Findings Of Fact The Bid The Department, through an Invitation to Bid (ITB), sought to secure a contract for the management of the Dade County Public Health Unit parking lot located at 1340 N.W. 14th Street, Miami, Florida. By April 1, 1986, the bid opening date, bids had been filed with the Department on behalf of Kinney, Floyd, and LaSalle Parking, Inc. (LaSalle). The Department's selection team reviewed the bids and recommended that the contract be awarded to Kinney. Consistent with the selection team's recommendation, by letter of April 2, 1986, the Department advised the unsuccessful bidders that the contract had been awarded to Kinney and advised them of their right to protest the award. Floyd filed a timely protest of the award and alleged, inter alia, that Mr. Shera, the Department's Business Manager, had outlined the criteria to be used in evaluating the bids as including a consideration of the bidder's ability to: Provide parking services to . . . employees and clients for the lowest monthly rate. 3/ Upon receipt of Floyd's protest, the Department reevaluated the bids and the ITB specifications, and concluded that the ITB specifications contained an ambiguity which had resulted in a lack of uniform bid response. Therefore, the Department rejected all bids and rebid the contract. 4/ Pertinent to this case the bid specifications provided. SPACES AVAILABLE: 13 Uncovered Reserved, present rate $10.50/ month. 22 Covered Reserved, present rate $10.50/ month. 115 Reserved for Health Department Employees, present rate $7.35/month. 3 Handicapped 45 Daily rental 45 Daily rental 198 TOTAL CURRENT RATE: Reserved Parking $10.50/month. Health Department Employees $7.35/month Health Department Clients 50 percent discount on daily rates. Daily rates: 1st hour $1.00 Additional 1/2 hour $.50 All day $2.50 3:00 P.M. 7:00 P.M. $1.50. MANAGERIAL RESPONSIBILITIES: 3. That in consideration for such services, the OWNER will allow the MANAGER the exclusive right to charge, collect the established fees for all those wishing to have their cars parked upon the parking premises. All fees must be approved by the owner. And, the mandated Bid Sheet required a response to three proposals: PROPOSAL FOR OPERATING THE LOT: PROPOSED RATES: PROPOSED NET INCOME DISTRIBUTION: Kinney's response to the ITB proposed to retain the current rates and offered a net income distribution of 25% to Kinney and 75% to the Department. Floyd's response to the ITB proposed rates of: RESERVED PARKING : $9.35/MONTH HEALTH DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEES: $6.24/MONTH HEALTH DEPARTMENT CLIENTS : 50% DISCOUNT ON DAILY RATES DAILY RATES : 1ST HOUR $1.00 EACH ADDITIONAL 1/2 HR. $.50 : MAXIMUM ALL DAY $2.50 : 3PM - 7PM $1.50 and a net income distribution of 30% to Floyd and 70% to the Department. While it was the Department's intent to maintain the current rates and to evaluate the bids primarily on a net income distribution basis, the bid specifications were ambiguous and subject to an interpretation which would permit a bid based on different parking rates, as well as a variable distribution basis. Accordingly, because of the ambiguity in the bid specifications, all bids submitted in response to the initial letting should be rejected. The Rebid On rebid, the Department amended its bid specifications to clarify its intent that the current rates would remain in effect, and delineated the "determining factors for bid award. Specifically, the rebid specifications provided: SPACES AVAILABLE: 13 Uncovered Reserved, present rate $10.50/ month. 22 Covered Reserved, present rate $10.50/ month. 115 Reserved for Health Department Employees, present rate $7.35/ month. 3 Handicapped. 45 Daily rental CURRENT RATES: Reserved Parking $10.50/month Health Department Employees $7.35/month Health Department Clients 50% discount on daily rates. Daily rates: 1st hour $1.00 Additional 1/2 hour $.50. All day $2.50 3:00 P.M. - 7:00 P.M. $1.50 The rates will remain the same. The owner will have full jurisdiction in raising or lowering said rate any time during the contract period. * * * Determining Factors for Bid Award: Unarmed parking attendant (outline measures to be taken to secure vehicles in lot). Experience (outline number of years in parking business as parking lot management firm.) Proposed net income distribution (percent split). Provide bilingual parking attendant (Spanish and English, French desirable but not mandatory). By May 14, 1986, the rebid opening date, Kinney, Floyd and LaSalle were the only bidders to respond to the ITB. The Department's selection team reviewed the bids and again recommended that the contract be awarded to Kinney. Accordingly, by letter of June 6, 1986, the Department advised the unsuccessful bidders of its decision to award the contract to Kinney and of their right to protest the award. Floyd filed a timely notice of protest and formal written protest of the proposed award. Floyd's formal protest, filed June 6, 1986, asserted that: Floyd & Associates Protection Corp. submitted the lowest responsive, responsible bid, and should be awarded this contract - Bid No. DCPHU 4/86. We protest the recommendation of the Parking Lot Management Bid Selection Team that Kinney Systems, Inc. be awarded this contract. The bidding process is supposed to protect small companies from the powers of a large company. At all times, the purchasing officers should operate with integrity and fairness to all suppliers. Floyd & Associates has a proven track record and should not be looked upon as inferior because we haven't been in business as long as Kinney. However, if you judge us on an equal and unbiased basis, Floyd should be awarded this contract. We have enclosed exhibit A as a true comparison as to the merits of both companies. 5/ Floyd & Associates should be awarded this contract; we deserve a piece of the American Dream. The Reevaluation Floyd's charge of racial discrimination, planted by Floyd's first protest and tacitly reasserted by it's second protest, was not lost on the Department. Notwithstanding the unsubstantiated nature of Floyd's charge, the Department, without notice to Kinney, purportedly reevaluated the bids. By letter of July 2, 1986, the Department advised Kinney, without explanation, that based on the "selection team's" recommendation the contract had been awarded to Floyd. 6. Kinney filed a timely notice and formal protest of the Department's action. The Department contends that Section 120.53(5)(d), Florida Statutes, authorized its reevaluation of the bid to amicably resolve the protest. The Department's reliance on section 120.53(5)(d), as permitting its unilateral decision to vitiate its prior award of the contract to Kinney, is misplaced. Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, establishes a statutory framework for resolution of protests arising from the contract bidding process. Pertinent to this case, section 120.53(5) provides: Upon receipt of a notice of protest which has been timely filed, the agency shall stop the bid solicitation process or the contract award process until the subject of the protest is resolved by final agency action, unless the agency head sets forth in writing particular facts and circumstances which require the continuance of the bid solicitation process or the contract award process without delay in order to avoid an immediate and serious danger to the public health, safety and welfare. The agency, on its own initiative or upon the request of a protestor, shall provide an opportunity to resolve the protest by mutual agreement between the parties within 7 days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, of receipt of a formal written protest. If the subject of a protest is not resolved by mutual agreement within 7 days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays, of receipt of the formal written protest and if there is no disputed issue of material fact, an informal proceeding shall be conducted pursuant to s.120.57(2) and applicable agency rules before a person whose qualifications have been prescribed by rules of the agency. If the subject of a protest is not resolved by mutual agreement within 7 days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, of receipt of the formal written protest and if there is a disputed issue of material fact, the agency shall refer the protest to the division for proceedings under s. 120.57(1). Under the provisions of section 120.53(5)(c), the Department was bound, absent circumstances not present here, to stop the bid solicitation process pending resolution of Floyd's protest by final agency action. Under the framework of 120.53(5)(d), final agency action could only occur through mutual agreement of the parties; an informal proceeding pursuant to Section 120.57(2) Florida Statutes, or a formal proceeding pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. See: Cianbro Corp. v. Jacksonville Transportation Authority, 473 So.2d 209 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). The provisions of section 120.53(5)(d), which provide an opportunity to resolve a protest by "mutual agreement between the parties," is not an invitation to the Department to unilaterally reevaluate its decision. Such resolution can only occur "between the parties"; which must include, at a minimum, the successful bidder, the protestant, and the Department. Since Kinney did not participate or concur in the Department's action, and there existed disputed issues of material fact, Floyd's protest could only be resolved by a formal 120.57(1) proceeding. Accordingly, the Department's subsequent decision to award the contract to Floyd was improper. 7/ The Bidders Kinney, which has operated the subject parking lot under contract with the Department for the past 6 years, is one of the world's largest parking companies, with over 50 years of experience in parking lot operations. Kinney presently parks approximately 20,000,000 automobiles annually in facilities it owns, leases or operates under contract. These facilities range in size from fewer than 50 spaces to those with thousands of spaces. Currently, Kinney operates 20 lots in south Florida, which contain 16-17,000 spaces and generate in excess of $20,000,000 in annual receipts. The proof establishes that Kinney has the requisite experience to operate the subject facility, properly supervise its operations, and accurately account for the proceeds generated by the parking operation. Kinney's rebid proposed to operate the subject parking facility predicated on a net income distribution of 25% to Kinney and 75% to the Department. The protestant, Floyd, was established in August 1982 and, until approximately November 1985, had been exclusively involved in providing security services. In November 1985, Floyd received a contract from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to manage its parking garage in Miami, Florida; which accounts for Floyd's total experience in parking lot management. Under Floyd's agreement with INS, it still operates as basically an unarmed security service. Since the majority of patrons utilizing the INS garage are clients of INS, no fees are collected. In the unusual event that the patron's ticket is not validated by INS and a fee is due, Floyd's simply collects the money and immediately gives it to an INS official. Floyd offered no evidence that it has any experience operating an in-and-out lot similar to the subject parking lot, or that it has any established or proposed methods of management, supervision and accounting controls necessary to service the Department's parking lot. Floyd proposed, however, to operate the subject parking lot based on a net income distribution of 20 percent to Kinney and 80 percent to the Department. 8/ The Department's selection team evaluated the responses of Kinney and Floyd, and recommended that the contract rebid be awarded to Kinney even though the net income differential proposed by Floyd would facially generate more income for the Department. The selection team's recommendation was premised on its conclusion that given the experience of Kinney, juxtaposed with the inexperience of Floyd, it could expect a greater return from Kinney even with the lower net income differential. Of the 198 spaces in the Department's parking lot, only 45 are reserved for daily rental. The balance of the spaces are reserved on a fixed monthly rate for Department and other employees. Accordingly, the ability to maximize revenue in the lot is directly dependent upon the operator's supervision and control of the 45 daily spaces. Kinney has demonstrated its ability to insure that those spaces remain open for their intended purpose, to collect and accurately account for all funds collected, and to maximize revenues. Floyd on the other hand has no such experience and offered no evidence that it had any inkling of what was required to operate such a parking lot or any plans to acquire such expertise. The selection team's recommendation was therefore reasonable, and the Department's decision to award the contract to Kinney was premised on an honest exercise of its discretion. At hearing, Floyd chose not to participate and, accordingly, offered no evidence discrediting the Department's award to Kinney or supporting its entitlement. The Department did offer evidence, however, to support its decision to "re-award" the contract to Floyd and thereby vitiate its initial decision. The thrust of the Department's evidence was two fold: a claim of mismanagement by Kinney of the subject parking lot and a claim that the selection team incorrectly assumed Floyd was not properly licensed. The Department's assertions lack substance and conviction. The Department's claims of mismanagement are founded on losses occasioned in the operation of the parking lot from June through November 1985, the theft of a car from the parking lot, and alleged damages to four cars caused by the mechanical arm which controls ingress to the lot. The losses in revenue were not, however, the fault of Kinney. These losses resulted from Kinney's inability to use the 45 daily spaces because the Department had issued over 250 gate cards for its employees. Despite Kinney's protests, it was not until December 1985 that the Department cooperated in solving this problem by limiting the number of gate cards, and the severe over crowding in the lot was eliminated. The only other factor bearing on lost revenue was some theft by a Kinney gate guard; however, Kinney, consistent with its routine practice, used "shoppers" to police the integrity of its employee, and the employee was caught and discharged. Rather than reflect unfavorably on Kinney, its discovery of the theft is evidenced of its good supervision. The Department's remaining claims of mismanagement are equally without merit. The one car stolen from the lot during Kinney's tenure was that of a Department employee who had left her keys in the car. The damage, if any (none was shown), to four cars by the mechanical arm, was occasioned by one car following another car too closely into the lot. The mechanical arm was not shown to function improperly. The foregoing facts, together with the assurances of Mr. Shera, the Department's local manager, that Kinney and the Department have enjoyed a very favorable working relationship over the past six years, renders the Department's assertions of mismanagement not credible. The Department's final basis to vitiate its award to Kinney is predicated on its assertion that its selection team incorrectly concluded that Floyd did not hold an occupational license to operate a parking lot. Again, the Department's assertion is not credible. The proof is that Floyd's licensure was not the motivating factor in the selection team's award of the contract to Kinney. The team's decision was premised on Kinney's superior qualifications and perceived ability to generate more revenue for the Department, compared with the team's well founded concerns of Floyd's ability to perform. As importantly, Kinney advised Mr. Shera by letter of May 15, 1986, of its protest to Floyd's qualifications because of Floyd's purported failure to have an occupational license at the time of bid submittal. Mr. Shera, on behalf of the Department, awarded the contract to Kinney by letter of June 5, 1986, and did not disqualify Floyd. Accordingly, the evidence supports the conclusion that the Department did not incorrectly exclude Floyd because of any licensure requirement. The totality of the evidence, including the demeanor of the witnesses, compels the conclusion that the Department's decision to support Floyd's bid was occasioned by its desire to avoid any appearance of discrimination, as opposed to a fair exercise of its discretion. Such conduct is arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, the evidence supports the award of the subject contract to Kinney.
The Issue Whether Respondent should sustain Petitioner's challenge to the preliminary determination to award Bid No. DCPHU 10-91 to Kinney System of Florida, Inc.?
Findings Of Fact Based on the record evidence, the following Findings of Fact are made: In November, 1991, Respondent issued Invitation to Bid No. DCPHU 10-91 (hereinafter referred to as the "ITB"). Through the ITB, Respondent solicited bids to manage the Dade County Public Health Unit's parking lot located at 1350 N.W. 14th Street in Miami, Florida. The managerial responsibilities to be assumed by the successful bidder were described in the ITB as follows: That the OWNER will grant unto the MANAGER, the full exclusive management rights to operate a public parking service, and said MANAGER will take the exclusive rights to operate upon the premises and driveways, of what is commonly known as a "Public Parking Service" at and for the Dade County Public Health Unit. The term "Public Parking Service" as indicated above, is defined as meaning "those patrons wishing to avail themselves of a paid parking service." MANAGER will furnish competent and courteous uniformed parking attendants, during the times and on the days and hours as may be deemed necessary, and to be set forth by the OWNER. It is understood and agreed, all employees are in the employ of MANAGER, solely and not in the employ of OWNER. OWNER is in no way liable to employees for their wages or compensation. That in consideration for such services, the OWNER will allow the MANAGER the exclusive right to charge, collect the established fees for all those wishing to have their cars parked upon the parking premises. All fees must be approved by the OWNER. The ITB indicated that, in order to be deemed a "qualified bidder," the bidder "must be licensed to do business in the State of Florida." The following advisement was given in the ITB regarding how the bids of "qualified bidders" would be evaluated: Bidders shall be evaluated on the basis of proposal for operating the lot, proposed rates, proposed net income distribution, proposer's financial condition, prior job performance, and recommended detailed anticipated operating expense budget for a twelve (12) months [sic] period. So that Respondent would have information upon which to evaluate the financial condition of those submitting bids, the ITB directed all bidders to submit: "1. COPY OF 1990 OR LATEST FINANCIAL STATEMENT AND 2. FEDERAL INCOME TAX RETURN AND 3. ANNUAL REPORT."1/ There are three basic types of financial statements that accountants prepare: those that are the product of an audit (hereinafter referred to "audit statements"); those that are the product of a review; and those that are the product of a compilation (hereinafter referred to as "compilation statements"). Of the various types of financial statements produced by accountants, certified audit statements are considered to be the most reliable and compilation statements that are produced without the benefit of the accountant's examination of the source documents and materials upon which they are purportedly based are considered to be the least reliable. In preparing such compilation statements, the accountant simply puts the figures he has been provided by his client in financial statement form without verifying the accuracy of these figures. Accordingly, it is standard practice in the accounting profession for accountants to warn readers of such compilation statements that they "do not express an opinion or any other form of assurance on the[se statements]." The ITB did not specify what type of financial statement bidders had to submit along with their bid. There was no indication in the ITB that a compilation statement would be deemed unacceptable. Petitioner submitted a timely bid in response to the ITB. Its bid was accompanied by the financial statement required by the ITB. The financial statement was a compilation statement prepared by Petitioner's accountant, Herbert Ehrlich. Appended to the statement was a letter written by Ehrlich. The body of the letter read as follows: We have compiled the accompanying balance sheet of Centre City Parking Inc. as of December 31, 1990, and related statement of income, retained earnings and supporting schedules, for the year then ended, in accordance with standards established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. A compilation is limited to presenting in the form of financial statements information that is the representation of management. We have not audited or reviewed the accompanying financial statements and, accordingly, do not express an opinion or any other form of assurance on them. Management has elected to omit substantially all of the disclosures and the statement of cash flows required by generally accepted accounting principles. If the omitted disclosures and statement of cash flows were included in the financial statements, they might influence the user's conclusions about the company's financial position, results of operations and cash flows. Accordingly, these financial statements are not designed for those who are not informed about such matters. The shareholders2/ have elected to treat the company as a small business corporation for income tax purposes as provided in the Internal Revenue Code and the applicable state statutes. As such, the corporation income or loss and credits are passed through to the shareholders and combined with their personal income and deductions to determine taxable income on their individual returns. In issuing such a written warning regarding the compilation statement he had prepared for Petitioner, Ehrlich was acting in accordance with the standards of acceptable accounting practice prescribed by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Kinney System of Florida, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Kinney"), Meyers Parking System, Inc. and Republic Parking System also timely submitted bids in response to the ITB. Kinney's bid was accompanied by a certified audit statement of its parent corporation, Kinney System Holding Corporation. There was no financial statement, however, reflecting Kinney's individual financial condition. A bid evaluation committee comprised of five members evaluated each of the four bids submitted in response to the ITB. The members of the committee determined that, of the four bids submitted, Petitioner's was the lowest. They were concerned, however, based upon the statements made in Ehrlich's letter, that Petitioner had Ehrlich prepare its financial statement without giving him the opportunity to verify the accuracy of the representations it had made to him regarding its financial condition. Because of these concerns, they eliminated Petitioner's bid from consideration, notwithstanding that it was the lowest responsive bid submitted by a qualified bidder, and recommended that the contract be awarded to Kinney, whom they determined to be the next lowest qualified and responsive bidder.3/ The committee members' decision was announced in a letter dated January 13, 1992, the body of which read as follows: Based on the proposed net income distribution, references, background and financial condition, the Parking Lot Management Bid Selection Committee recommends award of the annual parking lot management contract to Kinney Systems [sic] of Florida, Inc. Failure to file a protest within the time prescribed in Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Protests not filed within the prescribed time limit will not be considered. To comply with this statute, a written notice of intent to protest must be filed with the Administrative Services Director named in the bid invitation within 72 hours after receipt of this notice. Within ten days after a notice of intent to protest is filed, a formal written notice of protest must be filed with the Administrative Services Director. A copy of this letter was mailed to Petitioner. Petitioner subsequently protested the committee's recommendation in accordance with the procedures set forth in the letter.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order sustaining Petitioner's protest and awarding Petitioner the contract advertised in the ITB. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 26th day of March, 1992. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of March, 1992.
Findings Of Fact Six signs were described in a violation notice to Respondent Dandy Signs from Petitioner, Florida Department of Transportation dated July 7, 1977. The notice stated the signs were alleged to be in violation of Chapter 479 and rules 14-10.04; rule 14-10.03. By stipulation of the parties the charges on the signs listed were dropped except for the following two signs: a sign located one mile west of U.S. 1, State Road 44, Mile Post 28.25 with copy "Bob's Sandpiper Restaurant" and a sign located at Junction 17-92 Deland, U.S. Highway 17 (Section 35 Mile Post .02) with copy "Buddy Sheats". The foregoing signs have no permit and evidence was presented to show that each sign is nearer to a permitted sign than 500 feet. The Respondent admits that neither sign has been permitted and that both signs violate the spacing requirements. Respondent was given time to submit evidence that the signs had at one time been permitted, but no evidence was submitted to this hearing officer although the hearing was held in excess of three months before this order is being entered.
Recommendation Remove the subject signs and invoke penalty under Section 479.18, Florida Statutes. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 1978. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 1978. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Florida Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Dan Richardson, Owner Dandy Signs 324 Flagler Street New Smyrna Beach, Florida 32069
Findings Of Fact A McDonald's sign visible to automobile traffic on the I-75 is located .08 miles north of CR-54 along the I-75, 934 feet into the interchange between the I-75 and CR-54 in Pasco County, Florida. The I-75 at this location is part of the federal interstate highway system and is outside an incorporated town or city. The sign has no permit tags attached and no permit tags have ever been approved for the site. The property on which this sign is erected is approximately 77' by 52' with the southeast corner cut off owned by McDonald's Corporation. The site is connected to the restaurant site by a 15 foot strip of land which intersects a proposed road 275 feet north of the restaurant site. The sign is 1122 feet from the restaurant as measured along the paved surface between the sign and restaurant. Between this sign and the restaurant along CR-54 is a Standard station, an Amoco station, a Circle K shop and a Days Inn. The closest businesses to the sign are Abe Chevron station and the Days Inn Motel. Respondent presented proposed plans evidencing an intent to construct a McDonald's playland on the property on which the sign is located, presumably as an integral part of the restaurant. However, at the time of the hearing the property served only as a site for the sign. McDonald's playlands have been developed as a selling tool for families traveling over interstate highways and are generally located adjacent to the restaurant so children occupying the playland can be monitored by the parents from inside the restaurant. Respondent's witnesses were aware of no McDonald's playland located other than immediately adjacent to the restaurant building. Construction of the playland at the site of the existing sign has never-been started due to construction, drainage and sewage disposal problems at the restaurant site.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security illegally rejected Petitioner's bid as nonresponsive.
Findings Of Fact Fred Boozer, Sr., (Boozer), the Petitioner, owns Boozer Properties, a family business which includes a building at 2235 South Babcock Street, Melbourne, Brevard County, Florida. The building is currently occupied by staff of the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security (LES) and other tenants. In south Brevard, LES staff also occupies another building in Palm Bay. Because of staff expansion and the need to co-locate its offices, LES issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for Lease No. 540:0904 on January 28, 1992. The RFP had been previously advertised but was successfully challenged on issues unrelated to the issues in this proceeding. The January 1992 RFP sought approximately 11,474 to 11,818 square feet of office space. The RFP also specified that 95 off-street parking spaces be provided for the exclusive use of LES employees and clients. The spaces were to be suitably paved and lined, and under the control of the bidder. The RFP advertised a pre-proposal conference on February 4, 1992. No bidder attended, and no objections to the RFP were filed. Six responses were received on the February 28th deadline, one of which was immediately determined to be nonresponsive. The remaining bid proposals were evaluated, and Boozer's bid, offering his Babcock Street site, and 95 parking spaces, received the highest points from the evaluation committee. During a recent LES bidding process for office space in West Palm Beach, a problem arose with a bidder's ability to provide the required parking spaces. Cognizant of this, the LES leasing manager contacted the City of Melbourne to determine whether the apparent bid winner, Boozer, could meet his obligation to provide 95 spaces. The written response dated March 20, 1992, from Dominic Mauriello, a Melbourne city planner, provides his estimation that, for the various uses in the Babcock Street building, 207 parking spaces would be required. The memo states that a site plan on file at the city planning office reflects that there are 165 spaces. The site plan attached to Boozer's bid proposal submitted to LES indicates that 175 spaces are available. LES staff person, Lynne Mobley, telephoned Fred Boozer on March 24, 1992, informing him of the memorandum from the city. He responded with a request that he be allowed twenty-four hours to provide additional information. By March 27, 1992, the LES leasing office had not received further information from Boozer. The RFP had advertised a 30-day deadline for the bid award, which deadline fell on a weekend. The agency considered that it needed to make the award on Friday, the 27th. After contacting the City of Palm Bay to assure that the next highest rated response could deliver the requisite parking spaces, a letter was sent notifying Woodlake S.W. No. 1, Ltd., (Woodlake) of its award. In a letter dated March 27, 1992, LES notified Boozer that its bid was determined nonresponsive based on the outcome of investigation and consultation with the city regarding his inability to produce the required 95 exclusive spaces. In the meantime, Fred Boozer had contacted Peggy Bray, the City's Planning and Zoning Administrator, who provided an amended estimation stating that 190 spaces would be required for the Babcock Street site, and that the site currently includes 184 parking spaces. Ms. Bray's letter, dated March 27, 1992, states that in order to provide 95 spaces for the Department of Labor, 1800 square feet of office space would need to remain vacant. The Bray letter was immediately sent by facsimile transmission to LES, and was received the afternoon of March 27th, after the award and rejection notices were sent. Boozer's building is approximately 39,000 square feet. Several tenants are month to month lessees, and another tenant is expected to move prior to the beginning of the LES lease term. Boozer is willing to keep vacant the 1800 square feet and contemplated that necessity when he submitted his bid proposal. He did not include this agreement in his written bid response, but neither did LES specifically ask, either in the bid form or at the time of the committee's site walk-through prior to the bid award. Boozer contends that he responded on the bid proposal that he would provide 95 exclusive spaces and he remains willing to provide those spaces. At hearing, Boozer disclosed that 20 additional parking spaces are located adjacent to the subject property and are available for use by HRS' County Health Services, another tenant in the Babcock Street building. The spaces would reduce by 20 the spaces required by the city code, but their existence was not disclosed in the bid proposal as they are not part of the attached site plan. Boozer's onsite parking spaces range from one-half to one foot short of the eleven-feet width required by the city code. No evidence was presented with regard to any pending or contemplated enforcement action, and LES did not base its decision on this defect. LES did base its decision on a good-faith reliance on the communication by a member of the City of Melbourne planning staff. Even when that initial communication was corrected by the planning administrator, the number of spaces available were still less than needed for LES purposes and to comply with the City's code. LES did not anticipate, nor was it informed prior to bid award, of Boozer's ability and willingness to keep space vacant to comply with his commitment to provide 95 parking spaces to LES.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, recommended that a final order be entered dismissing Petitioner's protest of intended bid award. RECOMMENDED this 18th day of June, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of June, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-2372BID The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Adopted in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4. Adopted in paragraphs 4 and 9. Adopted in paragraph 6. Adopted in substance in paragraph 7. Rejected as unnecessary. The testimony of Ms. Mobley is that she did not receive the message. Adopted in paragraph 10. Adopted in paragraphs 8 and 9. Adopted in paragraphs 10 and 13. Rejected as unnecessary. 10-13. Adopted in paragraph 11. Rejected as unsubstantiated by competent evidence. Adopted by implication in paragraph 5. Rejected as irrelevant, except as to Intervenor's spaces, which is adopted in paragraph 8. 1718. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1. Adopted in paragraph 3. 2. Adopted in paragraph 1. 3. Adopted in paragraph 2. 4-5. Adopted in paragraph 4. 6-7. Adopted in paragraph 5. 8. Adopted in paragraph 6. 9. Adopted in paragraph 7. 10-11. Adopted in paragraph 8. 12. Adopted in paragraph 10. 13. Adopted in paragraph 12. 14. Adopted in paragraph 9. Intervenor's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-2. Adopted in substance in paragraph 3. 3. Rejected as unnecessary. 4-5. Adopted in paragraph 4. Adopted in paragraph 3. Adopted in paragraph 4. Adopted in paragraph 11. Adopted in paragraph 4. Adopted in paragraph 5. Adopted in paragraph 6. Adopted in paragraph 7. Adopted in paragraph 10. Adopted in paragraph 9. 15-16. Adopted in paragraph 8. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Preliminary Statement. 19-28. Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Howard M. Swerbilow, Esquire Post Office Box 541271 Merritt Island, FL 32954-1271 Edward A. Dion, Esquire Department of Labor and Employment Security Suite 307, Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle Southeast Tallahassee, FL 32399-2189 Jack Spira, Esquire 5205 Babcock Street N.E. Palm Bay, FL 32905 Alan Taylor Elizabethan Development Corporation 245 Avenue O S.W. Winter Haven, FL 33880 Frank Scruggs, Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security 303 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle S.E. Tallahassee, FL 32399-2152 Cecilia Renn Chief Legal Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security 303 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle S.E. Tallahassee, FL 32399-2152
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner has been subjected to an unlawful housing practice in violation of Section 760.23, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to these matters, Respondent operated an apartment building, Loutitt Manor, encompassing 177 apartments. The facility caters exclusively to elderly tenants. On August 3, 2001, Petitioner filed a Charge of Discrimination with FCHR alleging that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, Part II, Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and appropriate federal regulation. Allegedly, the discrimination was based on Respondent's failure to make reasonable accommodation for Petitioner's handicap. Following FCHR's Determination of no reasonable cause, dated June 24, 2002, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief on July 26, 2002. The case was subsequently transferred to DOAH. The testimony of Respondent's facility manager establishes that there are only 100 parking spaces for the 177 apartments in the building. The 100 parking spaces are assigned to specific tenants who are expected to park in their assigned space. Petitioner has an assigned space. A priority list is maintained for persons who need to park closer to the building. Respondent's rules require that anyone desiring to have their name placed on the list for such accommodation must first provide a written request to Respondent's office. Secondly, if the need for closer parking is a personal disability, then the name and address of a third party professional must be provided and the tenant must sign appropriate documentation (medical releases, etc.) to permit Respondent to obtain the medical information necessary to make a reasonable accommodation. Respondent does not place tenants on the priority parking list simply because they possess a handicapped parking placard issued by the State of Florida because 80 percent of the tenants in the facility possess such placards. Petitioner has never specifically complied with Respondent's rule requirements, maintaining that he cannot supply third-party documentation from medical personnel regarding his medical need for a closer parking space, because he is treated by the Veterans Administration (VA) and such personnel are constantly moving to other locations. By a note dated November 2, 2001, Petitioner did provide what he alleges are medical records from the VA clinic that were used by him to obtain a handicapped parking permit. While Petitioner maintains that he suffers from an episodic arthritic condition that impedes his walking the 200 feet from the building to his parking space, the records provided by him to Respondent details that Petitioner "should walk as much as possible" and that a disabled parking permit should be used only in "extreme circumstances." As established by Petitioner's testimony at final hearing, he has not been the subject of illegal discrimination by Respondent. The parties concede that Respondent has one disabled parking space closer to the facility than tenant parking. That space is designated as a handicapped space and bears signage stating that the space may only be used by visitors to the facility. Petitioner initiated this proceeding after he was warned on one occasion that he must move his car from the space or the car would be towed. Petitioner told Respondent's representative he would only be in the space for 15 minutes or less.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of October, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of October, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert Robins, Esquire Post Office Box 1649 Daytona Beach, Florida 32115 Glenn E. Whitener 229 South Ridgewood Avenue, Unit 316 Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order pursuant to an order closing the file of the Division of Administrative Hearings. The record reflects that the parties have settled their dispute and entered into a Settlement Stipulation, which Settlement Stipulation is hereby adopted by reference. Having reviewed the stipulation and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is therefore ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that: 1. Respondent has admitted the allegations of the administrative complaint in this matter. 2. Respondent has agreed to pay and has paid a civil fine of $600.00 by certified cashier’s check, receipt of which is acknowledged by the Department. 3. Each party will bear his or its own costs and attorney fees. DONE AND ORDERED this L 4 of July, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. L A. FORD, Direet6r Division of Motor Vehicles Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Division otor Vehicles this 2 day of July, 2009. Copies furnished: Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Senior Assistant General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Rm. A-432 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0504 Anthony Bliss 5325 Northwest 49 Court Coconut Creek, Florida 33073 Larry J. Sartin Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550" Dwight Davis Bureau Chief, Division of Motor Vehicles Wayne Jordan Program Manager, License Installer Program William Camper Hearing Officer Division of Motor Vehicles Billy Rankin Chief, Bureau of Field Operations Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Administrator Florida Administrative Law Reports Post Office Box 385 Gainesville, Florida 32602
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent has committed unlawful housing discrimination against Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Waterford Crossing is a development comprising 80 townhomes in Broward County, Florida. Respondent is a homeowners' association consisting of the owners of the 80 townhomes. Respondent is governed by the homeowners and their elected Board of Directors and the officers appointed by the Board. At all relevant times, William Shaw has been the Vice President of Respondent. Diana Arguinzoni del Toro is a female who purchased a townhome at Waterford Crossing in 1997 and has lived there continuously since that time. At all relevant times, Mr. Shaw resided in a townhome across the street from the townhome of Ms. del Toro. Parking is limited at Waterford Crossing. Illegally parked cars, which may consist of vehicles parked outside of marked parking areas or vehicles in marked parking areas, but without the appropriate permit, pose a serious problem. At times, emergency vehicles have been unable to access parts of Waterford Crossing due to illegally parked vehicles. From time to time, Respondent hires a towing company to tow illegally parked vehicles from Waterford Crossing. Immediately after so-called "towing nights," residents and guests tend to comply with applicable parking rules, but, over time, compliance lessens. When the number of parking complaints rises sufficiently, Respondent hires a towing company to conduct another "towing night." It is unnecessary to consider in detail the parking rules of Waterford Crossing. On the evening of March 24, 2004, Ms. del Toro's car was legally parked, as the parking rules have been applied, in a guest space near her townhome. This happened to be a "towing night," although this fact was unknown to Ms. del Toro. As is its practice, Respondent's Board of Directors advised an employee of its property manager to conduct a towing night, and the property manager requested the towing company to tow illegally parked vehicles from Waterford Crossing that night. The diligence and care exercised by the towing company in conducting towing nights left something to be desired. Routinely, the company would tow fewer than all of the vehicles illegally parked at Waterford Crossing, as it proceeded to other sites to serve the towing needs of more profitable customers. From time to time, the company would tow a legally parked vehicle, such as a vehicle parked in a marked space and bearing a suitable parking permit. On the evening in question, towing company's lack of diligence and care combined to result in the towing of Ms. del Toro's car, despite the fact that it bore a suitable parking permit and was legally parked, and in the failure to tow other vehicles that were illegally parked. The removal of Ms. del Toro's car resulted from the failure of the tow truck operator to notice her parking sticker. The failure to remove illegally parked vehicles resulted from the operator's decision to begin and end towing night with the removal of Ms. del Toro's car. Ms. del Toro attributed the improper towing of her car to Mr. Shaw because, in the summer of 2002, he had made an unwelcome sexual advance to her while in her home. At that time, while they were alone, Mr. Shaw twice pulled the front of her blouse, in the vicinity of her breasts, in an apparent attempt to embrace or kiss her. Ms. del Toro firmly rebuffed him, and she and Mr. Shaw, who had previously maintained a neighborly relationship, no longer spoke to each other. Ms. del Toro subsequently perceived another instance of discriminatory treatment in the maintenance of her landscaping, but the evidence provides no basis to attribute this to Mr. Shaw. The evidence does not link Mr. Shaw to any shortcomings in the maintenance of vegetation on Ms. del Toro's lot, as compared to the maintenance of vegetation on the lots of other owners. Similarly, there is no more basis to attribute the towing incident to Mr. Shaw than to the incompetence of the tow truck operator, which was later fired by the property manager due to its inability to tow sufficient vehicles on "towing nights." Mr. Shaw was at work at Miami International Airport on the night of the towing incident. Additionally, the passing of nearly two years between the unwelcome sexual advance and the claimed retribution--without earlier proved instances of retribution by Mr. Shaw--militates strongly against the interpretation of the towing incident offered by Ms. del Toro and shared by Petitioner. However, Mr. Shaw's longtime status as an officer of Respondent, his unwelcome sexual advance, and his personal involvement in at least one previous "towing night," coupled with the incompetence of the towing company in improperly removing Ms. del Toro's car, constitute a reasonable basis in law and fact supporting the theory of Ms. del Toro and Petitioner that Mr. Shaw had discriminated against Ms. del Toro, Although their theory proved unsupported by the evidence, Petitioner's commencement of this proceeding was substantially justified, so as to preclude the award of attorney's fees against Petitioner.
Recommendation RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of January, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of January, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Vicki Denise Johnson Attorney for Petitioner Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas F. Luken Attorney and Counselor at Law 1290 East Oakland Park Boulevard Suite 200 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33334
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent’s intended award of a lease for office space to a bidder other than Petitioner was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, on or about May 18, 1998, advertised and released RFP for Lease No. 800:0184 in order to procure approximately 5,000 square feet of office space in Lake City, Florida. Three timely filed proposals were submitted in response to the RFP. One of the submissions was determined to be nonresponsive and rejected. The two other proposals submitted by Petitioner and William and Willene Giles (Giles) were deemed responsive and evaluated by Respondent personnel. Site visits were made to each of the proposed sites. The sites were then evaluated using a numerical scoring system. Respondent’s initial posting of bid results on August 4, 1998, indicated a tentative award of the lease to Giles. Giles received a total score of 88.5 points. Petitioner received the maximum points with respect to cost, but was given only a total of 75.7 points. The RFP clearly requires that a bidder must provide a site layout drawn to scale which indicates the facility location and dimensions of each parking space. Also, the number of parking spaces assigned to other tenants must be identified. A bidder must agree to provide 25 parking spaces on site for use by Respondent. The site plan submitted with the Giles proposal shows five of the required parking spaces are located on property abutting the Giles property. Those five parking spaces do not currently exist on that property. No ingress or egress is shown on the site plan, although such is required by the RFP. The Giles bid should demonstrate requisite control over the adjacent property utilized in that bid. Such is not the case. Documents submitted to indicate control of the property by Giles are deficient. In addition to holders of life estates in the property, fee owners of the property must also agree to use of the property in conjunction with the lease between Giles and Respondent. The evidence does not establish that the fee owners have provided their consent. Testimony of Mary Goodman, an expert witness on behalf of Petitioner, establishes that the Giles’ bid did not demonstrate the requisite control of the property, specifically the parking area, required by the RFP at the time of bid opening. The Giles bid was not responsive. Petitioner’s bid identifies and offers for lease space in the Lake City Professional Plaza. The drawing submitted with the bid mistakenly identifies the area of the proposed lease space as “Grant Plaza.” Additionally, Petitioner’s bid did not contain a Public Entity Crime Addendum as required by the RFP. Failure to meet this requirement, by terms of the RFP, “will result in immediate disqualification of your proposal.” Other errors in Petitioner’s bid include the drawing submitted in the bid response which depicts parking. The drawing indicates that there are “new” parking spaces which are to be 10 feet wide by 19 feet deep. Under local land use regulations, new regular parking spaces must be 10 feet by 21 feet with a requirement that handicapped spaces measure 12 feet by 20 feet. Petitioner’s bid fails to comport with applicable local land use regulations. On page 2 of the RFP, Respondent reserves the right to reject any and all proposals which are not responsive. Neither the Giles’ bid nor the Petitioner’s is found to be responsive.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered finding none of the bids to be responsive and making such other disposition as may be deemed appropriate. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph M. Helton, Jr., Esquire Scott C. Wright, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Robert A. Sweetapple, Esquire Sweetapple, Broeker and Varkas 465 East Palmetto Park Road Boca Raton, Florida 33432 Calvin Ross, Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Janet Ferris, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100
