Elawyers Elawyers
Ohio| Change
Find Similar Cases by Filters
You can browse Case Laws by Courts, or by your need.
Find 49 similar cases
ANTHONY A. FULLER AND KATHLEEN M. FULLER vs. CITY OF CLEARWATER AND ANTONIOS MARKOPOULOS, 83-003362 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-003362 Latest Update: Dec. 08, 1983

Findings Of Fact Petitioners own the Sea Cloud Motel with 11 rooms located at 540 South Gulf View Boulevard, Clearwater, Florida, in an area zoned CTF-28. CTF-28 is high density commercial-tourist and is dominated by motels, restaurants, and other businesses catering primarily to tourists. The Sea Cloud Motel has only ten parking spaces at present, with two of these spaces so located that with the space behind them occupied a car cannot get into or out of those spaces. Petitioners have leased five additional spaces from the Clearwater Point Deli on property adjacent to the Sea Cloud Motel (Exhibit 2). Adjacent to the Sea Cloud Motel is the Hibiscus Gift Shop owned and operated as part of the Red Carpet Resort Motel. Across the street from Petitioners' property is a convenience store with gas pumps and a car rental agency. Several realty offices are located in the general area of the Sea Cloud Motel in addition to restaurants and convenience stores. The principal objection to the special exception here requested came from adjacent property owners who fear the real estate office will aggravate the inadequate parking facilities presently existing on Clearwater Beach. The addition of the real estate office in a space less than 150 square feet will not require the addition of another parking space. The leasing of five additional parking spaces will more than adequately compensate for the additional traffic anticipated to be generated by a one-desk real estate office, particularly where the office is intended to concentrate on foreign visitors interested in real estate investments at Clearwater and will be operated by the co-owner of the motel, Kathleen M. Fuller, a registered real estate salesperson.

# 1
WHARTON LITTLE RIVER INVESTMENT, INC., BY PROCACCI COMMERCIAL REALTY, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 95-001839BID (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Apr. 14, 1995 Number: 95-001839BID Latest Update: Jul. 18, 1995

The Issue Whether the Department of Corrections' proposed award of Lease No. 700:0710 to Melstine Corporation was proper.

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Department of Corrections, Region Four (Department), issued a request for proposals for approximately 7,500 square feet of office space in Dade County which was designated as Lease No. 700:0710 (RFP). The office space was to be used as offices for the professional and support staff who were providing probation and parole supervision. Petitioner Wharton Little River (Wharton), Intervenor Green East #2, Ltd. (Green East), and Melstine Corporation (Melstine) submitted proposals to the Department. The Department's evaluation committee evaluated the three proposals, and their evaluation included a site visit to each of the proposed locations. Melstine Corporation received the highest number of points followed by Wharton Little River. The Department notified all bidders of its intent to award the lease to Melstine. On March 15, 1995, Wharton filed a notice of intent to protest the Department's decision to award the lease to Melstine. Wharton filed its formal written protest on March 14, 1995. The RFP set forth the requirements for submitting a responsive proposal and the criteria to be used in evaluating the proposals. The bidders were required to provide 55 offstreet parking spaces for the exclusive use of the Department's employees and clients at no additional cost to the Department. This provision is interpreted to mean that the bidder could propose 55 exclusive parking spaces plus or minus one to two percent. The RFP provided spaces in which the bidders were to indicate whether they were proposing onsite or offsite parking. The RFP also provides: Federal, state, county, and local laws, ordinances, rules, and regulations that in any manner affect the items covered herein apply. Lack of knowledge by the bidder will in no way be a cause for relief from respon- sibility. This provision is interpreted to include applicable zoning codes. Both Melstine and Wharton proposed to provide 55 exclusive parking spaces onsite. Green East proposed 40 exclusive spaces and 20 nonexclusive spaces. The evidence did not establish whether Green East's spaces were onsite or offsite. The evaluation criteria assigned a maximum number of points a bidder could receive for specific criteria. The maximum points totaled 100. The criteria for evaluating parking was the "[p]roximity of adequate parking area to the building. Must be well lighted." The maximum number of points that could be awarded to a bidder for parking was 10. Melstine received 10 points for parking. The space proposed by Melstine is located on the ground floor of a six-story building with approximately 87,000 square feet. The building is currently vacant. Melstine is actively seeking to lease other portions of the building. In its proposal Melstine stated that its intention was to market the remaining space on the ground floor to the banking industry as a banking location. There are 54 onsite parking spaces on the property proposed by Melstine. There is additional space onsite that could be converted to 20 parking spaces, bringing the total parking spaces available on the Melstine property to There are approximately 50 offsite parking spaces available in a lot across the street from the building proposed by Melstine. Melstine provided a map in its proposal showing that the located property was located in a C-1, limited commercial, zone. By letter dated February 21, 1995, Phillip J. Procacci, advised the Department that he felt that the Melstine proposal did not meet the requirements of the RFP because the parking spaces did not meet the zoning code requirements of the City of Miami. Department staff contacted the City of Miami zoning officials and were advised that the parking proposed by Melstine was acceptable under the City of Miami's zoning regulations. The Department relied on the representations from the City of Miami that the Melstine property would be in conformance with the zoning code. By letter dated April 17, 1995, Juan C. Gonzalez, Acting Zoning Administrator, advised Melstine's agent that the parking on the Melstine site would be acceptable as meeting the zoning requirements for the City of Miami for office use without the need of providing additional spaces for existing office square footage. By letter dated April 24, 1995, Mr. Gonzalez further clarified the City of Miami's position on parking spaces assigned to individual tenants. While the code does mandate a certain amount of spaces to be provided on site for individual uses, the code is silent on how the parking will be assigned, therefore, the city does not become involved or regulates assignment of existing parking spaces. Region Four of the Department has not experienced a problem with lessors not providing adequate parking in the past. Melstine's proposal met the parking requirements of the RFP and complied with the City of Miami's zoning ordinance.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the bid protest of Wharton Little River, Investment, Inc. by Procacci Commercial Realty, Inc. be dismissed and that Lease No. 700:0710 be awarded to Melstine Corporation. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of June, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-1839BID To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. (Proposed Recommended Order After Reopening of Hearing) Paragraphs 1-3: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 4: Accepted in substance as it refers to the parking criteria. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 5: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 6: Accepted to the extent that Wharton received the second highest number of points. Paragraphs 7-11: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 12: Rejected as not supported by the evidence. There was no evidence that access to the parking lot from the Melstine property is owned by Melstine. Paragraphs 13-22: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-23: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 24-25: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraphs 26-28: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 29: Accepted. Paragraph 30: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 31: Accepted. Paragraphs 32-34: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraphs 35-41: Accepted in substance. Intervenor's Proposed Findings of Fact. (The paragraphs are unnumbered. Each paragraph will be addressed in the order it appears under the section entitled, "The Computation of Error.") Paragraph 1: The first three sentences are accepted in substance. The fifth, sixth, and seventh sentences are rejected as subordinate to the facts found. The remainder is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 2: These adopted paragraphs are addressed above under Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 3-4: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 5: Rejected as a conclusion of law. Paragraph 6: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: R. Beth Atchison Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Robert A. Sweetapple, Esquire Sweetapple, Broeker & Varkas 465 East Palmetto Park Road Boca Raton, Florida 33432 John R. Beranek, Esquire 227 South Calhoun Street Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida Harry K. Singletary, 2601 Blairstone Road 32302 Jr., Secretary Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Louis A. Vargas General Counsel 2601 Blairstone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500

Florida Laws (2) 120.53120.57
# 5
DAN GILBERTSON vs CITY OF TALLAHASSEE AND TALLAHASSEE-LEON COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION, 02-004236 (2002)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Oct. 24, 2002 Number: 02-004236 Latest Update: Jun. 16, 2003

The Issue The issue in this matter is whether Petitioner's application for a Type-A site plan should be approved.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Dan Gilbertson, has owned and operated Potbelly's restaurant, a student-oriented eating/drinking establishment, located at 459 West College Avenue, since 1994. Petitioner also operates a similar establishment known as The Painted Lady located directly adjacent and to the east of Potbelly's. Potbelly's and The Painted Lady are within the Institutional, Cultural, and University Transitional (DI) Zoning District. Surrounding uses to Petitioner's property include a Florida State University parking lot across Macomb Street to the west of the site, a privately owned parking lot across College Avenue to the north, a fraternity house to the east, and an apartment complex to the south. The existing Potbelly's and Painted Lady structures were constructed prior to the adoption of a 25-foot minimum building setback from Macomb Street codified in Section 10.3.O.2.d.3, Tallahassee Code. The Potbelly's building is partially within the 25-foot setback and is considered a pre- existing, nonconforming structure. Potbelly's is licensed to operate a full service kitchen while The Painted Lady is authorized to serve previously prepared food. Both parties agree that Potbelly's and The Painted Lady are licensed to serve alcohol within the premises identified in Respondent's supplemental exhibit. Respondent, The Tallahassee-Leon Planning Commission, is the legal entity responsible for reviewing and approving or denying applications for site plans. In September 2002, Petitioner submitted a site-plan application seeking to add a deck, handicap ramp, and bathrooms in the southwest area of the Potbelly's property and a deck behind The Painted Lady. The site plan application for the additional deck, restrooms, and handicap ramp behind Potbelly's seeks a deviation from the 25-foot setback requirement. In its application, Petitioner included architectural drawings of the premises but did not attach engineering drawings. Petitioner also enclosed a copy of a previously issued order dated June 14, 2001, from the Tallahassee-Leon County Board of Adjustment and Appeals granting a variance to the setback requirement for an existing deck on the west side of Potbelly's. Pursuant to Section 23.1, Tallahassee Code, Respondent may grant the deviation request to development standards only if it is consistent with the comprehensive plan and creates no adverse impact on the general health, safety, and welfare of the public. Petitioner's site plan application addresses less than 60,000 square feet and is subject to Type-A site plan review. Accordingly, Petitioner's application was reviewed by City staff including members from the Growth Management Department, Planning Department, Fire Department, Police Department, Utilities Department, and Public Works Department including Solid Waste and Traffic Engineering. Upon review, in October 2002, the Department advised Petitioner that his application had been denied. Petitioner timely appealed the decision. Code Deviation Criteria Pursuant to Section 23.3, Tallahassee Code, a request for deviation from the existing development standards is generally not favored and may only be granted upon a showing by the applicant that seven specific criteria have been met by a preponderance of the evidence. First, the applicant must demonstrate that the deviation will not be detrimental to the public good or to the surrounding properties. The evidence in this case demonstrated that, although the Tallahassee Police Department (TPD) reported that it received approximately 17 complaints over a two-year period for noise, physical disturbances, underage alcohol consumption, and other offenses, approximately 1 every 50 days, the frequency and severity of complaints has significantly declined. Further, Petitioner employs significant private security to curtail adverse incidents and has routinely attempted to hire off-duty TPD officers, but to no avail. There has been inadequate showing that a reasonable increase in the size and occupancy of Petitioner's premises will be detrimental to the public good or to the surrounding properties. Second, Petitioner must demonstrate that the requested deviation is consistent with the intent and purpose of the Zoning Code and the Comprehensive Plan. Respondent admits that "the intent of the DI zoning district is to provide a transition between downtown and the two universities, and to encourage pedestrian friendly or pedestrian oriented activities and development." Respondent further acknowledges that the intent of the 25-foot setback from Macomb Street and the 35-foot setback from College Avenue is to provide a transition for pedestrian activities along the roadways, a reduced scale of buildings along the pedestrian accesses and room for landscaping for enhancement of pedestrian activities. The evidence demonstrated that Petitioner's adjacent restaurant/bars primarily target and attract college students in the area and are pedestrian friendly. While the structures preceded the setback requirements, Petitioner has comported with the intent of the Tallahassee Code and Comprehensive Plan by enhancing vehicular and pedestrian access to the premises and improving their visual aesthetics. Third, Petitioner must demonstrate that the requested deviation is the minimum deviation that will make possible the reasonable use of the land, building, or structure. While the restaurant/bars maintain consistent business, additional patrons and/or a diversified, multi-use eating/drinking establishment, given the area, is a reasonable use of the land. Petitioner's deviation request is the minimum deviation necessary to garner the additional and diversified business. Fourth, Petitioner must demonstrate that strict application of the zoning requirements would constitute a substantial hardship that is not self-created or imposed. Strict application and unreasonable adherence to the 25-foot setback requirement, given the minimal external expansion requested and the fact that the existing structures currently extend into the setback, create a substantial and unnecessary hardship upon Petitioner's expanding business. Fifth, Petitioner must demonstrate whether there are any exceptional topographic, soil, or other environmental conditions unique to the property. The parties stipulate that there are no such environmental features on the site and the criterion is not relevant to Petitioner's application. Sixth, Petitioner must demonstrate that the requested deviation would provide a creative or innovative design alternative to substantive standards and criteria. Petitioner has shown that he intends to moderately expand the student- oriented, pedestrian friendly, eating/drinking establishment in the college campus area utilizing a consistent, creative, and attractive design alternative to the setback requirement. Finally, Petitioner must demonstrate that the impacts associated with the deviation will be adequately mitigated through alternative measures. Any impacts associated with the deviation are de minimus, however, Petitioner has agreed to adequately mitigate such impacts. First, Petitioner has constructed noise insulators on the south fence of the property to filter out excess sound to the apartment dwellers. Petitioner has also agreed to provide additional security when necessary and plans to significantly improve the visual aesthetics on the southwest side of the building. Respondent argues that Section 14.6 of the Zoning Code requires one loading berth for any site up to 8,000 square feet receiving goods and merchandise via motorized vehicle. The evidence demonstrates that Petitioner's property contains two parking spaces, identified as a loading berth, located directly in front of Potbelly's. Respondent, however, persuasively argues that the existing dumpster on the Potbelly's site does not comply with the City's Solid Waste requirements. Solid Waste and the Tallahassee Code require each site to provide sufficient space for a dump truck to enter the site, collect the refuse, and exit the site without backing into traffic. Although Waste Management empties the refuse at approximately 3:00 a.m., the current location of the dumpster presents a significant safety hazard which Petitioner must eliminate. Respondent argues that it cannot determine whether Petitioner's proposal meets the Floor Area Ratio requirements for the DI zoning district. The evidence presented during the hearing demonstrates that Petitioner's proposal satisfies the requirements. While the Tallahassee-Leon County Board of Adjustments and Appeals of Petitioner's previous approval of the existing deck variance is interesting, it is not relevant to this case. The formal proceeding before the Administrative Law Judge was properly noticed in the Tallahassee Democrat on November 24, 2002.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Commission enter a final order approving Petitioner's Type-A site plan and requested deviation contingent upon Petitioner's safe and acceptable relocation of the dumpster. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of May, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. PFEIFFER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of May, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Sylvia Morell Alderman, Esquire Katz, Kutter, Haigler, Alderman, Bryant & Yon, P.A. Post Office Box 1877 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Dan Gilbertson 459 West College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Linda R. Hurst, Esquire City Attorney's Office 300 South Adams Street City Hall, Box A-5 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1731 Jean Gregory, Clerk Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Commission City Hall 300 South Adams Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1731

# 6
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs ANNE HURST, 11-000071PL (2011)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lake City, Florida Jan. 10, 2011 Number: 11-000071PL Latest Update: Aug. 18, 2011

The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Respondent violated section 475.25(1)(b) & (c), Florida Statutes (2007), as alleged in the Administrative Complaint and if so, what penalty should be imposed?

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of real estate pursuant to section 20.165 and chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes. At all times material to this Administrative Complaint, Respondent was licensed as a real estate broker associate in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 3057283. At all times material to this Administrative Complaint, Respondent was licensed with Re/Max Professionals, Inc., a real estate corporation. At the time of hearing, Respondent was licensed with Access Realty of North Florida, Inc., a licensed real estate corporation. Respondent's address of record is 757 West Duval Street, Lake City, Florida 32055. At all times material to the Administrative Complaint, Respondent was the listing agent for a property known as 831 South West 5th Street, Live Oak, Florida (5th Street property). On March 4, 2008, Respondent listed the property as having a Commercial Intensive (CI) zoning. At the time of the listing, zoning classifications for property in Live Oak were not available on line, and could only be obtained by calling for the information. At the present time, George Curtis is employed by the City of Live Oak and handles inquiries regarding zoning for properties in the City of Live Oak. He does not recall receiving a telephone call from Respondent regarding the zoning classification for the 5th Street property. However, at the time of Respondent's inquiry, Mr. Curtis was just starting his employment with the city, and did not yet have an office. Inquiries were at that time directed to the City Clerk's office. Mr. Curtis could not state that no call was received by that office, or, if received, what information was given. The listing for the property states at the bottom, "[t]his information is deemed reliable, but is not guaranteed." Respondent listed the property zoning as CI after calling to inquire regarding the appropriate zoning for the property. While she testified that her call was to the Suwannee County office as opposed to the City of Live Oak, it is found that the call must have been made to the City, given the telephone call described below. The property described in the listing is not zoned CI, but rather Commercial Neighborhood (CN). In Live Oak, CI zoning is the most intense zoning district, and is limited to major arterial roads in the city. It is intended to meet the needs of a regional population. CN zoning is intended to provide for commercial use on a more limited scale, in terms of the size of the building that can be placed and the types of uses. It is intended to meet the needs of a neighborhood area. A funeral home would not be a permitted use for property zoned CN. It would require a zoning change. A funeral home would be permitted on a property zoned as commercial general (CG). The CG category is between CI and CN. In September 2008, Respondent contacted the City of Live Oak and was referred to George Curtis about the possible use of the property on SE 5th Street as a daycare. During their telephone conversation, he told her that in order to operate a daycare on the property, the owner would need to receive a special exception to the zoning requirements. He obtained her e- mail address and sent her an e-mail with attachments regarding obtaining special exceptions. Respondent believed, based upon their conversation, that the same would be true for any business to be located on the property. Mr. Curtis does not recall telling Respondent at that time that the property was not zoned as CI. On October 16, 2008, Respondent sent the following e- mail to Mr. Curtis: Hi George, the contract for a day care on 831 SW 5th Street, Live Oak (lots 14, 15, 16, Block E, Hildreth) fell through. I now have a pending contract but the buyers want to use the property for a funeral home. Do you see any problem with this? Anne The e-mail was sent at 5:01 p.m. At 5:22 p.m., Mr. Curtis sent the following reply: Hello Anne: I believe this property was Neighborhood Commercial between Green and Ammons on the south side of 5th. C-N does not have any allowances for a Funeral Home, even as a Special Exception. A petition could be proposed to the City Council for Residential- Office or Office Zoning that does allow for the Funeral Home (with also a Special Exception) but other criteria would have to be evaluated to be sure that parting and buffering requirements could be met after any zoning change took place--which is also a process that is not guaranteed but a possibility--there is no way to predict whether the rezoning and the special exception would be approved. This would probably be a 4-6 month process start to finish plus the associated fees to try. Funeral Homes are allowed by right in General Commercial Zoning but you have to front a major street (129/90/51, etc. to get considered for that zoning…) Hope this helps -- wish I had better news… Respondent claims that she never received this e-mail, and that she never deleted it from her computer. She testified that when she did not receive a response, she called the zoning office and was told that a special exception would be required for a funeral home. She passed this information on to Mr. Wright. On October 17, 2008, Russell Wright made an offer to purchase the property on S.W. 5th Street for $45,000. The contract (Petitioner's Exhibit 3) has been reduced and copied several times, and as a result, is illegible in most respects. However, it can be ascertained that the contract was made on October 17, 2008, and signed by the sellers on October 22, 2008. The contract specified that closing was to take place October 31, 2008, which it did. The contract also specified that the Buyers would pay $5,000 down, and the Sellers would finance the remainder at 8 percent, with payments of $485.31. As part of the closing, the Buyers and Sellers signed an Affidavit of Buyer and Seller Regarding Contract Compliance, which stated "all of the contingencies and conditions set forth in the contract (and all addendums thereto) between the Seller and Buyer have been satisfied, performed or waived by the Buyer and the Seller " Because of the condition of Petitioner's Exhibit 3, it cannot be determined whether the form contract made any representations regarding zoning and who was responsible for determining the appropriate zoning for the property. On October 23, 2008, Respondent sent an e-mail to Russell Wright with attachments labeled "Petition for Special Exemption," "How the Future Land Use Plan Map - Brochure," and "Sec. 12.2 Special Exceptions." The message in the e-mail reads: Hi Russ, here's the contact person who deals with the zoning in Live Oak, and the forms for filing. I received 1 of the forms back from you, the As Is Rider but I still need the corrected Lead based paint disclosure that I sent with the AS Rider in yesterday's fax. Please complete this form and fact back to me. The Seller's [sic] are going to close at 9:00 am on Friday 31st, please let me know as soon as possible a time that would be convient [sic] for you and your wife to attend. Regards, Anne. Mr. Wright acknowledged receiving an e-mail, but not the documents. He sent Respondent the other documents required for closing. After the closing, he called her and stated that he could not locate the paperwork related to special exceptions, and on November 3, 2008, she mailed it to him. With the paperwork was the following note: Dear Russell and Marcus: I have enclosed the paperwork for the Special exception. If you have any questions you may call George Curtis at 386-362-2276. Mr. Curtis is the development manager for the City of Live Oak. Regards, Anne Mr. Wright began making renovations on the property in order to open a funeral home. In July 2009, he began the process of getting his city occupational license. He could not obtain the license because the property was not zoned for his intended use. At that point, Mr. Wright contacted city officials, including George Curtis and the Mayor of Live Oak. Mr. Curtis advised Mr. Wright that he had sent an e-mail to Respondent advising her that a funeral home could not be operated on the property with its present zoning. Mr. Wright wrote to Respondent, demanding that she compensate him for the fact that he could not open the funeral home without a zoning change. The letter stated in pertinent part: The Mayor of Live Oak and Mr. George Curtis has informed me that I can apply for a zoning change so that My Wife and I can open our business. But it will cost $750.00 to file the initial papers. And that is NOT a guarantee. To date with the down payment and monthly payments and renovation cost, your dealings have cost us $25,000 plus pain and suffering and embarrassment. And we have property that we can't use for the intention it was purchased. Ms. Hurst, we are allowing you and your firm to settle this matter out of court. Ms. Hurst we will settle this matter for the amount of $50,000.00 which is damages plus pain and suffering. If you and ReMax Professionals, Inc., are not willing to settle with us out of Court, we will retain the Attorney with whom my Wife and I have consulted. . . . It is clear from the evidence that Mr. Wright chose to believe that he could open a funeral home on the property without any further administrative action either to change the zoning or to obtain a Special Exception for its intended use. Neither belief is consistent with the credible evidence that Respondent sent him information regarding Special Exemptions and the process to obtain them. All of the information given to him is consistent with his need to follow up with the City's zoning department, which he did not do. Based on the more persuasive evidence presented in this classic, "he-said, she-said" case, it is found that Respondent did not receive the October 17, 2008 e-mail from George Curtis, but believed that a Special Exemption would be required to operate a funeral home on the property, and that she supplied information to Mr. Wright to that effect. Mr. Wright's claim that Respondent represented that the property could be used as a funeral home with no further action is rejected.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing Count One in the Administrative Complaint; finding a violation of section 475.25(1)(c), as alleged in Count Two; imposing a reprimand and fining Respondent $250.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of June, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of June, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: William Haley, Esquire Brannon, Brown, Haley, Robinson & Bullock, P.A. Post Office Box 1029 Lake City, Florida 32056-1029 Joseph A. Solla, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 801N Orlando, Florida 32801-1757 Thomas W. O’Bryant, Jr., Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 801N Orlando, Florida 32801-1757 Layne Smith, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.5720.165475.25
# 7
JACK VASILAROS, EDWARD D. CARLSON, AND PAUL A. MEISSNER vs DON CURTIS PIERSON AND CITY OF CLEARWATER, 90-002919 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Clearwater, Florida May 11, 1990 Number: 90-002919 Latest Update: Jan. 14, 1991

The Issue Whether Respondent Pierson should be granted variances to permit construction of a triplex on a lot 95 feet wide and 87 feet deep. To do so the three variances required are (1) of 5 feet in width, (2) of 13 feet in depth, and (3) 753 square feet in area (10,000 square feet required).

Findings Of Fact Don Curtis Pierson owns the north one-half of Lot 2 and all of Lot 3, Block 6, Revised Map of Clearwater Beach, and has owned this property for some 28 years. The property is zoned RM-20 and is high density residential developed. Pierson's lot is approximately 95 feet by 87 feet (approximately 82,500 square feet). The property is currently occupied by a duplex which was constructed according to Code, except for variances of zero setback from the coastal construction control zone and a 6 foot height variance to permit the construction of a building 31 feet in height. Appellant is the owner of a multifamily building adjacent to Pierson's property which was constructed before various code provisions became effective and was constructed to the lot lines without any setbacks. When Pierson applied for variances in 1983 to construct a triplex on his property, the Board of Adjustment Appeal granted setback variances of 10 feet in rear and front setback lines to permit the construction of a triplex on this property. Vasilaros appealed that grant, and on July 12, 1983 the undersigned heard that appeal. On August 31, 1983, an order was entered denying the setbacks, but approving the construction of a triplex on the lot less than 10,000 square feet in area. That approval was predicated upon then Section 131.020 of the Land Development Code which waived the area requirement for a lot of record. This Section was removed in the 1985 rewrite of the Land Development Code. Specific code provisions respecting the size of the lot on which a three family structure may be erected are in Section 135.044 which requires a minimum lot area of 10,000 square feet, and minimum lot width and depth of 100 feet each. The applicant's only hardship upon which the requested variance can be granted is the uniqueness of the property becoming nonconforming solely by reason of zoning changes.

# 8
IN RE: MILTON WEST vs *, 16-005483EC (2016)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Sep. 20, 2016 Number: 16-005483EC Latest Update: Jul. 09, 2018

The Issue Whether Respondent, while serving as an appointed member of the Ocoee Planning and Zoning Commission, violated section 112.313(7)(a), Florida Statutes (2015)1/ by having a contractual relationship that conflicted with his official responsibilities; and, if so, the appropriate penalty.

Findings Of Fact At all times material to the complaint, Respondent served as an appointed member of the Ocoee P & Z Commission. Respondent is subject to the requirements of part III, chapter 112, Florida Statutes, the Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees, for his acts and omissions during his tenure on the P & Z Commission. As a member of the P & Z Commission, Respondent is subject to the “Ocoee Florida Land Development Code, Section 3, Planning and Zoning Commission [Land Development Code].” Section 3-2 of Land Development Code provides in part as follows: Establishment and Membership The Planning and Zoning Commission shall consist of nine (9) members appointed by the City Commission and one member appointed by the School Board of Orange County as a non- voting member. The member appointed by the School Board of Orange County shall attend those meetings at which the Planning and Zoning Commission considers comprehensive plan amendments and rezonings that would, if approved, increase residential density on the property that is the subject of the application. No member shall be an employee of the City of Ocoee and all members, except the member appointed by the School Board of Orange County, shall be residents of the City of Ocoee. When selecting members to the Planning and Zoning Commission, the City Commission shall attempt to select persons from different geographical areas within the City so as to create geographical diversity and representation. * * * E. Compliance with Laws The Planning and Zoning Commission, and its individual members, shall comply with all applicable laws relative to public bodies, including disclosure of interests and procedure[s] for refraining from participation [when] a conflict of interest exists. * * * G. Duties and Responsibilities To act as the Local Planning Agency (LPA) of the City of Ocoee, pursuant to Section 163.3174, Florida Statutes, and to prepare on its own initiative recommendations for amendments to the Comprehensive Plan of the City of Ocoee, including text and/or maps, and to forward such amendments to the City Commission for consideration. No such recommendation shall be made except after a public hearing held in accordance with State and local requirements. To review and make recommendations to the City Commission on applications for amendments to the Comprehensive Plan. No such recommendation shall be made except after a public hearing held in accordance with State and local requirements. To prepare on its own initiative recommendations for amendments to this Code, text and/or maps, and to forward such amendments to the City Commission for consideration. No such recommendation shall be made except after a public hearing held in accordance with State and local requirements. To review and make recommendations to the City Commission on applications for amendments to this Code, including applications for annexation or change of zoning. Pursuant to Section 163.3174(4)(c), Florida Statutes, the Planning and Zoning Commission shall also have the responsibility to review and make a finding as to the consistency of the proposed land development regulation with the adopted Comprehensive Plan and to report such finding to the City Commission. No such recommendation shall be made except after a public hearing held in accordance with State and local requirements. To review and make recommendations to the City Commission on applications for various development approvals or permits as provided within this Code, including, but not limited to Planned Unit Developments (PUD), special exceptions, subdivisions, and any other application for which the City Commission requests a report and/or recommendation. Where a public hearing is required by the applicable procedural section, no such recommendation shall be made except after a public hearing held in accordance with State and local requirements. To act in an advisory capacity to the City Commission on land use and land development issues and to make such studies and to conduct such investigations as may be requested from time to time by the City Commission. To review zoning of newly annexed lands when it represents an increase in intensity of use or a conflict with the Comprehensive Plan pursuant to requirements of State law and City ordinance. In addition to serving on the P & Z Commission, Respondent buys and sells commercial real estate. Respondent is a manager and shareholder in W.O.R.Y. INVESTORS, LLC (WORY), an entity that is also in the business of buying and selling commercial real estate. Respondent, in his individual capacity, owned approximately four acres, which abutted six acres owned by WORY. Both properties have an address on West Road in Ocoee, Florida, and will be referred to collectively herein as the “West Road property.” The Contract On or about November 11, 2015, Respondent, in his individual capacity, and as manager for WORY, executed an “Agreement of Sale” wherein the West Road property was to be purchased by Charter Schools Development Group, LLC (buyer), for $1,890,540. According to the Agreement of Sale, the buyer wanted to “develop and construct on the Property a K-8 public charter school.” The Agreement of Sale contained a number of contingencies, referred to in the contract as “Buyer Required Approvals,” that Respondent was required to satisfy prior to finalization of the sale of the West Road property. Paragraph six of the Agreement to Sale sets forth a number of the pre-sale contingencies imposed on Respondent, and the same provides as follows: 6. Development The Buyer intends to develop and construct on the Property a K-8 public charter school and adjacent commercial development acceptable to Buyer consisting of buildings and other improvements including, but not limited to recreation fields, related landscaping, open space, storm water, and appropriate parking (the "Project"). Buyer's obligation to complete the purchase of the Property from Seller in accordance with the terms of this Agreement is contingent upon the satisfaction of each of the following conditions with regard to the Property (each of which may be waived in whole or in part in writing by Buyer): Buyer has obtained final, unappealed and unappealable approvals from all necessary governmental authorities (including governmental agencies), for zoning, utilities and any other approvals (including necessary parking requirements) Buyer deems necessary, in its sole discretion, permitting the construction and use of the improvements comprising the Project, including but not limited to any required special exception. Buyer has obtained final, unappealed and unappealable approvals and/or permits required by any and all governmental authorities (including governmental agencies) so that the Property shall have immediate and adequate access to water, sewer and all other utilities in accordance with the final approved site development plan. Buyer has obtained final, unappealed and unappealable approvals and/or permits required by any and all governmental authorities (including governmental agencies) for storm water management; including easements and agreements for constructing and maintaining storm water basins; all wetlands studies and approvals in such form that wetlands, if any, shall not preclude construction of roads, utilities, storm water management facilities, any other required improvements for erection of buildings on the Property. Buyer has obtained all permits and approvals, and all conditions thereof shall have been satisfied, so as to allow for recording of the final plan and issuance of building permits subject only to satisfaction of the following requirements by Buyer at or after Closing (i) submission of construction drawings in accordance with applicable law, (ii) execution by the Buyer of the necessary development agreements, (iii) execution and funding by Buyer of the necessary escrow agreements for municipal improvements, and sewer and water improvements, and (iv) payment by the Buyer of all municipal fees and charges associated therewith. Subject to Seller's obligation set forth in Section 6(f) below, Buyer has obtained any and all other easements, approvals and/or permits that may be necessary to construct and use the improvements comprising the Project. Buyer shall obtain, at no additional cost to Seller, all easements and roads that in Buyer's sole reasonable discretion are necessary for property access, utilities and signage to the Property in accordance with Buyer's final approved site development plan. The items referred to in subsections 6(a) through 6(f) hereof shall hereafter be referred to as the "Buyer Required Approvals." After the end of the Inspection Period, Buyer shall diligently proceed with the filing of all applications necessary for obtaining the Buyer Required Approvals. Seller agrees, at no expense to Seller, to cooperate with buyer in connection with the Buyer Required Approvals to the extent of signing all applications necessary for obtaining the buyer Required Approvals and appearing and testifying at the various hearings. Seller's cooperation as aforesaid shall not entitle Seller to any additional compensation. All permit fees, studies, deposit and investigation costs incurred in connection with the Buyer Required Approvals shall be the sole responsibility of buyer and buyer agrees to affirmatively use its good faith efforts to obtain all of the Buyer Required Approvals without delay and as expeditiously as reasonably possible. Seller hereby grants to Buyer a power of attorney to file, on Seller's behalf, all applications related to the Buyer Required Approvals; provided, however, that the Land shall not be rezoned prior to the expiration of the Inspection Period. Seller acknowledges that buyer will likely contact, meet with and/or obtain consents for the Project from neighboring property owners during the Inspection Period and in the process of obtaining the Buyer Required Approvals. (emphasis added). None of the provisions of paragraph six of the Agreement of Sale were waived by either party. Paragraph 15(b) of the Agreement of Sale provides as follows: (b) If Seller shall violate or fail (in breach of its obligations hereunder) to fulfill or perform any of the terms, conditions or undertaking set forth in this Agreement within ten (10) days written notice from Buyer or (five (5) days written notice in the event of a monetary default), Buyer shall be entitled to: (i) terminate this Agreement and receive the return of the Deposit and reimbursement of Buyer's documented out-of-pocket due diligence expenses up to $15,000.00, and, thereupon, the parties hereto will be released and relieved from all provisions of this Agreement, or (ii) pursue specific performance. Paragraph 17 of the Agreement of Sale states that “[b]uyer and Seller agree to cooperate with each other and to take such further actions as may be requested by the other in order to facilitate the timely purchase and sale of the Property.” Paragraphs 6, 15(b) and 17 of the Agreement of Sale obligated Respondent to take all steps necessary, including “appearing and testifying at the various hearings,” for ensuring that the “Buyer Required Approvals” were satisfied, which in turn would allow Respondent to receive his share of the purchase price for the West Road property. Section 112.311(1), provides in part that “[i]t is essential to the proper conduct and operation of government that public officials be independent and impartial and that public office not be used for private gain other than the remuneration provided by law.” Rezoning and Respondent’s Role In order for a charter school to be built on the West Road property, it was necessary to rezone the existing planned unit development land use plan covering the property. Ocoee City Planner Michael Rumer testified that there are two types of rezoning. There is a straight rezoning to a zoning category listed in the land development code and there is rezoning to a planned unit development (PUD). Both types of zoning use the following process: an application is filed; then there is a review process by a development review committee, which is a staff level review; that review is forwarded to the P & Z Commission for a recommendation; and then it goes to the Ocoee City Commission for two readings of an ordinance for rezoning if the rezoning is approved. This is the process that was followed for the West Road property PUD. On February 9, 2016, the issue of whether to recommend rezoning of the West Road property to allow for the charter school referenced in the Agreement of Sale came before the P & Z Commission. Respondent was present for the meeting. During the meeting, Respondent spoke in favor of the rezoning request for the West Road property. When a fellow commissioner made a request for more time to review the rezoning issue, Respondent opposed the delay by stating “[i]f you don't give them a go now, you basically kill the deal because it's a time sensitive thing that they want the kids in there in August.” During the meeting, the commissioners struggled with whether to recommend denial of the West Road property zoning request, recommend approval of the request without conditions, or recommend approval of the request with conditions. After two previous motions regarding the zoning request died for lack of a “second,” a third motion was made wherein approval was recommended “with the condition that we’re all going to look at the traffic movement with the final site plan design.” When it appeared as though this motion was also likely to fail for lack of a “second,” Respondent encouraged the chairman of the P & Z Commission to voice a “second” for the motion since Respondent was unable to do so.2/ Respondent’s actions during the meeting of February 9, 2016, were consistent with his obligations under the Agreement of Sale to assist the buyer of the West Road property with securing the “Buyer Required Approvals.”

Recommendation Based on the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a civil penalty of $10,000.00 be imposed against Respondent due to his violation of section 112.313(7)(a) and that Respondent also be publicly censured and reprimanded. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of April, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of April, 2017.

Florida Laws (12) 112.311112.313112.3143112.316112.317112.322112.3241120.52120.569120.57120.68163.3174
# 9
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS vs CITY OF MARATHON AND BANANA BAY OF MARATHON, INC., 00-005128GM (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Marathon, Florida Dec. 26, 2000 Number: 00-005128GM Latest Update: Aug. 02, 2007

The Issue The issue is whether a development order adopted by Respondent City of Marathon by Resolution PC00-09-04 is consistent with the comprehensive plan, land development regulations, and statutes.

Findings Of Fact Respondent City of Marathon (Marathon) was incorporated on November 30, 1999. It adopted as its land development regulations (LDR) the LDRs of Monroe County in effect at the time of Marathon's incorporation. Marathon is within The Florida Keys Area of Critical State Concern. This case involves a development order that Marathon issued to Respondent Banana Bay of Marathon, Inc. (BB). As Planning Commission Resolution 00-09-04, the development order authorizes BB to add 12 motel rooms to an existing motel in return for imposing certain restrictions on the use of wet slips at its adjacent marina that is part of the same motel/marina development. The restrictions require the removal of cable television connections from 12 slips and limitation upon vessels using these 12 slips to those without plumbing facilities. For the remaining wet slips at the marina, the development order requires BB to limit their use to no more than 18 vessels at one time and to provide mandatory sewage pumpout for these vessels. At various points in the record and this recommended order, references to a "transfer" of 12 marina slips for 12 motel rooms refer to the conditions set forth in this paragraph. BB owns 7.39 acres of upland and 2.67 acres of adjacent bay bottom in Marathon at mile marker 49.5 (Subject Property or, as developed, Banana Bay). The Subject Property runs from U.S. Route 1 to the water. The Subject Property contains 60 motel rooms in two buildings, a conference room, a motel office, support buildings, three apartments suitable for employee use, and a marina. The marina includes 40-50 slips, depending upon the size of the moored vessels. The Subject Property is zoned Suburban Commercial (SC) and Mixed Use (MU). About 2.4 acres (104,544 square feet) running about 350 feet from U.S. Route 1 is SC. About 4.99 acres (217,364 square feet) is zoned MU. The additional 2.67 acres of adjacent bay bottom are also zoned MU, although the submerged acreage is unimportant for reasons discussed below. Twenty-five of the motel rooms are in SC, and 35 of the motel rooms are in MU, although the distinction between zoning districts is also unimportant for reasons discussed below. LDR Code Section 9.5-267 authorizes ten "rooms" per ”acre" as "allocated density" for motel uses in SC and MU and 15 "rooms" per "buildable acre" as "maximum net density" for motel uses in SC and MU. (There is no difference between "hotels" and "motels" in this case; all references to "motels" include "hotels.") Three fundamental questions emerge concerning the application of these two density limitations to this case. The first is whether BB must satisfy both the "allocated density" and "maximum net density" limitation. This is not a difficult issue; BB's proposal must satisfy each of these density limitations. The second question is what is included in the areas under each of these density limitations. Notwithstanding the use of "gross acres" in the "allocated density" formula, it is necessary to net out certain areas--just less than is netted out in the "maximum net density" formula. The third question is what constitutes a "room." When applied to marine-based units, the definition of a "room" presents a difficult and important issue. As a whole, the LDRs imply that no marine-based dwelling units should count as "rooms," but one provision specifically requires the inclusion of "live-aboard" units in density calculations. The first question requires little analysis. As noted below in the discussion of the two types of areas, "allocated density" and "maximum net density" provide two separate measures of the intensity of use of land. The allowable density for "maximum net density" is never less than the allowable density for "allocated density" because "maximum net density" is a safeguard to ensure that, after netting out from the parcel those areas reserved for open space, setbacks, and buffers, the intensity of use will not be excessive. Nothing whatsoever in the LDRs suggests that Marathon may issue a development order for a proposal that satisfies the "maximum net density," but not the "allocated density." These two densities limitations operate in tandem, not in the alternative. The calculation of the "allocated density" requires consideration of the second and third questions identified above. The issue of area seems straightforward. LDR Code Section 9.5-4(D-3) defines "density or allocated density" as "the number of dwelling units or rooms allocated per gross acre of land by the plan." LDR Code Section 9.5-4(D-4) defines "maximum net density" as "the maximum density permitted to be developed per unit of land on the net buildable area of a site, as measured in dwelling units or rooms per acre." LDR Code Section 9.5-4(G-4) defines "gross area" as "the total acreage of a site less submerged lands and any dedicated public rights-of-way." LDR Code Section 9.5-4(N-4) defines "net buildable area" as "that portion of a parcel of land which is developable and is not open space required by section 9.5-262 or 9.5-343 or required minimum bufferyard under article VII division 11 or required setbacks under section 9.5-281." The area of land involved in determining "allocated density" is greater than the area of land involved in determining "maximum net density." But the area of land involved in determining "allocated density" is itself a net amount. The LDRs expressly require reducing the gross areas by any submerged land and dedicated public rights-of-way. However, any reasonable application of the LDRs also requires reducing the gross areas used for the motel "allocated density" calculation by the minimum areas required to support other uses on the Subject Property. If the only use of the Subject Property were motel rooms, the "allocated density" limit of ten units per acre (10:1) would allow 73.9 rooms. But the Marathon Planning Commission Staff Report dated September 18, 2000, correctly netted from the Subject Property the land areas required to support the commercial aspects of the hotel and the commercial apartments. These reductions leave a total of 5.86 acres available to support the motel rooms. At a density of 10:1, the Subject Property could therefore support a total of 58 motel rooms. The Planning Commission incorrectly used the 15:1 ratio for "maximum net density" in concluding that the Subject Property could support a total of 67.65 motel rooms. Evidently, the Planning Commission used the "maximum net density" because it was not using "gross area" or "gross acres" (the terms are synonymous under the Code) in calculating the area. The netting reduction necessary to calculate whether BB's proposal satisfies the "maximum net density" limitation would require the calculation of the area of the Subject Property that must be devoted to open space, setbacks, and buffers. The Planning Commission probably undertook this step in calculating the "maximum net density" for the Subject Property, as its figures seem to include unstated deductions for the 20 percent open space plus another factor, probably for setbacks and buffers--all of which are discussed in its report. However, the Planning Commission erroneously neglected to apply the "allocated density" limitation to the "gross acres," exclusive of submerged land, public rights-of-way, and the minimum land required to support the other upland uses. As noted above, doing so would have yielded no more than 58 motel rooms. At present, the Subject Property contains 60 hotel or motel rooms. The Subject Property therefore cannot support the addition of another 12 hotel or motel rooms, given its "allocated density" of only 58 rooms. In general, BB justifies the addition of 12 rooms to the front motel by arguing that it is only transferring these units from the 12 existing wet slips. It is unnecessary to determine whether a transfer under these facts is lawful when, if these 12 slips count as units, the Subject Property is already 14 units over its "allocated density." The resolution of the third question--what constitutes a "room"--dispenses with this argument. Thirty of the existing 40-50 boat slips in the marina have water, electric, and cable hook-ups and are presently used for some form of habitation. Most vessels berth at the marina for two or three days, although the average stay is slightly over one month. The average stay at the 30 slips offering utilities, though, is two to three months. Typically, two persons use a vessel berthed at the marina for more than a couple of days. BB seals the discharge ports of all vessels mooring at the marina for any appreciable period of time. BB provides a sewage pumpout service for these and other vessels. The wastewater from the marina operations goes to a septic tank, in contrast to the wastewater from the motel operations, which goes to an onsite package plant. Persons mooring at the marina for at least two months normally obtain telephone service and may obtain cable television service, in addition to the potable water and electrical services provided by BB. The marina also provides rest rooms, laundry facilities, showers, a bar, limited food service, and a mail box. However, BB rules require that all persons berthing at the marina register a permanent address because the slips are "not considered permanent housing." At the request of the Florida Keys Aqueduct Authority and the Monroe County Planning Department, BB has limited rental agreements at the marina to a maximum of one month, although some persons enter into back-to-back rental agreements. Persons staying more than one week often have cars. Contrary to BB's contentions, none of these slips provides additional density for the Subject Property, and therefore the 12 slips are not available for transfer to the motel. For the same reason, as discussed below, the proposed transfer of the 12 units would also violate the Rate of Growth Ordinance (ROGO). In two respects, the record reveals that the conversion of marine-based residential uses to upland residential uses might facilitate the achievement of important land use planning objectives. First, the wastewater collected from the marina is directed to a septic tank, and the wastewater collected from the motel is directed to a package plant. Absent a significantly reduced flow from the marine-based residential use, the upland residential use would therefore impact the adjacent waters to a lesser extent. Second, marine-based residential users may be more reluctant to evacuate for an approaching hurricane than upland residential users. Absent a significantly greater number of visitors during hurricane season if the 12 units were taken from the marina slips and added to the motel, the upland residential use might therefore facilitate timely hurricane evacuation of the vulnerable Keys. However, the record was relatively undeveloped on these two points, and these possible advantages to the conversion of marine-based residential uses to upland-based residential uses do not override the LDRs. The LDRs may treat the more intense residential use associated with "live-aboards" differently than the less intense residential use associated with other moored vessels. Although the LDRs' treatment of "live-aboards" may not be entirely consistent, any inconsistency is irrelevant in this case because the moored vessels at the Banana Bay marina do not qualify as "live-aboards." As stipulated for the purpose of this case, LDR Code Section 9.5-4(T-4) defines a "transient residential unit" as "a dwelling unit used for transient housing such as a hotel or motel room, or space for parking a recreational vehicle or travel trailer." LDR Code Section 9.5-4(D-31) defines a "dwelling unit" as "one (1) or more rooms physically arranged to create a housekeeping establishment for occupancy by one (1) family with separate toilet facilities." LDR Code Sections 9.5-4(D-23) through 9.5-4(D-30) identify the various types of dwellings that may contain "dwelling units.” These dwellings are, respectively, detached zero-lot-line dwellings, multifamily apartment dwellings, attached dwellings, detached individual dwellings, duplex dwellings, commercial apartment dwellings, rooftop dwellings, and townhouse dwellings. The frequent references to "open yards" in these definitions precludes the application of these definitions to moored vessels, even "live- aboards." The exclusion of all moored vessels, including "live-aboards," from density calculations is also suggested by two other portions of the LDRs. As is typical, LDR Code Section 9.5-120.1 provides that the mechanism for enforcing density limitations is in the issuance of building permits, but this enforcement mechanism is of doubtful use in regulating vessel moorings, which do not typically involve the issuance of a building permit. Also, the density definitions discussed above both refer to the development of various types of residential uses on "land." Moreover, none of the zoning districts established in Marathon's LDRs measures the intensity of marina uses, including vessels moored for extended periods as live-aboards, by imposing some sort of marine density limitation, either by including the moored dwelling units or the submerged acreage. Because the LDRs did not intend to include such marine-based uses in density calculations, LDR Code Section 9.5-267, which is a table setting forth "allocated densities" and "maximum net densities," covers only upland-based uses, including recreational vehicle or campground spaces per acre, and does not extent to marine-based uses, such as live-aboard marina slips. However, two provisions in the LDRs require density calculations to include "live-aboards." LDR Code Section 9.5-308, which seems to be an older provision in the LDRs, provides that "each live-aboard shall count as a dwelling unit for the purpose of calculating density limitations in the district in which it is permitted." Better incorporated into the present regulatory scheme of the LDRs, LDR Code Section 9.5-120.1 defines a "residential dwelling unit" as a "dwelling unit," including a "transient rental unit," as defined in LDR Code Section 9.5-4(T-3), and "live-aboard vessels," as defined in LDR Code Section 9.5-4(L-6). However, LDR Code Section 9.5-4((L-6) states that a "live-aboard vessel" is "any vessel used solely as a residence or any vessel represented as a place of business, a professional or other commercial enterprise, or a legal residence." The record does not suggest that any of the moored vessels were used "solely" as a residence, as distinguished, for instance, from a vessel used for residential and recreational purposes, or that any of the mixed-use vessels served as the occupants' legal residence. Absent a finding that the moored vessels constitute "transient residential units," ROGO does not support this proposed transfer of residential uses from marine-based to upland-based. LDR Code Section 9.5-123(f)(3) authorizes the transfer of an existing "residential dwelling unit" from one site to another within the same subarea. However, LDR Code Section 9.5-122 defines a "residential dwelling unit" to extend only to "live-aboards." For the reasons already discussed, the less intense residential uses associated with the vessels moored at Banana Bay's marina preclude their treatment as "residential dwelling units" eligible for transfer to the motel. Petitioner has proved that the development order is materially inconsistent with the LDRs. LDR provisions governing the density and intensity of residential development go to the heart of effective land use planning, especially in an area as sensitive as the Keys. For these reason, it is unnecessary to consider the consistency of the development order with the more general provisions of Marathon's comprehensive plan, on which Marathon's LDRs are based.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission enter a final order denying the request of Banana Bay of Marathon, Inc., to approve the transfer of 12 slips to 12 rooms in a motel on the Subject Property. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara L. Leighty, Clerk Growth Management and Strategic Planning The Capitol, Suite 2105 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Charles Canaday, General Counsel Office of the Governor Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Suite 209 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1001 Cari L. Roth, General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Mitchell A. Bierman Weiss Serota 2665 South Bayshore Drive Suite 420 Miami, Florida 33133 James S. Mattson James S. Mattson, P.A. Post Office Box 586 Key Largo, Florida 33037

Florida Laws (4) 120.57380.05380.077.39
# 10

Can't find what you're looking for?

Post a free question on our public forum.
Ask a Question
Search for lawyers by practice areas.
Find a Lawyer