The Issue Whether Respondent acted fraudulently, arbitrarily, illegally, or dishonestly in its proposed rejection of all bids received in response to Request for Proposals, Lease No. 700:0819.
Findings Of Fact On May 10, 1999, the Respondent, Department of Corrections (Department), issued Request for Proposal, Lease No. 700:0819 (the RFP) for office space in Dade County for the Office for Probation and Parole Supervision. Petitioner, 7952 West 2nd Corporation, and Intervenor, Capital Group of Miami, Inc. (Capital), submitted the only responses to the RFP. Upon receipt of the proposals, Mr. Audwyn Francis, the Department's employee in charge of the RFP, believing the bids to be nonresponsive, contacted the Department's legal section for advice and for a determination of responsiveness. While waiting for the legal section to research and make a recommendation on the responsiveness of the proposals, because of time constraints, Department staff decided to proceed with the site visits and evaluation of the proposals but not to make an award until they received a decision from legal counsel concerning the responsiveness of the proposals. A site visit was conducted at the two proposed sites. The responses were evaluated according to the criteria in the RFP. Capital received a score of 98. 7925 West 2nd Corporation received a score of 92. The evaluation committee recommended that an award be made to Capital. Upon further review of the proposals by the Department's attorneys, it was determined that all of the bids were nonresponsive. Based on this determination, the Department rejected all bids. On page four, section A, paragraph seven, the RFP provides the following requirements relating to parking: A minimum of 50 on-site spaces for the exclusive use of the employees and clients at no additional charge to the leasee. Parking spaces must be under the control of the bidder and be suitably paved, lined, bumper pads installed, and labeled D.C. parking. At least two spaces must meet the requirements of the Accessibility Requirements Manual published by the Department of Community Affairs, latest edition. Parking area shall be well lighted and secure. Bidder shall provide a site plan identifying the number of parking spaces assigned to specific other tenants. The purpose of this submittal is to assure parking spaces requested in this RFP can be achieved without infringing on or combining with the parking requirements of other tenants. At the preproposal conference, Mr. Francis, advised the attendees that all attachments as indicated on pages 29 through 31 of the bid package must be included with the bid submittal. On page 30 the RFP requires the proposers to show proof of structures and parking control and directs the proposers to page 4, section A, paragraph 7 and page 23, section D, paragraph 7. Capital proposed to provide 43 parking spaces on-site and 7 parking spaces across the street. Capital's proposal was not responsive to the requirement of providing 50 parking spaces on-site. Petitioner included a document entitled "As-Built Survey" with its proposal. The survey showed the outline of the building on the site, but did not show any parking spaces. Petitioner stated in its proposal that it would provide 50 parking spaces. When Department staff arrived at Petitioner's site to conduct a site visit, they could not find a place to park. During the site visit, Robert Harrison, a representative of Petitioner, advised Department staff that Petitioner leased office space to another agency in the same building that was being offered to the Department. Mr. Harrison advised that he did not know the number of parking spaces to which the other agency was entitled to use. None of the parking spaces at the site were marked as being assigned to any tenant. As of the date of the Department's letter advising that it was rejecting all bids, Department staff were unaware of the total number of spaces available on the site and the number of spaces to which the other agency had exclusive use. After all the bids were rejected, Petitioner disclosed that it had a lease with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) for space in the building in which it proposed to lease space to the Department. The lease provided that HRS had exclusive use of 150 parking spaces on- site. Petitioner further disclosed that it had a total of 250 parking spaces on-site. Petitioner failed to comply with the requirement that the proposer provide a site plan showing the number of spaces assigned for the use of the current tenant at the building. The Department utilizes a manual entitled "Competitive Proposals," which establishes the procedures to solicit and evaluate proposals. Section Seven of the manual pertains to the procedures to be followed by the Department when evaluating proposals and provides: All proposals will first be reviewed for conformance with the provisions specified in the RFP. Any proposal not in compliance with the terms of the proposal specifications shall not receive further consideration. The evaluation committee will analyze each responsive proposal to determine which proposal is the lowest and best in accordance with established provisions and award factors. . . . To be considered for award, a proposal must comply in all material respects with the RFP so that all proposers may stand on equal footing, with respect to the method and time frame of submission, and to the substance of any resulting lease. The proposal must result in a binding contract. Non-responsive proposals. Any proposal which fails to substantially conform to the requirements of the Request for Proposal. A proposal may not be considered if the proposer imposes conditions which would modify requirements of the Request for Proposal, or limit their liability to the State of Florida, giving them an advantage over other proposers. When a question of responsiveness is unclear the agency's legal counsel should be consulted. In the event no acceptable proposals are received, all proposal should be formally rejected by letter, sent by certified mail, return receipt requested. * * * F. Proposals which technically conform to the requirements of the Request for Proposal are considered to be responsive and may be accepted for consideration by the evaluation committee for determination of an award recommendation. The evaluation committee can seek clarifications as needed from any proposer. However, clarifications received from the proposer which change what was originally proposed cannot be considered in the evaluation. * * * Each committee member is to personally inspect the proposed facility, and evaluate the location and facility on the basis of the evaluation criteria contained in the specifications. When all committee members have individually assessed award factor points for each proposal, the entire evaluation committee will meet to review the individual evaluations and jointly develop a committee determination of the best proposal based on the overall factor ratings. * * * L. The agency has the right to reject any and all proposals when such rejection is in the best interest of the State of Florida. Such rejection cannot be arbitrary, but must be based on strong justification. Each person with a rejected proposal should be notified by certified mail return receipt requested.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED a final order be entered dismissing Petitioner's protest. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of February, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Hearings Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative this 29th day of February, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael W. Moore, Secretary Department of Corrections 2601 Blairstone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Louis A. Vargas, General Counsel Department of Corrections 2601 Blairstone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Obed Dorceus, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blairstone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Robert A. Sweetapple, Esquire Sweetapple, Broeker & Varkas 165 East Boca Raton Road Boca Raton, Florida 33432-3911 David A. Anthony, Esquire Law Offices of David A. Anthony 916 Catalonia Avenue Coral Gables, Florida 33134
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding Respondent, Robert Hoffman, was a member of the Deltona Fire District Commission. He was elected to his office in the Deltona Fire District in November, 1992. At all times pertinent to this proceeding Theresa Cresswell was a dispatcher at the Deltona Fire District. She served as dispatcher for approximately eight years, leaving in January, 1995. On April 30, 1993, Ms. Cresswell filed Complaint No. 93-56 with the Florida Commission on Ethics, alleging that Mr. Hoffman had touched and kissed her on January 20, 1993, and on March 20, 1993. Ms. Cresswell also alleges that in March, 1993, after she had spilled water on her blouse while drinking from the water fountain that Mr. Hoffman said that he liked watching her brush the water off her blouse. JANUARY 20, 1993 INCIDENT In December, 1992, Ms. Cresswell organized a Santa Clause workshop for needy children. Mr. Hoffman had promised to provide candy canes and build the workshop for the event. He failed to keep his promise. As a result, Ms. Cresswell had to purchase the candy. On January 20, 1993, Ms. Cresswell came to the Deltona Fire Station around 9:30 p.m. to pick up some papers relating to her schoolwork. She was not on duty. Mr. Hoffman was at the fire station when she arrived. Ms. Cresswell was upset with Mr. Hoffman for his failure to provide the candy and build the workshop. She approached Mr. Hoffman in the reception area while he was talking to Robert Bell and told Hoffman that she was "pissed off at him." Mr. Hoffman acknowledged that he knew that she was upset and that he was sorry that he did not do what he had promised. Ms. Cresswell alleges that during the conversation Mr. Hoffman came to her, put his hand on her shoulder, leaned against her, kissed her on her cheek and whispered in her ear, "I'm sorry. Do your forgive me?" Ms. Cresswell's allegation that he whispered in her ear was made known for the first time at the formal hearing. Mr. Hoffman asserts that he never touched or kissed Ms. Cresswell on January 20, 1993. Robert Bell, the dispatcher who was on duty when the discussion between Ms. Cresswell and Mr. Hoffman took place, observed the discussion and described Ms. Cresswell as being upset. He did not see Mr. Hoffman kiss Ms. Cresswell on the evening of January 20, 1993. Ms. Cresswell did not tell Mr. Bell that Mr. Hoffman had kissed her. Ms. Cresswell did not make a complaint to anyone about the January 20 incident until March, 1993. Fire Chief Holland had been keeping notes about Mr. Hoffman's activities and he sent those notes to the attorney for the fire district. In those notes, he details a conversation that he had with Ms. Cresswell concerning the January 20, 1993 incident. There is no mention that Mr. Hoffman kissed Ms. Cresswell. Having observed the demeanor of the witnesses and having judged the credibility of the witnesses, I find that Mr. Hoffman did not touch or kiss Ms. Cresswell on January 20, 1993. THE WATER FOUNTAIN INCIDENT On March 20, 1993, Mr. Hoffman was attending an all day CPR class at the fire station. Ms. Cresswell was working dispatch on the 8:00 a.m. to 4 p.m. shift on that day. Ms. Cresswell alleges that she was drinking at the water fountain located in the hall of the fire station down from the room in which the CPR class was being conducted. She spilled water on her blouse and was brushing the water from her blouse when Mr. Hoffman came up to her and said, "Can I watch you do that? I like to watch you do that." Mr. Hoffman contends that the incident never occurred. There were no witnesses to the alleged incident. Timothy Brown was teaching the CPR class. He remembered Mr. Hoffman as being the only male student in the class on that day. Mr. Brown does not recall Mr. Hoffman leaving the classroom other than at the assigned breaks and at lunchtime. Mr. Brown was near the water fountain several times during the day while he used a nearby copy machine and when he drank from the fountain, but he did not see Mr. Hoffman and Ms. Cresswell together at the water fountain. When Ms. Cresswell complained to Assistant Chief Rogers on March 22, 1993 about the alleged incident of kissing which occurred either on the evening of March 20 or early morning of March 21, she did not mention the water fountain incident which allegedly occurred on March 20, 1993. When Ms. Cresswell's deposition was taken on April 12, 1993, three weeks after the alleged incident, Ms. Cresswell could not recall when the water fountain incident took place. Having observed the demeanor of the witnesses and having judged the credibility of the witnesses, I find that the water fountain incident did not occur and that Mr. Hoffman did not say, "Can I watch you do that? I like to watch you do that." THE MARCH 20-21, 1993 INCIDENT On the evening of March 20, 1993, Ms. Cresswell traded shifts with another dispatcher and reported to work at approximately 11:50 p.m. to work the midnight to 8:00 a.m. shift. Robert Bell was working the dispatch when she arrived. Mr. Hoffman was also at the fire station. Ms. Cresswell put away her purse and made coffee. As part of her duties on the midnight shift, she was responsible for erasing and rewinding the 911 dictaphone tapes. She went to the communications center, which is located adjacent to the reception area, and began to erase the tapes soon after her arrival at the fire station. While she was erasing the tapes, she, Mr. Bell, and Mr. Hoffman began talking about a storm that evening which caused a fire, destroying a local funeral home. During the discussion about the fire, they started to talk about cremation. Ms. Cresswell stated that she did not want to be cremated. Ms. Cresswell alleges that after she made the remark about cremation that Mr. Hoffman came over to her, put his hand on her shoulder, laughed, kissed her on the cheek, and said, "I hear you." At the formal hearing she could not recall whether Mr. Hoffman allegedly kissed her before or after midnight. According to Ms. Cresswell, Mr. Hoffman and Mr. Bell continued to talk about the funeral home after Mr. Hoffman kissed her. Additionally, Ms. Cresswell asserts that after Mr. Bell left the fire station that Mr. Hoffman stayed for approximately one and one half hours. Mr. Hoffman contends that he never touched or kissed Ms. Cresswell as she alleged and that he left the fire station the same time as Mr. Bell. During the conversation concerning the funeral home, Mr. Bell was in and out of the communications center. Mr. Bell did not see Mr. Hoffman kiss Ms. Cresswell as she alleged. Ms. Cresswell did not tell Mr. Bell that Mr. Hoffman had kissed her. Ms. Cresswell did not confront Mr. Hoffman concerning the alleged kiss. Donald Allen Helberg, a firefighter/EMT was present in the dispatch side of the fire station during the late evening and early morning hours of March 20 and 21, 1993, respectively. He saw Ms. Cresswell pull into the parking lot when she came to work the midnight shift. Mr. Helberg recalled Ms. Cresswell joining in the conversation that he, Mr. Hoffman and Mr. Bell were having. He also recalls seeing Mr. Bell head toward the double doors leading to the outside followed by Mr. Hoffman. Mr. Helberg was also leaving at that time to return to the firefighter section of the building. While he was present, Mr. Helberg did not see or hear anything unusual involving Mr. Hoffman and Ms. Cresswell. Sometime after March 21, 1993, Ms. Cresswell called Mr. Helberg and asked him if he remembered being present at the fire station on the night of the alleged incident. Mr. Bell left the fire station approximately ten minutes after midnight. Mr. Hoffman was walking behind Mr. Bell as he walked out the door. Mr. Hoffman was driving a red Jimmy vehicle that night. As Mr. Bell was driving out of the fire station parking lot, he observed a reddish vehicle behind him. The reddish vehicle left the parking lot after Mr. Bell, headed in the opposite direction. Mr. Hoffman lived approximately a mile and a half from the fire station. He arrived home at approximately fifteen minutes after midnight. His wife was up waiting for him when he got home. Having observed the demeanor of the witnesses and having judged the credibility of the witnesses, I find that Mr. Hoffman did not touch or kiss Ms. Cresswell either on the evening of March 20, 1993 or the morning of March 21, 1993.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing Complaint No. 93-56 against Robert Hoffman. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of September, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of September, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-5835EC To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Advocate's Proposed Findings of Fact. Stipulated Facts 1. Paragraphs 1-2: Accepted. Findings of Fact Paragraphs 1-3: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 4: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 5: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 6-7: Rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraph 8: Accepted in substance except as to the occurrence of the water fountain incident. Paragraph 9: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 10: The last sentence is rejected as not supported by credible evidence. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraph 11: Accepted that it is what Ms. Cresswell alleges but rejected as to that is what happened based on the credible evidence. Paragraph 12: The first part of the first sentence is accepted in substance. The last part of the first sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence. Mr. Bell did not see Mr. Hoffman and Ms. Cresswell the entire time but that does not mean that he wasn't paying attention to them during the time that he did see them. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 13: Rejected as not supported by credible evidence. Paragraphs 14-15: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 16: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found as to what Ms. Cresswell believed. Rejected as not supported by the evidence as to what Mr. Hoffman believed. Paragraph 17: The first two sentences are rejected as subordinate to the facts found. The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-2: Accepted. Paragraphs 3-5: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 6-7: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 8: Accepted in substance as that is what Ms. Cresswell contended. Paragraphs 9-10: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 11: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 12: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 13: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 14: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 15-17: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 18-19: Accepted that it was what Ms. Cresswell contended but rejected as not supported by credible evidence that it was what happened. Paragraph 20: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 21: Accepted to the extent that it is Ms. Cresswell's testimony. Paragraphs 22-25: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 26: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 27: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 28-30: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 31-33: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraphs 34-37: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 38: The first sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The last sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraph 39: The first sentence is accepted in substance as that was what was alleged. The second sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraphs 40-43: Accepted in substance as that is what was alleged. Paragraph 44: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 45: Accepted in substance as that is what was alleged. Paragraphs 46-47: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 48-49: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraphs 50-51: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 52: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 53-56: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 57: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 58-60: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 61: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 62: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 63: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 64: Accepted in substance as that was what was alleged. Paragraph 65: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 66-67: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 68: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 69-7O: Accepted in substance that the dictaphone equipment is located in the communications center. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 71: Accepted in substance that she made those allegations. Paragraphs 72-74: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 75-76: Rejected as not supported by credible evidence as that was what happened. Paragraph 77: Accepted in substance to the extent that Mr. Bell was not watching Mr. Hoffman and Ms. Cresswell the entire time of the conversation. Paragraphs 78-79: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 80-81: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 82: Accepted to the extent that she did not tell Mr. Bell of the kissing incident; otherwise rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence or unnecessary. Paragraphs 83-84: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 85: The first sentence is accepted to the extent that it is Ms. Cresswell's testimony. The last sentence is rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 86: Accepted in substance that it was her testimony. Paragraph 87: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 88: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 89: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 90-99: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 100: Accepted to the extent that he saw Bell heading toward the outside door, followed by Hoffman as Helberg was leaving to go to the firefighter side of the building. Paragraphs 101-104: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 105: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraphs 106-107: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 108: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 109-111: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 112-116: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 117: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 118-125: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 126-127: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 128-130: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 131-133: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 134: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 135-137: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 138-155: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 156-262: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 263: Rejected to the extent that it implies that there was a conspiracy. The evidence does not support a conclusion of conspiracy among Mr. Holland, Mr. Rogers, and Ms. Cresswell. Paragraphs 264-288: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 289-290: Rejected as not supported by the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Carrie Stillman Complaint Coordinator Commission on Ethics Post Office Box 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Virlindia Doss, Esquire Advocate For the Florida Commission on Ethics Department of Legal Affairs PL-01, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Stephen D. Milbrath, Esquire Alan, Dyer, Doppelt, Franjola & Milbrath Post Office Box 3791 Orlando, Florida 32802-3791 Bonnie Williams Executive Director Florida Commission On Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phil Claypool, Esquire General Counsel Ethics Commission 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Todd Voigt, should be terminated from employment with the City of Clearwater (City) for violating City policies as alleged in the City's Termination and Dismissal Notice (Notice) dated August 3, 2016.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Civil Service Board make a determination that the charges in the Notice are sustained, and that Mr. Voigt be terminated as a City employee. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 2016.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a company owned by Jack Williams that leases portable signs to businesses desiring to advertise. These signs are constructed to attach letters to spell out the advertised message on the sign and illuminate the sign at night if desired. The signs are sufficiently small and light that they can be readily moved as the lessee desires. On June 18, 1986, one of Respondent's signs leased to a car dealer was found to be in the DOT right-of-way along U.S. 19, 0.28 miles of Candlewood Drive and in front of the business advertised. The nearest edge of the sign to the highway was 46 feet from the easterly edge of the pavement. The eastern edge of the DOT right of way at this point is 50 feet from the edge of the paved surface of U.S. 19. U.S. 19 is a federal-aid primary highway. Respondent's lease agreement (Exhibit 8) is in the form of a statement billing the lessee of the sign for one month use of the sign. That statement provides it shall be the customer's responsibility to comply with state and local laws and regulations.
Findings Of Fact In March, 1992, the Department of Labor and Employment Security ("Department") issued a Request for Proposal and Bid Submittal ("RFP") seeking to lease approximately 21,033 square feet of office space in Pinellas Park, Florida. The RFP specifies that "approximately" 130 off-street no charge parking spaces were required for the exclusive use of the employees and clients of the Respondent. The RFP states that "[p]arking space must be under the control of the bidder and be suitably paved, lined, and bumper pads installed." The Department received two bids in response to the RFP; one submitted by Hart-Land Ext., Inc., ("Petitioner") and the other submitted by Resolving, Inc. Both bids were signed by James Hartley, as Vice President of the respective corporations. The Department initially determined that, on the basis of the representations contained in the bids, both bids were responsive. An evaluation committee determined that the bid submitted by the Petitioner was the lowest and best bid. On the basis of the evaluation, the Department awarded the bid to the Petitioner by letter dated May 13, 1992. Subsequent to the bid award, the Petitioner submitted several differing site plans to the Department. The site plans indicated various amendments to the configuration of parking spaces available. None of the plans indicated that there would be less than 130 parking spaces available for use by Department personnel. The Department suggests that the revisions of site plans raised doubts as to whether the property was under the control of the Petitioner, that such information was requested of the Petitioner and that appropriate responses were not forthcoming. Nothing in the site plans would suggest that the property was not under the Petitioner's control. The evidence establishes that sufficient information was provided by the Petitioner in response to Department inquiries related to property ownership. By letter dated August 24, 1992, the Department rescinded its award to the Petitioner. The stated reason for recission was that the Petitioner did not have control over 130 paved and lined parking spaces as the time of the bid opening. At the time the Petitioner submitted the proposal, it had the right, pursuant to an executed Contract for Sale and Purchase, to purchase the property which was identified in the proposal as the site upon which the office space was located. The contract was valid at all times material to this case. The Department accepts the existence of a valid Contract for Sale and Purchase as sufficient evidence of a bidder having control over the property proposed for use. The evidence establishes that at all times material to this case, the Petitioner controlled the property proposed for use in his response to the RFP. As to the parking requirements, the Department offered testimony asserting that the language in the RFP requires that such spaces be paved, lined, and bumper-pads installed, at the time the bid is submitted. The RFP includes no requirement, either express of implied, that the parking area proposed must be paved, lined, and bumpered at the time of bid submission. The Petitioner's response to the RFP met the parking requirements set forth therein. The Department asserts that because the parking spaces were not lined, it was unable to determine the number of spaces available in each area proposed for parking. The Department had ample opportunity to inspect the property proposed in the Petitioner's bid, and in fact, such inspections did occur. The Department reviewed site plans, floor plans, physically inspected the structure and had full access to the property. The fact that the parking spaces were not lined or bumper-padded at the time of bid submittal would have been obvious. Further, the RFP seeks to have "approximately" 130 spaces available. Of the 130 spaces the Petitioner said would be available, 118 spaces were paved at all times material to this case. The remaining 22 parking spaces were located in an unpaved area which would have been paved prior to the date upon which the Respondent would have occupied the building, at which time all 130 spaces would have been lined and bumper-padded also. Therefore, even if the agency's position that the RFP required paved spaces at time of bid submission were supported by evidence, the Petitioner's proposal would meet the requirement. Subsequent to the award of the project, the Petitioner closed the contract for sale in escrow and placed $150,000 in trust to close the sale. The Petitioner employed a general contractor, obtained completed floor plans, mechanical plans, electrical and plumbing plans for the structure, performed roof repairs and purchased new air conditioning equipment. At the request of Department's representatives, the Petitioner also made arrangements for additional parking spaces beyond the 130 spaces previously proposed, with the additional spaces being located off-site and across the street from the office space. The total cost of these actions is approximately $179,600. The purchase of the property and incurrence of related costs was done in good faith and in reliance upon the award of the project.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Labor and Employment Security enter a Final Order awarding proposed lease 540:0921 to Hart-Land, Ext., Inc. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 24th day of March, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of March, 1993. APPENDIX TO CASE NO. 92-5748BID The following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the parties. Petitioner The Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order. Respondent The Respondent's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: Rejected, unnecessary. Rejected as to reference of difficulty in determining availability of parking spaces, not supported by greater weight of evidence. Measurement would have established whether space was adequate. There is no evidence that it was not. 6-9. Rejected as to inference that submission of amended site plans was inappropriate, not supported by greater weight of evidence. There is no evidence that the agency rejected the proposal based on the amendment of site plans, irrelevant. As to the amendment of site plans being indicative of a lack of 130 paved spaces, rejected immaterial. 11. Rejected as to determination that such spaces were not available on property controlled by the Petitioner, not supported by credible and persuasive evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Shirley Gooding, Acting Secretary Suite 303, Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle S.E. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Cecilia Renn Chief Legal Counsel Suite 307, Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, S.E. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 William H. Walker, Esquire NCNB Bank Building, Suite 403 501 First Avenue North St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Edward Dion, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Suite 307, Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle S.E. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2189
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, within the past year, purchased two tracts of property 50 feet by 100 feet located at 614-620 Mandalay Avenue on Clearwater Beach. This property is zoned "CG" or "General Business" and there are four buildings on this property comprising five dwelling units. The land use plan for this location is commercial/tourist facilities. Petitioner submitted an artist's drawing of what the site could look like if the variance requested was granted. No building permits have been requested; accordingly, no specific plans have been submitted to establish the use to which the property would be put if the variance requested is granted. The proposal of Petitioner (such as it is) contemplates converting the ground floors of the existing structures to commercial use. If the existing buildings were so converted, with the upper floors remaining residential, the zoning code requires provision be made for twenty-eight off-street parking spaces. Since the existing five dwelling units would be credited (grandfathered) for having eight such parking spaces due to the construction having occurred before the zoning code was enacted, Petitioner is requesting a variance for the remaining twenty off-street parking spaces that would be required. Actually, there are no off-street parking spaces on this property but five or six parking spaces exist in the right-of-way for Mandalay Avenue. There are no off-street parking spaces on Mandalay Avenue in the vicinity of Petitioner's property and none are proposed to be provided by Petitioner. Mandalay Avenue is the main north-south artery on Clearwater Beach and is four-laned in the vicinity of Petitioner's property, which lies near the northern terminus of "CG" zoning. At the hearing before the Board one witness spoke in favor of the variance requested because the proposal by Petitioner was better than if the property was used for the construction of a high-rise residential unit, which the zoning would permit. Since no specific proposal is before the Respondent for the issuance of a permit, there is no assurance that granting the requested variance would preclude the construction of high-rise residential units. The dwellings occupying this property were constructed some thirty years ago and are expensive to maintain and are not a very attractive investment. Petitioner referred to several other businesses where variances in parking requirements have been granted when bars and restaurants on Mandalay Avenue were rebuilt or expanded; however, little evidence was presented that parking variances have been granted when a new use for the property was proposed.
Findings Of Fact Six signs were described in a violation notice to Respondent Dandy Signs from Petitioner, Florida Department of Transportation dated July 7, 1977. The notice stated the signs were alleged to be in violation of Chapter 479 and rules 14-10.04; rule 14-10.03. By stipulation of the parties the charges on the signs listed were dropped except for the following two signs: a sign located one mile west of U.S. 1, State Road 44, Mile Post 28.25 with copy "Bob's Sandpiper Restaurant" and a sign located at Junction 17-92 Deland, U.S. Highway 17 (Section 35 Mile Post .02) with copy "Buddy Sheats". The foregoing signs have no permit and evidence was presented to show that each sign is nearer to a permitted sign than 500 feet. The Respondent admits that neither sign has been permitted and that both signs violate the spacing requirements. Respondent was given time to submit evidence that the signs had at one time been permitted, but no evidence was submitted to this hearing officer although the hearing was held in excess of three months before this order is being entered.
Recommendation Remove the subject signs and invoke penalty under Section 479.18, Florida Statutes. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 1978. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 1978. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Florida Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Dan Richardson, Owner Dandy Signs 324 Flagler Street New Smyrna Beach, Florida 32069
Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order pursuant to an order closing the file of the Division of Administrative Hearings. The record reflects that the parties have settled their dispute and entered into a Settlement Stipulation, which Settlement Stipulation is hereby adopted by reference. Having reviewed the stipulation and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is therefore ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that: 1. Respondent has admitted the allegations of the administrative complaint in this matter. 2. Respondent has agreed to pay and has paid a civil fine of $600.00 by certified cashier’s check, receipt of which is acknowledged by the Department. 3. Each party will bear his or its own costs and attorney fees. DONE AND ORDERED this L 4 of July, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. L A. FORD, Direet6r Division of Motor Vehicles Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Division otor Vehicles this 2 day of July, 2009. Copies furnished: Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Senior Assistant General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Rm. A-432 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0504 Anthony Bliss 5325 Northwest 49 Court Coconut Creek, Florida 33073 Larry J. Sartin Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550" Dwight Davis Bureau Chief, Division of Motor Vehicles Wayne Jordan Program Manager, License Installer Program William Camper Hearing Officer Division of Motor Vehicles Billy Rankin Chief, Bureau of Field Operations Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Administrator Florida Administrative Law Reports Post Office Box 385 Gainesville, Florida 32602
Findings Of Fact Lawrence Morehouse is employed as a full time faculty member by the University of South Florida (USF). At all times material to this case, parking of vehicles on the campus is regulated by USF authorities. USF parking regulations are enforced by personnel of the USF Division of Parking Services from 8:00 a.m. to 8:30 p.m. on Monday through Thursday, and from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. on Friday. At all other times, USF parking regulations are enforced by campus police. A campus parking regulation violation is documented by a handheld electronic ticketing device which records the information and prints a notice of the violation. The printed notice is left at the vehicle for the driver to discover. A driver who believes a citation to be unfair may immediately bring the ticket to the counter clerk at the offices of the USF Division of Parking Services. The clerk is authorized to waive the fine if the individual circumstances of the case warrant waiver. The clerk records the waiver in the Division of Parking Services database. A written notice of the waiver is provided by the clerk upon the driver's request. In addition to appeal via the counter clerk, an aggrieved driver may also meet with a University Parking Appeals Mediator to discuss the matter. The driver may also file a written appeal of the ticket. If a driver remains unsatisfied after the matter is adjudicated by the mediator or by the committee which reviews written appeals, the driver may appeal the ticket to the USF Final Appeals Committee. The committee is made up of students, faculty and staff. A late fee of $13 is added to each fine imposed if the ticket remains unpaid more than ten days after adjudication is final. On June 14, 1993, Mr. Morehouse received a ticket for parking facing the direction of the traffic, a violation of campus parking restrictions. The fine for this violation is $10. Mr. Morehouse asserts that he immediately spoke to the counter clerk about the June 14 ticket and the fine was waived. There is no documentation to support his assertion. The testimony is not persuasive. On June 20, 1993, October 6, 1993, December 8, 1993, June 2, 1994 and June 7, 1994, notices of violation were provided to Mr. Morehouse for parking without a current university tag on his car. Mr. Morehouse testified that on one of these occasions, he filed a written notice of appeal. Although a hearing was convened, Mr. Morehouse did not attend the hearing because of a scheduling conflict. He did not inform appeals committee members of the conflict or advised them that he would not attend the hearing. There is no evidence that Mr. Morehouse made any attempt to appeal the four other tickets he received for parking without a current USF tag. The six tickets remain unpaid. An additional $13 late fee has been imposed on each ticket. Delinquency notices on all the tickets were sent to Mr. Morehouse. He made no apparent effort to respond to the notices. Toward the end of 1994, the matter was referred by USF Parking Services division to the USF Division of Finance and Accounting collections manager. The collections office issued monthly bills for the sum of the fines to Mr. Morehouse for approximately six months. There is no evidence that Mr. Morehouse responded to the billing. At the close of the six month billing period, a certified letter was sent to Mr. Morehouse, stating that the amount could be deducted from his paycheck and advising of his right to a hearing. Mr. Morehouse requested a hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the University of South Florida enter a Final Order deducting the lump sum of $188 from the next salary warrant issued to Lawrence Morehouse. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 26th day of September, 1995 in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of September, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-2718 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, the following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the parties. Petitioner The Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order. Respondent The Respondent did not file a Proposed Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Betty Castor, President Office of the President University of South Florida 4202 East Fowler Avenue, ADM 241 Tampa, Florida 33620 Noreen Segrest, Esquire Acting General Counsel University of South Florida 4202 East Fowler Avenue, ADM 250 Tampa, Florida 33620 Debra A. King, Esquire University of South Florida 4202 East Fowler Avenue, ADM 250 Tampa, Florida 33620 Lawrence Morehouse 2610 Drumwood Place Valrico, Florida 33594
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner's expulsion of Respondent from school is appropriate pursuant to provisions of Union County School Board Rule 5.37 and Section 230.23(6), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is R.S.V. He was a senior year student at Union County High School in October, 1994. Donald Leech was the principal of Union County High School in October, 1994, when he was apprised that there was a possibility of sale and possession of marijuana at the school. Leech contacted the school resource officer, Union County Sheriff's Deputy Charles Townsend, Jr., and an investigation was launched. Efforts of Townsend and Leech failed to yield any evidence of contraband substances on the school campus that could be linked to any individual or tested for purposes of subsequent prosecution. They had, however, obtained information about an event involving the alleged use of marijuana which had occurred on the school campus and allegedly involved Respondent. As a result, their investigation focused on Respondent. Townsend was apprised by his superior at the sheriff's department that a criminal prosecution could not be maintained due to the lack of admissible evidence or a "corpus delicti." Still, Leech and Townsend determined to question Respondent. On October 11, 1994, Leech and Townsend interrogated Respondent regarding his participation in the possession of a marijuana "joint" on school property on October 6, 1994. Townsend first apprised Respondent of his right against self- incrimination through the reading to Respondent of "Miranda" warnings regarding incriminating statements. The questioning then began. In response to questions, Respondent denied any knowledge of the October 6, 1994, incident. Leech failed to gain an admission from Respondent even though Leech advised Respondent that suspension for 10 days for being in an improper area (the school parking lot) was the only likely penalty. Leech then left the room. Respondent asked to telephone his mother. Townsend agreed. Respondent called his mother and explained the situation to her. She asked to speak with Townsend. Townsend told her that sufficient evidence existed to criminally prosecute Respondent. Respondent's mother told Townsend to cease questioning her son until Respondent's father arrived. Townsend complied and left Respondent alone in the room. Respondent's father soon arrived. He did not speak with Respondent. He, likewise, was informed by Townsend that sufficient evidence for prosecution existed, but that co- operation by Respondent would go a long way with authorities and have an impact on the likelihood of prosecution. Then, with the assent of Leech and Townsend, Respondent's father spoke privately with two other youths who were alleged to be involved in the incident. As a result of his conversation with the two youths, Respondent's father learned that his son had been present at a incident on school property where an alleged marijuana cigarette had been smoked but that his son had refused to participate in smoking the "joint." Respondent's father then spoke with Leech and Townsend. In addition to the earlier advice by Townsend of leniency if his son co-operated with the investigation, Respondent's father was now informed by Leech that only a 10 day suspension from school was contemplated because of Respondent's presence during the incident which had occurred in the school parking lot, an "improper area." Without any discussion with his son or legal counsel and solely in reliance upon the representations made to him by Leech and Townsend, Respondent's father then confronted his son and told Respondent to provide a written statement to Leech and Townsend. Respondent's statement reads as follows: On October 6, 1994. Myself, people 1 and people 2 walked out to the parking lot. People 1 lit up a marijuana joint and smoked it then passed it to people 2. After that, people 2 passed it to me. The 2 peoples walked off and I put it out and left it in the parking lot. After school I picked it up and kept it. Respondent later admitted to his father that he subsequently destroyed the remains of the cigarette after leaving school property. While Respondent's written statement references a "marijuana joint", no evidence was presented at the final hearing which is dispositive of whether the substance was, in actuality, cannabis. On the basis of Respondent's written statement, Leech instituted an immediate 10 day suspension of Respondent. On October 13, 1994, two days later, Leech formally recommended to the Union County School Superintendent, Eugene Dukes, that Respondent be expelled for the remainder of the school year. At final hearing, Leech rationalized that his expulsion recommendation was based upon Respondent's actual possession of the alleged contraband, as opposed to merely being present at the incident. By notice dated October 12, 1994, one day before the formal notification to him from Leech, Respondent's mother was informed by Superintendent Dukes that he would recommend the expulsion of Respondent for the remainder of the school year. The notice set forth no specific factual basis for the expulsion recommendation, but recited that the action was taken on the basis of misconduct charges set forth in Section 230.33 and Section 232.26, Florida Statutes, as well as Union County School Board Rules Section 5.37. Dukes also recommended the expulsion of the other students who admitted to actually smoking the alleged marijuana cigarette in question. The proposed expulsion of Respondent prevented his return to Union County High School and resulted in his completion of his senior year of high school in the school district of Columbia County, Florida.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Union County School Board imposing a 10 day suspension upon Respondent for violation of school restrictions regarding his presence in an improper location. FURTHER RECOMMENDED that such final order direct the destruction or sealing of school records that document the expulsion of Respondent for possession of a controlled substance due to the absence of credible evidence to sustain such charge. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of May, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of May, 1996. APPENDIX The following constitutes my ruling pursuant to Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1. Accepted. 2.-11. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. 12.-13. Rejected, legal conclusions, relevancy. 14. Rejected as to first preparatory phrase of the paragraph as unsupported by weight of the evidence. Remainder rejected as unnecessary to result reached. 15.-16. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. 17.-18. Incorporated by reference. 19.-20. Rejected, subordinate. 21. Rejected, legal conclusion. Respondent's Proposed Findings 1.-10. Accepted, but not verbatim. Incorporated by reference. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Ronald G. Meyer, Esquire Robert J. Sniffen, Esquire Meyer and Brooks Post Office Box 1547 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Stephen N. Bernstein, Esquire Post Office Box 1642 Gainesville, Florida 32602 Eugene Dukes, Superintendent Union County School Board 55 West Sixth Street Lake Butler, Florida 32054 Frank T. Brogan, Commissioner Department of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
