Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all relevant times, respondent, Passport Internationale, Inc. (Passport or respondent), was a seller of travel registered with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department). As such, it was required to post a performance bond with the Department conditioned on the performance of contracted services. In this case, petitioner, Barbara Bradshaw, has filed a claim against the bond in the amount of $435.40 alleging that Passport failed to perform on certain contracted services. For touring a timeshare resort in early 1992, petitioner received a travel certificate as a gift. After paying a $179.00 validation fee, the certificate entitled the holder to a five day, four night stay in the Bahamas. The certificate carried the name, address and logo of Passport International Express, a fictitious name then being used by Passport. Passport's assets and liabilities were assumed by Incentive Internationale Travel, Inc. (Incentive) in June 1991, and the corporation was dissolved sometime in 1991. Even so, Incentive continued to sell Passport's travel certificates at least through April 1992, when petitioner received her certificate. Therefore, the travel services described in those certificates were protected by Passport's bond. To validate her certificate, on April 17, 1992, petitioner sent Passport International Express a check in the amount of $179.00. Thereafter, she upgraded her accommodations, purchased additional land accommodations, and paid for port taxes. These items totaled $242.00, and were paid by check sent to Incentive on May 26, 1992. Throughout this process, petitioner assumed she was still dealing with Passport since she was never formally advised that Passport had been dissolved or that Incentive had assumed all of Passport's obligations. Petitioner was scheduled to depart on her trip on July 24, 1992. On July 15, 1992, Incentive mailed her a form letter advising that it was necessary to "temporarily delay" her trip due to "circumstances beyond (its control.)" She was offered several options, including a total refund of her money to be made in January 1993. She opted for a refund. To date, however, nothing has been paid, and Incentive is now subject to bankruptcy court protection.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the claim of petitioner against the bond of respondent be granted and that she be reimbursed from the bond in the amount of $421.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of December, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara Bradshaw 1169 La Mesa Avenue Winter Springs, Florida 32708 Michael J. Panaggio 2441 Bellevue Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Robert G. Worley, Esquire 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard D. Tritschler, Esquire The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to his claim against Respondent’s security deposit posted with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: On July 30, 2019, Michael and Barbara Warren, a retired couple living in Clermont, attended a “Vacation Seminar” sponsored by Vacations Plus Travel, a North Carolina based company that operates as an alter ego of Luxury Vacations, which is based in Florida. The seminar was staged in a conference room of the Hampton Inn in Clermont. The Warrens were lured by the promise of a free cruise if they listened to a sales presentation by representatives of Vacations Plus Travel. Mr. Warren testified that they were subjected to intense sales pressure to buy a software license that they were told would give them access to “true wholesale prices” on all their travel needs, from transportation to lodging, for the rest of their lives. The price of the license was in excess of $7,000, but the salesman promised it would more than pay for itself in savings. Mr. Warren placed the full purchase amount of $7,593.00 on a credit card. The “Reservation Services License Agreement” signed by the Warrens stated in bold type: Assuming the Licensee(s) has not accessed any benefits and has returned all materials delivered to them at closing, the Licensee(s) has the right to rescind this transaction within a period of three (3) days by sending notice of cancellation via certified mail, return receipt requested. Almost immediately after leaving the seminar, the Warrens regretted their purchase. They began calling the toll free phone number listed in their purchase documents to cancel the contract. No one ever answered the phone. Ms. Warren testified that she managed to leave a voice message stating that they wished to cancel the contract but the call was never returned. The Warrens did not send a notice of cancellation via certified mail. Mr. Warren testified that on August 19, 2019, he received an email from Luxury Vacations with instructions on using its website, including a password. Mr. Warren testified that he signed onto the website but that it was not functional. There was a home page, but clicking on any of the proffered links returned only a blank page. Mr. Warren stated that he and his wife were away from home for a time after August 19, 2019, and took no further action either to cancel the contract or use the website. When they came home, the Warrens again signed onto the Luxury Vacations website and this time found it to be functional. Mr. Warren testified that the website was not at all what was promised at the seminar in Clermont. The website was essentially a presentation of advertisements for vacation rentals, minus any information on price comparisons that would enable the Warrens to determine the savings they might realize by booking through the Luxury Vacations site. The properties themselves were also not to the Warrens’s liking. Mr. Warren testified that he and his wife decided they would never recoup the cost of the license and again attempted to cancel by phoning the number provided with their contract materials. Again, they were unable to speak to anyone or get any kind of response from Luxury Vacations. The Warrens sent a letter to Luxury Vacations, via certified mail, on August 27, 2019, informing the company of their inability to use the website and requesting cancellation of the contract. They heard nothing from the company. Having failed to cancel the contract by direct means, the Warrens contacted their credit card company to dispute the transaction. Blake Adams, the CEO of Luxury Vacations, testified that the company was “blindsided” by the Warrens’s dispute of the credit card charges because up to that point the company had heard nothing from the Warrens. As adamantly as Mr. Warren testified that he and his wife made repeated efforts to contact the company, Mr. Adams just as adamantly testified that the company had no record of any calls from the Warrens and no correspondence of any kind prior to receiving the notice of dispute from the credit card provider. Luxury Vacations provided sufficient information to the credit card provider to uphold the purchase and receive the funds for the Warrens’s license purchase. The Warrens’s cancellation letter had been misdelivered and did not reach Luxury Vacations until September 16, 2019. A December 31, 2020, letter to the Warrens from Stephanie Sorrentino, an employee of Luxury Vacations, states that upon receiving the cancellation letter, the company contacted the Warrens to explain that their account was active and to inform them of how to use the services they had purchased. The Warrens denied ever being contacted by Ms. Sorrentino or anyone else from Luxury Vacations. Mr. Warren timely filed the claim for $7,593.00 against the performance bond with the Department on or about September 25, 2019. Mr. Adams testified that Mr. Warren’s testimony about seeing only advertisements on the Luxury Vacations’ website showed that Mr. Warren was never actually logged into the website. Mr. Adams stated that the splash page of the website includes advertising, but that once the user logs into the licensed portion of the site there are no advertisements. Mr. Warren testified that he is a retired engineer and circuit designer and is perfectly capable of signing on to a website. The parties also disputed the events of July 31, 2019, the day after the Warrens signed the contract with Luxury Vacations. Mr. Adams testified that his company was at the Hampton Inn in Clermont all day on July 31, 2019, presenting another sales seminar. He stated that the Warrens could have come to the Hampton Inn and discussed rescission of their contract with the on-site representative of the company. Ms. Warren testified that she in fact went back to the Hampton Inn on July 31, 2019, and that no one from Luxury Vacations was there. Mr. Adams testified that the Warrens have an active contract with Luxury Vacations and the company remains ready to assist the couple in achieving the savings promised at the sales seminar. In summary, the Warrens present a sympathetic case. They were subjected to a high-pressure sales pitch and succumbed. Once away from the pressurized sales environment, they regretted their purchase and took some steps to rescind it. They repeatedly phoned the number provided by Luxury Vacations. However, the one thing they did not do was take the action specifically set forth in the contract they had just signed: send notice of cancellation within a period of three days via certified mail, return receipt requested. They waited until August 27, 2019, to send a written notice of cancellation to Luxury Vacations. Section 559.929(2) provides that the performance bond at issue in this proceeding must be in favor of the Department and is for “the use and benefit of a consumer who is injured by the fraud, misrepresentation, breach of contract, or financial failure, or any other violation of this part by the seller of travel.” There is no evidence that Luxury Vacations committed fraud, misrepresentation, or that it breached its contract with the Warrens. Luxury Vacations did not fail financially. Therefore, the Warrens may only succeed in claiming against the bond by showing that Luxury Vacations violated part XI of chapter 559. At the hearing, the undersigned raised the possibility that section 559.932, titled “Vacation Certificate Disclosure,” might apply in this case. Respondents argued that this statute did not apply because Luxury Vacations does not sell “vacation certificates,” which are defined in section 559.927(14) as: any arrangement, plan, program, vacation package, or advance travel purchase that promotes, discusses, or discloses a destination or itinerary or type of travel, whereby a purchaser is entitled to the use of travel, accommodations, or facilities for any number of days, whether certain or uncertain, during the period in which the certificate can be exercised, and no specific date or dates for its use are designated. A vacation certificate does not include prearranged travel or tourist-related services when a seller of travel remits full payment for the cost of such services to the provider or supplier within 10 business days of the purchaser’s initial payment to the seller of travel. The term does not include travel if exact travel dates are selected, guaranteed, and paid for at the time of the purchase. Respondents were correct that the software license at the heart of the contract between the Warrens and Luxury Vacations did not meet the definition of a “vacation certificate.” However, the undersigned raised the possibility that the statutory language of section 559.932 reaches more than vacation certificates, in spite of its title: A seller of travel must provide each person solicited with a contract that includes the following information, which shall be in 12-point type, unless otherwise specified…. The quoted language does not appear confined to sales of vacation certificates but applicable to any solicitation by a “seller of travel” such as Luxury Vacations. Part of the information that must be included in the contract is the following: (h) In immediate proximity to the space reserved in the contract for the date and the name, address, and signature of the purchaser, the following statement in boldfaced type of a size of 10 points: “YOU MAY CANCEL THIS CONTRACT WITHOUT ANY PENALTY OR OBLIGATION WITHIN 30 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF PURCHASE OR RECEIPT OF THE VACATION CERTIFICATE, WHICHEVER OCCURS LATER.” “YOU MAY ALSO CANCEL THIS CONTRACT IF ACCOMMODATIONS OR FACILITIES ARE NOT AVAILABLE PURSUANT TO A REQUEST FOR USE AS PROVIDED IN THE CONTRACT.” “TO CANCEL THIS AGREEMENT, A SIGNED AND DATED COPY OF A STATEMENT THAT YOU ARE CANCELING THE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE MAILED AND POSTMARKED, OR DELIVERED TO (NAME) AT (ADDRESS) NO LATER THAN MIDNIGHT OF (DATE) .” Respondents conceded that if this provision were applicable in the instant case, and Luxury Vacations had been required to give the Warrens 30 days in which to cancel their contract, then the Warrens’s August 27, 2019, cancellation letter was timely. However, Respondents continued to argue that section 559.932, taken as a whole, is plainly intended to apply only to contracts for vacation certificates. After careful review of the statute and the Proposed Recommended Order of American Contractors Indemnity Company, the undersigned is persuaded that Respondents have read section 559.932 correctly. The statute provides ten discrete provisions that a contract must contain, most of which are clearly directed to the terms and conditions for stays at specific destinations. Nearly all of these provisions would be inapplicable to the software licensing contract but would nonetheless be mandatory if section 559.932 applied to this contract. Further indication that the 30-day notice requirement is applicable only to vacation certificates is section 559.933, titled “Vacation certificate cancellation and refund provisions,” subsection (1)(a) of which provides: A seller of travel or an assignee must honor a purchaser’s request to cancel a vacation certificate if such request is made: (a) Within 30 days after the date of purchase or receipt of the vacation certificate, whichever occurs later…. Section 559.933 is replete with references to the 30-day cancellation requirement and is clearly limited to vacation certificates. Aside from the 30-day cancellation period for vacation certificates, part XI of chapter 559 appears to mandate no specific time period for cancellations of contracts. Looking farther afield, the Federal Trade Commission’s “Cooling Off” rule, 16 C.F.R. § 429, gives a consumer in the Warrens’s position three days to cancel a sale. Sections 501.021-.055, Florida Statutes, provide substantially the same right to cancel a “home solicitation sale,” which by definition includes the transaction at issue in this proceeding. See § 501.021(1), Fla. Stat. Luxury Vacations’ notice of cancellation rights did not comply fully with the letter of section 501.031, which provides: Every home solicitation sale shall be evidenced by a writing as provided in this section. In a home solicitation sale, the seller must present to and obtain from the buyer his or her signature to a written agreement or offer to purchase which designates, as the date of the transaction, the date on which the buyer actually signs and which contains a statement of the buyer’s rights, which statement complies with subsection (2). The statement must: Appear under the conspicuous caption, “BUYER’S RIGHT TO CANCEL”; Read as follows: “This is a home solicitation sale, and if you do not want the goods or services, you may cancel this agreement by providing written notice to the seller in person, by telegram, or by mail. This notice must indicate that you do not want the goods or services and must be delivered or postmarked before midnight of the third business day after you sign this agreement. If you cancel this agreement, the seller may not keep all or part of any cash down payment.” The Luxury Vacations’ contract provision was not consistent with section 501.031. It did not include a “conspicuous caption” of “BUYER’S RIGHT TO CANCEL” in all capital letters. It did not include the statutory language verbatim. The cancellation language in the Luxury Vacations’ contract was printed in bold type but no larger than the other language and was not on the page signed by the Warrens. The Luxury Vacations’ cancellation clause limited the exercise of the cancellation right to written notice via certified mail; the statute provides that the buyer may cancel in person, by telegram, or by mail. The relevant statutes provide that any person making home solicitation sales must first obtain a permit from the clerk of the court of the county in which the sales are to take place. § 501.022(2), Fla. Stat. The clerk of the court may revoke, suspend, or deny issuance of a home solicitation sales permit for failure to comply with any provision of sections 501.021-.055. § 501.022(4), Fla. Stat. The Attorney General or a state attorney may initiate proceedings to enjoin any person found to be violating the provisions of sections 501.021-.055. § 501.052, Fla. Stat. There are criminal penalties that attach to violations of the cited sections. See § 501.055, Fla. Stat. However, the home solicitation sales statutes are silent as to any direct remedy that a consumer may pursue for the failure of a home solicitation seller to abide by the notice provision of section 501.031. Also, the terms of the performance bond statute limit consumer claims to violations of part XI of chapter 559. The undersigned was unable to find a provision of part XI that would encompass the home solicitation seller’s cancellation notice requirements.1
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services issue a final order denying Michael Warren’s claim of $7,593.00 against the performance bond of Luxury Vacations in Paradise, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of April, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Blake Adams Luxury Vacations in Paradise, Inc. #219 5379 Lyons Road Coconut Creek, Florida 33073 Michael Cole Warren 2869 Highland View Circle Clermont, Florida 34711 Honorable Nicole “Nikki” Fried Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of April, 2021. W. Alan Parkinson, Bureau Chief Bureau of Mediation and Enforcement Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Rhodes Building, R-3 2005 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-6500 Garen H. Kasparian, Esquire American Contractors Indemnity Company 801 South Figueroa Street Los Angeles, California 90017 Steven Hall, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 407 South Calhoun Street, Suite 520 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all relevant times, respondent, Passport Internationale, Inc. (Passport or respondent), was a seller of travel registered with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department). As such, it was required to post a performance bond with the Department conditioned on the performance of contracted services. In this case, petitioner, H. Fleischer, has filed a claim against the bond for $648.95 alleging that Passport failed to perform on certain contracted services. On an undisclosed date in 1991, petitioner responded to a newspaper advertisement promoting a five-day, four-night cruise to the Bahamas for $99.00 per person. After calling a toll-free number, petitioner was told that in order to take the trip, he must purchase a video for $198.00 plus $11.95 postage, or a total of $209.95. Petitioner agreed to purchase the video in order to take advantage of the trip. The advertisement was being run by a telemarketeer in Tennessee who had been authorized to sell Passport's travel certificates. As such, it was acting as an agent on behalf of Passport. In June 1991, the assets and liabilities of Passport were assumed by Incentive Internationale Travel, Inc. (Incentive). Even so, any travel described in certificates sold after that date under the name of Passport was still protected by Passport's bond. Within seven days after receiving the video and other materials, which carried the name, address, logo and telephone number of Passport, petitioner returned the same to the telemarketeer along with a request for a refund of his money. When he did not receive a refund, he filed a complaint with the Department. In response to a Department inquiry, in December 1991 Incentive declined to issue a refund on the ground the video was purchased from a Tennessee firm, and not Passport, and Passport had never received any money from the telemarketeer. Incentive offered, however, to honor the travel certificate by allowing petitioner to purchase a trip to the Bahamas under the same terms and conditions as were previously offered. On July 6, 1992, petitioner accepted Incentive's offer and paid that firm $439.00 for additional accommodations, meals, fees and taxes. Shortly after July 24, 1992, petitioner received a letter from Incentive advising that his trip had been cancelled and that the firm had filed for bankruptcy protection. To date, petitioner has not received a refund of his money.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the claim of petitioner against the bond of respondent be granted, and he be reimbursed $648.95 from the bond. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of December, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: H. Fleischer 15 Wind Ridge Road North Caldwell, NJ 07006 Michael J. Panaggio 2441 Bellevue Avenue Daytona Beach, FL 32114 Robert G. Worley, Esquire 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard D. Tritschler, Esquire The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: Stipulated Facts: Petitioner submitted its application for DBE certification on or about July 27, 1993. Petitioner and Travel Professionals International Licensing Co., d/b/a Travel Professionals, Inc. (TPI) entered into a franchise agreement on September 28, 1993. Department conducted an on-site review of Petitioner's business on November 4, 1993. Department notified Petitioner of its intent to deny its application for DBE certification by certified mail on December 9, 1993. Petitioner requested a hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, on December 15, 1993. One hundred per cent of Petitioner's stock is owned by Jeanne Santo, a "socially and economically disadvantaged individual" as defined in Rule 14- 78.002(1), Florida Administrative Code, and therefore, Petitioner is in compliance with 14-78.005(7)(b), Florida Administrative Code. All securities which constitute ownership by Jeanne Santo are held directly by Jeanne Santo, and therefore Petitioner is in compliance with Rule 14-78.005(7)(d), Florida Administrative Code. The contributions of capital or expertise invested by Jeanne Santo are real and substantial, and therefore Petitioner is in compliance with Rule 14- 78.005(7)(f), Florida Administrative Code. The provisions of Rule 14-78.005(g) and (h), Florida Administrative Code, do not apply to Petitioner. The franchise agreement (Agreement) between Petitioner and TPI contains the following terms and conditions which are not in the agreements between Petitioner and Airlines Reporting Corporation (ARC); Petitioner and International Airlines Travel Agent Network (IATAN); and Petitioner and Systems One: a requirement that Petitioner locate its travel office only in "That portion of Pinellas County, Florida lying south of Florida State Highway 694". a requirement that Petitioner pay a quarterly advertising contribution. a requirement that Petitioner attend mandatory managers' meetings. ARC is customary in the travel agency industry. IATAN is customary in the travel agency industry. A leasing agreement for an automated reservation and ticketing system is customary in the travel industry. The Agreement requires that Petitioner be an ARC agent. Facts Not Stipulated The Fral Highway Administration (FHWA) is the federal agency that inisters the DBE program on the national level. The Department is the agency charged with the responsibility of administering the DBE program for the State of Florida. In making its determination of an applicant's eligibility for DBE, the Department considers: (a) Surface Transportation Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987 (Public Law 100-17); (b) 49 CFR Part 23; (c) Chapter 339, Florida Statutes, (d) Chapter 14-78, Florida Administrative Code, (e) United States Department of Transportation (USDOT) administrative decisions; and (f) guidelines and training material from the FHWA or USDOT. The USDOT through FHWA provided the Department with a copy of DBE Program Administration Manual (Publication No. FHWA-HI-90-047, April, 1990) which the Department uses as a guideline for USDOT's and FWWA's interpretation of the DBE program. Below are portions of the Agreement which are pertinent to this preceeding: Purposes of this Agreement: We have developed the Travel Professionals International System (hereinafter called "the TPI System) for the operation of retail travel agencies, and we have developed policies, procedures and techniques that are designed to enable such agencies to compete more effectively in the travel market... You have requested our assistance, the use of the TPI Systems, and a franchise from us to operate a retail travel agency using the TPI System.... Franchise: We hereby grant to you and you hereby accept from us a franchise to operate a retail travel agency utilizing the TPI System, only at the following location(s): That portion of Pinellas County, Florida lying south of Florida State Highway 694. We will not establish another franchisee or agency owned by us within the territory described above, or establish other franchises or company owned outlets providing similar products and services under a different trade name or trademark or modify your territory without your written permission, so long as you are not in default under the terms of this Agreement.... You may move the office of the travel agency to a new location in the same general vicinity with our prior written approval, which approval will not be unreasonably withheld. You may not operate any additional office or location without our prior written consent, which consent will be given upon inspection and approval of such new premises.... Advertising Contributions: In addition to the service fees set forth above, you will be required to pay an "advertising contribution" in the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY ($150.00) DOLLARS per quarter. We may adjust the advertising contribution annually on October 1, provided that any increase in the advertising contribution will be made only with the affirmative vote of at least fifty percent (50 percent) of the franchisees...The advertising contributions of all franchisees shall be placed in an advertising fund to be managed by us, and shall be used exclusively for advertising. Tradenames, Service Marks, Logos, Trade Secrets, and other Proprietary Matters: d. As you know, you will be given certain information about the Travel Professionals International System, our products and methods of doing business, as well as preferred supplier agreements, training and educational programs, computer operation and computer system arrangements, correspondence, memoranda, operating, sales and marketing manuals, and other confidential information. You recognize and acknowledge that this information is a valuable, special and unique asset belonging to us and constitutes our trade secrets which you agree to keep secret and not to disclose, during the operation of this Agreement, or after its termination or expiration, to any person or entity for any reason or purpose whatsoever.... Relationship of Parties: During the term of this Agreement, and any renewal term, you will be an independent contractor, and you will have no authority, expressed or implied, to bind us or to act as our agent, legal representative, or joint venturer. At our option, you will be required to describe yourself on all business forms, invoices, orders, stationery, and the like, as an independent licensee of Travel Professionals International, and to submit all such items to us for our written approval...The operation of your business shall be determined by your own judgment and discretion, subject only to the provisions of this Agreement and our policies and procedures, as they may be adopted or revised from time to time. We will not regulate the hiring or firing of your employees, the parties from whom you may accept business, the working conditions of your employees, or the terms of your contracts with your customers, except as may be necessary to protect the Travel Professionals International System. Service To Be Provided By Us: We will provide the following services to you pursuant to this Agreement: (b) We will prescribe certain standards of operation designed to enhance your profitability, which we shall expect you to follow. * * * (e) We may make recommendations to you regarding accounting and recordkeeping systems. * * * We will provide you with a policy manual, operations manual, preferred supplier manual, marketing manual, and an employee handbook which may be updated periodically. We will provide you with marketing, sales and promotional aids to include currently available professionally produced television spots, a series of high quality radio jingles, and from time to time, printed and other promotional material for use in your local area. We will operate an ongoing training program for you and your personnel. This program will include seminars, conferences, familiarization trips, and printed materials, such as bulletins and manuals, relating to marketing, management, and accounting procedures, and the like, and developments with the travel industry... * * * (l) We will provide, at no charge, up to five (5) person days of management expertise and sales effort effective on the first date of contract signing.... Your Obligation: During the term of this Agreement, and any renewal term, you will obligated to pay promptly to us any fees that are due hereunder, to maintain and keep such records and reports as we may prescribe, and to provide us with copies of such records and reports. You will be required to allow us to make inspection of your business and premises at any reasonable time, and to allow us to examine your books, tax returns and records during normal working hours. We reserve the right to establish a uniform accounting system to keep your books and records in conformity with such system. Your business shall be conducted in conformity with the provisions of this Agreement, with such policies and procedures as we may publish from time to time, and all state, federal and local laws and regulations.... You will be required to cause your chief operating officer or manager to attend our next available training program and to cause each of the franchise employees and principals (as shown on Schedule A attached hereto) to attend the required training courses set forth in our published policies and procedures. At present, mandatory training programs we provide include "New Owners Orientation", "New Manager Orientation", and the periodic "Managers Meetings". Although we are not obligated to do so, we offer, and plan to offer in the future, periodic (at least three times per year), Managers Meetings. Attendance at Managers Meetings, when offered, is mandatory. In the event you fail to send a representative to any Managers Meetings, then you shall pay to us the registration fee for that meeting, notwithstanding your lack of attendance at such meeting. Although paragraph 8 does require Petitioner to pay a fixed sum to TPI for advertising, it does not restrict the qualifying owner's exercise of control over the day-to-day decisions concerning advertising. In fact, TPI, under paragraph 11(i) of the Agreement, agrees to furnish certain materials to assist Petitioner in advertising on the local level. It is clear throughout the Agreement that the operation of the business is to be determined by the qualifying owner's own judgment and discretion subject to the provisions of the Agreement and TPI's policies and procedures which may be adopted or revised from time to time. Paragraph 4 , Terms of the Franchise, provides for the termination of the Agreement prior to its expiration date. It is clear from the qualifying owner's testimony ("Because nobody tells me what to do."), that she would terminate the Agreement rather than to allow TPI to exercise the day-to-day control of the business. There is no question that the qualifying owner has the authority to take such action under Paragraph 4 of the Agreement, if in no other manner, than by defaulting under Paragraph 4(4). This gives the qualifying owner the final authority as to who exercises the day-to-day control of the business. It is clear from the testimony of TPI's Vice-President of Franchise Sales and Development that TPI does not consider those provisions of the Agreement that appear to place restrictions on the qualifying owner's discretion as to the day- to-day control of the business as being mandatory, notwithstanding the language of the provisions to the contrary. Likewise, it is clear that TPI will not involve itself in the hiring, supervision or firing of employees because of the liability it would place upon TPI, notwithstanding any provision in the Agreement. The parties to the Agreement are experienced business people, who have expertise in the travel agency industry and franchising. The parties to the Agreement have clear and mutual understandings and interpretation of the meanings of the terms of the Agreement . Their understandings and interpretations are that the Agreement does not restrict the qualifying owner's exercise of the day-to-day control of the business. The parties' interpretation of the Agreement is a possible and permissible interpretation. TPI has some 60 franchisees within 22 states, with 17 franchisees in the State of Florida. There are several other franchisors that franchise travel agencies throughout the United States, including the State of Florida. The purpose of franchise agreements in the travel business in general, and this Agreement in particular, is to enable the small, independent travel agency to compete more effectively in the travel market. The growing trend in the travel agency industry is to belong to a franchise. The Agreement is a typical franchise agreement and customary in the travel industry.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department enter a Final Order granting Petitioner's application for certification as a Disabled Business Enterprise. RECOMMENDED this day 9th of January, 1995, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of January, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-0568 The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Petitioner has listed the stipulated facts separately as paragraphs 1 through 14. These stipulated facts have been adopted in Findings of Fact 1 through 14, respectively. Proposed findings of fact 1, 2, 3 and 4-5 adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 23, 24, 26 and 21, consecutively. Proposed findings of fact 6 through 9 are neither material nor relevant to this proceeding. Proposed finding of fact 10 is adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 20 through 22. Department's Proposed Findings of Fact. The Department has listed the stipulated facts separately as paragraphs 1 through 14. These stipulated facts have been adopted in Findings of Fact 1 through 14, respectively. Proposed findings of fact 1 and 2 are adopted in substance as modified in Finding of Fact 19. Proposed finding of fact 3 is adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 20 through 22. Proposed findings of fact 4, 5 and 6 are adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 15, 16 and 17, respectively. Proposed finding of 7 is rejected as being neither material nor relevant to this proceeding. Proposed findings of fact 8 and 9 are adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 18. Proposed findings of fact 10, 11 and 12 are considered conclusions of law or legal argument and for that reason are rejected as Findings of Fact. Proposed findings of fact 13 and 14 are rejected as not being supported by the record. COPIES FURNISHED: Oscar Blasingame, Esquire Blasingame, Forisz, Smiljanich, P.A. Post Office Box 1259 St. Petersburg, Florida 33731 Dorothy S,. Johnson, Esquire Mary J. Dorman, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS-58 Tallahassee Florida 32399-0458 Ben G. Watts, Secretary ATTN: Eleanor F. Hunter Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS-58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue At issue is whether respondent committed the offense alleged in the petitioner's "notice of intent to impose administrative fine and to issue cease and desist order" and, if so, what administrative action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, is a state agency charged, inter alia, with administering and enforcing the provisions of Chapter 559, Part XI, Florida Statutes, regulating "sellers of travel." Here, petitioner has charged that respondent had operated as a "seller of travel" without being registered as required by Section 559.927(2), Florida Statutes. The only proof offered to support such contention at hearing was a written inspection report prepared by James Kelly, an inspector employed by petitioner. 1/ That report recited that Mr. Kelly performed an inspection of respondent's premises on November 4, 1994, that he met with Denise Arencibia (who was later identified as respondent's vice president), and that the following events transpired: Went in undercover and asked about weekend cruises. Denise gave me a brochure for the Seaward & gave me prices at $329 per person. She can make all arrangements. They will accept a cashier's check payable to Escape Travel Services. Mr. Kelly did not, however, appear at hearing or otherwise offer testimony in this case. Consequently, for the reasons discussed in the conclusions of law, there is no competent proof of record to support a finding that respondent operated as a "seller of travel" on the date of Mr. Kelly's inspection as contended by petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be rendered dismissing the charges against respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of September 1995 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of September 1995.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all relevant times, respondent, Passport Internationale, Inc. (Passport or respondent), was a seller of travel registered with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department). As such, it was required to post a performance bond with the Department conditioned on the performance of contracted services. In this case, petitioner, Helen Stahler, has filed a claim against the bond in the amount of $198.00 alleging that Passport failed to perform on certain contracted services. In response to an offer run in a local newspaper on an undisclosed date in early 1991, petitioner agreed to purchase a five-day, four-night trip for two to the Bahamas at a cost of $99.00 per person. For this, she wrote two checks payable to Passport, each in the amount of $99.00. Although Passport has no record of the transaction, it may be reasonably inferred that the advertisement was run by, and the package purchased directly from, Passport since petitioner's checks were endorsed by Passport and deposited in a bank used by that entity. After receiving a videotape, brochure and travel certificate, petitioner attempted by telephone to reserve certain dates for her trip. Because the certificate could not be used on a weekend, a fact not known at the time the certificate was purchased, petitioner became frustrated and requested a refund of her money by letter dated January 27, 1992. To date, she has never received a refund of her money.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the claim of petitioner against the bond of respondent be granted in the amount of $198.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of January, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of January, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Helen Stahler 11200 Walsingham Road, Number 69 Largo, Florida 34648 Julie Johnson McCollum 2441 Bellevue Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Robert G. Worley, Esquire 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard D. Tritschler, Esquire The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
Findings Of Fact In December of 1973, petitioner Greenblatt and another registered the fictitious name "International Vacations" with the clerk of the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida. Since that time, petitioner has been engaged in business as a travel agent in Miami, under the name of "International Vacations." In the spring of 1977, before May 1, respondent Fitterman, who has herself been active in the travel business, filed an application with respondent Department of State to reserve the corporate name "International Vacations, Inc." At the time, Mrs. Fitterman was unaware that there was a travel agency in Miami with the name "International Vacations." When she learned that there was, she telephoned petitioner. In conversations with petitioner she related that she had incurred certain expenses, and there was some discussion of petitioner's arranging a trip for her and two of her grandchildren. In the course of the conversation, Mrs. Fitterman agreed not to use the corporate name "International Vacations, Inc." On May 23, 1978, respondent Fitterman wrote petitioner offering to "relinquish our hold on" the name in exchange for the trip, Petitioner's exhibit No. 1, but negotiations subsequently fell through. After agreeing not to use "International Vacations, Inc.," respondent Fitterman organized a corporation which she named "Miami Tours, Inc.," but she came to feel that this name was less satisfactory than "International Vacations, Inc." Since 1977, she has been doing business in Miami under the name of American International Travel Club. On or about December 4, 1977, petitioner Greenblatt applied to the Department of State on behalf of a California corporation, International Vacations, Inc., for authorization to transact business in Florida. A check in the amount of one hundred four dollars ($104.00) drawn in favor of the Secretary of State accompanied this application; and the check has been negotiated. Petitioner's exhibit No. 2.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent Department of State refuse Petitioner's request that it revoke respondent Fitterman's reservation of the exclusive right to use the corporate name "International Vacations, Inc." DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of June, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Nathan Greenblatt 311 Lincoln Road Miami Beach, Florida 33139 Mrs. Blanche Fitterman American International Travel Club, Inc. 17070 Collins Avenue, Suite 219 Miami Beach, Florida 33160 William J. Gladwin, Esquire Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues are whether, pursuant to section 559.929(3), Florida Statutes (2019), Petitioner has been injured by the fraud, misrepresentation, breach of contract, financial failure, or any other violation of chapter 559, part XI, by Respondent Travbuzz, Inc. (Respondent), for prearranged travel services and, if so, the extent to which Respondent is indebted to Petitioner on account of the injury.
Findings Of Fact Respondent provides prearranged travel services for individuals or groups. Having relocated from New Jersey to Miami, Florida, evidently in 2018, Respondent has been registered at all material times with the Department as a "seller of travel" within the meaning of the Act and holds registration number ST-41461. With Respondent as the principal, the Surety issued a Sellers of Travel Surety Bond bearing bond number 10076529 in the amount of $25,000, effective from June 22, 2018, until duly cancelled (Bond). On November 12, 2019, Petitioner, a resident of San Diego, California, purchased from Respondent one ticket for himself and one ticket for his daughter on the Palace on Wheels: A Week in Wonderland Tour (POWAWIWT) with a departure date of April 1, 2020. Earnestly described by Respondent's principal as a "cruise ship on wheels," the POWAWIWT provides one week's transportation, accommodations, and meals for travelers seeking to visit several of India's cultural and historical landmarks without the inconvenience of changing hotels, finding restaurants, arranging intercity transportation, or, it seems, obtaining refunds for trips that never take place. The purchase price for two POWAWIWT tickets was $8600.40. Additionally, Petitioner purchased from Respondent a guided side trip at one location for $75. At the time of the purchase of the two POWAWIWT tickets, Respondent charged Petitioner's credit card for the required downpayment of $1911.20 for both tickets. By personal check dated January 6, 2020, Petitioner timely paid the balance due for both tickets of $6689.20. By personal check dated February 19, 2020, Petitioner paid the $75 charge for the side trip. The credit card issuer duly debited Petitioner's account and credited Respondent's account for the charged amount, and Respondent obtained the funds represented by both checks. Petitioner later disputed the credit card charges, and the credit card company debited the $1911.20 amount in dispute from Respondent's account. Although Petitioner claimed that his account had not been credited for this amount, as of the evening prior to the hearing, Respondent's credit for these charges had not been restored, so the $1911.20 still seems to be in the possession of the credit card issuer. Despite availing himself of the remedy available under the Act, Petitioner has not authorized the credit card issuer to restore to Respondent's account the credit for the $1911.20. This case is a byproduct of the emerging Covid-19 pandemic, which, as discussed below, caused RTDC to cancel Petitioner's April 1 POWAWIWT. According to Respondent, RTDC has refused to refund Petitioner's payment of $8600.40 gross or about $8000 after deducting Respondent's 7% commission.1 Although Respondent's principal deflects the blame to RTDC for its no-refund policy and to Petitioner for supposedly waffling on the relief that he sought for the cancelled trip, Respondent quietly has declined to refund its commission of approximately $600, as well as the additional $75 payment, although the failure to refund the $75 may be explained by Petitioner's failure to address this negligible amount until he prepared the Prehearing Statement in this case. 1 Respondent's principal testified that Respondent discounted the price of the April 1 POWAWIWT by reducing its standard 17% commission, which would approximate $1460, to 7%, for a 10% discount, or about $860, leaving a net commission of about $600. Respondent's factual defenses to Petitioner's refund claim include the several defenses set forth above and a new defense asserted for the first time at the hearing: Petitioner cancelled his POWAWIWT before RTDC cancelled his POWAWIWT, so Petitioner was never entitled to a refund under the terms of the Contract. This defense oddly finds more support in Petitioner's allegation that he demanded a refund before RTDC cancelled the April 1 POWAWIWT than in Respondent's allegation that Petitioner did not demand a refund until the March 13 email, in which he reported that RTDC had cancelled the April 1 POWAWIWT.2 Regardless, this new defense is no more supported by the facts than Respondent's previously stated defenses. Respondent's who-cancelled-first defense is based on emails and telephone calls. Petitioner's emails portray his consistent efforts to obtain a refund for the trip, but only after RTDC had cancelled the April 1 POWAWIWT. The lone email of Respondent's principal serves to reveal Respondent's inability to respond meaningfully to Petitioner's efforts to protect his travel purchase and raises the possibility of bad faith on the part of Respondent's principal. On March 9, Petitioner emailed Respondent's principal a Times of India news article that reported that RTDC had cancelled the March POWAWIWTs, but not the April 1 POWAWIWT. This email does not seek to cancel the April 1 POWAWIWT, but expresses concern that RTDC will cancel the trip. On March 13, Petitioner emailed Respondent's principal a Times of India news article that reported that RTDC had cancelled the remaining POWAWIWTs through April. This email complains that RTDC had not 2 This oddity is unsurprising given the patter of each witness's testimony. Respondent's principal peppered his testimony with false apologies while, in a reassuring tone, he gently deferred and deflected blame and patiently, but mistakenly, insisted that the Contract did not require him to refund monies paid for a train trip that never took place. Petitioner frenetically rebutted each factual defense while somehow missing the salient points that he had paid for a POWAWIWT that never took place, Respondent refused to refund Petitioner's payment, and the Contract calls for a refund. Although a retired appellate attorney for the state of California, Petitioner seems to have grounded his early demands for a refund on natural law, because he appears not to have discovered one of the crucial contractual provisions, as discussed below, until he prepared the Prehearing Statement responded to Petitioner's requests for information, requests advice as to his available options, and asks for some assurance that Petitioner would not lose his payments of $8600 for the train tour plus an unspecified amount "for post trip activities" that are also unspecified. On March 15, Petitioner emailed Respondent's principal a news article in The Hindu that reported that another operator of train tours in India was paying refunds for cancelled trips and all tourist visas into India had been cancelled through April 15. This email implores Respondent to do the right thing and immediately refund the money paid for the cancelled trip. A few hours later, Petitioner emailed Respondent's principal an India West news article that reported that India was now in a complete lockdown and the Indian government had cancelled all nondiplomatic visas. This email asks Respondent's principal to keep Petitioner informed on what RTDC was going to do and expresses hope that RTDC issues refunds. On March 19, Respondent's principal emailed Petitioner that "we are reaching some agreement with our ground operator for the train and this is what is being finalized." The statement clearly discloses no agreement, but, at best, an expectation of an agreement. The email describes the expected agreement to allow Petitioner to take a POWAWIWT during the following season from September 2020 through April 2021, but requires Petitioner to select travel dates within six days and pay whatever fare is in effect at the time of the trip. Respondent's principal never explained why Petitioner had only six days to accept an "offer" that RTDC had not yet authorized its agent to make, might not authorize within the six-day deadline, and might not ever authorize. Respondent's demand for a near-immediate acceptance of a nonexistent offer of a trip at market price was unreasonable and suggests that Respondent's principal was merely trying to induce Petitioner to make an offer in the form of an acceptance, so the principal might have greater bargaining leverage with RTDC. On March 23, Petitioner emailed Respondent's principal, noting a series of unanswered emails and phone calls from Petitioner to the principal since the receipt of the March 19 "offer." Asking for clarification of the terms of the "offer," Petitioner's email concedes that it appears that Petitioner's money is lost and asks merely that Respondent show him the courtesy of calling him, confirming his fear, and providing a full explanation of what happened. Later that day, an employee of Respondent emailed Petitioner and informed him that the principal was suffering from a respiratory disorder and was unable to talk, so that future communications needed to be by email. Petitioner received no more emails from Respondent's principal, who, having returned to the United States after taking a POWAWIWT in early March, was later diagnosed with Covid. The telephone calls are undocumented. The credibility of Respondent's principal started to leave the tracks with the March 19 email of an illusory "offer" with an immediate deadline for acceptance. A month later, in responding to the disputed credit card charge, the credibility of Respondent's principal derailed completely, as he attempted to resecure the $1911.20 credit with material misrepresentations of what had taken place in an email dated April 21 to the credit card issuer. The email claims that Petitioner never cancelled the trip, so he was a "no-show"--a Kafkaesque claim that implies a duty to report for a trip that, undisclosed in the email, the sponsor had cancelled over two weeks prior to departure. The email states that, at the beginning of March, Petitioner called and said he did not feel comfortable taking the trip, but the trains were still running and "'Cancel for Fear'" was not an allowable reason for waiving a cancellation fee--perhaps true, but irrelevant. The email encloses a copy of the principal's March 19 email, states that Petitioner did not accept this "offer," and concludes that "[s]ince [Petitioner] did not cancel or inform us of the decision for travel before the travel date, the charge is valid as per the terms and conditions." The email cites a provision of the Contract addressing no-shows and, despite the absence of any mention of RTDC's cancellation of the trip due to the pandemic, adds a seemingly obscure reference to another provision of the Contract addressing acts of God, medical epidemics, quarantines, or other causes beyond Respondent's control for the cancellation of a trip. Notably, the email omits mention of the provisions of the Contract, described below, clearly calling for a refund. On balance, it is impossible to credit the testimony of Respondent's principal that, in telephone calls, Petitioner cancelled the trip before RTDC cancelled the trip or, more generally, that Petitioner could not settle on an acceptable remedy, and his indecisiveness prevented Respondent's principal from negotiating a settlement with RTDC--an assertion that, even if proved, would be irrelevant. Notwithstanding resolute attempts by Respondent's principal to misdirect attention from these unavoidable facts, Petitioner has paid for a train tour that never took place, RTDC cancelled the tour, and Petitioner never cancelled his tickets. The question is therefore whether, in its Contract, Respondent successfully transferred the risk of loss to Petitioner for a trip cancelled by the tour sponsor due to the pandemic. Analysis of this issue necessitates consideration of several provisions of the Contract that, despite its prolixity, is initially remarkable for two omissions: Respondent's Seller of Travel registration number3 and the name of RTDC as the sponsor of the POWAWIWT. Respondent claims that Petitioner caused his injury by declining to purchase travel insurance. The cover page of the Contract contains a section 3 Section 559.928(5) requires a seller of travel to include in each consumer contract the following: "[Name of seller of travel] is registered with the State of Florida as a Seller of Travel. Registration No. [X]." Even absent any mention of a statute, this disclosure provides a consumer with some means to learn of the somewhat obscure Act, the seller's statutory responsibilities, and the relief that may be available to a consumer for a seller's failure to discharge these responsibilities. Petitioner testified only that he somehow learned of the Act, but never said how. The record does not permit a finding that the omission of the statutory disclosure was purposeful, so as to conceal from the consumer the existence of the Act, or was a product of guileless ineptitude. called "Travel Insurance." This section provides an opportunity to purchase travel insurance from an entity "recommended by [Respondent]." The options are to check a box to purchase from Respondent's recommended entity or to check a box that states the traveler undertakes to obtain travel insurance independently, but this provision adds that, if travel insurance is not obtained, the consumer "absolve[s Respondent, t]he tour operator and the travel agent of all possible liabilities which may arise due to my failure to obtain adequate insurance coverage." Respondent offered no proof that its recommended travel insurance or other available travel insurance would pay for the cancellation of the April 1 POWAWIWT due to the pandemic, so Petitioner's choice not to purchase travel insurance is irrelevant. Additionally, the clear provisions of the Contract, discussed below, requiring a refund for a trip cancelled by the sponsor rebut Respondent's labored effort to apply the travel insurance provision to shift to the customer the risk of loss posed by a cancellation of the trip by the sponsor--a risk that might be better addressed by Respondent's purchase of commercial business interruption insurance. Respondent claims that the trip was cancelled by RTDC too close to the departure date to entitle Petitioner to any refund. The Contract contains a section called "Cancellation Fees." This section provides for increasing cancellation fees based on the proximity of the cancellation to the trip departure date. The Contract provides a 10% cancellation fee "if cancelled" more than 90 days prior to departure, 20% cancellation fee "if cancelled" between 89 and 35 days prior to departure, and 100% cancellation fee "if cancelled" within 34 days prior to departure. The Contract fails to specify if this provision applies to cancellations at the instance of the consumer or the trip sponsor, but the graduated fee reflects the greater value of a trip cancelled well in advance of the trip departure date, so that the trip can be resold. Obviously, a trip cancelled by a sponsor cannot be resold, so the cancellation fee provision applies only to a cancellation by a customer and does not shield Respondent from liability in this case. Lastly, Respondent relies on a section of the Contract called "Responsibility--Limitation of Liability." Provisions in this section warn that Respondent acts as an agent for a trip sponsor, such as the railroad, from which Respondent purchases the travel services. Although Respondent makes every effort to select the best providers of travel services, Respondent does not control their operations and thus CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR ANY PERSONAL INJURY, PROPERTY DAMAGE OR OTHER CLAIM which may occur as a result of any and/or all of the following: the wrongful, negligent or arbitrary acts or omissions on the part of the independent supplier, agent, its employees or others who are not under the direct control or supervision of [Respondent]; [or] * * * (3) loss, injury or damage to person, property or otherwise, resulting directly or indirectly from any Acts of God, dangers incident to … medical epidemics, quarantines, … delays or cancellations or alterations in itinerary due to schedule changes, or from any causes beyond [Respondent's] control. … In case of overbooking, [Respondent] will only be liable for refund [sic] the charged amount to the guest. [Respondent] shall in no event be responsible or liable for any direct, indirect, consequential, incidental, special or punitive damages arising from your interaction with any retailer/vendor, and [Respondent] expressly disclaims any responsibility or liability for any resulting loss or damage. The "Responsibility--Limitation of Liability" provisions are general disclaimers of liability for various forms of damages arising out of the acts and omissions of third parties or forces outside the control of Respondent, such as the pandemic. These provisions represent a prudent attempt to avoid liability for damages, such as the lost opportunity to visit a gravely ill relative who has since died, that may amount to many multiples of the price paid for a trip. Complementing these general provisions limiting Respondent's liability, other provisions limit Respondent's liability to the payment of a refund of the purchase price of a trip cancelled by the sponsor. The section immediately following the "Responsibility--Limitation of Liability" section is the "Reservation of Rights" section, which provides: "The company [i.e., Respondent] reserves the right to cancel any tour without notice before the tour and refund the money in full and is not responsible for any direct or indirect damages to the guest due to such action." As noted above, the Contract omits any mention of Respondent's principal, so as to Respondent in the place of its undisclosed principal; thus, a provision referring to a cancellation of the tour by Respondent includes a cancellation of the tour by Respondent's principal. As cited by Petitioner in the Prehearing Statement, the other relevant provision is in the "Prices, Rates & Fares" section and states that, if a customer cancels, any refund to which the customer is entitled, under the above-cited cancellation fee provisions, will be dependent on then-current exchange rates, but "[i]n the event that a tour is canceled through no action of the Client, the Client will receive a full refund of US$."4 This provision entitles a consumer to: 1) a refund and 2) a refund in U.S. dollars, presumably unadjusted for currency fluctuations since the payment. At the hearing, Respondent's principal tried to construe the "US$" provision as a reference to the currency to which a consumer is entitled to be paid when a consumer cancels a trip under conditions in which the customer is entitled to a refund, but this construction ignores that the cited clause applies to 4 An identical "US$" provision is found at the end of the section called "A Note About Cancellation for All Tours/Reservations." cancellations occurring through no action of the consumer and imposes on Respondent the obligation to make a "full refund" in such cases.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order directing Respondent to pay Petitioner the sum of $6689.20 within 30 days of the date of the order and, absent timely payment, directing the Surety to pay Petitioner the sum of $6689.20 from the Bond. 7 Perhaps the recommended and final orders in this case will persuade the credit card issuer to issue the credit for the $1911.20 to Petitioner, who is entitled to this disputed sum. But, if Respondent regains possession of this disputed sum and refuses to refund it to Petitioner, the Department may wish to consider suspending or revoking Respondent's certificate or referring the matter to the Miami-Dade County State Attorney's Office. See the preceding footnote. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of November, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of November, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Gil Gonzalez 8444 Mono Lake Drive San Diego, California 92119 (eServed) Benjamin C. Patton, Esquire McRae & Metcalf, P.A. 2612 Centennial Place Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) H. Richard Bisbee, Esquire H. Richard Bisbee, P.A. 1882 Capital Circle Northeast, Suite 206 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) W. Alan Parkinson, Bureau Chief Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Rhodes Building, R-3 2005 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-6500 Tom A. Steckler, Director Division of Consumer Services Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 520 407 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
The Issue The issues are as follows: (a) whether Respondent failed to make documents available to Petitioner in violation of Section 475.5015, Florida Statutes; (b) whether Respondent obstructed or hindered the enforcement of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, or hindered the performance of any person acting under the authority of that chapter in violation of Sections 475.25(1)(e) and 475.42(1)(i), Florida Statutes; and (c) what penalty, if any, should be imposed on Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is charged with regulating and enforcing the statutory provisions pertaining to persons holding real estate broker and salesperson licenses in Florida. Respondent is and was, at all times material to this case, a licensed real estate broker, having been issued license No. 0372849. Respondent's license is currently voluntarily inactive because she did not renew it in 1999. At all times material here, Petitioner was an agent and the broker of record for Park Avenue Properties, Inc. On or about September 11, 1998, Harper Fields, Esquire, filed a complaint with Petitioner. The complaint alleged that Respondent had mismanaged his wife's rental property pursuant to a property management agreement. The complaint resulted in an investigation and subsequent Administrative Complaint in DBPR Case No. 98-83963. That case became the subject of the Recommended Order in DOAH 02-2720PL, entered contemporaneously with the Recommended Order in the instant case. By letter dated November 25, 1998, Petitioner informed Respondent that Mr. Fields had filed a complaint against her. The letter stated that Petitioner's investigator, Sidney Miller, would be in contact with Respondent to discuss the complaint in detail. Respondent sent Mr. Miller a letter dated December 20, 1998. In the letter, Respondent attempted to explain her involvement in the management of the rental property owned by Mrs. Paula Fields. During the investigation of the complaint, Mr. Miller requested Respondent to furnish him all documentation related to the management of Mrs. Field's rental property. The initial request included documentation about the transaction for the months of February through April 1998, including, but not limited to, monthly statement reconciliations for Respondent's rental escrow account and her operating account, bank statements for these accounts and copies of supporting checks, deposits slips, and transfers. Soon thereafter, Respondent furnished Mr. Miller with some of the requested information. However, Respondent never provided Mr. Miller with a copy of the property management agreement at issue in DOAH Case No. 02-2720PL. Mr. Miller also requested information regarding any background check that Respondent conducted before renting Mrs. Field's property to Donnda Williams. Respondent provided this information to Mr. Miller under cover of a letter received by Mr. Miller on June 16, 1999. Mr. Miller's review of Respondent's monthly statement reconciliations for her rental escrow account from February through April 1998 revealed negative balances. The monthly statement reconciliations are a more accurate reflection of the transactions that occur in an account than a corresponding bank statement. Mr. Miller also discerned that Respondent transferred $1,000 from her rental escrow account to her operating account on February 10, 1998. Additionally, Respondent's February and April bank statements for her rental escrow account and her operating account did not reflect negative balances; but her March 1998 bank statement for the rental escrow account had two overdrafts, one on March 19 and another one on March 20. Respondent transferred $1,000 on March 2, 1998, and $8,000 on March 16, 1998, from her rental escrow account to her operating account. The $8,000 transfer resulted in a negative balance on Respondent's monthly statement reconciliation for her rental escrow account. Mr. Miller addressed his concerns relating to Respondent's rental escrow account in writing on June 25, 1999, and verbally on June 29, 1999. Mr. Miller requested Respondent to explain the March 1998 transfers and the negative balances reflected in the monthly statement reconciliations for the rental escrow account in the months of February through April 1998. Mr. Miller's June 25, 1998, letter requested additional information, stating as follows: I will also need the deposit slips and reconciliation for the rental escrow account for January 1998 along with copies of the bank statements, reconiliation's [sic] and deposits slips for any other account you maintained in January 1998. In addition please provide me with copies of the reconciliation's [sic] for the escrow account and the rental escrow account from May 1998 through the month you closed these accounts. If you maintained any other real estate escrow accounts for the period of January 1998 to this date, provide me with the same information. Respondent received Mr. Miller's June 25, 1999, letter. However, she hired an attorney and forwarded to him the records that she believed were responsive to Mr. Miller's request. Mr. Miller did not learn that Respondent had hired an attorney until he talked to her on June 29, 1999. On or about June 29, 1999, Petitioner explained to Mr. Miller that she had been in the State of Washington caring for a sick relative during parts of January, February, and March 1998. She did not have her rental escrow account checkbook with her when disbursements were due from that account. Therefore, Respondent made the disbursements from her operating account. She made the transfers from her rental escrow account to her operating account to facilitate making the payments in this manner. Upon learning that counsel represented Respondent, Mr. Miller contacted the attorney by telephone. The purpose of the call, in part, was to request the attorney to file a letter of representation. Because the attorney was unavailable, Mr. Miller left a message requesting the attorney to return the call. The attorney did not respond to the message. After not receiving any further information from Respondent or her attorney, Mr. Miller sent Respondent a letter dated November 1, 1999. The letter requested the status of the records requested in Mr. Miller's June 25, 1999, letter. Respondent received the November 1, 1999, and forwarded it to her attorney. In a letter dated November 29, 1999, Respondent's attorney acknowledged that he had received Mr. Miller's November 1, 1999, letter. The attorney stated that he had instructed Respondent to furnish Mr. Miller with copies of the cashed checks for the two transfers that Mr. Miller was inquiring about. The November 29, 1999, letter from Respondent's attorney did not otherwise address the information requested by Mr. Miller's June 25, 1999, letter. In correspondence dated January 22, 2000, Respondent's attorney explained that Respondent had issued the attached copies of checks while she was in the State of Washington during her father's illness only to avoid delay in payment. Attached to the letter were copies of checks, front and back, of Respondent's operating account for her business, Park Avenue Properties, Inc. The copies of checks were issued in February through April 1998. Respondent had furnished Mr. Miller with copies of these checks in June 1999. The January 22, 2000, letter from Respondent's attorney was otherwise not responsive to Mr. Miller's June 25, 1999, letter. Specifically, there were no copies of deposit slips and reconciliation for the rental escrow account for January 1998. There were no documents or reference to the same information for any other accounts that Respondent maintained in 1998. There were no copies of the reconciliations for the rental escrow account from May 1998 through January or February 1999 when Respondent closed her accounts. During the hearing, Respondent admitted that the information furnished to Mr. Miller under cover of the January 22, 2000, letter was not responsive to the request in Mr. Miller's June 25, 1999, letter. At no time during the investigation did Respondent explain that the documents reflected paid personal expenses, as well as expenses paid on behalf of clients out of the same account. In a letter dated April 6, 2000, Mr. Miller sent yet another request for records and information to Respondent's attorney. This letter requested an explanation regarding certain transfers between Respondent's accounts on March 6, April 6, and April 14, 1998. Mr. Miller needed copies of the cancelled checks and better copies of the bank statement for January 1998 for the rental escrow account. Mr. Miller also requested the bank statements, reconciliations, deposit slips and cancelled checks for the rental escrow, and operating accounts for February 1998. The April 6, 2000, letter again requested information previously requested in June 1999. This information included the following: (a) deposit slips for the rental escrow account in January 1998, along with copies of the bank statements, reconciliations, and deposit slips for any other accounts that Respondent maintained in January 1998; (b) copies of the reconciliations for the operating account and the rental escrow account from May 1998 through the month that Respondent closed the accounts; and (c) the same information for any other real estate escrow accounts that Respondent maintained from January 1998 to June 25, 1999. Mr. Miller's April 6, 2000, letter was sent to Respondent's attorney by certified mail. The return receipt indicates that the attorney's office received the letter on April 10, 2000. In a letter dated October 26, 2000, Respondent's attorney sent Petitioner's counsel a letter. According to the letter, Respondent had provided copies of all the checks and the explanation behind the transactions. The letter states that the attorney had not heard from Mr. Miller after the attorney sent the January 2000 letter. On or about June 3, 2002, Respondent's attorney sent Petitioner's counsel some 351 pages of documents, indicating that they included all documents requested by Mr. Miller and that they were responsive to all discovery requests. However, clear and convincing evidence indicates that the documents were not responsive to Mr. Miller's June 25, 1999, and April 6, 2000, record requests. During the hearing, Respondent agreed that the documents were not responsive to Mr. Miller's requests for records related to Respondent's rental escrow account from May 1998 through the time she closed the account. Because Mr. Miller was unable to review the records he requested, he was unable to perform an audit of Respondent's accounts. Mr. Miller needed records covering a six-month period in order to audit Respondent's accounts. Without the records, Mr. Miller was unable to determine whether problems in Respondent's rental escrow account occurred at other times. Respondent testified during the hearing that she had provided Mr. Miller with all of the records in her possession. Her testimony in this regard is not persuasive. Respondent admitted that Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, required her to keep all of her records for four or five years. The instant case is not the only time that Respondent has been the subject of a disciplinary proceeding. She admitted during the hearing that Petitioner previously had cited her and "smacked her on the wrist" for not disbursing funds in a timely fashion.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, enter a final order revoking Respondent's license. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth D. Cooper, Esquire 400 Southeast Eighth Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Stacy N. Robinson Pierce, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Suite N308 Orlando, Florida 32801-1772 Buddy Johnson, Director Nancy P. Campiglia, Chief Attorney Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
