The Issue This matter arose on Petitioner's Amended Administrative Complaint which charges Respondent with aiding an unlicensed person to evade Florida contracting licensing law and with conspiracy in using his general contractor's license to further such unlawful purpose. The parties submitted proposed findings of fact which have been incorporated herein to the extent they are relevant and consistent with the evidence.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a registered general contractor, having been issued license number RG 0013006. On January 6, 1978, Respondent obtained Dixie County building permit No. 335 for the construction of Evans Square Shopping Center located in Cross City, Florida. After purchasing the raw land and securing the building permit, Respondent was unable to borrow the funds needed for construction of the shopping center, and thereafter sold his interest in the project to Allied American Properties of Florida, Inc. (Allied). On May 15, 1978, Respondent entered into a contract with Allied to construct the Evans Square Shopping Center. On May 22, 1978, Respondent entered into a con- tract with Raymond H. Moody, individually, and Florida Gulf Coast Construction Co., Inc., acting by and through its President, Raymond H. Moody, who were to perform the actual construction of the Evans Square Shopping Center. At the time of contracting, Moody and Florida Gulf Coast Construction Co., Inc., were unlicensed to perform the type of construction outlined in the contract. Florida Gulf Coast Construction Co., Inc., eventually obtained proper licensure but did so subsequent to the period at issue here. In the contract agreement with Florida Gulf Coast Construction Co., Inc., and Moody, Respondent agreed that he would assist in obtaining necessary permits and local government services required for the construction of the Evans Square Shopping Center. Subsequent to the signing of the May 22, 1978, contract, Respondent learned from Moody that neither he nor Florida Gulf Coast Construction Co., Inc., was properly licensed to perform the type of construction for which they had contracted. Respondent took no immediate action based on this information. Moody and/or Florida Gulf Coast Construction Co., Inc., continued to perform construction activities with the use of Respondent's building permit and contractor's license. Respondent received in excess of $50,000.00 with regard to the May 22, 1978, contract which included payment for the building permit he had previously obtained. He did not, however, receive reimbursement for the several hundred thousand dollars he had invested in this project before the sale to Allied.
Recommendation From the foregoing, it if RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty as charged in the Amended Administrative Complaint and suspending his general contractor's license for a period of one year. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of December, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 1982.
The Issue The issue before the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission (FLWAC) in this proceeding is whether to grant the Petition to Establish the Tern Bay Community Development District (Petition), dated December 18, 2003. The local public hearing was conducted for the purpose of gathering information in anticipation of rulemaking by FLWAC.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Respondent Robert F. Park has been a licensed Tampa Bay pilot for some 26 years. All his piloting experience has been in the Tampa Bay area where he has piloted over 9,000 vessels in and out. He has piloted some fifty vessels in and out of the Florida Power Corporation Terminal at Weedon Island. The Florida Power docking facilities at Weedon Island consist of a north and a south pier. The south pier is approximately 1,100 feet long, the north pier is about 700 feet long and the channel or slip in between is approximately 250 feet wide. On August 5, 1982, at 1230 hours, respondent boarded the M/T ZAMORA for the purpose of docking it at the Weedon Island facility. The ZAMORA is a large tanker approximately 590 feet long, and, at the time, was carrying 155,000 barrels of oil. Upon boarding the vessel, respondent reviewed posted documents concerning the vessel in the wheelhouse and observed the condition of the vessel and its crew. He does not recall asking the captain whether the vessel had any particular maneuvering problems or characteristics. The ZAMORA, with two tugs assisting, was to enter the turning basin of the Weedon Island facility and moor, port side to, at the south pier. The A.P. ST. PHILLIP was positioned on the stern and the YVONNE ST. PHILLIP was placed on the starboard bow. The A.P. ST. PHILLIP, having 2800 horsepower, was made up with one headline to the center chock aft, or the Panama chock, so that it could work either the port or starboard quarter of the ZAMORA. The forward tug, the YVONNE ST. PHILLIP, having 3300 horsepower, was made up to push the bow toward the south pier for docking. The placement of the two tugs in this manner is appropriate and is an effective means of maintaining a vessel's approach in a docking maneuver. The YVONNE ST. PHILLIP and the A.P. ST. PHILLIP are among the most powerful harbor tugs in the Tampa Bay area. Two employees of the Weedon Island facility, both of whom had seen over a hundred vessels enter that facility for docking purposes, observed the ZAMORA make its entrance into the slip area between the north and south piers. One of these eye witnesses felt that the arrival of the ZAMORA was unusual because of the speed with which it was approaching the dock, and the angle of the vessel gave the appearance that it was a little out of control. The other witness observed that the ZAMORA, as it entered the slip, "was coming faster than what I normally see for a tanker." (TR 47). Neither of these witnesses were able to estimate, in knots or miles per hour, the actual speed of the vessel. According to the respondent and the captain of the YVONNE ST. PHILLIP, the speed of the ZAMORA upon entering the dock area was between one and two knots. This is not an excessive speed when approaching a dock. Respondent maintained constant radio contact with both tug captains whom he had worked with previously over a long period of time. The initial entry into the Weedon Island facility was without incident. Tidal and weather conditions were good. Respondent intended to head the ZAMORA toward the south dock on a slight angle. It is typical for a vessel's stern to veer to port during a backing maneuver, thus causing the bow to move to the right. The first time respondent backed the ZAMORA was during the entrance to the slip area. When he did so, the vessel backed very strongly to port. At that time, he instructed the A.P. ST. PHILLIP (the aft tug) to swing around and come ahead on the port. At all times, the YVONNE ST. PHILLIP was applying momentum to the starboard bow of the ZAMORA, which had the effect of slowing down the bow's swing to the right. The A.P. ST. PHILLIP was coming ahead and applying force to the stern of the ZAMORA. At some point after the vessel's bow began veering to the right, the line parted on the aft tug A.P. ST PHILLIP. The captain of the YVONNE ST. PHILLIP noticed no difference in the movement or rate of swing of the ZAMORA after the aft tug's line was parted. The ZAMORA's bow continued to veer to the right and ultimately, at approximately 1530 hours, struck the north pier of the Weedon Island facility, causing extensive damage to the pier and damage to the ZAMORA. The annunciator tape or telegraph on the ZAMORA reveals that respondent gave the following engine commands: 1520.5 half speed 1521 slow ahead 1525 stop 1526 dead slow ahead 1526.5 stop 1528 slow astern 1529 stop 1529.5 full astern 1530 full astern 1531.5 stop The second "full astern" command at 1530 constitutes a "jingle" and signifies an emergency situation. Respondent was attempting to get enough sternway on the vessel to swing clear of the north pier and to give the stern tug time to get another line up and proceed onto the dock. This did not occur. It was the opinion of Captain Park that the cause of striking the north pier was the loss of the assistance of the aft tug. It was the opinion of the petitioner's expert witness, based upon his review of the investigative file and the testimony of the forward tug captain, that the casualty would have occurred whether or not the aft tug's line had parted. There was also testimony that, depending upon the actual positioning and movement of the A.P. ST. PHILLIP, the parting of its line could have been beneficial to the ZAMORA in counteracting the vessel's veer to the right. A Marine Casualty Report was filled out by the respondent on August 5, 1982, the same day as the incident. It was received by the Department of Professional Regulation on August 16, 1982. The form provided for such reports advises that the law requires the reporting of a casualty within seven days of the casualty and that failure to fully and accurately complete the report will result in disciplinary action against the licensed State pilot. The form also provides that responses to any question of "not available" are not acceptable responses. The form requires the attachment of a copy of the bell book or ship's log entries covering the casualty and an additional page containing remarks or additional comments concerning the casualty. To the bottom of the form, respondent printed the words "NOTE -- Additional report will follow." It was respondent's intent to obtain a translation of the log book entries written in Spanish. An investigator with the Department of Professional Regulation interviewed respondent concerning this incident on September 9, 1982. Counsel for the respondent informed the investigator that he was making efforts to obtain and supply a translated version of the log book, and that once respondent had that information and the results of an underwater survey, respondent would be fully apprised of the facts and would supplement the Marine Casualty Report. The evidence in this proceeding does not reveal that an additional or supplemental report was ever filed with the petitioner.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of negligence in the performance of piloting duties and failure to file a complete written report of the casualty within seven days in violation of Sections 310.101(4) and (5), 310.111, Florida Statutes, and Rules 21SS-8.01(4) and (5) and 21SS-8.07(1)(n) (currently numbered (1)(l), Florida Administrative Code. For such violations, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board impose an administrative fine against respondent in the amount of $1,000.00. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 30th day of March, 1984. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: W. B. Ewers, Esquire Post Office Drawer 9008 Coral Springs, Florida 33075 David G. Hanlon, Esquire Post Office Box 3324 Tampa, Florida 33601 C. Steven Yerrid, Esquire Julia S. Chapman, Esquire Holland & Knight Post Office Box 1288 Tampa, Florida 33601 Joe W. Lawrence, II Director Division of Regulation Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jane Raker Executive Director Board of Pilot Commissioners Deapartment of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact NFS filed an application with the Department for a renewed operations permit, Permit No. A016-126149. The Department entered a Notice of Permit Issuance indicating its intent to grant NFS' permit application. The Department, however, informed NFS that it was imposing several specific conditions on the permit being issued to NFS. NFS requested a formal administrative hearing to contest the imposition of several of the specific conditions it had been informed the Department intended to impose. At the commencement of the final hearing, the parties represented that they had resolved their dispute concerning all of the specific conditions at issue except one. The parties represented that the only remaining condition imposed by the Department which was still at issue hearing was specific condition number 9. Pursuant to specific condition number 9, NFS was required to comply with the requirements of Rule 17-2.650(2)(c)11.b.(i), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 17-2.650(2)(c)11.b.(i), Florida Administrative Code, requires the following: No owner or operator of a source governed by Rule 17-2.650(2)(c)11., F.A.C., shall cause, permit, or allow any visible emissions (five percent opacity) from such source(s) except that at the point where material is being discharged to the hold of a ship from a conveyor system. When the conveyor and/or hatch covering is moved, an opacity of 10 percent will be allowed. NFS has not filed a challenge pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, to the requirements of Rule 17-2.650(2)(c)11.b.(i), Florida Administrative Code. NFS failed to offer any proof that Rule 17-2.650(2)(c)11.b.(i), Florida Administrative Code, and the rule's 5% opacity limit does not apply to it. NFS suggested that it "could not live with" the 5% opacity requirement. Rule 17-2.650(2)(c)11.b.(i), Florida Administrative Code, does contain an exemption from the 5% opacity requirement of the rule. NFS did not, however, offer any proof that it qualifies for any exemption from the 5% opacity requirement.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a Final Order dismissing North Florida Shipyard, Inc.'s challenge to the Department's Notice of Permit Issuance. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of August, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of August, 1992. APPENDIX Case Number 92-2822 The Department has submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Department's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 Hereby accepted. 2 4-5 3 5. 4 7-8. 5 8. COPIES FURNISHED: North Florida Shipyard, Inc. Commodores Point - Administrative Office Attn: John B. Shiffert Post Office Box 3863 Jacksonville, Florida 32206 Jefferson M. Braswell Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson General Counsel State of Florida Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Carol Browner, Secretary State of Florida Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Department of Community Affairs, is the state land planning agency charged with the responsibility of administering the provisions of Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. The Department has the authority to appeal to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission any development order issued in an area of critical state concern pursuant to Sections 380.031(18), 380.032, and 380.07, Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding and to DOAH Case Number 93- 7165DRI, Petitioner, Fred Snowman, owned the real property known as Lot 75, Matecumbe Ocean Beach subdivision, Lower Matecumbe Key, in Monroe County, Florida (the subject property). A building permit issued by Monroe County, described below, for this property was the subject of DOAH Case Number 93- 7165DRI (the underlying proceeding.) The lot is approximately 100 feet wide and, at different points, between 200 and 225 feet deep. The subject property is bounded on the landward side by U.S. 1 and fronts the Atlantic Ocean in an area known as Matecumbe Beach. Matecumbe Beach is a known resting and nesting habitat for marine turtles. This building permit constituted a development order on property within the Florida Keys Area of Critical State Concern. On September 30, 1993, Monroe County issued to Mr. Snowman, as the owner and general contractor, building permit number 9330008850, which authorized the construction on the subject property of a single-family residence containing 2,472 square feet of heated and cooled area, 1,568 square feet of porches, 1,435 square feet of storage enclosure below base flood elevation, and a swimming pool. The authorized construction was to be consistent with the building site plan, which was also approved by Monroe County. On November 18, 1993, the Department timely appealed the subject building permit to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission (FLWAC) pursuant to Section 380.07, Florida Statutes. FLWAC referred the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings where it was assigned DOAH Case Number 93- 7165DRI. A formal hearing was conducted in DOAH Case Number 93-7165DRI in Key West, Florida, on June 30, 1994. Following the formal hearing, the parties were afforded the opportunity to file post-hearing submittals. Thereafter, a recommended order was entered which recommended that FLWAC enter a final order that dismisses the Department's appeal. After the entry of the recommended order, the Department voluntarily dismissed its appeal. FLWAC subsequently entered a final order of dismissal. Petitioner, Fred Snowman, was the prevailing party in DOAH Case Number 93-7165DRI. SMALL BUSINESS PARTY The issue as to whether Petitioner is a "small business party" as defined by Section 57.111(3)(d), Florida Statutes, was disputed by the Department in this proceeding. The parties stipulated that Mr. Snowman meets the remaining criteria contained in Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, for an award of attorney's fees and costs. The following testimony elicited by Petitioner's counsel of the Petitioner was the sole evidence pertaining to the number of employees of the Petitioner: Could you tell us a little bit about your business? What's the nature of your business? Primarily I'm a speculation - spec builder and general contractor in the Florida Keys, and have been since 1973. Q. How many employees do you maintain on a regular basis? A. I mainly have subcontractors. Occasionally when I have a job, I hire for that particular job. But I'm the sole proprietor and I'm the employee. (Transcript, page 9, lines 12-22.) While the foregoing testimony establishes that as of May 15, 1995, Petitioner was the sole proprietor and sole employee of his business, it does not establish that Petitioner had fewer than 25 employees in 1993 when the Department initiated its actions against him. 1/ The following testimony elicited by Petitioner's counsel of the Petitioner pertains to his net worth: Q. What is your net worth? Let me ask you this. Does your net worth exceed a million dollars? A. No. Q. Less than a million dollars? A. Yes. (Transcript, page 9, line 23 through page 10, line 3) The following testimony elicited by Respondent's counsel of the Petitioner on cross examination also pertains to his net worth: Q. When you're identifying your net worth, what exactly are you considering? A. Well, net worth is all my assets minus my liabilities. Q. All of your personal assets? A. Which are far and few between (sic) today. Q. Do you have business assets? A. No. Q. Do you own any property? A. Lot 75. Q. Any property other than Lot 75? A. I own three lots, small lots in Plantation Key. Q. Are they developed or undeveloped? A. No, they're undeveloped. Q. Do you know how much they're worth? A. They're valued at fifteen thousand per lot. Q. They're not on the water? A. Not on the water. Q. Lot 75, do you know what that property's worth? A. That property is worth about a hundred and seventy-five thousand. Q. Without the house on it? A. Without the improvements, yes. Q. How about in its improved condition? A. I would say, in the improved condition, with this home, it would be about five hundred thousand. Q. Okay. Other than the real estate, do you have any personal or business investments, stocks or -- A. No. Q. No? A. Just my condo. (Transcript, page 10, line 8 through page 11, line 13.) There was no other evidence presented as to Petitioner's net worth. While the foregoing testimony establishes that as of May 15, 1995, Petitioner had a net worth of less than two million dollars, it does not establish that his net worth was below that figure in 1993 when the Department initiated its actions against him. SUBSTANTIAL JUSTIFICATION The Department's appeal initially raised several issues. All issues in the underlying proceeding but one were voluntarily dismissed by the Department either prior to the hearing or at the hearing. The only issue litigated at the formal hearing in DOAH Case Number 93-7165DRI was the appropriate setback from the portion of the beach-berm complex located on the subject property known to serve as an active nesting or resting area of marine turtles. Pertinent to this proceeding, Section 9.5-345(3)(f), Monroe County Code, provides: f. No structure shall be located within fifty (50) feet of any portion of any beach-berm complex which is known to serve as an active nesting or resting area of marine turtles, terns, gulls or other birds; There was no dispute in Case 93-7165DRI that the turtle nesting setback applied to Mr. Snowman's property. The dispute was how to apply the setback. There was a bona fide factual dispute as to the extent of the beach berm complex on the subject property that should be considered to be "beach berm complex which is known to serve as an active nesting or resting area of marine turtles" within the meaning of the setback ordinance. The Department established that it followed its standard procedures in deciding to appeal the subject development order. The Department maintains a field staff in the Florida Keys that routinely reviews development orders issued by Monroe County for consistency with the land development regulations, the Monroe County comprehensive plan, and Chapters 163 and 380, Florida Statutes. The permit package typically reviewed, and reviewed in this case, includes the permit, a permit conditions sheet, surveys, and site plans. The Department staff usually reviews a biological survey or habitat evaluation index, reviews the County's entire file, reviews aerial photographs and conducts a field assessment. In this case, the Department also looked at records of the Department of Natural Resources and of the Save A Turtle volunteer environmental group. In this case, the Department conducted a field assessment of Mr. Snowman's lot and measured the point it considered to be the landward extent of the turtle nesting setback line. Kate Edgerton, an experienced biologist employed by the Department, measured the point the Department asserted was the landward extent of the turtle nesting setback line. Ms. Edgerton made a good faith assessment of the beach berm complex and considered the property to contain one beach berm complex. (Transcript, DOAH Case 93-7165DRI, page 166, line 17.) Ms. Edgerton testified in the underlying proceeding that she considered herself bound by the definitions in the Monroe County land use regulations and that she believed herself to be applying the pertinent definition when she measured the setback line. (Transcript, DOAH Case 93- 7165DRI, page 163, lines 20-23.) Following field staff review, a report is prepared and forwarded to Tallahassee for review by additonal staff, including the Department's administrator of the critical state concern program. Department staff in Tallahassee review the field staff report and participate in formulating a recommendation as to whether to appeal the permit. The appeal decision is then made either by the Department Division Director or by the agency head. Each material step in the Department's customary practice of reviewing permits was followed in reviewing the subject permit. Section 9.5-4(B-3), Monroe County Code, contains the following definition of the term "beach berm" that was found to be pertinent to the underlying proceeding: (B-3) "Beach berm" means a bare, sandy shore- line with a mound or ridge of unconsolidated sand that is immediately landward of, and usually parallel to, the shoreline and beach. The sand is calcareous material that is the remains of marine organisms such as corals, algae and molluscs. The berm may include forested, coastal ridges and may be colonized by hammock vegetation. The term "berm" is identified in the Monroe County comprehensive plan as . . . a mound or ridge of unconsolidated sand that is immediately landward of, and usually parallel to, the shoreline and beach. A berm is higher in elevation than both the beach and the area landward of the berm. At the formal hearing in the underlying appeal, there was conflicting evidence as to the extent of the beach berm complex on the subject property. The Recommended Order found that there were two distinct ridges located on the subject property. The issue of whether both ridges could be considered part of the "beach berm complex" was one of first impression. Succinctly stated, it was the position of the Department in the underlying appeal that both ridges were in an area of potential habitat on a beach that is known habitat and it asserted the position that both ridges should be considered to be one beach berm complex. The Department asserted the position that the setback should be measured from the landward extent of the second ridge (the more landward of the two ridges). Monroe County had measured the setback from the landward extent of the first ridge. Mr. Snowman agreed with the County's determination of the setback. Mr. Snowman presented evidence that the County had, for several years, applied the setback from the landward extent of the first ridge and argued that, based on the foregoing definitions each ridge should be considered to be a separate beach berm, but that only the first should be considered to be a beach berm. The Department presented evidence that the County had applied the setback provision in an inconsistent manner by measuring from the crest of berms in some cases and measuring from the landward extent of berms in other occasions. The Recommended Order rejected the Department's position and concluded that the definition of "beach berm" contained in Section 9.5-4(B-3), Monroe County Code, and the description of "berm" in the comprehensive plan were unambiguous. Although the Department argued that other provisions of the code and comprehensive plan supported their construction of the setback requirement, it was concluded that the issues should be resolved based on the unambiguous definition of "beach berm". It was also concluded that no deference should be afforded the Department's construction of the term "beach berm" because there is a plain and unambiguous definition of the term that is a part of the Monroe County Code. It was observed that "[w]hile a greater setback may better serve the goals of the comprehensive plan, as argued by the Department, the imposition of a greater setback requirement should come from a change in the Monroe County Code." This observation was made because the Department had found support for its interpretation of the setback requirement from other parts of the code and comprehensive plan. This case involved bona fide disputed issues of material fact and legal issues that were of first impression. It is found that those issues, although resolved against the Department following the formal hearing, were of sufficient merit to substantially justified the Department's actions in initiating the underlying appeal.
Findings Of Fact At all times here involved Bernadine Geary was registered with FREC as a broker and Active Firm Member of Florida Real Estate Enterprises, Inc., a corporate broker, and William J. Geary was registered as a real estate salesman working for the corporate broker, Florida Real Estate Enterprises, Inc. Florida Real Estate Enterprises, Inc. entered into a contract to sell Bird Bay Village Condominiums by providing a salesman, William J. Geary, at the site developed by Valencia Development Corp. Although the exact relationship between Bird Bay Village and Valencia Development Corporation was not clearly established it appears that the former handled the sales of the condominiums built by the latter and Bird Bay Village was a subsidiary of Valencia Development Corporation or they had common ownership. During the latter part of 1974 meetings were held by representatives of Valencia Development Corporation and Atlantic Equities, Inc. to reach an agreement whereby the latter would refer its clients owning an interest in undeveloped Florida land to Valencia Development Corporation who would negotiate with these people to exchange their interest in land for condominiums in Bird Bay Village. The understanding reached between the negotiators was memorialized in Exhibit 1, a letter from Valencia Development Corporation to Atlantic Equities dated October 18, 1974. Therein Atlantic Equities agreed to refer their clients to Valencia Development and if they purchased a condominium Valencia Development would pay Atlantic Equities a commission. William J. Geary attended two meetings which resulted in the agreement described in Exhibit 1. On November 22, 1974, Folmer and Rita Reich entered into a contract to transfer their equity in undeveloped land in Florida as down payment on a condominium at Bird Bay Village (Exhibit 5). William J. Geary negotiated the sale of the condominium to the Reichs. No evidence was presented that any misrepresentations were made to induce this sale or that the Reichs were advised in any manner regarding continuation of payments on their contracts for deed representing their equity in the land exchange. They did exchange, or purport to exchange, an equity in real property for other real property or an equity therein.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent violated Sections 489.129(1)(i) and 489.129(1)(o), Florida Statutes, and if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was licensed as a Certified Plumbing Contractor, holding License No. CF C056847. Respondent has maintained an active license since October 19, 1995. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent conducted his business under the name of Ron Price Plumbing and Tile. On May 18, 2000, Respondent's business was located at 2043 Mike Street, South Daytona, Florida. On May 18, 2000, Respondent gave Edward Carlson a written proposal to perform some repair work in a bathroom at Mr. Carlson's residence, which was located in Daytona Beach, Volusia County, Florida. The letterhead on the written proposal indicates that Respondent's business address was 2043 Mike Street, Daytona Beach, Florida. The written proposal states that for the sum of $1,200, Respondent would perform the following work : (a) remove floor and bottom two rows of tile; (b) install PVC pan and drain; (c) install dura rock to walls; (d) install four-by-four wall tile; (e) install second floor; (f) install two-by-two floor tile; (g) use white grout; and (h) haul away refuse. Mr. Carlson accepted this proposal. Respondent did not pull a permit from the City of Daytona Beach Building Department before commencing the work in Mr. Carlson's bathroom. The City of Daytona Beach, Florida, requires a permit for the type of work performed by Respondent, even though very few plumbers or contractors actually take the time to pull one. Specifically, City of Daytona Beach Ordinance 104.1.4.1 requires a permit for minor repairs exceeding $500. Respondent, subsequently, completed the work in Mr. Carlson's bathroom. Mr. Carlson inspected the work and paid Respondent $1,200 as agreed. There is no credible evidence that Respondent's work was substandard or that he damaged Mr. Carlson's property in any respect. Thereafter, Respondent moved his business to 6089 Airport Road, Port Orange, Volusia County, Florida. As of September 1, 2000, Petitioner's records correctly reflect Respondent's current address of record at the new business location. Petitioner expended $312.48 in total cost, excluding attorney's fees, for investigating, filing, and pursuing the complaint against Respondent through the administrative complaint process.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 489.129(1)(o), Florida Statutes, imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $500, and assessing investigative costs in the amount of $312.48. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of November, 2001.
