to signing below. * * * YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO CANCEL THIS CONTRACT AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO MIDNIGHT OF THE THIRD (3) CALENDAR DAY AFTER THE DATE OF THIS CONTRACT. UPON CANCELLATION, YOU WILL RECEIVE A FULL REFUND, WITHOUT ANY CHARGES OR PENALTY, WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS UNLES SOONER REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW. THIS RIGHT IS NONWAIVABLE. TO EXERCISE YOUR RIGHT TO CANCEL, YOU MUST SEND A WRITTEN NOTICE STATING THAT YOU DO NOT WISH TO BE BOUND BY THIS CONTRACT. THE NOTICE MAY BE SENT BY EMAIL, FACSIMILE: 713-535-9239, OR BY DEPOSIT FIRST-CLASS POSTAGE PREPAID, INTO THE UNITED STATES MAIL: 13416 SOUTHSHORE DR. CONROE, TX 77304. In November 2017, Petitioners used the network software for the first time. Petitioners searched for accommodations in Cancun, Mexico at an all-inclusive resort. The resort had a price of $129.00 instead of $97.00 and a mandatory resort fee in the amount of $135.00 to $185 per person per day. Petitioners found accommodations at three different all-inclusive resorts, which also required an additional mandatory resort fee. While rooms were available for the price offered by using the software, Petitioners were dissatisfied because the resorts required a resort fee. At an unknown time after using the software, Petitioners called Respondent but did not receive a return call. On December 14, 2017, Petitioners sent text messages to Jonicar Cruz seeking a refund because the service was not what was represented to them at the presentation. Ms. Cruz offered to assist Petitioners with the software program. Ms. Cruz also directed Petitioners to contact another staff member, as she was no longer an employee of the company at that time. Petitioners’ calls and emails to the other Axis staff member were left unanswered. On February 7, 2018, Petitioners filed a complaint with the Better Business Bureau, and on February 13, 2018, Petitioners filed a complaint with the Office of Citizen Services, Florida Attorney General’s Office, and the Better Business Bureau. In April 2018, Petitioners filed a complaint with the Department. Petitioners admitted that they did not submit a written letter of cancellation of the agreement during the three-day cancellation period. Ms. Cruz testified that she did not receive any written request to cancel the agreement during the cancellation period. Ms. Cruz also testified that while she could not affirm certain representations made by the presenter, she explained to Petitioners the process for the price match guarantee, and that a resort fee may be associated with all-inclusive resorts.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioners, John Elkins and Mary Page’s, claim against Axis and the surety bond be DENIED. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of September, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of September, 2018. COPIES FURNISHED: W. Alan Parkinson, Bureau Chief Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Rhodes Building, R-3 2005 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-6500 (eServed) John E. Elkins Mary Page Apartment 1605 7507 Beach Boulevard Jacksonville, Florida 32216-3053 (eServed) Michael Borish Axis Getaways Systems, LLC 965 North Griffin Shores Drive St. Augustine, Florida 32080-7726 Axis Getaways Systems, LLC Suite B 108 Seagrove Main Street St. Augustine, Florida 32080 Travelers Casualty Surety Company of America One Tower Square Hartford, Connecticut 06183 Bryan Greiner Axis Getaway Systems, LLC 912 Ocean Palm Way St. Augustine, Florida 32020 Tom A. Steckler, Director Division of Consumer Services Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 520 407 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Stephen Donelan, Agency Clerk Division of Administration Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 407 South Calhoun Street, Room 509 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 (eServed)
The Issue The issue in this case is whether proposed amendments to Rule 12A-1.070 are an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Petitioners and Intervenors challenge Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1) and (4)(a) and (b). Respondent published the amendments in the Florida Administrative Law Weekly on March 18, 1994 and June 10, 1994. As described in the Joint Prehearing Stipulation, the proposed rule amendments address, among other things, the taxation of payments to airport authorities from concessionaires like rental car companies and airport restaurants. The law imposes a sales tax on payments for the use or occupancy of real property, whether the agreement consists of a lease or a license to use real property. The main dispute in these cases is whether the proposed rule amendments illegally extend the sales tax to payments for intangibles like a concession, franchise, or privilege to do business.
Findings Of Fact The Proposed Rules By notice published in 20 Florida Administrative Law Weekly 1549 on March 18, 1994, Respondent proposed amendments to existing Rule 12A-1.070. (All references to Sections are to Florida Statutes. All references to Rules are to the Florida Administrative Code. All references to Proposed Rules are to the rule amendments that are the subject of this proceeding.) The notice explains that the purpose of the rule amendments is to clarify the application of specific statutory sales tax exemptions for the lease or license to use real property at airports, malls and nursing homes. The rule amendments clarify that the total payment pursuant to a lease or license of real property is subject to tax, unless specifically exempt, irrespective of how the payment, or a portion thereof, is identified. However, if such leased property includes specifically exempt property, then such exemption may be applied on a pro rata basis. 20 Florida Administrative Law Weekly 1549 (March 18, 1994). In the notice, Respondent cites as specific authority for the proposed amendments Sections 212.17(6), 212.18(2), and 213.06(1). Respondent states that the proposed amendments implement Sections 212.02(10)(h) and (i) and (13), 212.03(6), and 212.031. By notice published June 10, 1994, in 20 Florida Administrative Law Weekly 4096, Respondent proposed amendments to the amendments previously proposed. As amended by both notices, Rule 12A-1.070 provides, with deletions stricken through and additions underlined: * 12A-1.070 Leases and Licenses of Real Property; Storage of Boats and Aircraft (1)(a) Every person who rents or leases any real property or who grants a license to use, occupy, or enter upon any real property is exer- cising a taxable privilege unless such real property is: * * * <<a>>. Property used at an airport exclusively for the purpose of aircraft landing or aircraft taxiing or property used by an airline for the purpose of loading or unloading passengers or property onto or from aircraft or for fueling aircraft. See Subsection (3). <<b. Property which is used by an airline exclusively for loading or unloading passengers onto or from an aircraft is exempt. This property includes: common walkways inside a terminal building used by passengers for boarding or departing from an aircraft, ticket counters, baggage claim areas, ramp and apron areas, and departure lounges (the rooms which are used by passengers as a sitting or gathering area immed- iately before surrendering their tickets to board the aircraft). Departure lounges commonly known as VIP lounges or airport clubs which are affiliated with an airline or a club which requires a membership or charge or for which membership or usage is determined by ticket status are not included as property exempt from tax. The lease or license to use passenger loading bridges (jetways) and baggage conveyor systems comes under this exemption, provided that the jetways and baggage conveyor systems are deemed real property. In order for the jetways and baggage conveyors to be deemed real property, the owner of these items must also be the owner of the land to which they are attached, and must have had the intention that such property become a permanent accession to the realty from the moment of installation. The items shall not be considered real property if the owner, when the owner is not the airport, retains title to the items after the purchase/installation indebtedness has been paid in full. Any operator of an airport, such as an airport authority, which is the lessee of the land on which the airport has its situs is, for the purposes of this sub- subparagraph, deemed the owner of such land. Real property used by an airline for purposes of loading or unloading passengers or property onto or from an aircraft which is exempt from tax includes: office areas used to process tickets, baggage processing areas, operations areas used for the purpose of the operational control of an airline's aircraft, and air cargo areas. If any portion of the above property is used for any other purpose, it is taxed on a pro- rata basis, which shall be determined by the square footage of the portions of the areas in the airport that are used by an airline exclusively for the purpose of loading or unloading passengers or property onto or from aircraft (which areas shall be the numerator) compared to the total square footage of such areas used by the airlines (which areas shall be the denominator). Example: An airline leases a total of 3,000 square feet from an airport authority. The airline uses the space as follows: 1,000 square feet are used to process tickets and check in the passengers' luggage; 1,000 square feet are used for the passengers' departure lounge; and 1,000 square feet are used for the management office and the employees' lounge. The 1,000 square feet used to process tickets and check in the luggage is exempt; the 1,000 square feet used as a passengers' departure lounge is also exempt; and the 1,000 square feet used as the management office and employees' lounge is taxable. Therefore, a total of 2,000 square feet is exempt because that portion of the total space leased by the airline is used exclusively for the purposes of loading or unloading passengers or property onto or from an aircraft. However, the total amount used as office space and the employees' lounge (i.e., 1,000 square feet) is taxable, because that portion of the space leased by the airline is not used exclusively for the purposes of loading or unloading passengers or property onto or from an aircraft. Real property used for fueling aircraft is taxable when the fueling activities are conducted by a lessee or licensee which is not an airline. However, the charge made to an airline for the use of aprons, ramps, or other areas used for fueling aircrafts is exempt. From July 1, 1990, through June 30, 1991, property used at an airport to operate advertising displays in any county as defined in s. 125.011(1), F.S., was exempt from tax.>> * * * (b)1. A person providing retail concessionaire services involving the sale of food or drink or other tangible personal property within the premises of an airport shall be subject to tax on the rental of such real property. 2. However, effective July 1, 1987, a person providing retail concessionaire services involving the sale of food and drink or other tangible personal property within the premises of an airport shall not be subject to the tax on any license to use such property. For purposes of this subparagraph, the term "sale" shall not include the leasing of tangible personal property. <<3. For purposes of this rule, the term "retail concessionaire," which may be either a lessee or licensee, shall mean any person .. . who makes sales of food, drinks, or other tangible personal property directly to the general public within the premises of an airport. With regard to airports, any persons which contract to service or supply tangible personal property for airline operations are considered to be providing aircraft support services and are not concessionaires for purposes of this rule.>> * * * The provisions of this rule relating to the license to use, occupy, or enter upon any real property are effective July 1, 1986, unless other- wise noted. "Real property" means the surface land, improvements thereto, and fixtures, and is synonymous with "realty" and "real estate." "License," with reference to the use of real property, means the granting of a privilege to use or occupy a building or parcel of real property for any purpose. <<1. Example:>> [[(g)]] An agreement whereby the owner of real property grants another person permission to install and <<operate>> [[maintain]] a full service coin-operated vending machine, coin- operated amusement machine, coin-operated laundry machine, or any like items, on the premises is a [[taxable]] license to use real property. The consideration paid by the machine owner to the real property owner <<for the license to use the real property>> is taxable. . . . <<2. Example:>> [[(h)]] An agreement between the owner of real property and an advertising agency for the use of real property to display advertising matter is a [[taxable]] license to use real property. <<The consideration paid by the advertising agency to the real property owner for the license to use the real property is taxable.>> * * * (4)(a)<<1.>> The tenant or person actually occupying, using, or entitled to use any real property from which rental or license fee is subject to taxation under s. 212.031, F.S., and shall pay the tax to his immediate landlord or other person granting the right to such tenant or person to occupy or use such real property. <<2. Where the lessor's or licensor's ability to impose fee(s) is based on its ownership or control of the real property, and the payment made to the lessor or licensor is for the lessee's or licensee's use of the real property, such fees are subject to tax. In such circumstances, the total payment for the use of real property, including airport property, is taxable, irrespective that the payment or a portion of the payment may be identified as consideration for the privilege to do business at that location, privilege fee, guaranteed minimum, concession fee, percentage fee, or by the use of similar terms which seek to distinguish such portion(s) from the payment for the lease of or license to use such real property for any purpose, unless such lease or license is otherwise specifically exempt. Example: A clothing retailer occupying a location inside a mall has an agreement with the owner of the mall under which it pays a minimum rent plus a percentage of its gross sales for the right to operate its store at that location. The agreement characterizes the minimum rent as consideration for the lease of designated real property and the percentage of gross sales as consideration for the privilege to do business in the mall; failure to make any of these payments can cause the agreement to be terminated. The total amount required under the agreement is subject to tax, regardless of how the consideration, or a portion thereof, is characterized. Example: A push cart or kiosk vendor has an agreement with the owner of the mall under which it pays a minimum rent plus a percentage of its gross sales for the right to sell its merchandise at various locations within the common areas of the mall. Failure to make the payments can terminate the right to sell merchandise in the mall. The total amount under the agreement is subject to tax because the statute defines a taxable license as the granting of the privilege to use real property for any purpose, including the privilege to use the real property to do business. Example: A car rental company has an agree- ment with an airport authority to operate its rental car business with a designated office and counter space within the airport terminal building. The agreement provides for a payment designated as rent for the use of real property as well as a payment based on a percentage of gross sales designated as a privilege fee for engaging in business at the airport. Failure to make either payment can terminate the agreement. The total amount required under the agreement is subject to tax. All past declarations, including Temporary Technical Assistance Advisements issued pursuant to Emergency Rule 87AER-91, Technical Assistance Advisements, Letters of Technical Assistance, and similar correspondence, issued by the Department, which advised that fees or portions of fees identified as privilege fees to engage in business were exempt, and which are inconsistent with this rule are rescinded. Therefore, such privilege fees are taxable payments for a lease or license to use real property for business purposes. (b) Except for tolls charged to the travelling public, both commercial and non- commercial, imposed exclusively for the right to travel on turnpikes, expressways, bridges, and other public roadways, the full consideration paid for the license to use airport real property for the purpose of picking-up or dropping-off passengers and baggage from airport sidewalks, landings, and other facilities by any person providing ground transportation services to such airport, shall be taxable as a license to use airport real property, irrespective of whether the operator of such service enters the airport terminal building while engaged in providing such service. Example: The fee paid by a hotel to an airport, for the privilege of coming on the airport property for the purpose of picking-up and dropping- off its guests at the airport terminal, is a license to use airport real property, and is taxable. Example: The fee paid by a taxicab and limousine company to an airport, for the privilege of coming on the airport property for the purpose of picking-up and dropping- off its passengers at the airport terminal, is a license to use airport real property, and is taxable. Example: The fee paid by a remote location rental car company, for the privilege of using the airport premises to pick-up and drop-off its customers at the airport terminal, is a license to use real property, and is taxable.>> Note: In the above text, language added to the statute is within the <<>>; deleted language is within the [[]]. Statutes and Legislative History As amended by 66, Chapter 86-152, Laws of Florida, Section 212.031 states: (1)(a) It is declared to be the legislative intent that every person is exercising a taxable privilege who engages in the business of renting, leasing, [[or]] letting<<, or granting a license for the use>> of any real property unless such property is: * * * Note: In the above text, language added to the statute is within the <<>>; deleted language is within the [[]]. Section 212.02(10)(h) defines "real property" as "the surface land, improvements thereto, and fixtures, and is synonymous with 'realty' and 'real estate.'" The 1986 amendments extend the sales tax to licenses for the use or occupancy of real property. Section 212.02(10)(i) defines "license." "License," as used in this chapter with reference to the use of real property, means the granting of a privilege to use or occupy a building or a parcel of real property for any purpose. Section 212.031 imposes a sale tax for the use and occupancy of real property, but not upon payments for intangibles, such as a franchise, concession, or other privilege to do business. The sales tax imposed by Section 212.031 is limited to the payments, or portions of payments, for the use or occupancy of real property. Each of the ten subsections under Section 212.031 exempts from the sales tax various types of property. Three exemptions relevant to these cases are at Section 212.031(1)(a)6, 7, and 10, which exempt real property that is: 6. A public street or road which is used for transportation purposes. 7. Property used at an airport exclusively for the purpose of aircraft landing or aircraft taxiing or property used by an airline for the purpose of loading or unloading passengers or property onto or from aircraft or for fueling aircraft or, for the period July 1, 1990, through June 30, 1991, property used at an airport to operate advertising displays in any county as defined in s. 125.011(1). Leased, subleased, or rented to a person providing food and drink concessionaire services within the premises of [[an airport,]] a movie theater, a business operated under a permit issued pursuant to chapter 550 or chapter 551, or any publicly owned arena, sport stadium, convention hall, [[or]] exhibition hall<<, auditorium, or recreational facility. A person providing retail concessionaire services involving the sale of food and drink or other tangible personal property within the premises of an airport shall be subject to tax on the rental of real property used for that purpose, but shall not be subject to the tax on any license to use the property. For purposes of this subparagraph, the term "sale" shall not include the leasing of tangible personal property.>> Note: In the above text, language added to the statute is within the <<>>; deleted language is within the [[]]. The indicated changes in subparagraph 10 were enacted by 10, Chapter 87-101, Laws of Florida. The remaining statutes cited by Respondent as law implemented by the Proposed Rules are not relevant to this proceeding. Court Decisions In Quick and Havey v. Department of Revenue, Case No. 72-363, Second Judicial Circuit, decided December 5, 1974, Donald O. Hartwell, Circuit Judge, entered a summary judgement in favor of Respondent. Quick and Havey operated a food concession at the municipal auditorium in West Palm Beach. In return for the concession, they agreed to pay the city base rental and a percentage of gross sales. The agreement entitled Quick and Harvey to the exclusive occupancy of part of the auditorium; they also provided concession services at other locations throughout the auditorium. Quick and Harvey paid the sales tax on the base rental, but argued that the percentage payment constituted "a fee paid for the exercise of a privilege." Judge Hartwell held that the tax applied to the base rent and percentage rent because the latter payments "are so inextricably entwined and enmeshed in the agreement to pay rent that they cannot be separated or distilled . . .." Judge Hartwell reasoned that rent is the "compensation paid for the use and occupation of real property." Recognizing that a tenant might make payments to its landlord that are not rent, Judge Hartwell found that at least under the terms of the instruments before it for construction and analysis that there has not been such a sufficient separation of the source of these funds as to warrant their classification solely as a fee for the exercise of a privilege. The right to use property cannot be separated from the property itself. We, of course, do not pass upon the question of whether the so-called concession rights can be [illegible] separated from the lease of the property itself. Suffice it to say that under the facts as herein presented, the Court is of the opinion that all payments made to the City of West Palm Beach under the agreement before the Court constitute payment of rent and are therefore subject to the tax specified in Section 212.031, Florida Statutes. In Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc. v. Askew, Case No. 74- 338, Second Judicial Circuit, decided January 20, 1977, Judge Hartwell decided whether certain payments made by Avis were taxable under Section 212.031. Avis had "entered into various contracts for a concession or license to do business at various airports and for the rental of real property," as well as contracts with private individuals for the rental of real property to conduct business at nonairport locations. Judge Hartwell divided the contracts of Avis into three categories. The first type of contract was for the payment of rental for the use real property. The second type of contract was for the payment of a concession fee for the right to do business on the premises and for the payment of a sum explicitly identified as rent for the use of real property. The third type of contract was for the payment of a concession fee for the right to do business on the premises and for the use of real property without a sum explicitly identified as rent. Judge Hartwell concluded that all payments for the rights conveyed by the first type of contract were taxable under Section 212.031. He ruled that the payments for the right to rent real property under the second type of contract were taxable, but the payments for the remaining rights were not. Declining to aggregate payments as he had in Quick and Havey two years earlier, Judge Hartwell ruled that the payments for the rights conveyed by the third type of contract required a "reasonable allocation." The allocation was between the payments for the use of real property, which were taxed, and the remaining payments, which were not. Judge Hartwell ordered that the allocation should be based on rental rates charged for the right of occupancy of the real property charged other tenants for comparable space. In a per curiam decision not yet final, the Fifth District Court of Appeal recently considered the taxation of concession fees in Lloyd Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 20 Fla. Law Weekly D552 (March 3, 1995). The findings of fact and conclusions of law in this final order do not rely upon Lloyd Enterprises, which is discussed merely as supplemental material. In Lloyd Enterprises, the taxpayer entered into a concession agreement with Volusia County for the rental of motorcycles at the beach. A fixed- location concessionaire, the taxpayer had the right to park its vehicles within 100 feet in either direction of its assigned spot during its assigned operating hours. Other concessionaires were allowed to roam the beach, but beach rangers would enforce the taxpayer's exclusive right to sell goods within its 200-foot territory if the free- roaming concessionaires parked or tried to sell goods in this territory. Rejecting Respondent's interpretation of its own rules, the court considered the language of the agreement, as well as a county ordinance incorporated by the agreement. The court held that neither document created a lease or license for the use of real property. Rather, they reflected the County's concern with the image that activities on the beach projected to visitors. The documents evidenced the County's intent to enhance the public's enjoyment of the beach through the provision of goods and services, as well as to raise revenue, mostly to defray cleanup costs at the beach. Thus, under the documents, the payments were nontaxable concession fees. Agency Interpretations Interpretations of Law Prior to Proposed Rule Amendments By letter dated May 14, 1968, Mr. J. Ed Straughn, Executive Director of Respondent, advised Mr. Wilbur Jones that tax is due on the space rented to car rental companies in any airport building. If the agreement makes no allocation between rental and nonrent payments, Respondent would require a "reasonable allocation" between rent and other payments with the tax due only on the amount paid for the right of occupancy. Mr. Straughn suggested that the rent component be estimated by the use of comparable rental rates for space elsewhere in the building. By letter dated August 14, 1985, Mr. Hugh Stephens, a Technical Assistant for Respondent, advised Mr. Victor Bacigalupi that a contract between an advertising company and Dade County, concerning advertising at Miami International Airport, did not involve the rental of real property. Mr. Stephens evidently relied on the nonexclusive right of posting advertising displays and the right of Dade County to require the advertiser to relocate or remove displays. By memorandum dated October 28, 1986, Mr. William D. Townsend, General Counsel, proposed policy for the taxation of licenses. Consistent with the Straughn letter 18 years earlier, the memorandum, which is directed to Mr. Randy Miller, Executive Director, states: A license in real property can be defined as a personal, revocable, and unassignable privilege, conferred either by writing or orally, to do one or more acts on land without possessing any interest in the land. Every license to do an act on land involves the occupation of the land by the licensee so far as it is necessary to do the act. Example: A concessionaire pays for permission (a license) to sell hot dogs in the building of a wrestling arena. The concessionaire has no possessory interest in the building. He normally has no specifically or legally described area which is his. He is allowed simply to vend his hot dogs in the building. Perhaps he delivers and vends in the stands. Without special permission, he cannot assign his license and it is normally revocable by the licensor unless specifically agreed otherwise. . . . For purposes of F.S. 212.031, however, the Department of Revenue (DOR) takes the position that either a lease or license is present in any business arrangement in which one or more owners, lessors, sublessors, or other persons holding a possessory interest in real property, permits a third party to use such real property for authorized acts unless all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the agreement between the parties conclusively indicate that the agreement is neither a lease nor a license. The form in which the transaction is cast is not controlling. Accordingly, some portion of the consideration paid for an agreement that in form is a joint venture, profits interest, management agreement, franchise, manufacturer's discount, bailment or other arrange- ment will be presumed by the DOR to be allocable to a lease or license if the arrangement involves the use of real property to perform authorized acts by the lessee or licensee. If the terms of the agree- ment are silent with respect to the portion of the consideration allocable to the inherent lease or license or if the consideration allocated under the terms of the agreement is less than its fair market value, the DOR will allocate to the lease or license a portion of the consideration that is equal to the fair market value of the lease or license. Contrary to the Straughn letter and Townsend memorandum eight months earlier, Technical Assistance Advisement 87A-011 dated July 2, 1987, which was prepared by Mr. Melton H. McKown, advised the Hillsborough County Aviation Authority that the privilege fees paid by car rental companies to the aviation authority were taxable. The agreement between the parties stated that the fees were "for the concession privileges granted hereunder, and in addition to the charges paid for the Premises .. ., [the car rental company] shall pay a privilege fee " Two months later, Temporary Technical Assistance Advisement TTAA 87(AER)-225 reversed TAA 87A-011. In TTAA 87(AER)-225, which is dated September 10, 1987, Ceneral Counsel William Townsend informed Mr. Samuel J. Dubbin that the payments made to airport authorities from concessionaires are "not for the right to use real property, but are for the right to engage in business at the airport." The letter relies upon Avis Rent-A- Car Systems, Inc. v. Askew. Respondent confirmed TTAA 87(AER)-225 in TTAA 88(AER)- 198, which is dated March 24, 1988, and in a letter dated April 6, 1989, from Mr. Robert M. Parsons, Technical Assistant, to Mr. Thomas P. Abbott. The April 6 letter confirms that payments from on- airport rental car companies are taxed only to the extent that the payments represent rent for space on airport property and not to the extent that the payments represent consideration for the privilege to do business. The April 6 letter adds that the payments from off-airport car rental companies for the right to pick up customers at the airport are not taxable because such payments are merely consideration for the privilege to engage in business. The April 6 letter discusses fees paid by other airport concessionaires. Acknowledging the recent enactment of the statutory exemption for license payments made to airports by food and drink concessionaires, the letter notes that, after July 1, 1987 (the effective date of the statutory changes), such payments, even if calculated as percentages of sales, are not taxable because such payments are construed as payments for a mere privilege or license to engage in business. The April 6 letter evidently marks the first time that, in a single document, Respondent inconsistently treats car rental company concession fees and all other concession fees. The April 6 letter adopts the Straughn/Townsend approach when it states that percentage rent is not taxable because it is payment for the privilege to do business. (The letter actually states "privilege or license" to do business, and this alternative use of "license," not involving the use or occupancy of real property, may have caused part of the confusion.) But the assurance of nontaxability of concession fees in the April 6 letter is limited to the period after July 1, 1987. Consistent with the McKown approach, the letter relies on the relatively recent statutory exemption for license payments from airport retail concessionaires. Consistent with the McKown approach, the letter later adds that percentage rent was taxable after the legislature amended Section 212.031 to tax payments for a license to use real property. The April 6 letter concludes erroneously that it is treating all airport concessionaires like on-airport car rental companies. In a Notice of Decision dated July 28, 1992, Respondent addressed the taxation of payments to airport authorities from car rental companies. Under a concession agreement, the airport charged a car rental company a fixed rent for occupied airport space, such as for parking, check-in, and service. Under the same agreement, the airport also charges the car rental company the greater of a guaranteed minimum or percentage of gross revenues. Taking the Straughn/Townsend approach, the Notice of Decision reversed a tentative assessment and held that the additional payments were not taxable. The July 28, 1992 Notice of Decision also addresses the taxation of percentage payments to airport authorities from other concessionaires. Explicitly endorsing the inconsistency of the April 6 letter, Respondent determined that percentage payments from concessionaires other than rental car companies were taxable either as leases or, since July 1, 1986, as licenses. The only explanation offered for the inconsistent treatment of concessionaires is that TTAA 87(AER)-225 applies only to rental car companies. Two years later, as reflected in a March 3, 1994 internal memorandum from Ms. Nydia Men,ndez to two Miami auditors, Respondent continued to perpetuate its inconsistent policy of taxing all payments for the privilege of engaging in business at airports, except for such payments from rental car companies. Returning to advertising, the July 28, 1992, Notice of Decision also states that the payments from the advertiser addressed in the letter dated August 14, 1985, have been taxable, as payments for a license, since July 1, 1986. This conclusion represents the correct treatment of licenses, as another means of granting a right to use or occupy real property. This treatment contrasts with the apparent misinterpretation in the April 6 letter that taxable licenses include grants of privileges to do business. In an early attempt to revisit the tax treatment of payments for concessions, franchises, and other privileges to do business, especially at airports, Respondent evidently chose the Quick and Havey and McKown approach that such business payments are taxable, at least when they are combined with taxable payments for the use or occupancy of real property. By memorandum dated January 14, 1993, from Assistant General Counsel Jeff Kielbasa to Ms. Lorraine Yoemans, Legislative Affairs Director, Mr. Kielbasa explained the purpose of unidentified proposed rule amendments addressing the same issues addressed by the subject proposed rule amendments. He wrote: The proposed rule amendment attempts to level the field by recognizing that any charge for the right, privilege, or license to do business at an airport is fundamentally a charge for the privilege to use or occupy land. If an airport business refuses to pay the fee, the airport's remedy is to have the business removed as a trespasser. It should be pointed out that we are not concerned with true business licenses or privilege fees attendant to use of trademarks, franchises and the like. These are licenses or privilege fees unrelated to the use of real property. The proposed rule does not differentiate between businesses such as on-airport car rental companies (with counterspaces) and off-airport car rental companies. The fee (however characterized) charged by the airport for the privilege to use or occupy the airport for business purposes is subject to the section 212.031 sales tax. See section 212.02(10)(i) defining license with reference to the use of real property as the "privilege to use or occupy a building or parcel of real property for any purpose." We believe that separation of a payment by characterizing one portion as a lease or license of realty (whether site specific or not) and another for the privilege of conducting business on the premises is artificial. It would be just as easy for the property owner on the corner of College and Monroe to charge a business tenant the average commercial square footage rental in Leon County for the lease and require the tenant to pay the premium attributable to the location at College and Monroe as a separate charge in the form of a license to do business. However carved up and characterized, under the statute each charge would be taxable since both leases and licenses to use real property are taxable. Interpretations of Proposed Rule Amendments On April 14, 1994, Respondent conducted a workshop on the proposed rule amendments prior to the modification published June 10, 1994. Respondent's representatives were understandably reluctant to opine on questions of law without detailed facts. However, explaining the tax consequences of payments from a concessionaire to an airport, Assistant General Counsel Kielbasa stated: I think the notion that there is a separate privilege fee that an airport charges unrelated to the fact that the privilege is being granted to function at the airport, I don't think that's what's happening. I think it's a very simple case, and I think it's very clear. But there may be separate provisions in contracts or lease agreements which have nothing to do with operating at that location, and to that extent, I don't think it would be subject to tax at all under the statute, and that's what we're trying to get at. Respondent's Exhibit 1A, pages 33-34. A major element of the dispute between Respondent and Petitioners and Intervenors (collectively, Petitioners) concerned Respondent's choice to take the Quick and Havey and McKown approach over the Avis and Straughn/Townsend approach in taxing mixed payments for the use of real property and for business intangibles. Following the rule workshop, Respondent made some Avis and Straughn/Townsend changes to the proposed rules, but the changes did not preclude a Quick and Havey and McKown approach, as evidenced by the following statement in the Prehearing Stipulation: "The Department contends that where the amount paid for a privilege fee is so intertwined or meshed with a payment for a license or lease to use real property that it cannot be separated, the full amount is taxable." Airports and Concessions Governmental entities operate and typically own large commercial airports, such as those in Orlando, Miami, and Tampa. By law, these airport authorities are empowered to enter into contracts with third parties to supply persons using airports with goods and services, such as food and beverage, retail sales, and car rentals. In some cases, airport authorities may obtain services by management agreements, which are not subject to sales tax. In most cases, though, airport authorities obtain goods and services for airport visitors by leases and grants of concessions, franchises, or other privileges to do business. The Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal defines "concession" as "a franchise for the right to conduct a business, granted by a government body or authority." The Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal defines "franchise" as "a privilege or right that is conferred by grant to an individual or group of individuals; usually an exclusive right to furnish public services or to sell a particular product in a certain community." By what are normally labelled "concession" or "franchise" agreements, airport authorities permit a concessionaire to operate a business with some nexus to the airport or at least its passengers, in return for which the concessionaire pays money to the airport authority. The nexus to the airport may take various forms. Some concessionaires sell food or drink or retail merchandise at exclusively assigned locations within the airport terminal. Hotel concessionaires operate hotels at fixed locations in the terminal. Some concessionaires, like taxi companies and nonairport hotels, pick up and drop off passengers at the airport terminal in areas designated for such purpose, but not reserved exclusively for any one concessionaire. An on-airport car rental concessionaire rents cars at the airport, using fixed counter space, parking areas, car service areas, and car pick-up and drop-off areas. A variation of the car rental concession is the off- airport car rental concessionaire, which has no fixed space at the airport except for customer pick-up and drop-off areas and usually counter space. In Florida, all off-airport rental car companies use their own vans to pick-up and drop-off customers. At some airports outside Florida, such as Sacramento, Dallas, and Minneapolis, the airport authorities operate their own vans to pick up and drop off customers of off-airport rental car companies. In such cases, the off-airport rental car companies do not directly use or occupy any of the real property of the airport. In general, the payments from the concessionaires to the airport authorities consist of two categories. First, there is a fixed payment, which the concession agreement typically characterizes as consideration for the use and occupancy of real property. The airport authority normally bases this rental payment on the fair market value of the space leased, as estimated by a licensed real estate appraiser, or under a cost-based formula. Second, there is a payment representing a percentage of the gross revenue of the concessionaire derived from airport business. The concession agreement typically characterizes this payment as consideration for the privilege to do business with airport passengers. Rents typically exceed $50 per square foot per year. Most, but not all concessionaires, make total payments of considerably more that $50 per square foot per year, often totalling hundreds and sometimes thousands of dollars. In entering into concession agreements, airport authorities pursue a variety of goals. They must produce high revenues because airport authorities do not operate on public subsidies, aside from the monopoly grant of the airport operation itself. But high returns from concessionaires are not the only goal. Airport authorities must serve airport visitors in order to maintain successful relations with the airlines. And airport visitors demand a mix of goods and services at acceptable prices and quality. In selecting concessionaires and pricing concession fees, airport authorities therefore balance maximizing revenues with serving visitors' needs. Airport authorities price concession fees based on the type of goods and services offered by the concessionaire. A bank at one major Florida airport pays six times the concession fees of a travel agency, which occupies space of equal size next to the bank. At the same airport, one theme-park retailer pays concession fees of more than three times what another theme-park retailer pays for the identical space. In the typical concession arrangement, the airport authority receives payments consisting of rent and "something else." The rent is attributable to the use and occupancy of real property. The "something else" is business income, which is attributable to an intangible business asset, such as a franchise, concession, or privilege to do business. Like any other lessor, airport authorities undertake, in their concession agreements, to provide their lessees with offices or retail space for their use and occupancy. Unlike other lessors, however, airport authorities also undertake, in their concession agreements, to provide nearly all of the concessionaire's customers through operating agreements with airlines. Through concession agreements, airport authorities allow concessionaires to share in the authority's most valuable asset, which is not the real property comprising the airport, but the exclusive, governmental franchise to operate the airport. In these regards, airport authorities are in very similar roles to the county in Lloyd Enterprises with the subjects of the government monopoly being in one case a beach and another an airport. Both governmental "owner/operators" provide customers for their respective concessionaires and predicate their agreements upon the ability of the contracting party to supply the needs of the customers in a manner that does not compromise the public asset--i.e., an airport or a beach. These elements are not typical of a lessor or licensor. To varying, lesser degrees, airport authorities also distinguish themselves from mere lessors through the marketing, management, working capital, and workforce that characterize the airport operation. Respondent's key witness identified four factors useful in determining whether a payment is for the use or occupancy of real property: the relationship of the parties to the real property, the use to be made of the real property, the rights granted the parties under the agreement, and the basis for the payment or charge for the real property. These four factors assist in the determination whether a payment is for the use or occupancy of real property. But the usefulness of the four factors is limited because they do not directly address the other possible component of a mixed payment, which is a payment for a franchise, concession, or other privilege to do business. It is easy to determine that concessionaire payments typically comprise rent or some other payment for the use and occupancy of real property plus a payment for an intangible, such as the privilege to do business with airport users. Obviously, Respondent is not required to accept the parties' labelling or allocations of these payments. But it is difficult to determine how much of a mixed payment is for the use or occupancy of real property, which is taxable (ignoring, as always, the special treatment of certain airport license payments, as well as other exemptions), and how much is for a privilege to do business, which is nontaxable. The issue is whether a "reasonable allocation" is possible between the two components in a mixed payment. As ordered in Avis and suggested by the Straughn letter and Townsend memorandum, the allocation process should begin with finding a fair rental value. It is difficult to estimate the fair market rent for space in a large commercial airport. The universe of comparables is small due to the uniqueness of major airports. But the appraisal of airport real property is not impossible. Nonairport comparables normally exist that, with suitable adjustments, yield reasonable approximations of fair market rentals. A real estate appraisal helps determine how much of a concessionaire's payment should be characterized as rent. However, the allocation problem can be approached at the same time from the opposite end. In appraising business assets, an accountant or business appraiser estimates the value of the concession, franchise, or other privilege to do business with airport visitors. The business-income approach to the allocation problem is aided by analysis of the payments made by completely off- airport car rental concessionaires in Sacramento, Minneapolis, and Dallas. These payments provide a rough approximation of the value of this intangible, even though they probably require major adjustments to reflect, among other things, differing passenger counts and demographics, as well as the costs incurred by the airport authorities in providing transportation to the off- airport sites. Based on the foregoing, the record demonstrates that: a) the payments of a concessionaire to an airport authority ordinarily consist in part of rent or license payments and in part of payments for an intangible, such as a franchise, concession, or other privilege to do business and b) these payments may be allocated, with reasonable precision, between the real property and business components. The Proposed Rules Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2 and (b) Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)1. is not materially changed by the proposed rule amendments. Consistent with the statute, this paragraph of the rule merely imposes the sales tax in taxable transactions on the person actually occupying, using, or entitled to use the real property and requires that such person pay its immediate landlord or grantor. The next subparagraph is new. Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(4)(a)2 contains two introductory sentences followed by three examples and a notice. The first sentence of Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2 fairly interprets the statute. The first sentence states that the sales tax is due on payments made to lessors or licensors when the payment is for the use of the real property and is based on the ownership or control of the real property by the lessor or licensor. By limiting the tax to those payments based on the payee's interest in the real property, the proposed rule ensures that the tax is imposed only on the portion of the payment attributable to the use or occupancy of real estate. The first sentence is unobjectionable. The second sentence of Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2 is no more controversial. This sentence provides that the "total payment for the use of real property" is taxable, even though the payment or part of the payment "may be identified" as payment for a privilege to do business. The use of "may be identified" in the "even though" clause refers to the label given such payments by the parties. The second sentence of Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2 merely provides that the taxable consequence of the transaction is not governed by the label given the payments by the parties. In other words, just because the parties use "concession fee," "privilege fee," "percentage fee," or "similar terms" does not necessarily make them payments for the privilege to do business. The second sentence assures that Respondent will not be deterred by mere labels from its lawful responsibility to characterize properly the nature of the payments, and make reasonable allocations when allocations are indicated. The three examples under Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2 are neither illustrative nor useful. To the contrary, they are vague and misleading and appear to reveal a misunderstanding of the proper taxation of mixed payments consisting of rent and payments for a privilege to do business. The first example is Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2.a. A clothing retailer occupies a location in a shopping mall. The retailer pays the mall owner minimum rent plus a percentage of gross sales. The agreement characterizes the minimum rent as consideration for the lease of designated space and the percentage of sales as consideration for the privilege to do business in the mall. The failure to pay either amount is grounds for termination of the agreement. The proposed rule concludes: "The total amount required under the agreement is subject to tax, regardless of how the consideration, or a portion thereof, is characterized." In fact, both payments made by the retailer to the mall owner may constitute taxable payments for the use of real property. Supplying little useful information as to how to determine the true character of payments, the proposed example ignores all of the important factors necessary in making this determination. The proposed example overrides the characterization of the payments by the parties. As discussed above, the parties' labelling of a payment may be tax-motivated, but it may also reveal their true intent. However, the proposed example offers insufficient explanation why it ignores the label of "privilege to do business" at the mall. The only possible grounds for ignoring the label are that the retailer occupies a location inside a mall under which it pays minimum rent and percentage rent and a default in the payment of either amount is grounds for terminating the agreement. The first basis is only that the payments are mixed and, except under the most strained reading of Quick and Havey, cannot, without more, possibly be considered justification for taxing the total payments. The key factor in the first proposed example is thus the presence of a cross-default clause. Such a clause may play a role in distinguishing between payments for the use of real property and other types of payments. In certain cases, the total amount actually being paid for the use of the real property may include all payments that must be paid in order for the agreement to remain in good standing. This would likely be true of base rent and additional rent, consisting of a lessee's prorata share of insurance, taxes, maintenance, and utilities. However, there is nothing in the record to suggest that a cross- default clause is of such importance as to confer upon it the status that it is given in the rule example. Nothing in the record supports the assertion that all cross-defaulted payments are therefore payments for the use or occupancy of real property. For instance, Respondent concedes that a lessee/payor might be obligated under a lease to make taxable payments of rent and nontaxable payments of promotional fees, such as for the use of logos or other intangibles. It is conceivable that a prudent (and powerful) lessor/payee might provide in the agreement, even if called a "lease agreement," that a default in either payment is grounds for terminating the agreement. Even so, the mere existence of such a cross-default clause does not, without more, transform the promotional fee into rent. The proper characterization of the two payments under the first proposed example requires consideration of, among other things, the four factors identified by Respondent's key witness: the relationship of the parties to the real property, the use to be made of the real property, the rights granted the parties under the agreement, and the basis for the payment or charge for the real property. The proper characterization requires consideration, in some fashion, of the elements that distinguish a real property asset from a business asset, such as any contributions by the mall owner in the form of operating agreements, other leases, marketing, management, working capital, and workforce, as well as the method by which the mall owner decides with whom it will enter into agreements and the total payments that it will require. The second example is Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2.b. A push cart vendor pays a mall owner minimum rent plus a percentage of gross sales for the right to sell merchandise at various locations within the common area of the mall. The mall owner may terminate the agreement if the vendor fails to make either payment. The example concludes that both payments are taxable "because the statute defines a taxable license as the granting of a privilege to use real property for any purpose, including the privilege to use real property to do business." The only difference in the first two examples is that the second involves a license and the first involves a lease. Like the example of the mall retailer, the example of the push cart vendor elevates the cross-default provision to outcome-determinative status. Again, the record does not support such reliance upon this factor for the above-discussed reasons. The third example is Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2.c. A car rental company pays an airport authority for designated office and counter space in the terminal. The agreement identifies a payment as rent for the use of real property. The agreement also identifies a payment, representing a percentage of gross sales, as a privilege fee for the right to engage in business at the airport. Failure to make either payment is grounds for terminating the agreement. The example concludes that the "total amount required under the agreement is subject to tax." As with the preceding examples, the example of the airport car rental company relies upon a cross-default clause to characterize all payments as for the use of real property. Again, for the reasons stated above, the record does not support such reliance upon this single factor. The three examples make no "reasonable allocation" between the real property and business components of what are probably mixed payments. Best revealed by the last sentence of the second example, the examples illegitimately transform business payments into real property payments simply because the business payor uses or occupies real property to conduct its business. In reality, the three examples seek to find their way back to the haven of Quick and Havey by equating cross-default clauses with inextricable intertwining and enmeshment. It is only conjecture whether a court would today so readily abandon an attempt to allocate between real property and business income. In any event, the present record demonstrates that "reasonable allocations" are achievable and require consideration of much more than cross- default clauses. Respondent's defense of the examples is inadequate. Respondent argues that the examples are modified by the language of Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(4)(a)2. As previously stated, the two sentences of Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(4)(a)2 represent a fair restatement of the statutory taxing criteria. But the role of the two examples is to illustrate the application of Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2, not provide a circular restatement of the rule and, thus, the statute. Given their language, the proposed examples stand alone and cannot be saved by the implicit incorporation of the first two sentences of Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(4)(a)2. Standing alone, the illustrations are erroneous in their reliance on cross-default clauses, misleading in their omission of material factors required for any reasonable allocation, and misguided in their implicit bias against making allocations between payments for real property and business components. Respondent claims that the examples create presumptions that a taxpayer may rebut. This claim is dubious on two counts. First, Respondent's key witnesses disagreed on whether the presumptions created by the examples were indeed rebuttable. One witness testified clearly that, if a nonexempt transaction fit one of the examples, then the transaction was taxable. Nothing in the examples suggests that these presumptions are rebuttable. But the examples do not work even if they establish only rebuttable presumptions. The cross-default provision cannot bear the burden even of creating a rebuttable presumption. A cross-default provision is simply not that important to the proper characterization of the payments, especially in light of far more important factors. Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)d warns taxpayers that all past declarations, including technical assistance advisements, that "advised that fees . . . identified as privilege fees to engage in business were exempt, and . . . are inconsistent with this rule" are rescinded. Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(4)(a)d concludes: "Therefore, such privilege fees are taxable payments for a lease of license to use real property for business purposes." Respondent's key witness could not identify with certainty the past declarations rescinded by Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)d or the past declarations left unaffected. This leave the proposed rule unnecessarily vague, at least as to airport authorities. There are a limited number of airport authorities and concessionaires that could be relying on past declarations and, if there are any besides those uncovered in this proceeding, they should be easily found. Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(b) identifies as a taxable license to use real property the "full consideration paid for the license to use airport real property for the purpose of picking- up or dropping-off passengers and baggage from airport sidewalks, landings, and other facilities" by any provider of ground transportation services, regardless whether the provider "enters the airport terminal building while . . . providing such service." The full payment for the real property component is taxable, and Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(b) accurately interprets the statutes. However, Respondent again encounters problems in the three examples that follow Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(b). In Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(b)1, a hotel pays a fee to an airport authority for the privilege of coming onto airport property to pick up and drop off hotel guests at the terminal. The example states that the payment is taxable because it is for a license to use airport real property. The second and third examples are identical except they involve a taxicab and limousine company and an off-site car rental company. Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(b) states the obvious-- i.e., that whatever the payor pays for the right to use or occupy real property is subject to sales tax. Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(4)(b) does not require the characterization of all payments between such parties as taxable payments for the use or occupancy of real property. The problem with the proposed examples is that they depart from the real-property language of Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(4)(b) and use the business language of a privilege to do business. The first example baldly provides that a fee paid by a hotel to an airport for the "privilege" to enter airport property and pick up and drop off hotel guests is a license to use airport property and is taxable. There is no mention of allocation or of the factors that would go into a reasonable allocation. The fee is taxable. The language and paucity of reasoning are practically identical for the second and third examples. Respondent argues that Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(b) must be read in connection with the language of Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2, which restates the statutory language. This argument fails for two reasons. Like the examples under Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2, Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(b) does not incorporate by reference the language of Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2. Respondent's argument of implicit incorporation is even weaker here because Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(b) is not even a subparagraph of Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(4)(a)2. The first set of proposed examples at least mentions a cross-default clause, which could have some bearing on the proper characterization of the payments, even though the omission of far more important factors invalidates the first set of examples. The second set of proposed examples fails even to mention a single factor. If the hotel, taxi cab company, or rental car company pays for the privilege of entering airport property to do business, the entire payment is taxable. Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1)(a)6.b and c Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1)(a)6.b provides that property "used by an airline exclusively for loading or unloading passengers onto or from an aircraft is exempt." The proposed rule identifies examples of such property as common terminal walkways used by passengers for boarding or exiting planes, ticket counters, baggage claim areas, ramp and apron areas, and departure lounges (but distinguished from VIP lounges or clubs that require a membership not determined by ticket status). Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1)(a)6.c adds that "[r]eal property used by an airline for purposes of loading or unloading passengers or property . . . which is exempt from tax includes ... office areas used to process tickets, baggage processing areas, operations areas used for the purpose of the operational control of an airline's aircraft, and air cargo areas." Petitioners object to the use of "exclusively" in subparagraph b. The statute provides an exemption for property used exclusively for aircraft landing or taxiing or property used by an airline for loading or unloading persons or property or for fueling. Clearly, due to the repetition of "property used" in the second clause, the modifier "exclusively" applies only to the first clause, which is consistent with the doctrine of the nearest antecedent argued in Petitioner's proposed final order. It is unclear how Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1)(a)6.b and c work together because they seem to define the same exempt property under different subparagraphs. Both subparagraphs apply to real property, and both seem to describe the same examples of real property, using different words. The subparagraphs under subparagraph b present reasonable rules for determining what is real property based on ownership of the underlying land, with a special rule when the airport authority leases, but does not own, the land on which the airport is situated. The subparagraphs under subparagraph c identify a prorating process, which applies when the property is used for both exempt and nonexempt purposes. It is unclear how property could be used for exempt and nonexempt purposes under the requirement of "exclusive" use in subparagraph b, although such mixed uses is contemplated by subparagraph c. The requirement contained in the first sentence of Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(1)(a)6.b that the property be used exclusively for loading or unloading passengers conflicts with the language of Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1)(a)6.c, as well as the language of Rule 12A-1.070(1)(a)6.a; neither of the latter two provisions predicates the exemption upon exclusivity of use. More importantly, the first sentence of Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(1)(a)6.b conflicts with the relevant statutes. However, the remainder of Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(1)(a)6.b, including subparagraphs (I) and (II), is a reasonable interpretation of the relevant statutes, as is Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1)(a)6.c, including subparagraphs (I) and (II). Petitioners argue that Respondent intends to tax nonairline concessionaires for their use of property used for loading or unloading persons or property. This argument is unclear, perhaps because the unobjectionable proposed rules do not require such an application. Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1)(b)3 Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1)(b)3 defines "retail concessionaire" as either a lessee or licensee that makes sales directly to the public within an airport. The words "retail concessionaire" are not used elsewhere in the rule or proposed rules at issue except in Rule 12A-1.070(1)(b)1 and 2, which addresses "a person providing retail concessionaire services" involving the sale of food or drink or other tangible personal property in an airport. Subparagraph 1 imposes tax on rent paid by such persons, and subparagraph 2 exempts from tax any license payments made by such persons. Petitioners' arguments against the definitional proposed rule are misplaced. The definition covers lessees and licensees, but does not impose any tax. In conjunction with subparagraphs 1 and 2, the proposed definition of "retail concessionaire" says, in effect, that all lessees and licensees selling food and drink or other personal property are subject to tax on payments for the rental of associated real property, but are not subject to tax on payments for the licensing of associated real property. The subparagraphs that carry tax consequences honor the legislative directives as to taxability.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all relevant times, respondent, Passport Internationale, Inc. (Passport or respondent), was a seller of travel registered with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department). As such, it was required to post a performance bond with the Department conditioned on the performance of contracted services. In this case, petitioner, Mitchell H. Abelman, has filed a claim against the bond for $389.00 alleging that Passport failed to perform on certain contracted services. Because the relevant events occurred some three or four years ago, many of the details concerning this transaction are somewhat vague. It is clear, however, that in response to a solicitation call, on August 15, 1990, petitioner purchased a travel certificate from Executive Travel, Inc., a Connecticut telemarketeer, authorized to sell travel certificates on behalf of Passport. The certificate entitled the holder to a five-day, four-night trip for two to the Bahamas, plus four nights' lodging in Daytona Beach and Orlando, Florida. For this, petitioner agreed to pay $389.00 through a charge to his credit card payable to the telemarketeer. The certificate carried the name, address, and logo of Passport. Prior to purchasing the certificate, petitioner was never told that in order to take the trip, he must pay additional charges. Had he known this, he would not have purchased the certificate. A travel certificate, video, and instructions were mailed by Passport to petitioner around August 22, 1990. The certificate clearly stated that it expired in one year, or on August 27, 1991. The instructions stated that in order to reserve travel dates, the traveler must return the certificate to Passport with the requested travel dates at least 75 days prior to the traveler's departure. Petitioner says he did not open up his mail from Passport for a considerable period of time and thus was initially unaware of these restrictions. On an undisclosed date, petitioner telephoned a representative of Passport and requested confirmation of certain travel dates. Although these dates were apparently more than a year after the certificate was issued, a Passport representative verbally approved the dates but told him that that in order to reserve those dates, he must send in an additional $90.00 for port charges, taxes, and meals on the ship. Petitioner refused to pay any more money since he had not been told this when he purchased the certificate. Therefore, he never returned the travel certificate to confirm his reservation. When petitioner telephoned a Passport representative a second time concerning the use of his certificate, he was told that his travel certificate had expired. He was offered the right to use the Florida portion of his trip but only if he paid a $50.00 deposit. Petitioner declined to do so and later filed this claim for a refund in the amount of $389.00.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the claim of petitioner against the bond of respondent be granted, and he be paid $389.00 from the bond. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of December, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Mitchell H. Abelman 507 Chestnut Avenue Los Angeles, California 90042 Michael J. Panaggio 2441 Bellevue Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Robert G. Worley, Esquire 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard D. Tritschler, Esquire The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner is entitled to attorney’s fees and costs.
Findings Of Fact This case was filed by Petitioner on behalf of Ida Heaps pursuant to Section 760.35, Florida Statutes. The case alleged that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner, Heaps, based on race when Respondent did not lease a home to Petitioner Heaps. On July 22, 2004, in Tavares, Florida, a one-day hearing was held after which post-hearing recommended orders were filed. Based on the evidence a Recommended Order finding Respondent guilty of a discriminatory housing practice against Ms. Heaps in violation of Section 760.23(1), Florida Statutes, was entered on February 1, 2005. Petitioner was therefore the prevailing party in this matter. The Recommended Order also found that Petitioner was entitled to attorney’s fees and costs; and reserved jurisdiction to determine the amount of fees and costs in the event the parties were unable to agree on such an award. On January 31, 2005, the Commission issued its Final Order approving the Recommended Order. The time limit for appealing the Final Order has passed. Petitioner has not been able to resolve the amount of fees and costs incurred in this matter. As evidence of the amount of attorney’s fees, Petitioner, FCHR, submitted an affidavit outlining the hours and costs spent incurred in the underlying case by its attorney. The requested fees are limited to hours expended on Petitioner’s behalf in DOAH Case No. 04-1593, including time spent in travel and establishing a right to attorney’s fees and costs. Petitioner’s attorney spent a total of 53 hours on this case, which include 46 hours for legal services and seven hours for travel. The hours multiplied by the reasonable rate results in a total of $14,850.00 for attorney’s fees. The Commission’s direct costs total $453.70, which include the travel costs of Petitioner’s attorney and investigator to attend the hearing and the court reporter’s fee. The time spent on this case by the Petitioner’s attorney was reviewed by an outside expert. The expert has found the time to be reasonable and has recommended a reasonable hourly rate, arrived at independently of the Commission and its attorneys and without direction by Petitioner, based on the nature, novelty and complexity of the case, and the expertise of the Petitioner’s attorney in federal and Florida administrative and anti-discrimination law. The expert opined that a rate of $300.00 per hour legal services and $150.00 per hour for travel was reasonable. Respondent did not challenge the affidavit of Petitioner’s or the expert’s opinion. The amount of hours and costs reflected in the affidavit are reasonable for this type of case. Likewise, the hourly fees for such litigation are reasonable for this type of case and the long experience of Petitioner’s attorney. Therefore, Petitioner, FCHR, is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $15,303.70.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all relevant times, respondent, Passport Internationale, Inc. (Passport or respondent), was a seller of travel registered with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department). As such, it was required to post a performance bond with the Department conditioned on the performance of contracted services. In this case, petitioner, H. Fleischer, has filed a claim against the bond for $648.95 alleging that Passport failed to perform on certain contracted services. On an undisclosed date in 1991, petitioner responded to a newspaper advertisement promoting a five-day, four-night cruise to the Bahamas for $99.00 per person. After calling a toll-free number, petitioner was told that in order to take the trip, he must purchase a video for $198.00 plus $11.95 postage, or a total of $209.95. Petitioner agreed to purchase the video in order to take advantage of the trip. The advertisement was being run by a telemarketeer in Tennessee who had been authorized to sell Passport's travel certificates. As such, it was acting as an agent on behalf of Passport. In June 1991, the assets and liabilities of Passport were assumed by Incentive Internationale Travel, Inc. (Incentive). Even so, any travel described in certificates sold after that date under the name of Passport was still protected by Passport's bond. Within seven days after receiving the video and other materials, which carried the name, address, logo and telephone number of Passport, petitioner returned the same to the telemarketeer along with a request for a refund of his money. When he did not receive a refund, he filed a complaint with the Department. In response to a Department inquiry, in December 1991 Incentive declined to issue a refund on the ground the video was purchased from a Tennessee firm, and not Passport, and Passport had never received any money from the telemarketeer. Incentive offered, however, to honor the travel certificate by allowing petitioner to purchase a trip to the Bahamas under the same terms and conditions as were previously offered. On July 6, 1992, petitioner accepted Incentive's offer and paid that firm $439.00 for additional accommodations, meals, fees and taxes. Shortly after July 24, 1992, petitioner received a letter from Incentive advising that his trip had been cancelled and that the firm had filed for bankruptcy protection. To date, petitioner has not received a refund of his money.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the claim of petitioner against the bond of respondent be granted, and he be reimbursed $648.95 from the bond. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of December, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: H. Fleischer 15 Wind Ridge Road North Caldwell, NJ 07006 Michael J. Panaggio 2441 Bellevue Avenue Daytona Beach, FL 32114 Robert G. Worley, Esquire 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard D. Tritschler, Esquire The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810
The Issue Has Respondent Try Fresh Produce, Inc. (Try Fresh) made proper accounting to Petitioner Green Grassing Company, Inc. (Green Grassing) in accordance with Section 604.22(1), Florida Statutes, for agriculture products delivered to Try Fresh from November 13, 1994, through December 9, 1994, by Green Grassing to be handled by Try Fresh as agent for Green Grassing on a net return basis as defined in Section 604.15(4), Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Green Grassing was in the business of growing and selling "agricultural products" as that term is defined in Section 604.15(3), Florida Statute, and was a "producer" as that term is defined in Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Try Fresh was licensed as a "dealer in agricultural products" as that term is defined in Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes, as evidenced by license number 8839 issued by the Department, supported by bond number BD 0694273 in the amount of $75,000, written by Florida Farm Bureau General Insurance Company with an inception date of September 23, 1994, and an expiration date of September 22, 1995. Green Grassing delivered certain quantities of agricultural products (squash) to Try Fresh during the fall and winter growing season of 1994-95. However, it is the accounting of the squash that was delivered between November 13, 1994, and December 9, 1994, inclusive, that is in dispute. It was verbally agreed between Try Fresh and Green Grassing that Try Fresh would act as Green Grassing's agent in the sale of the squash delivered to Try Fresh for the account of Green Grassing on a net return basis. There is no dispute as the quantity of squash or size of squash delivered by Green Grassing to Try Fresh during the above period of time. Furthermore, there is no dispute as to the charges made by Try Fresh for handling the squash, including but not limited to the commission charged by Try Fresh. There is some disagreement concerning the quality of the squash delivered by Green Grassing. However, none of the witnesses had personal knowledge as to the quality of the squash delivered by Green Grassing. Upon delivering the squash to Try Fresh, Green Grassing was given a numbered delivery receipt listing Green Grassing as owner of the squash showing the number of cartons delivered, the date delivered, the initials of the employee receiving the squash and the kind and size of squash delivered. On most of these receipts there were four blank squares located just above the line for the date on the receipt. Starting from the left side of the receipt, the squares represent average, below average, poor and very poor quality, respectively. It was the responsibility of the employee receiving the squash for Try Fresh to place a check mark in one of the squares to indicate the quality of the squash upon delivery. Only the accounting for the squash from delivery receipt ticket numbers 086 dated November 13, 1994; 005 dated November 15, 1994; 017 dated November 16, 1994; 047 dated November 17, 1994; 451 dated November 18, 1994; 463 dated November 19, 1994; 500 dated November 23, 1994; 501 dated November 25, 1994; 397 dated December 5, 1994, and 329 dated December 9, 1994, is being contested in this proceeding. The delivery receipts being contested are included in Petitioner's composite exhibit 1 and Respondent's composite exhibit 1. A compilation of those delivery receipts is attached to the Complaint in Petitioner's composite exhibit 2. Once Try Fresh found a market for the squash, a pre-numbered billing invoice was prepared by Try Fresh showing its customer's name and the quantity, description and price of the squash sold. In any given sale, the quantity of the squash sold may include squash furnished by Green Grassing and other producers. Therefore, under description on the billing invoice Try Fresh would show the size and type of squash being sold, the initials of the producer, the quantity of squash being sold for that producer and the producer's receipt number for example, med. s/n GGI 68/086. In its accounting to Green Grassing, Try Fresh prepared a statement which included the delivery receipt number, the quantity of squash sold, description of the product, i.e. med, s/n squash, the price per carton of squash and the total amount for the quantity sold. The statements also noted when a certain quantity of a squash had been transferred to another ticket number or if a trouble memo number (T number) was involved in a particular sale. Payment for the squash was made by Try Fresh to Green Grassing from these statements. Sometimes payment was for only one delivery receipt while at other times for several delivery receipts for different dates. The statements are included as part of Petitioner's composite exhibit 5. Petitioner's composite exhibit 4 is the Florida Vegetable Report, Volume XIV, Nos. 21 - 25 and 27 - 39, dated November 10, 14, 15, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23, 28, 29, 30, 1994 and December 1, 2, 5 - 9, 1994, which establishes prices paid during this period of time for small and medium straight neck squash. The report does not list prices paid for large straight neck squash. There is no evidence that the quality of the squash delivered to Try Fresh by Green Grassing during this period of time was the same quality of squash from which the prices in the report were derived. On November 13, 1994, Green Grassing delivered 32 cartons of small, straight neck squash (sm s/n squash), 145 cartons of medium, straight neck squash (med s/n squash), and 42 cartons of large, straight neck squash (lg s/n squash) to Try Fresh as reflected in delivery receipt number 086 dated November 13, 1994, showing Green Grassing as owner of the squash. None of the squares are checked and there is nothing in the remarks section of delivery receipt number 086 to indicate the quality of the squash at the time of delivery to Try Fresh on November 13, 1994. There is no dispute as to accounting of the 145 cartons of medium, straight neck squash reflected on delivery receipt 086. Try Fresh's statement of accounting to Green Grassing dated November 25, 1994 (page 5 of Petitioner's composite exhibit 5) indicates that the 32 cartons of small , s/n squash listed on receipt number 086 were transferred to receipt number 258 with the price left open and no payment made to Green Grassing. The next entry concerning these 32 cartons of squash appears on a statement dated December 2, 1994 (page 13 of Petitioner's composite exhibit 5) with the price left open and no payment made to Green Grassing. The next entry concerning these 32 cartons of squash appears on an undated statement (page 21 of Petitioner's composite exhibit 5) with reference made to trouble memo (T number 0040) with the price is left open and no payment made to Green Grassing. There is no further reference to these 32 cartons of squash (delivery receipt 086, ticket 258 or T number 0040) in the statement of accounting. There is no evidence that Green Grassing was paid for the 32 cartons of sm s/n squash as reflected by delivery receipt number 086. There is no indication on billing invoice number 065562 that the 32 cartons of sm, s/n squash from delivery receipt number 086 were included in the 240 cartons of sm, s/n squash shipped to Georgia Vegetable Co. as was the normal practice by Try Fresh as set out in Finding of Fact 7. Furthermore, there is insufficient evidence to show that the 32 cartons of squash were found to be below quality by a federal inspection (Certificate No. M-460187-8) on November 17, 1994, which resulted in Try Fresh receiving a reduced price of $1.71 per carton as shown on T number 0017 (trouble memo). This amount was paid to Green Grassing as shown by statement of accounting dated December 23, 1994, (see page 28 Petitioner's composite exhibit 5). However, those 32 cartons of squash were identified as transfer ticket number 259 which relates to delivery receipt number 005 dated November 15, 1994, not delivery receipt number 086 (see pages 9 and 13 of Petitioner's composite exhibit 5). Try Fresh has failed to account to Green Grassing for the 32 cartons of sm, s/n squash delivered on November 13, 1994, as reflected by delivery receipt number 086. Based on the prices Try Fresh billed and was paid for sm, s/n squash by its customer (including sm s/n squash belonging to Green Grassing) during this period, a price of $8.00 per carton would be reasonable price. Try Fresh owes Green Grassing for 32 cartons of sm s/n squash at $8.00 per carton for a total of $256.00. Try Fresh's statement of accounting dated November 25, 1994, (page 5 Petitioner's composite exhibit 5) shows 10 cartons of lg, s/n squash from delivery receipt number 086 as being transferred to ticket number 258 with a note of trouble memo (T number 0036) with the price left open and no payment to Green Grassing. The same page of the statement shows 21 cartons of lg, s/n squash from delivery receipt number 086 being dumped due to poor quality without payment to Green Grassing. The same page shows 11 cartons of lg, s/n squash being transferred to ticket number 258 without any explanation or payment to Green Grassing. These 11 cartons are accounted for at $2.00 per carton for a total of $22.00 on page 21 of Petitioner's composite exhibit 5. There is no evidence (testimony, trouble memo or federal inspection) to show why the 11 cartons of squash brought only $2.00 per carton when lg s/n squash from delivery ticket number 086 were billed out at $8.00 per carton on November 19, 1994 (see billing invoice number 065593). Likewise, there was no evidence as to who purchased these squash. Try Fresh's billing invoice number 065593 shows 50 cartons of lg, s/n squash being billed to G & B at 8.00 per carton which included 10 cartons of lg, s/n squash belonging to Green Grassing from delivery receipt number 086. Trouble Memo (T number 0036) shows a problem with the 50 cartons of lg, s/n squash shipped to G & B Produce on November 19, 1994, and reported on November 23, 1994, which resulted in the price being reduced to $2.50 per carton. Although sketchy, Respondent's accounting for the 10 cartons of squash on T number 0036 and the 21 cartons of squash dumped is sufficient. However, there is insufficient accounting for the 11 cartons of squash. Try Fresh owes Green Grassing $6.00 per carton, the difference between the billed price of $8.00 per carton and the $2.00 per carton paid, for 11 eleven cartons of squash for a total of $66.00. On November 15, 1994, Green Grassing delivered 198 cartons of med, s/n squash and 118 cartons of sm, s/n squash to Try Fresh as evidence by delivery receipt number 005 dated November 15, 1994. None of the squares are checked and there is nothing in the remarks section of delivery receipt number 005 to indicate the quality of the squash at the time of delivery to Try Fresh on November 15, 1994. There is no dispute as to 98 cartons of med, s/n squash and 9 cartons of sm, s/n squash. Try Fresh paid $1.00 per carton for the balance of 100 cartons of med, s/n squash listed on delivery receipt number 005 that is in dispute on February 3, 1995, by check number 2217 (see pages 35 and 36 of Petitioner's composite exhibit 5). However, there is no evidence to show that at the time these med, s/n squash were received by Try Fresh's customer, who allegedly reduced the price to Try Fresh, that the squash was of inferior quality and would demand a price of only $1.00 per carton when those same squash brought an average of $11.00 per carton from other Try Fresh customers. Try Fresh has failed to make a proper accounting for the 100 cartons of med, s/n squash. Try Fresh owes Green Grassing the difference of $10.00 per carton for 100 cartons of squash for a total amount of $1,000.00. The 99 cartons of sm, s/n squash reflected on delivery receipt number 005 that are in dispute were paid for by Try Fresh at the rate of $10.40 per carton for 77 cartons and $1.71 per carton for 32 cartons. Although 77 cartons were billed out at $12.00 per carton (see billing invoice number 065592), there is sufficient evidence (T number 0022) to support the reduction in price to $10.40 per carton. However, there is insufficient evidence to show the reduction in price to $1.71 per carton for the 32 cartons. Try Fresh has failed to make proper accounting for the 32 cartons. Try Fresh owes Green Grassing $8.69 per carton, the difference between $10.40 per carton that was paid for the 77 cartons and the $1.71 paid for the 32 carton for a total amount of $278.08. On November 16, 1994, Green Grassing delivered 64 cartons of med, s/n squash and 25 cartons of sm, s/n squash to Try Fresh as reflected by delivery receipt number 017. None of the squares are checked and there is nothing in the remarks section of delivery receipt number 017 to indicate the quality of the squash at the time of delivery to Try Fresh on November 16, 1994. On November 25, 1994, Try Fresh paid Green Grassing $12.00 per carton for 21 cartons of med, s/n squash and $12.00 per carton for 25 cartons of sm, s/n squash by check number 1447 as shown on pages 4 through of Petitioner's composite exhibit 5. However, page 28 of Petitioner's composite exhibit shows a zero amount for 25 cartons of sm, s/n squash reference to delivery receipt number 017. This is apparently an error, as is T number 0033 (Trouble Memo). Try Fresh also paid $12.00 per carton for the 43 cartons of med, s/n squash by check number 2009 dated January 6, 1995 (see pages 31 and 32 of Petitioner's composite exhibit number 5). There has been proper accounting by Try Fresh of the squash reflected by delivery receipt number 017. On November 17, 1994, Green Grassing delivered 93 cartons of sm, s/n squash and 161 cartons of med, s/n squash to Try Fresh as reflected by delivery receipt number 047. None of the squares are checked and there is nothing in the remarks section of delivery receipt 047 to indicate the quality of the squash at the time of delivery to Try Fresh on November 17, 1994. Only the accounting of the 93 cartons of the sm, s/n squash is disputed. On November 18, 1994, Try Fresh billed out 13 cartons of sm, s/n squash from delivery receipt number 047 to Georgia Vegetable on billing invoice number 065592 at $12.00 per carton. Try Fresh was advised by Georgia Vegetable of a problem. Trouble memo (T number 0022) was prepared by Try Fresh which indicated that after working with Georgia Vegetable a price of $10.40 per carton was agreed upon. Green Grassing was paid $10.40 per carton (see page 30 of Petitioner's composite exhibit number 5). Try Fresh has made proper accounting of these squash. On November 19, 1994, Try Fresh billed out 80 cartons of sm, s/n squash from delivery receipt number 047 to Phil Lucks on billing invoice number 65596 at an undetermined price (the price had been redacted on the billing invoice). Although trouble memo (T number 0032) indicates a problem (brown & decay) with 100 cartons of sm, s/n squash shipped on November 22, 1994, there was no evidence that these were the same squash billed on billing invoice number 065596. Try Fresh has failed to present sufficient evidence to show why these squash did not bring the same price the other sm, s/n squash on delivery receipt number 047 brought. Try Fresh has failed to properly account for these 80 cartons of squash. Therefore, Try Fresh owes Green Grassing $10.40 per carton for 80 cartons of squash for a total of $832.00. On November 18, 1994, Green Grassing delivered 33 cartons of lg, s/n squash, 41 cartons of med, s/n squash and 20 cartons of sm, s/n squash to Try Fresh as evidenced by delivery receipt number 451 dated November 18, 1994. The delivery receipt indicates that the squash was of very poor quality when delivered. The 20 cartons of sm, s/n squash was billed to T & M at $6.00 per carton. Although there is a trouble memo (T number 0025), it appears that Green Grassing was paid $6.00 per carton for these 20 cartons of squash. There is no evidence that these squash were of the same quality as those referenced in the Florida Vegetable Report for this period of time which could demand a price of $12.00 per carton as argued by Green Grassing. Furthermore, Green Grassing has produced no evidence that Try Fresh received $12.00 per carton for these squash. Try Fresh has made proper accounting of the 20 cartons of sm, s/n squash reflected in delivery receipt number 451. The 33 cartons of lg, s/n squash from delivery ticket number 451 required re-grading by Try Fresh. After re-grading, 16 cartons were not fit for sale. The 17 cartons of lg, s/n squash remaining after re-grading were sold by Try Fresh for $6.00 per carton. This amount was paid to Green Grassing by check number 1812 dated December 23, 1994, (see pages 27 and 28 of Petitioner's composite exhibit 5). Try Fresh has made proper accounting for the 33 cartons of squash reflected in delivery receipt number 451. The 41 cartons of med, s/n squash from delivery ticket number 451 was invoiced at an undetermined price (priced appeared to be redacted from the invoice) on billing invoice number 065582. Trouble memo (T number 0033) indicates that the 41 cartons of med, s/n squash from billing invoice number 065582 were brown and decayed and were rejected by Lucks. Try Fresh has made proper accounting of these 41 cartons of squash reflected in delivery receipt number 451. On November 19, 1994, Green Grassing delivered 32 cartons of sm, s/n squash, 54 cartons of med, s/n squash and 3 lg, s/n squash to Try Fresh as reflected by delivery receipt number 463. The delivery receipt indicates that the squash were of poor quality when delivered to Try Fresh on November 19, 1994. There is no dispute as to the accounting of the 54 cartons of med, s/n squash. On December 2, 1994, by check number 1568, Try Fresh paid Green Grassing $16.00 per carton for 25 cartons of sm, s/n squash from delivery receipt number 463 for a total of $400.00 (see pages 12 and 15 Petitioner's composite exhibit 5). On January 5, 1995, by check number 2009, Try Fresh paid Green Grassing $4.00 per carton for 25 cartons of sm, s/n squash from delivery receipt number 463 for a total of $100.00 (see pages 31 and 32 of Petitioner's composite exhibit 5). On December 2, 1994, by check number 1568, Try Fresh paid Green Grassing $1.00 per carton for 7 cartons of sm, s/n squash for a total of $7.00 from delivery ticket number 463. Try Fresh has paid Green Grassing a total of $507.00 for the sm, s/n squash from delivery receipt number 463. However, thirty two cartons of sm, s/n squash at $16.00 per carton would total $512.00. Since there is no evidence to support a price less than the $16.00 per carton paid by Try Fresh on December 2, 1994, Try Fresh owes a Green Grassing a balance of $5.00. There is sufficient evidence to show that the 3 cartons of lg, s/n squash from delivery receipt number 463 were re-graded and none were salvaged. Other than the $5.00 above, Try Fresh has made proper accounting of the squash reflected in delivery receipt number 463. On November 23, 1994, Green Grassing delivered 16 cartons of sm, s/n squash, 44 cartons of med, s/n squash and 5 cartons of lg, s/n squash to Try Fresh as reflected in delivery receipt number 500 dated November 23, 1994. None of the squares are checked and there is nothing in the remarks section of the delivery receipt to indicate the quality of the squash delivered to Try Fresh on November 23, 1994. There is no dispute as to the 16 cartons of sm. s/n squash or the 44 cartons of med, s/n squash. The 5 cartons of lg, s/n squash from delivery receipt 500 were sold to American Growers by Try Fresh for $4.00 per carton as reflected in billing invoice number 065628 dated November 25, 1994. Green Grassing was paid this amount by Try Fresh (see pages 19 and 23 Petitioner's composite exhibit 5). Try Fresh has made proper accounting of the squash reflected in delivery receipt number 500, notwithstanding the prices listed in the Florida Vegetable Report for this period of time. On November 25, 1994, Green Grassing delivered 18 cartons of sm, s/n squash, 68 cartons of med, s/n squash and 5 cartons of lg, s/n squash to Try Fresh as reflected in delivery receipt number 501 dated November 25, 1994. None of the squares are checked and there is nothing in the remarks section of the delivery receipt to indicate the quality of the squash delivered to Try Fresh on November 25, 1994. There is no dispute as to the accounting for the 18 cartons of sm, s/n squash or the 68 cartons of med, s/n squash. The 5 cartons of lg, s/n squash were sold to American Growers for $4.00 per carton by Try Fresh as reflected in billing invoice number 065628 dated November 25, 1994. Green Grassing was paid this amount by Try Fresh (see pages 19 and 23 of Petitioner's composite exhibit 5). Try Fresh has made proper accounting of the squash reflected in delivery receipt number 501, notwithstanding the price listed in the Florida Vegetable Report for this period of time. On December 5, 1994, Green Grassing delivered 2 cartons of sm, s/n squash, 68 cartons of med, s/n squash and 16 cartons of lg, s/n squash to Try Fresh as reflected in the delivery receipt number 397 dated December 5, 1994. None of the squares are checked and there is nothing in the remarks section of the delivery receipt to indicate the quality of the squash delivered to Try Fresh on December 5, 1994. The 2 cartons of sm, s/n squash were sold on December 6, 1994, at $8.00 per carton as reflected in billing invoice number 065749 dated December 6, 1994. Sixteen cartons of the med, s/n squash were sold on December 6, 1994, to K & M South for $8.00 per carton as reflected in billing invoice number 065003 dated December 6, 1994. Twenty seven cartons of the med, s/n squash were sold to Tom Lange Co. for $10.00 per carton as reflected in an unnumbered billing invoice dated December 9, 1994 with customer order no. 23- 4020. Twenty five cartons of the med, s/n squash were sold to G & B for $10.00 per carton as reflected in an unnumbered billing invoice dated December 10, 1994, with customer order number 8130. Sixteen cartons of lg, s/n squash were sold to Erenbaum for $5.00 per carton as reflected in an unnumbered billing invoice dated December 6, 1994 with customer number 9472. Although these prices are below prices quoted in the Florida Vegetable Report for December 6 - 9, 1994, for small and medium s/n squash (no prices quoted for large, s/n squash), the prices are consistent with prices Try Fresh was receiving during this same period for small, medium and large s/n squash that it handled for other producers. Try Fresh has made proper accounting for the squash reflected in delivery receipt number 397, notwithstanding the prices listed in the Florida Vegetable Report for this period of time. On December 9, 1994, Green Grassing delivered 2 cartons of sm, s/n squash, 31 cartons of med, s/n squash and 17 lg, s/n squash to Try Fresh as reflected in delivery receipt number 329 dated December 9, 1994. None of the squares are checked and there is nothing in the remarks section of the delivery receipt to indicate the quality of the squash delivered to Try Fresh on December 9, 1994. There is no dispute as to the accounting of the 2 cartons of small and 31 cartons of medium squash. The 17 cartons of large, s/n squash were billed to Erenbaum in billing invoice number 065035 dated December 9, 1994. It appears that the price originally billed to Erenbaum's was redacted and zero per carton written on billing invoice. A federal inspection was called for and the squash were found to be below quality. This resulted in a zero return on the squash. Try Fresh has made proper accounting for the squash reflected in delivery receipt number 329. From a review of Try Fresh's records placed into evidence that its accounting to Green Grassing was not always in accordance with Section 604.22(1), Florida Statutes. Particularly, there was no record of the quality of the squash, no explanation of the adjustments to the original price, or if an explanation was given, it was not clear and no record of when payment was received by Try Fresh from the purchaser making it difficult to determine the timeliness of the accounting of the sales and payment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that Respondent Try Fresh Produce Co., be ordered to pay Petitioner Green Grassing Co., Inc. the sum of $2,437.08. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of July, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of July, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-1532A The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted jointly by the Respondents Aetna and Naples in this case. Both Petitioner Green Grassing Co., Inc. and Respondent Try Fresh Produce, Co. elected not to file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law as allowed under Section 120.57(1)(b)(4), Florida Statutes. COPIES FURNISHED: J. Ragon Barnett, III 6 East Broadway Street Ft. Meade, Florida 33841 Hank Cord Post Office Box 995 Zolfo Springs, Florida 33890 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 508 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
