The Issue Whether Respondent, while serving as an appointed member of the Ocoee Planning and Zoning Commission, violated section 112.313(7)(a), Florida Statutes (2015)1/ by having a contractual relationship that conflicted with his official responsibilities; and, if so, the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the complaint, Respondent served as an appointed member of the Ocoee P & Z Commission. Respondent is subject to the requirements of part III, chapter 112, Florida Statutes, the Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees, for his acts and omissions during his tenure on the P & Z Commission. As a member of the P & Z Commission, Respondent is subject to the “Ocoee Florida Land Development Code, Section 3, Planning and Zoning Commission [Land Development Code].” Section 3-2 of Land Development Code provides in part as follows: Establishment and Membership The Planning and Zoning Commission shall consist of nine (9) members appointed by the City Commission and one member appointed by the School Board of Orange County as a non- voting member. The member appointed by the School Board of Orange County shall attend those meetings at which the Planning and Zoning Commission considers comprehensive plan amendments and rezonings that would, if approved, increase residential density on the property that is the subject of the application. No member shall be an employee of the City of Ocoee and all members, except the member appointed by the School Board of Orange County, shall be residents of the City of Ocoee. When selecting members to the Planning and Zoning Commission, the City Commission shall attempt to select persons from different geographical areas within the City so as to create geographical diversity and representation. * * * E. Compliance with Laws The Planning and Zoning Commission, and its individual members, shall comply with all applicable laws relative to public bodies, including disclosure of interests and procedure[s] for refraining from participation [when] a conflict of interest exists. * * * G. Duties and Responsibilities To act as the Local Planning Agency (LPA) of the City of Ocoee, pursuant to Section 163.3174, Florida Statutes, and to prepare on its own initiative recommendations for amendments to the Comprehensive Plan of the City of Ocoee, including text and/or maps, and to forward such amendments to the City Commission for consideration. No such recommendation shall be made except after a public hearing held in accordance with State and local requirements. To review and make recommendations to the City Commission on applications for amendments to the Comprehensive Plan. No such recommendation shall be made except after a public hearing held in accordance with State and local requirements. To prepare on its own initiative recommendations for amendments to this Code, text and/or maps, and to forward such amendments to the City Commission for consideration. No such recommendation shall be made except after a public hearing held in accordance with State and local requirements. To review and make recommendations to the City Commission on applications for amendments to this Code, including applications for annexation or change of zoning. Pursuant to Section 163.3174(4)(c), Florida Statutes, the Planning and Zoning Commission shall also have the responsibility to review and make a finding as to the consistency of the proposed land development regulation with the adopted Comprehensive Plan and to report such finding to the City Commission. No such recommendation shall be made except after a public hearing held in accordance with State and local requirements. To review and make recommendations to the City Commission on applications for various development approvals or permits as provided within this Code, including, but not limited to Planned Unit Developments (PUD), special exceptions, subdivisions, and any other application for which the City Commission requests a report and/or recommendation. Where a public hearing is required by the applicable procedural section, no such recommendation shall be made except after a public hearing held in accordance with State and local requirements. To act in an advisory capacity to the City Commission on land use and land development issues and to make such studies and to conduct such investigations as may be requested from time to time by the City Commission. To review zoning of newly annexed lands when it represents an increase in intensity of use or a conflict with the Comprehensive Plan pursuant to requirements of State law and City ordinance. In addition to serving on the P & Z Commission, Respondent buys and sells commercial real estate. Respondent is a manager and shareholder in W.O.R.Y. INVESTORS, LLC (WORY), an entity that is also in the business of buying and selling commercial real estate. Respondent, in his individual capacity, owned approximately four acres, which abutted six acres owned by WORY. Both properties have an address on West Road in Ocoee, Florida, and will be referred to collectively herein as the “West Road property.” The Contract On or about November 11, 2015, Respondent, in his individual capacity, and as manager for WORY, executed an “Agreement of Sale” wherein the West Road property was to be purchased by Charter Schools Development Group, LLC (buyer), for $1,890,540. According to the Agreement of Sale, the buyer wanted to “develop and construct on the Property a K-8 public charter school.” The Agreement of Sale contained a number of contingencies, referred to in the contract as “Buyer Required Approvals,” that Respondent was required to satisfy prior to finalization of the sale of the West Road property. Paragraph six of the Agreement to Sale sets forth a number of the pre-sale contingencies imposed on Respondent, and the same provides as follows: 6. Development The Buyer intends to develop and construct on the Property a K-8 public charter school and adjacent commercial development acceptable to Buyer consisting of buildings and other improvements including, but not limited to recreation fields, related landscaping, open space, storm water, and appropriate parking (the "Project"). Buyer's obligation to complete the purchase of the Property from Seller in accordance with the terms of this Agreement is contingent upon the satisfaction of each of the following conditions with regard to the Property (each of which may be waived in whole or in part in writing by Buyer): Buyer has obtained final, unappealed and unappealable approvals from all necessary governmental authorities (including governmental agencies), for zoning, utilities and any other approvals (including necessary parking requirements) Buyer deems necessary, in its sole discretion, permitting the construction and use of the improvements comprising the Project, including but not limited to any required special exception. Buyer has obtained final, unappealed and unappealable approvals and/or permits required by any and all governmental authorities (including governmental agencies) so that the Property shall have immediate and adequate access to water, sewer and all other utilities in accordance with the final approved site development plan. Buyer has obtained final, unappealed and unappealable approvals and/or permits required by any and all governmental authorities (including governmental agencies) for storm water management; including easements and agreements for constructing and maintaining storm water basins; all wetlands studies and approvals in such form that wetlands, if any, shall not preclude construction of roads, utilities, storm water management facilities, any other required improvements for erection of buildings on the Property. Buyer has obtained all permits and approvals, and all conditions thereof shall have been satisfied, so as to allow for recording of the final plan and issuance of building permits subject only to satisfaction of the following requirements by Buyer at or after Closing (i) submission of construction drawings in accordance with applicable law, (ii) execution by the Buyer of the necessary development agreements, (iii) execution and funding by Buyer of the necessary escrow agreements for municipal improvements, and sewer and water improvements, and (iv) payment by the Buyer of all municipal fees and charges associated therewith. Subject to Seller's obligation set forth in Section 6(f) below, Buyer has obtained any and all other easements, approvals and/or permits that may be necessary to construct and use the improvements comprising the Project. Buyer shall obtain, at no additional cost to Seller, all easements and roads that in Buyer's sole reasonable discretion are necessary for property access, utilities and signage to the Property in accordance with Buyer's final approved site development plan. The items referred to in subsections 6(a) through 6(f) hereof shall hereafter be referred to as the "Buyer Required Approvals." After the end of the Inspection Period, Buyer shall diligently proceed with the filing of all applications necessary for obtaining the Buyer Required Approvals. Seller agrees, at no expense to Seller, to cooperate with buyer in connection with the Buyer Required Approvals to the extent of signing all applications necessary for obtaining the buyer Required Approvals and appearing and testifying at the various hearings. Seller's cooperation as aforesaid shall not entitle Seller to any additional compensation. All permit fees, studies, deposit and investigation costs incurred in connection with the Buyer Required Approvals shall be the sole responsibility of buyer and buyer agrees to affirmatively use its good faith efforts to obtain all of the Buyer Required Approvals without delay and as expeditiously as reasonably possible. Seller hereby grants to Buyer a power of attorney to file, on Seller's behalf, all applications related to the Buyer Required Approvals; provided, however, that the Land shall not be rezoned prior to the expiration of the Inspection Period. Seller acknowledges that buyer will likely contact, meet with and/or obtain consents for the Project from neighboring property owners during the Inspection Period and in the process of obtaining the Buyer Required Approvals. (emphasis added). None of the provisions of paragraph six of the Agreement of Sale were waived by either party. Paragraph 15(b) of the Agreement of Sale provides as follows: (b) If Seller shall violate or fail (in breach of its obligations hereunder) to fulfill or perform any of the terms, conditions or undertaking set forth in this Agreement within ten (10) days written notice from Buyer or (five (5) days written notice in the event of a monetary default), Buyer shall be entitled to: (i) terminate this Agreement and receive the return of the Deposit and reimbursement of Buyer's documented out-of-pocket due diligence expenses up to $15,000.00, and, thereupon, the parties hereto will be released and relieved from all provisions of this Agreement, or (ii) pursue specific performance. Paragraph 17 of the Agreement of Sale states that “[b]uyer and Seller agree to cooperate with each other and to take such further actions as may be requested by the other in order to facilitate the timely purchase and sale of the Property.” Paragraphs 6, 15(b) and 17 of the Agreement of Sale obligated Respondent to take all steps necessary, including “appearing and testifying at the various hearings,” for ensuring that the “Buyer Required Approvals” were satisfied, which in turn would allow Respondent to receive his share of the purchase price for the West Road property. Section 112.311(1), provides in part that “[i]t is essential to the proper conduct and operation of government that public officials be independent and impartial and that public office not be used for private gain other than the remuneration provided by law.” Rezoning and Respondent’s Role In order for a charter school to be built on the West Road property, it was necessary to rezone the existing planned unit development land use plan covering the property. Ocoee City Planner Michael Rumer testified that there are two types of rezoning. There is a straight rezoning to a zoning category listed in the land development code and there is rezoning to a planned unit development (PUD). Both types of zoning use the following process: an application is filed; then there is a review process by a development review committee, which is a staff level review; that review is forwarded to the P & Z Commission for a recommendation; and then it goes to the Ocoee City Commission for two readings of an ordinance for rezoning if the rezoning is approved. This is the process that was followed for the West Road property PUD. On February 9, 2016, the issue of whether to recommend rezoning of the West Road property to allow for the charter school referenced in the Agreement of Sale came before the P & Z Commission. Respondent was present for the meeting. During the meeting, Respondent spoke in favor of the rezoning request for the West Road property. When a fellow commissioner made a request for more time to review the rezoning issue, Respondent opposed the delay by stating “[i]f you don't give them a go now, you basically kill the deal because it's a time sensitive thing that they want the kids in there in August.” During the meeting, the commissioners struggled with whether to recommend denial of the West Road property zoning request, recommend approval of the request without conditions, or recommend approval of the request with conditions. After two previous motions regarding the zoning request died for lack of a “second,” a third motion was made wherein approval was recommended “with the condition that we’re all going to look at the traffic movement with the final site plan design.” When it appeared as though this motion was also likely to fail for lack of a “second,” Respondent encouraged the chairman of the P & Z Commission to voice a “second” for the motion since Respondent was unable to do so.2/ Respondent’s actions during the meeting of February 9, 2016, were consistent with his obligations under the Agreement of Sale to assist the buyer of the West Road property with securing the “Buyer Required Approvals.”
Recommendation Based on the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a civil penalty of $10,000.00 be imposed against Respondent due to his violation of section 112.313(7)(a) and that Respondent also be publicly censured and reprimanded. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of April, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of April, 2017.
The Issue The issue is whether a development order adopted by Respondent City of Marathon by Resolution PC00-09-04 is consistent with the comprehensive plan, land development regulations, and statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent City of Marathon (Marathon) was incorporated on November 30, 1999. It adopted as its land development regulations (LDR) the LDRs of Monroe County in effect at the time of Marathon's incorporation. Marathon is within The Florida Keys Area of Critical State Concern. This case involves a development order that Marathon issued to Respondent Banana Bay of Marathon, Inc. (BB). As Planning Commission Resolution 00-09-04, the development order authorizes BB to add 12 motel rooms to an existing motel in return for imposing certain restrictions on the use of wet slips at its adjacent marina that is part of the same motel/marina development. The restrictions require the removal of cable television connections from 12 slips and limitation upon vessels using these 12 slips to those without plumbing facilities. For the remaining wet slips at the marina, the development order requires BB to limit their use to no more than 18 vessels at one time and to provide mandatory sewage pumpout for these vessels. At various points in the record and this recommended order, references to a "transfer" of 12 marina slips for 12 motel rooms refer to the conditions set forth in this paragraph. BB owns 7.39 acres of upland and 2.67 acres of adjacent bay bottom in Marathon at mile marker 49.5 (Subject Property or, as developed, Banana Bay). The Subject Property runs from U.S. Route 1 to the water. The Subject Property contains 60 motel rooms in two buildings, a conference room, a motel office, support buildings, three apartments suitable for employee use, and a marina. The marina includes 40-50 slips, depending upon the size of the moored vessels. The Subject Property is zoned Suburban Commercial (SC) and Mixed Use (MU). About 2.4 acres (104,544 square feet) running about 350 feet from U.S. Route 1 is SC. About 4.99 acres (217,364 square feet) is zoned MU. The additional 2.67 acres of adjacent bay bottom are also zoned MU, although the submerged acreage is unimportant for reasons discussed below. Twenty-five of the motel rooms are in SC, and 35 of the motel rooms are in MU, although the distinction between zoning districts is also unimportant for reasons discussed below. LDR Code Section 9.5-267 authorizes ten "rooms" per ”acre" as "allocated density" for motel uses in SC and MU and 15 "rooms" per "buildable acre" as "maximum net density" for motel uses in SC and MU. (There is no difference between "hotels" and "motels" in this case; all references to "motels" include "hotels.") Three fundamental questions emerge concerning the application of these two density limitations to this case. The first is whether BB must satisfy both the "allocated density" and "maximum net density" limitation. This is not a difficult issue; BB's proposal must satisfy each of these density limitations. The second question is what is included in the areas under each of these density limitations. Notwithstanding the use of "gross acres" in the "allocated density" formula, it is necessary to net out certain areas--just less than is netted out in the "maximum net density" formula. The third question is what constitutes a "room." When applied to marine-based units, the definition of a "room" presents a difficult and important issue. As a whole, the LDRs imply that no marine-based dwelling units should count as "rooms," but one provision specifically requires the inclusion of "live-aboard" units in density calculations. The first question requires little analysis. As noted below in the discussion of the two types of areas, "allocated density" and "maximum net density" provide two separate measures of the intensity of use of land. The allowable density for "maximum net density" is never less than the allowable density for "allocated density" because "maximum net density" is a safeguard to ensure that, after netting out from the parcel those areas reserved for open space, setbacks, and buffers, the intensity of use will not be excessive. Nothing whatsoever in the LDRs suggests that Marathon may issue a development order for a proposal that satisfies the "maximum net density," but not the "allocated density." These two densities limitations operate in tandem, not in the alternative. The calculation of the "allocated density" requires consideration of the second and third questions identified above. The issue of area seems straightforward. LDR Code Section 9.5-4(D-3) defines "density or allocated density" as "the number of dwelling units or rooms allocated per gross acre of land by the plan." LDR Code Section 9.5-4(D-4) defines "maximum net density" as "the maximum density permitted to be developed per unit of land on the net buildable area of a site, as measured in dwelling units or rooms per acre." LDR Code Section 9.5-4(G-4) defines "gross area" as "the total acreage of a site less submerged lands and any dedicated public rights-of-way." LDR Code Section 9.5-4(N-4) defines "net buildable area" as "that portion of a parcel of land which is developable and is not open space required by section 9.5-262 or 9.5-343 or required minimum bufferyard under article VII division 11 or required setbacks under section 9.5-281." The area of land involved in determining "allocated density" is greater than the area of land involved in determining "maximum net density." But the area of land involved in determining "allocated density" is itself a net amount. The LDRs expressly require reducing the gross areas by any submerged land and dedicated public rights-of-way. However, any reasonable application of the LDRs also requires reducing the gross areas used for the motel "allocated density" calculation by the minimum areas required to support other uses on the Subject Property. If the only use of the Subject Property were motel rooms, the "allocated density" limit of ten units per acre (10:1) would allow 73.9 rooms. But the Marathon Planning Commission Staff Report dated September 18, 2000, correctly netted from the Subject Property the land areas required to support the commercial aspects of the hotel and the commercial apartments. These reductions leave a total of 5.86 acres available to support the motel rooms. At a density of 10:1, the Subject Property could therefore support a total of 58 motel rooms. The Planning Commission incorrectly used the 15:1 ratio for "maximum net density" in concluding that the Subject Property could support a total of 67.65 motel rooms. Evidently, the Planning Commission used the "maximum net density" because it was not using "gross area" or "gross acres" (the terms are synonymous under the Code) in calculating the area. The netting reduction necessary to calculate whether BB's proposal satisfies the "maximum net density" limitation would require the calculation of the area of the Subject Property that must be devoted to open space, setbacks, and buffers. The Planning Commission probably undertook this step in calculating the "maximum net density" for the Subject Property, as its figures seem to include unstated deductions for the 20 percent open space plus another factor, probably for setbacks and buffers--all of which are discussed in its report. However, the Planning Commission erroneously neglected to apply the "allocated density" limitation to the "gross acres," exclusive of submerged land, public rights-of-way, and the minimum land required to support the other upland uses. As noted above, doing so would have yielded no more than 58 motel rooms. At present, the Subject Property contains 60 hotel or motel rooms. The Subject Property therefore cannot support the addition of another 12 hotel or motel rooms, given its "allocated density" of only 58 rooms. In general, BB justifies the addition of 12 rooms to the front motel by arguing that it is only transferring these units from the 12 existing wet slips. It is unnecessary to determine whether a transfer under these facts is lawful when, if these 12 slips count as units, the Subject Property is already 14 units over its "allocated density." The resolution of the third question--what constitutes a "room"--dispenses with this argument. Thirty of the existing 40-50 boat slips in the marina have water, electric, and cable hook-ups and are presently used for some form of habitation. Most vessels berth at the marina for two or three days, although the average stay is slightly over one month. The average stay at the 30 slips offering utilities, though, is two to three months. Typically, two persons use a vessel berthed at the marina for more than a couple of days. BB seals the discharge ports of all vessels mooring at the marina for any appreciable period of time. BB provides a sewage pumpout service for these and other vessels. The wastewater from the marina operations goes to a septic tank, in contrast to the wastewater from the motel operations, which goes to an onsite package plant. Persons mooring at the marina for at least two months normally obtain telephone service and may obtain cable television service, in addition to the potable water and electrical services provided by BB. The marina also provides rest rooms, laundry facilities, showers, a bar, limited food service, and a mail box. However, BB rules require that all persons berthing at the marina register a permanent address because the slips are "not considered permanent housing." At the request of the Florida Keys Aqueduct Authority and the Monroe County Planning Department, BB has limited rental agreements at the marina to a maximum of one month, although some persons enter into back-to-back rental agreements. Persons staying more than one week often have cars. Contrary to BB's contentions, none of these slips provides additional density for the Subject Property, and therefore the 12 slips are not available for transfer to the motel. For the same reason, as discussed below, the proposed transfer of the 12 units would also violate the Rate of Growth Ordinance (ROGO). In two respects, the record reveals that the conversion of marine-based residential uses to upland residential uses might facilitate the achievement of important land use planning objectives. First, the wastewater collected from the marina is directed to a septic tank, and the wastewater collected from the motel is directed to a package plant. Absent a significantly reduced flow from the marine-based residential use, the upland residential use would therefore impact the adjacent waters to a lesser extent. Second, marine-based residential users may be more reluctant to evacuate for an approaching hurricane than upland residential users. Absent a significantly greater number of visitors during hurricane season if the 12 units were taken from the marina slips and added to the motel, the upland residential use might therefore facilitate timely hurricane evacuation of the vulnerable Keys. However, the record was relatively undeveloped on these two points, and these possible advantages to the conversion of marine-based residential uses to upland-based residential uses do not override the LDRs. The LDRs may treat the more intense residential use associated with "live-aboards" differently than the less intense residential use associated with other moored vessels. Although the LDRs' treatment of "live-aboards" may not be entirely consistent, any inconsistency is irrelevant in this case because the moored vessels at the Banana Bay marina do not qualify as "live-aboards." As stipulated for the purpose of this case, LDR Code Section 9.5-4(T-4) defines a "transient residential unit" as "a dwelling unit used for transient housing such as a hotel or motel room, or space for parking a recreational vehicle or travel trailer." LDR Code Section 9.5-4(D-31) defines a "dwelling unit" as "one (1) or more rooms physically arranged to create a housekeeping establishment for occupancy by one (1) family with separate toilet facilities." LDR Code Sections 9.5-4(D-23) through 9.5-4(D-30) identify the various types of dwellings that may contain "dwelling units.” These dwellings are, respectively, detached zero-lot-line dwellings, multifamily apartment dwellings, attached dwellings, detached individual dwellings, duplex dwellings, commercial apartment dwellings, rooftop dwellings, and townhouse dwellings. The frequent references to "open yards" in these definitions precludes the application of these definitions to moored vessels, even "live- aboards." The exclusion of all moored vessels, including "live-aboards," from density calculations is also suggested by two other portions of the LDRs. As is typical, LDR Code Section 9.5-120.1 provides that the mechanism for enforcing density limitations is in the issuance of building permits, but this enforcement mechanism is of doubtful use in regulating vessel moorings, which do not typically involve the issuance of a building permit. Also, the density definitions discussed above both refer to the development of various types of residential uses on "land." Moreover, none of the zoning districts established in Marathon's LDRs measures the intensity of marina uses, including vessels moored for extended periods as live-aboards, by imposing some sort of marine density limitation, either by including the moored dwelling units or the submerged acreage. Because the LDRs did not intend to include such marine-based uses in density calculations, LDR Code Section 9.5-267, which is a table setting forth "allocated densities" and "maximum net densities," covers only upland-based uses, including recreational vehicle or campground spaces per acre, and does not extent to marine-based uses, such as live-aboard marina slips. However, two provisions in the LDRs require density calculations to include "live-aboards." LDR Code Section 9.5-308, which seems to be an older provision in the LDRs, provides that "each live-aboard shall count as a dwelling unit for the purpose of calculating density limitations in the district in which it is permitted." Better incorporated into the present regulatory scheme of the LDRs, LDR Code Section 9.5-120.1 defines a "residential dwelling unit" as a "dwelling unit," including a "transient rental unit," as defined in LDR Code Section 9.5-4(T-3), and "live-aboard vessels," as defined in LDR Code Section 9.5-4(L-6). However, LDR Code Section 9.5-4((L-6) states that a "live-aboard vessel" is "any vessel used solely as a residence or any vessel represented as a place of business, a professional or other commercial enterprise, or a legal residence." The record does not suggest that any of the moored vessels were used "solely" as a residence, as distinguished, for instance, from a vessel used for residential and recreational purposes, or that any of the mixed-use vessels served as the occupants' legal residence. Absent a finding that the moored vessels constitute "transient residential units," ROGO does not support this proposed transfer of residential uses from marine-based to upland-based. LDR Code Section 9.5-123(f)(3) authorizes the transfer of an existing "residential dwelling unit" from one site to another within the same subarea. However, LDR Code Section 9.5-122 defines a "residential dwelling unit" to extend only to "live-aboards." For the reasons already discussed, the less intense residential uses associated with the vessels moored at Banana Bay's marina preclude their treatment as "residential dwelling units" eligible for transfer to the motel. Petitioner has proved that the development order is materially inconsistent with the LDRs. LDR provisions governing the density and intensity of residential development go to the heart of effective land use planning, especially in an area as sensitive as the Keys. For these reason, it is unnecessary to consider the consistency of the development order with the more general provisions of Marathon's comprehensive plan, on which Marathon's LDRs are based.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission enter a final order denying the request of Banana Bay of Marathon, Inc., to approve the transfer of 12 slips to 12 rooms in a motel on the Subject Property. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara L. Leighty, Clerk Growth Management and Strategic Planning The Capitol, Suite 2105 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Charles Canaday, General Counsel Office of the Governor Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Suite 209 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1001 Cari L. Roth, General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Mitchell A. Bierman Weiss Serota 2665 South Bayshore Drive Suite 420 Miami, Florida 33133 James S. Mattson James S. Mattson, P.A. Post Office Box 586 Key Largo, Florida 33037
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent's proposed award of DCPHU Bid I-90 to the Intervenor, Meyers Parking Systems, Inc., for the management of a parking facility located at 1350 Northwest 14th Street should be upheld.
Findings Of Fact For approximately the last ten years, Kinney has operated the parking lot at the Dade County Public Health Unit building located at 1350 N.W. 14th Street in Miami, Florida (the "Parking Lot") pursuant to a contract with HRS. The existing contract between Kinney and HRS for the management of the Parking Lot was entered in June 1989 and was scheduled to expire on June 30, 1990. That contract included two one-year options to renew. The contract also included a provision that allowed either party to terminate the contract upon thirty days notice. The contracts for management of the Parking Lot in previous years were substantially identical in form to the existing contract. In February of each year, a contract review committee consisting of the head of the administrative services department of the facility (the "Contract Manager') and several other employees of the facility would meet to discuss the Parking Lot contract and to determine whether to renew the contract or rebid it. (This Committee will be referred to as "Parking Lot Committee.") The Contract Manager (whose title has been recently changed to Administrative Services Director) essentially chaired the Parking Lot Committee and appointed the other employees who served on the Committee. For the last ten years the Contract Manager has been responsible for overseeing this contract. During this time, his main contacts at Kinney were Chuck Adams, who was usually at the Parking Lot on a daily basis, and Mr. Adams' supervisor, Ken Deutsch. Both Mr. Deutsch and Mr. Adams left the employ of Kinney sometime prior to February, 1990. The exact date of their departure was not established. Both Mr. Deutsch and Mr. Adams now work for Meyers. Kinney's new representative with respect to the Parking Lot contract was Tony Benyon, who assumed those responsibilities on February 1, 1990. Mr. Benyon had previously worked for Meyers and was on the job only twenty two days before the decision was made to rebid the contract. On February 22, 1990, the Parking Lot Committee met and determined not to renew the contract with Kinney. At the time this decision was made, the Contract Manager was aware that the former Kinney employees had switched jobs and were now working for Meyers. However, it does not appear that he brought the job changes to the attention of the Parking Lot Committee because at least one member of the Committee was not aware of the job changes. On or about March 23, 1990, HRS issued an invitation to bid for the management and operation of the Parking Lot (the "Invitation to Bid.") Although the evidence did not establish exactly how many time this contract had been bid in the past, it appears that bids were solicited for this contract on at least two prior occasions during the ten years that Kinney had been operating the Parking Lot. On each occasion, the Invitation to Bid form was substantially identical to the form used in March of 1990. Page 6 of the Invitation to Bid requested bidders to submit a resume of their backgrounds. Page 8 of the Invitation to Bid was entitled "Bid Sheet" and required bidders to submit the following information: "(1) Proposal for Operating the Lot; (2) Proposed Rates, (3) Proposed Net Income Distribution." The Invitation to Bid did not require the bidders to provide any documentation regarding their financial condition nor did it indicate that prior job performance would be considered in evaluating the bids. The Invitation to Bid contained a provision that "any questions concerning conditions and specifications shall be directed in writing to this office for receipt no later than ten (10) days prior to the bid opening." Between the time the Invitation to Bid was sent out and the bids were received, the Contract Manager admits that he "probably" had conversations with some of the bidders and responded to questions about the bid. The Contract Manager could not specifically recall any such discussions with potential bidders between the time the Invitation to Bid was sent out and the date the bids were submitted. However, he admitted that it was likely that some discussions took place. Kinney was never advised of any such discussions between the Contract Manager and other potential bidders. Three sealed bids (including proposals from Kinney and Meyers) were received and opened by HRS at a bid opening on April 4, 1990. A fourth bid was disqualified because it was not sealed. The members of the Parking Lot Committee and representatives of the bidders were present at the bid opening. The bid submitted by Kinney proposed a net income distribution to HRS of 82.5 percent with the remaining 17.5 percent being retained by Petitioner. The Kinney bid also contained a specific breakdown of anticipated costs, fees and expenses to be deducted from the projected gross income to achieve projected net income, a resume and a list of references regarding other-lots being managed by the Petitioner in the area. Meyers and Hi-Rise Parking Systems, Inc. ("Hi- Rise") also submitted bids. Both of those bids contained a proposed net income distribution of 90 percent to HRS. Neither the Hi-Rise nor the Meyers' bids contained a resume or a list of local references of other lots being managed by the companies nor did they contain a listing of anticipated costs, fees and expenses. At the bid opening, the Contract Manager indicated that the bids submitted by Meyers and Hi-Rise were the low bids and the Parking Lot Committee would meet to determine how to "break the tie." At this point, Kinney was effectively eliminated from consideration. By letter dated April 10, 1990, the Contract Manager requested additional information from Meyers and Hi-Rise as follows: Company background information including officers, organization and latest financial/management audit; [and] At least three references to include name of contact person, firm, mailing address and telephone number. The Contract Manager did not request any additional information from Kinney or the disqualified bidder. On or about April 16, 1990, Meyers submitted the requested information to the Contract Manager. On or about April 17, 1990, Hi-Rise submitted the requested information to the Contract Manager. Thus, it is clear that information regarding the financial condition of Meyers and Hi-Rise was not submitted until after the bids were opened. On May 1, 1990, the Parking Lot Committee met to discuss the additional information received from Meyers and Hi- Rise. At that meeting, the members of the Committee completed a "bid selection review form" that listed (1) net income distribution (2) references and (3) company management and financial condition as the criteria for evaluation of the bids. The Committee determined that Meyers and Hi--Rise were "tied" in all categories except financial condition. At best, the submitted financial information provides a cloudy picture of Meyers' financial status. The information indicates that Meyers showed an income loss for the year 1988-1989 of $3,670,000. While a large portion of this loss is apparently related to corporate restructuring, it does not appear that any members of the Parking Lot Committee understood or fully considered this financial information nor did they seek to have the submitted financial information reviewed by an accountant. Hi-Rise's financial records indicate that it is a significantly smaller company, but its records indicated a positive cash flow for the preceding year. Notwithstanding these facts, the Committee decided to award the contract to Meyers. This decision was essentially made on the recommendation of the Contract Manager. The bid selection review form stated as follows: Based on bids and additional information provided, the Parking Lot Management Bid Selection Team recommended award of DCPH Bid No. I-90 to Meyers Parking System, Inc. On May 9, 1990, HRS provided all interested parties with a notice of its selection of Meyers as the successful bidder. In the Notice of Selection, HRS indicated that Meyers had been selected based on the proposed net income distribution, references, background and financial condition. Petitioner timely filed a protest of the proposed award of the contract. The Parking Lot Committee excluded Kinney from consideration based solely upon the net income distribution percentage. However, since the Invitation to Bid did not require the bidders to specify or limit in any way the expenses that could be deducted from gross revenues prior to distributing proceeds to HRS, there was an insufficient basis to accurately evaluate the proceeds that HRS could reasonably expect pursuant to any of the bid proposals. HRS and Meyers have argued that, because HRS has many years experience and expense records relating to the operation of the Parking Lot, the information provided pursuant to the Invitation to Bid provided HRS with sufficient information to make a reasonable evaluation of the financial terms of the proposals. This contention is rejected. To permit such uncertainty and discretion to be built into the bid process would substantially undermine the integrity and dependability of the process. Item 12 on page 6 of the Invitation to Bid required that "bidders will submit a resume of their background and other local lots they are currently managing." No such resume or lists were provided by Meyers. Meyers contends that its response to Item 1 on Page 8 of 8 adequately addressed this requirement. That response provided as follows: PROPOSAL FOR OPERATING LOT. Meyers Parking System, Inc. proposes to operate the Dade County Health department's parking lot with the same high degree of professionalism that we are known for and have demonstrated to our other clients throughout the county. The facility will be managed by trained, uniformed, courteous employees and supervised regularly and closely with our field supervisors and our Regional Vice-President... This statement is not a sufficient response to Item 12 of the Invitation to Bid. During the Parking Lot Committee meeting on February 22, 1990, several complaints were made regarding Kinney's performance under the existing contract. However, no efforts were ever undertaken by HRS to terminate the existing contract with Kinney. While HRS contends that the complaints were part of the reason for deciding to rebid the contract, no steps were taken to disqualify Kinney from bidding on the new contract. In any event, most of the complaints voiced on February 22, 1990 would have been the responsibility of the prior managers of Kinney who now work for Meyers. In February and March of 1990, the disbursements to HRS under the existing contract diminished significantly. This decrease in payments was the result of embezzlement by Kinney employees. While HRS has cited this shortage to justify its decision in awarding the contract to Meyers, there is no evidence that HRS ever attempted to terminate the existing contract nor does it appear that the Parking Lot Committee considered this fact in deciding to eliminate Kinney's bid from consideration. Similarly, the evidence established that there have been problems during the months of March, April and May of 1990 with attendants failing to appear at work on time or leaving the job site. Again, however, there is no indication that HRS attempted to terminate the existing contract or that the Parking Lot Committee relied upon these factors in deciding to eliminate the Kinney bid from consideration. There have been recurring complaints made to Kinney under the existing contract regarding excessive towing of cars from the Parking Lot. The problem of parking lot attendants ordering cars towed without the permission of HRS has existed off and on for sometime. Even though HRS representatives had voiced complaints about the. towing policies, the evidence indicates that this recurring problem became worse in the late spring and early summer of 1990. Nonetheless, HRS never sought to terminate the existing contract because of the towing problems nor did the Parking Lot Committee rely upon this fact in deciding to eliminate the Kinney bid from consideration.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Secretary of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a Final Order rejecting all bids for DCPHU Bid I-90 and issue a new Invitation to Bid. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 31 day of October, 1990. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31 day of October, 1990.
Findings Of Fact The Bid The Department, through an Invitation to Bid (ITB), sought to secure a contract for the management of the Dade County Public Health Unit parking lot located at 1340 N.W. 14th Street, Miami, Florida. By April 1, 1986, the bid opening date, bids had been filed with the Department on behalf of Kinney, Floyd, and LaSalle Parking, Inc. (LaSalle). The Department's selection team reviewed the bids and recommended that the contract be awarded to Kinney. Consistent with the selection team's recommendation, by letter of April 2, 1986, the Department advised the unsuccessful bidders that the contract had been awarded to Kinney and advised them of their right to protest the award. Floyd filed a timely protest of the award and alleged, inter alia, that Mr. Shera, the Department's Business Manager, had outlined the criteria to be used in evaluating the bids as including a consideration of the bidder's ability to: Provide parking services to . . . employees and clients for the lowest monthly rate. 3/ Upon receipt of Floyd's protest, the Department reevaluated the bids and the ITB specifications, and concluded that the ITB specifications contained an ambiguity which had resulted in a lack of uniform bid response. Therefore, the Department rejected all bids and rebid the contract. 4/ Pertinent to this case the bid specifications provided. SPACES AVAILABLE: 13 Uncovered Reserved, present rate $10.50/ month. 22 Covered Reserved, present rate $10.50/ month. 115 Reserved for Health Department Employees, present rate $7.35/month. 3 Handicapped 45 Daily rental 45 Daily rental 198 TOTAL CURRENT RATE: Reserved Parking $10.50/month. Health Department Employees $7.35/month Health Department Clients 50 percent discount on daily rates. Daily rates: 1st hour $1.00 Additional 1/2 hour $.50 All day $2.50 3:00 P.M. 7:00 P.M. $1.50. MANAGERIAL RESPONSIBILITIES: 3. That in consideration for such services, the OWNER will allow the MANAGER the exclusive right to charge, collect the established fees for all those wishing to have their cars parked upon the parking premises. All fees must be approved by the owner. And, the mandated Bid Sheet required a response to three proposals: PROPOSAL FOR OPERATING THE LOT: PROPOSED RATES: PROPOSED NET INCOME DISTRIBUTION: Kinney's response to the ITB proposed to retain the current rates and offered a net income distribution of 25% to Kinney and 75% to the Department. Floyd's response to the ITB proposed rates of: RESERVED PARKING : $9.35/MONTH HEALTH DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEES: $6.24/MONTH HEALTH DEPARTMENT CLIENTS : 50% DISCOUNT ON DAILY RATES DAILY RATES : 1ST HOUR $1.00 EACH ADDITIONAL 1/2 HR. $.50 : MAXIMUM ALL DAY $2.50 : 3PM - 7PM $1.50 and a net income distribution of 30% to Floyd and 70% to the Department. While it was the Department's intent to maintain the current rates and to evaluate the bids primarily on a net income distribution basis, the bid specifications were ambiguous and subject to an interpretation which would permit a bid based on different parking rates, as well as a variable distribution basis. Accordingly, because of the ambiguity in the bid specifications, all bids submitted in response to the initial letting should be rejected. The Rebid On rebid, the Department amended its bid specifications to clarify its intent that the current rates would remain in effect, and delineated the "determining factors for bid award. Specifically, the rebid specifications provided: SPACES AVAILABLE: 13 Uncovered Reserved, present rate $10.50/ month. 22 Covered Reserved, present rate $10.50/ month. 115 Reserved for Health Department Employees, present rate $7.35/ month. 3 Handicapped. 45 Daily rental CURRENT RATES: Reserved Parking $10.50/month Health Department Employees $7.35/month Health Department Clients 50% discount on daily rates. Daily rates: 1st hour $1.00 Additional 1/2 hour $.50. All day $2.50 3:00 P.M. - 7:00 P.M. $1.50 The rates will remain the same. The owner will have full jurisdiction in raising or lowering said rate any time during the contract period. * * * Determining Factors for Bid Award: Unarmed parking attendant (outline measures to be taken to secure vehicles in lot). Experience (outline number of years in parking business as parking lot management firm.) Proposed net income distribution (percent split). Provide bilingual parking attendant (Spanish and English, French desirable but not mandatory). By May 14, 1986, the rebid opening date, Kinney, Floyd and LaSalle were the only bidders to respond to the ITB. The Department's selection team reviewed the bids and again recommended that the contract be awarded to Kinney. Accordingly, by letter of June 6, 1986, the Department advised the unsuccessful bidders of its decision to award the contract to Kinney and of their right to protest the award. Floyd filed a timely notice of protest and formal written protest of the proposed award. Floyd's formal protest, filed June 6, 1986, asserted that: Floyd & Associates Protection Corp. submitted the lowest responsive, responsible bid, and should be awarded this contract - Bid No. DCPHU 4/86. We protest the recommendation of the Parking Lot Management Bid Selection Team that Kinney Systems, Inc. be awarded this contract. The bidding process is supposed to protect small companies from the powers of a large company. At all times, the purchasing officers should operate with integrity and fairness to all suppliers. Floyd & Associates has a proven track record and should not be looked upon as inferior because we haven't been in business as long as Kinney. However, if you judge us on an equal and unbiased basis, Floyd should be awarded this contract. We have enclosed exhibit A as a true comparison as to the merits of both companies. 5/ Floyd & Associates should be awarded this contract; we deserve a piece of the American Dream. The Reevaluation Floyd's charge of racial discrimination, planted by Floyd's first protest and tacitly reasserted by it's second protest, was not lost on the Department. Notwithstanding the unsubstantiated nature of Floyd's charge, the Department, without notice to Kinney, purportedly reevaluated the bids. By letter of July 2, 1986, the Department advised Kinney, without explanation, that based on the "selection team's" recommendation the contract had been awarded to Floyd. 6. Kinney filed a timely notice and formal protest of the Department's action. The Department contends that Section 120.53(5)(d), Florida Statutes, authorized its reevaluation of the bid to amicably resolve the protest. The Department's reliance on section 120.53(5)(d), as permitting its unilateral decision to vitiate its prior award of the contract to Kinney, is misplaced. Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, establishes a statutory framework for resolution of protests arising from the contract bidding process. Pertinent to this case, section 120.53(5) provides: Upon receipt of a notice of protest which has been timely filed, the agency shall stop the bid solicitation process or the contract award process until the subject of the protest is resolved by final agency action, unless the agency head sets forth in writing particular facts and circumstances which require the continuance of the bid solicitation process or the contract award process without delay in order to avoid an immediate and serious danger to the public health, safety and welfare. The agency, on its own initiative or upon the request of a protestor, shall provide an opportunity to resolve the protest by mutual agreement between the parties within 7 days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, of receipt of a formal written protest. If the subject of a protest is not resolved by mutual agreement within 7 days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays, of receipt of the formal written protest and if there is no disputed issue of material fact, an informal proceeding shall be conducted pursuant to s.120.57(2) and applicable agency rules before a person whose qualifications have been prescribed by rules of the agency. If the subject of a protest is not resolved by mutual agreement within 7 days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, of receipt of the formal written protest and if there is a disputed issue of material fact, the agency shall refer the protest to the division for proceedings under s. 120.57(1). Under the provisions of section 120.53(5)(c), the Department was bound, absent circumstances not present here, to stop the bid solicitation process pending resolution of Floyd's protest by final agency action. Under the framework of 120.53(5)(d), final agency action could only occur through mutual agreement of the parties; an informal proceeding pursuant to Section 120.57(2) Florida Statutes, or a formal proceeding pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. See: Cianbro Corp. v. Jacksonville Transportation Authority, 473 So.2d 209 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). The provisions of section 120.53(5)(d), which provide an opportunity to resolve a protest by "mutual agreement between the parties," is not an invitation to the Department to unilaterally reevaluate its decision. Such resolution can only occur "between the parties"; which must include, at a minimum, the successful bidder, the protestant, and the Department. Since Kinney did not participate or concur in the Department's action, and there existed disputed issues of material fact, Floyd's protest could only be resolved by a formal 120.57(1) proceeding. Accordingly, the Department's subsequent decision to award the contract to Floyd was improper. 7/ The Bidders Kinney, which has operated the subject parking lot under contract with the Department for the past 6 years, is one of the world's largest parking companies, with over 50 years of experience in parking lot operations. Kinney presently parks approximately 20,000,000 automobiles annually in facilities it owns, leases or operates under contract. These facilities range in size from fewer than 50 spaces to those with thousands of spaces. Currently, Kinney operates 20 lots in south Florida, which contain 16-17,000 spaces and generate in excess of $20,000,000 in annual receipts. The proof establishes that Kinney has the requisite experience to operate the subject facility, properly supervise its operations, and accurately account for the proceeds generated by the parking operation. Kinney's rebid proposed to operate the subject parking facility predicated on a net income distribution of 25% to Kinney and 75% to the Department. The protestant, Floyd, was established in August 1982 and, until approximately November 1985, had been exclusively involved in providing security services. In November 1985, Floyd received a contract from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to manage its parking garage in Miami, Florida; which accounts for Floyd's total experience in parking lot management. Under Floyd's agreement with INS, it still operates as basically an unarmed security service. Since the majority of patrons utilizing the INS garage are clients of INS, no fees are collected. In the unusual event that the patron's ticket is not validated by INS and a fee is due, Floyd's simply collects the money and immediately gives it to an INS official. Floyd offered no evidence that it has any experience operating an in-and-out lot similar to the subject parking lot, or that it has any established or proposed methods of management, supervision and accounting controls necessary to service the Department's parking lot. Floyd proposed, however, to operate the subject parking lot based on a net income distribution of 20 percent to Kinney and 80 percent to the Department. 8/ The Department's selection team evaluated the responses of Kinney and Floyd, and recommended that the contract rebid be awarded to Kinney even though the net income differential proposed by Floyd would facially generate more income for the Department. The selection team's recommendation was premised on its conclusion that given the experience of Kinney, juxtaposed with the inexperience of Floyd, it could expect a greater return from Kinney even with the lower net income differential. Of the 198 spaces in the Department's parking lot, only 45 are reserved for daily rental. The balance of the spaces are reserved on a fixed monthly rate for Department and other employees. Accordingly, the ability to maximize revenue in the lot is directly dependent upon the operator's supervision and control of the 45 daily spaces. Kinney has demonstrated its ability to insure that those spaces remain open for their intended purpose, to collect and accurately account for all funds collected, and to maximize revenues. Floyd on the other hand has no such experience and offered no evidence that it had any inkling of what was required to operate such a parking lot or any plans to acquire such expertise. The selection team's recommendation was therefore reasonable, and the Department's decision to award the contract to Kinney was premised on an honest exercise of its discretion. At hearing, Floyd chose not to participate and, accordingly, offered no evidence discrediting the Department's award to Kinney or supporting its entitlement. The Department did offer evidence, however, to support its decision to "re-award" the contract to Floyd and thereby vitiate its initial decision. The thrust of the Department's evidence was two fold: a claim of mismanagement by Kinney of the subject parking lot and a claim that the selection team incorrectly assumed Floyd was not properly licensed. The Department's assertions lack substance and conviction. The Department's claims of mismanagement are founded on losses occasioned in the operation of the parking lot from June through November 1985, the theft of a car from the parking lot, and alleged damages to four cars caused by the mechanical arm which controls ingress to the lot. The losses in revenue were not, however, the fault of Kinney. These losses resulted from Kinney's inability to use the 45 daily spaces because the Department had issued over 250 gate cards for its employees. Despite Kinney's protests, it was not until December 1985 that the Department cooperated in solving this problem by limiting the number of gate cards, and the severe over crowding in the lot was eliminated. The only other factor bearing on lost revenue was some theft by a Kinney gate guard; however, Kinney, consistent with its routine practice, used "shoppers" to police the integrity of its employee, and the employee was caught and discharged. Rather than reflect unfavorably on Kinney, its discovery of the theft is evidenced of its good supervision. The Department's remaining claims of mismanagement are equally without merit. The one car stolen from the lot during Kinney's tenure was that of a Department employee who had left her keys in the car. The damage, if any (none was shown), to four cars by the mechanical arm, was occasioned by one car following another car too closely into the lot. The mechanical arm was not shown to function improperly. The foregoing facts, together with the assurances of Mr. Shera, the Department's local manager, that Kinney and the Department have enjoyed a very favorable working relationship over the past six years, renders the Department's assertions of mismanagement not credible. The Department's final basis to vitiate its award to Kinney is predicated on its assertion that its selection team incorrectly concluded that Floyd did not hold an occupational license to operate a parking lot. Again, the Department's assertion is not credible. The proof is that Floyd's licensure was not the motivating factor in the selection team's award of the contract to Kinney. The team's decision was premised on Kinney's superior qualifications and perceived ability to generate more revenue for the Department, compared with the team's well founded concerns of Floyd's ability to perform. As importantly, Kinney advised Mr. Shera by letter of May 15, 1986, of its protest to Floyd's qualifications because of Floyd's purported failure to have an occupational license at the time of bid submittal. Mr. Shera, on behalf of the Department, awarded the contract to Kinney by letter of June 5, 1986, and did not disqualify Floyd. Accordingly, the evidence supports the conclusion that the Department did not incorrectly exclude Floyd because of any licensure requirement. The totality of the evidence, including the demeanor of the witnesses, compels the conclusion that the Department's decision to support Floyd's bid was occasioned by its desire to avoid any appearance of discrimination, as opposed to a fair exercise of its discretion. Such conduct is arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, the evidence supports the award of the subject contract to Kinney.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner owns Lot 70, Gates Knoll 1st Addition, which abuts a medical office complex of eighteen offices west of Lot 70. Off-street paved parking for the medical offices presently abuts Lot 70, but additional parking is needed. Lot 70 fronts on Barry Street, which is the only east-west through street in the immediate vicinity and is heavily travelled. Zoning for Lot 70 is "RS 50," which is single family residential. West of Lot 70 to Highland Avenue is zoned "PS," which would allow multiple family dwellings or business and professional services such as those for which the property is presently used. South of the area zoned "PS" the property adjacent to Gates Knoll 1st Addition is zoned "RM 28," which provides for high density multi-family use and just west of "RM 28" between that zoning and Highland Avenue the property is zoned "CS" for General Commercial use. A bowling alley is located in this area a short distance south of Barry Avenue. Lot 70 is currently fenced and the southern and western part of this lot is used for parking a few automobiles during business hours. The north side of Lot 70 is part of a drainage easement or ditch which occupies approximately 35 feet of this property. Lot 70 is 100 feet wide on Barry Street and 105 feet deep. The north 35 feet of this lot is unusable for construction due to the drainage easement. Adjoining property owners across Barry Street from Lot 70 oppose the special exception primarily because they want the lot to remain vacant to serve as a buffer zone between their property and the commercial development. Others oppose the application because they fear use of the property for anything except a single family residence will reduce their property values, increase the traffic in the neighborhood, and increase the noise and pollution from automobiles. Mr. Huff, the adjoining property owner whose home is immediately east of Lot 70 on Lot 71, is concerned about the proximity of the parked vehicles to his home. The existing fence is some ten feet from Huff's home.
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Respondent violated section 475.25(1)(b) & (c), Florida Statutes (2007), as alleged in the Administrative Complaint and if so, what penalty should be imposed?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of real estate pursuant to section 20.165 and chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes. At all times material to this Administrative Complaint, Respondent was licensed as a real estate broker associate in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 3057283. At all times material to this Administrative Complaint, Respondent was licensed with Re/Max Professionals, Inc., a real estate corporation. At the time of hearing, Respondent was licensed with Access Realty of North Florida, Inc., a licensed real estate corporation. Respondent's address of record is 757 West Duval Street, Lake City, Florida 32055. At all times material to the Administrative Complaint, Respondent was the listing agent for a property known as 831 South West 5th Street, Live Oak, Florida (5th Street property). On March 4, 2008, Respondent listed the property as having a Commercial Intensive (CI) zoning. At the time of the listing, zoning classifications for property in Live Oak were not available on line, and could only be obtained by calling for the information. At the present time, George Curtis is employed by the City of Live Oak and handles inquiries regarding zoning for properties in the City of Live Oak. He does not recall receiving a telephone call from Respondent regarding the zoning classification for the 5th Street property. However, at the time of Respondent's inquiry, Mr. Curtis was just starting his employment with the city, and did not yet have an office. Inquiries were at that time directed to the City Clerk's office. Mr. Curtis could not state that no call was received by that office, or, if received, what information was given. The listing for the property states at the bottom, "[t]his information is deemed reliable, but is not guaranteed." Respondent listed the property zoning as CI after calling to inquire regarding the appropriate zoning for the property. While she testified that her call was to the Suwannee County office as opposed to the City of Live Oak, it is found that the call must have been made to the City, given the telephone call described below. The property described in the listing is not zoned CI, but rather Commercial Neighborhood (CN). In Live Oak, CI zoning is the most intense zoning district, and is limited to major arterial roads in the city. It is intended to meet the needs of a regional population. CN zoning is intended to provide for commercial use on a more limited scale, in terms of the size of the building that can be placed and the types of uses. It is intended to meet the needs of a neighborhood area. A funeral home would not be a permitted use for property zoned CN. It would require a zoning change. A funeral home would be permitted on a property zoned as commercial general (CG). The CG category is between CI and CN. In September 2008, Respondent contacted the City of Live Oak and was referred to George Curtis about the possible use of the property on SE 5th Street as a daycare. During their telephone conversation, he told her that in order to operate a daycare on the property, the owner would need to receive a special exception to the zoning requirements. He obtained her e- mail address and sent her an e-mail with attachments regarding obtaining special exceptions. Respondent believed, based upon their conversation, that the same would be true for any business to be located on the property. Mr. Curtis does not recall telling Respondent at that time that the property was not zoned as CI. On October 16, 2008, Respondent sent the following e- mail to Mr. Curtis: Hi George, the contract for a day care on 831 SW 5th Street, Live Oak (lots 14, 15, 16, Block E, Hildreth) fell through. I now have a pending contract but the buyers want to use the property for a funeral home. Do you see any problem with this? Anne The e-mail was sent at 5:01 p.m. At 5:22 p.m., Mr. Curtis sent the following reply: Hello Anne: I believe this property was Neighborhood Commercial between Green and Ammons on the south side of 5th. C-N does not have any allowances for a Funeral Home, even as a Special Exception. A petition could be proposed to the City Council for Residential- Office or Office Zoning that does allow for the Funeral Home (with also a Special Exception) but other criteria would have to be evaluated to be sure that parting and buffering requirements could be met after any zoning change took place--which is also a process that is not guaranteed but a possibility--there is no way to predict whether the rezoning and the special exception would be approved. This would probably be a 4-6 month process start to finish plus the associated fees to try. Funeral Homes are allowed by right in General Commercial Zoning but you have to front a major street (129/90/51, etc. to get considered for that zoning…) Hope this helps -- wish I had better news… Respondent claims that she never received this e-mail, and that she never deleted it from her computer. She testified that when she did not receive a response, she called the zoning office and was told that a special exception would be required for a funeral home. She passed this information on to Mr. Wright. On October 17, 2008, Russell Wright made an offer to purchase the property on S.W. 5th Street for $45,000. The contract (Petitioner's Exhibit 3) has been reduced and copied several times, and as a result, is illegible in most respects. However, it can be ascertained that the contract was made on October 17, 2008, and signed by the sellers on October 22, 2008. The contract specified that closing was to take place October 31, 2008, which it did. The contract also specified that the Buyers would pay $5,000 down, and the Sellers would finance the remainder at 8 percent, with payments of $485.31. As part of the closing, the Buyers and Sellers signed an Affidavit of Buyer and Seller Regarding Contract Compliance, which stated "all of the contingencies and conditions set forth in the contract (and all addendums thereto) between the Seller and Buyer have been satisfied, performed or waived by the Buyer and the Seller " Because of the condition of Petitioner's Exhibit 3, it cannot be determined whether the form contract made any representations regarding zoning and who was responsible for determining the appropriate zoning for the property. On October 23, 2008, Respondent sent an e-mail to Russell Wright with attachments labeled "Petition for Special Exemption," "How the Future Land Use Plan Map - Brochure," and "Sec. 12.2 Special Exceptions." The message in the e-mail reads: Hi Russ, here's the contact person who deals with the zoning in Live Oak, and the forms for filing. I received 1 of the forms back from you, the As Is Rider but I still need the corrected Lead based paint disclosure that I sent with the AS Rider in yesterday's fax. Please complete this form and fact back to me. The Seller's [sic] are going to close at 9:00 am on Friday 31st, please let me know as soon as possible a time that would be convient [sic] for you and your wife to attend. Regards, Anne. Mr. Wright acknowledged receiving an e-mail, but not the documents. He sent Respondent the other documents required for closing. After the closing, he called her and stated that he could not locate the paperwork related to special exceptions, and on November 3, 2008, she mailed it to him. With the paperwork was the following note: Dear Russell and Marcus: I have enclosed the paperwork for the Special exception. If you have any questions you may call George Curtis at 386-362-2276. Mr. Curtis is the development manager for the City of Live Oak. Regards, Anne Mr. Wright began making renovations on the property in order to open a funeral home. In July 2009, he began the process of getting his city occupational license. He could not obtain the license because the property was not zoned for his intended use. At that point, Mr. Wright contacted city officials, including George Curtis and the Mayor of Live Oak. Mr. Curtis advised Mr. Wright that he had sent an e-mail to Respondent advising her that a funeral home could not be operated on the property with its present zoning. Mr. Wright wrote to Respondent, demanding that she compensate him for the fact that he could not open the funeral home without a zoning change. The letter stated in pertinent part: The Mayor of Live Oak and Mr. George Curtis has informed me that I can apply for a zoning change so that My Wife and I can open our business. But it will cost $750.00 to file the initial papers. And that is NOT a guarantee. To date with the down payment and monthly payments and renovation cost, your dealings have cost us $25,000 plus pain and suffering and embarrassment. And we have property that we can't use for the intention it was purchased. Ms. Hurst, we are allowing you and your firm to settle this matter out of court. Ms. Hurst we will settle this matter for the amount of $50,000.00 which is damages plus pain and suffering. If you and ReMax Professionals, Inc., are not willing to settle with us out of Court, we will retain the Attorney with whom my Wife and I have consulted. . . . It is clear from the evidence that Mr. Wright chose to believe that he could open a funeral home on the property without any further administrative action either to change the zoning or to obtain a Special Exception for its intended use. Neither belief is consistent with the credible evidence that Respondent sent him information regarding Special Exemptions and the process to obtain them. All of the information given to him is consistent with his need to follow up with the City's zoning department, which he did not do. Based on the more persuasive evidence presented in this classic, "he-said, she-said" case, it is found that Respondent did not receive the October 17, 2008 e-mail from George Curtis, but believed that a Special Exemption would be required to operate a funeral home on the property, and that she supplied information to Mr. Wright to that effect. Mr. Wright's claim that Respondent represented that the property could be used as a funeral home with no further action is rejected.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing Count One in the Administrative Complaint; finding a violation of section 475.25(1)(c), as alleged in Count Two; imposing a reprimand and fining Respondent $250.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of June, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of June, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: William Haley, Esquire Brannon, Brown, Haley, Robinson & Bullock, P.A. Post Office Box 1029 Lake City, Florida 32056-1029 Joseph A. Solla, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 801N Orlando, Florida 32801-1757 Thomas W. O’Bryant, Jr., Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 801N Orlando, Florida 32801-1757 Layne Smith, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Respondent Pierson should be granted variances to permit construction of a triplex on a lot 95 feet wide and 87 feet deep. To do so the three variances required are (1) of 5 feet in width, (2) of 13 feet in depth, and (3) 753 square feet in area (10,000 square feet required).
Findings Of Fact Don Curtis Pierson owns the north one-half of Lot 2 and all of Lot 3, Block 6, Revised Map of Clearwater Beach, and has owned this property for some 28 years. The property is zoned RM-20 and is high density residential developed. Pierson's lot is approximately 95 feet by 87 feet (approximately 82,500 square feet). The property is currently occupied by a duplex which was constructed according to Code, except for variances of zero setback from the coastal construction control zone and a 6 foot height variance to permit the construction of a building 31 feet in height. Appellant is the owner of a multifamily building adjacent to Pierson's property which was constructed before various code provisions became effective and was constructed to the lot lines without any setbacks. When Pierson applied for variances in 1983 to construct a triplex on his property, the Board of Adjustment Appeal granted setback variances of 10 feet in rear and front setback lines to permit the construction of a triplex on this property. Vasilaros appealed that grant, and on July 12, 1983 the undersigned heard that appeal. On August 31, 1983, an order was entered denying the setbacks, but approving the construction of a triplex on the lot less than 10,000 square feet in area. That approval was predicated upon then Section 131.020 of the Land Development Code which waived the area requirement for a lot of record. This Section was removed in the 1985 rewrite of the Land Development Code. Specific code provisions respecting the size of the lot on which a three family structure may be erected are in Section 135.044 which requires a minimum lot area of 10,000 square feet, and minimum lot width and depth of 100 feet each. The applicant's only hardship upon which the requested variance can be granted is the uniqueness of the property becoming nonconforming solely by reason of zoning changes.
The Issue Whether Interstate-Tallahassee West has demonstrated that development rights in certain real property it owns have vested against the provisions of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan?
Findings Of Fact The Purchase of the Property. In the Spring and Summer of 1985, Thomas W. Anthony began an inquiry relative to the purchase and development of 21.5 acres (original tract) located at the intersection of Capital Circle West and I-10. (R-2, pp. 11-15.) On December 11, 1985, a Deposit Receipt and Contract for Sale and Purchase was executed between Rehold, Inc. and C. Gary Skartvedt, Thomas W. Anthony, and Mary J. Price, d/b/a Denver West Joint Venture (Denver, Colorado) for the purchase of the original tract. (Deposit Receipt and Contract for Sale and Purchase.) On March 14, 1986, the Interstate-Tallahassee West Partnership Agreement was executed and Interstate purchased the original tract from Rehold, Inc. (Chronological Listing of Events, p. 1.) At the time of the closing on the initial purchase of the original tract, the property was zoned C-2, with the exception of a small portion in the northwest corner of the tract which was zoned A-2. (R-2, pp. 34-35, Preliminary Plat approved on January 18, 1990.) Development Chronology. During 1987 and 1988 the original tract was held to realize growth potential in terms of Interstate's economic investment. (Chronological Listing of Events, p. 2.) In 1989, Interstate began negotiations for the sale of a portion of the original tract to Kent C. Deeb (Deeb). (Chronological Listing of Events, p. 2.) On June 26, 1989, Broward Davis and Associates, Inc. prepared a drawing of easement location and depiction of a 25 year flood line relative to the portion of the original tract which was the subject of the negotiations between Interstate and Deeb. (Chronological Listing of Events, p. 2, R-2 p. 20.) On September 12, 1989, Tilden Lobnitz and Cooper, Inc., (Consulting Engineers) recommended a reconfiguration of the original tract relative to the location of high voltage power lines. (Chronological Listing of Events, p. 2.) On October 11,1989, final descriptions of the lakes on the original tract were prepared for Interstate by Broward Davis and Associates. (Chronological Listing of Events p. 2.) On November 13, 1989, a sketch depicting a revised legal description of a proposal to subdivide the subject property was prepared for Interstate by Broward Davis and Associates, Inc. (Chronological Listing of Events, p. 2.) On December 7, 1989, an Environmental Assessment of the site was prepared for Interstate by Jim Stidham and Associates. (Chronological Listing of Events, p. 2.) On December 14, 1989, Deeb executed a Purchase and Sale Agreement which contemplated the conditional purchase of 6.98 acres of the original tract from Interstate. Interstate signed the Purchase and Sale Agreement on December 27, 1989. (Purchase and Sale Agreement, p. 8.) Interstate contends the execution of this Purchase and Sale Agreement resulted in it incurring substantial contractual obligations and argues that these obligations (along with other items and events) are elements in support of "common law vesting" of its development rights. This agreement is the subject of expanded discussion later in this Final Order. The services that Interstate obtained during 1989 (as described in paragraphs 6-11 above) were related to the eventual consummation of the Purchase and Sale Agreement with Deeb. (R-2, pp. 20-21 and 27, Chronological listing of Events, p. 2.) On January 18, 1990, the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Commission approved Interstate's Preliminary Plat of the subject property. (Chronological Listing of Events, p. 3.) On April 4, 1990, the Tallahassee City Commission approved Interstate's previously filed application to rezone a portion of the subject property from A-2 to C-2. (Chronological Listing of Events, p. 3.) Interstate entered into a written Utility Agreement with the City on or about July 10,1990. (Letter of agreement dated June 25, 1990 from Henry L. Holshouser, Director of Growth Management, to Interstate Tallahassee West.) The Utility Agreement is the subject of expanded discussion later in this Final Order. On August 20, 1990 a Vested Rights Application covering 6.98 acres of the original tract, which is the subject of the Purchase and Sale Agreement between Interstate and Deeb, was approved. (Letter dated August 21,1990 to Kent Deeb from Mark L. Gumula, Director of Planning, Tallahassee-Leon Planning Commission, containing CERTIFICATION OF VESTED STATUS.) The Vested Rights Application for the approximately 15.6 acres remaining of the original tract was disapproved by the Staff Committee and that portion of the property is the subject of this appeal. (R-1, p. 17.) Interstate has not prepared a specific building or development design for the property which is the subject of this appeal. (R-2, p. 97, R-1, p. 5.) As of the date of the hearing in this case, Interstate had no specific building plans for the property which is the subject of this appeal. (R-2, p. 38.) As of the date of the hearing in this case, Interstate had not chosen a specific land use for the property. (R-2, pp. 38-39.) As of the date of the hearing in this case, Interstate had not made application for environmental permits for the property. (R-2, pp. 49 and 98.) As of the date of the hearing in this case, the only infrastructure that had been constructed on the original tract are two storm water ponds which were built in the 1970's, and prior to Interstate's purchase of the property. (R-2, pp. 86, 87.) Interstate was never assured by the City that the property could be used for any specific use such as a motel, apartments or offices. Interstate and the City made no commitments as to any specific uses of the property. (R-2, pp. 47-48.) The City advised Interstate by letter dated August 13, 1990, that the 2010 Comprehensive Plan requires Planned Unit Development zoning for an office park (which is by definition an office building or buildings of more than 40,000 square feet). (Letter from Martin P. Black, City's Chief of Land Use Administration, to Interstate Tallahassee West, dated August 13, 1990.) The City did not advise Interstate that it could not build such an office building on its property. (R-2, pp. 45, 46, and 100.) As of the date of the hearing in this case, Interstate had not requested a determination from the City as to whether the 2010 Comprehensive Plan would prohibit development of the property as the market might dictate. (R-2, p. 40.) At the hearing in this case, Interstate presented the testimony of Mr. Deeb regarding the existence of a master environmental permit for the original tract which was in place before Interstate purchased the property. (R-2, p. 67.) However, Interstate offered no evidence that such permit contemplated any specific use or density regarding development of the property. Costs Associated with Interstate's Property. Interstate purchased the original tract in 1986 at a cost of $748,000. (R-2, p. 17; Development Expenditures.) The cost to purchase the property was not incurred in reliance on any representation of the City. Interstate has expended $325,063.82 in interest on acquisition loans, pursuant to the property purchase. (Development Expenditures.) The interest cost on acquisition loans was not incurred in reliance on any representation of the City. Interstate has expended $46,824.95 in Ad Valorem taxes on the property. (Development Expenditures) These costs were not incurred based on any representation of the City. Interstate has expended $28,839.75 on engineering and survey work on the property. (Development Expenditures) The costs of the engineering and survey work during 1989 were substantially incurred by Interstate in conjunction with the negotiations of the potential sale of the 6.98 acre parcel of its property to Deeb. (Chronological Listing of Events, pp. 2-3; R-2, p. 27.) These costs were not incurred based upon any representation of the City. Interstate has expended $8,500.00 in legal and miscellaneous fees associated with development of the original tract and the potential sale of the 6.98 acres to Deeb. (Chronological Listing, Development Expenditures) Interstate has failed to prove that these costs were incurred based on any representation of the City. The Purchase and Sale Agreement with Deeb. Negotiations between Interstate and Deeb regarding The Purchase and Sale Agreement began in the Spring of 1989. (R-2, p. 20.) Deeb executed the agreement on December 14, 1989, and the Interstate partners signed the agreement on December 27, 1989. (Purchase and Sale Agreement, p. 8.) Interstate does not assert that the City was privy to this agreement and has failed to prove that it relied on any representation of the City in entering into this agreement or in incurring any costs or future obligations pursuant to the agreement. Interstate was aware that the 2010 Comprehensive Plan was being developed when the Tallahassee-Leon Planning Commission approved Interstate's Preliminary Plat on January 18, 1990. (R-2, p. 50.) Interstate knew that the Comprehensive Plan "was coming" at the time Mr. Anthony (partner in Interstate) understood that the original tract was to be subdivided in order to "cut out" a site for Deeb so as to "key on him" as to the development of the property. (R-2, p. 46.) The Preliminary Subdivision Plat drawing, subsequently presented to the Tallahassee-Leon Planning Commission, is dated November 29, 1990. (Preliminary Subdivision Plat as approved on January 18, 1990.) The testimony of Thomas W. Anthony that Interstate would not have entered into the Purchase and Sale Agreement with Deeb if it knew that it would not be able to move forward with C-2 development of the remaining lots is accepted. (R-2, p. 36.) However, Interstate has failed to prove that it relied on any representation of the City that it could so proceed upon adoption of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. The Utility Agreement. The Utility Agreement (previously described in paragraph 16) was executed by the City on June 25, 1990. The agreement was signed by on behalf of Interstate on June 29, 1990, by C. W. Harbin and Tommy Faircloth, and on July 10, 1990, by Mr. Anthony. This agreement outlines what Interstate and the City have each agreed to do in terms of Interstate's proposed development. The agreement describes Interstate's proposed development activity in general terms as "commercial development". In this agreement, the City makes no representation or commitments relative to any specific land use or specific density concerning Interstate's property. Interstate has failed to prove that the City, in executing the Utility Agreement, made any representation upon which Interstate relied in incurring any costs or future obligations. The Preliminary Plat Approval. The Preliminary Plat Approval of January 18, 1990, does not contemplate any specific uses, intensities or designations. (R-2, pp. 47-48.) Interstate has failed to prove that the approval of the Preliminary Plat constitutes an act or representation upon which Interstate relied in incurring any costs or future obligations. The A-2 Rezoning Approval. Interstate has failed to prove that it relied upon the act of the City, in approving Interstate's request to rezone a portion of the original tract from A-2 to C-2 in incurring any costs or future obligations. Interstate's Application for Vested Rights. On or about July 25, 1990, Interstate filed an application for vested rights determination (Application), with the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department. (Application VR0008T.) The Following information concerning the development of the subject property is contained on the Application: "Kent C. Deeb" is listed as the "owner/agent". Question 3 lists the name of the project as "Interstates Tallahassee West." The project is described as a "Four Lot Subdivision." The project location is described as "lots 1 and 2 Block A Commonwealth Center." The total project costs are estimated at $2.5 Million." Progress towards completion of the project is listed as: A. Planning: "Plans; Rezoning; Subdivision Plat Approval; Utility Agreement for Extension with the City"; B. Permitting: "Existing with the original Commonwealth Center Development; C. Site Preparation: "Zoning, Platting, and Plans"; D. Construction: "Original Holding Ponds". Total expenditures to date attributed to the progress towards completion of the project are listed as $1.325 Million. The form of government approval allowing the project to proceed is listed as "Original Plat; Rezoning; Subdivision Plat." On August 20, 1990, a hearing was held to consider the application before the City's three member Staff Committee. Kent C. Deeb appeared and testified for Interstate. By letter dated August 21, 1990, Mark Gumula, Director of Planning for the Tallahassee-Leon Planning Department, informed Interstate that the Application had been denied. During the hearing before the undersigned, Interstate stipulated that it sought approval of its Application based upon "common law vesting" and not upon "statutory vesting," as those terms are defined in City of Tallahassee Ordinance 90-0-0043AA.
Findings Of Fact Mary G. Realty owns Lots 57-63 and the north 10.25 feet of Lot 64, Clearwater Beach Park, which occupy the southwest corner of Mandalay Avenue and Baymont Street on Clearwater Beach. For many years this property was operated as a gasoline service station until the death of the owner-operator and its purchase by Mary G. Realty in December, 1983. The property is zoned CG and has been so zoned for many years without change to the present. The gasoline station building is still located on the property and the proposed development will include use of that structure, which is approximately 40 feet by 60 feet. Applicant proposes to construct and operate a two-story office/retail store building with three large apartments on the second floor. The proposed addition would add 16 feet to the south side of the existing building extending 80 feet eastward from the west line of this building, with the eastern 40 feet of this extension 25 feet wide. It is also proposed to add an additional 70.7 feet to the north side of the existing building. As proposed, the first floor would occupy 6,680 square feet and the second floor would contain 5,878 square feet. Variances approved by the zoning board include a 3.5 foot setback on the rear property line to allow the property additions to follow the line of the existing structure; a 6-foot setback on the south property line; a 15-foot setback on 25 feet of the proposed addition from Mandalay Avenue; no buffer zone between parking and street right-of-way on both Mandalay Avenue and Baymont Street; and a variance of 32 parking spaces. Applicant's proposal approved by the board is to provide 25 parking spaces, a variance of 32 in the parking space requirement for the structure proposed. Petitioner's property abuts the property owned by Mary G. Realty and the structure on that property, which was built before the present zoning laws became effective, is nonconforming with the zoning regulations. In its application for the variances here under review Mary G. Realty requested a zero setback from the north property line, which was withdrawn; a 3.5-foot setback at the rear of the property in lieu of the 10-foot requirement for commercial general, and the board approved 3.5 feet; a one-foot setback on south property line in lieu of the 10 feet required, and the board approved a 6- foot setback; a 15-foot front setback in lieu of 20 feet required by the code, and the board approved 15 feet; a variance of 48 parking spaces, which was reduced by applicant's withdrawal of zero setback for north property line, resulting in a smaller size structure requiring less parking spaces and the addition of parking spaces from this same reduction, and the board approved a variance of 32 parking spaces; and a zero buffering requirement abutting Mandalay Avenue and Baymont Street, which the board granted. This property is unique only in that it is located in an area in which a large percentage of the buildings are nonconforming. The property is a trapezoidal shaped parcel having the following dimensions: south property line 100.47 feet, west property line 167.52 feet, north property line 100.77 feet, and east property line 178.55 feet. One of the principal factors at issue here is the requested variance in parking spaces required. Applicant purchased the property due to the pending expiration of its existing business lease and intends to move its business to the new location and provide additional office and shop space with apartments on the second floor, thus having a combined commercial and residential structure. There are no shopping facilities on Mandalay Avenue north of State Road 60; the area is mostly built up with motels, hotels, apartments, and restaurants; and the shopping customers are generally the same people who walk along Mandalay. Accordingly, there is less need for parking to accommodate a shop in this area than would be required in another part of Clearwater, although the magnitude of this difference has not as yet been determined. Witnesses testified to the need for additional shopping facilities north of State Road 60; to the fact that few people in automobiles shop on North Clearwater Beach; and, while functioning as a service station, no parking spaces were provided on this property. This property was purchased by Mary G. Realty for $295,000 and evidence was presented that less building space than proposed would not make the purchase economically feasible. However, insufficient evidence was presented to support this conclusion. This factor is given little weight because the purchaser knew, or should have known, of the zoning restrictions before the property was purchased. Most of the property in the vicinity was developed long before the current zoning regulations were adopted and the structures thereon are generally nonconforming both with respect to setbacks and parking, even though they offer rooms to transients who arrive in automobiles. These nonconforming structures result in some of the buildings in the vicinity being built right to the property line.
