Findings Of Fact Petitioner's current address is 3195 East Atlantic Drive, Boynton Beach, Florida 33435. At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner received AFDC and Food Stamp benefits. At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner worked for Winn Dixie, 1565 S. Congress Ave., West Palm Beach, Florida, but failed to timely and/or accurately report her income to DHRS. By letters dated April 14, 1993, DHRS notified Petitioner that her failure to timely and/or accurately report her income resulted in an overissuance of $3,889 in Food Stamp benefits and an overpayment of $6,664 in AFDC benefits for the period of June, 1991 through November, 1992. On or about April 21, 1994, Petitioner filed a winning ticket in the face amount of $10,000 with the Lottery. On or about April 26, 1994, DHRS certified to the Lottery that Petitioner owed an arrearage in the amount of $10,533.00 for overpayments of AFDC and Food Stamp Benefits. On April 29, 1993, Petitioner acknowledged her liability and signed a Repayment Agreement for the AFDC and Food Stamp debts. On or about June 2, 1994, the Lottery transmitted Petitioner's $7,200 net prize ($10,000 less federal income tax in the amount of $2,800) to DBF with a request that DBF apply the funds as directed by Section 24.115(4), Florida Statutes. By letter dated June 8, 1994, DBF notified Petitioner that it intended to apply $7,200 of Petitioner's winnings to her unpaid debt. Said notice informed Petitioner of her right to a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. Petitioner received DBF's June 8, 1994, letter by certified mail on or about June 17, 1994. However, Petitioner failed to request a formal hearing until July 14, 1994. Record evidence established Petitioner's debt for overissuance of Food Stamps and overpayment of AFDC benefits. Petitioner did not make an appearance at the formal hearing held on November 22, 1994. At that time, Petitioner had not repaid DHRS any portion of her $10,533 debt.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that DBF enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's petition and transferring Petitioner's net prize in the amount of $7,200 to DHRS for credit to Petitioner's account in partial satisfaction of her debts to the state. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 29th day of December, 1994. SUZANNE F. HOOD, Hearing Officer Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 1994. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact The Petitioner did not file proposed findings of fact. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in Findings of Fact (FOF) #1. Accepted in FOF #5. Accepted in FOF #6. Accepted in FOF #8. Accepted in FOF #9. Accepted in FOF #10. Accepted in FOF #10 except as modified. The record does not contain a copy of a Final Order dated July 14, 1994. Accepted in FOF #10 except as modified. The record does not contain a copy of a Final Order date July 14, 1994. Accepted in FOF # 11. Accepted in FOF #6. Accepted in FOF #4. Accepted in FOF #7. Accepted in FOF #11. Accepted in FOF #11. Accepted in FOF #12 except as modified to eliminate subordinate information. COPIES FURNISHED: Emma Gonzales 3195 East Atlantic Drive Boynton Beach, Florida 33435 Mindy K. Raymaker, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Jorge Cruz-Bustillo, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Blvd. Bldg. E, Room 200 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Continued next page. Louisa H. Warren, Esquire Department of Lottery 250 Marriot Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4000 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 William G. Reeves, General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Robert L. Powell, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Kim Tucker, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Dr. Marcia Mann, Secretary Department of the Lottery 250 Marriot Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ken Hart, General Counsel Department of the Lottery 250 Marriot Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact In time sequence, the following transactions took place: a. Petitioner, Myron Friedman, executed a contract with Willow Industries, Inc., a New York corporation, on August 14, 1973, for the purchase of properties located in Manatee County, Florida. Conquistador Estates, Inc., a Florida corporation, for profit, was incorporated under the laws of the State of Florida on September 25, 1973. Petitioner, Myron Friedman, borrowed $650,000 from Franklin National Bank of Long Island, New York, on October 29, 1973. Mr. Friedman executed a personal note to the Florida National Bank on October 29, 1973. Myron Friedman made a loan to Conquistador Estates, Inc. in the amount of $400,000 to purchase the Manatee County property on October 30, 1973. Conquistador Estates, Inc. purchased the properties described in the contract from Willow Industries, Inc. to Myron Friedman on October 30, 1973. Conquistador Estates, Inc. executed a mortgage to Myron Friedman in the amount of $400,000 on October 30, 1973, in exchange for the herein before mentioned loan of $400,000 on October 29, 1973. Myron Friedman assigned the herein before mentioned mortgage to Franklin National Bank as security for the personal loan of $650,000 on October 30, 1973. Conquistador Estates, Inc. deeded the properties acquired by it from Willow Industries, Inc. to Myron Friedman on May 28, 1974. Additional facts: The notes and the mortgage herein described are still in existence. Conquistador Estates, Inc. is still a viable corporation although it owns no property and Myron Friedman is the sole stockholder. There were no payments made to Petitioner, Myron Friedman, as required by the terms of the promissory note of Conquistador Estates, Inc. to Myron Friedman. In an Audit of documents recorded in the office of the Circuit Clerk in and for Manatee County, Florida, Respondent, Department of Revenue, determined that insufficient documentary stamps and documentary surtax stamps were affixed to the warranty deed dated May 28, 1974, between Conquistador Estates, Inc. and Petitioner, Myron Friedman, an individual. Subsequent to the audit, the Respondent issued a "Proposed Notice of Assessment of Tax and Penalty Under Chapter 201, Florida Statutes, documentary surtax in the amount of $439.45, pursuant to Section 201.021, Florida Statutes, and penalties in the amount of $1,639.14 pursuant to Section 201.17, Florida Statutes. Attached to the said notice was "Schedule A," an explanation of the basis for the demand for additional documentary stamp tax and documentary surtax. It explained that the warranty deed to Petitioner, Myron Friedman, individually, from Conquistador Estates, Inc., satisfied the existing mortgage and which rendered the mortgage unenforceable as to the original mortgagor, Conquistador Estates, Inc., and cited Department of Administration Rule 12A-4.13(2) Florida Administrative Code. "Defaulting Mortgagor: Where a mortgagor, in full or partial satisfaction of the mortgage indebtedness, conveys the mortgaged premises to the mortgagee, documentary stamp taxes are due on the transaction." Petitioner, Myron Friedman, contends: That Conquistador Estates, Inc. was just a nominee used for the purpose of securing a mortgage loan; That he is the sole owner of the corporation; That there was no conveyance in full or partial satisfaction of the mortgage since he is the sole owner of the corporation, and he is the grantee and that, therefore, no documentary stamp tax or surtax or penalty is due; That the mortgage itself is assigned and is still in existence. The Respondent contends: That the clear wording of statute, Section 201.02(1), F.S., controls the transaction which was a conveyance by warranty deed; That because the corporation, Conquistador Estates, Inc. has no assets and made no payments to Petitioner, the conveyance by warranty deed was in full satisfaction of the mortgage indebtedness and canceled the written obligation of the corporation to pay $400,000, the unpaid portion of the obligation secured by the mortgage. The Respondent further contends that the partial indebtness of the corporation itself to Petitioner was canceled.
Recommendation Assess the documentary stamp and the documentary surtax against Petitioner, Myron Friedman. Do not assess penalties for failure to pay tax required, inasmuch as it is apparent that the taxes which were paid were paid in good faith and that the taxes which were due and owing were not paid because of a misunderstanding of the requirements of Chapter 201, F.S. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of May, 1976. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 1976. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert H. Carr, Esquire Post Office Box 3798 Sarasota, Florida 33578 Patricia Turner, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue The sole issue posed herein is: Whether or not the transfer to Petitioner by individuals Hugh P. Conser, Stewart L. Krug and Sidney Barbane1 of certain real property located in Pinellas County, Florida, on or about October 26, 1974, constitutes a conveyance subject to the Documentary Stamp Tax Act, pursuant to Chapter 201, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On or about October 26, 1974, the Petitioner received title to certain real property located Pinellas County, Florida, from Stewart L. Krug, Sidney Barbanel and Hugh P. Conser, the principals in KBC Development Corporation, which was recorded in Official Records Book 4229, page 1052, Public Records of Pinellas County, Florida. The only consideration, as evidenced by the deeds filed in the case, is that the conveyance was for "good and valuable consideration and ten dollars". This other good and valuable consideration, according to Petitioner and the other record evidence, consisted of the issuance of all one hundred shares of the authorized stock of KBC Development Corporation, Petitioner, as evidenced by the Minutes of the Shareholders Meeting of such corporation which was held on July 18, 1973. (See the minutes reflected in an attachment to Petitioner's Exhibit Number 1.) The issued stock had a par value of $5.00. The corporate entity, KBC, as Petitioner, was formed for the purpose of taking title to the property in question and, as evidenced by the record, had no other assets when the subject property was conveyed. On May 6, 1975, the Florida `Department of Revenue, Respondent, recorded in the office of the Circuit Court of Pinellas County, Florida, a warrant for collection of delinquent documentary stamp taxes in connection with the above-referenced transaction in the amount of $27,599.70, plus an identical amount of penalty, for a total sum of $55,212.40. Said warrant is recorded in O.R. Book 4286, page 31, Public Records of Pinellas County, Florida. Following a conference with the Department of Revenue, the taxes were paid by the Petitioner under protest. That payment set the stage for the Petitioner's filing of the claim for refund with the Respondent, the Comptroller of the State of Florida, pursuant to Florida Statutes section 215.26. The Petitioner argues that the only taxable consideration resulting from the subject conveyance was the par value of the stock, of which amount sufficient documentary stamps were affixed to the deeds in question. In support of this position, the Petitioner cites the fact that there are no income tax returns filed by the corporation, FIG; no business activities pursued by the corporation; no bank account of the corporation; and no assets held by the corporation, except as agents for the three individuals, Krug, Barbanel and Conser, all of which were acknowledged by all of the mortgagees. Additionally, the Petitioner urges that the bank and lending institutions involved regarded and held each individual personally liable for the indebtedness in connection with the loans advanced for the property in question. Finally, the Petitioner urges that, based on the conveyance in question, there was no shift in the economic burden to the corporation and, therefore, no taxable transaction occurred when the property in question was conveyed from the individuals, Krug, Barbanel and Conser, to FIG Development Corporation.
Conclusions The documentary stamp tax provided by Florida Statutes section 201.02 is an excise tax imposed on particularly described transactions, and in the case of instruments relating to realty, is based upon the total consideration involved in the transfer or conveyance. Thus, the key point in determining whether documentary stamps are to be affixed to an instrument transferring an interest in realty is in the presence or absence of consideration for the transfer. Rule 12A-4 .14, Florida Administrative Code, describes conveyances not subject to the documentary stamp tax as those "conveyances of realty without consideration, including. . .a deed to or by a trustee not pursuant to a sale . . . ." The facts of this case clearly do not illustrate an express or resulting trust relationship between KBC Development Corporation and its principals, Stewart L. Krug, Sidney Barbanel and Hugh P. Conser. When KBC took title to the property from Krug, Conser and Barbanel, the consideration was $10.00 and other valuable consideration and, based on the face of the instrument, the conveyance was not made to KBC subject to payment of any mortgages, etc., by KPC (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1). Section 201.02(1), Florida Statutes (1975). See Florida Department of Revenue v. De Maria, 338 So.2d 838 (Fla. 1976). Additionally, the facts herein reveal that the banks and lending institutions involved in the transaction required the personal guarantees of the individuals, Krug, Barbanel and Conser. No evidence was introduced indicating that Petitioner, KBC Development Corporation, was anything more than an entity whereby the lending institutions had advanced funds for the primary mortgages to Continental Investment and Development Company, which was in no way related to the present corporation, KBC, and that the corporate entity was used to protect the lending institutions from any possible violations of usurious transactions. As stated, the personal endorsements and/or guarantees of the individuals, Barbanel, Krug and Conser, were required by the lending institutions before the primary mortgagee, Continental Investment and Development Company, would be released. Krug, Barbanel and Conser were no more nor less obligated to pay and perform under the obligation, after the conveyance than before. Although there was a change in the form of the obligation, there was no change in the substance. See e.g., Straughn v. Story, 334 So.2d 337 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) cert. discharged 348 So.2d 954 (1977). (See Petitioner's Exhibits 2, 3 and 4.) For all of these reasons, it is the considered opinion of the undersigned that the Respondents have failed to demonstrate that the consideration for the conveyances in question were anything more than the par value of the stock and, accordingly, documentary stamp taxes should only be assessed in the amount of $4.10. Accordingly, I shall recommend that the excess assessments which Petitioner paid under protest be refunded.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Petitioner be refunded the amount of taxes and penalties it paid to the Respondent, Department of Revenue, under protest, over and above the amount it should have paid on the par value of the stock of KBC Corporation when the abovedescribed conveyance was made during October, 1974. RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of April, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building MAILING ADDRESS: 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Donald R. Hall, Esquire Goza, Hall & Peacock, P.A. 100 North Belcher Road Clearwater, Florida 33518 Cecil L. Davis, Jr., Esquire Assistant Attorney General The Capitol, Room LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32304 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA KBC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 76-1596 GERALD LEWIS, as COMPTROLLER OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, AND DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Respondents. / NOTICE TO: DONALD R. HALL, ESQUIRE ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER GOZA, HALL & PEACOCK, P.A. 100 NORTH BELCHER ROAD CLEARWATER, FLORIDA 33518 CECIL L. DAVIS, JR., ESQUIRE ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENTS ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL THE CAPITOL LL04 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32304 You will please take notice that the Governor and Cabinet, acting as head of the Department of Revenue at its meeting on the 12th day of June, 1979, approved the Respondent's Substituted Order, in lieu of the Division of Administrative Hearing's Recommended Order dated April 3, 1979. A copy of the Respondent's Proposed Substituted Order is attached. This constitutes final agency action by the Department of Revenue. JOHN D. MORIARTY, ATTORNEY DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATION DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE STATE OF FLORIDA ROOM 104, CARLTON BUILDING TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32301 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice was furnished by mail to Donald R. Hall, Esquire, Goza, Hall & Peacock, P.A. 100 North Belcher Road, Clearwater, Florida 33518, Attorney for Petitioner; by hand delivery to Cecil L. Davis, Jr., Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, The Capitol LL04, Tallahassee, Florida 32304, Attorney for Respondents and James E. Bradwell, Esquire, Hearing Officer, Division of Administrative Hearings, Department of Administration, Room 530, Carrolton Building, Tallahassee, Florida 32304, this 14th day of June, 1979. JOHN D. MORIARTY, ATTORNEY Attachment STATE OF FLORIDA
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents are guilty of food stamp fraud and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondents hold alcoholic beverage license #21-00010, series 2-APS, for use at 402 South First Street N.W., Immokalee, Florida. Respondents are husband and wife. On March 14, 1995, an investigator employed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture entered Respondents' licensed premises and approached Ricardo Ellis, who was behind the counter. Without identifying himself, the investigator asked Mr. Ellis if he could exchange food stamps for cash. Mr. Ellis agreed to do so and gave the investigator $100 in return for which the investigator gave Mr. Ellis food stamps with a value of $215. On March 23, 1995, the investigator returned to the licensed premises. He approached Debra Ellis, who was behind the counter, and asked her where Mr. Ellis was. She reported that he was out of the store. Without identifying himself, the investigator asked Mrs. Ellis if she could exchange food stamps for cash. Mrs. Ellis agreed to do so and gave the investigator $100 in return for which the investigator gave Mrs. Ellis food stamps with a value of $200. On April 27, 1995, the investigator returned to the licensed premises. Mr. Ellis was out of the store at the time. Without identifying himself, the investigator approached Ms. Ellis and asked her if she could exchange food stamps for cash. She agreed to do so and gave the investigator $159 in return for which the investigator gave her food stamps with a value of $265. Petitioner recovered the food stamps exchanged in the March 23 transaction. They were endorsed by "Rick's Economy Meats" and the federal government had redeemed them by paying their face value to Economy Meats. The food stamps exchanged in the March 14 transaction have never been recovered. The food stamps exchanged in the April 27 transaction were recovered moments after the transaction took place, when law enforcement officers arrested Mrs. Ellis.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, enter a final order against Debra Ellis revoking her license to sell alcoholic beverages and against Ricardo Ellis revoking his license to sell alcoholic beverages and disqualifying each of them from participation in the food stamp program for 10 years. ENTERED on October 19, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on October 19, 1995. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1-3: adopted or adopted in substance. 4: rejected as subordinate. 5-6: adopted or adopted in substance. 7-8: rejected as subordinate. 9: adopted or adopted in substance. 10: rejected as subordinate. 11: adopted or adopted in substance. 12-14: rejected as irrelevant. 15-16: adopted or adopted in substance. 17-19: rejected as subordinate. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Ricardo and Deborah Ellis 2925 4th St NW Naples, FL 33964 Ricardo and Deborah Ellis 316 S. 1st St. Immokalee, FL 33934 Leslie Anderson-Adams, Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1007 John J. Harris, Director Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Respondent David R. Hutto d/b/a Neighborhood Discount, signed a contract with the WIC Program administered by the Petitioner Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services on December 27, 1982, effective for the calendar year January 1 through December 31, 1983. One of the general conditions in the contract specifies that Neighborhood Discount, as a vendor, may be disqualified from participation in the WIC Program if it is disqualified from participation in any United States Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service Program. Respondent, operating as Neighborhood Discount, was disqualified from participation in the Food Stamp Program of the United States Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service Program, beginning July 16, 1983, for a period of six months. The basis for the disqualification was the sale of fourteen ineligible items including beer, cigarettes and a pocket knife.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered dismissing the proceedings to suspend the Respondent's WIC Program participation. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of March, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9 day of March, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Anthony W. DeLuccia, Jr., Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Post Office Box 06085 Fort Myers, Florida 33906 David R. Hutto Neighborhood Discount 2130 Ford Street Fort Myers, Florida 33001 Alicia Jacobs, Esquire General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David H. Pingree, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact The Petitioners herein, Lorisna Pierre, Dieuala St. Hilaire and St. Helene Joimelus, are Cuban/Haitian refugees who possess Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), cards 1-94 which contain the "Cuban Haitian Entrant" stamp thereon. At some time subsequent to their entrance into the United States, the Petitioners applied for food stamps for themselves and their families and were determined to be ineligible. Therefore, the Petitioners are, and it is so stipulated by Respondent, substantially affected by the challenged rule which formed the basis for the denial of their applications. By letter dated September 16, 1985, Marshall E. Kelly, Program Staff Director for Economic Services within DHRS, issued a letter memorandum, Number 85-131, in which he recites that information received from the U.S. Department of Agriculture indicates that the "Cuban/Haitian Entrant" stamp which appears on certain INS 1-94 cards may be questionable and thereafter outlines certain procedures to be followed when that particular card bearing the questioned stamp is presented by an alien applying for food stamps. Thereafter, DHRS, on April 1, 1986, promulgated a new Chapter 10 to its Manual Number 165-6U, dealing with Food Stamp Certification which at subparagraph 10-12 defines illegal aliens as persons who have entered the United States unlawfully and declares these individuals to be ineligible for food stamps, and at subparagraph 10-18, defines and describes the various types of 1- 94 cards which may be presented as identification by aliens applying for food stamps. It goes further to display samples of the various cards in question and indicate which are acceptable and which are not as well as what benefits are attached to each. This chapter in question is of general applicability as it applies to all potential applicants for food stamps within the State of Florida about whom there is or may be some question regarding eligibility based on citizenship or alien status. This new version of Chapter 10 was, upon promulgation, distributed to all food stamp offices statewide for immediate implementation and is used by food stamp eligibility workers in determining the eligibility of applicants for food stamps. The chapter as currently written interprets the INS rules displaying, as was stated previously- samples of specific 1-94 cards and the variations thereof that exist, implements, explains and otherwise gives guidelines for the application of the food stamp regulation, and goes further than the actual U.S. Department of Agriculture regulation by suggesting methods of resolution regarding questionable information when determining the eligibility of an applicant. In shorts substantial additional information not contained in the basic Department of Agriculture food stamp regulation is contained within the provisions of Chapter 10 of the DHRS manual which is the basic guideline for the implementation of the food stamp regulation as it pertains to aliens within the State of Florida. In the preparation and implementation of this paragraphs DHRS did not give any public notice of what it intended to do or what it was proposing. No explanation of the purpose and effect of the proposal was publicized or was the specific legal authority authorizing the adoption of the proposals or a summary of the economic impact of the proposal noticed. In facto no notice was given to anyone who would be impacted by the proposal prior to its implementation. No publication was made of the proposed promulgation in the Florida Administrative Weekly or any other public news dissemination source nor was the general public including Petitioners, offered an opportunity to present evidence and/or argument on the issues under consideration.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether a tax on a warranty deed is an allowable property cost, as claimed in Petitioner’s Medicaid cost report.
Findings Of Fact Venice operates Sunset Lake, a licensed nursing facility that participates in the Florida Medicaid program as an institutional provider. AHCA is the agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid program. On or about June 1, 2005, Venice (or an affiliate, which need not be distinguished from Venice for purposes of this proceeding) purchased the nursing facility that is now known as Sunset Lake from Bon Secours-Venice Healthcare Corporation. Venice filed its initial Medicaid cost report with AHCA for the fiscal period ending December 31, 2005. The initial Medicaid cost report for a nursing facility is used to set the per diem rates at which the Medicaid program will reimburse the facility, both retroactively for the initial period of operations, and prospectively until the next cost report is filed and used to set a new per diem rate. AHCA contracted with an outside auditing firm to audit Venice’s initial cost report. The auditing firm produced an audit report, which identified proposed adjustments to Venice’s cost report. The audit report was reviewed by AHCA analyst Steven Diaczyk before it was finalized and sent to Venice. Venice initially contested 17 adjustments in the final audit report. Before the final hearing, Venice withdrew its challenge to 16 of the 17 adjustments. The only remaining dispute to be resolved in this proceeding is whether audit adjustment number four, which disallowed $49,540.00 of costs in the category of “Property Taxes – Real Estate,” should be reduced by $12,203.80. The disallowed $12,203.80 represents one-half of the tax assessed pursuant to section 201.02, Florida Statutes (2005),1/ on the warranty deed conveying the Sunset Lake real property (including the land, land improvements, and the building) to Venice. Venice claimed one-half of the tax on its cost report because that is the amount paid by Venice; the other half was paid by the seller. Venice contends that this tax is an ad valorem tax and/or a property tax,2/ which is an allowable property cost on the Medicaid cost report. AHCA contends that the tax on the warranty deed is an excise tax, not a property tax, and, therefore, not an allowable property cost. The audit report did not explain the reason for disallowing the $12,203.80 tax, as part of the $49,540.00 adjustment. Instead, the audit report explained the entire $49,540.00 adjustment as necessary to “disallow unsupported costs,” suggesting a lack of documentation. However, no non- hearsay evidence was offered at hearing to prove that Venice failed to give the auditors sufficient documentation of the costs disallowed in adjustment number four. At least with respect to the disallowed $12,203.80 item, sufficient documentation was offered at hearing to support the cost as an actual cost incurred by Venice. The question is whether the documented cost is allowable as an ad valorem tax or property tax, as Venice claims. Documentation for the $12,203.80 tax on the warranty deed is found in the buyer/seller closing statement and on the face of the warranty deed. The closing statement sets forth the total purchase price of $7,500,000.00, which is also the amount of a mortgage loan from Bank of America. The closing statement allocates the total purchase price to the land ($477,000.00), land improvements ($496,500.00), the building ($2,513,250.00), FFE--furniture, fixtures, and equipment ($992,250.00), and personal property ($3,021,000.00). The closing statement also shows a separate category called credits and/or prorations, to appropriately account for items accruing over the calendar year. The first line item in this category is for “Ad Valorem Taxes.” If ad valorem taxes were due for calendar year 2005, they would have been prorated. However, the amount is shown to be zero. As confirmed at hearing, no ad valorem taxes were due for the Sunset Lake property in 2005, because as of January 1, 2005, the property was owned by a not-for-profit entity, making the property exempt from ad valorem taxes. The second line item in this category, for “Non-Ad Valorem Assessments,” for which there was no exemption, shows a total amount for 2005 of $8,235.29, which was prorated to credit the buyer for $3,270.65. The closing statement proration had the effect of charging the seller with its share of the assessments for the part of the year prior to closing.3/ A separate category on the closing statement addresses “Recording Fees.” The first line item in this category is for “Transfer Tax-snf [skilled nursing facility].” The taxable amount is shown as $3,486,800.00. The tax of $24,407.60 is split equally between buyer and seller, with $12,203.80 charged to each. The next line is for “Stamp Tax on mtg. [mortgage].” The taxable amount is shown as $7,500,000.00, the amount of the mortgage loan. The tax of $26,250.00 is charged to the buyer. Another line item is shown for “Intangible Tax on mtg.” Again, the taxable amount is shown as $7,500,000.00, and the tax of $15,000.00 is charged to the buyer. The top right corner of the warranty deed conveying the Sunset Lake property contains the following printed or stamped text in the space marked “(Space reserved for Clerk of Court):” RECORDED IN OFFICIAL RECORDS INSTRUMENT # 2005117710 7 PGS 2005 JUN 01 05:01 PM KAREN E. RUSHING CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT SARASOTA COUNTY, FLORIDA MMARSH Receipt#635187 Doc Stamp-Deed: 24,407.60 [Bar/Scan Code with instrument number] As Venice’s representative confirmed, the reference on the face of the warranty deed to “Doc Stamp-Deed: 24,407.60,” affixed by the clerk of the court in the official records entry, means that a documentary stamp tax on the deed in the amount of $24,407.60 was paid. Because the tax was split between buyer and seller, Venice actually paid $12,203.80. Although the closing statement shows that the tax at issue was called a transfer tax and categorized as a “recording fee,” and not an “ad valorem tax,” Venice contends here that the documentary stamp tax on the deed was an ad valorem property tax, because the tax was assessed on the value of the property. As Venice summarized its position: That irrespective of whether the transfer tax is called an excise tax, a doc stamp tax or any other type of tax, the fact that it is based solely on the value of the assets makes it an ad valorem tax, which is considered by the state of Florida in all cases under Medicaid cost reporting purposes [sic] as a property tax. (AHCA Exh. 3, p. 14). AHCA disagrees. AHCA contends that the documentary stamp tax on the deed is an excise tax, assessed on the consideration for the property transferred by the deed. The parties do agree that the documentary stamp tax rate, applied to either the value of the property or the consideration for the property, was 70 cents per $100.00.4/ The parties also agree that the “property” at issue, which was conveyed by the warranty deed, includes the land, land improvements, and the building. That being the case, it appears from the closing statement that the “taxable amount” used to determine the documentary stamp tax on the deed (referred to as the “transfer tax-snf”) was the sum of the purchase price allocations for the land ($477,000.00), land improvements ($496,500.00), and the building ($2,513,250.00).5/ The documentary stamp tax on the warranty deed was based on the consideration for the property stated in the closing statement.6/ Venice asserts that the documentary stamp tax was based on the “assessed value of the property (land, land improvements and the building) [of] $3,486.750.00[.]” (Venice PRO at ¶ 24, n. 1). However, Venice offered no evidentiary support for this assertion. The amount Venice calls the “assessed value” is actually the amount of the total purchase price allocated in the closing statement to the land, land improvements, and the building. In contrast, the “assessed value” for this property in 2005, according to the Sarasota County Tax Collector’s bill, was $3,724,300.00. The documentary stamp tax on the warranty deed was not based on the assessed value of the property. Venice also contends that subsequent action by the Department of Revenue supports Venice’s position that the documentary stamp tax on the deed was based on the value of the property and not on the consideration for the property. Venice offered in evidence portions of correspondence between representatives of Venice’s parent company with the Department of Revenue in 2008 that resulted in a determination that Venice owed additional documentary stamp tax on the Sunset Lake warranty deed. According to Venice, “the Department [of Revenue] did not agree with the value of assets that Venice had reported and paid taxes on.” (Venice PRO at ¶ 32). Contrary to Venice’s characterization, the portions of correspondence with the Department of Revenue in evidence confirm that the documentary stamp tax on the Sunset Lake warranty deed was based on the consideration for the real property (i.e., the land, land improvements, and the building). The Department of Revenue sought additional information from Venice to establish what the consideration was. The Department of Revenue “Official Request for Information” form asked for “Total Consideration (Purchase/Transfer Price)” for the property conveyed by warranty deed. The form completed on Venice’s behalf reported that the consideration was $3,486,750.00--the purchase price allocation in the closing statement to the land, land improvements, and the building. Along with the completed form, a letter of explanation on Venice’s behalf (with attachments not offered in evidence) went into great detail in an attempt to justify these purchase price allocations, and ended on the following note: We are hopeful that the enclosed documentation and the foregoing explanation of the purchase price allocations will provide sufficient information for the Department to determine that the correct amount of documentary stamp taxes was paid on each of the deeds, based in each case on the agreed consideration paid for the respective real estate assets. Thus, from the evidence offered by Venice, the focus of the Department of Revenue inquiry, as well as the Venice response to the inquiry, was entirely on the consideration paid for the property. The fact that the Department of Revenue ultimately determined that Venice owed more documentary stamp taxes on the warranty deed than was paid is not evidence that the tax was assessed on the “value” of the real property, as Venice argues. Instead, the material suggests that the Department of Revenue disagreed with what Venice contended was the total consideration and/or with Venice’s allocation of the total purchase price to the real property (the land, land improvements, and the building) and to the other assets acquired in the transaction, including furniture, equipment, and personal property. Venice also takes the position that the tax on the warranty deed is an allowable cost pursuant to two provisions in the federal Provider Reimbursement Manual (PRM), which is one of the sources used to determine allowable costs. First, PRM section 2122.1 provides the “general rule” that “taxes assessed against the provider, in accordance with the levying enactments of the several States and lower levels of government and for which the provider is liable for payment, are allowable costs.” Next, PRM section 2122.2 provides in pertinent part: Certain taxes . . . which are levied on providers are not allowable costs. These taxes are: * * * C. Taxes in connection with financing, refinancing, or refunding operations, such as taxes on the issuance of bonds, property transfers, issuance or transfer of stocks, etc. Generally, these costs are either amortized over the life of the securities or depreciated over the life of the asset. They are not, however, recognized as tax expense. Venice contends that the documentary stamp tax paid on the warranty deed must be allowed because it is a tax that meets the general rule in section 2122.1, and it is not an excluded tax under section 2122.2(C). The documentary stamp tax paid by Venice on the warranty deed satisfies the general elements of section 2122.1; AHCA does not contend otherwise. Instead, AHCA contends that the documentary stamp tax must be considered an excluded tax under section 2122.2(C). AHCA is correct that the documentary stamp tax on warranty deeds transferring real property is essentially a transfer tax. However, it is not a tax in connection with financing, refinancing, or refunding operations. An example of such a tax would be the documentary stamp tax that Venice paid on the mortgage on Sunset Lake, because it was a tax in connection with the financing for the property. Venice correctly points out that, grammatically, section 2122.2(C) suggests that the only taxes excluded under that subsection are taxes in connection with financing, refinancing, or refunding operations. The use of the phrase “such as” suggests that everything that follows that phrase must be considered an example of what precedes the phrase. AHCA acknowledges that consideration of the grammatical structure of section 2122.2(C) alone would support Venice’s interpretation. However, AHCA’s expert testified, reasonably and without contradiction, that Venice’s interpretation would render the phrase “property transfers” meaningless. As AHCA’s expert explained, a tax on a property transfer is not a tax on financing, refinancing, or refunding operations. Therefore, despite the grammatical structure, taxes on property transfers must be considered a separate type of excluded tax under section 2122.2(C). As further support for this interpretation, AHCA’s expert pointed to the second sentence, providing that the excluded costs referred to in the first sentence “are either amortized over the life of the securities or depreciated over the life of the asset.” AHCA’s expert explained that taxes on financing, refinancing, or refunding operations would all be amortized, whereas taxes on property transfers would be depreciated over the life of the depreciable assets transferred (i.e., the land improvements and the building). Venice relies solely on the grammatical structure of section 2122.2(C), offering no response to AHCA’s reasoning for interpreting the subsection in a way that is contrary to the meaning suggested only by grammatical structure. Venice did not explain how a tax on property transfers could be considered a tax on financing, refinancing, or refunding operations (so as to give meaning to the phrase “property transfers”), nor did Venice explain when taxes on financing, refinancing, or refunding operations would be depreciated over the life of the asset (so as to give meaning to that phrase in the second sentence).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a Final Order disallowing $12,203.80 claimed as a property tax expense in Venice’s initial Medicaid cost report. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of July, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of July, 2014.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is Fred Burke, Jr. He was an existing employee of a juvenile detention facility in Jacksonville, Florida in 1978, when Respondent assumed responsibility for operation of the facility. Petitioner continued to be employed by Respondent in the position of detention careworker class I, until notified of his demotion and reassignment to other duties on May 25, 1989. Respondent's demotion and reassignment of Petitioner followed Petitioner's refusal to work overtime on two occasions. On each of these occasions, Petitioner cited his cardiac condition as the basis for his refusal. All detention care workers in the facility are subject to mandatory overtime policy requirements which provide that overtime may be required if there is a need for additional supervisory coverage of clients. Prior to taking the demotion and reassignment action, Respondent sought an independent medical evaluation of Petitioner's ability to perform the duties of the position of detention careworker class I. Respondent required Petitioner to report to a family care physician who declined to make a medical judgement regarding Petitioner's health. Instead, the physician suggested that Respondent obtain the opinion of the cardiologist who had treated Petitioner for his heart condition in 1987. On May 4, 1989, that cardiologist offered his opinion as to Petitioner's health. Specifically, the doctor, who had seen Petitioner as recently as February 1989, noted that Petitioner's health deficiencies dictated that he work no more than eight hours per day; that he refrain from strenuous activity; that he not break-up fights; and that he not carry clients out of the facility in the event of fire. The specific work prohibitions noted by the cardiologist are all job tasks that an individual assigned to a detention careworker position, may be expected to perform. Upon the expiration of a required notice period to Petitioner, Respondent effectuated the reassignment of Petitioner to the position of cashier in the food stamp office. The position requires no overtime work and is less stressful. Petitioner is generally permitted to sit in the course of performing his duties. Following his reassignment, Petitioner continued to enjoy his same salary, although the cashier position occupied a lower pay grade than his previous position. Two other employees were alleged by Petitioner to have received favored treatment from Respondent. These employees, both female, did receive evaluations for the period ending in 1989 which indicated that their work performance exceeded required standards. While the evaluations made the other two employees eligible for merit incentive pay increases, neither employee ever received such an increase or any other pecuniary benefit. Petitioner, whose evaluation reflects that he achieved required work standards, did not receive disparate treatment from that accorded the two female employees by Respondent. As established by the Final Order of the PERC Commission in Case No. CS-89-166, Respondent's transfer to the position of food stamp cashier was warranted, comported with procedural requirements and served a legitimate governmental interest. Respondent does not have a work practice which discriminates with regard to compensation, conditions and privileges of employment on the basis of an employee's sex or handicap. Further, Petitioner has not been subjected to such discrimination by Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby recommended that a Final Order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief. RECOMMENDED this 11th day of December, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W.DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Fl 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 91-5278 The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS 1.-18. Adopted in substance, but not verbatim. PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS Petitioner's proposed finding consisted of nine unnumbered paragraphs. Those paragraphs have been numbered one through nine, respectively, and are addressed as follows: 1.-7. Adopted in substance. Rejected, not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Rejected, not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Further, one female employee had always been employed in the "lighter duty" situation of the control room. The other female employee was placed in a telephone receptionist position. Notably, no creditable evidence was presented that either of these employees refused to work overtime, or that they were not put on the "bubble list." COPIES FURNISHED: Robert Travis, Jr., Esq. 16 North Adams Street Quincy, FL 32351 Scott D. Leemis, Esq. Assistant District Legal Counsel P.O. Box 2417 Jacksonville, FL 32231-0083 Ronald M. McElrath Executive Director Florida Commission On Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240 / Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Margaret Jones Clerk Florida Commission On Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240 / Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Dana Baird, Esq. General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240 / Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925
Findings Of Fact On February 16, 1979, I-B-A, Inc., a Florida corporation, executed a Declaration of Trust pursuant to Section 689.071, Florida Statutes (1977), designating I-B-A, Inc., as Beneficiary and Lewis H. Harmon as Trustee. The trust agreement defined and declared the interest of the Beneficiary to be personal property only. Pursuant to the terms of the trust agreement I-B-A, Inc., conveyed legal title to the real property described in the Declaration of Trust to the Trustee by Warranty Deed. I-B-A, Inc., assigned its beneficial interest to One Biscayne Tower, N.V. Following the assignment, the Trustee, upon direction of the Beneficiary, conveyed legal title to the property to One Biscayne Tower, N.V. by Special Warranty Deed. These documents were all executed on February 16, 1979, and only minimal documentary stamps were placed on the Warranty Deed and the Special Warranty Deed. The consideration paid for the assignment of the beneficial interest from I-B-A, Inc., to One Biscayne Tower, N.V. was $49,101,000. On June 27, 1978, attorneys for taxpayer requested a private ruling from DOR respecting the documentary stamp taxes due on conveyances transferring real property through a Florida land trust established pursuant to Section 689.071, Florida Statutes. By letter dated July 10, 1978, DOR responded to this inquiry by opining that if the necessary documentation exists to comply with the statute the two recorded conveyances would require only minimal documentary tax stamps. One or more articles and/or editorials appeared in Miami newspapers following the February 16, 1979, transaction above discussed pointing out that some $200,000 in documentary stamp taxes had not been collected by the State on the transfer of a large downtown office building from one owner to another. On November 8, 1979, taxpayer received a Notice of Proposed Assessment under Chapter 201, Florida Statutes, in which DOR claimed $268,939.10 in taxes, penalties and interest due on the Special Warranty Deed by which the Trustee conveyed the trust property to One Biscayne Tower, N.V. Following an informal conference between Taxpayer's attorneys and DOR, DOR on June 18, 1980, issued a Revised Notice of Proposed Assessment under Chapter 201, Florida Statutes, in which DOR claimed $283,939.76 in taxes, penalties and interest, with interest accruing at the rate of $66.18 per day. In this assessment DOR claimed taxes were due on the Special Warranty Deed from Trustee to Taxpayer or, in the alternative, on the assignment of the beneficial interest under the trust from I-B-A, Inc., to One Biscayne Tower, N.V. Both the Warranty Deed from I-B-A, Inc., to the Trustee and the Special Warranty Deed from the Trustee to One Biscayne Tower, N.V. were recorded. The Trust Agreement was not recorded. DOR's basis for the assessment issued in this transaction was that no recorded instrument contained a provision declaring the interests of the beneficiaries under the Trust Agreement to be personal property-only. Following receipt of the Revised Assessment, the Trustee and One Biscayne Tower, N.V. filed suit in the Circuit court in and for Dade County seeking to reform the Warranty Deed from I-B-A, Inc., to the Trustee to include a provision specifically stating that the interest of the beneficiaries under the Trust Agreement was personal property only. I-B-A, Inc., was joined as a defendant. On 18 July 1980, the parties to this suit submitted a stipulation to the court that final judgment may be entered ex parte without delay, reforming the Warranty Deed ab initio in accordance with the Complaint. By Final Judgment entered 12 August 1980, Circuit Judge Dan Satin reformed this Warranty Deed ab initio to include the language in a recorded instrument specified in Section 689.071(4), Florida Statutes. The purpose of the parties in setting up a Florida land trust through which to transfer the property was to avoid the payment of documentary stamp taxes and surtaxes on the $49,101,000 purchase price which a bankruptcy court had approved for the sale of this asset. Accordingly, the reformation of the Warranty Deed was to comply with the intent of the parties at the time the Warranty Deed was executed and delivered.
The Issue The issues are whether the Petitioner, Alice P. Whitehead, is indebted to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (DHRS) for $1,362 and whether her lottery winnings should be withheld and applied to the debt.
Findings Of Fact On February 12, 1993, Whitehead submitted a claim to the Lottery based on a Play-4 ticket she held for a Lotto drawing. The ticket reflected that she was eligible for a prize of $2,500. DHRS certified to the Lottery that Whitehead owed the State $1,362.00. That sum represents an overpayment of food stamps and AFDC benefits to Petitioner. Pursuant to Section 24.115(4), Florida Statutes, the Lottery transmitted the prize to DBF. By letter dated March 12, 1993, DBF notified Whitehead that it was in receipt of her prize from the Lottery and that it intended to apply $1,362.00 of the award toward the unpaid food stamp and AFDC debt. Enclosed with the letter was State of Florida warrant number 2057985 in the amount of $1,138.00 payable to Whitehead. That warrant was partial payment of the lottery prize and represented the difference between the amount of the prize and the amount of the food stamp and AFDC debt that DHRS had certified as being due. In a letter received by DBF on March 31, 1993, Petitioner indicated she was unaware of any indebtedness to the state and requested a hearing. A referral was made to the Overpayment/Overissuance, Fraud and Recoupment Unit on June 23, 1980, for an overpayment of AFDC and an overissuance of food stamps to Whitehead. Additionally, a referral was made to the Overpayment/ Overissuance, Fraud and Recoupment Unit on October 30, 1979, for an overissuance of food stamps. Whitehead was notified of the overpayment of AFDC benefits and of the overissuance of food stamp benefits via notices dated August 27, 1980, and January 9, 1980. Whitehead was overissued food stamps in the amount of $750.00, and she received an overpayment of AFDC benefits in the amount of $623.00. Whitehead has paid $20 toward the original debt. The current balance due to DHRS on this debt is $750 for the food stamp overissuance and $612.00 for the AFDC overpayment for a total amount of $1,362.00. Whitehead does not dispute that she owes a debt to DHRS, but she does not want to pay it because she is unemployed and is caring for her 83-year-old mother, a victim of Alzheimer's disease. She says she has no income.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Banking and Finance enter a Final Order and therein: Confirm the debt of Alice P. Whitehead to Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services in the amount of $1,362.00. Withhold $1,362.00 from Whitehead's lottery winnings. Transmit that $1,362.00 to Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services in satisfaction of Whitehead's debt. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of July, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July, 1993. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 93-2662 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondents 1. Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1-8(1-8). COPIES FURNISHED: Alice P. Whitehead, Pro Se 510 West 19th Street Jacksonville, Florida 32206 Scott C. Wright Assistant General Counsel James C. Agazie Certified Legal Intern Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Katrina M. Saggio Economic Services Attorney Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 6, Room 466 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Laura P. Gaffney Senior Attorney Department of the Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-4011
