The Issue This is a license discipline proceeding in which the Petitioner seeks to take disciplinary action against the Respondent on the basis of allegations set forth in a two-count Administrative Complaint in which the Respondent is charged with violations of Sections 493.6118(1)(j), 493.6106(1)(b), 493.6118(1)(t), and 493.6101(7), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is a licensed security officer holding a Class "D" Security Officer License and a Class "G" Statewide Firearm License.1 On May 25, 1996, the Respondent was driving himself and his wife, Tracee Kinlock, to the home of the latter's brother. During the course of that drive an argument began on the subject of whether the Respondent had been seeing another woman. During the course of the argument, Ms. Kinlock became angry about the Respondent's refusal to discuss the subject and began hitting him on the arm and side. The argument continued to escalate, and eventually Ms. Kinlock became so upset that she insisted that the Respondent stop the car and let her get out. The Respondent refused to do so. Eventually, Ms. Kinlock took matters in her own hands and grabbed the gear shift lever and pushed it into the neutral or park position.2 The Respondent told Ms. Kinlock to take her hands off of the gear shift lever and made several efforts to pull her hands off of the lever, but Ms. Kinlock refused to move her hands and refused to release the gear shift lever. The Respondent became so angry or frustrated that he leaned over and bit Ms. Kinlock on the hand. He bit her hard enough to make her cry and release the gear shift. The bite did not draw blood, but it was sufficiently severe to leave visible marks and to cause the hand to swell. After biting Ms. Kinlock, the Respondent was able to put the car in gear and resume driving. When they arrived at the home of Ms. Kinlock's brother, Ms. Kinlock threw her wedding rings at the Respondent, got out of the car, and began walking rapidly towards her brother's home in an effort to get away from the Respondent. The Respondent chased after her, grabbed her from behind, and then swung his foot in a sweeping motion in such a way as to intentionally trip Ms. Kinlock and cause her to fall down. Ms. Kinlock fell to the ground, and the Respondent fell on top of her. Ms. Kinlock's brother immediately pulled the Respondent away from Ms. Kinlock and then restrained the Respondent while Ms. Kinlock went into the house. The police were called and shortly thereafter the Respondent was arrested and charged with the battery of Ms. Kinlock. The Respondent ultimately entered a plea of "no contest" to the charge of battery. Adjudication was withheld on the charge of battery.
Recommendation Pursuant to Rule 1C-3.113(2)(n), Florida Administrative Code, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent's Class "D" Security Officer License and Class "G" Statewide Firearm License be revoked pursuant to Section 493.6118(2)(e), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of November, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 1997.
Findings Of Fact Robert W. Barnard was initially issued a Class "D" security guard license on May 12, 1986, by the Florida Department of State, Division of Licensing. At the time of licensure the agency was aware that Barnard had been found guilty of the felony of aggravated assault by a jury verdict, but that adjudication of guilt was withheld and he was placed on probation for five years, on September 3, 1974. (Exhibit #1, Respondent's Memorandum in Response to Petition. Effective October 1, 1986, the legislature added the following to Chapter 493, F.S., relating to licensing for investigative and patrol services: 493.319 Grounds for disciplinary action.-- * * * (1) The following constitutes grounds for which disciplinary action specified in subsection (2) may be taken: * * * (p) The department shall deny an applicant or revoke a license when the person or licensee has been convicted of a felony, regardless of whether adjudication was withheld or whether imposition of sentence was suspended, unless and until civil rights have been restored and a period of 10 years has expired: * * * Chapter 86-193, Laws of Fla. This provision was renumbered and was amended in 1987, as follows: (3) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1)(c) and subsection (2), the department shall deny an application or revoke a license when the person or licensee has been convicted of a felony, regardless of whether adjudication was withheld or whether imposition of sentence was suspended, unless and until civil rights have been restored and a period of 10 years has expired. A conviction based on a plea of nolo contendere shall create a presumption of guilt to the underlying criminal charges, and the department shall allow the person being disciplined to present any evidence relevant to the underlying charges and the circumstances surrounding his plea. Chapter 87-274, Laws of Fla. The agency issued a renewal certificate to Robert Barnard on March 17, 1988. (Exhibit #1, Respondent's Memorandum in Response to Petition) On September 19, 1989, the Department of State, Division of Licensing issued its Administrative Complaint, Case #89-01377, alleging that Robert W. Barnard's guard license should be revoked, based on his violation of Section 493.319(3), F.S.. Count I of the complaint alleges, "On September 3, 1974, Respondent was found guilty of one felony count of aggravated assault in Orange County, Florida." No other convictions or violations were alleged. Through counsel, Robert Barnard requested a formal hearing in response to the complaint. On November 1, 1989, Department of State Assistant General Counsel, Henri C. Cawthon, wrote to Richard Wallsh, Barnard's attorney, stating that it did not appear that material facts were in dispute and that an informal hearing would be more appropriate. The letter provided, in pertinent part: ... Because the Division will stipulate to the factual allegations in your petition, the only issue is a legal one: does Section 493.319(3), Florida Statutes (1987), require revocation when a licensee had adjudication withheld on a felony over ten years ago. It can also be stipulated that Mr. Barnard was licensed in spite of his criminal record, and that the Division is applying the statute retroactively. * * * (Attachment to Petition for Fees and Costs) On November 3, 1989, Robert Barnard petitioned for an informal hearing based on Mr. Cawthon's letter. On November 30, 1989, Robert Barnard filed his "suggestion of sealing of record", stating that on November 8, 1989, the ninth Judicial Circuit Court, in and for Orange County, entered its order sealing the pertinent criminal records pursuant to Section 943.058, F.S. and Fla. R. Criminal Procedure 3.692. (Attachment to Petition for Fees and Costs) Counsel for the agency claims that he had informed Petitioner's counsel that sealing the criminal record would result in dismissal of the administrative complaint, although the agency was under no obligation to inform Petitioner of this option. (Memorandum of Law in Response to Petition) On December 11, 1989, in a letter from Assistant General Counsel, Henri Cawthon, to Richard Wallsh, the agency informed Robert Barnard that, based on the order sealing records, the administrative complaint was being withdrawn. The informal hearing scheduled for December 19, 1989, was cancelled. Robert W. Barnard is a "prevailing small business party", as defined in Section 57.111(3)(c) and (d), F.S. (parties' Stipulation of Facts). The agency was not a "nominal party" as provided in Section 57.111(4)(d), F.S. (parties' Stipulation of Facts) In successfully defending the administrative complaint, Robert Barnard incurred reasonable attorneys fees and costs totalling $1,527.07. (parties' Stipulation of Facts) In successfully pursuing fees and costs, Robert Barnard incurred additional reasonable fees and costs in the amount of $1,281.53, for a total of $2,808.60.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, ORDERED: That the Department of State, Division of Licensing pay Robert Barnard's attorney fees and costs in the amount of $2,808.60. DONE AND ORDERED this 3rd day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of July, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard I. Wallsh, Esquire 2699 Lee Road, Suite 505 Winter Park, FL 32789 Henri C. Cawthon, Esquire Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, Mail Station No. 4 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Ken Rouse General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, LL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent's Class "D" Security Officer License and/or Class "G" Statewide Firearm License should be revoked or otherwise disciplined based upon the alleged violations of Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, set forth in the Third Amended Administrative Complaint filed by Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence introduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: On or about June 7, 1989, Respondent filed an application for a Class "D" Security Officer License with the Department. The application form asked the applicant whether he had ever been arrested and to list any and all arrests. The application specifically provided that "falsification of this question may be grounds for denial of your license." Respondent answered affirmatively that he had been arrested. The only specific incident listed on the application was an arrest in 1979 for a charge of "asault [sic] with a deadly weapon intemp [sic] to kill Fay N.C. [sic]." The Application also required the applicant to set forth the outcome of all arrests. Respondent replied that the "charges was [sic] drop [sic]." On or about July 17, 1990, Respondent submitted an application with the Department for a Class "G" Statewide Firearms License. The application form for this license included an identical request regarding prior arrests. In response, Respondent checked the box indicating he had never been arrested and wrote "N/A" where he was supposed to indicate the date, charge and outcome of the arrests. Respondent has not provided any explanation for why his Class "D" Application disclosed an arrest in 1979, but his Class "G" Application did not reference this arrest. This discrepancy is not alleged in the Third Amended Administrative Complaint. Petitioner has submitted a certificate from the Cumberland County, North Carolina Superior Court which indicates that a criminal summons was issued for "Angelo Louis Lugo" on or about May 5, 1987, for a charge of "M Assault By Pointing A Gun." It is not clear whether this summons is directed at Respondent nor is it clear whether the Summons was ever served and/or the subject was arrested. The ultimate disposition of this criminal case is not clear. Respondent denies ever being served with the summons referenced in this court record. The evidence was insufficient to establish that Respondent was ever arrested in connection with this matter. Petitioner has submitted a second certified record from the Cumberland County, North Carolina Superior Court, which indicates that Respondent was issued a "Citation" on March 10, 1986, for the charge of "M Shoplifting Concealment Goods." No other evidence or explanation of this record has been provided. Respondent admits that he was issued a Notice to Appear in court after he was caught by store security personnel taking aspirin from a bottle. He testified that he did not list this matter on his applications because he was not "arrested." Instead, he claims that he was merely issued a citation to appear in court. The evidence presented in this case did not refute Respondent's version of the events surrounding this court record. In sum, the evidence was not clear and convincing that Respondent was ever formally "arrested" for this incident. The ultimate disposition of this criminal charge is not clear from the record in this proceeding. Counts III and IV of the Third Amended Administrative Complaint are based upon an incident that occurred on February 9, 1993 between Respondent and Jorge Ruiz. There is a good deal of conflicting evidence regarding this incident. Both Respondent and Ruiz have testified and/or given statements on several occasions about the incident including statements to the police, testimony in a related criminal proceeding against Respondent and depositions taken in connection with a civil lawsuit filed by Ruiz against Respondent, Respondent's employer and the Bank where Respondent worked. It is impossible and unnecessary to resolve all of the conflicts in the differing accounts of the incident as described by Respondent and Ruiz at various times. After considering all of the evidence presented, including the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, the findings in this Recommended Order are based upon the clear and convincing evidence presented. On February 9, 1993, Respondent was working as an armed security guard at a Barnett Bank in Plantation, Florida. At approximately 1:30 p.m., Respondent was working outside the bank in the vicinity of the drive-thru lanes. He was there to direct traffic and monitor the area. Around this time, Jorge Ruiz pulled into the paved area in front of the drive-thru booths. Ruiz had been to the Bank on numerous occasions in the past and he had often used the drive-thru windows. Ruiz has a very powerful radio in his pick-up truck and he admits that he tends to play music at a loud volume. On at least one prior occasion, Ruiz had proceeded to the drive-thru station with his radio blasting. The tellers had complained about the noise coming through the intercom system. During the week or so prior to February 9, 1993, Ruiz and Respondent had at least one minor confrontation. During this prior instance, Respondent advised Ruiz that he had to turn his radio down before he reached the drive-thru booth because the intercom system picked up the background noise and it interfered with the tellers' ability to communicate with the customers. Ruiz replied that he would turn down the radio when he got to the window. When Ruiz entered the Bank's parking lot on February 9, 1993, his radio was playing loudly. Respondent approached the driver's side window of Ruiz' vehicle and asked Ruiz to turn his radio down. Ruiz responded with a number of obscenities. Respondent told Ruiz that unless he turned his radio down, he could not use the drive-thru facility. Ruiz refused to comply. Respondent stood in front of Ruiz' vehicle and directed him away from the drive-thru lane. Ruiz' vehicle moved forward and bumped into Respondent. Respondent drew his gun and shouted at Ruiz to stop the car and get out. Respondent claims that he intended to hold Ruiz while he called the police. The parties exchanged words and Ruiz' truck again moved forward striking Respondent. Respondent was not knocked down or otherwise injured, however, his gun discharged. The bullet penetrated the windshield of Ruiz' truck and hit the steering wheel. A fragment from the steering wheel struck Ruiz in the neck or chest area, causing a minor wound. Respondent contends that he was justified in drawing his weapon and/or using deadly force "to prevent the escape from custody of a person who committed a felony in his presence." This contention is rejected because there is no evidence that Ruiz was attempting to escape. Furthermore, it is not clear that Ruiz in fact committed a felony, nor does it appear that the use of force was reasonably necessary under the circumstances of this case. Respondent also contends that he was justified in drawing his weapon in self-defense because he was being threatened by a deadly weapon, i.e. Ruiz' truck, and he had no reasonable means of escape. Respondent claims that he was boxed in by a vehicle in front of the truck and had no reasonable way to retreat from the "deadly force" that confronted him. Respondent's contention that he had no reasonable means of escape is rejected as not credible. Contrary to Respondent's claim, the evidence was clear that Respondent had reasonable means of escape. Moreover, there were alternate ways to handle the situation which would have diffused rather than exacerbated the tension and danger. Respondent claims that the gun discharged accidently when the truck hit him. No persuasive evidence was presented to refute this contention. Indeed, in some of his statements, Ruiz admitted that the gun may have gone off by accident when his truck struck Respondent. In sum, it is clear that Ruiz was belligerent and abusive and that his car bumped into Respondent twice. Nonetheless, Respondent's contention that he was justified in drawing his weapon and that he had no reasonable means of escape is rejected. While it can not be concluded from the evidence presented that Respondent deliberately shot at Ruiz, the evidence did establish that Respondent was guilty of negligence, misconduct and/or incompetency when he drew and pointed his loaded weapon at Ruiz. The circumstances did not justify Respondent pointing a loaded weapon at Ruiz. Without question, Respondent failed to demonstrate that level of discretion and caution that is expected of a person licensed to carry a firearm in the course of his employment. After the gun went off, Respondent immediately jumped into the truck and took Ruiz to a nearby hospital where Ruiz' minor injury was treated and he was released.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Department of State, Division of Licensing enter a Final Order dismissing Counts I, II, and III of the Third Amended Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent and finding Respondent guilty of the allegations contained in Count IV of that Third Amended Administrative Complaint. As a penalty for the violation, Respondent should be fined $1,500.00, his Class "G" Firearms License should be revoked and his Class "D" Security Guard License should be placed on probation for three years. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of December, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-2566 Petitioner has not submitted any proposed Findings of Fact. Respondent's proposed recommended order included a section entitled Findings of Fact. However, that section does not include any individually numbered proposed findings of fact and the paragraphs contained in this section of Respondent's proposal include a mixture factual assertions, argument and legal conclusions. The proposal has been fully reviewed and considered. However, because proposed findings of fact have not been separately identified, no rulings are made with respect to Respondent's proposal. COPIES FURNISHED: Henri C. Cawthon Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, MS #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 James S. Benjamin, Esquire Benjamin & Aaronson, P.A. 100 Northeast Third Avenue, Suite 850 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
Findings Of Fact In March, 1955 the Petitioner was convicted in Federal Court in the Southern District of Florida of the felony Interstate Transportation of Forged Checks. He was placed on probation. Shortly thereafter the Petitioner was again arrested for probation violation and he served a three-years sentence. He was released from prison in 1958. It does not appear that the Petitioner's civil rights have been restored to him. The Petitioner is in all other respects entitled to be issued a license as an employee guard.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent hereto, Respondent held a valid Class "W" Concealed Weapon or Firearm License issued by the Petitioner. Petitioner alleges that Respondent was convicted of Assault with Intent to Murder on June 8, 1960 in the State of Georgia and his civil rights have not been restored. A person by the name of John P. Piner was sentenced by the Superior Court of Richmond County, Georgia, on June 8, 1960, to serve a term of imprisonment at hard labor for a period of not less than three (3) years and not more that four (4) years for the crime of Assault with Intent to Murder. The sentence was suspended and the Defendant was placed on probation and fined. Respondent, John P. Piner, during all relevant times was on active duty with the United States Army and remained so until his honorable separation from the service on June 23, 1969, after more than twenty years of service. The evidence failed to show that the person named in the Sentencing document found in the records of Richmond County, Georgia was the same person as the Respondent named in the Administrative Complaint. The evidence failed to show that the Respondent, John P. Piner, was adjudicated guilty of the felony of Assault with Intent to Murder in the State of Georgia by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent be DISMISSED and that Petitioner's application for renewal of his concealed weapon or firearm license be GRANTED. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of November, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1994. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner. Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1 Rejected as against the greater weight of evidence: paragraphs 2, 3, 4. Proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent. Accepted in substance: Section 1. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard R. Whidden, Jr. Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, MS-4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Donald R. Henderson, Esquire Mateer Harbert & Bates Post Office Box 2854 Orlando, Florida 32802-2854 Honorable Jim Smith, Secretary of State Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue Does Petitioner, Captain Ronald G. Beermunder, have standing to bring this action? Does the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) have jurisdiction over this matter? Do the 2008 Firearms Instructor's Training Manual and the 2011 Certificate of Firearms Proficiency for Statewide Firearm License constitute agency statements that amount to a rule as defined in section 120.52(16), Florida Statutes (2014)?1/ If so, has the Division adopted the statements through the chapter 120 rulemaking procedure?
Findings Of Fact The Parties The Division licenses and regulates private investigative, security, and repossession services in Florida. §§ 493.6100 and 493.6101, Fla. Stat. Some Division licensees may bear firearms in the course of regulated activities. § 493.6115(2), Fla. Stat. A licensee who bears a firearm must also possess a Class "G" license. § 493.6115(2), Fla. Stat. An applicant for a Class "G" license must satisfy minimum training criteria for firearms established by statute and rule of the Department. The criteria include 28 hours of range and classroom training taught and administered by a Class "K" licensee. § 493.6105(5), Fla. Stat. Additionally, each Class "G" licensee must submit proof annually that he or she has received a minimum of four hours of firearms recertification training, also taught by a Class "K" licensee during each year of the license period. § 493.6113(3)(b), Fla. Stat. Captain Beermunder has been a licensed Class "K" firearms instructor since 2009. A Brief History of the Manual, the Certificate, and Rules Over the years, the Division has prepared various versions of a Firearms Instructor's Training Manual for Class "K" instructors to use when teaching Class "G" students. The Division has also prepared various versions of a Certificate of Firearms Proficiency for Statewide Firearm License for use by Class "K" instructors to certify a Class "G" student's completion of training. In 1996, the Division, housed, at the time, at the Secretary of State, incorporated the existing versions of the manual and the certificate in Florida Administrative Code Rule 1C-3.1000(6), now rule 5N-1.100. Over the following years, the Division prepared and relied upon various updated versions of the manual and the certificate, including the 2008 version of the Manual and the 2011 Certificate. It did not adopt these versions by reference in a rule. In the euphemistic words of Mr. Wilkinson, the assistant director of the Division, who took that position in 20113/: "Well, I have to acknowledge that my predecessors were not observant in their duties to update manuals and go through the proper rulemaking process." In 2014, after Captain Beermunder began his challenges to use of the 2008 Manual and the 2011 Certificate, the Department amended rule 5N-1.134. The amendment incorporated revised versions of the manual and the certificate as permitted by section 120.54(1)(h). The rule, as amended, became effective May 21, 2014. The Division stopped relying on the 2008 Manual on May 21, 2014, upon adoption of the 2014 version. On May 20, 2014, the Division sent all Class "K" instructors an "Important Notice," along with a compact disc (CD) containing an electronic version of the 2014 Firearms Instructor's Training Manual. The notice informed instructors of the changes to the 2008 Manual and that a supply of revised 2011 Certificates would be forwarded in June 2014. On June 25, 2014, the Division issued another "Important Notice" to Class "K" instructors, along with a supply of the newly adopted 2014 Certificates. It sent a second CD because the one sent in May contained typographical errors. The "Important Notice" informed Class "K" instructors that they could continue using the 2011 Certificate until their stock of certificates ran out. If an applicant submitted the 2011 Certificate, the Division would accept it. New Criminal Statute in 2013 and Investigation of Beermunder The Legislature amended section 493.6120, Florida Statutes (2012), in 2013 to make it a third-degree felony to knowingly possess, issue, sell, submit, or offer "a fraudulent training certificate, proficiency form, or other official document that declares an applicant to have successfully completed any course of training required for licensure under this chapter." § 493.6120(5), Fla. Stat.; Ch. 2013-251, § 6, Laws of Fla. The Division began investigating several Class "K" instructors, including Captain Beermunder, for violation of the new statute. The Division turned the investigation of Captain Beermunder over to the Department of Agriculture Law Enforcement unit. Investigator Padgett issued a probable cause statement that led to the State Attorney of Santa Rosa County charging Captain Beermunder with multiple felony violations. During the Department's investigation and determination of probable cause, the Division relied upon the 2008 Manual and the 2011 Certificate, neither of which were ever adopted as rules. Before this rule challenge hearing, Captain Beermunder entered a no contest plea to nine felony counts of issuing fraudulent certificates, reserving the right to appeal the ruling on a motion in limine raising an issue of whether charges relied upon an unpromulgated rule. The Division is acting against Captain Beermunder's license on the basis of his no contest plea. The nine counts of amended information that Captain Beermunder pled no contest to in criminal case no. 13001343CFMXAX charged him, using identical language except for the differing names of the applicants and different dates in 2013, with issuing a Certificate of Proficiency for the Security Officer G-License applicants when he "knew or reasonably should have known that the certificate, form, or document was fraudulent in violation of Sections 493.6120(7) and 493.6105(5), Florida Statutes." Section 493.6105(5) states among other things: In addition to the requirements outlined in subsection (3), an applicant for a Class "G" license must satisfy minimum training criteria for firearms established by rule of the department, which training criteria includes, but is not limited to, 28 hours of range and classroom training taught and administered by a Class "K" licensee; however, no more than 8 hours of such training shall consist of range training. Every one of the charges to which Captain Beermunder pled no contest were based upon issuing certificates of firearms proficiency fraudulently stating that the applicant had completed 28 hours of training. The Legislature established the requirement for 28 hours of training in 1997 when chapter 97-248, section 3, Laws of Florida, amended section 493.6105, Florida Statutes (1996), to raise the hours of training requirement to 28. The requirement has been in effect ever since. It was in effect when Captain Beermunder was first licensed in 2009.
The Issue Whether petitioner's application for a concealed weapon or firearm license should be approved.
Findings Of Fact On May 22, 1989, petitioner, Angel Cordero (Cordero) filed an application with respondent, Florida Department of State, Division of Licensing (Department), for a concealed weapon or firearm license. Accompanying such application was Cordero's fingerprint card and a certificate of completion of the required safety course for a concealed weapon permit. By letter dated July 19, 1989, the Department informed Cordero that it had received criminal justice information which indicated that he had been convicted of a felony, and that before processing his application further he would have to submit proof he had not been convicted of a felony or that his civil rights and firearm rights had been restored. The letter further advised Cordero that failure to submit the necessary documentation within thirty days would result in the denial of his application. Following receipt of the Department's letter, Cordero wrote to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the agency from which the Department had received the adverse criminal justice information. In his letter, Cordero denied ever having been convicted of a felony, and requested that the FBI provide him with the proof or documentation necessary to reflect such fact. In response to Cordero's letter, the FBI sent a letter to the State of New York on August 16, 1989, which stated: Enclosed herewith is a copy of a communication questioning arrest data previously submitted by your agency, together with a copy of the subject's identification record, as it currently appears in our files. You are requested to verify or correct the challenged entry/entries submitted by your agency.... To date there has been no resolution of this request. 1/ On August 21, 1989, the Department, having failed to receive the information from Cordero requested in its letter of July 19, 1989, wrote Cordero and informed him that his application for a concealed weapon license had been denied. Included with the letter was an election of rights form which advised Cordero of his right to a hearing pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. On September 20, 1989, Cordero filed a timely request for formal hearing with the Department, and denied that he had ever been convicted of a felony. The matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the assignment of a hearing officer to conduct a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. At hearing, Cordero, whose testimony is credited, adamantly denied that he had ever been convicted of a felony. Cordero did, however, candidly divulge that in 1968 he was convicted, as a minor, of misdemeanor possession of drugs, sentenced to one year of confinement, and was released from custody after having served 8 months of his sentence. Following his release, Cordero moved to Puerto Rico where he remained until 1973 when he returned to the United States. On December 20, 1971, while living in Puerto Rico, Cordero was married. To support its position that Cordero had been convicted of a felony, the Department introduced the criminal justice information it had received from the FBI. That document provided: Use of the following FBI record ... is REGULATED BY LAW. It is furnished FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY and should ONLY BE USED FOR CONTRIBUTOR OF NAME AND ARRESTED OR CHARGE
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Cordero `s application for a concealed weapon or firearm license be approved. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 28th day of February 1990. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February 1990.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, Respondent held a Class "C" Private Investigator's License Number C90-00727 and a Class "G" Statewide Firearms License, Number G90-02226. In April 1991 Respondent taught a Saturday morning class, the third or fourth week of that month, in which Beatrice Price and Ryan Martin were trainees. At the conclusion of the lecture Respondent took the two trainees on a "real" investigation. The subject of the investigation was a dentist, Dr. Kathleen Gerreaux, under surveillance on either a worker's compensation claim or a liability claim (conflict in the testimony and the type of surveillance is not relevant). Respondent placed a microphone under the blouse of Beatrice Price a/k/a Beatrix Herrera and had her go to the office of Dr. Gerreaux to try and learn in what activities she was engaging. The conversation was recorded in Respondent's van parked some distance away. When Herrera returned to the van the tape was replayed in her presence and the words of the investigator and Dr. Gerreaux could be clearly understood. Shortly thereafter Dr. Gerreaux left her office and returned to her home. Respondent took the van to the vicinity of the residence, parked several houses away and rigged Ryan Martin with a microphone under his shirt and had him go to Dr. Gerreaux's home to attempt to get her to go jogging or perform some other exercise which could be videotaped. Herrera overheard the conversation between Martin and Dr. Gerreaux while waiting in the van. This incident was not reported to Petitioner until several months later after Herrera had contacted plaintiff's investigator to complain about an incident which she was told she had been taped without her knowledge or consent. When told that her evidence was insufficient to support her claim Herrera told the investigator about the taping of the conversation with Dr. Gerreaux. This initiated the investigation which led to the Administrative Complaint filed herein. After talking to Herrera and Martin the investigator also interviewed Respondent regarding the taping incident. Respondent admitted to the investigator that he had used Herrera and Martin to intercept the conversations with Dr. Gerreaux, but said the tapes were unintelligible. Respondent's version of this incident was similar to the testimony given at the hearing by Herrera except for the clarity of the taped conversation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered finding David J. Berry guilty of violating section 493.6118(1)(f), F.S. and that an Administrative fine of $1000 be imposed. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 2nd day of November, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of November, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Henri C. Cawthon Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, Mail Station #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Ronald L. Jones, Esquire 1020 East Lafayette Street, Suite 108 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
