The Issue Whether the allegations of the Administrative Complaint are correct and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the state agency responsible for regulation of licensed real estate salespersons in the State of Florida. At all times material to this case, the Respondent was a licensed real estate salesperson, holding Florida license no. 0566297. Most recently, the Respondent's license identifies her as a salesperson with Robert E. Bartlett at Bartlett Realty, 3500 First Avenue North, St. Petersburg, Florida 33701. From July 11, 1995, to September 27, 1996, the Respondent was employed by Century 21, Grant Realty of Florida, 6450 Seminole Boulevard, Largo, Florida 34642. Steve and Janice Perry (the Perrys) owned a house located at 12907 Hickorywood Lane, Largo, Florida. On or about June 5, 1996, the Perrys listed the house for sale through execution of an Exclusive Right to Sell Listing Agreement with the Respondent and Grant Realty. The Perrys were very anxious to sell the house and contacted the Respondent almost daily to determine whether there was activity on the listing. In time, the Respondent presented to the Perrys a written and signed offer (the "first offer") to purchase the property. The Perrys declined the offer, but proposed a counteroffer, and executed the document. The Respondent did not provide a copy of the offer or counteroffer to the Perrys. The Respondent eventually told the Perrys that the purchasers had been unable to obtain financing. The Respondent has no documentation of the first offer. The Respondent is unable to recall the names of the prospective buyers or of any agent representing the buyers. The files of Grant Realty contain no records related to the first offer. At some time after the first offer had failed to close, the Respondent presented a second written and signed offer to the Perrys. The Respondent indicated to the Perrys that she knew the second buyer. On the Respondent's advice, Mr. Perry amended the second offer, initialed the changes, and signed the document. Mr. Perry told the Respondent that if the amendments were not acceptable to the buyer, he would accept the original offer. The Respondent did not provide a copy of the second offer to the Perrys. The Respondent has no documentation of the second offer. The files of Grant Realty contain no records related to the second offer. The day following execution of the second offer, the Perrys inquired about the status of the matter. The Respondent told Mr. Perry that the buyer was part of an "investment group" and that the group was being contacted about the Perrys' amendments. The Perrys continued to contact the Respondent about the status of the second offer, but she offered little new information. The Respondent eventually told the Perrys that the prospective buyer thought she was being "too pushy" and was refusing to discuss the matter with her. The Respondent told the Perrys that the buyer's agent would handle the sale, but stated that it would be improper for the Perrys to contact the buyer's agent and declined to identify the agent. The Perrys continued to contact the Respondent and request information. She eventually indicated that the buyer's agent was "Dave," another Century 21 agent, and suggested it could be Dave Sweet, another Grant Realty agent. The Perrys contacted Dave Sweet. Mr. Sweet had no knowledge of the second offer and was unable to provide any information. At this point, the Perrys contacted the Respondent's employer and spoke with Karen Selby, a broker at Grant Realty. Ms. Selby was unaware of any offer on the property. Conrad Grant, owner/broker of the agency, was also unaware of any pending offer on the Perry property. Ms. Selby took possession of the Perry listing file. There was no documentation in the file suggesting that any offers were received. Ms. Selby questioned the Respondent about the second offer. The Respondent stated that the offer came from "John," a man who had come through an open house a few weeks earlier, that she'd prepared a written offer according to his direction but that he had not signed it, that Mr. Perry counteroffered, and that the counteroffer had been declined. The Respondent further told Ms. Selby that the buyer had been working with "Dave," an agent in another Century 21 agency. Ms. Selby asked for the full names of the buyer and the agent, but the Respondent was unable to provide them. Ms. Selby asked the Respondent to consult her notes or the open house sign- in sheet for the information. The Respondent was unable to provide any additional information related to the offer. Ms. Selby contacted the agency's attorney and arranged a meeting with the Respondent. During this meeting, the Respondent was again asked for, but was unable to provide, additional information related to the alleged offers. Subsequent to the meeting, the Respondent provided a name and telephone facsimile number for the alleged buyer. Using the phone number, Ms. Selby attempted to contact the buyer, identified as "Brian John Edridge." Ms. Selby received a response from a business which stated that no one by that name was involved in the business. Ms. Selby discussed the matter with Dave Sweet. Mr. Sweet told Ms. Selby he was not involved in the purported offer and had no information about the situation. The Respondent's employment at Grant Realty was terminated. There is no credible evidence that the "offers" presented by the Respondent to the Perrys were real. There is no credible evidence that the prospective "buyers" identified to the Perrys by the Respondent existed. There is no credible evidence that anyone identified as "Brian John Edridge," or any variation of the name, was involved in any prospective purchase of the Perry property. There is no credible evidence that an agent identified as "Dave" was involved in any prospective purchase of the Perry property. At the hearing, the Respondent testified in her own behalf. Her testimony lacks credibility and is rejected.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby recommended that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, enter a Final Order revoking the Respondent's real estate license. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of June, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire 1415 East Robinson Street, Suite B Orlando, Florida 32801-2169 Christine M. Ryall, Esquire Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Henry M. Solares, Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900
The Issue The issue to be resolved herein concerns whether the Petitioners are entitled to an award of attorney's fees in this proceeding. Embodied in that general issue are questions concerning whether the Petitioners are the prevailing parties; whether they meet the definition of "small business" parties, including the net worth amounts, enumerated in Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, as well as whether the disciplinary proceeding against both Petitioners was "substantially justified". See Section 57.111(3)(e) , Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida charged with licensing and regulating the practices of real estate salesmen and brokers by the various provisions of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. Included within those duties is the duty to investigate conduct by realtors allegedly in violation of Chapter 475 and related rules and to prosecute administrative penal proceedings for which probable cause is found as a result of such investigations. At times pertinent hereto, both Ms. Maxwell and Ms. Cosyns, (then Pauline Sealey) were licensed realtors working as independent contractors for Mariner Properties, Inc. and V.I.P. Realty Inc. The complete file of the underlying proceeding DOAH Case No. 86-0140, was stipulated into evidence. That file included the Administrative Complaint filed against these Respondents and the Recommended and Final Order, which Final Order adopted the Recommended Order. The findings of fact in that Recommended Order are incorporated by reference and adopted herein. During the Petitioner's case, counsel for Petitioner voluntarily reduced the attorney's fees bills for both Petitioners such that Ms. Maxwell's bill is the total amount of $2,695.50 and Ms. Cosyns' bill is $17,200, rather than the original amounts submitted in the affidavit. Respondent acknowledged in its proposed Final Order that the fees and costs submitted by the Respondent were thus reasonable. The testimony the Petitioners presented through depositions, transcripts of which were admitted into evidence into this proceeding, was unrefuted. That testimony demonstrates that both Ms. Cosyns and Ms. Maxwell were prevailing parties in the administrative proceeding referenced herein brought by the Respondent, Department of Professional Regulation. They were individually named as Respondents in the Administrative Complaint whereby their professional licenses were subjected to possible suspension or revocation for alleged wrong doing on their part. There is no dispute that they were exonerated in that proceeding and are thus prevailing parties within the meaning of Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. The Petitioners are also "small business parties". In that connection, they both were independently licensed Real Estate professionals during times pertinent to the underlying proceeding and were acting in the capacity of independent contractors for all the activities with which the administrative complaint was concerned. Each established that her net worth is below the limit provided by Section 57.111 as an element of the definition of "small business party". The reasonableness of the fees having been established in the manner found-above and the Petitioners having established that they meet the definitional requirements of prevailing small business parties, there remains to be determined the issue of whether the proceedings against the two Petitioners were "substantially justified", that is, whether the proceeding had a "reasonable basis in law and fact at the time it was initiated by a State agency." See Section 57.111(3)(e), Florida Statutes. The facts concerning each Petitioner's case regarding the three counts of the Administrative Complaint relating to them are as found in the Recommended Order incorporated by reference herein. Respondent Maxwell was charged in the complaint with having worked in conjunction with an office manager, Mr. Hurbanis of V.I.P. Realty, in conspiring with him to submit a fraudulent real estate sales contract to a lending institution for purposes of financing. This allegedly involved submitting a contract to the lending institution with an inflated purchase price in order to secure one hundred percent financing, the scheme being more particularly described in that portion of the findings of fact in the Recommended Order related to Jean Maxwell. In fact, Ms. Maxwell did not work in the realty office as charged in the Administrative Complaint, but rather was employed by Mariner Properties, which may have been a related company. The contract in question, although alleged to be fraudulent was, in fact, a bona fide contract which was a legitimate part of the Real Estate transaction submitted to the bank for financing purposes, about which the bank was kept fully advised. All details of the transaction were disclosed to the lender. Maxwell was specifically charged with concealing the true contract from the lender in order to enhance the percentage of the purchase price that the bank would finance, done by allegedly inflating the purchase price in a second contract submitted to the bank. It was established in the disciplinary proceeding that no such concealment ever took place. In fact, Ms. Maxwell was purchasing a lot from her own employer, Mariner Properties. Two contracts were indeed prepared for the purchase of Lot 69, a single family lot on Sanibel Island. In fact, however, the difference of $42,875 and $49,500 in the stated purchase price, as depicted on the two contracts, was the result of continuing negotiations between Ms. Maxwell and the seller, who was also her employer. The difference in the two prices depicted on the contracts was the result of, in effect, a set-off to the benefit of Ms. Maxwell, representing certain employee discounts and real estate commission due from the employer and seller to Ms. Maxwell, the purchaser. As Petitioners' composite Exhibit 5 reflects, the lender involved, North First Bank of Ft. Myers, Florida, was fully apprised of all the details concerning this transaction at the time it was entered into and the loan commitment extended and closed. Mr. Allan Barnes, the Assistant Vice President of North First Bank revealed, in the letter contained in this exhibit in evidence, that there was no concealment or misrepresentation of the facts to his institution by Ms. Maxwell. This letter is dated April 18, 1984. The other related letter in that exhibit, of May 2, 1984 from attorney Oertel to attorney Frederick H. Wilson of the Respondent agency, thus constitutes notice to the agency well before the complaint was filed, that no concealment or misrepresentation to the lender involved had occurred and the charges were requested to be dismissed. In spite of the fact that the agency was on notice of this turn of events well before the filing of the Administrative Complaint, it proceeded to file the complaint and to prosecute it all the way up to the date of hearing, requiring Ms. Maxwell's attorney to attend the hearing to defend her interests. At the hearing, counsel for the Department acknowledged that there was no basis for prosecuting Ms. Maxwell and voluntarily dismissed the complaint as to her. The Respondent's witness, Investigator Harris, in his deposition taken September 11, 1984, acknowledged that he did not discuss any details concerning the investigation, with attorney Frederick Wilson, who prepared the complaint, nor did he confer with him by telephone or correspondence before the filing of the complaint. Therefore, the complaint was prepared solely on the basis of the investigative report. The investigative report came into evidence as Respondent's Exhibit 1. It reveals that Mr. A. J. Davis the president of Mariner Group and Mariner Properties, who was Jean Maxwell's employer and the owner of the lot in question, signed one contract and his Executive Vice President signed the other. In spite of this, the investigative report does not reveal that the investigator conferred with either Ms. Maxwell, or the sellers concerning this transaction. He conducted a general interview of A.J. Davis concerning the alleged "problem" in his office of "double contracting," but asked him no questions and received no comment about the Jean Maxwell transaction whatever. Nor did the investigator confer with Mr. Allen Barnes or any other representative of North First Bank. If the investigation had been more complete and thorough, he would have learned from Mr. Barnes, if from no one else, that the bank had knowledge of both contracts and all details of the transaction underlying them and there had been no concealment or misrepresentation of the facts regarding the transaction by Ms. Maxwell. This information was learned by attorney Oertel as early as April 18, 1984 by Mr. Barnes' letter, referenced above, and it was communicated to the agency by Mr. Oertel on May 2, 1984. Nevertheless, the complaint was filed and prosecuted through to hearing. Therefore, the prosecution and filing of the Administrative Complaint were clearly not substantially justified. If the Department had properly investigated the matter it would have discovered the true nature of the transaction as being a completely bona fide real estate arrangement. Former Respondent, Pauline Sealy Cosyns was charged with two counts, III and V, in the Administrative Complaint at issue. One count alleged, in essence, that Ms. Sealey had engaged in a similar fraudulent contract situation regarding the sale of her residence to a Mr. and Mrs. Thomas Floyd. The evidence in that proceedings revealed no concealment of any sales contract occurred whatever with regard to the lending institution or anyone else. The facts as revealed at hearing showed Ms. Cosyns and the Floyds, through continuing negotiations after the original sales contract was entered into, amended that contract and executed a second one, in order to allow Ms. Cosyns to take back a second mortgage from the Floyds. This was necessary because Mr. Floyd, an author, was short of the necessary down payment pursuant to the terms of the original contract, because his annual royalty payment from his publishers had not been received as the time approached for closing. The second contract was executed to allow for a second mortgage in favor of the seller, Ms. Cosyns, in order to make up the amount owed by the Floyds on the purchase price agreed upon, above the first mortgage amount. The testimony and evidence in the disciplinary proceeding revealed unequivocally that the lending institution, Amerifirst Mortgage Company, was fully apprised of the situation and of the reason for the two contractual agreements. The $24,000 second mortgage in question is even depicted on the closing statement issued by that bank. There was simply no concealment and no effort to conceal any facts concerning this transaction from the lender or from anyone else. The investigation conducted was deficient because the investigator failed to discuss this transaction with the lender or with the purchasers. He discussed the matter with Ms. Sealy-Cosyns and his own deposition testimony reveals, as does his investigative report, that he did not feel that he got a complete account of the transaction from her. She testified in her deposition, taken prior to the instant proceeding, that she indeed did not disclose all facts of the transaction to him because she was concerned that he was attempting to apprehend her in some "legal impropriety". Therefore, she was reluctant to be entirely candid. The fact remains, however, that had he conducted a complete investigation by conferring with the lender and the purchasers, he would have known immediately, long before the Administrative Complaint was filed and the matter prosecuted, that there was absolutely no basis for any probable cause finding that wrong-doing had occurred in terms of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Thus, the facts concerning the prosecution as to Count III against Pauline Sealy-Cosyns, as more particularly delineated in the findings of fact in the previous Recommended Order, reveal not only that Ms. Cosyns was totally exonerated in the referenced proceeding, but that there was no substantial basis for prosecuting her as to this count at all. Concerning Count V against Ms. Cosyns, it was established through the evidence at the hearing in the disciplinary case that she was merely the listing agent and did not have any part to play in the drafting of the contract nor the presenting of it to the lender. Because there was no evidence adduced to show that she had any complicity or direct involvement in any fraudulent conduct with regard to the transaction involved in Count V of the Administrative Complaint at issue she was exonerated as to that count as well. It is noteworthy here that a statement was made by counsel for the agency, appearing at pages 20 and 21 of the transcript of the proceeding involving the Administrative Complaint, which indicates that the agency, based upon its review of certain documents regarding Counts III and V, before hearing, felt that indeed there might not be a disputed issue of material fact as to Mrs. Cosyns. The agency, although acknowledging that a review of the documents caused it to have reason to believe that it was unnecessary to proceed further against Ms. Cosyns nevertheless did not voluntarily dismiss those counts and proceeded through hearing. Be that as it may, the investigation revealed that Ms. Cosyns acknowledged that she knew that there were two contractual documents involved, but the investigation also revealed that Ms. Cosyns was only the listing agent. The selling agent was Mr. Parks. The investigation revealed through interviews with Ms. Cosyns, Mr. Parks and Mr. Hurbanis, the office Manager of V.I.P. Realty, that Ms. Cosyns, as listing agent, was merely present when the offer from the buyers was communicated to the office manager, Mr. Hurbanis, and ultimately to the sellers, the Cottrells. There was no reason for the investigator to believe that Ms. Cosyns had anything to do with the drafting of the contracts nor with the communication of them to the lending institution involved. That was done by either Mr. Parks or Mr. Hurbanis or by the buyers. The investigation (as revealed in the investigative report) does not show who communicated the contract in question to the lender. The investigation was simply incomplete. If the investigator had conferred with the buyers, the sellers and especially the lender, he could have ascertained-whether the lender was aware of all the facts concerning this transaction and whether there was any reason to believe that Ms. Cosyns had anything to do with the arrangement and the details of the transaction. It was ultimately established, by unrefuted evidence at hearing, that indeed Ms. Cosyns did not have anything to do with the transaction, nor the manner in which it was disclosed to the lender. The fact that she was aware that two contracts had been prepared did not give a reasonable basis for the investigator to conclude that she had engaged in any wrong-doing. The report of his interviews with Ms. Cosyns, Mr. Hurbanis and Mr. Parks, as well as Donna Ross, does not indicate that he had a reasonable basis to conclude that Ms. Cosyns had engaged in any fraudulent conduct with regard to the transaction, including the conveyance of a bogus contract to the lending institution involved, nor for that matter, that Mr. Hurbanis or Mr. Parks engaged in such conduct. In order to ascertain a reasonable basis for concluding whether Ms. Cosyns was involved in any wrongful conduct, he would have had to obtain more information than he did from these people or confer with the lender, the buyer or the seller, or all of these approaches, before he could have a reasonable basis to recommend to the prosecuting agency that an Administrative Complaint be filed against her concerning this transaction. In fact, he did not do so, but the Administrative Complaint was filed and prosecuted through hearing anyway, causing her to incur the above-referenced attorney's fees. It thus has not been demonstrated that there was any substantial basis for the filing and prosecution of Count V of the Administrative Complaint against Ms. Cosyn. Thus she is entitled to the attorneys fees referenced above with regard to the prosecution of the Administrative Complaint in question.
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Respondent committed the violation of Section 475.25(1)(m), Florida Statutes, alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against her.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (the "Department"), is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, including Chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Maureen Teresa Mobley, is a licensed real estate salesperson in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0647773. On or about January 22, 1997, Respondent filed an application with the Department for licensure as a real estate salesperson. Pertinent to this case, item 9 on the application required that Respondent answer "Yes" or "No" to the following question: Have you ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld? This question applies to any violation of the laws of any municipality, county, state or nation, including traffic offenses (but not parking, speeding, inspection, or traffic signal violations), without regard to whether you were placed on probation, had adjudication withheld, paroled, or pardoned. If you intend to answer "NO" because you believe those records have been expunged or sealed by court order pursuant to Section 943.058, Florida Statutes, or applicable law of another state, you are responsible for verifying the expungement or sealing prior to answering "NO." If you answered "Yes," attach the details including dates and outcome, including any sentence and conditions imposed, in full on a separate sheet of paper. Your answer to this question will be checked against local, state and federal records. Failure to answer this question accurately could cause denial of licensure. If you do not fully understand this question, consult with an attorney or the Division of Real Estate. Respondent answered item 9 by checking the box marked "No." The application concluded with an "Affidavit of Applicant," which was acknowledged before a Notary Public of the State of Florida, as follows: The above named, and undersigned, applicant for licensure as a real estate salesperson under the provisions of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, as amended, upon being duly sworn, deposes and says that (s)(he) is the person so applying, that (s)(he) has carefully read the application, answers, and the attached statements, if any, and that all such answers and statements are true and correct, and are as complete as his/her knowledge, information and records permit, without any evasions or mental reservations whatsoever; that (s)(he) knows of no reason why this application should be denied; and (s)(he) further extends this affidavit to cover all amendments to this application or further statements to the Division or its representatives, by him/her in response to inquiries concerning his/her qualifications. (Emphasis added.) On March 3, 1997, Respondent passed the salesperson examination and was issued license number 0647773. From March 15, 1997, through April 7, 1997, Respondent was an inactive salesperson. From April 8, 1997, through the present, Respondent has been an active salesperson associated with Betty K. Woolridge, an individual broker trading as B. K. Woolridge and Associates, currently in Tampa, Florida. Steve Pence, Investigative Supervisor for the Department, investigated Respondent’s criminal history. He discovered that Respondent had "a problem" with a worthless check charge. Mr. Pence obtained a Certificate of Disposition from the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County, Florida. The Certificate indicated that on November 4, 1992, Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to a misdemeanor charge of obtaining property with a worthless check, an offense that occurred on July 25, 1991. The Certificate further indicates that adjudication was withheld. After Mr. Pence concluded his investigation, the Department filed the Administrative Complaint at issue in this proceeding which, based on Respondent's failure to disclose the aforesaid criminal disposition, charged that "Respondent has obtained a license by means of fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment in violation of [Section] 475.25(1)(m), Florida Statutes" and sought to take disciplinary action against her license. According to the complaint, the disciplinary action sought . . . may range from a reprimand; an administrative fine not to exceed $5,000.00 per violation; probation; suspension of license, registration or permit for a period not to exceed ten (10) years; revocation of the license, registration or permit; and any one or all of the above penalties. . . . At the hearing, Respondent testified that six or seven years ago, she wrote a check for $19.00 that was not cleared at her bank. She had moved during this period, and for some reason the notification did not reach her. When she found out the check had not been paid, she went directly to the intended payee and made the payment. A year later, she was stopped for a minor traffic violation and was arrested on an outstanding warrant for her arrest on the worthless check charge. At the time, she thought the matter had been taken care of and had no idea there was warrant out for her arrest. Respondent testified that she went before the judge, who noted that she had made good on the check more than a year before her arrest. Respondent admitted pleading no contest to the charge. However, Respondent’s understanding of "adjudication withheld" was that the judge had dismissed the charge, provided she pay the court costs. She never saw the Certificate of Disposition until Mr. Pence brought it to her attention several years later. Respondent's explanation for her failure to disclose the worthless check charge on her application is credited. It is found that, at the time she submitted her application, Respondent did not intend to mislead or deceive those who would be reviewing her application. In so finding, it is observed that Respondent's testimony was candid and her understanding of the disposition of the matter was reasonable, given the passage of time since the events in question, the minor nature of the underlying charge, and the fact that the judge acknowledged she had long since made good on the $19.00 check at issue.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be rendered dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of March, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel Villazon, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Leonard H. Johnson, Esquire Schrader, Johnson, Auvil and Brock, P.A. Post Office Box 2337 37837 Meridian Avenue Dade City, Florida 33526-2337 William Woodyard Acting General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 James Kimbler Acting Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32302-1900
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint? him? If so, what disciplinary action should be taken against
Findings Of Fact Respondent is now, and has been since September 23, 1991, a Florida-licensed real estate salesperson (holding license number 0579778). On September 30, 1993, his license became "involuntary inactive." His license was reactivated effective November 22, 1994, and remained active through September 30, 1995. Respondent's license is currently in "involuntary inactive" status. In January of 1994, Respondent was hired to (and thereafter did work) as a real estate salesperson for 4% Realty, Inc. (4%). The decision to hire Respondent was made by Frank Eckert, 4%'s broker. At no time did Respondent advise Eckert that he (Respondent) did not have an active real estate salesperson's license. On January 26, 1997, and January 27, 1997, Respondent provided $500.00 to 4% (in the form of two checks made out to 4%, one, dated January 26, 1994, in the amount $300.00 and the other, dated January 27, 1994, in the amount of $200.00). The $500.00 represented a deposit made by Respondent in connection with a proposed real estate transaction involving Respondent (as the buyer) and Mark Solowitz (as the seller). By letter dated March 3, 1994, Respondent notified Solowitz that, as of January 26, 1994, there was “on deposit in 4% Realty, Inc., Escrow account a total sum of $500.” The real estate transaction between Respondent and Solowitz was never finalized. After the transaction failed to close, Eckert returned Respondent’s $500.00 deposit to Respondent. On or about October 12, 1994, Respondent applied and interviewed for a salesperson position in the Weston office of Prudential Florida Realty (Prudential). The interview was conducted by Dorothy McCullough, the branch manager of Prudential's Weston office. Respondent made certain statements during the interview with which McCullough was "not comfortable." At the conclusion of the interview, McCullough told Respondent that she would "get back to him" and "let him know" of her decision. At no time did McCullough hire Respondent or authorize him to use Prudential's forms or stationary or to act as an agent for Prudential. On or about October 13, 1994, Respondent submitted to First Atlantic Realty (First Atlantic), on behalf of prospective tenants, an offer to lease property (located at 3350 Ivy Way in Miramar) listed by First Atlantic. Respondent purported to be acting as a representative of Prudential. When McCullough discovered what Respondent had done, she telephoned him to make sure that he understood that he had not been, nor would he be, hired by her to work for Prudential. Subsequently, First Atlantic's broker, Roger Herman, learned that the prospective tenants on whose behalf Respondent had submitted the offer had already moved into the rental property notwithstanding that their offer (which was "extremely weak") had not been accepted.3 Herman thereupon went to the rental property "to find out what was going on." He attempted to communicate with the prospective tenants, but was unsuccessful because they spoke ”very little English." He then telephoned the police. Upon arriving on the scene, the police spoke with the prospective tenants and persuaded them to vacate the premises. On or about October 24, 1994, Respondent submitted to First Atlantic, on behalf of the same prospective tenants, another offer to lease the property at 3350 Ivy Way. On this occasion, however, Respondent was acting as a salesperson in the employ of 4%. Herman responded to this second offer by contacting the Department by telephone and discussing the situation with a Department representative. During the discussion, Herman was advised by the Department representative that Respondent did not possess an active salesperson's license. Herman then telephoned Eckert and informed him of Respondent's licensure status. After speaking with Herman, Eckert telephoned the Department and received confirmation that Respondent did not have an active salesperson's license. Eckert then contacted Respondent and advised him that his employment with 4% was terminated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order finding Respondent guilty of the violations described in Conclusion of Law 41 of this Recommended Order and revoking his real estate salesperson's license for having committed said violations.DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of April, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of April 1997.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated certain provisions within chapter 520, Florida Statutes (2010),1/ as alleged in Petitioner’s Administrative Complaint; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Sam’s Car is a motor vehicle retail installment seller based in Pensacola, Florida, and is governed by chapter 520. Mirza Ahmad is the president and 50-percent owner of Sam’s Car. Between January 7, 2009, and December 31, 2010, Sam’s Car held license number MV0902721 enabling it to conduct business as a motor vehicle retail installment seller. In other words, Sam’s Car could offer financing so that its customers could purchase vehicles through installment payments. At some point in 2010, Mr. Ahmad decided to convert the sole proprietorship named Mirza Aftab Ahmad, d/b/a Sam’s Car, into a corporation named Sohail Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Sam’s Car. If a sole proprietorship licensed as a motor vehicle retail installment seller wishes to convert to a corporation, the new corporation must file a new application to be licensed as a motor vehicle retail installment seller. Accordingly, Mr. Ahmad filed an application in December of 2010 for a motor vehicle retail installment seller’s license on behalf of Sohail Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Sam’s Car. Mr. Ahmad did not renew license number MV0902721, and the license went into inactive status on December 31, 2010. Sam’s Car could not enter into retail installment contracts with an inactive license. OFR ultimately issued license number MV9905731 to Sohail Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Sam’s Car, and that license became effective on March 16, 2011. Sam’s Car never moved to re-activate license number MV0902721, and OFR deemed that license to have retroactively expired on December 31, 2010. Sam’s Car was not licensed to enter retail installment sales contracts between January 1, 2011, and March 15, 2011. OFR licenses motor vehicle retail installment sellers such as Sam’s Car and is responsible for ensuring that licensees comply with chapter 520. OFR may conduct examinations and investigations to determine whether any provision of chapter 520 has been violated. In March of 2014, OFR contacted Mr. Ahmad and notified him that OFR would soon be conducting an on-site examination of Sam’s Car. During an on-site examination, OFR examiners visit a motor vehicle retail installment seller’s office, identify themselves, and examine various records in order to verify that the licensee complied with chapter 520 during the time period in question. OFR examiners arrived at Sam’s Car on March 19, 2014, and spent approximately six hours examining and scanning particular records of Sam’s Car. The examiners began by requesting that the office manager of Sam’s Car provide them with all the motor vehicle installment contracts that Sam’s Car had entered into in 2011 and 2012 (“the examination period”). Some of the requested records were at Mr. Ahmad’s home rather than at Sam’s Car. Accordingly, one of the examiners returned to Sam’s Car on April 9, 2014, to scan those documents after they had been retrieved from Mr. Ahmad’s home. The examiners reviewed 20 to 25 records from Sam’s Car and determined that several of the sales contracts utilized by Sam’s Car were not the form contract that had been approved as an industry standard by the Florida Independent Auto Dealer Association. There was a period of time during the examination period when Sam’s Car was utilizing a sales contract that it had essentially created from scratch. The examiners determined that the sales contracts in question did not have several of the items required by chapter 520. On September 5, 2015, OFR issued an Administrative Complaint alleging that Sam’s Car violated four provisions within chapter 520. In Count I, OFR alleged that Sam’s Car violated section 520.07, Florida Statutes, by failing to ensure that all motor vehicle retail installment contracts executed by Sam’s Car during the examination period satisfied all of the requirements of section 520.07. The contracts reviewed by OFR allegedly failed to contain the “Notice to Buyer,” the “total amount of payments,” and a specific statement that liability coverage is not included. OFR further alleged in Count I that several of the contracts failed to ensure that the contract had been signed by the buyer and the seller. Finally, OFR also alleged in Count I that there were two instances in which Sam’s Car failed to ensure that the contract was completed before it was signed. OFR alleged in Count II that several of the reviewed contracts violated section 520.07(6) by enabling Sam’s Car to collect delinquency/collection charges or late fees in excess of five percent of the installment payment due. In Count III, OFR alleged that Sam’s Car violated section 520.07(3), and Florida Administrative Code Rules 69V- 50.001 and 69V-50.002 because there were instances in which Sam’s Car had failed to document that it refunded or credited title charges collected from the buyer that exceeded the actual charges. Finally, OFR alleged in Count IV that Sam’s Car violated section 520.03(1) by selling motor vehicles on installment payments between January 1, 2011, and March 16, 2011, without an active license. The following findings are based on the documentary evidence and testimony received at the final hearing conducted on March 11, 2016. OFR proved by clear and convincing evidence that the retail installment sales contracts in OFR Exhibits 1 through 20 do not have the notice to buyer required by section 520.07(1)(b). OFR proved by clear and convincing evidence that the retail installment sales contracts in OFR Exhibits 1 through 20 do not have the specific statement about liability insurance coverage required by section 520.07(1)(b). OFR proved by clear and convincing evidence that the retail installment sales contracts in OFR Exhibits 1 through 20 do not set forth the “total of payments” as required by section 520.07(2)(c). OFR proved by clear and convincing evidence that the retail installment sales contracts in OFR Exhibits 6 through 8, 11, and 14 through 18 were not signed by the seller as required by section 520.07(1)(a). OFR proved by clear and convincing evidence that the retail installment sales contracts in OFR Exhibits 18 and 20 were not complete prior to being signed as required by section 520.07(1)(a). In sum, OFR proved all of the allegations in Count I of its Administrative Complaint by clear and convincing evidence. With regard to Count II, OFR proved by the clear and convincing evidence set forth in OFR Exhibits 6, 7, and 21 that Sam’s Car violated section 520.07(6) by collecting a delinquency/collection charge in excess of five percent of each installment. As for Count III, OFR proved by the clear and convincing evidence set forth in OFR Exhibits 1 and 14 that there were two occasions during the examination period when Sam’s Car did not refund the overcharges on the estimated title, tag, and registration fees. Accordingly, OFR proved that Sam’s Car violated rule 69V-50. With regard to Count IV, OFR proved by the clear and convincing evidence set forth in OFR Exhibits 22, through 25 that Sam’s Car violated section 520.03(1), by entering into retail installment contracts with four separate buyers during the period when Sam’s Car did not have a motor vehicle retail installment seller’s license (i.e., January 1, 2011, through March 15, 2011). Even though OFR proved the allegations in its Administrative Complaint by clear and convincing evidence, there was no indication that those responsible for Sam’s Car’s operations intentionally committed the aforementioned violations. Instead, the testimony presented at the final hearing demonstrated that the violations resulted from inadvertence and/or an incomplete understanding of chapter 520’s requirements.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Office of Financial Regulation enter a final order imposing a $1,000 administrative fine on Sohail Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Sam’s Car. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of May, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of May, 2016.
The Issue The issues for determination in this proceeding are whether Respondent violated Sections 475.426(1)(a) and 475.25(1)(a), (b), and (e), Florida Statutes, 1/ by: acting as a broker; failing to deposit money in escrow; committing fraud, deceit, or dishonesty; and, if so, what, if any, penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the governmental agency responsible for issuing licenses to practice real estate and for regulating licensees on behalf of the state. Respondent is a licensed real estate sales person under license number 0585127. In September, 1992, Respondent's real estate license had lapsed. It was renewed on October 22, 1992. The last license issued to Respondent was issued as a sales person at 457 Loma Bonita Drive, Davenport, Florida. Respondent is a British citizen doing business in Florida. Respondent owns 50 percent of the outstanding stock of Newbay Florida Associates ("Newbay") and Newbay Properties of Central Florida, Inc ("Newbay Properties"). Mr. Paul Chandler is a British citizen confined to a wheelchair by osteogenesis imperfecta, a bone disease. Mr. Chandler was injured in an automobile accident by a drunken driver in 1989. As a result, Mr. Chandler was awarded a jury verdict of $600,000. From the net proceeds of the jury verdict, Mr. Chandler purchased four houses in Florida from Respondent. The houses were for Mr. Chandler and members of his family who have disabilities similar to Mr. Chandler's. 2/ Mr. Chandler paid the remainder of his jury award, approximately $225,000, to Respondent to purchase a furniture franchise. The franchise was to be operated as Flamingo Interiors, Inc. ("Flamingo"), in Kissimmee, Florida. In September, 1992, Respondent and Mr. Chandler negotiated and executed a Franchise Rights Agreement (the "agreement"). The agreement identifies Mr. Chandler as the "franchisee" but otherwise conceals material facts and contains misrepresentations, false promises, false pretenses, and amounts to dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device. The agreement illustrates Respondent's fraud and breach of trust in a business transaction. The agreement contains the name "NEWBAY FLORIDA ASSOCIATES" across the top of the front page of the document. However, the agreement identifies the "franchisor" as Flamingo Interiors of Wells, Somerset, England. The agreement requires Flamingo Interiors to perform numerous obligations. The obligations include: setting up a retail store; providing all necessary training, licensing, qualifications, visas, and inventory; conveying an exclusive area of operation within an "eight (8) miles radius from the Newbay office;" and establishing the location and size of the retail store at the discretion of Newbay. The agreement represents that Newbay owns 25 percent of the outstanding stock in Flamingo Interiors. However, the agreement conceals Flamingo Interiors' place of formation, organization, and current status, and conceals Newbay's authority, or lack of authority, to bind Flamingo Interiors to the obligations of the franchisor in the agreement. Respondent is the only signatory to the agreement other than Mr. Chandler. Respondent signed the agreement on behalf of Newbay. No one from Flamingo Interiors is a signatory to the agreement. The purchase price under the agreement requires Mr. Chandler to deposit $45,000 upon execution of the agreement. The balance of $180,000 is to be paid by December 31, 1992. Mr. Chandler paid the $225,000 required under the agreement in three checks made payable to "Newbay Clients Account." Respondent represented that the amounts paid by Mr. Chandler would be held in the escrow account of Newbay Properties until the obligations of the franchisor were completed in accordance with the terms of the agreement. All negotiations were conducted in the offices of Newbay Properties. Newbay Properties had no escrow account. Respondent failed to place the $225,000 paid to him by Mr. Chandler into any escrow account. The obligations of the franchisor were never satisfied, in whole or in part. Neither Respondent, Newbay, nor Flamingo Interiors made any attempt to obtain performance of the obligations of the franchisor. After repeated efforts and requests by Mr. Chandler, Respondent failed to account for or return Mr. Chandler's money. Respondent never explained his failure to return the money deposited with Respondent by Mr. Chandler.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent not guilty of violating Sections 475.25(1)(k), 475.25(1)(e), and 475.42(1)(a); guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(b); and revoking Respondent's real estate sales license. RECOMMENDED this 8th day of February, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL S. MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of February 1995.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is licensed by the Department of Professional Regulation as a real estate salesman having been issued license number 0142776, effective August 27, 1984. Linda J. Nuccitelli is his registered employer. John Nuccitelli was respondent's former registered employer. In February, 1983, a final order was entered by the Florida Real Estate Commission which revoked the broker's license of John L. Nuccitelli. The final order was appealed, and the District Court of Appeal, Fifth District, stayed the order of Real Estate Commission pending disposition of the appeal. The appellate court ultimately affirmed the order of the Real Estate Commission, and the court's mandate was issued on March 16, 1984. On April 1, 1984, respondent's license was renewed by the Department of Professional Regulation even though John Nuccitelli was named as his employer. The respondent was notified of the revocation of John Nuccitelli's license and automatic cancellation of respondent's license as a salesman, by letter from the Florida Real Estate Commission dated June 21, 1984. Prior to receipt of that letter neither the respondent nor John L. Nuccitelli were aware that the appeal process has been completed and the final order revoking Mr. Nuccitelli's broker's license had become effective. On April 16, 1984, the respondent submitted to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), on behalf of Israel Branton, an offer to purchase certain property located at 4746 Miramar Road. The offer was set forth on a standard form entitled "Offer to Purchase and Broker's Tender." The form has a space for the signature of the broker and also has a space for the name and address of the broker. The offer to purchase designated "Anchor Realty REALTOR John Nuccitelli" as broker. Respondent signed his name in the space designated "Signature of Broker". The offer was accepted, and a HUD Standard Retail Sales Contract was executed. At the bottom of the contract is a certification to be signed by the broker. Typed in above the line stating "Name of Broker and Phone No" is "Anchor Realty REALTOR John Nuccitelli 305-422-0747." The line below states "By", and is signed "Louis Boatman, Jr. associate." On the Forfeiture of Earnest Money Deposit form, also submitted to HUD in connection with the transaction, respondent's signature is located on the line provided for the signature of the selling broker. A sales/broker's commission of $1,623.00 was paid to Anchor Realty as a result of this sale. (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3) On April 27, 1984, respondent submitted to HUD on behalf of Israel Branton an offer to purchase property located at 5019 Columbia Street, Orlando. As in the transaction above, "Anchor Realty REALTOR John Nuccitelli" is named as the broker and respondent signed his name in the space provided for the signature of the broker. The certificate at the bottom of the Standard Retail Sales Contract was executed in the same manner it was on the contract for the property on Miramar, indicating "Anchor Realty REALTOR John Nuccitelli" as broker and signed by "Louis Boatman, Jr. Associate." On the Forfeiture of Earnest Money Deposit form submitted to HUD in connection with the transaction, respondent's signature was located on the line provided for the signature of the selling broker. (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4). Israel Branton had known the respondent several years and was aware that respondent was a salesman and not a broker. Judy Sellers of Lawyers' Title Insurance Corporation, who handled the closing on the Miramar property, was aware that respondent was a salesman and John Nuccitelli was the broker for Anchor Realty. John Nuccitelli had given respondent authorization, as his agent, to sign all documents submitted to HUD on his behalf. Mr. Nuccitelli was aware that respondent was a very competent salesman with a thorough understanding of HUD paperwork and procedures. Due to the time restraints involved with HUD sales, respondent sometimes worked until midnight preparing the paperwork that had to be delivered to Tampa the next morning. To avoid having to get up before 5 a.m. to sign the documents himself, Mr. Nuccitelli told the respondent to sign: the documents for him. However, Mr. Nuccitelli was always fully informed about the transactions The Department of Housing and Urban Development has no objection to a salesman signing on behalf of a broker as long as the broker has authorized the salesman to do so. On August 2, 1984, respondent submitted to HUD, on his own behalf, an offer to purchase property located at 4777 Pleasant Valley, Orlando. Mr. Schroeder, Chief of the Loan Management and Property Disposition Branch of HUD, Tampa Office, rejected the offer noting on the document that the "OFFER MUST BE SUBMITTED BY A LISCENSED (sic) Broker." Mr. Schroeder had been informed shortly before August 2, 1984, that Mr. Nuccitelli's broker's license had been revoked and that the people who worked for him at Anchor Realty were not legally licensed. The Offer to Purchase had been signed by respondent as applicant and as broker, and it named "Anchor Realty REALTOR" as broker. Respondent indicated Anchor Realty as broker because respondent was still with Anchor Realty, and he filled out the form as he always had. However, he had not been authorized by Linda Nuccitelli to sign as the broker. Linda Nuccitelli became the licensed broker of Anchor Realty in August of 1984. Respondent did not represent to anyone that he was a broker. He never concealed the fact that he was a real estate salesman. He signed the HUD forms in the places for the broker's signature because John Nuccitelli told him that he could do so. At the same time, respondent clearly named "Anchor Realty REALTOR John Nuccitelli" as the broker. Mr. Schroeder, the HUD official who signed the contracts, was aware that John Nuccitelli was the broker. Mr. Schroeder indicated that HUD officials don't look at the signature on a form too closely but rely instead on the name that is typed in the appropriate space to determine the broker. The evidence presented established that respondent did not intend to deceive or mislead anyone and that in fact, no one was deceived or misled. Respondent has held a real estate license for about 15 or 16 years and has never had a disciplinary action filed against him until the instant complaint.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Counts I and III of the Administrative Complaint be dismissed, that respondent be found to have violated section 475.42(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and that respondent be fined $500 pursuant to section 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes. DONE and ENTERED this 5th day of February, 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE A. GRUBBS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of February, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur R. Shell, Jr., Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32802 Richard J; R. Parkinson, Esquire 602 East Central Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Salvatore Carpino General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harold Huff, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings On Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Accepted in Finding of Fact 1. Accepted in Finding of Fact 2, except last half of last sentence which is a legal conclusion. Accepted as modified in Finding of Fact 4. Accepted as modified in Finding of Fact 5. Last sentence rejected as irrelevant and not supported by the evidence. Rejected as not supported by the evidence. Respondent signed on behalf of the broker, and clearly signed by respondent as "associate." Accepted in Finding of Fact 9. Accepted in Finding of Fact 3. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted By Respondent 1. Accepted in Findings of Fact 1, 2 and 3. 2. Accepted in Findings of Fact 4 and 7. 3. Accepted in Findings of Fact 5 and 7. 4. Accepted in Findings of Fact 7 and 8. 5. Accepted in Finding of Fact 9. 6. Accepted in Finding of Fact 6. 7. Accepted in Finding of Fact 2.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with licensing and regulating the practice of real estate salesmen and brokers by the various provisions of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. Included in those duties and enforcement authorities is the duty to investigate conduct by realtors allegedly in violation of Chapter 475, and related rules, and prosecuting administrative proceedings filed as a result of such investigations in order to seek imposition of disciplinary measures against the licensure status of miscreant realtors. The Respondents, at all times pertinent hereto, were licensed real estate brokers or salesmen in the State of Florida, having been issued the license numbers depicted in the Administrative Complaint. Respondent Hurbanis last was issued a license as a broker/salesman located at Sanibel Realty, Inc., Sanibel, Florida. Respondent Pauline Seely was last licensed as a broker/salesman located at VIP Realty Group, Sanibel, Florida. Respondent John M. Parks was licensed as a broker/salesman, last issued for a location at The Realty Shoppe of Lee County in Fort Myers, Florida. Respondent Jean Maxwell was licensed as a broker/salesman located at Suite 205, 1619 Periwinkle Way, Sanibel, Florida. At all times pertinent hereto, the Respondents were licensed and operating in the real estate brokerage business in the employ of VIP Realty Group, Inc., a licensed corporate real estate broker. Concerning the charges in Count I, one Eric Rosen, a real estate salesman employed by VIP Realty Group, Inc., the same firm employing Respondent Pauline P. Seely, obtained Nicholas Fontana and John Priebbe as purchasers of a certain piece of property by sales contract which was owned by Clarence Liebscher and Joseph Kubosch. The sales contract was entered into June 3, 1983, and reflected a purchase price of $315,000, including the sale of certain furniture and other personal property. The complaint alleges that former Respondent Rosen and Respondent Hurbanis, together with the purchasers and sellers, conspired to enter into a second bogus sales contract (so called "double contracting") substantially similar to the first contract, except the sales price was shown to be $350,000 and the terms concerning sale of furniture and other personalty was deleted. It is alleged that this contract was prepared by Rosen under the direction and approval of Respondent Hurbanis for the purpose of obtaining a mortgage loan from a lending institution in an amount greater than the normal percentage of the sales price that the banking laws and policies of such lenders provide as the maximum amount of mortgage financing which can be obtained on a given piece of property. It is alleged that these Respondents were thus attempting to obtain a loan commitment in an amount greater than could have been obtained had the actual sales price of $315,000 been revealed to the lender. The bogus contract showing the $350,000 sales price was allegedly submitted to the lender, AmeriFirst Savings and Loan Association, without the Respondents notifying AmeriFirst that the actual sales price was $315,000. Although witness Rosen for the Petitioner, testified that he believed the contracts involved in this count had been discussed with Mr. Hurbanis he could not say for certain and could not recall the conversation. In fact, another Petitioner witness, Brandy Vallois, stated several times that Mr. Hurbanis was on vacation during the time that the contract was negotiated, executed and submitted to the lender and that, although Respondent Hurbanis was the office manager at VIP Realty Group at the time, others were serving in his stead at the time he was on vacation (the time of the incident alleged in Count I). Although the Department elicited testimony to the effect that seminars had been given where the Respondent, as well as other realtors, had discussed "creative financing," there was no testimony or other evidence that such lectures by the Respondent or others advocated a policy of "double contracting" or in effect deluding lenders into lending more money for real estate purchases than they normally would have if true purchase prices were disclosed. In any event, both the seller and buyer were aware of the situation concerning this transaction and the lender was never deceived or misled because in fact the loan never closed and no funds were disbursed. There was no evidence that the true particulars of this transaction were not disclosed to the lender. Count II Count II concerns a transaction in which Respondent John Parks was the listing and selling salesman and Respondent Hurbanis was the office manager with the same real estate firm. Allegedly, Respondent Hurbanis directed and approved Respondent Parks' preparation of two sales contracts on or about December 16, 1982, calling for the purchase and sale of certain real estate by Mike Volker from Dr. Robert Pascotto and Gaspar Turanna. Both contracts were similar and pertained to the same parcel of property, but one reflected an actual sales price of $149,000, whereas the allegedly bogus, second contract reflected a total sales price of $157,000. It is thus alleged that these two Respondents conspired with the purchasers and sellers to enter into the higher priced, bogus contract for the purpose of obtaining a mortgage loan commitment principal amount at a greater percentage of the sales price than could have been obtained if the actual sales price had been disclosed to the lender. It is alleged that these two Respondents submitted the bogus contract reflecting the $157,000 false sales price together with loan application documents to First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Fort Myers without informing that institution that the actual sales price was $149,000. No competent, substantial evidence was offered, however, to show that Respondent Parks was anything other than the listing salesman. It was not established that he drafted the contract nor that he submitted either contract to the lender. Concerning Respondent Hurbanis, although it was shown that he was the office manager at the time of the incident, it was not established that he directed or approved the drafting of either contract, directed or approved the submission of either contract to the named lender nor that he was involved in the negotiation or closing stage of the transaction in any way. In fact, although the two contracts show differing purchase prices, neither contract depicts any different amount to come from mortgage financing by First Federal. In fact, both contracts reflect that a mortgage would be obtained from First Federal in the amount of $125,600. Nothing any different was disclosed to First Federal. The difference comes in a differing deposit amount held in escrow by VIP Realty Group, Inc., according to the terms of the contract. One contract, that with the lower purchase price, reflects $7,000 in deposit money toward the purchase and the second contract reflects $15,000 deposit money held toward the purchase. This accounts for the $8,000 difference in the amount of the two contracts, but, in any event, the amount to be obtained by mortgage funds from First Federal was the same on each contract. There was no evidence to prove that the deposit amounts depicted on either contract were bogus or other than the result of bona fide arm's length negotiations between the parties. In any event, there was no evidence that First Federal or its lending officers were not aware of any of the particulars in the transaction. There was no showing that that the lender relied on either contract to its detriment. Count III Respondent Pauline Seely, as listing salesman and owner of certain real property, with former Respondent (since dismissed) James O'Neill as selling salesman, and allegedly with Respondent Charles Hurbanis' direction and approval, prepared and obtained execution of two sales contracts on or about December 30, 1982, for the purchase and sale of her real property by Thomas and Sheila Floyd. Both contracts were substantially similar and pertained to the same parcel, but one contract reflected an actual earnest money deposit of $8,660 and a purchase money mortgage in the amount of $24,000, whereas the supposed bogus, second contract reflected a total earnest money deposit of $14,000 and a purchase money mortgage in the principal amount of $18,660. It is alleged that the Respondents then submitted this to the lending institution for the purpose of obtaining a greater percentage of the sales price in mortgage funds than could have been obtained had the actual sales price, terms and conditions been revealed to the lender. In fact, testimony of record and Respondent Seely's Exhibit 2 reveals that the lender was furnished all documents with regard to this transaction which revealed to the lender, as the loan officer involved stated in the letter constituting this exhibit, that the buyers and the seller had agreed that the seller would take back a second mortgage in the amount of $24,000 and that a contract addendum existed (which is in evidence) reflecting this second agreement. Thus, AmeriFirst, the lender, did in fact have a copy of the agreement stating that the seller would hold the second mortgage for the above amount and that AmeriFirst was aware of all details concerning the transaction. In point of fact, both contracts in evidence, one of which reflects a purchase money mortgage of $18,660 which the seller would hold and which reflects that $7,000 would be paid in cash to the seller at the time of contracting, and the second contract, are identical as to purchase price. The second contract also shows a purchase price of $125,000, the difference being essentially that the second contract shows the $24,000 purchase money mortgage amount instead of the figure of $18,660 shown on the first contract. Both contracts merely call for assumption of a mortgage already made in favor of AmeriFirst in the amount of $92,340. There is no evidence that any additional funds are being sought from AmeriFirst at all. There was no evidence that any action by the Respondents would result in any impairment of the security of AmeriFirst's first mortgage lien on the premises. The purchase money mortgage referenced in the testimony and evidence, regardless of its ultimate amount as that relates to the manner in which the total purchase price would be paid the seller, would, in all events, be a subordinate mortgage lien and it is difficult to see how AmeriFirst could rely on either contract to its detriment, even had it not known of one of the contracts. They both represented a purchase price of $125,000 and merely varied as to ways the purchase price would be paid, over and above the $92,340 outstanding first mortgage loan (which was to be assumed). In all events, however, AmeriFirst and its lending officer was fully aware of all details of this transaction and had no objection to the manner in which the transaction was to be closed and disbursements made, nor to the conditions of the assumption of its mortgage. The so called "double contract" that Ms. Seely is alleged to have entered into was shown thus to be an innocent modification of terms of the original sales contract. No wrongdoing or concealment was shown to have been committed by Respondent or any person who participated in the sale of Pauline Seely's property to Thomas and Sheila Floyd. Count V Concerning Count V, it is alleged that Respondents Seely, Parks and Hurbanis obtained two sales contracts on or about January 24, 1983, for the purchase and sale of certain real property by Computer Maintenance Corporation, purchaser, from James and Loretta Cottrell as sellers. Both contracts pertain to the same piece of real property. Both contracts showed a "purchase price" item of $310,000. One contract, however, actually reflected a total price of $344,000, arrived at by combining a $279,000 "90 percent mortgage loan" with a $60,000 purchase money mortgage and a $5,000 cash deposit. This contract contains a notation at the bottom that the "seller agrees that a separate contract for purchase will be given to the Savings and Loan for loan approval." The other contract related to this sale lists a total purchase price of $310,000 only, with a $5,000 deposit noted with no purchase money mortgage being shown, rather there is shown, in addition to the $279,000 90 percent mortgage loan, a balance of $26,000 cash being paid to the seller. This contractual situation is somewhat mysterious and it may indeed be that an attempt was made to conceal the $60,000 purchase money mortgage on the first contract and make it appear to the lender that the purchaser was actually putting up an additional $26,000 in cash at the closing as an inducement to obtain the principal first mortgage of $279,000 from Naples Federal Savings and Loan, AmeriFirst or some other lender. In point of fact, however, the witness, Ms. Heavener, from AmeriFirst indicated that the bank did not act upon the advice contained on the face of the contract, but rather loaned a percentage of their own independent appraisal value and thus did not act to its detriment upon any information contained on the face of either contract. She indicated that that lender was fully informed about all aspects of this transaction in any event. The evidence does not reflect that Mr. Hurbanis nor Ms. Seely had any part in drafting the contract nor presenting it to the lender. Seely's only involvement was as listing agent, that is, the realtor who obtained the listing from the sellers. There is no evidence to indicate that she participated in any fashion in the sale of the property, the negotiations, nor the drafting or presenting of the contracts. No evidence was offered to show for what purpose, whether illicit or innocent, the two different contracts were drafted. In any event, Ms. Seely was not involved in the preparation of the contracts. Mr. Hurbanis was not connected by any competent, substantial evidence, with any activity concerning the drafting of the contracts nor the presenting of them to the lender. A representative of the lending institution testified that she did not recall any discussions at all with Mr. Hurbanis concerning this transaction and upon cross-examination clearly indicated that the lending institution had protected itself against a "double contract" situation by reliance upon its own independent appraisal in making its lending decision, rather than the contract or contracts themselves. Count VI In this count, it is alleged that Hurbanis obtained a sales contract on January 22, 1983, between T N T Partners, a general partnership as seller and Christopher Smith as purchaser. The pertinent terms of the sale were $30,000 total purchase price, $3,000 deposit and $4,500 cash to be allegedly furnished at closing, together with a $22,500 new note and mortgage on the property. It is alleged, in essence, that Respondent Hurbanis falsely represented to Naples Federal Savings and Loan Association that the purchaser would pay $4,500 cash at closing. The transaction closed on April 15, 1983, but instead of the cash, the seller took back a purchase money mortgage in the amount of $4,500. Thus, the issue here is whether the $4,500 mortgage was properly disclosed to the lender. The evidence is silent as to any connection of Mr. Hurbanis with this transaction. In any event, however, it would appear from the face of the contract itself that the lending institution could not have been deceived by the parties to the contract nor any realtor involved, since the contract itself does not require cash in the amount of $4,500 but rather requires "cash or equivalent at closing." Thus, even if there had been a participation by Respondent Hurbanis in this transaction, which was not proven, it is impossible to detect any concealment or deception since the words "or equivalent" would clearly not preclude the use of a purchase money mortgage in the amount of $4,500 as consideration for this portion of the purchase price, rather than actual cash. Indeed, any other thing of equivalent value could have been used as consideration in this particular without violating the terms of the contract, of which the lender clearly had notice.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the evidence of record, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint be dismissed in its entirety as to all Respondents. DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of October, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of October, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-0140 Petitioner: Petitioner filed no Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Respondent Hurbanis: The Proposed Findings of Fact by Respondent Hurbanis are subsumed in those made in this Recommended Order to the extent that that Respondent's submissions constitute bona fide Proposed Findings of Fact. In the main, the "Findings of Fact" in the Post-Hearing Submission by this Respondent constitute largely recitations of evidence and testimony, discussion of the weight thereof, inextricably intermingled with Proposed Findings of Fact which cannot be separately ruled upon because of multiple factual findings, legal argument and evidence discussion intertwined in the same paragraph. Respondents Maxwell's and Seely's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-12. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 John P. Milligan, Jr., Esquire Suite 201, Royal Palm Square 1400 Colonial Boulevard Fort Myers, Florida 33907 Kenneth G. Oertel, Esquire Suite C 2700 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Johnny W. Parks c/o The Realty Shoppe of Lee County 12635 Cleveland Avenue Fort Myers, Florida 33907 Tom Gallagher, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 William O'Neil, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent provided the Florida Real Estate Commission with false information in his application to take the broker's examination, in violation of Sections 475.25(1)(b)and (l), Florida Statutes, or whether he is guilty of misrepresentation, false promises, or dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device in any business transaction, in violation of Section 457.25(1)(b), and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent became a licensed real estate salesperson on September 27, 1993. On this date, he placed his license with Brokers Realty of Naples, Inc. Respondent has not pursued the real estate profession as his primary business. He has not bought or sold any real estate under his license and has not put any time into it. Respondent's profession is the ministry. He as been a minister for 20 years and has been the senior pastor of Gulf Shore Community Church for five years. Respondent is a member of the Christian Missionary Alliance. In June 1993, Respondent was assigned the responsibility of forming a church in Naples. Respondent's wife was more interested than Respondent in pursuing a real estate career, and Respondent took the course with her more for moral support. While in class, they met a broker with whom they agreed they would place their salesperson's licenses. After receiving their salesperson's licenses, Respondent and his wife placed their licenses under the broker, as they had agreed. However, the broker closed her office after a couple of months. In the meantime, Respondent's wife had met David Bayer of Century 21 Old Naples Realty, Inc. (Century 21). In November 1993, she decided to place her license with Century Respondent agreed that he would do the same. Busy with starting a church, Respondent did not attend to the details of transferring his license. He believed that someone else was doing this for him, but no one did. Respondent's inattention allowed his licensing status to lapse. Unknown to Respondent at the time, his salesperson's license became invalid on November 16, 1993, for lack of an employing broker, according to Petitioner's records. Respondent's license remained invalid until March 31, 1995, when it became inactive, according to Petitioner's records. Respondent's wife later decided to pursue her broker's license. Again for moral support and to help her with preparing for the examination, Respondent agreed that he would also apply for his broker's license. In attempting to obtain the necessary paperwork to take the broker's examination, Respondent discovered in late August 1995 that Petitioner's records had not been updated to reflect the transfer of his license to Century 21. It appears that Respondent was not yet aware of the other above-described impediments to licensure. Trying to update Petitioner's records, Respondent submitted the two forms that are the subject of the present disciplinary proceeding. The first form was a Request for License or Change of Status, which Respondent faxed to Petitioner. Respondent completed the top section of this form, which is to be completed by the licensee. He signed it beside a typed-in date of December 30, 1993, which was the effective date of the transfer of his license to Century 21. Petitioner has not objected to anything in this section. The next section is to be completed by the broker/employer or nonlicensed owner/employer. At the bottom of this section are the words, "Broker or Non-Licensed Owner Sign Here:". Respondent hand-wrote Mr. Bayer's name in what he described as printing, but, on a blurry fax, could be mistaken for a signature for someone unfamiliar with Mr. Bayer's signature. Beside Mr. Bayer's name "December 30, 1993" was typed in. Petitioner has objected to Respondent's undisclosed signing of Mr. Bayer's name on this form. On September 11, 1995, Petitioner received another Request for License or Change of Status form. The bottom section of this form was signed by Mr. Bayer at the bottom in script considerably different from that of the earlier form. The top section of this form is filled out exactly as the earlier form, with Respondent's signature beside the typed-in date of "December 30, 1993." Petitioner objected to the typed-in date because it was nearly two years prior to the date that the form was filed. As to the second objection, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Respondent was trying to file paperwork with Petitioner in 1995 that was misdated so as to suggest that it was filed two years earlier. The 1993 date was the effective date of the license transfer. The form does not state "Date Signed"--only "Date." There is no place on the form to show an earlier effective date. Not only was Respondent not trying to mislead Petitioner with the date on the form, but it is almost impossible to find that the date was misleading. There is no way to conceal that the forms were filed in September 1995, not December 1993. Respondent even sent the second form certified, return receipt requested, so as to document further that the form was sent in 1995. In the absence of another place on the form to show the effective date of the transfer, Respondent's use of the date line to show the effective date was reasonable and not misleading. Thus, Respondent did not intend to mislead with this date entry, and no one could reasonably have claimed to have been misled by this date entry. Interestingly, Petitioner did not claim that Respondent's first form, which had a similar date entry, was misleading as to the date. As to the first form, Petitioner's objection is more substantial: Respondent signed Mr. Bayer's name without disclosing that he was doing so. Mr. Bayer testified that he would have signed the form in December 1993 or September 1995 because Respondent in fact had transferred his license to Century 21 in December 1993. The record does not establish that Mr. Bayer authorized Respondent to sign the form before he did so, but the record clearly established that he ratified the signature. A few days after the first form was faxed, Mr. Bayer signed a form and sent it to Petitioner. Clearly, Respondent's handling of the signature of Mr. Bayer does not rise to misrepresentation, false promises, or dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device. There was not fraudulent intent. The question is closer as to whether Respondent's handling of the signature rises to the level of making or filing a false report or record which the licensee knows to be false. Given the standard of evidence imposed upon Petitioner, there is considerable doubt whether the factual basis supporting a finding that Respondent signed as the agent of Mr. Bayer, who immediately ratified the act to eliminate any doubt as to its authorization, is sufficient to find that Petitioner has proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent knowingly made or filed a false report or record. However, the parties stipulated to a violation of at least one count, and the administrative law judge accepted the stipulation.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order either dismissing the Administrative Complaint or finding Respondent guilty of knowingly making or filing a false record or report and issuing a notice of noncompliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven D. Fieldman, Chief Attorney Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Jeanette Martinez Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur 4501 Tamiami Trail North, Suite 400 Naples, Florida 34103 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Henry M. Solares, Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900
