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GIL GONZALEZ vs TRAVBUZZ INC., D/B/A PALACE TOURS, AND HUDSON INSURANCE COMPANY, AS SURETY, 20-003509 (2020)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 07, 2020 Number: 20-003509 Latest Update: Dec. 27, 2024

The Issue The issues are whether, pursuant to section 559.929(3), Florida Statutes (2019), Petitioner has been injured by the fraud, misrepresentation, breach of contract, financial failure, or any other violation of chapter 559, part XI, by Respondent Travbuzz, Inc. (Respondent), for prearranged travel services and, if so, the extent to which Respondent is indebted to Petitioner on account of the injury.

Findings Of Fact Respondent provides prearranged travel services for individuals or groups. Having relocated from New Jersey to Miami, Florida, evidently in 2018, Respondent has been registered at all material times with the Department as a "seller of travel" within the meaning of the Act and holds registration number ST-41461. With Respondent as the principal, the Surety issued a Sellers of Travel Surety Bond bearing bond number 10076529 in the amount of $25,000, effective from June 22, 2018, until duly cancelled (Bond). On November 12, 2019, Petitioner, a resident of San Diego, California, purchased from Respondent one ticket for himself and one ticket for his daughter on the Palace on Wheels: A Week in Wonderland Tour (POWAWIWT) with a departure date of April 1, 2020. Earnestly described by Respondent's principal as a "cruise ship on wheels," the POWAWIWT provides one week's transportation, accommodations, and meals for travelers seeking to visit several of India's cultural and historical landmarks without the inconvenience of changing hotels, finding restaurants, arranging intercity transportation, or, it seems, obtaining refunds for trips that never take place. The purchase price for two POWAWIWT tickets was $8600.40. Additionally, Petitioner purchased from Respondent a guided side trip at one location for $75. At the time of the purchase of the two POWAWIWT tickets, Respondent charged Petitioner's credit card for the required downpayment of $1911.20 for both tickets. By personal check dated January 6, 2020, Petitioner timely paid the balance due for both tickets of $6689.20. By personal check dated February 19, 2020, Petitioner paid the $75 charge for the side trip. The credit card issuer duly debited Petitioner's account and credited Respondent's account for the charged amount, and Respondent obtained the funds represented by both checks. Petitioner later disputed the credit card charges, and the credit card company debited the $1911.20 amount in dispute from Respondent's account. Although Petitioner claimed that his account had not been credited for this amount, as of the evening prior to the hearing, Respondent's credit for these charges had not been restored, so the $1911.20 still seems to be in the possession of the credit card issuer. Despite availing himself of the remedy available under the Act, Petitioner has not authorized the credit card issuer to restore to Respondent's account the credit for the $1911.20. This case is a byproduct of the emerging Covid-19 pandemic, which, as discussed below, caused RTDC to cancel Petitioner's April 1 POWAWIWT. According to Respondent, RTDC has refused to refund Petitioner's payment of $8600.40 gross or about $8000 after deducting Respondent's 7% commission.1 Although Respondent's principal deflects the blame to RTDC for its no-refund policy and to Petitioner for supposedly waffling on the relief that he sought for the cancelled trip, Respondent quietly has declined to refund its commission of approximately $600, as well as the additional $75 payment, although the failure to refund the $75 may be explained by Petitioner's failure to address this negligible amount until he prepared the Prehearing Statement in this case. 1 Respondent's principal testified that Respondent discounted the price of the April 1 POWAWIWT by reducing its standard 17% commission, which would approximate $1460, to 7%, for a 10% discount, or about $860, leaving a net commission of about $600. Respondent's factual defenses to Petitioner's refund claim include the several defenses set forth above and a new defense asserted for the first time at the hearing: Petitioner cancelled his POWAWIWT before RTDC cancelled his POWAWIWT, so Petitioner was never entitled to a refund under the terms of the Contract. This defense oddly finds more support in Petitioner's allegation that he demanded a refund before RTDC cancelled the April 1 POWAWIWT than in Respondent's allegation that Petitioner did not demand a refund until the March 13 email, in which he reported that RTDC had cancelled the April 1 POWAWIWT.2 Regardless, this new defense is no more supported by the facts than Respondent's previously stated defenses. Respondent's who-cancelled-first defense is based on emails and telephone calls. Petitioner's emails portray his consistent efforts to obtain a refund for the trip, but only after RTDC had cancelled the April 1 POWAWIWT. The lone email of Respondent's principal serves to reveal Respondent's inability to respond meaningfully to Petitioner's efforts to protect his travel purchase and raises the possibility of bad faith on the part of Respondent's principal. On March 9, Petitioner emailed Respondent's principal a Times of India news article that reported that RTDC had cancelled the March POWAWIWTs, but not the April 1 POWAWIWT. This email does not seek to cancel the April 1 POWAWIWT, but expresses concern that RTDC will cancel the trip. On March 13, Petitioner emailed Respondent's principal a Times of India news article that reported that RTDC had cancelled the remaining POWAWIWTs through April. This email complains that RTDC had not 2 This oddity is unsurprising given the patter of each witness's testimony. Respondent's principal peppered his testimony with false apologies while, in a reassuring tone, he gently deferred and deflected blame and patiently, but mistakenly, insisted that the Contract did not require him to refund monies paid for a train trip that never took place. Petitioner frenetically rebutted each factual defense while somehow missing the salient points that he had paid for a POWAWIWT that never took place, Respondent refused to refund Petitioner's payment, and the Contract calls for a refund. Although a retired appellate attorney for the state of California, Petitioner seems to have grounded his early demands for a refund on natural law, because he appears not to have discovered one of the crucial contractual provisions, as discussed below, until he prepared the Prehearing Statement responded to Petitioner's requests for information, requests advice as to his available options, and asks for some assurance that Petitioner would not lose his payments of $8600 for the train tour plus an unspecified amount "for post trip activities" that are also unspecified. On March 15, Petitioner emailed Respondent's principal a news article in The Hindu that reported that another operator of train tours in India was paying refunds for cancelled trips and all tourist visas into India had been cancelled through April 15. This email implores Respondent to do the right thing and immediately refund the money paid for the cancelled trip. A few hours later, Petitioner emailed Respondent's principal an India West news article that reported that India was now in a complete lockdown and the Indian government had cancelled all nondiplomatic visas. This email asks Respondent's principal to keep Petitioner informed on what RTDC was going to do and expresses hope that RTDC issues refunds. On March 19, Respondent's principal emailed Petitioner that "we are reaching some agreement with our ground operator for the train and this is what is being finalized." The statement clearly discloses no agreement, but, at best, an expectation of an agreement. The email describes the expected agreement to allow Petitioner to take a POWAWIWT during the following season from September 2020 through April 2021, but requires Petitioner to select travel dates within six days and pay whatever fare is in effect at the time of the trip. Respondent's principal never explained why Petitioner had only six days to accept an "offer" that RTDC had not yet authorized its agent to make, might not authorize within the six-day deadline, and might not ever authorize. Respondent's demand for a near-immediate acceptance of a nonexistent offer of a trip at market price was unreasonable and suggests that Respondent's principal was merely trying to induce Petitioner to make an offer in the form of an acceptance, so the principal might have greater bargaining leverage with RTDC. On March 23, Petitioner emailed Respondent's principal, noting a series of unanswered emails and phone calls from Petitioner to the principal since the receipt of the March 19 "offer." Asking for clarification of the terms of the "offer," Petitioner's email concedes that it appears that Petitioner's money is lost and asks merely that Respondent show him the courtesy of calling him, confirming his fear, and providing a full explanation of what happened. Later that day, an employee of Respondent emailed Petitioner and informed him that the principal was suffering from a respiratory disorder and was unable to talk, so that future communications needed to be by email. Petitioner received no more emails from Respondent's principal, who, having returned to the United States after taking a POWAWIWT in early March, was later diagnosed with Covid. The telephone calls are undocumented. The credibility of Respondent's principal started to leave the tracks with the March 19 email of an illusory "offer" with an immediate deadline for acceptance. A month later, in responding to the disputed credit card charge, the credibility of Respondent's principal derailed completely, as he attempted to resecure the $1911.20 credit with material misrepresentations of what had taken place in an email dated April 21 to the credit card issuer. The email claims that Petitioner never cancelled the trip, so he was a "no-show"--a Kafkaesque claim that implies a duty to report for a trip that, undisclosed in the email, the sponsor had cancelled over two weeks prior to departure. The email states that, at the beginning of March, Petitioner called and said he did not feel comfortable taking the trip, but the trains were still running and "'Cancel for Fear'" was not an allowable reason for waiving a cancellation fee--perhaps true, but irrelevant. The email encloses a copy of the principal's March 19 email, states that Petitioner did not accept this "offer," and concludes that "[s]ince [Petitioner] did not cancel or inform us of the decision for travel before the travel date, the charge is valid as per the terms and conditions." The email cites a provision of the Contract addressing no-shows and, despite the absence of any mention of RTDC's cancellation of the trip due to the pandemic, adds a seemingly obscure reference to another provision of the Contract addressing acts of God, medical epidemics, quarantines, or other causes beyond Respondent's control for the cancellation of a trip. Notably, the email omits mention of the provisions of the Contract, described below, clearly calling for a refund. On balance, it is impossible to credit the testimony of Respondent's principal that, in telephone calls, Petitioner cancelled the trip before RTDC cancelled the trip or, more generally, that Petitioner could not settle on an acceptable remedy, and his indecisiveness prevented Respondent's principal from negotiating a settlement with RTDC--an assertion that, even if proved, would be irrelevant. Notwithstanding resolute attempts by Respondent's principal to misdirect attention from these unavoidable facts, Petitioner has paid for a train tour that never took place, RTDC cancelled the tour, and Petitioner never cancelled his tickets. The question is therefore whether, in its Contract, Respondent successfully transferred the risk of loss to Petitioner for a trip cancelled by the tour sponsor due to the pandemic. Analysis of this issue necessitates consideration of several provisions of the Contract that, despite its prolixity, is initially remarkable for two omissions: Respondent's Seller of Travel registration number3 and the name of RTDC as the sponsor of the POWAWIWT. Respondent claims that Petitioner caused his injury by declining to purchase travel insurance. The cover page of the Contract contains a section 3 Section 559.928(5) requires a seller of travel to include in each consumer contract the following: "[Name of seller of travel] is registered with the State of Florida as a Seller of Travel. Registration No. [X]." Even absent any mention of a statute, this disclosure provides a consumer with some means to learn of the somewhat obscure Act, the seller's statutory responsibilities, and the relief that may be available to a consumer for a seller's failure to discharge these responsibilities. Petitioner testified only that he somehow learned of the Act, but never said how. The record does not permit a finding that the omission of the statutory disclosure was purposeful, so as to conceal from the consumer the existence of the Act, or was a product of guileless ineptitude. called "Travel Insurance." This section provides an opportunity to purchase travel insurance from an entity "recommended by [Respondent]." The options are to check a box to purchase from Respondent's recommended entity or to check a box that states the traveler undertakes to obtain travel insurance independently, but this provision adds that, if travel insurance is not obtained, the consumer "absolve[s Respondent, t]he tour operator and the travel agent of all possible liabilities which may arise due to my failure to obtain adequate insurance coverage." Respondent offered no proof that its recommended travel insurance or other available travel insurance would pay for the cancellation of the April 1 POWAWIWT due to the pandemic, so Petitioner's choice not to purchase travel insurance is irrelevant. Additionally, the clear provisions of the Contract, discussed below, requiring a refund for a trip cancelled by the sponsor rebut Respondent's labored effort to apply the travel insurance provision to shift to the customer the risk of loss posed by a cancellation of the trip by the sponsor--a risk that might be better addressed by Respondent's purchase of commercial business interruption insurance. Respondent claims that the trip was cancelled by RTDC too close to the departure date to entitle Petitioner to any refund. The Contract contains a section called "Cancellation Fees." This section provides for increasing cancellation fees based on the proximity of the cancellation to the trip departure date. The Contract provides a 10% cancellation fee "if cancelled" more than 90 days prior to departure, 20% cancellation fee "if cancelled" between 89 and 35 days prior to departure, and 100% cancellation fee "if cancelled" within 34 days prior to departure. The Contract fails to specify if this provision applies to cancellations at the instance of the consumer or the trip sponsor, but the graduated fee reflects the greater value of a trip cancelled well in advance of the trip departure date, so that the trip can be resold. Obviously, a trip cancelled by a sponsor cannot be resold, so the cancellation fee provision applies only to a cancellation by a customer and does not shield Respondent from liability in this case. Lastly, Respondent relies on a section of the Contract called "Responsibility--Limitation of Liability." Provisions in this section warn that Respondent acts as an agent for a trip sponsor, such as the railroad, from which Respondent purchases the travel services. Although Respondent makes every effort to select the best providers of travel services, Respondent does not control their operations and thus CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR ANY PERSONAL INJURY, PROPERTY DAMAGE OR OTHER CLAIM which may occur as a result of any and/or all of the following: the wrongful, negligent or arbitrary acts or omissions on the part of the independent supplier, agent, its employees or others who are not under the direct control or supervision of [Respondent]; [or] * * * (3) loss, injury or damage to person, property or otherwise, resulting directly or indirectly from any Acts of God, dangers incident to … medical epidemics, quarantines, … delays or cancellations or alterations in itinerary due to schedule changes, or from any causes beyond [Respondent's] control. … In case of overbooking, [Respondent] will only be liable for refund [sic] the charged amount to the guest. [Respondent] shall in no event be responsible or liable for any direct, indirect, consequential, incidental, special or punitive damages arising from your interaction with any retailer/vendor, and [Respondent] expressly disclaims any responsibility or liability for any resulting loss or damage. The "Responsibility--Limitation of Liability" provisions are general disclaimers of liability for various forms of damages arising out of the acts and omissions of third parties or forces outside the control of Respondent, such as the pandemic. These provisions represent a prudent attempt to avoid liability for damages, such as the lost opportunity to visit a gravely ill relative who has since died, that may amount to many multiples of the price paid for a trip. Complementing these general provisions limiting Respondent's liability, other provisions limit Respondent's liability to the payment of a refund of the purchase price of a trip cancelled by the sponsor. The section immediately following the "Responsibility--Limitation of Liability" section is the "Reservation of Rights" section, which provides: "The company [i.e., Respondent] reserves the right to cancel any tour without notice before the tour and refund the money in full and is not responsible for any direct or indirect damages to the guest due to such action." As noted above, the Contract omits any mention of Respondent's principal, so as to Respondent in the place of its undisclosed principal; thus, a provision referring to a cancellation of the tour by Respondent includes a cancellation of the tour by Respondent's principal. As cited by Petitioner in the Prehearing Statement, the other relevant provision is in the "Prices, Rates & Fares" section and states that, if a customer cancels, any refund to which the customer is entitled, under the above-cited cancellation fee provisions, will be dependent on then-current exchange rates, but "[i]n the event that a tour is canceled through no action of the Client, the Client will receive a full refund of US$."4 This provision entitles a consumer to: 1) a refund and 2) a refund in U.S. dollars, presumably unadjusted for currency fluctuations since the payment. At the hearing, Respondent's principal tried to construe the "US$" provision as a reference to the currency to which a consumer is entitled to be paid when a consumer cancels a trip under conditions in which the customer is entitled to a refund, but this construction ignores that the cited clause applies to 4 An identical "US$" provision is found at the end of the section called "A Note About Cancellation for All Tours/Reservations." cancellations occurring through no action of the consumer and imposes on Respondent the obligation to make a "full refund" in such cases.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order directing Respondent to pay Petitioner the sum of $6689.20 within 30 days of the date of the order and, absent timely payment, directing the Surety to pay Petitioner the sum of $6689.20 from the Bond. 7 Perhaps the recommended and final orders in this case will persuade the credit card issuer to issue the credit for the $1911.20 to Petitioner, who is entitled to this disputed sum. But, if Respondent regains possession of this disputed sum and refuses to refund it to Petitioner, the Department may wish to consider suspending or revoking Respondent's certificate or referring the matter to the Miami-Dade County State Attorney's Office. See the preceding footnote. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of November, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of November, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Gil Gonzalez 8444 Mono Lake Drive San Diego, California 92119 (eServed) Benjamin C. Patton, Esquire McRae & Metcalf, P.A. 2612 Centennial Place Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) H. Richard Bisbee, Esquire H. Richard Bisbee, P.A. 1882 Capital Circle Northeast, Suite 206 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) W. Alan Parkinson, Bureau Chief Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Rhodes Building, R-3 2005 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-6500 Tom A. Steckler, Director Division of Consumer Services Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 520 407 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800

Florida Laws (16) 120.569120.57120.60320.641394.467552.40559.927559.928559.929559.9355559.936559.937604.21760.11766.303766.304 DOAH Case (1) 20-3509
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NORMAN M. SUTHERBY vs. DELTA AIR LINES, INC., 84-003319 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-003319 Latest Update: Nov. 15, 1990

Findings Of Fact Petitioner was born in 1936. While on active duty in the United States Navy in 1955, he suffered an injury which subsequently led to the amputation of his left foot. When discharged from the Navy, his disability was rated by the Veterans Administration (VA) at 40 percent. Subsequent problems with the stump of the left leg, arthritis, and a spinal fusion led to VA disability increases, which disability rating at time of hearing was 100 percent. Petitioner applied for work with Delta Air Lines, Respondent, in 1966 and was employed as a reservations agent in Chicago. At this time his VA disability rating was 70 percent. In 1967 Petitioner, at his own request, was transferred by Respondent to Tampa, Florida. At this time Petitioner was able to move around the bay in which he worked with and without his crutches. In September 1979 Petitioner was hospitalized for stump revision and remained in an off-duty status until June 1980 when he returned to his position with Delta. At this time Petitioner carried out his duties as a reservation agent in a wheelchair. Following his return to work in 1981 Petitioner's performance of duty was marginal. Petitioner takes prescribed medication for pain. On one occasion the medication adversely affected his ability to perform his duties satisfactorily and he was told by his supervisor not to take medication at work. The doctor changed this prescription from 1-100 mg. daily to 4-25 mg. daily and Petitioner continued his medication as prescribed without further problems. On October 28, 1981, Petitioner was examined by Dr. Frazier, one of the physicians used by Delta for its employees. The purpose of this examination was to evaluate Petitioner's physical condition for continued employment. Report of this examination is contained in Exhibit 5 wherein Dr. Frazier concluded that Petitioner "has several progressive disabilitating diseases, that combined with his psychological state make him unemployable for Delta Air Lines. I would recommend because of his depression, amputation, hypertension, osteo-arthritis and spinal fusion problems that he be retired on disability." Respondent does not have a retirement for physical disability status. In lieu thereof it has short-term disability benefits and long-term disability benefits. Long-term disability benefits are calculated as a percentage of the employee's basic monthly salary less social security benefits the employee receives. Petitioner was in a long-term benefit status while recovering from stump revision in 1979-1980. Following Delta's receipt of the report of Dr. Frazier, Petitioner was sent home in a short-term disability status while the report was evaluated. Respondent subsequently advised Petitioner that he was qualified for sedentary work and directed him to return to his position with Delta Air Lines. Petitioner returned to work around June 1982 as a reservations agent. Fifteen or twenty reservation agents work in a "bay" where each has access to a telephone and computer terminal. These agents handle all reservation requests via telephone with no visual contact with the customers. They work an eight-hour shift with two 10 minute breaks and one-half hour off for lunch. While operating from his wheelchair, Petitioner usually took a station near the entrance to the bay which provided easier access for the wheelchair than a station farther down into the bay. He made no complaints about access to his station to Delta supervisory personnel. Reservation agents' telephone communications are monitored by supervisors on an intermittent basis to ensure the agent is carrying out his duties in a satisfactory manner and is providing proper information to the customers. In June 1972 Petitioner was placed on three months' probation. In September 1972 this probationary period was extended an additional three months. In July 1974 Petitioner was again placed on probation and given a "final chance" letter. In October 1977 he was given a letter for poor performance. Petitioner acknowledged that several times before 1982 he had been disciplined by Respondent but not fired. In December 1982 Charles Cortright, a retired architect, called the Tampa office of Delta Air Lines to get information on a flight to and from the West Coast interrupted with cruises while on the West Coast. Specifically, Cortright wanted to fly to Seattle, take a ferry trip to Alaska, perhaps two more sea cruises from West Coast ports, take a train from Seattle to San Francisco, and fly back to Tampa from San Francisco. He was referred to Petitioner, who quoted him a price of $278.00 on the air portion of this trip, but, since Petitioner did not think the cruises could be arranged by Delta, referred Cortright to a travel agency. Petitioner testified that he referred Cortright to three travel agencies located in the vicinity of Cortright's residence and did not specify the agency at which Petitioner's wife worked. Although Cortright testified that he was not referred to any one by name and did not know that Petitioner's wife worked at Tri-Cities Travel Agency, he went to Tri-Cities and his reservations were made by Malinda, who, in fact, was Petitioner's wife. It is likely that Cortright did not know that Malinda was Petitioner's wife, but it is believed that Cortright was told by Petitioner to ask for Malinda and he did so. When the airline tickets arrived at the travel agency, Cortright was advised by the agency the price of the air fare was $302.00. Cortright then, on December 14, 1982, called Delta and asked to speak to Petitioner to inquire about the difference in the fares quoted by Petitioner and the cost of the tickets at the travel agency, and to get the fare guaranteed that was quoted by Petitioner. At the time this call was received by another agent, Jennings King, King was being monitored by his supervisor, Carolyn Corvette. In this phone conversation Cortright said he had spoken to Petitioner two times before, that he went to the agency to which he had been directed by Petitioner, that he spoke to Malinda as directed by Petitioner, and that he was charged a higher fare than was quoted by Petitioner. Corvette had the call transferred to the customer service desk and authorized guarantee of the lower fare quoted. She promptly prepared a memo of the incident to Arthur Arden, Chief Reservation Supervisor (Exhibit 7). Arden called Cortright, who confirmed that Petitioner had directed him to Tri-Cities Travel Agency. Arden extracted from Delta's computer the reservation made for Cortright which disclosed the reservation was made by Malinda at Tri-Cities (Exhibit 8). Knowing that Malinda was Petitioner's wife, Arden, on December 15, told Petitioner that he was suspended from work and would be recommended for dismissal. On December 15, 1982, Arden signed a memo to Harry Dean, Delta's Regional Manager at Tampa, recommending that Petitioner be terminated (Exhibit 6). Dean concurred, sent the memo to Delta's Atlanta office, and Petitioner was fired. All reservation agent trainees are told that they should make every effort to arrange all of the transportation needs of the customers through Delta Air Lines, including tours requiring other modes of transport than air; and that they should never refer a customer to a specific travel agency. If a travel agency's services are needed by the customer, the customer should be referred to the yellow pages of the phone book to select a travel agency. This same information is contained in the Standard Practices Manual, which is available to all reservation agents. The reason for this rule is to eliminate, insofar as possible, conflicts of interest and to refrain from alienating some travel agents by appearing to favor other travel agents. This could create a serious problem for the air lines and is taken very seriously by air line company management. Petitioner's testimony that he did not refer Cortright to Tri-Cities Travel Agency and that he never referred a customer to a specific travel agency was rebutted by Betty Maseda, a fellow reservations agent who frequently sat alongside Petitioner at work and on several occasions overheard Petitioner giving specific instructions to customers on exactly how to get to Tri-Cities Travel Agency and to ask for Malinda. Ms. Maseda considers herself a good friend of Petitioner and did not volunteer this information to Respondent until after Petitioner had been fired.

Florida Laws (1) 760.10
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UNIVERSAL TRAVEL AND TOURS, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 84-001362 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-001362 Latest Update: May 21, 1990

Findings Of Fact In January 1984, Respondent Department of Transportation (DOT) published a Request for Proposal for travel services (RFP). After receiving proposals, Respondent reconsidered its financial statement requirement and returned all proposals. DOT then published a second RFP deleting the financial statement requirement. In its second RFP, Respondent stated: The Department intends to award the contract to the responsive and responsible proposer whose proposal is determined to be the most advantageous to the Department. A responsive proposer is one who has submitted a proposal which conforms in all material respects to this Request for Proposal . . . As the best interest of the State may require, the right is reserved to reject any and all proposals or waive any minor irregularity or technicality in proposals received. Proposers are cautioned to make no assumptions unless their proposals have been evaluated as being responsive. The RFP directed that all proposals include a resume of the travel agency, explaining the abilities that make it best qualified to perform the required services and information relating to years of experience, ownership, minority ownership, volume of business, proof of membership in Air Traffic Conference (ATC) and International Air Transport Association (IATA), number of persons employed, number of persons to be assigned to DOT business, and computer/communications facilities. The required minimum services specified in the RFP included: 1) planning fares and itineraries; 2) scheduling and arranging airline and rental car reservations; 3) issuing and delivering airline tickets; 4) processing unused tickets; 5) providing sufficient direct communications to DOT; 6) providing rental car confirmation numbers; 7) ensuring social security numbers recorded on tickets; 8) providing copies of used tickets for billing reconciliation purposes; 9) providing a monthly financial statement in a prescribed format, and 10) providing monthly summary analysis of travel trends and patterns. Each travel agency was also required to list any additional services it proposed to provide that were not included in the minimal travel service requirements and to list the additional services to be incorporated in the executed contract. In order to determine the proposal which offered the most advantageous combination of services, Respondent developed a rating scale for the assignment of points to each additional service proposed according to its value (zero points for no value, one point for limited value, two points for reasonable value, and three points for significant value). Respondent intended that the agency proposing the most advantageous combination of services would receive the highest number of points and therefore award of the contract. Proposals were submitted by eight travel agencies. The proposals were evaluated by Respondent and points were assigned on the zero to three point rating scale. Intervenor's score was highest with 24 points. Petitioner's proposal was second with 14 points. Respondent initially announced its intention to award the contract to Intervenor, but thereafter advised proposers that it intended to reject all proposals and withdraw the intended award. Respondent's intent to withdraw is based on its admitted failure to announce criteria. This failure allowed bidders to obtain points for services of questionable or non-existent value. Petitioner, for example, received one point for Telex service which was not available when the proposal was submitted and still not installed at the time of final hearing. The ratings were highly subjective as indicated by the disagreement of witnesses over the value of various services. Intervenor, for example, received several points for such questionable services as a newsletter, proposed workshops and staff visits. However, Respondent's principal rater supported his reasons for assignment of points on a rational basis. He conceded only a one point change in Petitioner's score and no change in Intervenor's score. Both Intervenor and Petitioner claim advantages for the reliability and range of services provided by their computer systems. Respondent lacked the expertise necessary to resolve these competing claims with the precision demanded by Petitioner. However, the evidence offered at hearing by Petitioner in support of its claims of system superiority was largely self serving and unsubstantiated by any studies or performance data.

Recommendation From the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order denying the petition of Universal Travel and Tours, Inc. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of August, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of August, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas M. Beason, MOYLE, JONES & FLANIGAN 118 North Gadsden Street, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mark A. Linsky, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William L. Grossenbacher, Esquire BORNE, RHODES, & JAFFRY Post Office Box 1140 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Paul N. Pappas, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (1) 287.057
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FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS, ON BEHALF OF IDA HEAPS vs BARBARA STRICKLAND, 05-001317F (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tavares, Florida Apr. 13, 2005 Number: 05-001317F Latest Update: Jul. 27, 2005

The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner is entitled to attorney’s fees and costs.

Findings Of Fact This case was filed by Petitioner on behalf of Ida Heaps pursuant to Section 760.35, Florida Statutes. The case alleged that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner, Heaps, based on race when Respondent did not lease a home to Petitioner Heaps. On July 22, 2004, in Tavares, Florida, a one-day hearing was held after which post-hearing recommended orders were filed. Based on the evidence a Recommended Order finding Respondent guilty of a discriminatory housing practice against Ms. Heaps in violation of Section 760.23(1), Florida Statutes, was entered on February 1, 2005. Petitioner was therefore the prevailing party in this matter. The Recommended Order also found that Petitioner was entitled to attorney’s fees and costs; and reserved jurisdiction to determine the amount of fees and costs in the event the parties were unable to agree on such an award. On January 31, 2005, the Commission issued its Final Order approving the Recommended Order. The time limit for appealing the Final Order has passed. Petitioner has not been able to resolve the amount of fees and costs incurred in this matter. As evidence of the amount of attorney’s fees, Petitioner, FCHR, submitted an affidavit outlining the hours and costs spent incurred in the underlying case by its attorney. The requested fees are limited to hours expended on Petitioner’s behalf in DOAH Case No. 04-1593, including time spent in travel and establishing a right to attorney’s fees and costs. Petitioner’s attorney spent a total of 53 hours on this case, which include 46 hours for legal services and seven hours for travel. The hours multiplied by the reasonable rate results in a total of $14,850.00 for attorney’s fees. The Commission’s direct costs total $453.70, which include the travel costs of Petitioner’s attorney and investigator to attend the hearing and the court reporter’s fee. The time spent on this case by the Petitioner’s attorney was reviewed by an outside expert. The expert has found the time to be reasonable and has recommended a reasonable hourly rate, arrived at independently of the Commission and its attorneys and without direction by Petitioner, based on the nature, novelty and complexity of the case, and the expertise of the Petitioner’s attorney in federal and Florida administrative and anti-discrimination law. The expert opined that a rate of $300.00 per hour legal services and $150.00 per hour for travel was reasonable. Respondent did not challenge the affidavit of Petitioner’s or the expert’s opinion. The amount of hours and costs reflected in the affidavit are reasonable for this type of case. Likewise, the hourly fees for such litigation are reasonable for this type of case and the long experience of Petitioner’s attorney. Therefore, Petitioner, FCHR, is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $15,303.70.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57120.68760.23760.35
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PASSPORT INTERNATIONALE, INC. vs DOROTHY L. CASTELLANO AND DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES, 94-004014 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jul. 15, 1994 Number: 94-004014 Latest Update: Feb. 23, 1995

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all relevant times, respondent, Passport Internationale, Inc. (Passport or respondent), was a seller of travel registered with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department). As such, it was required to post a performance bond with the Department conditioned on the performance of contracted services. In this case, petitioner, Dorothy L. Castellano, has filed a claim against the bond in the amount of $59.00 alleging that Passport failed to perform on certain contracted services. The facts giving rise to this controversy are not in dispute. In late 1989, petitioner received a promotion offer from Budget Rent A Car for a "free" one-day cruise for two persons from Fort Lauderdale to Freeport (Bahamas Islands) on Discovery Cruise Lines. The travel was to be arranged by Passport and required petitioner to pay Passport a $40.00 fee, plus $19.00 in port taxes, or a total of $59.00. She did so on March 6, 1989, as evidenced by a money order made payable to Passport International Express, a ficticious name then used by Passport. After it received the money, Passport issued two travel certificates to petitioner. On the face of each certificate was the notation "Not valid after 08/30/90." This meant that petitioner had to use the certificates no later than August 30, 1990. Even so, this gave petitioner more than a year in which to take the trip. Petitioner does not deny that she was aware of this restriction. According to Passport, the expiration date was controlled by Discovery Cruise Lines and thus it had no authority to extend the life of the certificates. No evidence was adduced regarding the refund policy of Passport. Petitioner eventually made reservations to use the certificates in July 1990. On June 6, 1990, she broke her ankle and was temporarily disabled. As a consequence, she could not travel before the certificates expired. Although petitioner contacted both Passport and Discovery Cruise Lines and requested either a refund of her money or an extension of time in which to use the certificates, her request was denied. Therefore, petitioner was unable to use the certificates. She then filed a claim with the Department seeking a refund of her money.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the claim of petitioner against the bond of respondent be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of November, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of November, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Dorothy L. Castellano 3821 S. E. 44th Street Ocala, Florida 34480 Michael J. Panaggio 2441 Bellevue Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Robert G. Worley, Esquire 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard D. Tritschler, Esquire The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810

Florida Laws (2) 120.57559.927
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ALICE KENYON vs WHOLESALE INVENTORY NETWORK, LLC, 17-000881 (2017)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Port St. Lucie, Florida Feb. 10, 2017 Number: 17-000881 Latest Update: Oct. 31, 2017

The Issue Whether Respondent, a "seller of travel," owes Petitioner $5,400.00 for failing to provide services to Petitioner pursuant to a contract between the parties.

Findings Of Fact WIN is a "seller of travel" as defined by section 559.927(11), Florida Statutes. On January 31, 2016, Petitioner and her sister, Julie Loftus, attended an Italian festival in St. Lucie County where they both entered a drawing to win a free "getaway" vacation. The sisters were contacted within a few days and told they had won, but to collect their prize, they had to attend a meeting at a Holiday Inn in Port St. Lucie. On February 13, 2016, the sisters attended the presentation that was put on by WIN. They were provided a brochure regarding the travel services offered by WIN and were impressed by the presentation. WIN offered a "lifetime of worry- free travel at your fingertips" with travel software to provide 24/7 access to booking, and significant discounts on travel services, such as hotel stays, cruises, excursions, dining, car rentals, and access to a "live personal travel concierge." The software does not provide on-line booking for airfare, private homes, yacht, or recreational vehicle rentals. Although neither sister is adept at using the Internet or computers, they were very interested in having a personal travel concierge, particularly because they intended to travel to Rome later in the year. After the presentation, they jointly purchased and executed a "Reservation Services Software Licensing Agreement" (Agreement) for a "lifetime License Fee" of $5,400.00. The price included a $1,000.00 discount in lieu of a certificate for a free "getaway" that the sisters had won. In pertinent part, the Agreement provides: This Agreement is made with reference to the following facts: A The Licensee desires to license software from the Licensor to obtain access to vacation packages, nightly stays, bonus weeks, fantasy getaways, activities and excursions, cruises, car rentals, golf discounts, hotels and luxury condominium and villa rentals. The Licensee acknowledges that the network benefits may be changed from time to time. * * * 6 Annual Software Renewal Fee. In addition to the purchase price, the Licensee does hereby agree to pay an Annual Software Renewal Fee of $199 to SaveOn Resorts, LLC (whose phone number is 858-649- 1481), with the first payment to be paid twelve (12) months from the purchase date of this Licensing Agreement. . . . a. Freeze Option. The Licensee acknowledges that they have the option to freeze their license. By doing so, they understand that although their License is Lifetime, during the freeze period, they will not have access to the website or Reservations Hotline. The Licensee may freeze their license without penalty by contacting SaveOn Resorts at least 7 days prior to their Annual Renewal Fee due date. * * * Discount Variation. All benefits and discounts conferred through this Agreement vary greatly based on the characteristics of the vacation unit or type, the time of year, space availability, and/or the rates charged by those parties listing the accommodations for rent. The Licensee acknowledges that he/she has been advised that while some discounts may be significant, these same accommodations may not enjoy deep discounts at other times and that deep discounts are not available for some vacation units or types at any time. The Licensee acknowledges that the value in this License is expected to be realized over time and that the License Fee is not guaranteed to be recovered on a single vacation, the first year, if the Licensee does not take vacations, or if the vacation choices are not tailored to deep discount offerings, but rather are contingent on the frequency of the use of the software. Assistance of Personal Live Travel Concierge and Website Access. The Licensee shall be provided 24 hour access to the internet website www.planwithWIN.com and may book travel arrangements through this website 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, with the exception of those travel arrangements which require the coordination of booking assistance with travel vendors, such as cruise lines. The Licensee shall also be provided access to a Personal Live Travel Concierge Agent at 1-858-649-1481 during the hours of 9am through 9pm EST, Mondays through Fridays, and 10am through 4pm EST, Saturdays, at no additional charge. The hours of availability for the Live Travel Concierge Agent are subject to change without notice. * * * 11 Live Online Software Demonstration and Tutorial. The Licensee acknowledges that he/she has had direct access to, including a live demonstration online, and a complete tutorial covering usage of the software program operation prior to the execution of this Agreement and was able to review the benefits with a sales agent of the Licensor. The Licensee acknowledges that they are comfortable with the operation of online software program. The Licensee acknowledges that the licensor has informed him/her that at any time during normal business hours, the Licensee may also call SaveOn Resorts at (858)649-1481 to schedule an additional tutorial for assistance with the operation of the software at no additional cost. On February 18, 2016, Petitioner and her sister spoke by telephone to Dae Byun, WIN's Member Services Agent, who walked them through the online software tutorial. By the end of the call with Mr. Byun, the sisters were familiar with the software capabilities and how to use it. Mr. Byun asked the sisters if they knew where their first trip would be. They explained that they intended to travel to Rome in August or September 2016 to attend a ceremony at the Vatican for a friend who was celebrating his 50th anniversary as a priest. Mr. Byun told the sisters that when they call to make travel arrangements, they should dial his direct line in Orlando because he had been a travel agent for over 30 years, was very familiar with Italy, and could easily assist them. Mr. Byun told the sisters that when they called, they should speak exclusively with him and that he worked Monday through Friday, and was not available on weekends. Because both sisters are retired, these arrangements were fine with them. During this same call, the sisters asked Mr. Byun to begin working on their flight from Philadelphia to Rome on August 31, 2016. They advised that they did not need hotels in Rome because a friend had made arrangements for them to stay in a convent bed-and-breakfast. However, they sought hotels in Venice and Florence on September 9 and September 18 through 22, 2016, respectively. Mr. Byun spoke knowledgeably about hotels and travel in Italy, and the sisters were pleased. Petitioner used WIN's personal travel concierge to book a one-night hotel room stay at a Microtel in Leesburg, Florida, for $65.00 during the week of February 27, 2016. During the months of March and April 2016, the sisters made multiple calls to WIN's Orlando office in an attempt to speak with Mr. Byun to schedule their Rome trip. Most times they called, they were told he was out of the office or training new customers on the software. Because of Mr. Byun's initial instruction to speak only to Mr. Byun regarding the trip to Rome, they did not want to speak with another member services agent for this trip. On or about March 23, 2016, Petitioner also called to arrange a rental cabin in the North Carolina Mountains for a girlfriends' gathering. Petitioner was told that WIN did not have access to discounts and reservations for private cabins, but she was provided information on a condominium and hotel room options in the area. Because Petitioner found the choices provided by WIN unsuitable for her group, she chose to make her own arrangements. During March and April 2016, the sisters spoke to Mr. Byun regarding the Italy trip once or twice. WIN sent four e-mails to the sisters on April 15 with a tentative flight schedule, hotel options, and train information for Italy. The sisters were not pleased with the initial flight itinerary because it called for a layover on the way from Philadelphia to Italy. They were concerned that their luggage was more likely to be lost with a layover and asked for a direct flight. According to Petitioner, her sister had a follow-up conversation with Mr. Byun during which she selected a direct flight, provided credit card information, and asked him to book the flight. Mr. Byun testified that he was told at that time that they were not sure of their travel dates. This was a preliminary search only. He has no notes reflecting credit card or any additional information he would have needed to book the flight, such as dates of birth, passport numbers, frequent flyer account numbers, and seat preferences. Mr. Byun credibly testified that if he booked airline tickets, that would be done in one phone call with the client on the line because airfares change within minutes. Mr. Byun would not quote an airfare with the intention of booking a flight at a later time, even on the same date. Mr. Byun had no further conversation with the sisters regarding the Italy trip. According to Petitioner, on May 24, 2016, her sister received her credit card statement and realized there was no charge for airline tickets. The sisters were panicked because they had learned Mother Teresa was being canonized a saint in Rome at the same time as their trip and flights and hotels were filling up quickly. The sisters attempted to reach Mr. Byun by telephone to demand an explanation. Although they did not reach Mr. Byun, another WIN employee explained that there was no record of reservations of the proposed trip to Italy. Within a few days, the sisters opted to use the services of AAA to book the trip to Italy. The sisters sent a letter by e-mail on May 31, 2016, expressing their extreme disappointment and asked "What are we paying you for?" They received no response. They subsequently used the services of the Glanz law firm to send WIN a demand letter seeking a refund of the $5,400.00. They also filed a complaint with the Better Business Bureau and the Department. Petitioner and her sister traveled to Italy and Greece from August 31 through September 23, 2016, without the assistance of WIN. Beginning in February 2017, Petitioner's sister began receiving correspondence and frequent automated calls from WIN that their annual maintenance fee of $199.00 is due. Although Petitioner and her sister have made their intention clear that they do not wish to use the services of WIN going forward, they have not asked to "freeze" their account as is provided for in the Agreement.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner Alice Kenyon's claim against WIN and the surety bond be DENIED. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of August, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MARY LI CREASY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of August, 2017. COPIES FURNISHED: W. Alan Parkinson, Bureau Chief Bureau of Mediation and Enforcement Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Rhodes Building, R-3 2005 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-6500 (eServed) Tina Robinson Bureau of Mediation and Enforcement Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Rhodes Building, R-3 2005 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida (eServed) 32399-6500 Alice B. Kenyon 5668 Travelers Way Fort Pierce, Florida 34982-3989 (eServed) Kenneth Hamner, Esquire The Entrepreneur Law Center, P.L. 250 North Orange Avenue, Suite 600 Orlando, Florida 32801 (eServed) Tom A. Steckler, Director Division of Consumer Services Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 520 407 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Stephen Donelan, Agency Clerk Division of Administration Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 509 407 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 (eServed)

Florida Laws (4) 120.569559.926559.927559.929
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INTERNATIONAL TOURS OF JUNO BEACH AND WEST PALM BEACH vs PALM BEACH COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 89-006775BID (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Dec. 08, 1989 Number: 89-006775BID Latest Update: Feb. 07, 1990

Findings Of Fact On August 8, 1989, Respondent issued to prospective vendors a clear and unambiguous request for proposals (RFP) relating to the delivery to travel agency services for the School District of Palm Beach County, Florida. All proposals were due no later than August 28, 1989. Review of proposals, to include any interviews Respondent deemed necessary, was to take place between August 29 and September 18, 1989. The following appears in Paragraph 1.1 of the RFP, in the introductory section: 1.1 This is a Request for Proposal (RFP) to provide travel agency services to the School District of Palm Beach County, Florida; The School District operates 112 schools and 55 administrative departments in an area encompassing 2,332 square miles. The services include but are not limited to, purchases and delivery of air and other modes of travel tickets and related travel services. ... The introductory section of the RFP also provides the names, titles and telephone numbers of two persons to whom questions could be directed. The following appears in Paragraph 5.5 of the RFP, in the terms and conditions section: 5.5 The District reserves the right to reject any or all proposals, to further negotiate any proposal, to request clarification of information submitted in any proposal, and to request additional information from any Proposer. Proposals relating to the provision of the following services are solicited in Paragraph 6.1 of the RFP, the scope of services section: 6.1 The following are to be included in the specific tasks to be performed by the Travel Agency; however, it is not considered as a complete list of tasks: A. Deliver tickets, itineraries and other travel documents to the specific office or school requesting same. Proposals from several vendors were received, including proposals from Petitioner and ETA Travel Agency. Petitioner's response to Paragraph 6.1(A) was as follows: Ticket Delivery: will be made as follows: An On-Site reservation and ticketing facility at a mutually acceptable location on School Board administration property. Deliveries will be made to other offices as follows: Scheduled. Emergency. Delivery receipts. Via agency and outside courier service. ETA's response to Paragraph 6.1(A) was as follows: E.T.A. provides immediate free delivery of airline tickets and documents to school board travelers as detailed below: E.T.A.'s radio dispatched couriers provide unlimited deliveries of tickets and travel documents to schools and school board offices from Jupiter to Boca Raton as often as required throughout the business day. At E.T.A. Travel we never limit deliveries to once of twice a day. Tickets are delivered according to the school board's schedule - not ours. In addition to office delivery, E.T.A.'s couriers will deliver tickets and documents to the traveler's home or to other designated place whenever required. Deliveries to west area schools and school board offices are provided through the school board's "pony express" mail system, time permitting, or through federal express overnight delivery services. Deliveries to out-of-county travelers, or to west area travelers requiring expedited delivery, are provided through federal express overnight delivery service. E.T.A. Travel Agency utilizes a delivery and pickup receipt system to insure tracking of all airline tickets. To insure accountability all tickets delivered and picked up must be signed for and receipted at the time of exchange. While in the process of evaluating the respective proposals, Dr. Henry Boekhaff, Respondent's Associate Superintendent for Administration, contacted Mr. James Bertino, the owner of Petitioner to seek clarification as to the operation of Petitioner's proposed on-site ticketing and reservation facility. Mr. Bertino explained that there would be located on school board property a satellite ticket printer that could print airline tickets at the school board site. However, Mr. Bertino did not make it clear to Dr. Boekhoff that the travel documents printed on the satellite ticket printer would be delivered by Petitioner to each office requesting the travel document. Mr. Bertino's verbal description of the manner in which the satellite ticket printer would operate, along with Petitioner's written response to Paragraph 6.1(A), caused Dr. Boekhoff to conclude that Petitioner was not proposing to deliver travel documents to each requesting office. Respondent, following its review of Petitioner's proposal and following Dr. Boekhoff's conversation with Mr. Bertino, construed Petitioner's proposal as making a distinction between deliveries to offices in the administrative building in which the satellite ticket printer was to be located and deliveries to other offices. Respondent construed the proposal to require that persons whose offices were in the same building as the satellite ticket printer to pick up from the printer the tickets, itineraries, and other travel documents they had requested, while deliveries to offices in other administrative buildings and schools would be made by Petitioner. Respondent's construction of Petitioner's proposal was a reasonable construction of the written proposal presented by Petitioner and of the comments Mr. Bertino made to Dr. Boekhoff. Petitioner did not make it clear in either its response to Paragraph 6.1(A) or during the conversation between Mr. Bertino and Dr. Boekhoff that the Petitioner was proposing to deliver tickets to each office in the administrative building where the satellite facility would be located, a service that is of primary importance to Respondent. Following the evaluation of awards the proposal of ETA was selected, subject to the resolution of any timely protest. The services to be afforded by the vendor and the cost of those services were the items of primary importance to Respondent in evaluating and selecting a vendor. Petitioner's protest of the intended award of the contract to ETA was filed on a timely basis. During the informal hearing held in an attempt to resolve this dispute and in the formal hearing held in this proceeding, Petitioner, through Mr. Bertino, maintained that it intended by its response to Paragraph 6.1(A) to state that it would deliver tickets, itineraries, and travel related documents to every School Board office. Petitioner contends that it should be permitted to clarify its intentions at this time. Although Petitioner's response to Paragraph 6.1(A) did not cause its proposal to be rejected by Respondent, the Petitioner's failure to clearly state that it would deliver tickets, itineraries, and other travel documents to each requesting office was the primary reason the proposal of Petitioner was not selected. The services that ETA proposed in its response was the deciding factor in its favor.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board of Palm Beach County enter a final order which rejects the bid protest filed by International Tours of Juno Beach and which accepts the proposal submitted by ETA Travel Agency. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of February, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 1990. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-6775BID The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Petitioner. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 1 are adopted in material part by paragraph 11 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 2 are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made in paragraph 13 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 3 are rejected, in part, as being contrary to the weight of the evidence. The evidence failed to establish that the proposal submitted by Petitioner was superior to the proposal submitted by ETA. What action the School Board may have taken had Petitioner clearly stated its proposal is speculative. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 4 are adopted in part by paragraph 9 of the Recommended Order and are rejected in part as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. While Mr. Boekhoff did contact ETA during the evaluation period regarding its organizational structure, there is no contention that such contact was improper. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 5 are rejected as being conclusions of law instead of findings of fact. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 6 are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made in paragraph 10 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 7 are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made in Paragraph 13 or as being conclusions of law and not findings of fact. 8-10. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 8-10 are rejected as being conclusions of law and not findings of fact. The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Respondent: The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 1 are adopted in part by paragraph 1 of the Recommended Order and are rejected in part as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 2 are adopted in material part by paragraph 11 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 3 are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made in paragraph 13 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 4 are adopted in material part by paragraph 5 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 5 are adopted in material part by paragraph 7 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 6 are adopted in material part by paragraph 10 of the Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald R. Fountain, Jr., Esquire Lytal & Reiter 515 North Flagler Drive Post Office Box 024466 West Palm Beach, Florida 33402-4466 Robert A. Rosillo, Esquire School of Palm Beach County 3970 RCA Boulevard Suite 7010 Palm Beach Gardens, Florida 33410 Thomas J. Mills Superintendent of Schools The School Board of Palm Beach County, Florida Post Office Box 24690 West Palm Beach, Florida 33416-4690

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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GLOBAL TOURING, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES, 94-005096 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Sep. 14, 1994 Number: 94-005096 Latest Update: Jan. 23, 1995

The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to an exemption from the requirements of Section 559.927, Florida Statutes, under subsection (12)(h) of the statute.

Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Global Touring, Inc., is in the wholesale travel business. It sells Australia and New Zealand travel packages to travel agencies. Jennifer Pickens is Global Touring, Inc.'s sole shareholder and its President. Pickens has been in the travel business in Broward County, Florida, since 1983, when she started her own travel agency, Global Travel Service, which she operated as a sole proprietorship. At the time, the Air Traffic Conference (hereinafter referred to as the "ATC") had an airline ticket purchase and payment program for participating travel agents. In September of 1983, Pickens contracted with the ATC to participate in its program. She was given an ATC Agency Code Number (618310) and placed on the official ATC Agency List. Approximately a year later, Pickens began a wholesale travel operation, Global Touring Service, which sold tours to Australia and New Zealand. Global Touring Service and Global Travel Service operated out of the same office. Pickens used her ATC Agency Code Number to write airline tickets for both operations. Effective the close of business on December 30, 1984, the ATC terminated its airline ticket purchase and payment program for travel agents. The ATC program, however, was replaced by a similar program operated by the Airlines Reporting Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the "ARC"). Travel agents on the official ATC Agency List were given an opportunity, at their option, to be placed on the official ARC Agency List "in substantially the same status as that agent st[ood] on the ATC list on December 30[, 1984,]" by entering into an agreement with the ARC to participate in its replacement program. Pickens opted to participate in the program. She was assigned an ARC Agency Code Number and placed on the official ARC Agency List. On November 20, 1985, Pickens incorporated her business enterprises. She created one corporate entity, Jennifer R. Pickens Travel, Inc., with two operating divisions: Global Travel Service and Global Touring Service. The newly formed corporation continued to operate under the contract Pickens had entered into with the ARC. In 1986, Jennifer R. Pickens Travel, Inc., purchased another travel agency, Lighthouse Travel Services. Jennifer R. Pickens Travel, Inc., assumed Lighthouse Travel Services' contract with the ARC and Lighthouse Travel Services' ARC Agency Code Number and it cancelled the ARC agreement under which it had been conducting business prior to its purchase of Lighthouse Travel Services. Lighthouse Travel Services and Global Travel Service were combined into one retail travel operating division bearing the name of the former. In December of 1991, Jennifer R. Pickens Travel, Inc., changed its name to Global Touring, Inc., and eliminated its retail travel operating division. Since that time, it has engaged only in the wholesale travel business. On or about March 1, 1992, Global Touring, Inc., sold the assets of its former retail travel operating division, including its ARC contract and ARC Agency Code Number, to YAM, Inc. Following the sale, Global Touring, Inc., sought to enter into another contract with the ARC and obtain a new ARC Agency Code Number. Because the paperwork Global Touring, Inc., initially submitted to the ARC was lost, it was not until on or about December 9, 1992, that Global Touring, Inc., entered into such a contract and received a new ARC Agency Code Number (10-53349-3). The contract is still in effect. Since its inception, with the exception of the period from on or about March 1, 1992, to on or about December 9, 1992, Global Touring, Inc., has continuously operated under a contract with the ARC. While it has undergone a name change, it has remained under the ownership and control of the same person, Jennifer Pickens, during the entire time that it has had a contractual relationship with the ARC. Earlier this year, Global Touring, Inc. submitted to the Department an application for a statement certifying that, based upon the total number of years it has contracted with the ARC, it is exempt from the requirements of Section 559.927, Florida Statutes. Pickens, who prepared the application, failed to sign it. In the application, she asserted that Global Touring, Inc., had been "a member of ARC since: 09/14/83," holding "ARC Number 618310." The Department preliminarily determined to deny the application. In its letter to Pickens advising her of its preliminary determination (hereinafter referred to as the "Notice of Proposed Denial"), the Department gave the following reasons for its proposed action: Application for exemption unsigned, with wrong data; 2) ARC approval 10-53349-3, made 12/9/92 is less than 3 years. Such proposed action is consistent with the Department's practice of granting exemptions under subsection (12)(h) of Section 559.927, Florida Statutes, only to those sellers of travel who are able to show that they have an agreement with the ARC which has been in effect for at least the immediately preceding three years. Pickens responded to the Department's advisement with a letter of her own, the body of which read as follows: We wish to apply for a Formal Procedure Hearing. We applied for an exemption on July 22, 1994 and it seems that the reviewer completely ignored all the enclosures. We have been in the travel business since 1983. We took over Lighthouse Travel in 1985 and had the ARC number 618310 for seven years until selling Lighthouse Travel in 1992 and allowing the ARC number to remain with that part of the business. In 1992, after having our application lost, we again became members of ARC, and all of the above under the same company, Jennifer R. Pickens Travel Inc. which changed its name in 1991 to Global Tour- ing, Inc. In the interim we have become one of the 10 largest American Wholesalers to Australia and New Zealand. Our company can obviously prove an ARC relationship for 3 years (actually 11 years) and a history of selling travel for the same period. We therefore request an exemption as per our submis- sion and inasmuch as a formal hearing seems to be the procedure, we hereby request such a hearing. The letter was dated August 25, 1994, and signed by Pickens in her capacity as the President of Global Touring, Inc. After receiving Pickens' letter, the Department referred the instant matter to the Division of Administrative hearings.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order granting Petitioner's application for a letter of exemption pursuant to Section 559.927, Florida Statues. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 27th day of December, 1994. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of December, 1994.

Florida Laws (3) 120.54120.57559.927 Florida Administrative Code (1) 5J-9.0015
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