The Issue The issue for consideration in this hearing is whether Petitioner is entitled to arbitration under the Florida Lemon Law, concerning his 1994 Ford Explorer, purchased on May 17, 1994.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Respondent, DOA, was the state agency responsible for the receipt, evaluation and, when appropriate, forwarding of consumer RFAs to the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board conducted by the Attorney General of the State of Florida. On May 17, 1994, Petitioner, Kenneth P. Williamson, purchased a new 1994 Ford Explorer sport utility vehicle from Gator Ford in Tampa, Florida. Almost from the beginning, Petitioner experienced a vibration of the entire vehicle when a speed of more than fifty miles per hour was achieved. After several repair attempts, when the Petitioner had driven the vehicle for 12,000 miles without any relief from the problem, he took it back to Gator Ford for repairs. Gator’s efforts did not detect the cause of the problem or correct it. At some later point in time, when sought, no paper work relating to that service call could be found at Gator Ford. Thereafter, however, Petitioner took the vehicle to Carl Flammer Ford in Tarpon Springs for the same problem. Neither the problem’s cause nor a solution to it could be found. On or about June 23, 1995, the odometer on the vehicle in question indicated it had been driven 24,990 miles. Based on that fact, it is found that as of June 22, 1995, Petitioner had exceeded 24,000 miles of operation in the vehicle. This was recognized by Petitioner in his answer to question 17C on the RFA, when he indicated he had reached 24,000 miles on his vehicle in “5/95 OR 6/95.” On May 30, 1996, when the vehicle had 37,800 miles on it, Petitioner forwarded a motor Vehicle Defect Notification Form to Ford Motor Company advising of the vibration problem. That notice, sent by certified mail, was received by Ford on June 5, 1996. Petitioner claims, and Respondent admits, that his vehicle was out of service at least 21 days due to one or more substantial defects, and that there have been three or more repair attempts made to correct the same defect or condition. Because of these factors, and because Petitioner filed a notice of non-conformity with the manufacturer, albeit late in the proceedings, the DOA considered Petitioner to be entitled to the extension period within which his RFA may be filed. The times in this case pertinent under Florida’s Lemon Law are: Date of purchase of vehicle 5/17/94 Eighteen months from date of purchase 11/16/95 24,000 miles of operation reached 6/22/95 Initial Lemon Law limit reached 6/22/95 Six month extension due to Notice of Non-compliance filed 12/22/95 Six month deadline to file after expiration of 6 month extension 6/22/95 Date RFA filed with DOA 7/24/96 Excessive delay 32 days. On the basis of the above chronology, the DOA concluded that Petitioner’s RFA was not timely, and by letter dated August 23, 1996, rejected it. Petitioner submitted his Petition for Formal Proceedings on September 5, 1996, and it was received by the DOA on September 19, 1996. As of the date of this hearing, the unacceptable condition of the vehicle still exists. Ford Motor Company has contended that the condition is not serious, and when the vehicle had 16,000 miles on it, offered Petitioner $1,000 toward the purchase of a new vehicle. The dealer has now indicated it can do no more to correct the condition in issue. Petitioner claims he was misled by Ford Motor Company into waiting until the time limit for filing the Lemon Law RFA had expired. He did not know of the time constraints under the Lemon Law and believed Ford would correct the problem. He also claims that notwithstanding his signature appears on all the pertinent documents herein, his wife took care of all the paperwork. Ms. Williamson believes that the RFA was sent in on or around the time it was dated - June 5, 1996, but she cannot be sure. She is also not sure if it was sent by certified mail, but she has no receipt to demonstrate it was. She contends the RFA could not have been held by her as long as would be required for it to not be delivered until July 24, 1996, and suggests the DOA’s date stamp might be in error. The likelihood of that is remote. Petitioner and his wife admit to having been given a Lemon Law pamphlet when they bought the vehicle but also admit they did not study it timely to determine the criteria for filing a RFA. They want an opportunity to exercise their rights under the Lemon Law through arbitration and though they are not prepared to give this up because they cannot afford to replace the vehicle, they are very uncomfortable regarding its safety.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a Final Order denying Petitioner’s Request for Arbitration as untimely. DONE and ORDERED in Tallahassee, Florida this 14th day of January, 1997. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of January, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth P. Williamson 3732 Meridian Pace Land O’Lakes, Florida 34536 Rhonda Long Bass, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Mayo Building, Room 515 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Petitioner is eligible to participate in arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board concerning his purchase of a 1995 Saturn automobile.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Respondent, Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, was the state agency responsible for the administration of matters regarding the implementation of the Lemon Law for motor vehicles in this state. Chapter 681, Florida Statutes, deals with motor vehicle sales warranties, and incorporates Florida’s Lemon Law as it is pertinent to this matter. Petitioner, Marshall E. Pitts, III, a resident of Groveland, Florida, purchased a 1995 Saturn SLI automobile on or about March 14, 1995, from Saturn of Orlando. The purchase order/contract for sale bears a date of March 14, 1995. The purchase price of the vehicle was $13,750. Petitioner had a trade-in valued at $8,400, which left a difference of $5,350 to be paid. In his request for arbitration, Petitioner indicated the purchase date as March 16, 1995, and the Department, giving him the benefit of the doubt in calculating the allowable time for filing under the Lemon Law, considered the March 16, 1995, date as the date of purchase/delivery which initiates the running of the time for filing a request for arbitration. The Lemon Law calls for filing for arbitration within 18 months or 24,000 miles of delivery. Therefore, the initial filing deadline was September 16, 1996. The vehicle reached 24,000 miles on the odometer sometime in November 1996. The Lemon Law statute allows an extension of six months for filing if a nonconformity has been reported but not cured by the manufacturer or its representative by the expiration of the Lemon Law period. Petitioner took the vehicle in for repairs to the safety belt three times starting sometime in October 1995. Exact dates are not shown. He also took it in for repairs to the transaxle three times, on March 21, 1996, September 19, 1996, and on January 31, 1997. The trouble with the transaxle was not corrected within the Lemon Law rights period. Because of this, a six-month extension for triple reports of difficulty was implemented. This extended the filing deadline to March 16, 1997. Petitioner was afforded an additional six-months extension because of the wording of the statute which grants an individual six months after the expiration of the Lemon Law Rights period to request arbitration. Application of this additional six months extended the filing deadline to September 16, 1997. Petitioner submitted his request for arbitration on October 29, 1997, and it was received in the Department on November 5, 1997. At the time of filing the request, there were 77,000 miles on the vehicle’s odometer. Petitioner claims he did not receive any notification of his rights under the Lemon Law from the dealer at the time he took delivery of the vehicle. He claims it was only when talking with an attorney late in the process that he learned of the existence of the arbitration procedure. A dealer of new cars is required by law to provide the purchaser of a new vehicle with a copy of the Department’s brochure which outlines the Lemon Law program. Petitioner also recites a litany of complaints regarding the vehicle and the treatment he received from both the selling dealer and the manufacturer. Unfortunately, traumatic as these problems must have been to him, they have no relevance to the issues here.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a Final Order denying Petitioner’s request for arbitration under the Florida Lemon Law as untimely filed. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of April, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of April, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Marshall E. Pitts, III 3831 Soto Road Groveland, Florida 34736 Rhonda Long Bass, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 515 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue The issue for consideration in this matter is whether Petitioner's request for arbitration before the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board should be denied as untimely.
Findings Of Fact The Department's Division of Consumer Services is the state agency in Florida charged with the responsibility to receive and evaluate requests for arbitration before the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board (Board), submitted by purchasers of new motor vehicles in this state. If a request qualifies for arbitration and is timely filed, the matter is referred to the Florida Attorney General for further processing and action. On September 10, 1993, Petitioner took delivery of a new Ford Escort automobile from Ken Marks Ford in Clearwater, Florida. The mileage reflected on the odometer at the time of delivery was 26 miles. Petitioner claims that at the time he took delivery of the vehicle, he was not furnished with a copy of the Attorney General's brochure entitled Preserving Your Rights Under the Florida Lemon Law, nor was he given any other information, either in person or in writing, from the dealer or from anyone else, regarding the operation of the Lemon Law program. However, at hearing he indicated that he had a copy of the pamphlet as early as October 13, 1995, when he signed the Defect Notification form which is included within the pamphlet. The pamphlet clearly outlines the benefits, requirements and time limits pertinent to the program. From the very beginning of his ownership, Petitioner experienced difficulty with the vehicle. His first problem, requiring the replacement of the right head lamp assembly, took place on September 13, 1993, only three days after delivery and continued until December, 1995. He experienced problems with several systems at least three times each. These included squealing brakes, the right seat belt, the alarm light, the tachometer, the gas pedal and the idle. By the time he took the vehicle in for the third time for the most recent problem, the odometer registered 30,710 miles. He claims to have notified the manufacturer in writing of this problem on October 18, 1995. Mr. Maxwell accumulated 24,000 miles on his vehicle on or before January 4, 1995. It was on that date, when he brought the vehicle to the dealer for the third time for the squeaking brakes, the alarm light and the seat belt problems, that the odometer showed 24,035 miles. Even though the initial Lemon law period expired at 24,000 miles, Petitioner was potentially eligible for a six month extension of the original rights period because several complaints registered with the dealer during the initial period remained uncorrected at that time. The six months extension expired on or before July 4, 1995. Under the Florida Lemon Law, consumers are entitled to file for relief under the statute for a period of up to six months after the expiration of the Lemon Law rights period. In this case, because of the six month extension, the filing deadline of six months expired no later than January 4, 1996. In October 1995, Petitioner contacted Ford's Customer Assistance Center and requested information regarding correction of his problems. In response he received a customer satisfaction questionnaire but no assistance with his difficulties. Thereafter, he contacted the Department to request the form for filing the Request for Arbitration on November 11, 1995. Subsequent to the receipt of the Request for Arbitration from the Division, Mr. Maxwell engaged in several telephone negotiations with representatives of Ford Motor Company and received oral settlement offers from the company, including either a replacement automobile or a total refund. When Mr. Maxwell elected to receive a refund, he was told that the Ford representative would get back to him but no one from either Ford Motor Company or Ken Marks Ford ever did. Petitioner believes he was misled by both so that he would thereafter become ineligible for participation in the arbitration program. Ford Motor Company has no state- certified settlement procedure. Petitioner's Request for Arbitration reflects January 6, 1996 as the date of execution. It was received in the Division of Consumer Services on January 10, 1996. It was subsequently reviewed and rejected as untimely by the Division on January 16, 1996.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's Request for Arbitration as untimely. DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul D. Maxwell 775 Lantana Avenue Clearwater Beach, Florida 34630 Rhonda Long Bass, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
Findings Of Fact Background Petitioner, Chrysler Corporation (Chrysler), is a "manufacturer" of motor vehicles as that term is defined by Section 681.102(10), Florida Statutes (1992 Supp.), 1/ and, as such, is subject to the provisions of Chapter 681, Florida Statutes, the "Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act." Consequently, Chrysler is substantially affected by the rules promulgated by respondent, Department of Legal Affairs (Department) to implement Chapter 681, and the parties have stipulated that it has standing to maintain this rule challenge proceeding. The Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act (the "Lemon Law") imposes upon manufacturers, as defined by Section 681.102(10), a duty to repair nonconformities which are first reported by consumers during the "Lemon Law rights period," and liability for the refund of the purchase price or replacement of those motor vehicles if their nonconformities are not corrected within a reasonable number of repair attempts. A consumer's right to exercise the remedies provided by the Lemon Law accrue from the date the consumer takes delivery of the motor vehicle. The "Lemon Law rights period" is defined by Section 681.102(9), Florida Statutes, as follows: "Lemon Law rights period" means the period ending 18 months after the date of the original delivery of a motor vehicle to a consumer or the first 24,000 miles of operation, whichever occurs first. On October 9, 1992, the Department published notice, inter alia, of proposed rule 2-30.001(3)(e), in volume 18, number 41, of the Florida Administrative Weekly. Such rule would define "24,000 miles of operation," for purposes of calculating the running of the Lemon Law rights period established by Section 681.102(9), Florida Statutes, as "miles of operation by the consumer." By petition filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on October 30, 1992, Chrysler timely challenged the validity of such proposed rule as an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. The predicate for Chrysler's challenge was its contention that the proposed rule enlarges, modifies or contravenes Section 618.102(9), Florida Statutes, the provision of law sought to be implemented. 2/ The proposed rule Proposed rule 2-30.001(3)(e) provides: When calculating the running of the Lemon Law rights period as defined by s. 681.102(9), FS., "24,000 miles of operation" means miles of operation by the consumer. If the consumer is a subsequent transferee as defined in s. 681.102(4), FS., "24,000 miles of operation" means miles of operation by both the original consumer and the subsequent transferee. The gravamen of the dispute between the parties concerning the propriety of the proposed rule is a disagreement regarding the interpretation to be accorded Section 681.102(9), Florida Statutes, which defines the "Lemon Law rights period" as: . . . the period ending 18 months after the date of the original delivery of a motor vehicle to a consumer or the first 24,000 miles of operation, whichever occurs first. Chrysler contends that the "Lemon Law rights period," as defined by Section 681.102(9), is clear and unambiguous, and that the "first 24,000 miles of operation" refers to the actual mileage shown on the odometer of the motor vehicle, without regard to when or by whom the mileage was accrued. So read, proposed rule 2-30.001(3)(e) conflicts with the law sought to be implemented. The position advanced by Chrysler is of import to it since Chrysler impresses new motor vehicles into use as company cars and permits its dealers to purchase and use new vehicles for demonstration purposes for customers or personal use, prior to their retail sale. During this period, the motor vehicle accumulates mileage on its odometer as a result of such "demonstrator" use. Excluding the mileage so accrued from the running of the "Lemon Law rights period," as contemplated by the proposed rule, could extend Chrysler's liability under the Lemon Law beyond the first 24,000 miles of operation registered on the vehicle, if it issued a warranty as a condition of sale to the consumer. See Section 681.102(14), definition of "motor vehicle," discussed infra. Contrasted with Chrysler's position, the Department interprets the "first 24,000 miles of operation" provision of Section 681.102(9), to relate to operation by a consumer, and would exclude any mileage accrued on the vehicle prior to its delivery to the consumer when calculating the "Lemon Law rights period." So interpreted, the proposed rule is consistent with the law sought to be implemented. The Department's interpretation is premised on its reading of Section 681.102(9) in pari materia with Section 681.102(14) which defines a "motor vehicle" as: . . . a new vehicle, . . . and includes a vehicle used as a demonstrator or leased vehicle if a manufacturer's warranty was issued as a condition of sale, or the lessee is responsible for repairs. . . . So read, a demonstrator is considered a new vehicle, and no distinction is made in applying the Lemon Law rights period between consumers who purchase a motor vehicle with no or minimal mileage on its odometer at delivery and those who purchase a demonstrator. The proposed rule's predecessor Pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 88-95, Laws of Florida, Chapter 681, Florida Statutes, was amended effective January 1, 1989, to establish what has been referred to as the Lemon Law. At that time, the "Lemon Law rights period" was defined as: . . . the period ending 1 year after the date of the original delivery of a motor vehicle to a consumer or the first 12,000 miles of operation, whichever occurs first. Section 681.102(7), Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.). To implement the provisions of the Lemon Law, the Department adopted Rule 2-30.001, Florida Administrative Code, in or about January 1989. At that time, the rule included the following definition of the "Lemon Law rights period": The "Lemon Law Rights period" is the period ending one year after the date of the original delivery of the motor vehicle to the consumer, or the first 12,000 miles of operation, whichever occurs first. This period may be extended if a substantial defect or condition is reported to the manufacturer or its authorized dealer during the Lemon Law Rights period, but has not been cured by the expiration of the period. If you put 12,000 miles on your vehicle (miles driven minus miles on the vehicle on the date of delivery) before the end of the first year of operation, you should note that date in your personal records. If a warranty problem is examined or repaired during the Lemon Law Rights period, be sure you get and keep a copy of the work order which contains the date, odometer reading, and a description of that problem. Your work order copy provides the best proof as to when the problem was first reported. [Respondent's exhibits 3 and 15]. Consistent with the foregoing rule, the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board, which is charged with the responsibility of arbitrating disputes under the Lemon Law, has consistently construed the provisions of the "Lemon Law rights period" concerning "miles of operation" to relate to operation by the consumer, and has excluded any mileage accrued on the vehicle prior to its delivery to the consumer when calculating the "Lemon Law rights period." [See e.g., Respondent's exhibits 5, 8 and 9]. Since the Lemon Law was enacted, there has been no change in the definition of "Lemon Law rights period," or the Department's rule, until the passage of Chapter 92-88, Laws of Florida, effective July 1, 1992. Under such law, the "Lemon Law rights period" was amended to read as follows: (9)(7) "Lemon Law rights period" means the period ending 18 months 1 year after the date of the original delivery of a motor vehicle to a consumer or the first 24,000 12,000 miles of operation, whichever occurs first. Section 681.102(9), Florida Statutes. Here, the proposed rule is designed to reflect the change in the "Lemon Law rights period" from one year or 12,000 miles to 18 months or 24,000 miles, occasioned by the aforesaid amendment to Chapter 681. The Department's interpretation of the "Lemon Law rights period" concerning "miles of operation" to relate to operation by the consumer remains, however, consistent with its prior rule and interpretation.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent properly denied Petitioner’s request for arbitration before the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the Florida Department of Agriculture And Consumer Services, Division of Consumer Services. Respondent administers the “Motor Vehicle Enforcement Warranty” set forth in Chapter 681, Florida Statutes, inclusive of the Florida New Vehicle Arbitration Board. Petitioner is a consumer who took delivery of the then new motor vehicle at issue on December 8, 1995. He received no information from the dealership where he purchased the vehicle concerning his rights to access to Respondent’s arbitration program. On June 1, 1998, Respondent received Petitioner’s request for arbitration. Petitioner’s vehicle had 24,000 miles on it at that time. Petitioner’s arbitration request disclosed vehicle problems requiring at least three repair attempts. Petitioner’s request failed to provide a copy of any written defect notification, or other written notification to the manufacturer of the vehicle. In his arbitration application and later at the final hearing, Petitioner maintained that he had provided the manufacturer with such written notification. However, despite Respondent’s repeated request of Petitioner to provide Respondent with copies of that notification, Petitioner failed to provide any such documentation. The fourth notice by Respondent to Petitioner informed him that a copy of such notification must be received by Respondent no later than August 3, 1998. Petitioner failed to provide Respondent with a copy of the manufacturer notification by the deadline of August 3, 1998. Thereafter, by letter dated August 5, 1998, Respondent notified Petitioner that his request for arbitration was denied as ineligible. At the final hearing, the testimony of Respondent’s spokesman, James D. Morrison, established that Petitioner’s failure to provide Respondent with a copy of the Motor Vehicle Defect Information form sent to the manufacturer by Petitioner was the sole reason that Petitioner’s application for arbitration was denied. As further established by Morrison’s testimony, the rationale of Respondent for the requirement of the copy of Petitioner’s notification to the manufacturer, and copy of receipt of acceptance by the manufacturer, is to ascertain that Petitioner has complied with Section 681.104, Florida Statutes, requiring that all applicants for arbitration first notify the vehicle manufacturer by registered or express mail of such application.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner’s application. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of April, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of April, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Howard C. Holtzendorf, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 515 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Arthur H. Baredian 275 Ravine Street Jacksonville, Florida 32206 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Bob Crawford, Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
