The Issue The issues are whether the Respondents committed unlawful employment practices against Petitioner, and if so, to what relief is she entitled.
Findings Of Fact In the spring of 1994, Respondent CSD began operating a residential detention program for juvenile offenders pursuant to a contract with the Department of Juvenile Justice. The purpose of the program, commonly known as Hamilton House, was to provide redirection to the lives of its youthful residents/clients. Hamilton House had 48 beds divided between two dormitories. Respondent CSD assigned each resident to the appropriate dormitory, level six or level eight, depending on the type of security and rehabilitative services required. The program included an educational program as well as facilities for vocational and recreational activities. Respondent CSD employed Petitioner, a 51 year-old white female, as a resident advisor at Hamilton House from March 24, 1994 through June 30, 1996. Petitioner initially worked the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift in the level six dormitory. At times she served as the acting shift supervisor though she was not paid a supervisor's wages. When Petitioner began working for Respondent CSD, she lived with her elderly mother, Lotus Musgrove, whose colon cancer was in remission. At that time, Mrs. Musgrove was able to live independently and did not need a caretaker. On April 24, 1994, some of the clients managed to gain access to a bottle containing an alcoholic beverage. Petitioner and other employees received a verbal warning for failing to adequately monitor the behavior and movement of the clients. A training letter was placed in each employee's personnel file. In May of 1995, Respondent CSD hired Bobby Williams, Sr., as a resident advisor in the level eight dormitory. Mr. Williams is a black male. He eventually assumed the position of shift supervisor for the entire facility. There is no evidence that Petitioner sought this full-time position or a similar supervisory position at any time during her employment with Respondent CSD. In October of 1995, some of the clients accused Petitioner and another staff member of inappropriate conduct including, but not limited to, furnishing them with prohibited magazines and movies. As a result of the allegations, Respondent CSD suspended Petitioner and her co-worker without pay on October 18, 1995. By letter dated October 20, 1995, Respondent CSD advised Petitioner in writing that there was insufficient evidence of misconduct to warrant termination of her employment. However, the letter stated that Petitioner had violated company policy and procedure by allowing a youth to leave his room for extended periods after curfew. Respondent CSD paid Petitioner and her co- worker for the time they were suspended during the internal investigation. Respondent CSD subsequently reassigned Petitioner and her co-worker to work in a different dormitory and on a different shift. The change in time and location of their work shift was necessary to ensure there was no contact between them and the clients who had accused them of improper conduct. Petitioner was assigned to work the 3:00 p.m. - 11:00 p.m. shift in the level eight dormitory. In a written statement dated October 23, 1995, Petitioner objected to the change in her shift. She preferred to continue working the 11:00 p.m. - 7:00 a.m. shift. She asserted that, during the day, she took care of her 78 year-old mother who had cancer. Respondent CSD did not immediately honor Petitioner's request. On or about November 24, 1995, Petitioner voluntarily purchased some supplies in the amount of $20.98 from a retail store. The supplies included the following: hand sprayers, cotton swabs, hydrogen peroxide, rubbing alcohol, highlighters, marker, Sharpies, and other miscellaneous items. Petitioner requested reimbursement from Respondent CSD because she intended to use the supplies at work. Respondent CSD declined to reimburse Petitioner for the supplies. There is no evidence that Respondent CSD ever authorized the purchase of the supplies. On December 11, 1995, a resident in the level eight dormitory attempted to discard a container of contraband tobacco. Petitioner detected his effort and responded appropriately. She received a letter of commendation for exemplary action which was placed in her personnel file. On January 23, 1996, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Juvenile Justice made a formal and final determination that "[i]t is inconclusive that staff members Julie Toughton and Alice Musgrove engaged in improper conduct with clients." On or about February 1, 1996, Petitioner took a box of pens and pencils from a client's desk. The client became upset and exhibited inappropriate behavior toward Petitioner. As a result of the client's tantrum, Petitioner took token-economy points from the client. Petitioner filed a written complaint dated February 4, 1996, with Respondent CSD after learning that one of her supervisors, Mike Myers, changed the client's point sheet. Petitioner's February 4, 1996, statement also asserted that Supervisor Myers was mishandling clients' mail. She complained that he was logging clients' mail and making the clients read their personnel mail to him. According to Petitioner, handling client mail was the responsibility of "line staff." On one occasion in February 1996, Petitioner was 30 minutes late reporting to her assigned duty station in the dormitory. She spent that time in the administration building because she refused to work with one of her co-workers. Supervisor Myers was responsible for changing Petitioner's time sheet to reflect a 30-minute deduction in regular time. On another occasion in February 1996, Petitioner and other employees worked two hours of overtime due to a crisis situation with one of the clients. Petitioner elected to "bank" the overtime rather than receive time-and-one-half of overtime pay. The other employees chose to receive overtime pay. Petitioner was off from work on February 22-23, 1996. When Petitioner arrived at work on February 24, 1996, her time sheet was not with the time sheets of other employees. Petitioner's time sheet was locked in a supervisor's office until February 26, 1996, because the supervisor was not at work. There is no indication in the record whether Petitioner's time sheet was locked up inadvertently or due to a dispute over Petitioner's wages. On March 1, 1996, Petitioner filed a written grievance with Respondent CSD regarding her pay. She claimed that Supervisor Myers was harassing her and discriminating against her by changing her time sheet without her knowledge. Specifically, Petitioner complained that Mr. Myers cheated her out of 30 minutes of regular time on one occasion and two hours of overtime on another occasion. She complained that her time sheet was locked in a supervisor's office for four days. On March 4, 1996, the Program Director, Dale Edwards, agreed that Petitioner should not be penalized for one-half hour of regular pay because she was in the administration building during the disputed time. Additionally, Mr. Edwards directed Supervisor Myers not to change an employee's time sheet without prior approval. He also requested that Petitioner furnish documentation that the company owed her for the two hours of overtime. Mr. Edwards was under the mistaken impression that the dispute over Petitioner's time sheet had been resolved. In March of 1996, Petitioner was working the midnight shift in dormitory eight consistent with her written request dated October 23, 1995. On March 18, 1996 and March 27, 1996, Petitioner made written requests for a change to the 7:00 a.m. - 3:00 p.m. shift. Petitioner specifically wanted to replace a Ms. Aikens on the morning shift. Respondent CSD did not honor Petitioner's request. However, there is no evidence showing that Ms. Aiken's position was ever filled, and if so, whether Respondent CSD selected a person of a different race or a younger to file the position. Petitioner was absent from work between April 8, 1996, and April 16, 1996, on April 22, 1996, and on April 29, 1996, due to illness and/or medical appointments. While she was absent, her inner-office mail box became so full that the mail had to be removed. The administrative manager gave Petitioner's mail to her supervisor. On April 23, 1996, Supervisor Myers completed Petitioner's annual performance appraisal for the period March 14, 1995 through March 14, 1996. Petitioner disagreed with the determination that she had difficulty communicating with others. Petitioner's mental health counselor, Christine Clark, sent Mr. Edwards an unsolicited letter dated April 23, 1996. According to the letter, Ms. Clark was treating Petitioner for family/employment related stress reduction. The letter states as follows in pertinent part: Due to the demands of her home environment, caretaking of her elderly mother who is dying from colon cancer, I am recommending that Ms. Musgrove be reassigned new working hours, namely a day schedule of approximately 8:00 AM until 5:00 PM in order to effectively and efficiently facilitate the evening and night care of her mother. In addition, Ms. Musgrove appears to have unresolved issues regarding her personnel file and salary still due to her for 30 minutes or .5 hour pay as well as two hours uncompensated work from several weeks ago. I personally read your approval for this compensation but apparently this has still not yet been indicated on her pay check. There also remain the allegations of her misconduct charges that appears not to be fully resolved. As an employee she does have the legal right to have these fully addressed and challenged. From my understanding that although the misconduct charges have been dropped, there are still areas that compromise Ms. Musgrove's reputation as a resident advisor. Mr. Edwards did not disclose the contents of Ms. Clark's letter to any employee of Respondent CSD other than his superiors, who advised him to get a release from Petitioner before responding to the letter. After receiving Ms. Clark's letter, Mr. Edwards had a telephone conversation with Petitioner's mother because Petitioner was not at work or at home. During the conversation, Mr. Edwards inquired about the mother's health. Mr. Edwards learned that Mrs. Musgrove's cancer had been in remission since 1993 and that she no longer required assistance with daily living activities. Mr. Edwards did not disclose any information regarding Petitioner's employment status, medical condition, or personal business to Mrs. Musgrove. Petitioner's sister placed an unsolicited telephone call to Mr. Edwards several days after he talked to Mrs. Musgrove. The purpose of the call was to thank Mr. Edwards for his concern over Mrs. Musgrove's health. During the telephone call, Mr. Edwards and Petitioner's sister did not exchange any information relating to Petitioner's employment, medical condition, or personal business. On April 29, 1996, all staff at Hamilton House received a memorandum advising them as follows, in pertinent part: As a result of the recent competitive bid conducted by District 3, Department of Juvenile Justice, Gator Human Services has been awarded the contract to operate the Hamilton County Youth Treatment Complex starting July 1, 1996. The memorandum also included information regarding the transfer of operations to the new service provider. Respondent CSD advised employees that, if requested, it would supply Gator Human Services the name, position title, hire date, and current salary of each employee of record. Respondent CSD stated that no other information would be given to the new organization without the consent of the employee. On May 1, 1996, Mr. Edwards wrote two memoranda regarding Petitioner's pay. First, Mr. Edwards directed the administrative manager to pay Petitioner for .5 hours of regular wages out of the company's petty cash fund and to get a receipt for the payment. Second, he directed the resident life manager to allow Petitioner to leave work two hours early (with pay) at a time of her choosing within the next work week. Petitioner could not "bank" the time indefinitely because Respondent CSD's contract was scheduled to expire on June 30, 1996. Mr. Edwards phoned Petitioner at home on May 2, 1996, to request a written release so that he could respond to Ms. Clark's letter. Petitioner wrote that release on May 3, 1996. The release gave Mr. Edwards permission to disclose confidential information to Ms. Clark. On May 3, 1996, Petitioner signed a written acknowledgment that receipt of $4.06 in payment for .5 regular hours would end the issue of the .5 regular hours owed to her. On May 10, 1996, Respondent Gator informed the staff at Hamilton House of the procedure for handling applications for employment with Respondent Gator's new program, Tiger Success Center. Applications were due on or before May 28, 1996. Interviews were to be scheduled between May 28, 1996, and June 7, 1996. Applicants would be advised of the final selections and employment offers by June 14, 1996. Respondent Gator requested that each applicant take a copy of their most recent performance appraisal to their employment interview. By letter dated May 13, 1996, Mr. Edwards responded to Ms. Clark's inquiry. First, he explained that questions regarding Petitioner's compensation had been resolved. Second, he stated that letters from the Department of Juvenile Justice and from the Office of the Inspector General had been added to Petitioner's personnel file, clearing her of all misconduct allegations. Third, he explained that the day shift would be the least desirable shift in terms of stress reduction because the activity level of the residents is highest during the day. Mr. Edwards also revealed that Petitioner's mother was treated successfully for cancer in 1993 and that her current health failed to support the need for a change in Petitioner's shift. Finally, Mr. Edwards noted that he had to consider the needs of the residents and other staff. A copy of Ms. Clark's inquiry and Mr. Edwards' response were placed in Petitioner's personnel file. Neither of the documents were disclosed to unauthorized persons. On May 22, 1996, the employees at Hamilton House received another memorandum advising them that after June 30, 1996, Respondent CSD would no longer operate the facility. The employees were encouraged to apply for employment with the new organization. Petitioner was scheduled for an employment interview on May 30, 1996. However, the interview was rescheduled because she was unable to keep the appointment. Petitioner's application for employment with Respondent Gator is dated May 31, 1996. She also furnished Respondent Gator with copies of three performance appraisals. Petitioner's signature on the application authorized Respondent Gator to make inquiries of references and former employers regarding her general character and past performance. There is no evidence that Respondent Gator ever made any such inquiries about Petitioner. A panel of three people representing Respondent Gator interviewed Petitioner. The panel asked her the same questions that they asked other applicants. Petitioner was very negative and critical of the existing program and Respondent CSD during her interview. After the interview, each member of the interview panel tallied their score sheets independently. All three agreed that Petitioner should not be given further consideration for employment with Respondent Gator because of her negative attitude and low interview scores. On June 13, 1996, Petitioner received a memorandum from Respondent Gator stating that the company was unable to offer her a position of employment. That same day, Respondent Gator offered employment to every other Hamilton House staff applicant except one black male, Mr. Humphrey. Respondent Gator hired a black female, Latasha Bristol, who worked in the level eight dormitory with Petitioner. Ms. Bristol is younger than Petitioner. However, she was not hired to replace Petitioner. Respondent Gator hired Ms. Bristol to work in the level six dormitory. Respondent Gator offered an employment position to a white female, Lucy Oxendine. Ms. Oxendine was over 60 years old at the time. She declined to accept a job with Respondent Gator for personal reasons. Mr. Edwards was hired by Respondent Gator to continue as program director after July 1, 1996. However, neither he nor any other employee of Respondent CSD shared any information about Petitioner with Respondent Gator or had any input into Respondent Gator's decision not to hire Petitioner. Respondent Gator based its decision not to employ Petitioner solely on the results of her interview which was very negative. On June 14, 1996, the staff at Hamilton House received a memorandum stating that anyone interested in accepting employment with Respondent Gator must sign up on June 19, 1996. On June 14, 1996, Petitioner's doctor faxed a medical excuse to Respondent CSD stating that Petitioner could not return to work for an undetermined period of time. The document indicates that Petitioner's diagnosis involved anxiety, depression, and work-related stress. The doctor commented that Petitioner was the primary caretaker of her mother who was terminally ill with cancer. The doctor's June 14, 1996, fax was received by Respondent CSD in the administrative manager's office. It was on her desk for a brief period of time before it was delivered to Mr. Edwards. There is no credible evidence that any employee of Respondent CSD disclosed the contents of the fax to unauthorized persons. Petitioner's doctor did not give her permission to return to work until after July 1, 1996.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that FCHR enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's Charges of Discrimination against both Respondent CSD and Respondent Gator. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of July, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of July, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: H. B. Stivers, Esquire Levine and Stivers 245 East Virginia Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Faye Musgrove Post Office Box 657 Live Oak, Florida 32064 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent is guilty of discrimination in employment on the basis of marital status.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is Julie Wallace. She was employed by Respondent as an automobile salesperson from the last week of June, 1987, until September 12, 1988. Respondent is an automobile dealership, Heartland Pontiac-Buick- Cadillac-GMC Truck, Inc. Its corporate president at the time of Petitioner's employment termination was Nancy Cosgrove. Respondent hired Petitioner on June 18, 1987. Respondent's corporate president at that time was Steven Cosgrove, then husband to Nancy Cosgrove. Petitioner and her husband were married in July, 1987, shortly after she began her employment with Respondent. At the time, Petitioner's husband was also employed by Respondent as an automobile salesperson. The wedding ceremony took place at the Cosgrove home. Respondent does not have a work practice prohibiting nepotism and there are several examples of Respondent's employment of married couples, as well as employment of other multiple members of individual families. Petitioner fared well in Respondent's employment initially. She was recognized by the dealership as the "salesperson of the month" in August, 1987. She was awarded a trip to the "Indy 500" in May, 1988. In spite of Petitioner's productivity during the first year of her employment, Respondent lost a great amount of money for a period of approximately 14 months prior to terminationof Petitioner's employment. Respondent's financial losses resulted from insufficient sales overall in the dealership during that period of time. The separation and subsequent divorce of the Cosgroves coincided with Ms. Cosgrove's assumption of the presidency of Respondent. Ms. Cosgrove took over the dealership in order to prevent it from collapsing financially. For approximately two to four weeks prior to termination of Petitioner, sales records were abysmal for the entire sales force. Further, morale of the sales force was poor as the result of management changes and efforts to cut unnecessary expenses. In conjunction with management attempts to strengthen the dealership's dwindling finances, traditional assignment of demonstrator automobiles to salespeople were eliminated a few days prior to the termination of Petitioner's employment. The elimination of the demonstrator automobiles, coupled with the change in management from Mr. Cosgrove to Ms. Cosgrove, resulted in a verbal altercation between Petitioner's husband and Ms. Cosgrove on September 12, 1988. The upshot of that confrontation was the firing of Petitioner's husband by Ms. Cosgrove. A short time, perhaps an hour later, the sales manager employed by Ms. Cosgrove requested to see Petitioner. He asked Petitioner whether she might prefer to resign in theaftermath of her husband's termination. Petitioner said she did not wish to leave her employment. After Petitioner and Respondent's sales manager concluded their discussion, the sales manager returned later in the day and explained that Petitioner's employment was terminated in view of Petitioner's lack of production or automobile sales. Later, Respondent's sales manager provided Petitioner with a letter erroneously stating that Petitioner had been employed by Respondent for two years. The letter correctly stated that Petitioner was always in the top one third of the sales force in her performance, but did not elaborate on the extent to which performance of all members of the sales staff had plummeted prior to Petitioner's termination. At the time of Petitioner's employment termination, there was only one other salesperson, in addition to the sales manager, remaining on Respondent's sales staff. Through attrition and previous terminations, Ms. Cosgrove had virtually eliminated the sales force inherited from her ex-husband's management by the time of Petitioner's termination. The world of automotive salespersons is extremely competitive and pressurized. Individuals are constantly urged to produce or seek other employment. The fact of previous sales accomplishments provides salespersons no cushion for future periods of sale failures. As stated by Ms. Cosgrove, in a somewhat cold and dispassionate manner, at the final hearing, "you're either a hero or a zero." The discharge of sales personnel after a change of management and an extended period of financial non-profitability is not unusual in the automobile dealership business. Such a movement on the part of Ms. Cosgrove was also motivated by a desire to increase sales and improve morale with salespersons of her own choosing. Salespeople, such as Petitioner, working at Respondent's dealership are "at will" employees, possessing no employment contracts of a specified term, or conditions governing the termination of their employment. Sales employees at the dealership did have a payment plan or agreement with Respondent. The plan in effect during Petitioner's employment permitted her to draw a salary against commissions, provided she had accumulated commissions in-house and elected to utilize this draw procedure versus direct commission payment. At the time of her termination, Petitioner had no accumulations against which to draw a salary. The payment plan did not provide a set term of employment or address standards for employment termination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of June, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W.DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Fl 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of June, 1990. APPENDIX It should be noted that both parties incorrectly filed their proposed findings with the Commission On Human Relations as opposed to the Division Of Administrative Hearings. Upon discovery of the error, the parties were permitted to have the proposed findings forwarded to the abovesigned by Commission personnel. Upon review of the proposed findings, it was noted that neither party's proposal is presented in the form of separately numbered paragraphs which would permit a referenced comment or ruling on each proposed finding. Each party's proposed findings have been reviewed and addressed to the extent possible by the foregoing findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240 / Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Julie Wallace 1406 Chloe Terrace Sebring, FL 33870 E. Mark Breed III, Esq. 335 South Commerce Sebring, FL 33870 Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240 / Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240 / Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed as a waitress at the Kapok Tree Restaurant in October, 1983. She suffered a heart attack in August, 1985 and remained out of work until January, 1986 at which time she was rehired by Respondent as a hostess. From January, 1986 until June 3, 1986 Petitioner was employed by Respondent as a hostess, and her duties included greeting and seating customers. She also made sure customers' reservations were in order and that customers were equally distributed among the waiters and waitresses. While she was a hostess, Petitioner's supervisors were Scott Evans and Janice Kehoe. Respondent rehired Petitioner in January, 1986 as a hostess rather than a waitress because the duties of a hostess are less strenuous than those of a waitress, and Petitioner willingly accepted the position. She enjoyed her job as hostess very much, and had no medical limitations which in any way precluded or adversely affected her performance of a hostess' duties. While employed as a waitress Petitioner was counseled, and placed on one-week suspension without pay by her supervisor on April 30, 1984 for being rude to customers. She also received a disciplinary warning slip on May 26, 1985 for poor attitude and uncooperative response to job training and supervisor direction. After being rehired as a hostess, her performance was less than ideal and she became flustered and gruff with customers, according to Scott Evans and Janice Kehoe, her supervisors. She was counseled approximately five times about her performance as a hostess, and then was laid off on June 3, 1986 because business volume was down, and only the most outstanding employees could be retained. Since petitioner's performance was only satisfactory, but not as outstanding as others, she was selected to be laid-off. There is no competent substantial evidence that Petitioner's heart condition, or insurance expenses associated therewith, were in any way considered by, or factors in, Respondent's decision to lay-off Petitioner. Ten other employees were laid-off, or had their hours reduced, at approximately the same time as Petitioner's lay-off due to slow business volume. Respondent does currently employ handicapped workers. There is no evidence that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in this case due to any handicap. Petitioner would not be considered for rehire by Respondent due to her performance as a hostess.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that a Final Order be issued dismissing Petitioner's charge of discrimination against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of June, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of June, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Terry M. Broklehurst, Esquire 2420 Enterprise Road, Suite 204 Clearwater, Florida 33575 W. Reynolds Allen, Esquire Gail Goldman Holtzman, Esquire 609 West Horatio Street Tampa, Florida 33606 Ronald M. McElrath Post Office Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 33518-4748 Miles Lance, Esquire Post Office Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 33518-4748
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Charge of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on January 7, 1998.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this discrimination case, which has an extremely limited factual record and is replete with hearsay, Petitioner, Thornton Alan Bline, who was 52 years of age in October 1997, contends that Respondent, Automax and Pearson Group, unlawfully terminated him on account of his age. Respondent denies the allegation and contends that Petitioner was terminated because of poor performance. A preliminary decision on the merits of the claim was never reached by the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission). Respondent is a car dealer that began business in the summer of 1997. Although there is no specific evidence on the issue of whether Respondent is an employer within the meaning of the law, monthly compensation reports received in evidence as Respondent's Exhibits 1 and 2 reflect that during August and September 1997, Respondent employed five team leaders, including Petitioner. Thus, the total number of employees would have been greater. Even so, the record does not show the precise number of persons employed by Respondent, and the undersigned is unable to determine if Respondent is an employer within the meaning of the law and thus subject to the Commission's jurisdiction. Petitioner was hired by Respondent on May 30, 1997, as a floor manager. That position required Petitioner to manage a small team of salespersons who assisted customers in purchasing automobiles. The team's performance was measured by the number of automobiles (units) sold each month. In August and September 1997, Petitioner's team had the lowest sales volume of any team. More specifically, in August 1997, out of 80 units sold by all teams, Petitioner's team sold only 10 units; in September 1997, out of 97 units sold by all teams, Petitioner's team sold only 4. At hearing, Petitioner agreed that these numbers were accurate and that his sales "were down" during that period of time. On October 1, 1997, Petitioner was summoned to the office of the general manager, "Bud" Holian, who advised him that he was being terminated due to low sales performance. At that brief meeting, Holian explained that he "felt bad" about the decision, especially "with all [Petitioner had] done," but that he had to let Petitioner go. Petitioner contended that during the conversation, Holian had also stated that the company needed "someone younger and fresher to liven up the team." He further contended that another floor manager named "Rick" overheard the conversation and could confirm these remarks. However, Rick did not appear and testify. Neither was there was any other corroborating or independent evidence to confirm this allegation. Holian, who is older than Petitioner, denied making the comment. He also established that after Petitioner was terminated, he hired two other salesmen who were older than Petitioner. Finally, the record does not show who replaced Petitioner and the age of that individual. In light of the foregoing, there is insufficient evidence to find that Respondent's employment decision was grounded on discriminatory animus in any respect, or that a discriminatory reason motivated the employer in its actions. Rather, the more persuasive evidence supports a finding that Petitioner was terminated solely because of poor sales performance.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing, with prejudice, the Charge of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of August, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (850) 488-9675, SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of August, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Thornton Alan Bline 5720 Northeast 4th Street Ocala, Florida 34470 Bernard B. Holian, General Manager Automax and Pearson Group 1918 Southwest 17th Street Ocala, Florida 34470 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Stephanie Walker, timely filed a Petition for Relief regarding her charge of discrimination against the Respondent, Bennett Auto Supply, Inc.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Stephanie Walker, applied for and received employment with the Respondent, Bennett Auto Supply, Inc. The Petitioner's initial employment with the company ended on March 8, 2001, as she resigned her job on or about February 26, 2001. Thereafter, the Petitioner returned to employment with the Respondent. Again, the Petitioner resigned her job and left employment on April 27, 2002. The exact reasons the Petitioner began employment, left employment, returned to employment, and again left employment with the Respondent are immaterial to the findings dispositive of this case. Suffice it to say the Petitioner ultimately filed a claim of discrimination with the FCHR against the Respondent. The Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination naming the Respondent was dated March 21, 2003, and noted April 27, 2002, as the date the most recent discrimination had taken place. Based upon its investigation of the allegations, the FCHR issued a Determination: No Cause on September 23, 2003. The Determination: No Cause provided, in pertinent part, ". . . it is my determination that there is no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred." The Notice of Determination: No Cause, provided: Complainant may request an administrative hearing by filing a PETITION FOR RELIEF within 35 days of the date of this NOTICE OF DETERMINATION: NO CAUSE. A Petition for Relief form is enclosed with Complainant's notice. It may be beneficial for Complainant to seek legal counsel prior to filing the petition. If the Complainant fails to request an administrative hearing with [sic] 35 days of the date of this notice, the administrative claim under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Chapter 760, will be dismissed pursuant to section 760.11, Florida Statutes (1992). The Petition for Relief was filed approximately 159 days after the FCHR issued its determination in this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner's Petition for Relief as it was not timely filed and is, therefore, barred as a matter of law. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of April, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Aplachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard A. Giardino, Esquire Davis & Giardino, P.A. 201 Arkona Court West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Stephanie Walker 1808 Northwest 52nd Avenue Lauderhill, Florida 33313
The Issue Whether the Respondent unlawfully discriminated against the Petitioner on the basis of race or handicap in discharging him from employment on February 25, 1992; and whether the Respondent unlawfully discriminated against the Petitioner and other black employees in pay for similar jobs.
Findings Of Fact During the summer of 1988, Larry Jelks, a black male, approached Jerry Sikes, the Director of Public Works of Suwannee Country, seeking employment. Petitioner, Jelks, explained and Sikes was aware that Petitioner had significant experience as a welder. Several weeks later, Sikes contacted Jelks and offered him a job as a laborer. The Petitioner began work of August 16, 1988 with a starting pay of $5.00/hour in the position of laborer, an entry level, unskilled job classification. The Petitioner received a copy of the employer's regulations. On August 24, 1988, the Petitioner was promoted to Serviceman, and his pay increased to $6.00/hour. On October 12, 1988, Sikes hired Mr. Praley, a white male, as a welder, although his expertise was as a mechanic and Praley was subsequently assigned duties as a mechanic by Sikes. Praley was paid a starting salary of $6.50/hour. The welder/mechanic position was open when Jelks was hired. On November 24, 1988, Petitioner completed his 100 day probation and given his annual 5 percent raise, increasing his pay to $6.30/hour. Other black employees also had their pay raises delayed until after their probation was completed. White employees, including Praley, received their annual raises in the year of their initial employment, notwithstanding their probationary status. This discrepancy in treatment of employees was not explained by the County. On September 30, 1989, the Petitioner laterally transferred to the position of truck driver for the refuse collection service because he did not enjoy the work of a serviceman. One October 1, 1989, Petitioner received an annual raise of 4 percent, to $6.56/hour. Subsequently, the axle in Petitioner's truck broke, and when he was questioned about it, he asked for a transfer. On March 3, 1990, the Petitioner was transferred to a shop position in which he repaired rusted or damaged garbage bins (dumpsters), by welding new sides and bottoms on them. The sheets of steel which Petitioner welded on the bins were 6 feet by 12 feet in size and 1/16" thick, and weighed approximately 180 pounds. These sheets were generally cut into smaller pieces prior to being moved from the stack in which they were stored. These pieces of material had to be moved into position to be cut and welded. The bins were moved using backhoes and forklifts. The Petitioner was responsible for moving the pieces of sheet steel and using the equipment to move the bins. On March 17, 1990, the Petitioner received a 5 percent pay increase to $6.89/hour. On April 28, 1990, the Petitioner received a 5 percent raise to $7.24/hour. On October 1, 1990, the Petitioner was given a 5 percent raise to $7.61/hour. In early 1991, the Petitioner's child became critically ill, and the Petitioner obtained leave to be with the child. In addition, Jerry Sikes approved flexibility in the Petitioner's scheduling to permit him be with the child conditioned upon Petitioner letting his supervisors know what he was doing and when he was going to be away from his job. Problems were encountered with Petitioner's attendance, and he was counseled about this and given a copy of the Country's leave policy. Generally, however, the Petitioner's performance was satisfactory, and he was considered a good and valued employee. On September 23, 1991, the Petitioner suffered a job- related injury, and was placed upon workers' compensation leave. The Petitioner received workers' compensation and disability benefits during his leave. During his absence the other employees performed his welding duties. While on leave, the Petitioner received a 3 percent pay increase to $7.84/hour. On November 25, 1991, Sikes wrote Petitioner a letter advising that he was required to submit doctor's notes concerning his absences while on workers compensation leave. On December 20, 1991, John B. Roberts, the County's workers' compensation (rehabilitation) consultant contacted Sikes and asked Sikes to identify an alternative position the duties of which the Petitioner could perform. Sikes advised Roberts that the County had no light duty jobs, but that driving a truck was one of the least physically demanding jobs in the County's maintenance department. He advised Roberts that he would assign the Petitioner to drive one of the light dump trucks if he returned to work. These trucks have an especially rough ride when operated off road, as these were. Roberts looked at the duties of the job, and determined that the Petitioner ought to be able to perform these duties. Roberts discussed returning to work and performing the duties of a truck driver with the Petitioner; however, the Petitioner advised Roberts that he wanted to talk with his attorney prior to returning to work. The Petitioner did not return and assume the duties of driving a truck in December as Roberts had arranged. On January 2, 1992, the Petitioner was sent a copy of a letter which was to Mr. Larry Sikes from Dr. Cason who had been treating Petitioner. The letter stated that the Petitioner was released from treatment to return to regular work activities as of January 2, 1992. On January 3, 1992, the Petitioner returned to work. He had a 4 percent permanent impairment, but his employer was not advised of this. His doctor advised the rehabilitation counselor that the Petitioner be placed on light duty because he would have to toughen up after returning to work. Sikes did not afford the Petitioner the opportunity to work back into the job. The Petitioner's work area was outside, behind the regular shop, exposed to the elements. It was very cold at the time the Petitioner returned to work. The Petitioner's production was low because he could not physically manhandle the large sheets of steel as he could prior to his injury. He asked that an inmate be assigned to work with him all the time, but assistance was denied to the Petitioner. The Petitioner asked for a backhoe, which he had previously modified, to move the bins and sheets around; however, this piece of equipment had been sent to the landfill. He was told to use a front end loader to do this work; however, he went to the landfill and retrieved the backhoe because he had difficulties climbing into the cab of the front end loader. His demands and getting the backhoe without permission created additional conflicts between the Petitioner and his supervisors. On January 8, 1992, Sikes issued the Petitioner a memo concerning his poor productivity and failure to follow the instructions of his supervisor. Prior to his injury, the Petitioner repaired approximately one bin per day. During the period after his return to work, he did approximately one bin every two to three days. When presented with the memorandum, the Petitioner advised that he was unable to do that which he had formerly done. The Petitioner was told that he was expected to do all his regular work. This motivated the Petitioner to return to the doctor and seek a clarification of what he could and could not do. In addition, Petitioner was also seeing a chiropractor regularly for treatment. Petitioner left work almost daily to see the doctor, and frequently did not return. He did not provide his employer with documentation of these visits. The Petitioner asked that an overhead chain hoist, similar to the one which was inside the shop area, be installed in his work area to move the sheets of steel to assist him. His direct supervisor, Mr. Horton, denied the request because it was expensive and required additional construction to support the mechanism. On January 13, 1992, the Petitioner received a second warning for being absent from work without notifying his supervisor. Sikes advised the Petitioner that he would have to comply with the County's personnel regulations which required prior notification and a note from the doctor. Although the Petitioner testified he was absent attending doctor's visits, he presented no other substantiation of these visits at the hearing. On January 22, 1992, the Petitioner submitted, as requested earlier, a report from Dr. James B. Slatery of Gainesville Orthopedic Group, advising that the Petitioner could return to work, but should avoid climbing and limit his lifting over 50 pounds to an occasional basis. A similar report was submitted by Dr. A. C. Bass. The metal sheets the Petitioner was lifting weighed over fifty pounds. The County failed to make accommodations for the Petitioner's physical problems upon his return to work in a manner it had for white employees. The county had placed recovering white employees in positions where they were flagmen, directed traffic, and in similar positions. The county placed the Petitioner back at his regular duties, stated it had no "light duty" positions, and demanded Petitioner perform all his duties to pre-injury standards of productivity. When the Petitioner asked for assistance in lifting the sheets of steel which were in excess of the weight allowance set by his doctor, the County told him to seek assistance from his coworkers, who were instructed to assist him. He had to wait until they finished with their immediate task, and they were less than happy about these interruptions, and going outside where the Petitioner worked. This slowed his production for which he received criticism from his supervisors. The conditions imposed by the employer were not so bad as to constitute a constructive discharge. However, had Petitioner filed an action at that time, he would have proven that he was treated differently than white employees who were accommodated for their physical problems when returning from workman's compensation leave. There was a verbal exchange between the Petitioner and one of his coworkers, Earnest Johns, arising out of their interactions in the shop. The Petitioner told Johns that he "would pass up a bus load of white girls, to make him (Johns) his bitch." Johns complained to Sikes about the Petitioner, and told Sikes, "he needed to do something about that Nigger." Sikes told Johns that he would take care of it and to calm down. Johns, who was very upset, subsequently apologized to Sikes for his confrontational manner in raising the matter with him. On January 25, 1992, Sikes sent the Petitioner another memo confirming a verbal warning about his poor work habits, wasting time, and absenteeism. On January 30, 1992, Sikes sent the Petitioner another memo regarding his poor work habits. In February, the Petitioner's wife, from whom he was separated, died, and he was granted three days bereavement leave for February 11-13, 1992. On February 18, 1992, the Petitioner called the shop and left word with a secretary that he would not be at work for the rest of that week. He did not submit a leave request for this period of time. Subsequently, the Petitioner was absent without permission from February 14 until February 24, 1992. The Petitioner did not obtain permission from his supervisors prior to taking this leave, did not request leave without pay, and did to explain his absence. Neither did his doctor, the rehabilitation counselor, his chiropractor, his attorney, or a member of his family or a friend report his absence and give any explanation. During this period, he appeared once at work to pick up his pay check on February 21, 1992. On this occasion the Petitioner did not address the matter of his absence with Sikes or Horton, although Horton advised he Petitioner that Sikes wanted to speak with him. The Petitioner had exhausted all of his sick and vacation leave prior to February 14, 1992. Under the County's rules, an employee had to request leave without pay after exhausting sick and annual leave, and the request had to be approved by the County Commission. The Petitioner did not make a request for leave without pay. Although the Petitioner asserts that he had not exhausted his sick leave because he was visiting the doctor during his absences which was covered by workers' compensation leave, he did not provide medical substantiation for the alleged treatments and doctors' visits as required by the employer's rules in order to obtain workers' compensation leave. On February 25, 1992, the Petitioner returned to work at starting time wearing work clothes. Horton stopped him on his way to his work area, and advised him that Sikes wanted to talk with him. Horton accompanied the Petitioner to Sikes office. Sikes asked the Petitioner were he had been, and the Petitioner answered that he had been attending to personal business. Sikes asked him for a more detailed explanation of his absence, and the Petitioner again told him that he had been tending to business and that Sikes should either fire him or get off his back. Sikes warned the Petitioner that unless he provided some explanation for his unauthorized absence, he would have to terminate him. The Petitioner refused to provide any additional explanation, but asked that his firing be put in writing. The Petitioner left the work place after the meeting, and did not return to work or attempt to explain his absences. Sikes viewed the Petitioner's absences and refusal to obey the personnel regulations as undermining his credibility as a supervisor. Several days after the confrontation on February 25, 1992, Sikes wrote a letter terminating the Petitioner for (1) continued or gross neglect of duty; (2) absence without leave; incompetence or unwillingness to render satisfactory service; insubordination; and (5) habitual absences, as provided in Parts X and XI of the County personnel regulations. Sikes extended special consideration to all employees of the department, who were permitted to take leave or be absent without applying for leave. The Petitioner was permitted to take leave without applying for it, and that considerable latitude was extended to the Petitioner regarding his absences prior to his being discharged. A white male, who was not handicapped, was hired on May 28, 1992 to file the position from which the Petitioner was discharged. The Petitioner appealed his discharge under the County's rules, and after an evidentiary hearing in which the Petitioner was represented by counsel, the county's hearing officer found that the dismissal was for cause in a Final Order dated September 24, 1992. Discrimination in Promotion and Pay among Blacks. The population and labor market statistics offered by the Petitioner in support of his contention that Blacks were discriminated against in promotion fail to support the proposition for which they were offered. For example, the Petitioner limits the labor pool to those persons who are over 16 and worked in 1989. However, there are those persons who are over 16 and would like to work, but who have not been hired. If the Petitioner's contention is correct, one would expect that for every white employee hired, there was a black applicant who was not hired. Therefore, comparisons based upon persons actually hired understate the percentage of Blacks in the labor pool. The relevant labor market for this dispute is Suwannee County, Florida, and the relevant labor pool are those people over 16 years of age who are now seeking, or who have in the past sought employment. According to the 1990 census, 14.7 percent of the population of the County is black. Blacks constitute 13.8 percent of the County's employees. The work environment was not overtly racist, and while, as stated above, racially charged verbal barbs were occasionally exchanged, there is no evidence that this was common or tolerated by the employer. The best evidence of discrimination by the employer were the actual practices engaged in by the County. During the 12 years prior to the termination of the Petitioner, the County had never had a Black supervisor. From 1989 to September 23, 1992, the County hired one black employee of 30 employees who it hired. Its top 10 highest paid employees were all white. The highest paid black was the forty-first highest paid employee of the County. Kevin Praley was placed in a welder's position despite the fact he was a mechanic at $6.50/hour; and Petitioner, who was a professional welder, was hired as a laborer at $5.00/hour in 1988. At the time Praley was hired, the Petitioner was making $6.00/hour, so that the differential between their pay was $.50/hour in 1988. After four years, Praley, who was hired after the Petitioner, was paid $2.01/hour more than the Petitioner for work which Sikes and others said was similar. This reflects continuing discrimination in hiring and paying Blacks. Blacks were hired in the lowest paying, menial jobs within the county, and this was not on the basis of education. All of the county's custodial employees are black. Only one of the county's secretaries is black. Until very recently, there were no black supervisors in the county's maintenance department. Most of the County's increases in Black employment and promotions occurred after institution of this case. The Clerk of the Circuit Court/Clerk of the Board of County Commissioners has not published a salary discrimination review required by Section 28.34, Florida Statutes. Further, the County's Equal Opportunity Program of 1992 provided for annual assessment of its progress in equal opportunity. As of May 9,1994, the County and not compile an annual report pursuant to its plan. The County did not train Black employees to assume greater responsibility, and did not utilize them as heavy equipment operators until after the institution of this action. The county did not pay Jelks and other Black employees annual pay raises while they were on probation; however, it did pay white employees Praley, Hardin, Simmons, Mobley, Luanne Mixon, Tervola, and Brother annual pay raises while they were on probation. These white employees were all hired prior to or during the year the Petitioner was hired. Jelks received the raise at the end of his probation period on November 24, 1988. Helen Stoudermire, Mattie L. Weatherspoon, Tyrone Tillman, and Marvette Gwinn, all black employees of the Respondent, did not receive annual raises while in probationary status, contrary to the treatment afforded white employees. The amounts of their collective salary losses were not presented as a finding of fact. The county did discriminate against the Petitioner and other black employees in pay and promotion during the period 1989 until February 25, 1992.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission of Human Relations enter a Final Order directing that: The Petitioner's Petition for Relief relating to his discharge be dismissed; Black employees of the County be certified as a class for the period beginning August 1988 until the present; The County be ordered to cease and desist its discriminatory practices in pay and promotion against the class of black employees; The County's Clerk be ordered to file reports on salary differentials are required by statute; and Reasonable attorney's fees and costs be awarded to Petitioner's counsel. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of September, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of September, 1994. APPENDIX CASE NO. 93-5330 Both of the parties submitted proposed findings which were read and considered. The following states which findings were adopted, and which were rejected and why: Petitioner's Recommended Order Findings Paragraph 1 Paragraph 2 Paragraph 2 Rejected as contrary to more credible facts. See Paragraph 41. Paragraph 3 True, but part of statement of case. Paragraph 4 Paragraph 11. Paragraph 5 Paragraph 1. Paragraph 6 Subsumed in Paragraph 11. Paragraph 7 Subsumed in Paragraphs 11 and 17. Paragraphs 8,9,10 Paragraph 44. Paragraph 11 Conclusion of Law Paragraph 12 Paragraph 57. Paragraph 13 Contrary to facts. The Petitioner returned to duty. Paragraph 14 Irrelevant. Paragraph 15 Paragraph 48 Paragraphs 16,17,18 Paragraph 51 Paragraph 19,20 Contrary to more credible evidence. Paragraph 21 Subsumed in paragraph 54. Paragraph 22 Paragraph 56. Paragraphs 23,24,25 Paragraphs 2,3,4,58,60 Paragraph 26 Paragraph 26. Paragraphs 27,28 Paragraph 42. Paragraphs 29,30 Subsumed in 2,3,52,53. Paragraph 31 Rejected because Jelks received the raise at the end of his probation period on November 24, 1988. His reduction in pay was $.30/hour for October and November, or 8 weeks X 40 hours X .30 = $96.00. Paragraph 32 County's claims were rejected on this point. Paragraph 33 Paragraph 18 Paragraph 34 The statistical record is rejected for lack of credibility because it considers averages of both groups compared when there are findings which show whites held higher paying jobs. Paragraph 35 Subsumed in paragraph 32. Paragraph 36 Subsumed in paragraph 54. Paragraph 37 Rejected as contrary to better evidence. Paragraph 38 Subsumed in Paragraphs 26,27. Paragraph 39 Paragraphs 29,30. Paragraph 40 Is not addressed specifically because it violated the HO's directions that findings be kept short, and address specific factual matters, and is mostly argument. Paragraph 41 Subsumed in Paragraph 17. Paragraph 42 Paragraph 20. Paragraph 43 The County did accommodate some whites. Paragraph 44 Rejected as contrary to best evidence. Paragraph 45 Paragraph 50. Paragraph 46 Subsumed in Paragraph 55. Paragraph 47 Rejected. Welder and mechanic were the same job description. Paragraph 48 Irrelevant. Paragraph 49 Rejected because "handicap" relates to permanent conditions, and his permanent handicap was only 4 percent. It was his temporary condition which impacted his ability to perform the work. Paragraph 50 Irrelevant. Paragraph 51,52 The name calling by employees, to include Johns, occurred in the context of an angry exchange with Sikes, who cautioned Johns to calm down. Johns subsequently apologized to Sikes, and neither were aware that his comments had been overheard by Jelks. Paragraph 53 Paragraph 51. Respondent's Recommended Order Findings Paragraphs 1-5 Paragraphs 1-6 Paragraph 6 Subsumed in part in 1-6, and rejected in part as contrary to most credible evidence. Paragraphs 7,8 Paragraph 6 & rejected as contrary to most credible evidence. Paragraph 9 Rejected as contrary to most credible evidence. Paragraph 10,11 Paragraph 8 Paragraph 12,13,14 Paragraph 9,10 Paragraph 15 Paragraph 29 Paragraph 16 Paragraph 49 Paragraphs 17-23 Paragraphs 11-17 Paragraph 24 Paragraph 21 Paragraph 25 Paragraph 19. Paragraphs 26,27 Irrelevant. Paragraph 28 Paragraph 25 Paragraph 29 Paragraph 17 Paragraph 30 Rejected as contrary to most credible evidence. Paragraph 31 Paragraph 28. Paragraph 32 Irrelevant. Paragraph 33 Rejected as contrary to most credible evidence. Paragraph 34 Paragraph 20. Paragraphs 35,36 Paragraph 19 & rejected as contrary to best evidence. Paragraph 37 Paragraph 23. Paragraph 38 Paragraph 24. Paragraph 39 Paragraph 25. Paragraph 40 Paragraph 31. Paragraph 41 Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 42 Paragraph 33. Paragraphs 43,44 Paragraph 32. Paragraph 45 Paragraph 35. Paragraph 46 Paragraph 36. Paragraph 47 Irrelevant. Paragraph 48 Subsumed in paragraphs above. Paragraph 49 Subsumed in Paragraph 33. Paragraph 50 Paragraph 35, best evidence. Paragraph 51 Paragraph 32. Paragraph 52 True, but part of law. Paragraph 53 Paragraph 34. Paragraphs 54-58 Paragraphs 37,38,40,41 Paragraph 59 Irrelevant. Paragraph 60 Duplicative. Paragraphs 61,62 Irrelevant. Paragraph 63 Rejected as contrary to most credible evidence. Paragraph 64 Paragraph 48. Paragraph 65 Subsumed in Paragraph 41. Paragraph 66 Subsumed in Paragraph 48. Paragraph 67 Irrelevant. Paragraph 68 The wage disparity was the result of hiring Blacks in the lowest paying jobs. Paragraph 69 Subsumed in Paragraph 54. Paragraph 70 Paragraph 50. Paragraph 71 See comments to Paragraph 68. Paragraphs 72-83 Subsumed in Paragraphs 54, 55. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael Mattimore, Esquire Kimberly L. King, Esquire Suite 305 215 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 Toby Buel, Esquire Three Rivers Legal Services 817 West Duval Street Lake City, FL 32055 C. Dean Lewis, Esquire Post Office Box 8 Live Oak, FL 32060 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4113
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner has been the victim of employment discrimination by reason of his being terminated, allegedly on account of his physical disability.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an "employee" as defined in Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and the Respondent meets the statutory definition of "employer" appearing in that Chapter. The Petitioner is a truck driver by occupation and was employed by the Respondent, Gurley Refining Company, in that capacity from February, 1982 until February 11, 1988, with the exception of a very brief period of time when he performed some other duties for that firm. This cause arose under the auspices of the Florida Human Relations Commission, an agency of the State of Florida constituted in Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. It is charged by that Chapter with oversight of working conditions and circumstances between employers and employees in Florida to the extent that the agency, under the mandate of Chapter 760, provides a procedure whereby employee claims of employment discrimination on account of race, age, sex, religion, national origin or disability can be adjudicated in a due process hearing environment, including hearings before the Division of Administrative Hearings in the event such claims culminate in formal disputes. During the course of the Petitioner's employment with Gurley Refining Company, in addition to being employed as a truck driver (the vast majority of his duties with that company), the Petitioner also had significant experience as a warehouse employee, handling the company's inventory and freight. The Petitioner had an unblemished record as a truck driver for the Respondent company. He had no disciplinary altercations with his supervisors and his attendance record was characterized by very few absences, sick leave and little tardiness. In approximately early January of 1988, the Petitioner suffered an acute myocardial infarction (heart attack), which necessitated his absence from work for a period of approximately thirty days. His treating physician, a cardiologist, Dr. Story, of Orlando, released him approximately a month after his heart attack, but admonished him to engage in light duties, and restricting him against lifting weight in excess of seventy pounds. During the course of his illness, the operations manager of the Respondent's Lake County facility and Petitioner's supervisor, Mr. Kenny Hart, had assured the Petitioner that his job would be waiting for him as soon as he recovered from his illness. In fact, however, in early February, when the Petitioner was released by his doctor to return to his job, with the restrictions mentioned above, the Petitioner requested his former job back and was refused. Mr. Hart indicated to the Petitioner that he would not hire him back, and in fact terminated him due to his medical condition, as Mr. Hart explained it. The Petitioner's doctor had not restricted him from doing his same job or from working an eight hour day, but merely had restricted him against lifting more than seventy pounds at any one time. When Mr. Hart refused to put him back to work in his old job, the Petitioner requested to be assigned to duties in the company's warehouse or bottling plant. The company had an operation involving bottling of windshield washer detergent fluid. The Petitioner had had substantial experience in those operations, especially as a checker of merchandise and as a forklift operator in the company warehouse. His physical disability would not preclude him from performing those functions. Mr. Hart, and his superior, Mr. Helton of the company's office in Memphis, Tennessee, declined to place the Petitioner in such an employment position with the company. There have been a number of instances in which the company accommodated employees by placing them at work at various positions in the company operations during the period of time they were on medical restrictions by their doctors due to some disability or illness. The Petitioner described one case in particular involving an employee who had surgery for amputation of his leg and who was allowed to come back to work performing various minor jobs during his convalescence in order to allow him some gainful employment, later being restored to more meaningful permanent duties. The Petitioner was not thus accommodated, however. The Petitioner could have performed any of the types of duties mentioned above, involving the warehouse or the bottling plant or driving a truck once again, because all were within the scope of his years of experience with the company and his physical abilities, even as restricted by his doctor. The Petitioner was making $7.80 an hour when he was terminated and during the year after his termination from February 11, 1988 to approximately February 1, 1989, the Petitioner was not able to get regular employment. For a time after termination, he was receiving unemployment compensation and thereafter worked at casual labor jobs involving loading and unloading trucks for a trucking company. He also worked at laying sewer lines, doing manual labor. During the year after his termination, the Petitioner and his wife earned approximately $18,000. Four thousand dollars of that sum was from the wife's part-time employment. The Petitioner had grossed approximately $30,000 in the past full year he worked for the Respondent company, that is, 1987. In February, 1989, the Petitioner again obtained full-time employment in a truck driving position with another firm. He is again making approximately $30,000 gross salary per year. At the time Petitioner was off work from his job with the Respondent due to his heart condition, and at the time of his termination, no mention was made or information given him about any right to medical disability to leave. The Petitioner apparently missed approximately thirty days of work, and then was terminated under the above conditions and circumstances.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, and the candor and the demeanor of the witnesses, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Human Relations Commission finding that an unlawful employment practice occurred by Respondent's discrimination against the Petitioner on account of his handicap, and that he be accorded all relief allowed under the above-cited authority, including back pay of $16,000 and related benefits in accordance with the requirements of Section 760.10(13), Florida Statutes. DONE and ENTERED this 16th of October, 1989, at Tallahassee, Florida. P MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings, The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of October, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Allen Reynolds 2356 Oliver Avenue Leesburg, FL 32748 Mr. R. D. Helton Director of Operations Gurley Refining Company Post Office Box 626 Memphis, Tennessee 38101 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 240, Building F 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 =================================================================
The Issue Whether Petitioner was discriminated against by being given poor evaluations, receiving disciplinary action as the result of grievances, and being passed over for a promotion because of his race.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was an employee of Respondent, Sunrise Community, Inc. He was employed by Respondent for eleven years. He worked as a caregiver in a facility for persons requiring intermediate care or therapy. He was a home manager supervising several co-workers in caring for and training mentally handicapped residents. Approximately one year prior to filing his complaint in 1996, Petitioner was counseled for improperly touching a female employee with whom he worked. He did not perform certain activities associated with his job. Because of his conduct and work deficiencies, Petitioner was given a poor performance evaluation. Subsequently, a promotional position became open. Petitioner applied for the opening. He was qualified for the position. He was not promoted. Petitioner is a black male. Petitioner asserts that he was not promoted because he is a black male. The evidence shows that Petitioner did touch a female co-worker inappropriately, and that Respondent gave him a reprimand for this conduct. He received a poor performance evaluation. Such evaluations are by their nature subjective; however, the reprimand and his poor job performance were sufficient cause to reduce his evaluation. The promotional position was filled by a black female employee of the company who had more experience than Petitioner, and who had previously performed similar duties. There was no showing that the grievances, evaluations, or failure to promote were racially motivated.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter its final order dismissing Petitioner's Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of August, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of August, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Wilford Evans 925 Cochran Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Steven M. Weinger, Esquire Kurzban, Kurzban, Weinger & Tetzeli, P.A. 2650 Southwest 27th Avenue Second Floor Miami, Florida 33133 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Petitioner was discriminated against in employment by reason of his race (black) and handicap.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by TECO beginning on or about June 21, 1976, last worked for TECO July 18, 1980, and was discharged July 23, 1980, for failing to keep the employer notified on a daily basis of his absence and the reasons for it. (Exhibit 1) Petitioner reapplied for employment on February 19, 1990, and was not rehired. At the time Petitioner was discharged by Respondent, the latter had a firm policy that no former employer of TECO would be rehired. This no-rehire policy was amended in 1989 (Administrative policy L-75, R 6/86)(Exhibit 4, effective 2/1/89), by changing Section IV thereof regarding former employees to allow former employees who voluntarily leave the company subsequent to the effective date of this policy to be considered for regular full time employment. Petitioner was involuntarily separated from employment with Respondent well before the policy change regarding rehiring former employees took effect. Accordingly, he would not be eligible for reemployment under the policy extent at the time he was dismissed from employment or under the new policy respecting those voluntarily leaving employment. Petitioner opined that he was not rehired because of his race (black) and his knee injury, but submitted no facts to support this opinion.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Petition For Relief from employment practices filed by Lynwood B. Graddy against Tampa Electric Company be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 15th day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of July, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Lynwood B. Graddy 1221 13th Avenue Tampa, FL 33605 Stacy Frank, Esquire 702 N. Franklin Street Tampa, FL 33601 Dana Baird General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Margaret Jones, Agency Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of discrimination in employment based on race.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has worked as a furniture finisher and repairman for over 30 years. He was hired by Respondent on October 10, 1986. At that time, he worked at Respondent's store located on U.S. Route 441 in the Orlando area. Respondent is a furniture retailer. Although Respondent does not manufacture furniture, at least in the Orlando area, Respondent employs persons to perform various work on furniture, such as to repair damage in shipment or delivery. From 1986 through the end of 1987, Petitioner was the only finisher employed by Respondent and the only person qualified to perform major repairs. During this time, Petitioner performed a variety of services, including finishing, repair, upholstery, set up, and service calls. In December, 1987, Petitioner was transferred to Respondent's Landstreet facility. In general, Respondent was experiencing increasing retail sales at this time. To meet the needs associated with increased sales activity, Respondent added another warehouse employee to perform touch- up work and new equipment, such as a spray booth, to assist finishing and repair work. As Respondent's business increased, the demands on Petitioner also increased. Petitioner possesses substantial skills with respect to furniture finishing. However, Petitioner takes considerable time to perform his work. While retail activity had remained modest, Respondent tolerated Petitioner's slow pace. But as sales increased, Respondent pressured Petitioner to increase the pace of his work. On August 16, 1988, a supervisor gave Petitioner a performance and potential summary in connection with a periodic performance review. The summary states that Petitioner's performance rating is below average. The summary identifies Petitioner's major weakness as "complain[ing] about everything and everybody." The summary notes Petitioner's slow pace, poor work habits, refusal to use new finishing aids, and refusal to give up his "old ways." The summary also states that his results were generally reasonable, but his overall results "leave something to be desired." On December 8, 1988, a supervisor gave Petitioner a disciplinary action form. The form states that, in the four months since the August 8 performance summary, Petitioner has shown no significant improvement. The form concludes that, "If there is no improvement there will be no more chances." Petitioner refused to sign the December 8 disciplinary action form. Petitioner became angry at the meeting at which the form was produced. Respondent fired Petitioner on December 28, 1988. Petitioner is a black person. However, he presented no evidence that his race was a factor in the termination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner. ENTERED this 12th day of March, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of March, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Ronald M. McElrath, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Margaret Jones, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Herbert Dawkins 7055 Hennepin Blvd. Orlando, FL 32818 Jerry Lind, Operations Manager Rhodes, Inc. 901 Landstreet Rd. Orlando, FL 32821