The Issue Whether or not Petitioner's application for registration as an associated person of Brauer & Associates, Inc., and as an investment adviser of G.G. Brauer & Associates, Inc. should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Department of Banking and Finance, is the state agency charged with the administration and enforcement of Chapter 517, Florida Statutes, The Florida Securities and Investor Protection Act and the administrative rules promulgated thereunder. On or about October 30, 1990, Petitioner submitted a Form U-4, Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration or Transfer, seeking transfer as an associated person of Brauer & Associates, Inc., and as an investment adviser of G.G. Brauer, Inc. On or about January 25, 1991, Respondent denied Petitioner's application for registration based upon its determination that Petitioner had filed a form U-4, which contained material misstatements and had demonstrated prima facie evidence of unworthiness by engaging in prohibited business practices. Petitioner was previously registered as an associated person with the St. Petersburg, Florida branch office of Smith Barney from March 1987 until July 25, 1990, when he was permitted to resign from the firm for ordering securities from the "over the counter" desk without prior client orders. Petitioner was also registered with the NASD and is charged with knowledge of their Rules of Fair Practice. On or about May 9 1990, Ronald Padgett filed a written complaint with Respondent alleging that Petitioner was engaging in unauthorized trading in his account and that the account was trading on margin without a signed margin agreement. Mr. Padgett also alleged that the signed margin agreement on file with Smith Barney was a forgery. After receiving Mr. Padgett's complaint, Respondent commenced its investigation in Petitioner's activities and requested that Smith Barney provide it with information regarding Padgett's complaint. Respondent also requested and was provided with copies of all other customer complaints that had been filed against Petitioner with Smith Barney. Smith Barney provided Respondent with copies of customer complaints that had been filed against Petitioner by Dorothy Juranko, Wayne Schmidt, Mark Madison, Michael Russo, Gloria Fallon, Patricia Schoenberg and William & Verna Bankhead. All of these individuals were investor clients of Petitioner. Prior to his employment with Smith Barney, Petitioner had not been the subject of a customer complaint or industry disciplinary proceeding or licensure revocation, suspension, or denial. Wayne Schmidt Sr. the owner of Suncoast Chrysler-Plymouth (Suncoast) opened his account at Smith Barney in 1985. Initially, the account executive assigned to Schmidt's account at Smith Barney was Steve Ellis. Schmidt maintained two accounts with Smith Barney and Steve Ellis, namely, a profit- sharing account for Suncoast Chrysler-Plymouth and a joint account with his wife. Schmidt exercised no control of the Suncoast account, but rather allowed his associate, Gloria Fallon to initially monitor the transactions in that account. Afterwards, Schmidt started overseeing the trading activities in the Suncoast account. Schmidt had no knowledge of any unauthorized transactions in the Suncoast account after he began monitoring it. Gloria Fallon did not testify at the proceeding. In connection with the maintenance of his joint account at Smith Barney, Schmidt executed a "Securities Account Agreement." During the time Schmidt maintained his account at Smith Barney, the Securities Account Agreement was utilized by Smith Barney as a margin contract. The Securities Account Agreement qualifies as a margin account agreement/margin contract as to form, and is consistent with industry standards, custom and usage. Although Florida Statutes proscribes certain procedures relative to margin agreements, neither the Florida Securities Act nor the rules promulgated thereunder require a broker/dealer to characterize a margin contract as a "margin agreement." The gravamen of Schmidt's complaint against Petitioner was that certain shares of stock were not liquidated from the joint account maintained by him in contravention of his directions to Petitioner. There was no proof submitted to support any conclusion that Petitioner failed to place an order for the liquidation of such securities for Schmidt's account. Likewise, there was no evidence of any unauthorized trading in the Schmidt's joint account. While Petitioner was assigned as account executive to the Schmidts joint account, a profit of approximately $10,000.00 was generated for that account in 1988 and in 1989, a net gain of approximately $15,000.00 was generated. Schmidt conceded at hearing that Petitioner probably did a better job handling his account than his prior broker, Steve Ellis. During the year 1988, Smith Barney generated and sent to Schmidt, monthly statements and confirmation statements regarding every transaction in his joint account. The monthly statements sent to Schmidt for the joint account contained entries regarding margin interest being charged to the account. For the year 1989, Smith Barney also generated and sent to Schmidt, monthly statements and confirms regarding every transaction in his joint account. The 1989 monthly statements sent to Schmidt also showed margin interest. For the years 1988 and 1989, Schmidt deducted from his individual tax returns, the margin interest charged to his account. Also, during 1988 and 1989, Schmidt did not complain to Petitioner or Smith Barney that the use of margin account was unauthorized. During his tenure at Smith Barney, Petitioner was the account executive assigned to the account of Michael Russo (Russo). Petitioner was assigned to the Russo account in approximately May of 1990, an account which was formerly serviced by an account executive whose last name is Dudenhaver. Michael Russo matriculated at City College of New York where he received a Bachelor of Business Administration degree and was a certified public accountant for approximately 30 years. Russo has been in the accounting business for approximately 40 years and during this time period, he operated his own accounting practice. Russo maintained three (3) accounts at Smith Barney which included an account with his wife, an individual account and an IRA account. Russo opened his first brokerage account in the early 1980s with Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith. Russo has a history is investing in real estate and by mid 1990, he had accumulated a net worth of approximately $750,000.00. On or about July 13, 1990, Russo presented Petitioner a check in the amount of $26,000.00 which was to be deposited into Russo's accounts. The $26,000.00 check was deposited by Petitioner into Russo's accounts but were returned for non-sufficient funds (NSF). Russo then replaced the NSF check with a $22,000.00 check. The funds derived from the $26,000.00 of Russo originated from an interest-bearing money market account from the Fidelity- Spartan Mutual Funds Family. During the period July 13-20, 1990, Russo was on vacation and was away from his home visiting relatives in the Melbourne, Florida area. During that week, Russo spoke by telephone with Petitioner regarding his account on more than one occasion. Russo specifically recalls speaking with Petitioner on July 15, 1990, regarding his account. During that week, Russo spoke with Respondent about selling certain shares of stock in his account and his specific recall is that one of those conversations occurred on July 15, 1990. The shares were to be sold "at market." Russo again spoke with Petitioner on July 21, 1990, regarding transactions in his account. On July 24, 1990, Russo told Larry Youhn, the branch manager at Smith Barney, that he was very happy with Petitioner as his broker. The July 1990 month-end statement for the Russo account indicate that funds were deposited into the Russo accounts in an amount sufficient to satisfy security purchases made in his account during July 1990. Although these transactions appear at month-end in a type-2 margin account, a review of such statements indicate that the transactions initially occurred in a cash account and were mistakenly journaled to the margin account by Smith Barney as a result of an NSF check presented by Russo as payment for the purchase transactions. The individual account of Russo reflects the purchase of 500 shares of Wiley Laboratories on July 16, 1990, for $7,702.00. On that same day, $10,500.00 from the $26,000.00 NSF check was received into the account. The July 1990 monthly statement for Russo's individual account reflected that there would have been a $2,800.00 net credit in the account if Russo had not presented the NSF check. During his tenure at Smith Barney, Petitioner also served as the registered representative for an account maintained by Nicholas and Dorothy Juranko (Juranko). The Jurankos have a substantial history of business experience, having currently owned a service station in the Ohio area and Mrs. Juranko currently owns her own drapery shop and manages eight (8) apartment/rental units that they jointly own. The Jurankos opened their first securities brokerage account in approximately 1962. They have held accounts at several brokerage firms including Merrill Lynch, Blinder-Robinson and First Jersey Securities prior to opening their account at Smith Barney. At Blinder-Robinson, the Jurankos engaged in the purchase of several "Penny" stocks and fully realized that they were speculating. The Blinder- Robinson account was opened by the Jurankos so that Mr. Juranko would "have something to do." The Jurankos maintained a securities brokerage account at First Jersey Securities prior to Petitioner's employment with First Jersey. Petitioner was assigned as account executive for the Juranko account at First Jersey in approximately 1985. When the Jurankos opened their account at Smith Barney, their net worth was approximately $220,250.00. Although Mrs. Juranko maintains that unauthorized trades occurred in her account during the month of December 1987, when asked to identify which trade which unauthorized, she could not do so. This was so, despite an effort to refresh her recollection by presenting her the December 1987 monthly account statement which depicted all securities holdings and transactions generated in their account. Mrs. Juranko also alleged that she was losing money and did not want to deposit any additional funds into her account. However, Mrs. Juranko wanted to have profits generated from the funds that were then existing into her account as of year-end December, 1987. Respecting the December 1987 trades, the Jurankos received confirms for every transaction that occurred during the month. Through December 1987, while Petitioner was assigned to manage the Juranko account, the account generated a net profit. Also, continuing through January 1988, Petitioner had effected trades which produced a net profit for the Juranko account. As testified by Mrs. Juranko, "All I could see...greed, all I could see was $14,200.00 some dollars and $9,900.00 some dollars, and I thought, wow... I thought "wow", he's making me money." Although Mrs. Juranko complained that she was losing money, an analysis of the account revealed that during the two years that Petitioner was assigned her account, it made a net profit. Notwithstanding the documentary evidence to the contrary, Mrs. Juranko admitted that she was upset and complained to Smith Barney's compliance officer, a Mr. Singer, because of her unfounded belief that she had lost money. Mrs. Juranko identified anger as the basis for her inability to understand a letter which was sent by Larry Youhn, Smith Barney's branch manager, which show the activity that had been generated into her account. Notwithstanding the clear language of that letter, Mrs. Juranko maintained that she did not understand it. This is so, despite the fact that Mrs. Juranko did not telephone Smith Barney to complain because she "didn't want to get [Petitioner] in trouble." 1/ The use of margin in the Jurankos account was discussed because Mrs. Juranko believed the account was losing money; she wanted to do whatever was necessary over a period of time to make up for the losses and she refused to deposit additional funds into the account to generate profits in trading the account. In connection with the maintenance of the Juranko account at Smith Barney, Petitioner instructed his sales assistant to send a margin agreement to Mr. and Mrs. Juranko for execution. The use of margin was discussed with the Jurankos in approximately November 1987. Petitioner relied upon the Smith Barney infrastructure to maintain the necessary paperwork for margin accounts, including the Jurankos. This is a customary practice in the securities industry and is utilized by most large brokerage houses. Juranko first complained to Petitioner about the use of margin in January 1988, when she received her monthly account statement which contained an entry for margin interest. Mrs. Juranko explained that she thought the margin charges were too much and that she wanted to reduce the margin charges by liquidating securities from the account. Mrs. Juranko thereafter became uncooperative and it became difficult for Petitioner to transact business in the account consistent with Mrs. Juranko's desired objectives. As a result, in March 1988, Petitioner determined that the only thing he could do for the account was to liquidate positions at or near break-even points. Thereafter, Petitioner never made any other purchase recommendations to the Jurankos. Petitioner also serviced the account of Mark D. Madison while employed at Smith Barney. Madison is a marketing, advertising and management consultant who owns his own business. Madison maintained two (2) accounts at Smith Barney's St. Petersburg branch office, including an individual account and an account in the name of his mother, Mary Jean Madison. Mark Madison was a fiduciary for and conducted all transactions in his mother's account. Prior to Petitioner's assignment as broker to Madison's fiduciary account, it was assigned to broker Steve Ellis. The fiduciary account was maintained as a margin account since its opening in 1984. Commencing on February 13, 1986, broker Ellis and Madison executed several margin transactions in the fiduciary account. Through the period ending October 31, 1987, roughly 95% of the transactions in the fiduciary account were executed on margin. As of year-end 1987, the Madison fiduciary account and Mark Madison's personal account historically traded over-the-counter securities. During this period while Ellis was the broker, margin transactions were executed in both Madison accounts. During this period, broker Ellis actively traded both accounts and generated both profits and losses in the accounts. Mark Madison was familiar with the active trading in both accounts as well as the profit/loss picture. Madison estimated losses in the fiduciary account to be over $20,000.00 while the account was handled by Ellis. These losses all occurred while he was the fiduciary on the account and was in charge of approving trading in the account. When the fiduciary account was transferred from Ellis to Petitioner, Madison expressed his concern about the losses that his mother's fiduciary account had sustained as well as his responsibility for such losses. During his initial conversations with Petitioner, Madison explained his mother's displeasure at the approximately $30,000.00 in losses that had been generated while Ellis was assigned as broker. Madison also explained to Petitioner that his brother had made references to conversations with his mother about suing him as the fiduciary because of the losses generated. During the time that the fiduciary account was handled by Ellis, there were differences in the execution prices of transactions in the same securities which occurred in both the fiduciary account and his (Mark Madison's) personal account. When Petitioner was assigned the account, it became apparent to him that Madison consistently obtained higher prices on liquidating transactions than his mother was obtaining in the fiduciary account for the same securities. Petitioner was concerned with the type of trading in which Madison wanted to engage in for the fiduciary account and brought this trading strategy to the attention of branch manager, Youhn, who explained to Petitioner that it was the fiduciary who had ultimate responsibility for trading the account. In addition to discussing the trading strategy with Youhn, a review of the account history was conducted by Petitioner. Petitioner's review revealed that the account had lost approximately 40% in equity during the time it was handled by account executive Ellis and Mark Madison as fiduciary. As a result of the losses generated, Madison expressed his desire to Petitioner to recoup losses in the account by taking advantage of 2-3 point swings in certain over-the-counter securities. During the months of January through March 1988, Madison, despite his allegations to the contrary, authorized the purchase of a specified number of shares of certain securities and later maintained that certain additional shares of those securities were purchased without his authorization. Throughout this period, Madison maintained continuous telephone conversations with Petitioner regarding such securities. Throughout the period, Madison did not instruct Petitioner to cancel the trades, but rather instructed him that he wanted out of those positions as near as possible to "break even." The Department conducted an investigation of the allegations made by Petitioner's former clients in connection with the denial of his registrations as an associated person an investment advisor. In connection with the investigation, the Department, through its investigative employee, Carol Irizarry (Irizarry), spoke with individuals who had submitted written complaints against Petitioner. In furtherance of her investigation, Irizarry visited the office of William Lyman, Esquire, who represented several of the former customer/complainants, and reviewed the information that Lyman had relative to such complaints. Ms. Irizarry did not testify during the formal hearing herein. Dennis Farrar (Farrar), area financial manager, Division of Securities, Department of Banking and Finance, supervised the writing of the report completed by Irizarry. Farrar's first direct contact with the investors/complainants in this case occurred approximately one (1) week prior to the commencement of the hearing herein. Following Ellis' separation from employment with Smith Barney, several Smith Barney brokers and clients of Petitioner advised him that broker Ellis was out to get him and urged them to file complaints against Petitioner. Specifically, Petitioner received a telephone call from Gloria Fallon, an associate of Wayne Schmidt, who warned Petitioner that Ellis was "trying to stir up trouble for him." In connection with the initial customer complaint received by the Department, a request for information responsive to the complaint was sent to Smith Barney. Among the documents received by the Department was a securities account agreement which contained language normally contained in a margin contract. The securities account agreement is the document utilized by Smith Barney as its margin contract at all time material hereto. A Form U-4, Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration for Transfer, is a document generated by the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA). The Form U-5, Uniform Termination Notice, also is generated by the above entities. The disclosure section of a Form U-4 requires an applicant to respond to the best of his ability. An intentional falsification of information on a Form U-4 will give rise to a violation of Section 517.161, Florida Statutes. It is customary in the securities industry for a registered representative to rely upon his current broker/dealer employer to determine which complaints, if any, are disclosable on the Form U-4. It is customary in the industry for a representative to rely on the Form U-5, termination notice for completion of his U-4 and usually the information on both forms track each other. Also, the prospective applicant filling out his U-4 usually consults with the firm that he separated from to ensure that both Forms U-4 and U-5 are consistent. Petitioner's completion of the Form U-4 on August 30, 1990 in connection with his employment at Brauer & Associates contained a disclosure of customer complaints consistent with the disclosures made by Smith Barney on its amended Form U-5 Termination Notice dated August 17, 1990. Petitioner's reliance on the information contained in his files and that provided by his employers was reasonable and there was no evidence that Petitioner intentionally falsified his Form U-4 application.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that Respondent enter a Final Order granting Petitioner's application for registrations as an associated person or broker/dealer of Brauer & Associates, Inc. and investment adviser to G.G. Brauer, Inc. RECOMMENDED this 13TH day of August, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of August, 1991.
Findings Of Fact The Application On June 28, 1985, Petitioner, Frank Edward B1anco (Blanco), filed an application with Respondent, Department of Banking and Finance (Department), for registration as an associated person with Rothschild Equity Management Group, Inc. Pertinent to this proceeding, the application provided: Have you ever: been the subject of a major complaint or legal proceeding? E. been the subject of any order, judgment, decree or other sanction of a foreign court, foreign exchange, or foreign governmental or regulatory agency? * * * While associated in any capacity in the securities, commodities, investment advisory, real estate, banking or insurance industry or any other business have you ever: * * * C. had any temporary or permanent injunction or administrative order entered against you or any broker, dealer, investment advisor, municipal securities dealer, bank or commodities firm with which you were associated in any capacity at the time such injunction was entered? Blanco answered "yes" to each of the foregoing questions, and in response to his obligation to provide "complete details" advised that he had been named in a cease and desist order by the State of Missouri while associated with Precious Metals International, Inc., (PMI), and a cease and desist order by the State of Florida, Department of Banking and Finance, arising from his association with First Petroleum Corporation of America (First Petroleum). On August 12, 1985, Blanco filed an amendment to his application, and in so doing advised the Department that he had agreed to enter into "what is the equivalent of a Consent Decree" in the case of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the State of Florida, Department of Banking and Finance v. Precious Metals International, Inc., Executive Control Corporation, and Frank Blanco, et al, then pending in the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida. By Order of October 5, 1985, the Department denied Blanco's application for registration as an associated person predicated, inter alia, or Blanco's failure to disclose an injunction entered against him in the case of Federal Trade Commission v. First Petroleum, Blanco, et al, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, Case No. 82-2744- CIV, and his unworthiness to transact business as an associated person. Blanco filed a timely request for a formal hearing. The Background Mr. Blanco was employed from September 198 to November 1982 by First Petroleum as a salesman and, ultimately, Executive Vice President (sales manager and recruiter). From December 1983 to December 1984 he was the president and sales manager of Precious Metals International, Inc. (PHI), and from December 1984 to January 1985 the "Director of Consulting" for Executive Control Corporation (the "administrative branch" for PMI). By complaint for injunctive and other relief filed in the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, Case No. 82-2744-CIV, the Federal Trade Commission sued First Petroleum, Blanco, and others (Defendants) for violations of Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), 15 U.S.C. 45(a), regarding unfair or deceptive acts or practices. Specifically, the complaint alleged that Defendants misrepresented certain material facts in their solicitation of the sale of filing, evaluation and advisory services to consumers in connection with the Federal Simultaneous Oil and Gas Leasing System (SIMOL System). On April 6, 1983, the court entered a "Stipulated Final Order and Judgment."1 In its order, the court found: Defendants First Petroleum Corporation of America,... Frank E. Blanco,... ("defendants") may have misrepresented their past success in obtaining oil and gas mineral rights in the Federal Simultaneous Oil and Gas Leasing System (SIMOL System), the level of competition for such rights, and the value of rights obtained through the program; Defendants may have deceptively failed to disclose in oral sales presentations and written sales materials the true number parcels of land for which they obtained oil and gas leasing rights for their customers and the true number of attempts to obtain such rights. The Court enjoined the defendants from misrepresenting, orally or in writing, the past or likely future success of defendants' customers in obtaining oil or gas lease rights through the SIMOL System or any program which makes such rights available to the public; misrepresenting, orally or in writing, the number of competing applications for lease rights that are filed, or are likely to be filed; representing orally or in writing, that parcels defendants select for their clients contain oil or gas; or making any false or deceptive claims concerning past or likely future earnings of defendants' customers. The court also ordered that the defendants, jointly or severally, contribute to an escrow account established by the Federal Trade Commission the sum of $125,000 as redress for customers who may have been injured by the alleged deceptive practices. Blanco paid $25,000 into the escrow account. By complaint for injunctive and other relief filed in the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, Case No. 85-6705-CIV, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the State of Florida, Department of Banking and 1 Finance, sued Precious Metals International, Inc. (PMI), Executive Control Corporation (ECC), Blanco, and others (Defendants) for the use of unfair, misleading, false and deceptive sales practices in the sale of "physical deferred payment" contracts for precious metals, and the unlawful operation of a "boiler room" within the State of Florida. On September 27, 1985, the court entered a final judgment and permanent injunction with the Defendants' consent, but without any adjudication on the merits and without the Defendants admitting or denying the allegations of the complaint. In its final judgment, the court found that the defendants, "without admitting or denying" had violated Section 4(a) of the Commodity Exchange Act, in that they had solicited orders in connection with contracts for the purchase and sale of commodities for future delivery without such transactions having been conducted on or subject to the rules of a board of trade designated by the CFTC as a "contract market", without such contracts having been executed or consummated through a member of such "contract market", and without such contracts having been evidenced by a record in writing showing the date, the parties, their addresses, the property, its price and terms of delivery. The court also found that the defendants, "without admitting or denying" had violated Section 4(b) of the Commodity Exchange Act, in that they had cheated, defrauded, and willfully deceived, or had attempted to cheat, defraud or deceive, customers in connection with contracts for the purchase and sale of commodities for future delivery. Finally, the court found that the defendants, "without admitting or denying" had also violated Section 517.301 and 517.312, Florida Statutes, by operating a boiler room selling commodities future contracts or "investments" as defined in Section 517.021(11), Florida Statutes, and by making various oral and written untrue and misleading representations which defendants knew or should have known were untrue and misleading.2 The court enjoined the defendants, including Blanco, from the future commission of the aforesaid offenses; appointed a receiver for PMI and ECC to take control of their assets, wind-up their business operations, remove the individual defendants from control and management of PHI and ECC, and to satisfy the claims of customers; and ordered Blanco to disgorge $28,000, payable $10,000 within 30 days of the entry of judgment and $1,500 per month for one year. Blanco has made the payments required by the court's order. On March 25, 1985, In the matter of Precious Metals International, Inc., Frank Blanco and Merrill Porte, 2 (Respondents), file No. CD-85-7, the State of Missouri, Secretary of State, Division of Securities, entered an order to cease and desist against Respondents. In its order, the Commissioner of Securities found that Respondents had violated section 409.201, 409.301, 409.101 and 409.408 of the Missouri Statutes by engaging in broker-dealer and agent activities within the state without being properly registered; by selling unregistered securities in a fraudulent manner; and by failing to file a statement of exemption with the Commissioner. Respondents were ordered to cease and desist from the offer or sale of unregistered or exempt securities in violation of section 409.301, Missouri Statutes. BLANCO'S RESPONSE Blanco asserts that his failure to disclose the final order entered in Federal Trade Commission v. First Petroleum, Blanco, et al, on his application to the Department was inadvertent. Blanco claims he "inadvertently thought" it was part of the cease and desist order entered by the State of Florida, Department of Banking and Finance, against First Petroleum. Blanco's assertion is inherently improbable. The cease and desist order entered by the Department was, as Blanco knew, reversed on appeal. Blanco paid $25,000 under the final order entered in the Federal Trade Commission case. These matters were hardly subject to confusion. An evaluation of Blanco's proof in this case is glaring in its absence of substance. With respect to the injunctions rendered against him in the Federal Trade Commission v. First Petroleum, Blanco, et al, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. PMI, B1anco, et al, cases, Blanco offered no evidence concerning the validity of the charges, the propriety of the injunctions, or any exculpatory or mitigative proof. Regarding the Missouri case, Blanco averred that it arose because of misrepresentations made by PMI salesman Merrill Ponte (Ponte).3 At the time in question, however, Blanco was the president and sales manager of PMI, and responsible for assuring that sales personnel did not make misrepresentations. Blanco offered no proof that he was unaware of Ponte's activities, or that Ponte's activities were unauthorized.4
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent Mark S. Henderson (hereinafter "Henderson") has been a real estate salesman licensed in the State of Florida, having been issued License No. 0441662. At all times material hereto, Respondent Auction World of West Florida, Inc., (hereinafter "Auction World") has been a corporate real estate broker registered in the State of Florida, having been issued License No. 0238372. Respondent Henderson is a real estate salesman/auctioneer employed by Auction World. He moved to Florida in October, 1984, and became a licensed real estate salesman in Florida in February, 1985, some 8 months prior to the transaction forming the basis for the Administrative Complaint. John and Joanne Henneberry signed a listing for the auction/sale of their home with Auction World through Henderson. The Henneberrys are both educated people who had prior experience in buying and selling real estate. The October 1, 1985 listing signed by the Henneberrys provided that it was a 30-day listings provided for a seven percent commission, provided for the Henneberrys to pay advertising costs not to exceed $750, and provided specifically that the $750 would not be considered as an advance fee. The listing further provided for an accounting to be made within 30 days. The Henneberrys gave Auction World a check for $750. The Henneberrys' best friend is Ralph Marciano, a real estate broker. He sold his home through Auction World and referred the Henneberrys to Auction World. The Henneberrys purchased a home through Marciano and throughout the transactions involved here consulted Marciano about how to proceed. Auction World was engaged primarily to sell the Henneberrys' home in Lehigh Acres, and Marciano was involved in the purchase or offers to purchase their new home. Pursuant to the listings advertising for the auction was published by Auction World. The auction was held on October 19, 1985, but no sale resulted from the contract negotiated through the auction. Auction World continued to work on behalf of the Henneberrys pursuant to an oral extension. Johan Ruhe and his wife were advised by Henderson of the availability of the Henneberrys' home in Lehigh Acres. Johan Ruhe is a retired real estate broker who now works for Lee County as its Director of Land Management. In December, 1984, an offer of $66,000 was made by the Ruhes to the Henneberrys through Auction World, but this offer was not accepted. On January 2 or 3, 1985, the Ruhes made an offer on the Henneberrys' home in the amount of $68,000. The offer provided for no down payment; included the range, refrigerator, dishwasher, washer, dryer, curtains and draperies to be included in the sale price; and called for financing over 30 years at an 11 percent fixed rate of interest. It further required that financing be obtained for 80 to 95 percent of the purchase price. This offer was accepted by the Henneberrys, and all parties considered this to be a binding legal contract. The original listing had called for a 7 percent commission, but when the $68,000 contract was signed, the Henneberrys negotiated Auction World from a 7 percent commission down to a $3,000 commission. The Ruhes filed a loan application with B. F. Saul Mortgage Company (hereinafter "B. F. Saul") based upon the $68,000 contract. B. F. Saul has an office in Fort Myers, Florida, which was opened on May 2, 1983, by Robert W. Prange (hereinafter "Prange") who at all times relevant to this action was a vice-president of B. F. Saul and branch manager of the local office. On January 11, 1986, the Henneberrys made an offer to purchase a home from the Jamilles, which was contingent on the Henneberrys closing with the Ruhes. Prior to signing the contract with the Ruhes, the Henneberrys discussed the contract with their best friend, real estate broker Marciano who made changes to the contract and discussed with the Henneberrys the fact that there was no deposit provided in reference to that contract. After the Henneberrys signed the contract to purchase a home from the Jamilles, the Jamilles' broker indicated to the Henneberrys that the Jamilles would like the Henneberrys' contract with the Ruhes to have a provision for a deposit. During this period of time, the Henneberrys were in direct contact with Prange at B. F. Saul, and Prange indicated to them that there was no problem with the Ruhe contract and loan application. After the Jamilles' broker contacted the Henneberrys and asked for a contract showing an escrow deposit on the Henneberry home, the Henneberrys contacted Henderson at Auction World and asked him to draw a new contract to show that a down payment had been made. Henderson prepared a new contract, and the Ruhes signed it. The new contract showed a deposit of $3,600, a purchase price increase of $3,600, and a commission increase of $3,600. In order to show the deposit requested by the Henneberrys, Auction World "gifted" by letter the $3,600 to the Ruhes. The contract was then presented to the Henneberrys. In fact, the Ruhes were not paying $3,600 more to purchase the home for which they already had a contract. Since the new agreement increased the commission by $3,600, Auction World by letter was giving back that sum to the Ruhes so that everything actually stayed the same but an escrow was shown as requested by the Henneberrys. The Henneberrys signed the new contract. At the time that they signed, they knew that the Ruhes were not paying the $3,600 additional purchase price. About the same time that the Henneberrys were requesting that the contract be redrawn to reflect a down payment from the Ruhes, Prange at B. F. Saul became concerned as to whether the Ruhes had sufficient cash available to them to consummate the transaction. When the second contract was taken by Henderson to Prange, Prange suggested that a change be made in it from a fixed interest rate to a variable interest rate so that the Ruhes could qualify for the loan. Prange then "whited out" the listing of personal property that appeared in the contract, suggesting that the deletion of the personal property would reflect an increased value in the price of the real estate. Although Prange was an officer of B. F. Saul, he was on a commission basis. He was not only the loan officer on the Henneberrys/Ruhes transaction, he was also the loan officer on the Henneberrys/Jamilles transaction. Accordingly, he knew that a successful consummation of the Ruhe transaction would ensure him of receiving two commissions but that a lack of success on the Ruhe transaction would automatically defeat the Jamille transaction. Prange knew that there was no escrow of $3,600 as reflected by the second contract Henderson presented to him. Yet, he requested Henderson to execute a "Verification of Earnest Money" form, which stated that an earnest money deposit had been received in the amount of $3,600 to be held toward the down payment and/or closing costs on the Henneberrys home. The form did not represent that the money was held in escrow, nor did it differentiate between whether that money was the down payment toward the purchase or whether that money was to be used toward closing costs. Henderson signed the verification that the $3,600 deposit was being held by Auction World because he believed the gift to the Ruhes was the same as having the deposit since it was Auction World's $3,600. Additionally, the buyer, the seller, and the loan officer were aware of the contents and reasons for the series of contracts, and the gift was evident from the series of contracts involved. Henderson prepared another contract. He also prepared an addendum to that contract containing an agreement on the purchase of the personal property since he believed the personal property had to be mentioned somewhere in order to protect both the buyer and the seller. The addendum was signed on or about February 13, 1985. The newest contract also provided for the seller to pay the closing costs. When the addendum was presented to the Henneberrys they insisted that an additional provision be added to the addendum that would guarantee that the buyer would pay the Henneberrys $4,000 toward the closing costs prior to the closing. Therefore, at the Henneberrys' request, language was added to the addendum to provide that $4,000 would be paid to the Henneberrys 72 hours prior to the closing by either Auction World or by the Ruhes. Despite the efforts of Henderson and Prange to successfully structure the Henneberry/Ruhe transaction, the Ruhes were not able to obtain approval on their loan application, and the Henneberry/Ruhe sale was not consummated. The listing agreement for the auction of the Henneberry home required that the Henneberrys pay $750 to Auction World to pay for the costs of advertising the auction. The listing contract specifically provided that the $750 did not represent an advance fee but simply represented costs of advertising. Since the statutes regulating the real estate profession do not define what constitutes an advance fee, Henderson consulted an attorney regarding the desire to obtain advertising costs in advance. The listing form used and the method of handling the Henneberrys' $750 was in compliance with the recommendation to Auction World and Henderson by that attorney. The legal advice given to them was that none of the $750 should be used on any overhead or internal expenses but rather the $750 must all be spent on independent outside advertising. Since the listing agreement specified that the $750 was not an advance fee, and since Henderson and Auction World followed the procedure recommended to them by an attorney, all parties believed that the funds were not an advance fee. The listing called for an accounting within 30 days, and an oral accounting was provided at that time. The Henneberrys did not request a further accounting until February 27 or 28, 1985. A written accounting was provided by March 11, 1985. No evidence was offered to show that any of the $750 was kept other than in a trust or escrow account at Auction World, and no evidence was offered to indicate that any of it was misused. In fact, the advertising expenses on the Henneberry home exceeded $750, and Auction World bore the extra expense.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondents Henderson and Auction World not guilty of the allegations contained within Counts I, III, and V, and dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against them. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of November, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-0602 Respondents Henderson and Auction World's proposed findings of fact numbered 1, 30, 35, 36, and 38 have been rejected as not constituting findings or fact but rather as constituting conclusions of law or argument of counsel. Respondents Henderson and Auction World's proposed findings of fact numbered 2, 6, and 7 have been rejected as being immaterial to the issues under consideration herein. Respondents Henderson and Auction World's proposed findings of fact numbered 3-5, 8-29, 31-34, 37, and 39-42 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Harold Huff, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Arthur R. Shell, Jr., Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 E. G. Couse Esquire Post Office Drawer 1647 Fort Myers, Florida 33902 Tom Gallagher, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 William O'Neil, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Claudio A. Sevilla, submitted an application for licensure as an associated person with Great Western Financial Securities Corporation. At the time that application was submitted, the Petitioner was employed by, or had a contract for employment with, Great Western Financial Securities Corporation. Shortly after issuance of the original notice of denial, Great Western Financial Securities Corporation terminated its employment relationship with the Petitioner. As a result of that action, the Petitioner is not currently seeking, and cannot currently seek, registration as an associated person with Great Western Financial Securities Corporation because he no longer has an employment relationship with that company. In Florida, an individual must be employed by a dealer or investment adviser in order to become registered as an associated person. The Petitioner cannot become registered as an associated person with a dealer or investment adviser with which he does not have an employment relationship. Prior to filing the subject application, the Petitioner was the subject of disciplinary proceedings regarding certain banking activities. Those disciplinary proceedings were resolved by a consent order, in which the Respondent was ordered to pay an administrative fine in the amount of five hundred dollars and to cease and desist from certain enumerated activities. The Respondent never paid the administrative fine. 2/ Item 22E(4) of the application form asks whether any state regulatory agency has ever "entered an order against you in connection with investment- related activity?" At the beginning of item 22 on the application form, the term "investment related" is defined as "Pertaining to securities, commodities, banking, insurance, or real estate including, but not limited to acting as or being associated with a broker-dealer, investment company, investment adviser, futures sponsor, bank, or savings and loan association." [Emphasis supplied.] The Petitioner checked the "No" box in response to item 22E(4) on his application. 3/
Recommendation For all of the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Banking and Finance issue a Final Order in this case denying the Petitioner's application for licensure as an associated person with Great Western Financial Securities Corporation. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of October 1994 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of October 1994.
The Issue Whether Respondent, a real estate broker, committed the offenses alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated February 16, 2010, and, if so, the penalties that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular Section 20.165 and Chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was licensed in the State of Florida as a real estate broker, having been issued license BK-575099. Respondent is registered as a sole proprietor broker, trading as Atlantic Auction Realty. On February 21, 2008, Respondent, acting through his company, entered into a contract (auction contract) with David Mover to auction a townhouse owned by Mr. Mover located at 8626 S.W. 94th Street, Miami, Florida (the subject property). Mr. Mover had been trying to sell the subject property for approximately two years. In March 2007, Mr. Mover became unable to make the mortgage payments on the subject property. On February 21, 2008, the Circuit Court in and for Dade County, Florida, entered a Final Judgment of Mortgage Foreclosure (Judgment of Foreclosure) against the subject property in favor of Washington Mutual Bank, the holder of the first mortgage. The amount of the judgment was $245,727.25. The Judgment of Foreclosure ordered that the property be sold at public sale on April 24, 2008. At the time of the auction, there was a second mortgage on the subject property owned by a trust. The approximate amount of the second mortgage was $120,000.00. The trust was a defendant in the foreclosure proceedings. Prior to the auction conducted by Respondent, the trustee of the trust indicated a possible willingness on the part of the trust to accept less than the balance owed on the second mortgage if the property were sold by private auction, as opposed to the public auction ordered by the Judgment of Foreclosure. However, the subject auction occurred prior to the trustee’s making a commitment to take less than the balance owed on the second mortgage. The price listed on the auction contract was $350,000.00. The minimum amount Mr. Mover wanted for the townhouse was $370,000.00, which would have been sufficient to satisfy the Judgment of Foreclosure and the second mortgage. Mr. Mover never agreed to accept less than $370,000.00 for the subject property.2 Mr. Mover understood that the $350,000.00 figure was a starting point for the auction.3 This was not an absolute auction. Mr. Mover had the right to refuse a bid less than $350,000.00. The auction contract contained the following provision in paragraph 3: 3. 10% BUYER’S PREMIUM will be added to the Buyer’s Bid and be the Auctioneer’s total commission. The auction contract provided that the auction would be on March 20, 2008. Respondent prepared a flyer that announced the terms of the auction. Prospective bidders were notified by the flyer that a 10% deposit would be required the day of the sale and that there would be a buyer’s premium of 10% of the bid. Prospective bidders were required to have a cashier’s check in the amount of $10,000.00. The “Auction Terms and Conditions” included the following provisions: Bidder Registration. The auction is open to the public and your attendance is welcomed. To register, you must display a cashier’s check in the amount as set forth in each property description. Upon being declared the top bidder, the cashier’s check will be applied as a partial deposit, and the deposit must be increased to equal (10%) [sic] of each contract price. Please be advised there are no exceptions. . . . Contract and Deposit. Bids may not be retracted once accepted by the auctioneer. Upon being declared top bidder, the cashier’s check will be applied as a partial deposit. . . . The auction was conducted in the driveway of the subject property. Mr. Mover waited in the upper area of the subject property during the auction. Mr. Gordon opened the bidding at the base bid (the bid amount prior to tacking on the buyer’s premium) of $285,000.00, but agreed to up the base bid to $300,000.00 when Respondent agreed to reduce the buyer’s premium to $10,000.00 from 10% of the base bid amount ($28,500.00 for a base bid of $285,000.00 or $30,000.00 for a base bid of $300,000.00). Respondent went upstairs and wrote down the amount of the bid and told Mr. Mover that he would reduce the buyer’s premium to $10,000.00 if Mr. Mover would accept that price. Mr. Mover refused to accept that bid. Mr. Mover believed that the auction had failed to sell the property. After talking with Mr. Mover, Respondent concluded the auction by declaring Mr. Gordon, bidding on behalf of himself and his wife, the winning bidder at the auction. Mr. Gordon’s base bid was in the amount of $300,000.00 plus a buyer’s premium in the amount of $10,000.00, bringing the total bid to $310,000.00. After being declared the winning bidder, Mr. Gordon gave to the Respondent the $10,000.00 cashier’s check he had brought to the auction. Mr. Gordon signed a document styled “Contract for Sale and Purchase at Auction” (Purchase Contract), which reflected a total selling price of $310,000.00 (this figure included the buyer’s premium) and a requirement that the closing date be on or before April 19, 2008. The Purchase Contract contained the following provision relating to the Buyer’s Premium: 8. BUYER’S PREMIUM – WHEN EARNED: it is understood and agreed by the Seller and the Buyer that the Buyer’s Premium is paid to the Auctioneer at the time of the Auction Sale and is the sole property of the Auctioneer, and he is entitled to this money as his fee at the time of said payment. Respondent told Mr. Gordon that he would cash the check Mr. Gordon gave to him on March 20, 2008, after Mr. and Mrs. Gordon had an executed contract signed by both parties. Respondent cashed Mr. Gordon’s check on March 21, 2008. Respondent never presented the Purchase Contract to Mr. Mover, and the transaction never closed. The Gordons were unable to secure financing because they had no contract. Mr. Gordon has made repeated demands for the return of the proceeds from the check he gave to Respondent. Respondent has refused those demands.4 Respondent was aware of the foreclosure proceeding before he conducted the auction. Respondent did not disclose the foreclosure proceeding to Mr. Gordon prior to the auction. After the auction, Mr. Mover filed for bankruptcy. Mr. Gordon filed no claim in that proceeding.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Division of Real Estate find Respondent guilty of the violations alleged in Counts I and II of the Administrative Complaint. For the violation found in Count I, it is recommended that the final order impose against Respondent an administrative fine in the amount of $1,000.00 and that it revoke his broker’s license. For the violation found in Count II, it is recommended that the final order impose an administrative fine in the amount of $250.00 and that it revoke his broker’s license. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of July, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of July, 2010
