The Issue Whether the Respondent owes the Petitioner money for watermelons allegedly purchased from Petitioner. The factual and legal issue is whether Respondent purchased the melons or acted as a broker/agent for Petitioner and attempted to sell the melons for Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact During the 1996 season, the Petitioner, who is a labor contractor and farmer, grew watermelons. The Respondent, who is a building contractor and watermelon broker, was “handling” watermelons in the area around Archer, Florida. The Respondent was represented by Tony Tharp, brother of the Respondent, who spoke with the Petitioner. As a result of an oral agreement reached between Tony Tharp and Petitioner, the watermelons which Petitioner had grown were picked by persons working for Tharp on June 20, 21, and 23, 1996. There was no written contract or memorandum regarding the agreement of the parties. Petitioner stated that he wanted to get his melons picked, but that he was busy with his crew and could not pick them, and the melons needed to be picked because they were past their prime. Tony Tharp agreed to “move them” for Petitioner. One truck load was picked and loaded on June 20; three truck loads were picked and loaded on June 21, and two truck loads were picked and loaded on June 23. Tharp paid Petitioner $700 which was termed an “advance” by Respondent, and considered a “down payment” by Petitioner, who understood he would receive the remainder of the money due him in approximately seven days. The trucking was arranged for by Tharp, and the Respondent bore the cost of picking and freight initially, and the merchants who received the melons paid the shipping for the melons they accepted. The melons were shipped to markets in several states. The first load was refused by the intended recipient, and after several attempts to dispose of the melons, they were sold at salvage for $180. The second load was also refused, and could not be salvaged. Pictures of this load were introduced where it was unloaded in Marianna, Florida. The remaining loads of watermelons were accepted, and $4,876.43 received for them. The costs of loading the two loads which were refused was $1,149.75. The freight costs on these two loads was $3,901.83. The Petitioner testified that the Tharp agreed to purchase the melons in the field, and, therefore, he is entitled to the purchase price for the melons. Dennis Tharp stated he was a broker, and that the Petitioner assumed the risk if the melons could not be sold. Dennis Tharp stated that he had lost the costs of picking, $1,149.75, and transporting, $3,901.83, the two loads of melons offset by the salvage value of $180.00, resulted in a total loss of $4,871.58. When the costs of picking the last four loads, $1,591.20, and the $700.00 advance on the sale is deducted from the proceeds of the sale of the last four loads, $4,876.43, the net profit on the last four loads is $2,585.23. When the profits from the sale of the last four loads is deducted from the loses on the first two loads, there is a net loss of $2,286.35. This net loss was absorbed by the Respondent. Several of the people who were in the field testified regarding the state of the melons being picked. The melons were past their prime for picking. On the last load, the pickers refused to pick any more melons without additional compensation because so many melons were being rejected at the truck. Petitioner, who was present, concurred in this extraordinary expense. Generally, melons are not sold because the market drops and the merchants refuse melons being shipped to them. In this case, the first melons were rejected, and the last loads were accepted. The quality of a watermelon cannot be determined without cutting it open which destroys its merchantability. Watermelon graders attempt to judge the quality of melons from the external characteristics; however, purchasers cut open samples upon receipt to judge their quality. The Respondent notified the Petitioner by letter dated July 11, 1996 that the first two loads had been rejected; that he had salvaged those he could; and that the costs related to these two loads exceeded the profits due Petitioner on the last four loads.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Department enter a Final Order finding that the Respondent owes no further money to the Petitioner. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of March, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of March, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Alphonso Hunt 226 Fawn Drive Archer, Florida 32618 Dennis Tharp 4516 Decatur Street Marianna, Florida 32446 Auto Owners Insurance Company Legal Department Post Office Box 30660 Lansing, MI 48909-8160 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing and Bond Department of Agriculture 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Bob Crawford, Commissioner Department of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, Ingram Grove Services, Inc., (Ingram), was a commercial grower of citrus fruit and a licensed citrus fruit dealer in Florida. Mark Fetzer, Inc. (Fetzer), was also a grower and a licensed citrus fruit dealer in Florida. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company was an insurance company authorized to write surety bonds in this state during the 1991-1992 citrus shipping season and was the underwriter of Fetzer's bond for the transaction in issue herein. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company was an insurance company authorized to write surety bonds in this state during the 1991-1992 citrus shipping season and was the underwriter of Ingram's bond for the transaction herein. By contract number 518, dated January 14, 1992, and drafted on the letterhead of Mark Fetzer, Inc., Ingram, the grower, sold and conveyed to Fetzer, the buyer, approximately 20,000 boxes of valencia oranges at a price of $10.50 per box, with a moving date of April 30, 1992. This description was intended to cover all valencia oranges grown by Ingram and contained in Suncrest #11 field in Sebring, Florida and included transportation to Polk County. Ingram was authorized to, and did, request a deposit of $1.00 per box, and by check dated April 27, 1992, Fetzer paid Ingram the sum of $20,000. The oranges were to be delivered by Ingram to the Commercial Carriers Cold Storage, (CCCS), facility in Auburndale, Florida. The entire crop of fruit covered by this contract was to be paid for within 30 days of delivery to CCCS. The contract did not prohibit Fetzer from re-selling the fruit covered thereby. Ingram and Fetzer had done business together for several years, since 1985. In every case, each had paid what was owed to the other, but it is admitted that on occasion, such payment was delayed for a short time. Neither had ever failed to ultimately pay what was owed the other, however. Sometime after delivery of the fruit to CCCS by Ingram, Fetzer sold 3,000 of the boxes to Vero Beach Groves, Inc., (VB), a producer of commercial orange juice for commercial sales. At that time, and at all times pertinent to the issues herein, VB was having financial difficulties. Evidence of record indicates that at the time, VB owed approximately $32,000 to Fetzer, somewhat more than $60,000 to Ingram, and over $600,000 to Florida Growers, another entity not pertinent to the issues herein. The terms of Fetzer's sale to VB called for a payment of $13.65 per box. This included $11.65 per box for the oranges then delivered, including 15 brokerage, and $2.00 per box to satisfy VB's antecedent debt to Fetzer. If all the Ingram fruit were resold by Fetzer to VB, this procedure would have paid off VB's debt to Fetzer before all the Ingram fruit was pulled out of storage. When the antecedent debt was liquidated, the price per box would have been reduced to $11.65. Fetzer had not allowed VB's debt to it to grow very large, and the above practice, which had been followed for several years, had to this point, been successful. There was no dispute under the terms of the contract between Ingram and Fetzer until sometime in mid-May, 1992 when, prior to the delivery of any fruit, Mr. Ingram called Mr. Fetzer and asked for a meeting. At that meeting, Mr. Ingram told Mr. Fetzer that unless an agreement was made to get him, Ingram, a debt reduction procedure similar to Fetzer's, he would not make available to Fetzer the fruit called for under the contract. Mr. Ingram indicated at the hearing that when he heard Fetzer had contracted with VB, in light of VB's tenuous financial condition, he was concerned about being able to get paid and this caused him to seek the meeting with Fetzer. However, he did not communicate this to Fetzer nor did he ask Fetzer for payment in advance or some security for the obligation. In fact, according to Fetzer, he had the money available, in cash, to pay the entire amount owed Ingram if necessary. In addition, Fetzer told Ingram that even if VB could not take the fruit, there were at least 3 -5 other "juicers" to whom he could sell the fruit and pay Ingram. In point of fact, the fruit was subsequently sold, by Ingram, to other juice processors at a per box price which varied from $12.50 to $13.35. Nonetheless, Fetzer tried to work the situation out for all concerned with no consideration given him for any purported change to the contract. Faced with the potential for not being able to get the fruit for sale to VB, the contract with whom was worth in excess of $200,000 to him, Fetzer met with a representative of VB and reached an agreement with it whereby VB would pay an additional $3.35 over the $13.65 so that Ingram could be paid. At this meeting he was told by Mr. Kordick, VB's vice president, that VB would work something out with Ingram for the remaining fruit. Thereafter, VB agreed with Ingram to make additional payments to Ingram. It appears, however, that this agreement to pay the extra on Ingram's antecedent debt was more acquiescence to coercion than voluntary agreement. Fetzer then released the first shipment of oranges to VB. VB paid for the shipment of oranges when it came in.It also issued four checks in the amount of $1,680.00 each fdor payment on VB's antecedent debt to Ingram which were made payable to Ingram or Fetzer. These four checks were cashed by Fetzer and were dishonored. They were ultimately redeemed by VB after several weeks, but none of the funds were transmitted by Fetzer to Ingram. Fetzer kept them as compensation for the amount of profit he lost because of Ingram's refusal to release any more oranges after the first shipment. In addition, Fetzer did not pay Ingram for the first 3,000 box shipment. After the first shipment was delivered to VB, Mr. Fetzer was contacted by VB's representative, Mr. Kordick, who advised VB could not pay the amount asked for the fruit which included the "surcharge" to reimburse Ingram because the processed juice would not bring enough to cover it. Admittedly, Mr. Fetzer did not ask Mr. Ingram to rescind the requirement for the "surcharge" payment. Had he done so and had Ingram agreed, it is most likely that VB could have purchased all the oranges from the entire contract and paid for it. All Fetzer did was tell Ingram he should not place the extra burden on VB, and as it was, VB went out of business. Mr. Fetzer knew of the arrangements for the "surcharge" that Ingram wanted before the delivery of the one shipment to VB and requested that shipment knowing what was required. He decided to go along with Ingram to see what would happen even though he felt by then that Ingram had breached the contract. However, he did not put this in writing to Ingram. He felt he had no choice due to Mr. Ingram's representation to him at their May meeting that it would be Ingram's way or not at all. Fetzer went along with it because he saw it as the only way to potentially get the money owed him by VB. Considering the net amount paid by Fetzer as deposit, ($20,000 - $3,000 = $17,000); the amount of antecedent debt unrecoverable due to Ingram's actions, ($26,000) and the anticipated profit lost of the remaining boxes un- delivered by Ingram, ($14,950), Ingram owes Fetzer a gross total of $57,590. From this must be deducted the $6,720 which Fetzer collected from VB on Ingram's behalf but which was not delivered to Ingram, and the $31,500 unpaid for the 3,000 boxes delivered, leaving Ingram's net obligation to Fetzer as $19,730.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that A Final Order be issued by the Commissioner of Agriculture awarding the sum of $19730 to Mark Fetzer, Inc. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of June, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR FETZER: & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Not a Finding of Fact but a statement of the law. Not a Finding of Fact but a Conclusion of Law. Accepted as a restatement of the case history. - 9. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 11. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein except that the debt of VB to Ingram was approximately $60,000. Accepted that no tripartite agreement was reached. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Not a Finding of Fact. Accepted. Not a Finding of fact but a restatement of testimony. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted that Ingram resold to others the fruit not released to Fetzer. Not a Finding of Fact but a statement of law. Accepted and incorporated herein with amount stated. Accepted and incorporated herein. FOR INGRAM: & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. First sentence rejected in so far as it indicates a tri-party agreement. VB's participation was more a matter of acquiescence than agreement. Second sentence accepted and incorporated herein. First sentence rejected. Fetzer did not decline to take fruit as called for in the original contract. Second sentence accepted as it notes the sale to third parties but not "as a result" of Fetzer's failure to take the fruit. Not a Finding of Fact but a Conclusion of law. Rejected as contra to the weight of the evidence. Rejected. Not a proper Finding of Fact but more a comment on the state of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas A. Lockwood, III, Esquire Peterson, Myers, Craig, Crews, Brandon & Puterbaugh, P.A. P.O. Drawer 7608 Lake Region Plaza, Suite 300 141 5th Street, N.W. Winter Haven, Florida 33883-7608 C. Kennon Hendrix, Esquire Hendrix & Brennan P.O. Box 520- 2043 14th Avenue Vero Beach, Florida 32961-0520 Chester C. Payne Financial Examiner Analyst Office of Citrus Bond and License Division of Marketing Development Department of Agriculture P.O. Box 1072 500 Third Street, N.W. Winter Haven, Florida 33882-1072 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing and Bond Department of Agriculture 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
The Issue Whether Respondent, Larry D. Henson d/b/a Cordele Melon Depot, is liable to Petitioners for $5,817.40 for watermelons grown by Petitioners and brokered by Respondent, pursuant to Chapter 604, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Andy Mulberry owns real property in Alachua County, Florida. He and Petitioner Ermon Owens (the growers) were partners or joint venturers for the purpose of producing a profitable watermelon crop on Mr. Mulberry's property during the summer of 2003. Respondent Larry Henson is a licensed "dealer in agricultural products," as defined in Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes. He lives out of state and his business is located in Cordele, Georgia. On June 21, 2003, Hardy Tate contacted Andy Mulberry, stating that he had noticed Petitioners' crop of watermelons was of excellent quality. Mr. Tate stated that he believed his "boss," Respondent Larry Henson, would be interested in buying the watermelons. Mr. Tate had never worked with either Petitioners or Respondent before the present "deal," and had only met Mr. Henson a few months earlier. Mr. Tate is a "watermelon bird dog." That means that he is a freelance promoter of agreements between growers and dealers. His business is connecting growers (in this case, Owens and Mulberry) and dealers, a/k/a brokers, (in this case, Henson, d/b/a Cordele Melon Depot) and facilitating their negotiations and harvest. He does not work regularly for any one grower or dealer, but on his own initiative, acts as "go- between" for many growers and dealers. Mr. Tate resides in Ft. Pierce, Florida, and does not maintain his own crew of harvesters. However, Mr. Tate will pick up laborers wherever he travels and oversee their harvesting of agricultural products. These laborers may be described as "local," "day," "itinerant," or "casual," depending upon which of several federal or state statutes may apply. On June 21, 2003, Mr. Tate cajoled Mr. Mulberry into letting him put Mulberry and Henson together so Mr. Tate and his harvesters could “make a little money." After being assured by Mr. Tate by telephone that Mr. Mulberry had a good crop of medium-sized melons, Mr. Henson dealt directly with Mr. Mulberry by telephone to set the terms of their oral contract. Mr. Henson told Mr. Mulberry that he had a buyer in Ohio who needed quality, medium-sized watermelons. It was estimated that the Petitioners' field would yield three truckloads of such melons. Messrs. Henson and Mulberry initially negotiated a price of seven cents per pound for the first truckload and six cents per pound for all subsequent truckloads, to be paid by Mr. Henson to Petitioners after sale of the melons at the ultimate point of delivery in Ohio. There were apparently no price variations considered for potential market price fluctuations or for the cost of freight (truck and driver). Despite some vacillation in Mr. Mulberry's testimony, it is found that he clearly understood that Mr. Henson expected to receive top quality, medium-sized melons at the ultimate point of delivery in Cleveland, Ohio, for the first truckload. Also, upon a preponderance of the credible evidence, it is found that Mr. Henson made clear to Mr. Mulberry that he expected the second truckload of melons also to consist of top quality medium-sized melons at the ultimate point of delivery in Cleveland, Ohio. While there is some suggestion within the testimony that if the first two truckloads sold well in Cleveland, Ohio, Mr. Henson might have accepted a third truckload of mixed large and small melons, that is irrelevant in calculating what, if anything, the parties owe each other, because that truckload was sold elsewhere, and as a result, Petitioners are not seeking money from Respondent for that truckload. (See Finding of Fact 36.) Petitioners had been ready to harvest several days earlier, but had no harvesting crew on the premises or on standby 1/ and were short of money to hire one, so it was finally agreed between Mr. Henson, Mr. Mulberry, and Mr. Tate that Mr. Henson would advance Petitioners the cost of harvesting and loading (calculated at two cents per pound) and would forward to Mr. Tate the money to pay harvesters secured by Mr. Tate, with the understanding that this amount was to be deducted from the amount due from Mr. Henson to Petitioners for the first truckload of watermelons. This arrangement meant that Petitioners could then expect to be paid only five cents per pound and only four cents per pound for the first and second truckloads, respectively. Mr. Tate hired a local crew, set the crew to picking, picked up the money advanced by Mr. Henson, and ultimately paid the crew for harvesting and loading. It is also noted that on the two nights Mr. Tate's crew worked on Petitioners’ crop, Mr. Owens and his wife bought dinner for the crew. Mr. Henson hired and sent a third-party truck and driver to Petitioners’ field on June 21, 2003. Although it is clear that all concerned were aware Mr. Henson was paying the cost of the freight by providing the truck and driver, there is no competent evidence that the parties ever reached any meeting of the minds as to how the cost of freight was ultimately to be allocated between the growers and broker. There also is no evidence in this record setting out the standard operating procedure or business custom by which such freight costs are normally allocated in the trade. The crew selected by Mr. Tate harvested the first truckload of melons on or about June 21, 2003. Before they began harvesting, Mr. Tate cut open some medium-sized melons and showed the crew and Mr. Mulberry the size and quality of melons Mr. Henson wanted. Mr. Tate personally oversaw approximately 750 of the 2000 melons that went into the first truck provided by Mr. Henson. These melons appeared to be of good quality and the correct size (medium). However, Mr. Tate was not in the field all of the time. In addition to being gone for approximately five hours on June 21, 2003, to pick up the wages of the harvesters which Mr. Henson had advanced, Mr. Tate was apparently off-premises on other days in other fields with other crews. Although Mr. Tate testified that Mr. Henson would hold him responsible for the size and quality of the melons loaded, Mr. Tate assumed that Mr. Mulberry was in charge of loading his melons while he, Mr. Tate, went to pick up the funds advanced by Mr. Henson to pay the harvesting crew. According to Mr. Tate, it is common procedure for him to rely on the grower to see that the correct kind of melons are loaded, because if the right type and quality of melons do not arrive at the ultimate destination, the grower will not be paid. Because Mr. Tate's commission from Mr. Henson also would be based on the size and quality of the melons at the ultimate point of delivery, in Mr. Tate's opinion, his and Mr. Mulberry's interests in loading good melons were the same. With regard to the first truckload of melons, Mr. Tate was gone from Petitioners' field for approximately five hours. When he returned to the field, the first truckload was fully loaded. Mr. Tate remembered the quality of the first 700 melons he had seen loaded and was satisfied with the melons on the top of the truck, but he did not check the full depth of the first truckload for size and quality. The entire first truckload amounted to approximately 2000 melons, including approximately 1250 melons Mr. Tate had not personally checked. The greater weight of the credible evidence is that the first truckload of melons left Mr. Mulberry’s field after midnight on June 22, 2003, that is, plus or minus 12:01 a.m. June 23, 2003. The greater weight of the credible evidence is that the first truckload weighed in at 42,820 pounds of melons. Given Mr. Henson’s and Mr. Mulberry’s agreement with regard to harvesting costs, this weight would mean that the growers would be paid five cents per pound upon delivery of that weight of medium-sized, good quality melons in Cleveland, Ohio. The first truckload of melons was delivered to Mr. Henson's customer in Cleveland, Ohio, on the morning of June 24, 2003. There is no competent evidence that there was any unreasonable delay in transit. Due to the poor quality and varying sizes of these melons (from small to large instead of all medium), the customer at the point of delivery refused delivery and telephoned Mr. Henson with that information. Mr. Henson told the Ohio customer to call for a federal inspection of the first truckload of Petitioners' melons. Mr. Henson then telephoned Mr. Mulberry and told him of the problem with the first truckload. The federal inspection report, dated 11:20 a.m., June 24, 2003, declared that the average defects were 34 percent and serious defects were 26 percent of the first truckload, and further noted that many of the melons were in an advanced state of decay. On this basis, the Ohio customer, the Economy Produce Company, rejected the first truckload. Ultimately, the Economy Produce Company sold the first truckload at a vastly reduced rate and transmitted the full amount received to Mr. Henson. This amount was $700.00. There is considerable dispute about whether the second truckload had been loaded and had actually left Petitioners' field before Mr. Henson faxed the federal inspection report to Mr. Mulberry. The best reconstruction of chronological events is that Mr. Tate started to oversee the loading of the second truckload in Mr. Mulberry’s field on June 23, 2003, but loading was not completed until June 24, 2003. On the morning of June 24, 2003, when Mr. Henson telephoned Mr. Tate to tell him that the first truckload had been bad (see Finding of Fact 23), Mr. Tate was not in Mr. Mulberry’s melon field. Mr. Henson then faxed the federal inspection sheet to Mr. Mulberry. When Mr. Tate later arrived at Mr. Mulberry's melon field, Mr. Tate explained the inspection sheet to Mr. Mulberry. Then, Mr. Mulberry and Mr. Tate went to inspect the second truck which was still being loaded. Mr. Tate cut open several melons from the second truck and showed them to Mr. Mulberry, citing their large size and over-ripeness as probably the same problems that had occurred with the first truckload. Reconciling the differences in the witnesses’ respective testimony as much as possible, it appears that both Mr. Mulberry and Mr. Tate knew that there were some off-size and some over-ripe melons in the second truckload, but Mr. Henson was allowed to believe, during his phone calls concerning the problems with the first truckload, that the second truckload had left the field and could not be held. Mr. Tate warned Mr. Mulberry that there would be some problems with the second load too. Mr. Tate told Mr. Mulberry not to load any more large melons and to leave the large melons under a tree packed in straw. Mr. Tate then left the melon field. When Mr. Tate returned, the second truckload had already left the field, and there were no large melons stacked under the tree. At that point, Mr. Tate realized Mr. Mulberry had allowed all sizes of melons to be loaded into the second truck. If the second truckload, containing 47,000 pounds of melons, had arrived in Cleveland, Ohio, with the right size and quality of melons, Petitioners would have been entitled to four cents per pound from Mr. Henson, on the basis of their ultimate harvesting agreement. When the truck driver radioed to Mr. Henson on June 24, 2003, that he was en route to Cleveland, Ohio, with the second truckload of melons and that the truck was passing Lake City, Florida, Mr. Henson diverted the second truckload of melons to his wholesale warehouse in Cordele, Georgia. Mr. Henson did this because he did not want to incur freight charges of approximately $1,800.00 on a second load of melons which could be as bad as the first. Mr. Henson’s calling the truck into the Georgia facility did not sit well with the third-party truck driver, because he already had arranged a return run from Cleveland, Ohio, to Florida. Upon Mr. Henson's own inspection and that of his qualified employee, Robbie Alvarez, in Cordele, Georgia, Mr. Henson determined that the second truckload contained many melons which were over-ripe; some melons which were under-ripe; some melons which were the wrong size; and some melons which were "bottle necks." Mr. Henson decided not to send the second truckload on to Ohio and sustain shipping charges in excess of what he could reasonably expect in payment for the watermelons. Mr. Henson made several telephone calls to Mr. Mulberry urging him to come to Cordele, Georgia, to inspect the second truckload and to work out some fair monetary arrangement. Mr. Mulberry promised to come to Cordele, Georgia, and so Mr. Henson let the second truckload sit, awaiting Mr. Mulberry's arrival. However, Mr. Mulberry did not go to Cordele and did not notify Mr. Henson that he had changed his mind on the advice of the Alachua County Agent. Mr. Mulberry did not ever inform Mr. Henson that he was not coming to inspect the second truckload. Messrs. Owens and Mulberry testified that Mr. Henson sent them "release from liability" papers to sign, so that Mr. Henson would not have to pay them for the two loads of watermelons. Mr. Henson testified that he sent "release papers" so that he could sell the second load of watermelons in Cordele, Georgia. Given the evidence as a whole, Mr. Henson is the more credible witness on this issue. After approximately a day and one-half, during which Mr. Mulberry failed to come to Georgia as he had promised, Mr. Henson sold the second truckload of watermelons to By-Faith Co. for $2,150.00 and let the irate third-party truck driver go about his business. Mr. Henson did this in order to minimize his loss on the second truckload of inferior watermelons. Messrs. Mulberry and Owens sold the 1,300 melons of various sizes that would have made up the third truckload to Tavaries Brown, a local trucker, who testified that "they [the melons] were in pretty good shape, no sunburn." However, the sizes and prices of these melons were not proven-up, and “sunburn” is a different problem than decay. Therefore, Mr. Brown’s testimony does not demonstrate that the preceding two truckloads consigned to Respondent were medium-sized, good quality melons. Messrs. Mulberry and Owens sold other melons from their crop at a roadside stand, without any complaints from customers. However, the sizes and prices of these melons also was never proven-up so those sales also do not demonstrate that the first two truckloads consigned to Respondent were medium- sized, good quality melons. Petitioners seek to receive $2,997.40 for the first load of melons and $2,820.00 for the second load of melons. These figures are based on Petitioners’ contention that both truckloads of melons consigned to Respondent were the right size and of good quality. Their calculations are based upon 42,820 pounds of melons in the first load, at seven cents per pound, and 47,000 pounds of melons in the second load, at six cents per pound. Neither monetary amount accounts for the price Petitioners agreed they would owe Mr. Henson for the costs he advanced to them for harvesting at two cents per pound. Those figures would be $2,142.50 and $1,880.00, respectively. Respondent calculated the following amounts as due to him as follows: Load No. 1 Net return $ 700.00 Less 2¢ per pound advance (harvesting) -856.40 Less freight to Cleveland, Ohio -1,712.80 Less NWPD Dues -8.56 Cordele Melon Depot Commission (waived) 0.00 Net due Cordele Melon Depot $1,877.76 Load No. 2 Net return from By-Faith Co. $2,150.00 Less 2¢ per pound advance (harvesting) -940.00 Less freight to Cordele, Georgia -400.00 Less NWPD Dues -9.40 Net due Petitioners $ 800.60 Net due Cordele Melon Depot $1,877.76 Less net due Petitioners -800.60 Balance due Cordele Melon Depot $1,077.16 The evidence of the amounts paid to Respondent dealer is sufficient to establish the net returns of $700.00 and $2,150.00 respectively. The charges for harvesting costs are a matter of simple arithmetic and appear correct. At the hearing, Petitioners did not challenge Respondent's charge for the NWPD dues, but neither was there any evidence of a meeting of the minds or a standard mode of conduct with regard to this amount. Since there was no clear agreement that Petitioners would reimburse Respondent for freight costs, those calculations by Respondent are not substantiated. The amounts claimed for freight costs by Respondent also may not be established merely upon Respondent's testimony without some corroborating bill of lading or other document itemized by the third-party hauler.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a Final Order requiring Respondent and/or its surety to pay Petitioners $1,053.60. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of February, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of February, 2004.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following facts are found: At all times pertinent to this proceedings Petitioner was a producer of agricultural products in the State of Florida as defined in Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes (1983). At all times pertinent to this proceedings Respondent BB & W was a licensed dealer in agricultural products as defined by Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes (1983), issued license No. 245 by the Department, and bonded by Fireman's Fund Insurance Company (Fireman) in the sum of $15,000 - Bond No. SLR - 4152 897. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent Fireman was authorized to do business in the State of Florida. The complaint filed by Petitioner was timely filed in accordance with Section 604.21(1), Florida Statutes (1983). Although Respondent BB & W contends that the watermelons in dispute were purchased through Scotty Luther Produce as were all watermelons purchased by the Respondent BB & W in Florida, the evidence shows that on the load in dispute, Respondent BB & W, through its president Cecil Bagwell was dealing directly with Petitioner when Cecil Bagwell contacted him by telephone to discuss the purchase of the watermelons and in making the necessary arrangements for a truck to pick up and deliver the watermelons to their destination. The evidence also shows that Scotty Luther of Scotty Luther Produce was not present in the area when the watermelons in dispute were purchased or loaded and was not involved in this transaction. The agreement between Petitioner and Respondent BB & W was that title and risk of loss passed to Respondent BB & W on shipment, with all remedies and rights for Petitioner's breach reserved to Respondent BB & W. Petitioner loaded three (3) loads of Charleston Grey Watermelons (grey) to Respondent BB & W on June 3 and 4, 1985 but only one (1) load is in dispute which is a load of grey watermelons loaded on June 4, 1985 on a truck furnished by Respondent BB & W. The net weight of the watermelons was 46,810 pounds and the agreed upon price was $0.03 per pound for a total price of $1,404.30 which Respondent BB & W has refused to pay. Petitioner also sold Respondent BB & W two (2) loads of grey watermelons on June 3, 1985 that were harvested from the same field as the watermelons in dispute and shipped: one load to Orlando, Florida; and one (1) load to Atlanta, Georgia without any incident of loss as a result of overmaturity or otherwise. The watermelons in dispute were not federally or state inspected before or during loading. Although Respondent BB & W contended that the watermelons had been inspected by a federal inspector at their destinations the evidence was insufficient to show that the watermelons in dispute had been inspected or that they were over mature upon arrival at their destination. Likewise the evidence was insufficient to prove that the watermelons in dispute were over mature upon loading. The record reflects that the watermelons in dispute were loaded in a closed trailer with no apparent ventilation and the refrigeration unit not operating when the trailer departed from Petitioner's farm after loading. Petitioner received a call from Respondent BB & W's office two (2) days after shipping the watermelons advising him that the watermelons had been "kicked" but it was two (2) more days before he reached Cecil Bagwell to find out that they were "kicked" for being over mature.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent BB & W be ordered to pay to the Petitioner the sum of $1,404.30. It is further RECOMMENDED that if Respondent BB & W fails to timely pay the Petitioner as ordered, then Respondent Fireman be ordered to pay the Department as required by Section 604.21, Florida Statutes (1983) and that the Department reimburse the Petitioner in accordance with Section 604.21, Florida Statutes (1983) Respectfully submitted and entered this 25th day of February, 1986, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of February, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Doyle Conner, Commissioner Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert Chastain General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 513 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ron Weaver, Esquire, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Joe W. Kight, Chief License and Bond Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Freddie Woods Jr. Post Office Box 52 Evinston, FL Cecil Bagwell, President BB & W Farms, Inc. Route 2, Box 855 Cordell, GA 31015
The Issue Is Petitioner entitled to all or part of $12,732.61 he claims as a result of eight loads of watermelons brokered by Respondent Sunny Fresh Citrus Export & Sales Company between June 17, 1996 and June 21, 1996?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a grower of watermelons and qualifies as a "producer" under Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes. Respondent Kelly Marinaro d/b/a Sunny Fresh Citrus Export & Sales Company is a broker-shipper of watermelons and qualifies as a "dealer" under Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes. Respondent American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida is surety for Respondent Sunny Fresh. Petitioner's father had long done business with Kelly Marinaro's father, Frank Marinaro, before each father's retirement. Upon what basis the fathers traded is not clear on the record. Petitioner approached Kelly Marinaro d/b/a Sunny Fresh on three occasions with written proposals, two of which involved some front money being put up by Kelly Marinaro to help Petitioner grow and sell watermelons. One proposal suggested a standard broker's fee to be taken off loads. In each instance, Kelly Marinaro rejected the proposals, explaining that he was not a grower or a buyer but only "brokered" melons other people grew. On or about June 15, 1996, Petitioner telephoned and requested that Kelly Marinaro d/b/a Sunny Fresh assist him in the sale of watermelons he had already grown on a 40 acre field near Wildwood, Florida. Earlier in the 1996 watermelon season, Carr Hussey had taken two loads of melons from Petitioner's field. Hussey had advanced Petitioner $3,000 for harvesting of the melons. Although Petitioner claimed that Mr. Hussey bought his melons in the field, he also conceded that the melons he sold Mr. Hussey did not net that amount when sold to the ultimate purchaser, and therefore, neither Mr. Hussey nor Petitioner made any profit on those two loads. Mr. Hussey did not require reimbursement of the $3,000 he had advanced and proposed that Petitioner and he "work it out" the following season. However, Mr. Hussey took no more loads of Petitioner's melons and "went off to Georgia." This left Petitioner in need of some immediate help in selling his remaining melons. In the June 15, 1996 phone call, Kelly Marinaro d/b/a Sunny Fresh agreed to "broker" Petitioner's remaining watermelons to ultimate buyers in the north and northeast United States whom Marinaro lined up by telephone before shipping the melons. That is, he agreed to use his best efforts to sell the watermelons on Petitioner's behalf to ultimate consumers, charging Petitioner one cent per pound or $1.00 per hundred weight sales charge. The parties' arrangement depended upon the sale of the watermelons and the price actually paid at the ultimate destination, rather than the price the watermelons ideally could be sold for on the day they left Petitioner's field. The parties' agreement by telephone was not reduced to writing, but Findings of Fact 8 and 9 are made contrary to Petitioner's assertion that "they (Sunny Fresh) inspected; they bought the melons as is" for the following reasons. Kelly Marinaro had previously rejected any different risk for his company than selling the melons at the ultimate destination. He produced a written notation he had made contemporaneously with his telephone negotiation with Petitioner. Despite Petitioner's vague testimony to the contrary, it appears that Petitioner had had arrangements with other brokers in the past whereby he knew no profit would be made if the melons did not arrive in good condition, and he should have been aware that the actual sale price received at the point of delivery was the standard of doing business. Petitioner did not dispute that the sales charge was to be deducted by Kelly Marinaro from the ultimate price obtained. This is consistent with a dealer selling on behalf of a grower at the ultimate destination. Petitioner relied on prices given in the standard "Watermelon Reports" as F.O.B. (F.O.B. usually signifies delivery at a certain price at the seller's expense to some location.) I also find that the parties agreed to the price of the melons being based upon the amount they netted at the melons' ultimate destination for the reasons set out in Findings of Fact 13 and 16-21. Frank Marinaro, the father of Kelly Marinaro, is retired and regularly resides outside the State of Florida. He is unable to drive himself due to age and infirmity. He has a hired driver named James Hensley. The senior Mr. Marinaro is not a principal or employee of Sunny Fresh, but he likes to visit his son and his old cronies in Florida's watermelon belt during the growing season, for old times' sake. He was visiting his son in June, 1996. Kelly Marinaro arranged for Frank Marinaro to be driven by Mr. Hensley to Wildwood. Kelly Marinaro then transferred $6,300 of Sunny Fresh's money to a Wildwood bank where it was withdrawn in cash by Frank Marinaro. Frank Marinaro, driven by Mr. Hensley, then delivered the cash in three incremental payments authorized by Kelly Marinaro to Petitioner to pre-pay Petitioner's harvesting costs. The senior Mr. Marinaro also helped with the incidental duties of meeting trucks at the Wildwood weighing station or local truck stops and directing them to Petitioner's farm. He was not paid by Sunny Fresh or by Petitioner for these services. Petitioner testified that Frank Marinaro was present in his field for the loading of several truckloads of melons on different days, that he cut open some melons in the field and pronounced them "good" after sampling them, and that Frank Marinaro asked Petitioner to pay Mr. Hensley $50.00 for helping around the field and with physically loading some melons while they were there. This testimony is not evidence of Frank Marinaro's "apparent agency" to engage in the more complicated and technical process of "grading" watermelons on behalf of Sunny Fresh. These activities of Frank Marinaro did not alter Petitioner's agreement with Kelly Marinaro on behalf of Sunny Fresh so that Frank Marinaro's and James Hensley's actions constituted a direct sale to Sunny Fresh of all the melons loaded at Petitioner's farm (the point of embarkation) because both Petitioner and Kelly Marinaro clearly testified that the $6,300 cash harvesting costs constituted advances against receipts of the sale of watermelons when sold by Sunny Fresh at the ultimate destination. Further, the request that Petitioner pay Mr. Hensley for helping load the watermelons is in the nature of Petitioner paying a casual laborer for harvesting rather than it is evidence that any Sunny Fresh authority resided in Mr. Hensley. Between June 17, 1996 and June 21, 1996, Petitioner loaded eight truckloads of watermelons onto trucks for sale to various customers in the north and northeast United States. Of the eight truckloads loaded, the breakdown of actual costs and expenses worked out as follows: ACCOUNTING OF R. BASS LOADS Sunny Fresh #93775 Sold to: Frankie Boy Produce Frankie Boys #96095 New York, NY Weight shipped: 41,250 Unloaded weight: 40,400 Initial price at shipment to grower for good watermelon: 5 - ½ cents/lb Net return $1,212.00 Sales charge: (404.00) Watermelon promotion board tax: (8.08) Return to R. Bass due to bad melons: 2 cents/lb $ 799.92 Sunny Fresh #93791 Sold to: Fruitco Corp. Fruitco #1880 Bronx, NY Weight shipped: 40.800 Unloaded weight: 39,180 Initial price at shipment to grower for good watermelon: 5 - ½ cents/lb Net return $ 974.71 Sales charge: (391.81) Watermelon promotion board tax: (7.84) Return to R. Bass due to bad melons: 2.49 cents/lb $ 575.06 Sunny Fresh #81312 Crosset Co. #67012 Sold to: Crosset Co. Cincinnati, OH Weight shipped: 45,860 Unloaded weight: Initial price at shipment to 41,762 grower for good watermelon: 5 cents/lb Gross return $4,134.42 Shipping charges (freight): (1,712.63) Net return: 2,421.79 Sales charge: (438.48) Watermelon promotion board tax: Return to R. Bass due to bad melons: 4.75 cents/lb (8.35) $1,974.96 Sunny Fresh #93804 Sold to: Tom Lange Co. Lange #3344 St. Louis, MO Weight shipped: 44,550 Unloaded weight: Initial price at shipment to grower for good watermelon: 39,760 5 cents/lb Gross return $2,584.40 Shipping charges (freight): (1,455.96) Net return: 1,128.44 Sales charge: (445.50) Watermelon promotion board tax: Return to R. Bass due to bad melons: 1.72 cents/lb (7.95) $ 674.99 Sunny Fresh #93802 M.A. Fruit #N/G Sold to: M.A. Fruit Trading Corp New York, NY Weight shipped: 40,130 Unloaded weight: 36,720 Initial price at shipment to grower for good watermelon: 5 cents/lb Gross return $3,797.40 Shipping charges (freight): (1,758.55) Net return: 2,038.85 Sales charge: (401.30) Watermelon promotion board tax: (7.34) Return to R. Bass due to bad melons: 4.46 cents/lb $1,630.21 Sunny Fresh #93817 Sold to: C. H. Robinson Company C.H. Robinson #379035 Cleveland, OH Weight shipped: 43,300 Unloaded weight: Initial price at shipment to 42,147 grower for good watermelon: 5 cents/lb Gross return $4,440.21 Shipping charges (freight): (1,930.27) Net return: 2,509.94 Sales charge: (411.02) Watermelon promotion board tax: Return to R. Bass due to bad melons: 5 cents/lb (8.43) $2,090.49 Sunny Fresh #93819 Sold to: Isenberg #N/G Joseph Isenberg, Inc. Buffalo, NY Weight shipped: Unloaded weight: Initial price at shipment to grower for good watermelon: 45,100 5 cents/lb Gross return $ 500.00 Shipping charges (freight): (1,877.98) Net return: (1,377.98) Sales charge: Return to R. Bass due to bad melons: 4.06 cents/lb (451.00) $(1,828.98) Sunny Fresh #81334 Sold to: Palazzola . Palazzola #N/G Memphis, TN Weight shipped: 47,700 Unloaded weight: Initial price at shipment to grower for good watermelon: 5 cents/lb Gross return $ 0.00 Shipping charges (freight): (1,553.30) Net return: (1,553.30) Inspection: (65.00) Bins: (30.00) Sales charge: Return to R. Bass due to bad melons: 4.46 cents/lb (477.00) $(2,125.90) Kelly Marinaro testified credibly that the resultant low prices paid by the ultimate purchasers was the result of the poor quality of Petitioner's melons upon their arrival at their ultimate destination. Exhibits admitted in evidence without objection verified the poor condition of five of the loads. In those instances in which there were United States Department of Agriculture Inspection Reports, I accept those reports as clearly dispositive of the issue of the melons' poor condition upon arrival. Petitioner's more vague testimony that he doubted any load could ever pass such an inspection as "A-1," does not refute them. Kelly Marinaro testified credibly and without contradiction that each time he was informed by a potential buyer that a load of melons was in poor condition upon arrival at their destination, he faxed, mailed, or telephoned Petitioner with the "trouble report" information as soon as feasible and tried to involve him in the decision as to what should be done. This is consistent with a sale at the ultimate destination. Kelly Marinaro further testified credibly and without contradiction that for two loads he recommended to Petitioner that they not obtain a federal inspection because it was not cost efficient. He made this recommendation for one of these two loads because it reached its destination on a Friday and the fruit would have to stand and deteriorate further in quality and price over the weekend if they waited on an inspection. Petitioner agreed to waive at least one inspection. Petitioner and Kelly Marinaro did not agree as to the number of times they spoke on the phone about "trouble reports", but Petitioner acknowledged at least four such phone conversations. Petitioner and Kelly Marinaro did agree that in each phone call, Petitioner told Kelly Marinaro to "do the best you can," and stated he did not want to pay any freight. This type of conversation is not indicative of a relationship in which the melons have been purchased outright at the site of embarkation, Petitioner's field. I have considered the testimony of Petitioner and of Kelly Marinaro, respectively, on the issue of whether or not Petitioner was required to pay the freight on the watermelons from their first oral contract by telephone call on June 15, 1996. Without attributing any ill-motive to either party- witness, I find they did not initially have a meeting of the minds as to how the cost of freight was to be handled, and that Petitioner assumed at some point he would not have to pay freight. However, it is clear from the evidence as a whole that Kelly Marinaro did everything possible to avoid freight charges to Petitioner and would not have meticulously informed and received oral waivers of inspections from Petitioner if there had been any clear agreement either that Sunny Fresh was purchasing the watermelons "as is" in Petitioner's field or that Sunny Fresh Produce was paying all the freight. Indeed, Petitioner was not charged for freight when Kelly Marinaro d/b/a Sunny Fresh provided the trucks. It is also clear from the evidence as a whole that Petitioner was informed on or about the date that each load arrived at its ultimate destination that he was going to be charged for at least some freight charges out of the ultimate price received for the melons. Bill Ward has acted as a broker of watermelons for many years. I accept his testimony that there can be varying grades of watermelon within one field or one harvest. The several "Watermelon Reports" admitted without objection show that the demand for Florida watermelons was light or fairly light in June 1996, that the price was down or to be established, and that all quotations were for stock of generally good quality and condition. There had been a lot of rain in Florida during the 1996 watermelon season and rain unfavorably affects the quality of melons. Melons from further north where there had been less rain were able to be shipped to northern and northeastern buyers in less time than were Florida melons. Northern and northeastern buyers did not have to select from inferior melons that year. Petitioner's testimony and supporting documentation that he sold to other purchasers two truckloads of good quality, top price melons from the same field between June 17 and June 21, 1996 does not overcome all the evidence that the majority of melons he sold through Sunny Fresh were of the poor quality reported by the ultimate buyers and federal inspectors or that the melons sold to Sunny Fresh deteriorated due to slow transport.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's complaint.RECOMMENDED this 26th day of March, 1997, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax FILING (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of March, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Ronald Bass 32510 Sumter Line Road Leesburg, FL 34748 Arthur C. Fulmer, Esquire Post Office Box 2958 Lakeland, FL 33806 Mr. Robert Waldman American Bankers Insurance Company Claims Management Services 11222 Quail Roost Drive Miami, FL 33157-6596 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800
The Issue Is Petitioner entitled to $7,433.00, or any part thereof, from Respondent on the basis of a brokered sale of watermelons?
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Petitioner Terry McCully was a first-year independent grower of Sangria watermelons in Jasper, Florida. Respondent is a professional broker of produce. On June 13, 1999, Petitioner and Nolan Mancil, known to Petitioner as a watermelon buyer from Georgia representing Respondent, "walked" Petitioner's sole field. On June 13, 1999, Petitioner and Mr. Mancil agreed that Respondent would pay 10¢ per pound for watermelons from Petitioner's sole field of watermelons. However, Petitioner also understood that ultimately, his payment would be based on whatever the "market price" was, per load. Petitioner had no prior experience with how "market price" is defined or determined. At all times material, Nolan Mancil was acting as an agent of Respondent, and regardless of the extent of the authority actually authorized by Respondent, Mr. Mancil had, with Respondent's concurrence, apparent authority for all agreements reached with Petitioner. According to Respondent's President, Mr. Ward, the standard in the industry is that no value is placed on an agricultural commodity until a final price is determined with the ultimate consumer/retailer. Respondent produced business records tracking each of the six loads harvested from Petitioner's field (including the four loads in dispute) and showing the accepted weights for each load. According to Mr. Mancil, "market price" is "zero," unless some amount is paid by the retailer to the broker on delivery and the amount paid on delivery constitutes "the market price." He denied ever telling Petitioner that their oral contract would use the United States Department of Agriculture National Watermelon Report (USDA Report) to specifically set a daily market price, although he admitted that at a later point in time, under changed conditions (see Finding of Fact No. 19) he had told Petitioner that the USDA Daily Report could be the maximum price. Petitioner conceded that he received the USDA Report from the Department of Agriculture Extension Agent only after a dispute arose and Petitioner had begun to prepare his claim. The undersigned infers therefrom that Petitioner was only aware of this methodology of setting a market price "after the fact." On Monday, June 14, 1999, Nolan Mancil's harvesters and graders entered Petitioner's field. Petitioner agreed to pay for the harvesting by Respondent's deduction of harvesting costs from each load after sale to the ultimate buyer, but at this point Petitioner also expected Respondent to pay him by the load, each load, immediately after sale at the ultimate point of sale (FOB). On Tuesday, June 15, 1999, trucks hired by Mr. Mancil and/or Respondent began removing watermelons from Petitioner's field. On that day, Mr. Mancil indicated that the watermelons being loaded were worth only 8-1/2¢ per pound. Petitioner agreed to the change in the amount to be paid. At some point, Petitioner accommodated Mr. Mancil by getting a truck, driver, and loaders, and by feeding Mr. Mancil's crew members. Petitioner seeks no reimbursement for these accommodations. Respondent took two truckloads away on June 15, 1999. Load #3664 of 46,340 pounds "shipped weight" and 45,830 pounds "accepted weight" were brokered by Respondent to a retailer at 8¢ per pound. Load #3692 of 48,060 shipped weight and 43,392 pounds accepted weight were brokered to a retailer at 9¢ per pound. Respondent's business records show that on the first (undisputed) load, the sale to a retailer was contracted by Respondent at 8¢ per pound, but when the time came to settle- up, the payment was made by Respondent's retail customer at the small melon size (13-plus pounds), not at the medium or large melon size. Respondent's business records further show that the second (undisputed) load was contracted at 9¢ per pound but was ultimately paid-out at the average weight per melon of 15.4 pounds instead of at 19.2 pounds per melon, after an initial rejection by the first buyer. No brokerage fee was imposed by Respondent on either of these undisputed loads, and on each of these loads, Respondent suffered a substantial loss. These losses were not passed on to Petitioner due to their "immediate cash payment" arrangement. Respondent immediately paid Petitioner for both loads at the agreed rate of 8-1/2¢ per pound, less harvesting costs and mandatory government fee. Petitioner does not dispute deduction of the government fee from the first two loads. Indeed, Petitioner's claim does not address the amount, method, or appropriateness of Respondent's payment to Petitioner for these first two loads. Petitioner's claim only addresses the last four loads harvested after June 15, 1999. After the first two loads, Mr. Mancil informed Petitioner that Respondent could no longer pay Petitioner in cash immediately after each load, but would henceforth pay Petitioner within 30 days. There is no dispute that Petitioner reluctantly agreed to this change in the timing of payment. Mr. Mancil claimed that he told Petitioner, either beginning with the third load or sometime between the third and fourth loads, that the USDA Report's daily price would be the highest price Petitioner could be paid by Respondent. According to Mr. Ward, over the four loads in dispute, the price received by Respondent from retailers was 7¢ per pound adjusted downward due to market conditions such as watermelon size being less than expected, smaller watermelons being in less demand, and the watermelons being in poor condition when accepted by the retailer(s). According to Mr. Ward, the net weight of a load is determined by deducting the truck's empty weight from the loaded weight of the truck; then the melons in the truck are counted, and that count is divided into the net weight, to get the average weight per melon. Petitioner maintained that he was never advised by Mr. Ward or Mr. Mancil that the watermelons in the last four loads were the wrong size or that many melons were not good. Mr. Mancil stated that he believed he had indicated to Petitioner that the watermelons in the last four truckloads were actually smaller than the size anticipated when the deal was struck on June 13, 1999, and that the watermelons were of poorer quality. He conceded that he was not sure Petitioner had understood him. There is no dispute that Petitioner's field was rather overgrown or that watermelons could be harvested despite this overgrowth. The overgrowth could have obscured the size and condition of the watermelons until after harvest. After the sixth load, neither Respondent nor Mr. Mancil sent any more trucks. There was never an agreement that Respondent would buy all the watermelons in Petitioner's field. Petitioner found it necessary to obtain trucks himself to haul away and dump the remaining watermelons which were rotting in his field. He seeks no reimbursement for this expense. Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, I also find that the watermelons in the last four loads were smaller and inferior in quality to what had been expected. On June 16, 1999, 42,140 pounds shipped weight of watermelons were loaded by Respondent from Petitioner's field in Load #3691. Petitioner is claiming 7¢ per pound on the basis of a USDA Report on every pound for $2,879.00, less harvesting costs of $781.00 for $2,098.00. On June 17, 1999, 43,500 shipped weight of watermelons were loaded by Respondent from Petitioner's field in Load #3685. Petitioner is claiming 6¢ per pound on the basis of a USDA Report for every pound for $2,610.00, less harvesting costs of $826.00 for $1,784.00. The same day, 43,620 shipped weight of watermelons were loaded by Respondent from Petitioner's field in Load #3694. Petitioner is claiming 6¢ per pound on the basis of a USDA Report for every pound for $2,617.20, less harvesting costs of $830.00 for $1,787.20. Either on June 20, 21, or 22, 1999 (the dates on exhibits conflict), 43,000 shipped weight of watermelons were loaded by Respondent from Petitioner's field in Load #3702. Petitioner is claiming 6¢ per pound on the basis of a USDA Report for every pound less harvesting costs of $817.00 for $1,763.00. Petitioner bases the price per pound that he is claiming on his Exhibit P-6, the USDA Reports for June 17-18, and 21, 1999. He did not select from those reports the price per largest average weight of Sangria watermelon, but selected the middle or lowest average weight of "other red meat varieties." Except for June 21, 1999, this calculation gives Respondent the benefit of the doubt as to cents per pound for average market price on the respective USDA Reports, but in light of all the other evidence it is not an accurate method of calculating the true market price for the four disputed loads. Although Petitioner considers payment on the first two (undisputed) loads based on accepted weight to be within the parties' agreement and correct, he has not made his calculations of claim on the accepted weight of any of the last four (disputed) loads. Petitioner's calculations of claim also have not addressed the mandatory government fee for any of the last four (disputed) loads, although he considers payment on the first two, (undisputed) loads, for which Respondent deducted the mandatory fee, to be within the parties' agreement and correct. According to Respondent's business records for the four loads shipped after the Mancil-Petitioner re-negotiations of price per pound and discussion on maximum market pricing, these disputed loads were sold to retailers as follows: On June 16, 1999, Load #3691 had a shipped weight of 41,140 pounds and accepted weight of 39,940 pounds. The sale price was $0.055 per pound. The sale amount was $2,196.70. The government fee was $7.99. The harvesting cost was $781.00. A brokerage fee of $399.40 was subtracted, and Respondent's debt to Petitioner was calculated as $1,008.31. On June 17, 1999, Load #3685 had a shipped weight of 43,500 pounds and an accepted weight of 43,280 pounds. The watermelons were originally contracted for retail sale at $.0635 per pound but were refused by the first retailer as undersized. The second, alternative retailer bought these watermelons at a smaller-size market price for melons averaging 18 pounds, instead of 19.5- pound melons, and also made some returns of bad watermelons, so that the sale amount ended-up as $973.80, less a $8.66 government fee, less $826.00 for harvesting, less $216.40 brokerage fee, so that even Petitioner lost $77.26 on the deal. Also on June 17, 1999, Load #3694 had a shipped weight of 43,620 pounds and an accepted weight of 42,848 pounds. The contract sale had been for watermelons averaging 19.3 pounds, and the average size turned to out to be 16.7 pounds, and some of these melons were returned. The ultimate sale amount was $1,692.50, less a government fee of $8.72, less harvesting costs of $830.00, less brokerage fee of $321.36, with Respondent owing Petitioner $532.42. Finally, on or about June 22, 1999, the final load, #3702, had a shipped weight of 43,000 pounds, and accepted weight of 41,157 pounds, for a sale amount of $832.00; a government fee of $8.60; harvesting costs of $817.00; brokerage fee of $200.00; and amount due to Petitioner of $193.60. Again, the contract price of 6¢ from the retailer had been negotiated on melons in good condition of an average weight of 19.6 pounds, and the watermelons actually delivered by Respondent from Petitioner's field averaged 16.8 pounds, and many melons were returned to Respondent based on lack of quality. On the foregoing calculations, Respondent admits to owing Petitioner $1,269.87, rather than the $7,433.00 claimed by Petitioner's calculations. Neither party presented any evidence of an agreement to deduct a brokerage fee or how a brokerage fee was to be calculated. No brokerage fee was deducted by Respondent for the first two loads which are not in dispute, but Respondent actually suffered a loss on those loads which was not passed on to Petitioner (See Finding of Fact No. 14). For the last four loads, the only loads in dispute and the only loads for which a brokerage fee was deducted, the brokerage fee constitutes the only profit made by Respondent on the entire six-load transaction.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture enter a final order requiring Respondent Growers Marketing Service, Inc. to pay Petitioner $1,269.87, plus interest, if any, to be calculated by the Department, and requiring that if Growers Marketing Service, Inc., does not pay the amount specified within 30 days of the final order that its surety, Preferred National Insurance Company, shall be liable to Petitioner for the full amount. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of April, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of April, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Terry McCully 3245 Northwest 30th Lane Jennings, Florida 33806 William R. Ward, Jr., President Growers Marketing Service, Inc. Post Office Box 2595 Lakeland, Florida 33806 Preferred National Insurance Company Post Office Box 407003 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33306 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of License and Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue Whether or not Petitioners (complainants) are entitled to recover $5,640.19 or any part thereof against Respondent dealer and Respondent surety company.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners are growers of watermelons and qualify as "producers" under Section 604.15(5) F.S. Respondent Eddie D. Griffin d/b/a Quality Brokerage is a broker-shipper of watermelons and qualifies as a "dealer" under Section 604.15(1) F.S. Respondent United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company is surety for Respondent Griffin d/b/a Quality. Petitioners' claims against the dealer and his bond are listed in the Amended Complaint in the following amounts and categories: 6-18-92 Inv. #657 45,580 lbs. Crimson melons @ .05 lb. $2,279.00 Advance - 700.00 NWPB* - 9.12 $1,569.88 6-19-92 Inv. #668 2,490 lbs. Crimson melons @ .05 lb. $ 124.50 (paid for 42,860 lbs. short 2,490 lbs.) NWPB* - .50 124.00 6-20-92 Inv. #695 6,818 lbs. Crimson melons @ .05 lb. $ 340.90 (paid for 39,062 lbs. short 6,818 lbs.) NWPB* 1.36 339.54 6-20-92 Inv. @ #702 .05 39,880 lbs. Sangria melons lb. $1,994.00 Advance - 700.00 Packing Straw - 10.00 NWPB* - 7.98 Pmt. - 90.00 1,186.02 6-21-92 Inv. @ #706 .05 44,740 lbs. Sangria melons lb. $2,237.00 Advance - 700.00 Packing Straw - 10.00 NWPB* - 8.95 1,518.05 6-22-93 Inv. @ #716 .04 11,280 lbs. Crimson melons lb. NWPB* - 2.32 460.88 6-22-92 Inv. @ #709 .04 46,740 lbs. Crimson melons lb. $1,869.60 Advance - 700.00 Packing Straw - 10.00 NWPB* - 9.35 1,150.25 Deducted for #706 - 441.82 441.82 PAID 708.43 Total Claimed $5,640.19 *NWPB = National Watermelon Promotion Board Fee Petitioners and Respondent dealer have had an oral business relationship for four to five years. Both parties agree that their oral agreement initially called for a federal inspection to be done on each load if the load were refused in whole or in part by the ultimate recipient. Respondent Griffin contended that over the years there had been further oral agreements to "work out" or "ride out" small discrepancies or partial refusals of loads without resorting to federal inspections, the cost of which inspections could eliminate the entire profit on single loads. Petitioners denied that such an amended oral agreement was ever reached and further maintained that the amounts of the loads at issue herein could not be considered "small" by any interpretation. Respondent submitted no evidence as to what the relative terms, "large" and "small," mean in the industry. Consequently, it appears that there was never a meeting of the minds of the parties on the alleged oral contract amendments relied upon by Respondent. Respondent testified that in past years, prior to 1992, he had interpreted the term "ride it out" to mean that he would simply accept the hearsay statements of ultimate recipients that named poundages of melons were bad and he would let the ultimate recipients pay for only the melons they said were good. Respondent would thereafter absorb any losses himself, not passing on the loss by deducting any amount from the full amount he would normally pay to the growers within ten days. However, 1992 was such a bad year for melons that the Respondent dealer chose not to absorb the greater losses and passed them on to the growers by way of deductions on "settlement sheets." In 1992 Respondent sent Petitioners the settlement sheets with the deductions explained thereon with the net payments as much as thirty days after the ultimate sales. Upon the foregoing evidence, it appears that Respondent had established a course of business whereby Petitioners could reasonably have expected him to absorb any losses occasioned by Respondent's reliance on hearsay statements of the ultimate recipients concerning poor quality melons unless Respondent chose not to test the questionable melons with a federal inspection. Petitioners obtained Exhibit P-5 for load 657 at Respondent dealer's place of business, but were not certain it applied to the load Mr. Tucker claimed he delivered to Respondent on 6-18-92 because Mr. Tucker did not know his load number that day. The exhibit represents the weight ticket Petitioners believe applies to the load which Mr. Tucker claimed to have delivered to Respondent dealer on 6-18-92. However, the exhibit bears two other names, "Jones and Smith," not Petitioners' respective names of Tucker or Watson. It has "WACC" handwritten across it, which Mr. Tucker claimed signified the name of his watermelon field. The number "657" also has been handwritten across it. There is no evidence of who wrote any of this on the exhibit. Respondent denied that load 657 was received from Mr. Tucker. The exhibit shows a printed gross weight of 78,900 lbs., tare weight of 32,860 lbs. and net weight of 66,800 lbs. Net weights are supposed to signify the poundage of melons delivered to the dealer. Nothing on the exhibit matches Mr. Tucker's journal entry (Petitioners' Exhibit 3) of delivering 45,580 lbs. of watermelons to Respondent dealer on 6- 18-92. Mr. Tucker testified that he was never paid for his delivery. Respondent denied there was such a delivery and testified that he paid Jones and Smith for load 657. Petitioners have established no entitlement to their claim of $1,569.88 on Invoice 657. Petitioners' Exhibit P-4 represents two weight tickets secured from Respondent dealer's records that Petitioners contend apply to load 668. The first page has "45,350/6-19-92/Scott Tucker WACC" handwritten across it. None of the four poundages imprinted thereon match any of the amounts claimed by Petitioners for invoice 668, and subtracting amounts testified to also does not conform these figures to Petitioners' claim on load 668. The second page weight ticket shows a date of 6-18-92 and a weight of 34,260 lbs. It also does not match Petitioner's claim that they were owed for 45,350 lbs. but were paid for only 42,860 lbs., being paid 2,490 lbs. short. Exhibit P-8 is the 668 invoice/settlement sheet which Respondent provided to Petitioners and shows invoice 668 with date of 6-19-92, tare and pay weight of 42,860 lbs. at $.05/lb. for $2,143.00 less $8.57 melon adv. association (a/k/a NWPB, see supra) for $2,134.43, less a $700.00 advance and $10.00 for packing straw for a total due Petitioners of $1,424.43 which Respondent has already paid. Petitioners have established no entitlement to their claim of $124.00 on Invoice 668. Petitioners Exhibit P-6 represents two weight tickets secured from Respondent dealer's records. The first page has "45,880 lbs./6-20-92/Scott Tucker Crimson WACC 695" handwritten across it. None of the printed gross, tare, or net weights thereon match any of the amounts claimed by Petitioners for invoice 695. The second page shows the date 6-20-92 and a printed net weight of 32,000 lbs. Respondent dealer provided Petitioners with Exhibit P-7, invoice/settlement sheet 695 dated 6-20-92 showing tare and pay weights of 39,062 lbs. priced at $.05/lb. totalling $1,953.10, less melon adv. assoc. (a/k/a NWPB) fee of $7.81, for $1,945.29, less $700.00 advanced, less $10.00 for packing straw for a total of $1,235.29. The foregoing do not support Petitioner Tucker's claim based on his journal entry (P-3) that he was entitled to be paid for 45,880 lbs. he claims he delivered that day instead of for 39,062 pounds (short by 6,818 pounds) with balance owing to him of $339.54. Respondent has paid what was owed on invoice 695. By oral agreement at formal hearing, Petitioners' Composite Exhibit 9 shows that Petitioner Tucker delivered 39,880 lbs. of melons to Respondent dealer on 6-20-92 and Petitioner Watson received back from Respondent dealer an invoice/settlement sheet 702 showing 39,880 pounds @ $.05/lb. equalling $1,994.00 and that although $1,994.00 was owed Petitioners, Respondent thereafter subtracted for $800.00 worth of returned melons, a $700.00 advance, $7.98 for melon adv. association (a/k/a NWPB), and $10.00 for packing straw, and that a balance was paid to Petitioners of only $90.00. This is arithmetically illogical. The subtractions total $1,517.98. Therefore, if all of Respondent's subtractions were legitimate, the total balance due Petitioners would have been $476.02. If the right to deduct for the $800.00 in returned melons were not substantiated by Respondent dealer, then Petitioners would be due $1,276.02. Since all parties acknowledge that $90.00 was already paid by Respondent dealer, then Petitioners are due $1,186.02 if Respondent did not substantiate the right to deduct the $800.00. Load 702 was "graded out," i.e. accepted as satisfactory, by a representative of Respondent dealer or a subsequent holder in interest when the melons were delivered by Petitioners to Respondent dealer. That fact creates the presumption that the melons were received in satisfactory condition by the Respondent dealer. Nothing persuasive has been put forth by the Respondent dealer to show that the situation concerning the melons' quality had changed by the time the load arrived at its final destination. Respondent got no federal inspection on this load and relied on hearsay statements by persons who did not testify as to some melons being inferior. In light of the standard arrangement of the parties over the whole course of their business dealings (see Findings of Fact 5-7 supra), Petitioners have proven entitlement to the amount claimed on load 702 of $1,186.02. By oral agreement at formal hearing, Petitioners' Composite 10 shows Petitioners Tucker and Watson delivered 44,740 lbs. of melons to Respondent dealer on 6-21-92. At $.05/lb., Petitioners were owed $2,237.00, less melon adv. association fee (a/k/a NWPB) of $8.95, $700.00 for an advance, and $10.00 for straw. Those deductions are not at issue. Therefore, Petitioners would be owed $1,518.05, the amount claimed, from Respondent. However, the invoice also notes that Respondent made a $268.18 deduction for melons returned. Respondent's Composite Exhibit 1 purports to be a BB&W Farms Loading Sheet and Federal Inspection Sheet. Respondent offered this exhibit to show that only $68.18 was realized by him on load 706 which he attributed to Petitioner Watson. However, the federal inspector did not testify as to the results of the inspection, the inspection sheet itself is illegible as to "estimated total," the "estimated total" has been written in by another hand as "$62.60," and there was no explanation on the Composite Exhibit or in testimony as to how Respondent dealer came up with $200.00 in "return lumping charges" as also indicated on Exhibit R-1. Accordingly, Petitioners have established that with regard to load/invoice 706, they delivered watermelons worth $2,237.00 to Respondent dealer and Respondent dealer did not affirmatively establish that any melons were bad, despite the federal inspection sheet introduced in evidence. Petitioners have proven entitlement to their claim on invoice 706 for $1,518.05. However, Petitioners conceded that Respondent actually paid them $441.82 on invoice/settlement sheet 706. Therefore, they are only entitled to recoup a total of $1,076.23 on their claim for Invoice 706. In the course of formal hearing, Respondent dealer admitted that, with regard to load invoice 716, (Tucker) he did owe Petitioners $460.88 for 275 watermelons, and that it had not been paid purely due to clerical error. By oral agreement at formal hearing, Petitioners' Composite Exhibit 12 (Invoice and Weight Tickets 709, Watson) shows Petitioner Watson delivered 46,740 lbs. of melons to Respondent dealer on 6-22-92 and at $.04 lb., Petitioners were owed $1,869.60, less appropriate deductions. Petitioners conceded that Respondent dealer appropriately deducted $9.35 for melon adv. association (a/k/a NWPB), $700.00 for an advance, and $10.00 for packing straw, bringing the amount they were owed to $1,150.25. Petitioners and Respondent are in agreement the Respondent paid only $708.43 of the $1,150.25 owed on invoice/settlement sheet 709 because Respondent dealer also deducted from the amount owed on invoice 709 the $441.82 he had previously paid out on Invoice 706. See, Finding of Fact 13, supra. Since Petitioners have established that they were owed $1,518.05 on invoice 706 but were paid only $441.82 thereon, it appears that Petitioners should be paid $1,076.23 on Invoice 706 and realize nothing on Invoice 709.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Agriculture enter a final order awarding Petitioners $1,186.02 on invoice 702, $1,076.23 on invoice 706, and $460.88 on invoice 716 for a total of $2,723.13, dismissing all other claimed amounts, and binding Respondents to pay the full amount of $2,723.13, which in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company's case shall be only to the extent of its bond. RECOMMENDED this 30th day of June, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Scott Tucker and Phillip Watson Route 2 Box 280 Trenton, FL 32693 Eddie D. Griffin d/b/a Quality Brokerage Post Office Box 889 Immokalee, FL 33934 William J. Moore USF&G Post Office Box 31143 Tampa, FL 33631 United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company Post Office Box 1138 Baltimore, MD 21203 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Department of Agriculture Division of Marketing, Bureau of Licensure and Bond Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, Esquire General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810
Findings Of Fact In the summer of 1986, petitioner, Leo R. Fleming, as the agent for a Mr. Griffin, entered into an agreement with Jimmy Davis, representing D & M Pecan Company, to sell an unspecified amount of watermelons to D & M at the "ground" price which was to be determined daily. The parties also agreed to "joint" the melons, meaning that D & M and Mr. Griffin would split whatever profit or loss was made on the sale of the watermelons. Under the terms of the agreement D & M supplied the trucks and petitioner was responsible for harvesting and loading the melons on the trucks. Fifteen loads of watermelons were loaded and sold to D & M between June 28 and July 2, 1986. On June 28, 1986, D & M paid petitioner $3,000 as an advance on the watermelons so that the field crew could be paid. On June 30, 1986, D & M paid $5,000 and on July 2, 1986, D & M paid $3,000. None of the monies paid to petitioner between June 28 and July 2 were for specific loads or lots of melons, but were advances to be credited against the total amount that was ultimately owed to petitioner. From the first day of loading, June 28, 1986, D & M experienced problems with the melons loaded by petitioner. Mr. Davis would call petitioner the night before the loading to advise him as to the type and size of melon that was to be put on each truck to be loaded the following day. However, petitioner would get the orders confused, which resulted in the trucks being loaded with a different size and type of watermelon than was ordered. D & M usually did not discover the problem until the trucks reached their destination. On a few occasions, the discrepancies were discovered when petitioner called back in after the trucks had left the field to report the amount of melons put on each truck. In any event, the failure to load the right melons on the trucks caused D & M to have to find other buyers and reroute the trucks or reduce the price of the melons delivered. On July 12, 1986, petitioner and Mr. Davis met in Cordele, Georgia, for the purpose of determining the amount owed by D & M for the watermelons. Petitioner brought typed invoices with him which reflected the type of watermelon, the number of pounds shipped, and ground price per pound for each lot or load. However, due to the problems with the wrong melons being loaded, the parties agreed to reduce the price per pound on those loads which had not been loaded as ordered. The adjusted price agreed upon was written on the original invoices and the typed price was marked through. No adjustment was made for the lots that were loaded properly. Lot 621 was not included in the negotiations because petitioner did not present an invoice for that lot and neither party at that time knew what had happened to that truck. However, the parties did agree to settle the other 14 loads for a total price of $25,783.60. (See Appendix A which lists the invoiced price and negotiated price per load.) D & M deducted $10,000 from that total for the advances that had been made and gave petitioner a check for $15,783.60. 1/ The stamp marks on the back of the check reveal that the check was deposited by petitioner on or before July 14, 1986. On July 15, 1986, petitioner wrote a check to the grower for the watermelons. The amount of the check was based on the negotiated price minus petitioner's commission and the cost of the harvesters. This amount is reflected on the original invoices. (P.Ex.1) However, Mr. Griffin did not accept the changes in the price and insisted upon payment from petitioner based on the original invoiced amount. Petitioner then paid Mr. Griffin based on the original invoiced amount "for keeping him from going to the PACA." (T-30) Thereafter, on August 6, 1986, petitioner sent D & M a statement reflecting a balance due based on the original invoiced amounts. From thee evidence presented, it is clear that on July 12, 1986, the parties reached an agreement concerning the full amount to be paid for all the loads of watermelons purchased by D & M except for the load labelled Lot No. 621. D & M admits that it owes petitioner for Lot No. 621, but it contends that it only owes $1,898.40 for that load, whereas the invoice indicates that $2,133.90 is owed. Mr. Davis explained that D & M should not have to pay $2,133.90 for that load because that was the total amount it was able to get for the load. In other words, if D & M paid the full invoiced amount, it would not make a profit. Nevertheless, the original agreement of the parties was that D & M would pay ground price for the melons. D & M paid full invoice price on the melons that were correctly loaded and paid an agreed upon adjusted price for the melons that were not loaded as ordered. D & M failed to present any evidence establishing that Lot No. 621 consisted of melons that were not of the type and size ordered. Therefore, D & M owes petitioner $2,133.90 for Lot 621.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Agriculture directing respondent to pay petitioner the sum of $2,133.90 within 15 days after the final order is entered. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of February, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE A. GRUBBS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 1988.
The Issue Has Respondent VBJ Packing, Inc. (Respondent) paid Petitioner, Chastain- Bishop Farms (Petitioner) in full for watermelons represented by Respondent's load numbers 3002 and 3004 purchased from Petitioner during the 1995 watermelon season?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner was a "producer" of agricultural products in the State of Florida as defined in Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes. Watermelons come within the definition of "agricultural products" as defined in Section 604.15(3), Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was licensed as a "dealer in agricultural products" as defined in Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes. Respondent was issued license number 8887 by the Department which is supported by Bond Number 137743741 in the amount of $75,000 written by Respondent Continental Casualty Company (Continental), as surety, with an inception date of January 1, 1995, and an expiration date of December 31, 1995. The Complaint was timely filed by Petitioner in accordance with Section 604.21(1), Florida Statutes. Sometime during the week prior to Monday, May 8, 1995, Petitioner and Respondent entered into a verbal agreement which contained the following terms: (a) Petitioner would sell Respondent a semi-trailer load of medium size melons of good quality to be harvested and loaded by Petitioner onto a semi-trailer furnished by Respondent; (b) Respondent would have the right and opportunity to inspect the melons before or during loading; (c) Respondent would pay Petitioner fifteen cents ($0.15) per pound for the melons loaded onto the trailer; (d) upon delivery at Petitioner's farm, the melons became Respondent's property and Petitioner had no further obligation to Respondent concerning the melons; and (e) settlement was to be made by Respondent within a reasonable time. Subsequent to the above agreement, Petitioner sold and Respondent bought, a second semi-trailer load of melons to be delivered under the same terms and conditions as agreed in the above verbal agreement. On Friday, May 5, 1995, Respondent's agent, Robert Allen and T. J. Chastain, a partner in Chastain-Bishop Farms, had a disagreement concerning Eddie Idlette, Respondent's inspector, being on the Petitioner's farm. Because of an incident in the past involving Idlette and Petitioner, Chastain did not want Idlette on Petitioner's farm and made this known to Allen. As result of this disagreement, Idlette left the Petitioner's farm and was not present on Monday or Tuesday, May 8 & 9, 1995, to inspect the two loads of melons. Allen testified that Chastain also excluded him from Petitioner's farm at this time, and that Chastain told him that neither he nor Idlette needed to be present during the loading of the melons because Chastain "would stand behind the loads". However, the more credible evidence shows that Chastain did not prevent Allen from inspecting the melons on Monday or Tuesday, May 8 & 9, 1995, or tell Allen that he "would stand behind the loads". Furthermore, there is credible evidence to show that Allen was present at Petitioner's farm on Monday and Tuesday, May 8 & 9, 1995, and he either inspected, or had the opportunity to inspect, the two loads of melons, notwithstanding Allen's testimony or Respondent's exhibit 6 to the contrary. Petitioner did not advise Respondent, at any time pertinent to the sale of the melons, that Petitioner would give Respondent "full market protection" on the melons. Furthermore, Petitioner did not agree, at any time pertinent to the sale of the melons, for Respondent to handle the melons "on account" for Petitioner. The more credible evidence supports Petitioner's contention that the melons were purchased by Respondent with title to the melons passing to Respondent upon delivery at Petitioner's farm, subject to inspection or the opportunity to inspect before loading and delivery. On Monday, May 8, 1995, Petitioner loaded Respondent's first semi- trailer with a State of Georgia tag number CX9379, with 2,280 medium size Sangria melons of good quality weighing 46,800 pounds and identified as Respondent's load number 3002. Respondent accepted load 3002 for shipment to its customer. Using the agreed upon price of fifteen cents ($0.15) per pound times 46,800 pounds, the Respondent owed Petitioner $7,020.00 for load number 3002. On Tuesday, May 9, 1995, Petitioner loaded Respondent's second semi- trailer with a State of New Jersey tag number TAB4020, with 2,331 medium size Sangria melons of good quality weighing 46,620 pounds and identified as Respondent's load number 3004. Respondent accepted load 3004 for shipment to its customer. Using the agreed upon price of fifteen cents ($0.15) per pound times 46,620 pounds, the Respondent owed Petitioner $6,9993.00 for load number 3004. The combined total amount owed to Petitioner by Respondent for load numbers 3002 and 3004 was $14,013.00. Respondent shipped load 3002 to E. W. Kean Co, Inc. (Kean). Upon receiving load 3002, Kean allegedly found problems with the melons. Respondent allowed Kean to handled the melons on account for Respondent. Kean sold the melons for $6,804.05 or 14.5 cents per pound. After Kean's deduction for handling, Kean paid Respondent $6,112.05 or 13.02 cents per pound. In accounting to Petitioner, Respondent made further deductions for handling and freight, and offered Petitioner $3,641.24 or 7.8 cents per pound for the melons on load 3002. Respondent shipped load 3004 to Mada Fruit Sales (Mada). Upon receiving load 3004, Mada allegedly found problems with the melons. By letter dated June 8, 1995 (Respondent's exhibit 4), Mada grudgingly agreed to pay the freight plus 10 cents per pound for the melons. Mada paid Respondent $4,662.00 for load 3004, and after Respondent deducted its commission of $466.20, offered Petitioner $4,195.80 or nine cents per pound for the melons on load 3004. By check number 18922 dated May 28, 1995, Respondent paid Petitioner $7,760.08. Respondent contends that this amount was offered to Kye Bishop in full settlement for loads 3002 and 3004, and that after Bishop consulted with Chastain, Bishop on behalf of Petitioner, accepted this amount in full settlement for loads 3002 and 3004. Bishop contends that he turned down the $7,760.08 as settlement in full but took the $7,760.08 as partial payment and proceeded to file a complaint with the Department against Respondent's bond for the difference. There is nothing written on the check to indicate that by accepting and cashing the check Petitioner acknowledged that it was payment in full for load numbers 3002 and 3004. The more credible evidence shows that Bishop did not accept the check in the amount of $7,760.08 as payment in full for loads 3002 and 3004 but only as partial payment, notwithstanding the testimony of Allen to the contrary. There was an assessment charge of $62.72 which Petitioner agrees that it owes and should be deducted from any monies owed to Petitioner by Respondent. Initially, Respondent owed Petitioner $14,013.00. However, substracting the partial payment of $7,760.08 and the assessment of $62.72 from the $14,013.00 leaves a balance owed Petitioner by Respondent of $6,190.20
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order granting the Petitioner relief by ordering Respondent VBJ Packing, Inc. to pay Petitioner the sum of $6,190.20. RECOMMENDED this 23rd day of May, 1996, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-4226A The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. Proposed findings of fact 1(a) through 1(i) are adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 1 through 16. Respondent VBJ Packing, Inc's Proposed Findings of Fact. Proposed finding of fact 1 is covered in the Conclusion of Law. Proposed finding of fact 2 is adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 1 through 16. Proposed finding of fact 3, 6, 7 and 8 10, are not supported by evidence in the record. As to proposed finding of fact 4, Petitioner and Respondent VBJ Packing, Inc. agreed that Petitioner would sell and Respondent would pay $0.15 per pound for medium size melons. Otherwise proposed finding of fact is not supported by evidence in the record. See Findings of Fact 4, 7 and 8. As to proposed finding of fact 5, Respondent sold the loads. Otherwise proposed finding of fact 5 is not supported by evidence in the record. Respondent Continental elected not to file any proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing and Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 508 Mayo Building Lakeland, Florida 32399-0800 David K. Oaks, Esquire David Oaks, P.A. 252 W. Marion Avenue Punta Gorda, Florida 33950 Mark A. Sessums, Esquire Frost, O'Toole & Saunders, P.A. Post Office Box 2188 Bartow, Florida 33831-2188
The Issue Whether Respondent owes Petitioner $2,377.20 as alleged in the complaint filed by Petitioner in July 1997.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Bigham Hide Company, Inc. (Petitioner), is a watermelon grower in Coleman and Lake Panasoffkee, Florida. Respondent, Florida-Georgia Produce, Inc. (Respondent), is a licensed dealer in agricultural products having been issued License Number 7666 by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department). Respondent has posted a bond in the amount of $30,000.00 written by Cumberland Casualty & Surety Company, as surety, to assure proper accounting and payment to producers such as Petitioner. In a complaint filed with the Department in July 1997, Petitioner alleged that he entered into an agreement with Bobby Patton (Patton) on behalf of Respondent to sell one truckload of "pee wee" watermelons. Under that agreement, Respondent agreed to pay seven cents per pound for the watermelons, and it would advance Petitioner $700.00 to cover the labor costs associated with loading the truck. The remainder would be paid upon final delivery. The complaint goes on to allege that Petitioner subsequently learned that there was "some problem" with the delivered produce. After Respondent inspected Petitioner's field to verify the quality of the crop, Petitioner was told that Respondent would "fight the fight" to get the shipment accepted. Since that time, however, the complaint alleges that Petitioner did not receive payment, an accounting of the transaction, an inspection report, or any further explanation. Accordingly, Petitioner filed this complaint seeking $3,077.20, less the $700.00 advance, or a total of $2,377.20. In its answer, Respondent has alleged that it actually received a truckload of "old diseased watermelons that had been lying in the field or on [the] field truck for a week," and the receiver refused to accept the load. Since it received nothing for the shipment, Respondent contends it is owed $700.00 for the money advanced to Petitioner. The parties agree that in late May 1997, Petitioner was contacted by Bobby Patton, who was representing Respondent, regarding the sale of small size watermelons. Patton offered to buy one truckload of "pee wee" watermelons at a price of seven cents per pound, to be paid after delivery to the receiver. Patton also agreed to advance Petitioner $700.00 to cover his loading costs. Petitioner agreed to these terms, and the truck was loaded from his field on June 3, 1997. The net weight of the loaded produce was 43,960 pounds. The vehicle's tag number was recorded on the loading slip as "AH 39099" from the province of Quebec, Canada. There is no evidence that the crop was diseased when it was loaded, or that it had been picked and lying in the field for several days before being loaded, as suggested in Respondent's answer to the complaint. The shipment was destined for Ontario, Canada. On or about June 5, 1997, the product was delivered to the customer, Direct Produce, Inc., in Etobicoke, Ontario. Because of a perceived lack of quality, the buyer refused to accept the load. Respondent immediately requested a government inspection which was performed on June 6, 1997. The results of that inspection are found in Respondent's Exhibit 3. It reveals that 1 percent of the load was decayed, 3 percent were bruised, 6 percent had Anthrocnose (belly rot), and 75 percent had "yellow internal discolouration." In addition, a composite sample reflected that 20 percent had "Whitish Stracked Flesh" while 5 percent had "Hollow Heart." In other words, virtually the entire shipment was tainted with defects or disease. The report also reflected that the net weight of the shipment was 44,500 pounds, and the tag number of the vehicle was "ALP 390999." The weight and tag number were slightly different from those recorded on the loading slip at Petitioner's field. After learning of the results of the inspection, Respondent's president, James B. Oglesby, immediately contacted Petitioner's president, Greg Bigham, and requested an inspection of Bigham's field to verify the quality of watermelons. During the inspection, Oglesby did not find any signs of belly rot or other problems similar to those noted in the government inspection. If there had been any incidence of belly rot in Petitioner's field, it would have been present in other unpicked watermelons. At the end of his inspection, Oglesby told Petitioner that he would "fight the fight" to get the shipment delivered and sold. Oglesby eventually found a buyer who would accept the shipment as feed for cattle. The buyer agreed to pay the freight charges for hauling the watermelons to Canada but nothing more. Therefore, Respondent was not paid for the load. Petitioner was led to believe that he would receive payment and paperwork, including the inspection report, within a few days. When he did not receive any documentation, payment, or further explanation within a reasonable period of time, he filed this complaint. It would be highly unlikely that a farmer would have one completely bad load from a field without the same problems being present in other loads shipped from the field at the same time. Petitioner presented uncontroverted testimony that no other shipments from that field during the same time period were rejected or had similar problems. In addition, it was established that poor ventilation on the truck, or leaving the loaded truck unprotected in the sun, could be causes of the crop being spoiled or damaged before it was delivered to Canada. Finally, at hearing, Respondent suggested that Bigham may have shown him a different field than the one from which his load was picked. However, this assertion has been rejected.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Affairs enter a final order determining that Respondent owes Petitioner $2,377.20. In the event payment is not timely made, the surety should be responsible for the indebtedness. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of February, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675, SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this day 6th of February, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing and Bond 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Terry T. Neal, Esquire Post Office Box 490327 Leesburge, Florida 34749-0327 James B. Oglesby Post Office Box 6214 Lakeland, Florida 33807 Cumberland Casualty & Surety Company 4311 West Waters Avenue Tampa, Florida 33614 Richard D. Tritschler, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
