The Issue Whether Petitioner is qualified to take the examination for licensure as a real estate sales associate.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Petitioner is presently sixty-eight years of age. She first became licensed as a real estate sales associate in the State of Florida in 1982, and in December of 1988 she passed the examination for a broker's license. Shortly after she passed the examination for a broker's license, the Petitioner began setting up her own real estate brokerage firm. At that time the Petitioner had her sales associate license placed with a broker named Robert F. Armand & Associates. Her arrangement with Mr. Armand was that she would pay him a flat monthly fee of $250.00 in exchange for the services brokers usually provide for sales associates. The agreement provided that Mr. Armand would not receive any share of any commissions earned by the Petitioner. While the Petitioner was in the process of making arrangements to terminate her relationship with Mr. Armand and start her own brokerage firm, the Petitioner was successful in obtaining a contract for the sale of a residence ("the Molina transaction"). At that time the Petitioner still had her license placed with Mr. Armand's brokerage firm and had not yet begun operation of her own brokerage firm. Because Mr. Armand had become very upset when the Petitioner told him she would soon be leaving, the Petitioner did not want to have any further dealings with Mr. Armand that were not absolutely necessary, so she did not tell Mr. Armand about the Molina transaction. Rather, she held the Molina transaction and processed it through her own brokerage firm shortly thereafter. The Molina transaction closed in due course and there was no financial harm to either the buyer or the seller. There was no financial harm to Mr. Armand, because he was not entitled to share in any commission related to the Molina transaction. By some means not revealed in the record of this proceeding, the Respondent became aware of the manner in which the Petitioner had handled the Molina transaction and initiated disciplinary action against the Petitioner.1 The Petitioner decided to resolve the disciplinary proceedings by agreeing to surrender her licenses for revocation. Towards that end, on April 10, 1989, the Petitioner signed a document titled Affidavit for the Voluntary Surrender of License, Registration, Certificate/Permit for Revocation. That document included the following statements by the Petitioner: That my name is Addy Miller. That I am currently the holder of a real estate license/registration/certificate or permit issued pursuant to Chapter 475, Florida Statutes and the Rules of the Florida Real Estate Commission. That in lieu of further investigation and prosecution of the pending complaint(s) and case(s) received and filed with the Department of Professional Regulation, I do hereby consent to and authorize the Florida Real Estate Commission of the Department of Professional Regulation to issue a Final Order revoking any and all of the licenses, registrations, certificates and permits issued to or held by the undersigned. That the effective date of the revocation shall be April 10, 1989. All licenses, registrations, certificates and permits are hereby deemed surrendered and the undersigned hereby requests that the same be placed in and remain in inactive status pending final disposition by the Florida Real Estate Commission. That I will not apply for nor otherwise seek any real estate license, registration, certificate or permit in the State of Florida for a period of not less than ten (10) years from the effective date of the revocation. That I will not perform any act or service without first being the holder of a valid and current license, registration, certificate or permit thereof [sic] at the time the act or service is performed. That I waive any right to be noticed of any further administrative proceedings in this matter. That I waive any right to appeal or otherwise seek judicial review of the Final Order of revocation to be rendered in accordance with the provisions of this affidavit. [Emphasis added.] The above-quoted affidavit was considered at a meeting of the Florida Real Estate Commission on April 18, 1989. At that meeting the Commission issued a Final Order, the material parts of which read as follows: On April 18, 1989, the Florida Real Estate Commission heard this case to issue a Final Order. On April 10, 1989, the Respondent voluntarily surrendered her license and entered a written agreement that her license would be revoked. A copy of this agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit A and made a part hereof. Based upon this information and upon the information provided to the Florida Real Estate Commission at its meeting of April 18, 1989, the Commission ORDERS that the license of the Respondent be revoked, effective April 10, 1989. Prior to the incident that led to the 1989 order described immediately above, the Petitioner had never before had a complaint filed against her. Consistent with paragraph 8 of the affidavit quoted above, the Petitioner did not appeal the Final Order issued on April 18, 1989. The Petitioner has complied with all of the terms of the Final Order issued on April 18, 1989. The loss of the Petitioner's real estate license has adversely affected her ability to make a living and support herself. In recent years she has been working in sales and marketing with several different companies. She appears to be highly regarded by some of her employers. During the fifteen years since the revocation of her license, the Petitioner has lived a moral and honorable life and has not been involved in any matters that would cast doubt upon her good character and her reputation for fair dealing. During the fifteen years since the revocation of her license, the Petitioner has not been the subject of any criminal charges. The Petitioner acknowledges that her conduct related to the Molina transaction so many years ago was improper and is committed to avoiding any improper conduct in the future. Further, the Petitioner is sincerely embarrassed about her conduct in that matter and is remorseful regarding her actions in that regard. In view of the long lapse of time (more than fifteen years) since her misconduct related to the Molina transaction, and in view of her good conduct and reputation during that fifteen-year period, it is unlikely that the interests of the public and investors will be endangered by the granting of her application for relicensure. On or about March 19, 2004, the Petitioner filed an application to be relicensed as a sales associate. At a meeting on May 19, 2004, the Florida Real Estate Commission considered the Petitioner's application to be relicensed. Following such consideration the Commission voted to deny the application. The Commission's order denying the application gave the following reason for the denial: "After completely reviewing the record and being otherwise fully advised, the Board ORDERS that the application be DENIED based on the applicant's answer to the question regarding a professional license disciplined." Apparently, at the May 19, 2004, meeting the Commission was somewhat less than "fully advised," because at a Commission meeting on June 16, 2004, there was staff discussion of the fact that at the prior meeting "we did not have the information that you have today," and that at the prior meeting "we could not locate the old information." At the June 16, 2004, meeting staff confirmed that "[s]ince the May meeting we have found the old file. That's in your packet today." At the June 16, 2004, meeting, the Commission tabled further consideration of the Petitioner's application because the Petitioner was sick and could not attend that meeting. The Petitioner's application for relicensure was reconsidered at a Commission meeting on July 21, 2004. During that meeting there was some discussion of the Petitioner's background. During the course of that discussion the Petitioner agreed with the observation of one of the Commissioners that during the past fifteen years she had "been absolutely squeaky clean." During the course of the meeting, without any statement of the reason for doing so, one of the Commissioners moved to deny the application, another seconded the motion, and without any further discussion the Petitioner's application was denied by a vote of five to one. Following the July 21, 2004, Commission meeting, the Commission issued a written order again denying the Petitioner's application to be relicensed. The written order contained the following reason for the denial: "After completely reviewing the record and being otherwise fully advised, the Board ORDERS that the application be DENIED based on the applicant's answer to the question regarding the discipline of a professional license." The question on the application regarding any prior discipline of a license called for a "yes" or "no" answer. The Petitioner truthfully checked the "yes" box. Instructions on the application form asked those who checked the "yes" box to also: . . . please provide the full details of any . . . administrative action including the nature of any charges, dates, outcomes, sentences, and/or conditions imposed; the dates, name and location of the court and/or jurisdiction in which any proceedings were held . . . and the designation and/or license number for any actions against a license or licensure application. The Petitioner complied with this request by including as part of her application a typed statement and a handwritten statement which, respectively, read as follows, in pertinent part: THE TYPED STATEMENT I held real estate licenses from 1982-1989. I voluntarily surrendered my license to the Department in 1989. I was not involved in any litigation, with the DPR or the courts, and there was no payment made from the Recovery Fund. However, my license was suspended for ten years that was fulfilled in April, 1999. The Department informed me that once I had served my suspension term, I would be able to start again with the salesman's classroom requirements and apply for and pass the state examination as I am presently doing with the Gold Coast School of Real Estate. If you require additional information, please do not hesitate to contact me. THE HANDWRITTEN STATEMENT I voluntarily surrendered my license in April 1989. I held on to escrow money for a longer period of time than the law allows. The transaction was successfully closed and it was to be my last. My suspension was for a maximum of ten years that was satisfied in 1999. There was no other consequence other than my ability to practice real estate for ten years. The answers quoted above appear to be truthful and candid answers consistent with the requirements of the instructions on the application form. The details in the answers provide some enlightenment regarding the basis for the Commission's disciplinary action against the Petitioner in 1989, but those details, standing alone, do not provide any enlightment regarding the basis for the Commission's vote to deny the pending application for relicensure. It appears that since the revocation of her real estate license in 1989, the Petitioner has rehabilitated herself and that therefore it is not likely that her relicensure would endanger the public.2
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order finding that the Petitioner is qualified to practice as a real estate sales associate, subject to passing the licensure examination. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of February, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ___________________________________ MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of February, 2005.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Heriberto Alonso, violated Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2005- 2006), as alleged in a one-count Administrative Complaint filed with the Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against his Florida real estate associate license.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Petitioner, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (hereinafter referred to as the “Division”), is an agency of the State of Florida created by Section 20.165, Florida Statutes. The Division is charged with the responsibility for the regulation of the real estate industry in Florida pursuant to Chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Heriberto Alonso, was at the times material to this matter, the holder of a Florida real estate associate license, license number 3037527, issued by the Division. At the times relevant, Mr. Alonso was an active sales associate with The Keyes Company, 690 Lincoln Road No. 300, Miami Beach, Florida 33139. The “Frow Avenue Property” Listing Agreement. On or about March 9, 2006, Mr. Alonso entered into a listing agreement with Mark Saracino and Suzanne Lloyd, husband and wife, whereby Mr. Alonso agreed to list property they owned located at 106 Frow Avenue, Coral Gables, Florida (hereinafter referred to as the “Frow Avenue Property”). Pursuant to the listing agreement for the Frow Avenue Property, the property was to be listed by Mr. Alonso on the MLS for $359,000.00. Consistent with the listing agreement for the Frow Avenue Property, the property was listed on the MLS on March 10, 2006, for $359,000.00. The “Thomas Avenue Property” Listing Agreement. On or about March 14, 2006, Mr. Alonso entered into a listing agreement with Mr. Saracino and Ms. Lloyd, whereby Mr. Alonso agreed to list property they owned located at 3837 Thomas Avenue, Miami, Florida (hereinafter referred to as the “Thomas Avenue Property”). Pursuant to the listing agreement for the Thomas Avenue Property, the property was to be listed by Mr. Alonso on the MLS for $350,000.00. Consistent with the listing agreement for the Thomas Avenue Property, the property was listed on the MLS on March 21, 2006, for $350,000.00. Sale of the Frow Avenue and Thomas Avenue Properties. In June of 2006, Ms. Lloyd entered into a sale and purchase contract with Reinaldo Gonzalez whereby it was agreed that the Frow Avenue Property would be sold to Mr. Gonzalez for $329,000.00. At the same time, Mr. Saracino entered into a sale and purchase contract with Mr. Gonzalez, whereby it was agreed that the Thomas Avenue Property would be sold to Mr. Gonzalez for $325,000.00. Without the knowledge or permission of Mr. Saracino and/or Ms. Lloyd, on July 26, 2006, Mr. Alonso raised the listing price on each property to $450,000.00. Mr. Saracino and Ms. Lloyd first learned of the increased listing price when they appeared at the scheduled closing on the properties and were presented with closing documents with a sales price on each property of $450,000.00. On the advice of counsel, Mr. Saracino and Ms. Lloyd refused to complete the sale of the properties. Mr. Alonso’s testimony to the effect that he disclosed the increase in the sales price of the properties prior to the aborted closing is rejected as inconsistent with the credible testimony of Mr. Saracino and Ms. Lloyd. Cost of Investigation. The cost of investigating this matter totaled $1,551.00.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Commission: Finding that Heriberto Alonso, by his failure to disclose the change in listing price for the properties, did conceal pertinent facts from Mr. Saracino and Ms. Lloyd and, in so doing, violated Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes; and Suspending his real estate associate’s license for a period of one year, requiring the payment of a fine of $1,000.00, and requiring the payment of the Division’s cost of investigation. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of June, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of June, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Heriberto Alonso 11336 Southwest 75th Terrace Miami, Florida 33173 Jennifer Leigh Blakeman, Esquire Department of Business & Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N-801 Orlando, Florida 32801 Thomas W. O’Bryant, Jr., Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Hurston Building-North Tower, Suite N802 Orlando, Florida 32801 Reginald Dixon, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue in this case is whether disciplinary action should be taken against Respondent's real estate salesperson license based upon the alleged violation of Section 475.25(1)(m), Florida Statutes, set forth in the Administrative Complaint filed by Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the Final Hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is a licensed real estate salesperson in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0606079 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued to Respondent was as a salesperson, c/o Century 21 Action Realty, Inc., 8904 Taft Street, Hollywood, Florida 33024-4649. Respondent obtained his Florida real estate license on or about December 11, 1993. Respondent's application for licensure as a real estate salesperson (the "Application") was filed with Petitioner on or about October 14, 1993. Question 9 of the Application asked Respondent if he had ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere even if adjudication was withheld. Respondent answered that question in the negative. The evidence established that Respondent's answer to Question 9 on the Application was not accurate. On April 1, 1985, Respondent pled nolo contendere to a charge of possession of cocaine. Adjudication of guilt was withheld and Respondent was given a suspended sentence. At the time of Respondent's plea agreement, he was 20 years old. The circumstances surrounding his arrest, arraignment and plea indicate that Respondent did not fully understand the legal technicalities of what was taking place. Respondent entered the plea on the same day that he was arraigned and a public defender was appointed to represent him in connection with charges arising from an arrest that occurred on January 26, 1985. Respondent's arrest on January 26, 1985 took place outside a bar in Fort Lauderdale. Respondent had gone to the bar to meet some friends. While he was waiting for his friends, Respondent met an individual, S.T., with whom he was not previously acquainted. Respondent and S.T. began a conversation and talked about the possibility of going to another bar. Respondent and S.T. went to the parking lot and were sitting in S.T.'s car discussing where to go next. A police officer approached the car and observed S.T. holding a small plastic straw. According to the police report, when the police officer reached the car and asked for identification, S.T. handed the straw to Respondent and exited the car. The police officer then asked Respondent to exit the car. As Respondent was getting out of the car, the police officer saw Respondent drop the straw. The police officer picked up the straw and noticed a white powdery substance which he thought to be cocaine. He arrested Respondent and S.T. and, upon, subsequent search of the car, found a small bag containing cocaine. The amount of cocaine found is not clear from the evidence presented in this case. Because of his shock and surprise when he was arrested and the subsequent passage of time, Respondent does not remember all of the details surrounding his arrest. In particular, he does not remember S.T. handing him the straw and/or dropping it upon leaving the car. Respondent claims that he did not know that there was cocaine in the car and there is no evidence directly tying him to the cocaine. As indicated above, the case was resolved at Respondent's arraignment on April 1, 1985. Respondent does not recall all of the discussions that took place, but it was his understanding that he had not been convicted of a crime. Respondent did not understand the legal significance of the term "withheld adjudication". He was told that he was "free to go". No probation or further conditions were imposed upon him. Consequently, Respondent did not move to have the records of his criminal case sealed or expunged, even though he could have sought such an order from the court. When he was filling out the Application, Respondent believed that since no penalties had been imposed and he had not been convicted of a crime he could truthfully answer no to Question 9 on the Application. While the evidence established that Respondent did not intentionally lie on the Application, it does not appear that he took any steps to verify the accuracy of his belief before submitting the Application. Respondent first learned that there was some question regarding his criminal record when he was contacted by an investigator for Petitioner. Respondent immediately notified his supervisor at Century 21 Action Realty, where he was employed. Respondent's supervisor testified at the hearing in support of Respondent and stated that she found him to be trustworthy, honest, loyal and dependable. She indicated that she would not hesitate to hire Respondent again even after learning of his brush with the criminal justice system.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a Final Order finding the Respondent not guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(m), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 12th day of July, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of July, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-6150 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner: Adopted in pertinent part in findings of fact 1. Adopted in substance in findings of fact 3. Adopted in substance in findings of fact 2. Adopted in substance in findings of fact 4. Adopted in substance in findings of fact 15. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in pertinent part in findings of fact 1. Adopted in substance in findings of fact 1. Adopted in substance in findings of fact 3. Adopted in substance in findings of fact 3. Adopted in substance in findings of fact 2. Adopted in substance in findings of fact 4. 8. Rejected as unnecessary. 9. Adopted in substance in findings of fact 11. 10. Adopted in substance in findings of fact 7. 11. Adopted in substance in findings of fact 7 and 8. 12. Adopted in substance in findings of fact 9. 13. Adopted in substance in findings of fact 9. 14. Adopted in substance in findings of fact 10. 15. Adopted in substance in findings of fact 10. 16. Adopted in substance in findings of fact 13. 17. Adopted in substance in findings of fact 12. 18. Adopted in substance in findings of fact 11. 19. Adopted in substance in findings of fact 5. 20. Adopted in substance in findings of fact 6. 21. Adopted in substance in findings of fact 14. Subordinate to findings of fact 14. Subordinate to findings of fact 15. Subordinate to findings of fact 16. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in findings of fact 16. Adopted in substance in findings of fact 16. Adopted in substance in findings of fact 17. COPIES FURNISHED: Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Theodore R. Gay Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation 401 N.W. 2nd Avenue, Suite N-607 Miami, FL 33128 Harold M. Braxton, Esq. Suite 400, One Datran Center 9100 South Dadeland Boulevard Miami, FL 33156-7815
The Issue Whether Weston Professional Title Group, Inc. (Respondent) committed the violations alleged in Counts I, II, III, V, VI, and VII of the Amended Administrative Complaint and, if so, the penalties that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times, Petitioner has been the entity of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility to regulate title insurance agencies. At all times relevant to this proceeding Respondent was licensed by Petitioner as a title insurance agent in the State of Florida. As of the formal hearing, Respondent had ceased its operations due to the lack of business. Petitioner's investigation of Respondent was initiated by a complaint from a man named Robert Anderson. Mr. Anderson represented to Petitioner that he discovered that his name and address had been used as the buyer of the two residences discussed above. Respondent was the title and settlement agent for both transactions. The Collonade Drive transaction settled on November 14, 2006, with disbursement of the funds on November 16, 2006. The Vignon Place transaction settled and the funds were disbursed on December 15, 2006. Mr. Anderson reported to Petitioner his belief that his identity had been stolen by a person named Pamela Higgins. Mr. Anderson reported to Petitioner that he had not participated in either transaction, and asserted that he did not sign any of the documents that purport to contain his signature as the buyer. Respondent was required to comply with the provisions of RESPA in completing the HUD-1 for the Collonade Drive closing and the Vignon Place closing. RESPA required that disbursements at closing be consistent with the HUD-1 as approved by the parties to the transaction and by the lender. COLLONADE DRIVE CLOSING On September 15, 2006, Robert Anderson (or someone impersonating Mr. Anderson) signed a "Contract for Sale and Purchase" (Collonade contract), agreeing to buy the Collonade Drive property from Mark Mariani and Kathy Mariani, for the purchase price of $1,375,000.00. The Collonade contract reflected that a deposit had been made to "FLORIDA TITLE & ESC." in the amount of $5,000 with an additional deposit of $5,000 to be made within ten days. Two loans with separate mortgages constituted the financing for the purchase of the Collonade Drive property. The first mortgage was $962,500.00. The second mortgage, as reflected on the HUD-1 Settlement Statement with the disbursement date of November 14, 2006, was $263,430.08.3/ First Magnus Financial Corporation, an Arizona corporation, was the lender for both loans. Agents of America Mortgage Corp. served as the mortgage broker for the transaction. Juan Carlos Rodriguez, an employee of Agents of America Mortgages, signed Mr. Anderson's loan application as the "interviewer." The following was a special clause of the Collonade contract: "BUYER AGREES TO PAY FOR TITLE INSUANCE [sic] FEE ONLY (LINE 1108 OF SELLERS' SETTLEMENT STATEMENT), ONLY [SIC] IF SELLERS AGREE TO USE BUYER'S TITLE COMPANY OF CHOICE. BUYER IS A LICENSED FLORIDA REAL ESTATE AGENT." Petitioner established that Robert Anderson was not a licensed Florida real estate agent. The Collonade contract represented that there were no real estate brokers representing either party. On or about November 1, 2006, Respondent received a "Request for Title Commitment" from Claudit Casanova, a mortgage broker with Agents of America Mortgage Corp., for the Collonade Drive transaction. This was a revised request. The first request had been sent to Respondent on or about October 3, 2006. A copy of the Collonade contract had been forwarded to Respondent with the first request. In connection with the Collonade Drive transaction, Respondent prepared two HUD-1s,4/ each of which was approved by the parties and the lender.5/ The first HUD-1 had an anticipated closing date of November 14, 2006. That HUD-1 was revised in response to the lender's instruction to move the disbursement date from November 14, 2006, to November 16, 2006. The revision of the HUD-1 slightly reduced the amount of cash the buyer needed to close as a result of interest beginning to run on the loans as of November 16 instead of November 14. This was a mail-away closing, in that a packet of the documents the buyer was to sign was sent to someone named Laurie Martin at a title agency in Glendale, Arizona. Ms. Marrero testified she mailed the packet pursuant to instructions without specifying who gave her those instructions. The packet of documents was returned to Respondent, with signatures purporting to be Mr. Anderson's. Laurie Martin appears to have served as the notary public when the documents were signed. The transaction closed pursuant to the revised HUD-1 with the disbursement date of November 16, 2006, which, as approved by the parties and the lender, reflected that the sellers were to receive $477,884.93 upon closing. Upon closing, Respondent drafted a check in the amount of $477,884.93 made payable to the sellers. The sellers voided the check and based on instructions from the sellers, Ms. Marrero redistributed the sellers' proceeds by wire transfer as follows: $116,112.85 to sellers; $170,250.00 to Pamela Higgins; and $191,508.08 to Unlimited Advertising USA. Fourteen dollars were spent on wire transfer charges. The actual disbursement of the seller's proceeds was inconsistent with the HUD-1 and unknown to the buyer and the lender. Respondent violated the provisions of RESPA by disbursing the proceeds of the sale in a manner that was inconsistent with the HUD-1. $195,000 DEPOSIT The Collonade contract reflected that a $5,000 deposit had been made to "Fla. Title & Esc." required for the buyer to pay an additional deposit of $5,000 within ten days. There was no evidence establishing any relationship between Respondent and "Fla. Title & Esc." Both HUD-1s for the Collonade Drive transaction reflected that the buyer had provided to the sellers a deposit in the amount of $195,000. These HUD-1s, reflecting that the sellers were holding a deposit in the amount of $195,000, were approved by the parties and the lender. Ms. Marrero testified that she was instructed to include the $195,000 deposit on the HUD-1s without specifying who gave her those instructions. Ms. Marrero did not attempt to verify that the $195,000 deposit was actually being held by the sellers. FRAUD Petitioner alleged that the Collonade Drive transaction was fraudulent. Mr. Wenger's testimony, based in part on reports of mortgage fraud prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, supported that allegation. Other evidence supporting that allegation included the following facts The first mortgage quickly went into foreclosure; A mailing address given for Robert Anderson did not (as of April 19, 2011) exist. The address of Unlimited Advertising USA was also the address of Claudia Rodriguez, a former Florida title agent whose license had been suspended by Petitioner for failing to disburse in accordance with HUD statements and disbursing on uncollected funds; The address of Unlimited Advertising USA was also the address of Juan Carlos Rodriguez (the person who supposedly took the credit application from Robert Anderson); The address of Unlimited Advertising USA was also the address of Agents of America Mortgage Corporation (the mortgage broker for the Collonade closing. Juan Carlos Rodriguez supposedly notarized the document authorizing disbursement of part of the sellers' proceeds to Pamela Higgins. Mr. Anderson's purported signatures on different documents are inconsistent. The address for Mr. Anderson as it appears on the HUD- 1 Settlement Statements is 14233 W. Jenan Drive, Surprise, Arizona. Prior to the closing Ms. Marrero sent by Federal Express a copy of the unexecuted closing documents to "Pam Higgins c/o Robert S. Anderson" 12211 N. 85th Street, Scottsdale, Arizona. Following the closing, Ms. Marrero sent a copy of the closing documents by Federal Express to Robert S. Anderson, at the address 12211 N. 85th Street, Scottsdale, Arizona. Ms. Marrero testified that she acted on instructions in sending the two packages, without identifying who gave her those instructions. There was no evidence that anyone employed by Respondent knew anyone connected to this transaction prior to being asked to provide a title commitment. There was insufficient evidence to establish that Respondent had anything to do with the buy-sell agreement between the buyer and the sellers or the efforts by Mr. Anderson (or the person or persons impersonating Mr. Anderson) to obtain financing for the purchase. While there was significant evidence that the Colonnade Closing was a fraudulent transaction, there was insufficient evidence to establish that Respondent was complicit in that fraud. VIGNON COURT CLOSING On a date prior to November 6, 2006, Maribel and Timothy Graves signed a "Contract for Sale and Purchase" offering to sell their Vignon Court residence to Robert Anderson for the purchase price of $1,975,000.00. Mr. and Mrs. Graves were represented by counsel during this transaction. The copy of the contract admitted into evidence had not been signed by Mr. Anderson and did not bear a legible date. The contract provided an acceptance date of November 6, 2006. The fully executed contract was not admitted into evidence. On October 4, 2006, Claudit Casanova of Agents of America Mortgage requested Respondent to provide a title commitment for the Vignon Court transaction. In that request, the sales price was stated as being $1,975,000; the loan amount was $1,481,250 and the mortgagee was American Brokers Conduit. Preferred Properties, Int., Inc., was listed as being the real estate broker for the transaction. Respondent prepared a HUD-1 for the Vignon Court transaction that reflected a closing and disbursement date of December 15, 2006. DEPOSIT The unexecuted (by the buyer) and undated copy Purchase Agreement required a deposit of $100,000 at the time of acceptance with an additional $50,000 being due within ten days thereafter. There was no evidence as to the terms of the completely executed Purchase Agreement. Line 201 of the HUD-1 reflected a deposit of $250,000 paid on behalf of the buyer. Respondent did not verify that deposit had been made. The HUD-1 specified that the deposit was being held by the sellers. The buyer, sellers, and lender approved the HUD-1, which reflected the existence of a deposit of $250,000, prior to closing. GASPARE VALENTINO On December 6, 2006, Mr. and Mrs. Graves entered into a "Joint Venture and Property Resale Agreement" (Resale Agreement) pertaining to the sale of the Vignon Court residence with Gaspare Valentino. On February 5, 2002, Gaspare Rino Valentino was issued a license by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation of the type "Real Estate Broker or Sales" and of the rank "Sales Associate." That license was valid at the times relevant to this proceeding. Paragraph 2 of the Resale Agreement provides as follows: (2) SALE EFFORTS: CONTRACT PROCEEDS. Valentino agrees to use reasonable efforts to obtain a third party purchaser (a "Purchaser") for the Property. Valentino is not required to advertise the Property or list the Property for sale, but shall have such right to do so. Valentino does not guaranty [sic] the procurement of a Purchaser. The parties agree that the intention is for Valentino to secure a Purchaser who will pay a purchase price sufficient in order to (i) satisfy the existing debt upon the Property, (ii) pay ordinary and reasonable closing costs of the transaction, (iii) generate a net proceeds [illegible] to Owner not less than ONE HUNDERED THOUSAND AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($100,000); and (iv) generate such further sums beyond the foregoing in order to pay Valentino a fee for services rendered as set forth in this Agreement. In accordance with such understanding, Owner agrees to enter into and fully execute a Contract for Purchase and Sale with a Purchaser procured by Valentino which is consistent with the terms set forth in this Agreement, including without limitation, a designated sales price which enables Owner to receive at closing a net proceeds sum equal to ONE HUNDERED THOUSAND AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($100,000) (the "Owner's Sale Proceeds") after payment of the Property Sale Expenses, hereinafter defined as set forth in Paragraph 3. Owner agrees that any net sales proceeds in excess of the Owner's Sale Proceeds shall be payable to Valentino (the "Excess Proceeds Fee), as Valentino's fee for the efforts of Valentino as set forth herein. Paragraph 3 (i) of the Resale Agreement reiterates that after the payment of the "Property Sale Expenses" as follows: Owner shall receive the Owner Sale Proceeds consisting of exactly ONE HUNDERED THOUSAND AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($100,000) from the net sales proceeds . . . Paragraph 3 (ii) of the Resale Agreement reiterates that after the payment of the "Property Sale Expenses" and the "Owner Sale Proceeds": Valentino shall receive the Excess Proceeds Fees, constituting all remaining net sales proceeds in excess of the Owner Sale Proceeds, as a fee for services rendered by Valentino pursuant to this Agreement. Paragraph 7 of the Resale Agreement is as follows: 7. Licensed Agent: Valentino represents and discloses that Valentino is a licensed real estate agent in the State of Florida. Notwithstanding such, Valentino is individually entering into this Agreement using his own resources to assist Owner in the improvement and sale of the Property, and as such is a principal in this transaction earning the Excess Proceeds Fee. The parties acknowledge that Valentino is an investor in this transaction and as such at closing is entitled to and shall receive the Excess Proceeds Fee as set forth in Section [Paragraph] 3(ii) of this Agreement. Under RESPA, Section 700 of a HUD-1 is appropriately used for reporting the payments for commissions to real estate salesmen and/or brokers as part of the "Settlement Charges." Such payments can also be reported under Section 1300 ("Additional Settlement Charges"), if the payments are appropriately labeled. Respondent reflected the payment of $527,656.92 as "Payoff" to Gaspare Valentino at line 1307 of Section 1300." Prior to closing the buyer, sellers, and lender had approved the HUD-1 for the Vignon Court transaction. The lender was aware of the Resale Agreement. Mr. Marrero is an attorney licensed to practice law in Florida. Mr. Marrero construed the payments to Mr. Valentino to be other than a real estate commission. Although it is clear that Petitioner considers that payment to Mr. Valentino to be a real estate commission, the terms of the Resale Agreement entitled Mr. Marrero to treat that payment as being to an investor. Petitioner failed to establish that Respondent erroneously stated the payment to Mr. Valentino on the HUD-1. SURETY BOND As a condition of licensure, a title agency is required to provide to Petitioner a $35,000 security deposit or a $35,000 surety bond. In connection with its application for licensure on August 29, 2002, Respondent filed the required surety bond with Petitioner. The bond was issued by Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland with bond number 133046577. On July 14, 2004, Petitioner received from Respondent a surety bond issued by Western Surety Company in the amount of $35,000, effective as of August 29, 2004. The bond number was 69728435. On May 28, 2010, Petitioner received a letter from his surety dated May 24, 2010, which advised that bond number 69728435 would be voided or cancelled as of August 29, 2010. That letter of cancellation showed a copy being furnished to Respondent at the address "1820 North. Corporate Lakes Boulevard, Suite 105, Weston, Florida 33326." On June 11, 2010, Petitioner advised Respondent by letter sent to "1820 North Corporate Lakes Boulevard, Suite. 105, Weston, Florida 33326" that it had received the cancellation letter. The letter stated, in part, as follows: If we do not receive a replacement bond within 30 days of the dated letter, we will forward your file to the appropriate division for disciplinary action. If you do not plan to continue transacting business and wish to terminate your license, you must submit a request to us immediately. Prior to May 24, 2010, Respondent moved its offices from 1802 North Corporate Lakes Boulevard, Suite 105, Weston, Florida, to Suite 304 of the same building. Mr. Marrero testified that he had no recollection of receiving the letters cancelling the surety bond or the letter from Petitioner dated June 11, 2010. Respondent was without a surety bond between August 29, 2010, and November 18, 2010. Petitioner did not establish that Respondent's failure to maintain it surety bond during that period was willful within the meaning of section 626.8437(9). No prior disciplinary action has been brought against Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating the provisions of subsections 626.8473(2) and (4) as alleged in Count I of the Amended AC; and guilty of failing to maintain a surety bond as required by section 626.8418(2) in violation of section 626.8437(1), as alleged in Count III of the Amended AC. It is further recommended that the final order find Respondent not guilty of all other violations alleged in the Amended AC. For the violations found as to Count I, it is recommended that Respondent's licensure be suspended for a period of six months. For the violations found in Count III, it is recommended that Respondent's licensure be suspended for a period of three months. It is further recommended that the periods of suspension run concurrently. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of February, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of February, 2012
The Issue Pursuant to Subsection 320.641(3), Florida Statutes (2006),1 the issues in the case are whether Nissan North America, Inc.'s (Respondent), proposed termination of the dealer agreement with Classic Nissan, Inc. (Petitioner), was clearly permitted by the franchise agreement, undertaken in good faith, undertaken for good cause, and based on material and substantial breach of the dealer agreement; and whether the grounds relied upon for termination have been applied in a uniform and consistent manner.
Findings Of Fact Pursuant to definitions set forth at Section 320.60, Florida Statutes, the Petitioner is a "motor vehicle dealer" and the Respondent is a "licensee." In 1997, the Petitioner and the Respondent entered into an agreement whereby the Petitioner took control of an already- existing Nissan dealership located in Orlando, Florida. In 1999, the Petitioner and the Respondent entered into a Dealer Sales and Service Agreement (Dealer Agreement), which is a "franchise agreement" as defined at Subsection 320.60(1), Florida Statutes. The Respondent's proposed termination of the 1999 Dealer Agreement is at issue in this proceeding. At all times material to this case, the dealership has been owned by Classic Holding Company. Classic Holding Company is owned by four members of the Holler family. Christopher A. Holler is identified in the Dealer Agreement as the principal owner and the executive manager of the dealership. The family owns a number of other dealerships, representing a variety of auto manufacturers. The Respondent does not sell cars at retail to individual purchasers. Standard Provision Section 3.A. of the Dealer Agreement requires that the Petitioner "actively and effectively promote" vehicle sales to individual retail purchasers. Standard Provision Section 3.B. of the Dealer Agreement permits the Respondent to develop and select the criteria by which sales are measured, as long as the measurement criteria is reasonable. Standard Provision Section 12.B.1.a. of the Dealer Agreement permits the Respondent to terminate a dealership when a dealer fails to substantially meet its vehicle sales obligation. The Dealer Agreement includes examples of various criteria that may be used to measure dealer performance. Specifically included among the examples is the calculation of a dealer's "sales penetration" within a defined geographic "Primary Market Area" (PMA) around the dealership as compared to other local and regional dealers. Sales penetration is calculated by dividing a dealer's total new vehicle sales by the number of competitive new vehicles registered in the dealer’s PMA. Data related to vehicle registration was compiled by R. L. Polk (Polk), a nationally recognized organization commonly relied upon in the auto industry for such information. There was no evidence offered to suggest the Polk data was incorrect. The dealer's sales penetration is compared to Nissan's regional sales penetration to determine the dealer's sales performance as measured against other Nissan dealer's in the region. A dealer performing at 100 percent of the regional average is performing at an "average" level. Otherwise stated, an average dealer is performing at a "C" level. The use of sales penetration calculations as a measurement of dealer performance is common in the automotive industry. The Respondent has used sales penetration as a measurement of dealer sales performance for more than 20 years. The Respondent's use of sales penetration as a measurement of dealer performance was reasonable or was permitted by the specific terms of the Dealer Agreement. The Respondent's use of the sales penetration measurements was widely communicated to dealers, who were advised on a routine basis as to the performance of their dealerships compared to local dealers and on a regional basis. The Petitioner knew, or should have known, that sales penetration was being used to measure the Petitioner's sales performance. There was no credible evidence presented at the hearing that the Respondent calculated sales penetration in order to disadvantage the Petitioner relative to other Nissan dealers in the region. At the hearing, the Petitioner suggested alternative standards by which sales performance should be reviewed, including consideration of total sales volume. The use of sales volume to measure retail effectiveness would penalize dealerships in smaller markets and fail to reflect the market opportunity available to each dealer. There was no credible evidence presented at the hearing that total sales volume more accurately measured the Petitioner's sales performance than did sales penetration. The Petitioner suggested that the use of sales penetration to substantiate the proposed termination of the Dealer Agreement at issue in this case was unreasonable and unfair because approximately half of Nissan's dealerships will be performing below 100 percent of the regional average at any given time, yet the Petitioner has not proposed termination of dealership agreements with half of its dealer network; however, the proposed termination at issue in this case is not based merely on the Petitioner's sales penetration. In 2002, the Petitioner's sales penetration was 110.5 percent, well above the regional average. At that time, the Respondent was preparing to introduce a number of new vehicles to the market. Some of the new vehicles were revisions of previous models, while others were intended to compete with products against which Nissan had not previously competed. Nissan representatives believed that the new models would substantially expand sales opportunities for its dealerships, and they encouraged their dealer network to prepare for the new environment. Some dealers responded by increasing staff levels and modernizing, or constructing new facilities. The Petitioner failed to take any substantive action to prepare for the new model lineup. Beginning in 2003, and continuing throughout the relevant period of this proceeding, the Petitioner's regional sales penetration went into decline. From 2002 to 2003, the Petitioner's annualized sales penetration fell more than 30 points to 85.13 in 2003. The Petitioner's sales penetration for 2004 was 65.08 percent. The Petitioner's sales penetration for the first quarter of 2005 was 61.78 percent. Following the introduction of the new models and during the relevant period of this proceeding, regional Nissan sales increased by about 40 percent. By 2004, the average Nissan dealer in the Petitioner's region had a sales penetration of 108.8 percent of the regional average. Through the first quarter of 2005, the average dealer in the region had a sales penetration of 108.6 percent of the regional average. Compared to all other Florida Nissan dealers during the relevant period of this proceeding, the Petitioner was ranked, at its best, 54th of the 57 Florida Nissan dealerships and was ranked lowest in the state by January 2005. Every Florida Nissan dealership, other than the Petitioner, sold more new cars in 2004 than in 2002. The Petitioner sold 200 fewer vehicles in 2004 than it had two years earlier. The three other Orlando-area Nissan dealers experienced significant sales growth at the same time the Petitioner's performance declined. The Petitioner has suggested that the Respondent failed to provide the information to appropriate management of the dealership. The Dealer Agreement indicated that Christopher A. Holler was the executive manager of the dealership; however, his address was located in Winter Park, Florida, and he did not maintain an office in the dealership. The Respondent's representatives most often met with managers at the dealership, who testified that they communicated with Mr. Holler. On several occasions as set forth herein, Nissan representatives met with Mr. Holler for discussions and corresponded with him. There was no credible evidence presented at the hearing that the Petitioner was unaware that its sales penetration results were declining or that the Petitioner was unaware that the Respondent was concerned with the severity of the decline. The Respondent communicated with the Petitioner on a routine basis as it did with all dealers. As the Petitioner's sales performance declined, the Respondent communicated the monthly sales report information to the Petitioner, and the topic of declining sales was the subject of a continuing series of discussions between the parties. In February 2003, Tim Pierson, the Respondent's district operations manager (DOM), met with the Petitioner's on- site manager, John Sekula, and discussed the dealership's declining sales penetration. Mr. Sekula was subsequently transferred by the ownership group to another auto manufacturer's dealership. In August 2003, Mr. Pierson met with the Petitioner's new manager, Darren Hutchinson, as well as with a representative from the ownership group, to discuss the continuing decline in sales penetration, as well as an alleged undercapitalization of the dealership and the lack of an on-site executive manager with authority to control dealership operations. On October 1, 2003, the Respondent issued a Notice of Default (NOD) charging that the Petitioner was in default of the Dealer Agreement for the failure to "retain a qualified executive manager" and insufficient capitalization of the dealership. In December 2003, Mr. Pierson met with Christopher A. Holler to discuss the dealership's problems. By the time of the meeting, Mr. Hutchinson had been designated as the executive manager, although Mr. Hutchinson's decision-making authority does not appear to have extended to financial operations. During that meeting, based on the Petitioner's failure to meet the capitalization requirements and respond to the deterioration in sales, Mr. Pierson inquired as to whether the Petitioner was interested in selling the dealership, but Mr. Pierson testified without contradiction that Mr. Holler responded "no." Mr. Hutchinson explained at the hearing that he asked the question because there was little apparent effort being made to address the deficiencies at the dealership, and he was attempting to ascertain the Petitioner's intentions. Mr. Hutchinson was directed to prepare a plan to address the Petitioner's customer service rating, which had fallen to the lowest in the area. Based on an apparent belief that the ownership group was going to remedy the Respondent's concerns about capitalization, the Respondent extended the compliance deadline set forth in the NOD, but the extended deadline passed without any alteration of the dealership's capitalization. A letter to the Respondent dated March 25, 2004, allegedly from Mr. Holler, noted that sales and customer service scores had improved; however, there was no credible evidence presented during the hearing to support the claimed improvement in either sales or customer service. The letter also stated that the capitalization of the dealership would be increased in April 2004 and that new vehicle orders were being reduced. On March 19, 2004, Mr. Pierson spoke with Mr. Holler and believed, based on the conversation, that a meeting would be scheduled to discuss the sales and capitalization issues. In anticipation of the meeting, Pierson sent the sales penetration reports directly to Mr. Holler, but the meeting did not occur. There was no additional capital placed into the dealership during April 2004. In April 2004, Andy Delbrueck, a new DOM for the area, met with Mr. Hutchinson to discuss the continuing decline in sales penetration through the end of March 2004. Other dealers in the area were experiencing increased sales at this time, but the Petitioner's regional sales penetration continued to decline and was below the region for almost all Nissan models. Mr. Hutchinson advised that he was hiring additional staff and had sufficient advertising funds to return the regional sales penetration averages by June. In early May 2004, Mr. Delbrueck and a Nissan vice president, Patrick Doody, sent a letter about the Petitioner's declining sales performance to Mr. Holler and requested that the Petitioner prepare a plan to address the problem. On May 18, 2004, Mr. Delbrueck again met with Mr. Hutchinson and discussed the decline in sales performance and customer service scores, as well as the issue of the dealership's undercapitalization. A May 25, 2004, letter to the Respondent, allegedly from Mr. Holler, noted that the dealership's sales penetration had improved, that additional staff had been hired, and that the Petitioner anticipated reaching or exceeding the regional sales penetration average by the end of the third quarter of 2004. The Petitioner never reached regional sales penetration averages following this letter, and, at the time it was written, there had been no material improvement in the dealership's sales penetration. On June 17, 2004, Mr. Delbrueck met with Mr. Holler to discuss the continuing decline in the Petitioner's sales performance. Mr. Delbrueck believed, based on the meeting, that Mr. Holler was aware of the problem and would make the changes necessary to improve sales, including employing additional sales staff. On July 7, 2004, the Respondent issued an Amended NOD, citing the continuing decline in the Petitioner's sales performance as grounds for the default, in addition to the previous concerns related to capitalization that were identified in the earlier NOD. The Amended NOD established a deadline of November 29, 2004, by which time the cited deficiencies were to be remedied. One day later, Mr. Delbrueck met with Mr. Hutchinson, discussed the Amended NOD, and made various suggestions as to how the Petitioner could improve the dealership's sales, including marketing and staffing changes. Mr. Delbrueck also offered to send in a trained Nissan representative, William Hayes, to review dealership operations and provide suggestions to improve conditions at the facility and ultimately to increase car sales. Mr. Hutchinson accepted the offer. A letter to the Respondent dated July 23, 2004, allegedly from Christopher A. Holler, noted that staffing levels had increased as had sales for the month of July; however, there was no credible evidence presented at the hearing that any substantive increase in staffing had occurred or that the Petitioner's sales penetration had increased. The letter contained no specific plan for remedying the problems cited in the Amended NOD. In late July 2004, a Nissan training representative, William Hayes, performed a focused review of the Petitioner's operations and provided a list of specific recommendations intended to improve the Petitioner's sales performance. He met with Mr. Hutchinson at the dealership and discussed the list of recommendations. At that time, Mr. Hutchinson stated that he believed the recommendations were useful. On September 10, 2004, Nissan Vice President Doody sent another letter to Mr. Holler referencing the Petitioner's declining sales performance and, again, requesting that the Petitioner prepare a plan to address the issue. A September 30, 2004, letter to the Respondent, allegedly from Mr. Holler, noted that staffing levels had been increased, a new executive manager (Mr. Hutchinson) had been hired, advertising funds had been increased, and customer service scores had improved. However, by that time, Mr. Hutchinson had been employed at the dealership since at least August of 2003, and there was no credible evidence presented at the hearing that staffing levels, advertising funds, or customer satisfaction scores had been materially increased. On October 18, 2004, Nissan Vice President Doody, sent another letter to Mr. Holler about the Petitioner's declining sales performance, noting that whatever efforts had been made by the Petitioner to improve sales had been unsuccessful. Thereafter, Mr. Doody arranged a meeting with Mr. Delbrueck, Mr. Holler, and another member of the Holler family to discuss the deteriorating situation at the dealership and between the parties. The meeting occurred on October 26, 2004, during which the Nissan representatives addressed the issues including under- capitalization, declining sales, and customer satisfaction scores. The Nissan representatives noted the Petitioner's failure to respond to any of the continuing problems and advised the Petitioner that, if the situation did not improve, the Respondent could initiate proceedings to terminate the Dealer Agreement. At the hearing, the Nissan representatives testified that the Holler family members in attendance at the October 26th meeting had no response during the discussion and offered no specific plan to resolve the situation. The Petitioner presented no credible evidence to the contrary. Shortly after the meeting, and in the absence of any substantive attempt by the Petitioner to resolve the concerns set forth in the NODs, the Nissan representatives decided to pursue termination of the Dealer Agreement if the Petitioner's sales penetration continued to be unsatisfactory. The Petitioner's regional sales penetration as of November 2004 was 65.69 percent. The year-end sales penetration for 2004 was 64.5 percent of regional average. On January 7, 2005, Mr. Delbrueck met with Mr. Hutchinson to discuss the dealership's sales performance. By that time, more than a year had passed since Mr. Hutchinson's designation as executive manager, yet the dealership's sales performance had not improved. Mr. Delbrueck inquired as to whether the Petitioner would be interested in using an additional Nissan resource (the EDGE program) designed to identify specific deficiencies in the sales process. The EDGE program included an extensive review of the sales process from the customer perspective, including a six-month survey period and four hidden camera "mystery shopper" visits. There was a charge to dealers participating in the EDGE program. Mr. Hutchinson told Mr. Delbrueck that he would have to discuss the program with the owners. The Petitioner subsequently chose not to participate. During the January 7th meeting, Mr. Delbrueck also encouraged Mr. Hutchinson to hire additional sales staff. At the hearing, Mr. Hutchinson testified that at the time of this meeting, he had been "building a sales force" yet by March of 2005, the Petitioner's full-time sales staff was approximately one-half of what it had been in 2003. On February 11, 2005, Mr. Delbrueck met with Mr. Hutchinson and Holler family members to follow up on the NOD and the October 26th meeting, but made no progress towards resolving the problems. On February 23, 2005, Mr. Delbrueck and Mr. Hayes met with Mr. Hutchinson to follow up on the recommendations Mr. Hayes made in July 2004. Mr. Hutchinson continued to state that the recommendations were useful, but very few had been implemented, and he offered no plausible explanation for the delay in implementing others. On February 24, 2005, the Respondent issued a Notice of Termination (NOT) of the Dealer Agreement that set forth the continuing decline in sales penetration as grounds for the action, as well as the alleged undercapitalization. At some point in early 2005, the Petitioner increased the capitalization of the dealership and corrected the deficiency, although it was implied during the hearing that the correction was temporary and that the increased capital was subsequently withdrawn from the dealership. In any event, the Respondent issued a Superceding NOT on April 6, 2005, wherein capitalization was deleted as a specific ground for the proposed termination. The Petitioner's January 2005 sales penetration was 49.3 percent of regional average, the lowest of any Nissan dealer in the State of Florida. Consumers typically shop various automobile brands, and a consumer dissatisfied with a dealer of one brand will generally shop dealers of competing brands located in the same vicinity, in order to purchase a vehicle at a convenient dealership for ease of obtaining vehicle service. The Respondent asserted that it was harmed by the Petitioner's deteriorating sales performance because Nissan sales were "lost" to other manufacturers due to the Petitioner's failure to appropriately market the Nissan vehicles. The Petitioner asserted that because Nissan's overall sales performance in the Petitioner's PMA was average, no Nissan sales were lost. The Respondent offered testimony suggesting that sales lost to Nissan may not have been lost to the Holler ownership group because the group also owned nearby Mazda and Honda dealerships. The evidence regarding the calculation of lost Nissan sales was sufficiently persuasive to establish that Nissan was harmed by the Petitioner's inadequate vehicle sales volume and by the Petitioner's failure to meet its obligation to "actively and effective promote" the sale of Nissan vehicles to individual purchasers as required by the Dealer Agreement. The number of sales lost is the difference between what a specific dealer, who met regional sales averages, should have sold compared to what the dealer actually sold. In 2003, the Respondent lost 185 sales based on the Petitioner's poor sales performance. In 2004, the Respondent lost 610 sales based on the Petitioner's poor sales performance, 200 more lost sales than from the next poorest performing Nissan dealer in Florida. The parties offered competing theories for the Petitioner's declining performance, which are addressed separately herein. The greater weight of the evidence presented at the hearing establishes that as set forth herein, the Respondent's analysis of the causes underlying the Petitioner's poor sales performance was persuasive and is accepted. The Respondent asserted that the sales decline was caused by operational problems, including an inadequate facility, inadequate capitalization, poor management, ineffective advertising, inadequate sales staff, and poor customer service. Competing dealerships in the area have constructed improved or new facilities. Customers are more inclined to shop for vehicles at modern dealerships. Upgraded dealerships typically experience increased customer traffic and sales growth. The Petitioner's facility is old and in disrepair. Some dealership employees referred to the facility as the "Pizza Hut" in recognition of the sales building's apparent resemblance to the shape of the restaurant. Nissan representatives discussed the condition of the facility with the Petitioner throughout the period at issue in this proceeding. When the Respondent began preparing for the introduction of new models in 2002, the Respondent began to encourage dealerships including the Petitioner, to participate in the "Nissan Retail Environment Design Initiative" (NREDI), a facility-improvement program. Apparently, the Petitioner was initially interested in the program, and, following a design consultation with the Respondent's architectural consultants, plans for proposed improvements to the Petitioner's facility were created. At the time, the Respondent was encouraging dealers to improve facilities, the Respondent had a specified amount of funding available to assist dealers who chose to participate in the NREDI program, and there were more dealers interested than funds were available. Although funds were initially reserved for the Petitioner's use, the Petitioner declined in June of 2003 to participate in the program, and the funds were reallocated to other dealerships. The Respondent implied that one of the reasons the Petitioner did not upgrade the dealership facility was a lack of capitalization. The allegedly inadequate capitalization of the dealership was the subject of continuing discussions between the Petitioner and the Respondent for an extended period of time; however, inadequate capitalization was specifically deleted from the grounds for termination set forth in the NOT at issue in this proceeding. Although the evidence indicates that lack of capitalization can limit a dealer's ability to respond to a multitude of problems at a dealership, the evidence is insufficient to establish in this case that an alleged lack of capitalization was the cause for the dealership's failure to upgrade its facility. In a letter to the Respondent dated June 30, 2003, the Petitioner stated only that it was "not feasible" to proceed and indicated an intention only "to proceed in the future," but offered no additional explanation for the lack of feasibility. Similarly, it is not possible, based on the evidence presented during the hearing, to find that Petitioner's failure to respond to the deteriorating operations at the dealership was due to a lack of financial resources. Daily operations at the dealership were hampered by the lack of appropriate management at the dealership location. Although Mr. Holler was identified in the Dealer Agreement as the principal owner and the executive manager of the dealership, his address was located in Winter Park, Florida, and there was no credible evidence presented that he managed the operation on a daily basis. As sales deteriorated, the Respondent began to insist that the Petitioner designate someone located on-site at the facility as executive manager with full control over the day-to- day operations of the dealership. In June 2003, Mr. Sekula was appointed as executive manager, but his authority was limited and his decisions required approval of the ownership group. At the hearing, Mr. Sekula acknowledged that the ownership group was bureaucratic. Shortly after his appointment, he was transferred by the ownership group to another of their competing dealerships. Several months later, Mr. Hutchinson was appointed as executive manager. There was no credible evidence presented to establish that Mr. Hutchinson ran the fiscal operations of the dealership. He prepared budgets for various expenditures and submitted them to the ownership group. The ownership group apparently controlled the "purse strings" of the dealership. There was no credible evidence presented as to the decision- making process within the group; however, decisions on matters such as the dealership's advertising budget required approval of the ownership group. The failure to provide appropriate on-site management can delay routine decisions and negatively affect the ability to manage and motivate sales staff. For example, when Nissan offered Mr. Hutchinson the opportunity to participate in the Nissan EDGE sales program, Mr. Hutchinson was initially unable to respond, because he lacked the ability to commit the financial resources to pay for the program. Mr. Hutchinson testified that the ownership group routinely approved his advertising budget requests. As the Petitioner's sales declined, so did advertising expenditures, from $694,107 in 2002 to $534,289 in 2004. The Petitioner's declining advertising expenditures were a contributing factor in deteriorating sales. The Petitioner reduced its total advertising budget while the Orlando market was growing, and the Petitioner's sales penetration declined while competing dealerships sales increased. Additionally, the Petitioner did not monitor the effectiveness of its advertising. The Petitioner's advertising was implemented through "Central Florida Marketing," a separate company owned by the Holler organization. There is no evidence that either the Petitioner or Central Florida Marketing monitored the effectiveness of the advertising. A substantial number of Nissan buyers within the Petitioner's PMA purchased vehicles from other dealerships, suggesting that the advertising failed to attract buyers to the Petitioner's dealership. Only eight percent of the Petitioner's customers acknowledged seeing the Petitioner's advertising, whereas about 20 percent of car shoppers in the Orlando area admit being influenced by dealer advertising. The Respondent asserted that the Petitioner failed to have sufficient sales staff to handle the increased customer traffic precipitated by the introduction of new Nissan models in 2002 and 2003. The Respondent offered evidence that the average vehicle salesperson sells eight to ten cars monthly, five to six of which are new cars and that, based on sales expectations, the Petitioner's sales force could not sell enough cars to meet the regional averages. Although the evidence establishes that the Petitioner cut sales staff as sales declined at the dealership, there is no credible evidence that customers at the Petitioner's facility were not served. The assertion relies upon an assumption that the Petitioner experienced increased sales traffic upon the introduction of new models and that the sales staff was inadequate to sufficiently service the increased traffic. The evidence failed to establish that the Petitioner experienced an increase in sales traffic such that sales were lost because staff was unavailable to assist customers. However, the Petitioner's sales staff failed to take advantage of customer leads provided to the dealership by the Respondent. The Respondent gathered contact information from various sources including persons who requested vehicle information from the Respondent's internet site, as well as the names of lease customers whose lease terms were expiring. The contact information was provided to dealers without charge through the Respondent's online dealer portal. The Petitioner rarely accessed the data, and it is, therefore, logical to presume that the leads resulted in few closed sales. The Petitioner's customer satisfaction scores also declined during the time period relevant to this proceeding. Poor customer service can eventually influence sales as negative customer "word-of-mouth" dampens the interest of other prospective customers. The Respondent monitored the customer opinions of dealer operations through a survey process, which resulted in "Customer Service Index" (CSI) scores. Prior to 2003, the Petitioner's CSI scores had been satisfactory, and then CSI scores began to decline. By the close of 2003, the CSI scores were substantially below regional scores, and the sales survey score was the lowest in the Petitioner's district. Although the Petitioner asserted on several occasions that CSI scores were increasing, the evidence established that only the March 2004 CSI scores improved and that no other material improvement occurred during the time period relevant to this proceeding. The Petitioner asserted at the hearing that the sales performance decline was caused by a lack of vehicle inventory, the alteration of the Petitioner's PMA, a lack of available financing from Nissan Motors Acceptance Corporation (NMAC), hurricanes, improper advertising by competing dealers, and the death of Roger Holler, Jr. The Petitioner also asserted that this termination action is being prosecuted by the Respondent because the Petitioner declined to participate in the NREDI dealer-facility upgrade program and declined to sell the Respondent's extended service plan product. A number of the suggested causes offered by the Petitioner during the hearing were omitted from the Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order, but nonetheless are addressed herein. The Petitioner asserted that the Respondent failed to make available marketable inventory sufficient for the Petitioner to meet sales penetration averages. The evidence failed to support the assertion. Nissan vehicles were distributed according to an allocation system that reflected dealer sales and inventory. The Respondent used a "two-pass" allocation system to distribute 90 percent of each month's vehicle production. The remaining 10 percent were reserved for allocation by Nissan market representatives. Simply stated, dealers earned new vehicles to sell by selling the vehicles they had. New vehicle allocations were based upon each dealer's "days' supply" of cars. The calculation of days' supply is essentially based on the number of vehicles a dealer had available on the lot and the number of vehicles a dealer sold in each month. Through the allocation system, a dealership that failed to sell cars and lower its days' supply would be allocated fewer cars during the following month. More vehicles were made available to dealers with low days' supplies than were available to dealers with higher supplies. It is clearly reasonable for the Respondent to provide a greater supply of vehicles to the dealers who sell more cars. At some point during the period relevant to this proceeding, Nissan removed consideration of sales history from the days' supply-based allocation system calculation; however, there was no credible evidence presented to establish that the elimination of the sales history component from the calculation reduced the vehicle allocation available to the Petitioner. The Respondent applied the same allocation system to all of its dealerships, including the Petitioner. There is no evidence that the Respondent manipulated the allocation system to deny any vehicles to the Petitioner. The Respondent provided current inventory and allocation information to all of its dealerships, including the Petitioner, through a computerized database system. The Petitioner was responsible for managing vehicle inventory and for utilizing the allocation system to acquire cars to sell. Although the Petitioner asserted that the decline in sales was related to a lack of vehicle inventory, there was no evidence that the Petitioner's inventory declined during the period relevant to this proceeding. In fact, the evidence established that the Petitioner's inventory actually increased from 150 vehicles in early 2003 to 300 vehicles in early 2004, at which time the Petitioner reduced vehicle orders and the inventory began to decline. The Petitioner also asserted that it was provided vehicles for sale that were undesirable to the Petitioner's customers, due to expensive or excessive options packages. There was no credible evidence that the Petitioner's sales declines were related to an inventory of undesirable vehicles. Further, there was no evidence that the decline in sales penetration was related to poor supply of any specific vehicle model. Other than two truck models, the Petitioner's sales penetration decline occurred across the full range of Nissan vehicles offered for sale. Every Nissan dealer had the ability to exercise significant control (including color and option package choices) over most of the inventory acquired during the "first pass" allocation. Any inventory deficiencies that may have existed were the result of the Petitioner's mismanagement of inventory. Mr. Hutchinson did not understand the vehicle allocation system or its relationship to the days' supply calculation. The Petitioner routinely declined to order units of Nissan's apparently most marketable vehicles during the allocation process. During 2003, the Petitioner declined 137 vehicles from the "first pass" allocation, including 18 Sentras and 56 Altimas, and declined 225 vehicles from the "second pass" allocation, including 59 Sentras and 59 Altimas. During the first half of 2004, the Petitioner declined 58 vehicles from the "first pass" allocation and 42 vehicles from the "second pass" allocation. During the hearing, one of the Petitioner's witnesses generally asserted that the Respondent's turndown records were erroneous; however, the witness was unable to identify any errors of significance, and the testimony of the witness was disregarded. After the two-pass allocation process was completed, there were usually some vehicles remaining for distribution to dealers. Nissan assigned responsibility to DOMs to market these units to dealers. The DOMs used the days' supply calculation to prioritize the order in which they contacted dealers, although the vehicles were available to any dealer. There is no evidence that any DOM manipulated the days' supply-based prioritization of vehicles for denying the Petitioner the opportunity to obtain vehicles to sell. Any vehicles remaining available after the DOM attempts to distribute the vehicles were identified as "Additional Vehicle Requests" (AVR) and were made available to all dealers simultaneously. Dealerships were notified of such availability by simultaneous facsimile transmission or through the Nissan computerized database. There was no evidence that the Petitioner was denied an opportunity to obtain AVR vehicles, and in fact, the Petitioner obtained vehicles through the AVR system. The Petitioner asserted that the Nissan practice of reserving 10 percent of each month's production for allocation by market representatives rewarded some dealers and punished others. Market representative allocations are standard in the industry, and such vehicles are provided to dealerships for various reasons. Nissan market representative allocations were used to supply extra cars to newly opened dealerships or in situations where a dealership was sold to new ownership. Nissan market representative allocations were also provided to dealers who participated in the NREDI facility upgrade program. The provision of additional vehicles by market representatives to new or expanded sales facilities was reasonable because the standard allocation system would not reflect the actual sales capacity of the facility. The Petitioner presented no evidence that the Respondent, or any of its market representatives, manipulated the 10 percent allocation to unfairly reward any of the Petitioner's competitors or to punish the Respondent for not participating in various corporate programs. Prior to 2001, the Respondent had a program of providing additional vehicles to under-performing dealers in an apparent effort to increase sales by increasing inventory; however, the program did not cause an increase in sales and actually resulted in dealers being burdened with excessive unsold inventory and increased floor plan financing costs. The Respondent eliminated the program in 2001, and there is no evidence that any dealership was provided vehicles through this program during the time period relevant to this proceeding. There is no evidence that the Respondent eliminated the program for the purpose of reducing the vehicles allocated or otherwise provided to the Petitioner. The Petitioner asserted that the Respondent altered the Petitioner's assigned PMA in March 2004 and that the alteration negatively affected the Petitioner's sales penetration calculation because the Petitioner's area of sales responsibility changed. Prior to March 2004, the Petitioner's PMA was calculated using information reported by the 1990 United States Census. After completion of the 2000 Census, the Respondent evaluated every Nissan dealer's PMA and made alterations based upon population changes as reflected within the Census. Standard Provision Section 3.A. of the Dealer Agreement provides that the Respondent "may, in its reasonable discretion, change the Dealer's Primary Market Area from time to time." There was no credible evidence presented to establish that the 2000 PMA was invalid or was improperly designated. There was no evidence that the Respondent's evaluation of the Petitioner's PMA was different from the evaluation of every other PMA in the United States. There was no evidence that the Respondent evaluated or altered the Petitioner's PMA with the intent to negatively affect the Petitioner's ability to sell vehicles or to meet regional sales penetration averages. There was no credible evidence that the 2000 PMA adversely affected the dealership or that the Petitioner's declining sales penetration was related to the change in the PMA. The alteration of the PMA did not sufficiently affect the demographics of the Petitioner's market to account for the decline in sales penetration. Recalculating the Petitioner's sales penetration under the prior PMA did not markedly improve the Petitioner's sales penetration. The Petitioner suggested that the 2000 PMA revision was an impermissible modification or replacement of the Dealer Agreement, but no credible evidence was offered to support the assertion. There was no evidence that the Petitioner did not receive proper notice of the 2000 PMA. At the hearing, the Petitioner implied that the Respondent caused a decline in sales by refusing to make Nissan Motor Acceptance Corporation (NMAC) financing available to the Petitioner's buyers. NMAC is a finance company affiliated with, but separate from, the Respondent. NMAC provides a variety of financing options to dealers and Nissan vehicle purchasers. NMAC relies in lending decisions, as do most lenders, on a "Beacon score" which reflects the relative creditworthiness of a customer's application to finance the purchase of a car. Vehicle financing applications are grouped into four general "tiers" based on Beacon scores. Various interest rates are offered to customers based on Beacon scores. The Petitioner offered data comparing the annual number of NMAC-approved applications submitted in each tier by the Petitioner on behalf of the Petitioner's customers to suggest that the decline in the Petitioner's sales indicated a decision by NMAC to decrease the availability of NMAC credit to the Petitioner's customers. There was no evidence that NMAC treated the Petitioner's customers differently than the customers of competing dealerships or that NMAC-financed buyers received preferential interest rates based upon the dealership from which vehicles were purchased. There was no evidence that the Respondent exercised any control over individual financing decisions made by NMAC. There was no evidence that the Respondent manipulated, or had the ability to manipulate, the availability of NMAC financing for the purpose of negatively affecting the Petitioner's ability to sell vehicles. A number of hurricanes passed through the central Florida region in August and September of 2004. The Petitioner asserted that the dealership's physical plant was damaged by the storms, and that the hurricane-related economic impact on area consumers caused, at least in part, the decline in sales. The evidence failed to establish that the Petitioner's physical plant sustained significant hurricane damage to the extent of preventing vehicle sales from occurring. None of the Petitioner's vehicle inventory sustained hurricane- related damage. There was no evidence presented to indicate that the Petitioner's customers experienced a more significant economic impact than did the customers of competing dealers in the area. There was no credible evidence that the hurricanes had any material impact on the Petitioner's sales penetration. The Petitioner's sales penetration immediately prior to the hurricanes was 62.8 percent. The Petitioner's sales penetration in August 2004 was 61.6 percent, in September was 61.1 percent, and in October was 62.3 percent. Generally, within 30 to 45 days after a hurricane, customers with damaged vehicles use insurance proceeds to purchase new vehicles. The Petitioner's sales volume increased at this time; although because other dealers in the region also experienced increased sales, there was no change to the Petitioner's sales penetration calculation. The Petitioner asserted that improper advertising of "double rebates" by competing dealers caused declining sales, and offered evidence in the form of newspaper advertisements in support of the assertion; however, the Petitioner's own advertising indicated the availability of such rebates on occasion. There was no evidence presented to establish that the Respondent was responsible for creating or approving advertisements for dealerships. The Respondent has a program whereby dealers who meet certain advertising guidelines can obtain funds to defray advertising costs, but the program is voluntary. The Respondent does not regulate vehicle advertising or retail pricing. There was no evidence that the Petitioner reported any allegedly misleading or illegal advertising with any law enforcement agency having jurisdiction over false advertising or unfair trade practices. Mr. Hutchinson testified that the death of Roger Holler, Jr., in February 2004, negatively affected sales at the dealership, but there was no evidence that Roger Holler, Jr., had any role in managing or operating the dealership. The Petitioner's sales decline commenced prior to his death and continued thereafter. The evidence failed to establish that the death had any impact on the operation of the dealership or the Petitioner's sales performance. The Petitioner asserted that the Respondent's effort to terminate the Dealer Agreement was an attempt to punish the Petitioner for declining to participate in the NREDI program and offered a chronology of events intended to imply that the Respondent's actions in this case were a deliberate plan to force the Petitioner to either build a new facility or sell the dealership. The assertion is speculative and unsupported by credible evidence. During the time period relevant to this proceeding, only one of the four Orlando-area Nissan dealers agreed to participate in the NREDI program. Of the four dealerships, three experienced increased sales activity during the period relevant to this proceeding. The Petitioner was the only one of the four dealerships to experience a decline in sales penetration during this period. The Respondent has taken no action against the two other dealerships that declined to participate in the NREDI program. There was no credible evidence that the Respondent has taken any punitive action against any dealership solely based on a dealership's decision not to participate in the NREDI program. The Petitioner asserted that the Respondent's actions in this case were intended to punish the Petitioner for not selling the Respondent's extended service contract (known as "Security Plus") and for selling a product owned by the Petitioner, but there was no evidence supporting the assertion. A substantial number of dealers in the region did not sell the Security Plus product to new car buyers. There was no evidence that the Respondent has penalized any dealer, including the Petitioner, for refusing to sell the Nissan Security Plus product. During the hearing, the Petitioner identified a number of other troubled Nissan dealerships, ostensibly to establish that other dealerships similarly situated to the Petitioner had not been the subject of Dealer Agreement termination proceedings and that the Respondent had failed to enforce the Dealer Agreement termination provisions fairly. A number of the dealerships cited by the Petitioner are outside the State of Florida and are immaterial to this proceeding. The Dealer Agreement provides for termination of an agreement if the dealer materially and substantially breaches the agreement. The Dealer Agreement does not require termination of every dealership that fails to achieve average regional sales penetration. Termination of a Dealer Agreement because of sales performance requires a dealer-specific analysis that includes consideration of the factors underlying poor sales and consideration of conditions that may warrant delaying termination proceedings. As to the other Florida Nissan dealers cited by the Petitioner, many had higher sales penetration levels than did the Respondent. When compared to the Florida dealerships, the magnitude of the Petitioner's sales penetration decline exceeded that of all the other dealerships. Many of the cited dealerships had also initiated changes in management, staffing, and facilities to address sale and service deficiencies. Some of the cited dealers had already shown sales and service-related improvements. One dealership, Love Nissan, had already been terminated, even though its sales penetration had exceeded that of the Petitioner. One dealership cited by the Petitioner was Hampton Nissan, against whom the Respondent had initiated termination proceedings in 2003. Changes to Hampton's PMA based on the 2000 PMA resulted in an increase in the dealership's sales penetration eventually to levels exceeding those of the Petitioner, and Nissan has rescinded the action. There was no evidence that the Hampton Nissan PMA was calculated differently than the Petitioner's PMA, or that either PMA was altered purposefully to affect the dealer's sales penetration results. Other dealerships cited by the Petitioner were being monitored by the Respondent to ascertain whether efforts to improve sales performance succeed. The Respondent may ultimately pursue termination proceedings against underperforming dealerships if sales performance fails to improve. There was no credible evidence that, prior to initiating this termination proceeding, the Respondent failed to consider the facts and circumstances underlying the Petitioner's poor sales and the Petitioner's response to the situation. The Petitioner has experienced a substantial and continuing decline in sales penetration and has failed to respond effectively to the deteriorating situation during the period at issue in this proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's protest and approving the April 6, 2005, Superceding Notice of Termination. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of March, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of March, 2007.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with the licensure and regulation of real estate brokers and salespersons in the State of Florida pursuant to chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes. At all times material to this action, Respondent was licensed a real estate sales associate in the State of Florida. On November 18, 2010, Petitioner filed an Administrative Complaint against Respondent, which reads in pertinent part: On or about October 5, 2007, Respondent prepared a sales purchase contract on behalf of Anne Vincent (Buyer) and Donald Gilchrest (Seller) for a property known as 6521 SW 9th Street, Pembroke Pines, Florida 33023 for $250,000. Respondent represented in the sales and purchase contract for the Subject Property that a $2,000 deposit was held in escrow by Title Sense Inc. Respondent communicated to the Sellers that he had received a check in the amount of $2,000 from the Buyer. * * * 10. Respondent failed to place with Respondent's registered employer any funds entrusted to Respondent by the Buyer for the Subject Property. * * * 12. Respondent failed to deliver a copy of the sales and purchase contract to Respondent's Broker, Edgar Rhenals. Based upon the foregoing, Petitioner alleged that Respondent violated section 475.25 (1)(b), (1)(e), and (1)(k), Florida Statutes, as well as Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-14.009. As discussed in the preliminary statement of this Recommended Order, Petitioner's sole witness at the final hearing was Ms. Krystal Cordo, an investigator employed with the Division of Real Estate. Other than Ms. Cordo's description of statements made by Respondent during the investigation——in which Respondent denied all wrongdoing——Ms. Cordo's testimony and investigative report consisted entirely of hearsay, with no applicable hearsay exceptions. In light of the complete absence of incriminating non-hearsay evidence, Petitioner properly conceded that Respondent's guilt could not be established in connection with any of the charges.2 Accordingly, the undersigned finds, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Respondent is not guilty of Counts I, II, and III of the Administrative Complaint.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of March, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S EDWARD T. BAUER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 2011.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent has been a licensed real estate salesman in the state of Florida having been issued License No. 0341212. The last license issued to Respondent is delinquent, and Respondent's license is in an involuntary inactive status. On or about October 28, 1986, the Respondent, while holding a delinquent involuntary inactive license as a salesman in the employ of KSP Real Estate Corporation and Mortgage Services (hereinafter "KSP"), did prepare an offer to purchase (a sales contract) on behalf of Emma L. Brown, Mary L. Howard and Betty F. Howard, as purchasers, for certain real property which was listed for sale with Lucy Charles of Homes by Charles of South Florida. Respondent received in trust $500 as an earnest money deposit which was to be placed in the KSP escrow account. In connection therewith, Respondent represented in the sales contract that, as president of KSP, he was acting as an escrow agent and that the $500 was to be held in escrow pending the outcome of the transaction. KSP is not and has not been a corporation registered as a broker with the Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate. Although the contract called for a closing within 120 days from the delivery of the abstract, the transaction did not close. At no time was the $500 placed in a KSP escrow account as was represented in the sales contract Respondent prepared. Respondent expected to be paid all or part of $2,640 as compensation for his services, calculated as 3% of the sales price of $88,000, as reflected in the sales contract. Respondent prepared and presented the sales contract offer to Lucy Charles of Homes by Charles representing himself to be a real estate broker. The purchasers had previously submitted an offer on the same property through Rickenback Associates, Inc. That offer was not contingent on FHA financing and on the purchasers refinancing their current home. When they showed that offer to their long-time friend, the Respondent, he prepared the sales contract in question in an attempt to re-negotiate the purchasers' then- outstanding offer so they could obtain the terms they wanted which had not been included by Rickenback Associates, Inc.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent guilty of Counts I and II of the Administrative Complaint and suspending Respondent's real estate salesman license for a period of six (6) months. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 15th day of March, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of March, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Darlene F. Keller, Executive Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Kenneth A. Ratliff 813 Northwest 107th Street Miami, Florida 33168 James H. Gillis, Esquire Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 William O'Neil, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint? him? If so, what disciplinary action should be taken against
Findings Of Fact Respondent is now, and has been since September 23, 1991, a Florida-licensed real estate salesperson (holding license number 0579778). On September 30, 1993, his license became "involuntary inactive." His license was reactivated effective November 22, 1994, and remained active through September 30, 1995. Respondent's license is currently in "involuntary inactive" status. In January of 1994, Respondent was hired to (and thereafter did work) as a real estate salesperson for 4% Realty, Inc. (4%). The decision to hire Respondent was made by Frank Eckert, 4%'s broker. At no time did Respondent advise Eckert that he (Respondent) did not have an active real estate salesperson's license. On January 26, 1997, and January 27, 1997, Respondent provided $500.00 to 4% (in the form of two checks made out to 4%, one, dated January 26, 1994, in the amount $300.00 and the other, dated January 27, 1994, in the amount of $200.00). The $500.00 represented a deposit made by Respondent in connection with a proposed real estate transaction involving Respondent (as the buyer) and Mark Solowitz (as the seller). By letter dated March 3, 1994, Respondent notified Solowitz that, as of January 26, 1994, there was “on deposit in 4% Realty, Inc., Escrow account a total sum of $500.” The real estate transaction between Respondent and Solowitz was never finalized. After the transaction failed to close, Eckert returned Respondent’s $500.00 deposit to Respondent. On or about October 12, 1994, Respondent applied and interviewed for a salesperson position in the Weston office of Prudential Florida Realty (Prudential). The interview was conducted by Dorothy McCullough, the branch manager of Prudential's Weston office. Respondent made certain statements during the interview with which McCullough was "not comfortable." At the conclusion of the interview, McCullough told Respondent that she would "get back to him" and "let him know" of her decision. At no time did McCullough hire Respondent or authorize him to use Prudential's forms or stationary or to act as an agent for Prudential. On or about October 13, 1994, Respondent submitted to First Atlantic Realty (First Atlantic), on behalf of prospective tenants, an offer to lease property (located at 3350 Ivy Way in Miramar) listed by First Atlantic. Respondent purported to be acting as a representative of Prudential. When McCullough discovered what Respondent had done, she telephoned him to make sure that he understood that he had not been, nor would he be, hired by her to work for Prudential. Subsequently, First Atlantic's broker, Roger Herman, learned that the prospective tenants on whose behalf Respondent had submitted the offer had already moved into the rental property notwithstanding that their offer (which was "extremely weak") had not been accepted.3 Herman thereupon went to the rental property "to find out what was going on." He attempted to communicate with the prospective tenants, but was unsuccessful because they spoke ”very little English." He then telephoned the police. Upon arriving on the scene, the police spoke with the prospective tenants and persuaded them to vacate the premises. On or about October 24, 1994, Respondent submitted to First Atlantic, on behalf of the same prospective tenants, another offer to lease the property at 3350 Ivy Way. On this occasion, however, Respondent was acting as a salesperson in the employ of 4%. Herman responded to this second offer by contacting the Department by telephone and discussing the situation with a Department representative. During the discussion, Herman was advised by the Department representative that Respondent did not possess an active salesperson's license. Herman then telephoned Eckert and informed him of Respondent's licensure status. After speaking with Herman, Eckert telephoned the Department and received confirmation that Respondent did not have an active salesperson's license. Eckert then contacted Respondent and advised him that his employment with 4% was terminated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order finding Respondent guilty of the violations described in Conclusion of Law 41 of this Recommended Order and revoking his real estate salesperson's license for having committed said violations.DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of April, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of April 1997.
The Issue The issue in this matter is whether the Florida Real Estate Commission may deny Petitioner’s application for a license as a real estate sales associate, and, if so, whether it is appropriate to do so based on the underlying facts.
Findings Of Fact The Commission is the state agency charged with licensing real estate sales associates in Florida. See § 475.161, Fla. Stat. On January 21, 2016, Petitioner applied to the Commission for a license as a real estate sales associate. In her application, Petitioner dutifully divulged that on December 12, 2002, the Commission revoked her real estate broker’s license. On August 16, 2016, the Commission issued a Notice of Intent to Deny notifying Petitioner that it denied her application for a sales associate license. The Commission denied Petitioner’s application based on its finding that Petitioner’s broker’s license was previously revoked by the Commission in 2002. At the final hearing, Petitioner explained the circumstances that led to her broker’s license revocation. In 2000, a Commission investigator audited her real estate trust account. The audit uncovered information that Petitioner failed to timely transfer a $1,000 deposit and properly reconcile her escrow account. Petitioner disclosed that a sales contract she was handling required the buyers to deposit $1,000 with her as the broker. The sale fell through, and the buyers did not close on the house. In May, 2000, the buyers demanded Petitioner transfer the deposit within 15 business days. Petitioner, however, did not forward the deposit out of her escrow account until four months later in September 2000. Based on this incident, the Commission alleged that Petitioner failed to account for delivered funds; failed to keep an accurate account of all trust fund transactions; failed to take corrective action to balance her escrow account; and filed a false report in violation of sections 475.25(1)(d)1, 475.25(1)e, 475.25(1)(l), 475.25(1)(b) and Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-14.012(2). Based on the charges, the Commission ordered Petitioner’s real estate broker’s license permanently revoked. Petitioner stressed that she did not steal the buyers’ money. Her mistake was in not timely transferring the deposit from her trust account. Petitioner asserted that she simply lost track of the funds. At the final hearing, Petitioner accepted full responsibility for her mismanagement. At the final hearing, Petitioner expressed that she first entered the Florida real estate industry in 1982 when she became a licensed real estate sales associate. In 1987, she obtained her broker's license. She subsequently purchased a Century 21 franchise. She conducted her real estate business until 2002 when her broker’s license was revoked. Petitioner explained that she is not seeking another broker’s license from the Commission. Instead, she is just applying for another sales associate license. Petitioner described the difference between a sales associate and a broker.5/ Petitioner stated that a sales associate works directly under, and is supervised by, a broker. The sales associate interacts with prospective buyers and sellers, negotiates sales prices, and accompanies clients to closings. Regarding financial transactions, however, the broker, not the sales associate, processes all funds related to a real estate sale. The broker, not the sales associate, transfers funds into and out of escrow accounts. In other words, the error Petitioner committed as a broker in 2000 could not happen again if she was granted a sales associate license. Petitioner further testified that during the time she worked as a sales associate, she was involved in the sale of approximately 100 houses. Petitioner represented that she never received any complaints or criticisms from any of her clients. Petitioner relayed that she became motivated to return to the real estate business following her husband’s death in 2015. Petitioner expressed that she was very good at selling houses. Real estate is her passion. She voiced that she eats, sleeps, walks, and talks real estate. Despite her misstep in 2000, Petitioner declared that she is a very honest and hardworking person. She just wants another chance to work in the profession that she loves. Currently, Petitioner works for a charitable organization. She helps administer and manage the charity’s finances. Petitioner represented that she has never failed to meet her financial responsibilities. She has always accounted for all of the funds for which she is entrusted (approximately $8 million since she began working for the charity over 20 years ago). No evidence indicates that Petitioner has committed any crimes or violated any laws since her broker’s license was revoked in 2002. At the final hearing, Petitioner presented three witnesses who testified in favor of her receiving a sales associate license. All three witnesses proclaimed that Petitioner is trustworthy, of good character, maintains high moral values, and is spiritually strong. The witnesses, who know Petitioner both personally and professionally, opined that she is honest, truthful, and has an excellent reputation for fair dealing. All three witnesses declared that the public would not be endangered if the Commission granted Petitioner’s application for licensure. Petitioner also produced six letters of support. These letters assert that Petitioner is an honorable and trustworthy person. Based on the competent substantial evidence presented at the final hearing, the preponderance of the evidence provides the Commission sufficient legal grounds to deny Petitioner’s application. Consequently, Petitioner failed to meet her burden of establishing that she is entitled to a license as a real estate sales associate. However, as discussed below, Petitioner demonstrated that she is rehabilitated from the incident which led to the revocation of her broker’s license in 2002. Therefore, the Commission may, in its discretion, grant Petitioner’s application (with restrictions) pursuant to sections 475.25(1) and 455.227(2)(f).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Florida Real Estate Commission has the legal authority to deny Petitioner’s application for licensure. However, based on the underlying facts in this matter, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order granting Petitioner’s application for a license as a real estate sales associate. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of May, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRUCE CULPEPPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of May, 2017.
