The Issue The issue is whether Respondent abused its discretion in denying Petitioner’s request for an exemption from disqualification for employment in a position of trust.
Findings Of Fact AHCA is the state agency charged with protecting vulnerable persons, such as Medicaid recipients and the Medicaid program, and, in that capacity, it maintains discretion to approve or deny requests for exemption from disqualification. Petitioner is seeking to work as a certified nursing assistant. Petitioner’s employment goals require her to have a Level 2 criminal background screening to ensure she does not have any disqualifying offenses to prohibit her from working with AHCA-regulated facilities. Petitioner’s background screening of February 5, 2020, identified the following five criminal offenses: elder abuse/neglect; trespass (refuse to leave property, peace officer’s request); and three counts of obstructing/resisting executive officer with minor injury. By letter dated February 5, 2020, AHCA notified Petitioner that she was disqualified from employment due to the disqualifying offense of “04/22/2017 Sheriff’s Office San Diego, Obstruct/Resist Exec Off.” The letter also informed Petitioner that she may be eligible to apply for an exemption from disqualification and how to apply. On or around February 7, 2020, Petitioner submitted a request for exemption from disqualification and supporting documentation to AHCA. By letter dated February 18, 2020, AHCA denied Petitioner’s request for exemption. On April 6, 2020, Petitioner submitted a second Application for Exemption (“exemption package”) to AHCA. Petitioner’s exemption package contained documentation including employment history, education/training, a criminal history report, arrest reports, investigation reports, a California Department of Public Health investigation report, and a 12-month suspension of nurse assistant certification. By letter dated April 7, 2020, AHCA denied Petitioner’s request for exemption, stating Petitioner is not eligible for the exemption based on the following grounds: A disqualifying felony offense(s) and you have not been lawfully released from confinement, supervision, or nonmonetary condition imposed by the court for the disqualifying felony 3 years prior to the date you applied for the exemption. Our records indicate you met the above criteria for the following: ELDER/DEP ADULT CRUELTY, Case number CN3772399 Petitioner contested the denial and requested a formal administrative hearing. AHCA acknowledged the disqualifying offense error in the denial letter of April 7, 2020, and corrected its denial letter. The corrected denial letter dated September 8, 2020, deemed Petitioner not eligible for an exemption based on the following grounds: A disqualifying felony offense(s) and you have not been lawfully released from confinement, supervision, or nonmonetary condition imposed by the court for the disqualifying felony 3 years prior to the date you applied for the exemption. Our records indicate you met the above criteria for the following: Corrected Disqualifying Offense: 04/22/2017 SHERIFF’S OFFICE SAN DIEGO, RESISTING AN OFFICER (California Penal Code section 148,) Case Number CN372399. Hearing At hearing, Petitioner testified about the incident that occurred on April 22, 2017, while working at Fallbrook Skilled Nursing (“Fallbrook”) in California. Petitioner explained that three police officers came to her job at Fallbrook while she was working her shift and asked to speak to her outside the facility about allegations of resident abuse. Petitioner testified she refused to leave the facility upon multiple instructions from the police to leave. Petitioner admitted that after an officer told her several times he was going to arrest her, she told the police “you don’t have a right to arrest me.” Petitioner detailed how she did not allow the police to put handcuffs on her because she believed the reports about her were lies. Ultimately, the incident escalated--Petitioner testified that when she did not allow the police to handcuff her, the three police officers put her on the ground, one put his knee on her back, and she was handcuffed. Petitioner weighed approximately 125 pounds when arrested. After the police got Petitioner outside, the three police officers picked her up, put her in the police car, and took her to jail. Petitioner was charged with: elder abuse/neglect; trespass (refuse to leave property, peace officer’s request); and three counts of obstructing/resisting an officer, all stemming from the same April 22, 2017, incident. The elder abuse and trespass charges against Lalanne were dismissed. On January 30, 2018, Petitioner proceeded to a bench trial before a judge on the resisting an officer charge. At trial, Petitioner was found guilty and convicted of “count 1 PC 148 (a)(1), resisting an officer” in case number CN372399. That same day, the judge sentenced Petitioner to three years’ probation2 and community service for the resisting an officer conviction. Subsequently, the County of San Diego, California, probation department provided Petitioner a certificate of completion for completing her three days of public work service on or about September 13, 2018. Petitioner testified that she made a mistake when she did not listen to the officers and it was a lesson for her. She also testified that she believed there was no harm to the police and her offense is a misdemeanor not a felony. Vanessa Risch (“Risch”), AHCA’s operations and management consultant manager in the Background Screening Unit, testified that because Petitioner’s offense occurred in California, AHCA had to evaluate the nature of the offense, what occurred during the incident, and the final outcome of the case to determine the correlating criminal offense in Florida. Risch testified that she contacted the California Clerk of Courts to validate the outcome of Petitioner’s case and probationary status. Risch testified that, through her investigation, she confirmed that Petitioner’s probation started on January 30, 2018, and terminates on January 30, 2021. Risch also detailed how AHCA converted Petitioner’s California resisting an officer charge to a Florida resisting arrest with violence felony offense, after determining the officers in California had to force Petitioner’s body to the ground after Petitioner did not comply with the officers’ repeated instructions. AHCA concluded that Petitioner’s actions of opposing the three 2 The compelling evidence at hearing supports Petitioner’s probationary sentence. The undersigned finds that Petitioner failed to testify honestly and forthright regarding her three-year probationary period. First, Petitioner denied knowledge of any probationary period even though probation was listed on the sentencing documents Petitioner presented as Exhibit 1. Also, Petitioner’s Exhibit 3 is from the probation department. Additionally, Petitioner testified that her lawyer told her she had probation, which confirms Petitioner’s knowledge of her probationary period. officers is equivalent to the criminal offense of resisting arrest with violence in Florida. Risch testified that resisting an officer with violence is a disqualifying felony offense. Risch testified further that AHCA ultimately concluded that Petitioner was not eligible to apply for an exemption. Risch explained that Petitioner’s current probationary status prohibited her from being eligible to apply for an exemption because eligibility starts three years after Petitioner’s probationary period for the disqualifying felony offense is terminated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration, enter a final order denying Shaddainah Lalanne’s, request for an exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of December, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. MCKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of December, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Shaddainah Sherly Lalanne Apartment 206 6609 Woods Island Circle Port St. Lucie, Florida 34952 (eServed) Katie Jackson, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 7 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Shena L. Grantham, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Building 3, Room 3407B 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Thomas M. Hoeler, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Bill Roberts, Acting General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Shevaun L. Harris, Acting Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 1 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed)
The Issue The first issue to be determined is whether Respondent failed to maintain good moral character in violation of section 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes (2011), as alleged in the Administrative Complaint. If so, the second issue for consideration is what penalty should be imposed for such a violation.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was a certified law enforcement officer, having been issued Law Enforcement Certificate Number 194525 by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission. At the time of the incident in question, Respondent was employed by the FHP. For an unspecified time prior to July 11, 2011, Respondent was involved in a relationship with a woman named Tamarah Rasmussen. For some period, she shared his home with him. However, in the weeks or months preceding July 11, 2011, the couple’s relationship had deteriorated, and Respondent wanted it to end. He had, however, allowed her to remain in the home “as a friend.” On July 10, 2011, the couple had a fight, and Respondent left the house. On July 11, 2011, Respondent returned to the home after his work shift, and told Ms. Rasmussen that he wanted their relationship to end. Respondent told her he wanted to sleep in a separate bed, and took the mattress pad off of a bed in a bedroom downstairs and put it on a separate bed upstairs. Ms. Rasmussen reacted by taking the mattress pad off of the second bed and throwing it out the window. Respondent retrieved the mattress pad. Ms. Rasmussen then poured a container of water on the bed where Respondent intended to sleep. Respondent turned on the video function on his cellular phone and asked Ms. Rasmussen about her actions. She responded by telling him he was a fool and an idiot, and that he was crazy. In what can be gleaned from the tape, Respondent asked her to take her things and leave. Instead, Ms. Rasmussen approached Respondent trying to get his phone as he started to go upstairs, and began hitting him. He can be heard on the cell phone recording repeatedly asking her to stop. Ms. Rasmussen repeatedly answered “no,” and “this was good enough for you last night,” and the sound of her striking Respondent can be heard clearly. This altercation occurred as Respondent attempted to retreat up the stairs. At one point, Respondent exclaimed that Ms. Rasmussen had hit him in the face, and Ms. Rasmussen responds, “yeah, I did.” Respondent and Ms. Rasmussen end up in what appears to be a walk-in closet upstairs. At that point, Respondent told Ms. Rasmussen that she was “going down,” and that he would “arrest her myself.” Respondent appeared to be out of breath. Ms. Rasmussen responded by telling him repeatedly that she was not under arrest and he was not arresting her for anything. She told him several times to stop, and to “get off of her,” stating that she could not breathe. Eventually, she told him that he had won, and asked him to help her up. Ms. Rasmussen testified that Respondent dragged her up the stairs, hitting her head on the stairwell on the way up. She testified further that he slammed her against the wall, handcuffed her behind her back, and was sitting on top of her while he did so, and while she pleaded with him to stop. According to her, Respondent hit her several times during the time they were in the closet, and then dragged her back down the stairs by the chain on the handcuffs. She also stated that Respondent threatened to kill her, saying that if he did so he could dispose of her body in the pond on the property and no one would know unless they drained the pond. Respondent, on the other hand, testified that Ms. Rasmussen began hitting him around the head and neck, and he was retreating up the stairs in an effort to get away from her, telling her repeatedly to stop. He testified that once they reached the closet, he told her he was arresting her and placed her hands behind her back in order to handcuff her. When she told him he was not arresting her for anything, he warned her not to “make me Taze you,” and finished placing the handcuffs on her wrists, behind her back. Respondent denied sitting on Ms. Rasmussen, saying that he knelt on one knee with one foot flat on the floor, and with Ms. Rasmussen secured between his legs, as he learned in law enforcement training. While Ms. Rasmussen testified that he dragged her down the stairs of the house and then threw her down the outside steps, Respondent testified that he carried her down the stairs of the home so as not to injure her, but that she was resisting him. While the taped recording contained sounds indicating that Respondent was being hit by Ms. Rasmussen going up the stairs, the same is not true with respect to the descent. Ms. Rasmussen can be heard telling Respondent to stop, but there is no sound that can be attributed to her head banging against the wall or anyone being dragged down the stairs. Once they were both downstairs, Respondent called in a “1024” on his FHP radio, which means “officer in jeopardy, send help as soon as possible.” The consensus of those officers testifying was that this call is rarely used and is the equivalent of “calling the calvary,” because the officer needs help immediately. Both Rasmussen and Respondent exited the home once the 1024 call was placed. Rasmussen testified at hearing that Respondent offered to take the handcuffs off of her and she refused the offer, saying that she wanted the responding officers to “see me exactly this way.” She got in his truck, which was parked near his locked law enforcement vehicle, and shut the door to get out of the rain. Law enforcement responding to the 1024 call were Marcus Bailey, an investigator with the Bay County Sheriff’s Office; FHP Major Eddie Johnson; and Lieutenant Davis Ward of the Bay County Sheriff’s Office. Their arrival at the home was approximately twelve minutes from the call being received by the FHP dispatcher. The Bay County Sheriff’s Office conducted the investigation of the matter, and because a law enforcement officer was involved, the investigation was conducted by supervisors. As a result of the incident, Respondent was placed on administrative duty on July 11, 2012, and terminated from the FHP July 16, 2012. The officers who responded all saw the video of the cell phone recording, which was also played several times during the course of the hearing. While, curiously, two of the three refer to Respondent as “taunting” Ms. Rasmussen at the beginning of the video, the video does not display or record anything that the undersigned could describe as taunting. It portrayed Respondent expressing dismay at Ms. Rasmussen’s behavior; Respondent requesting that she get her things and leave; Ms. Rasmussen’s angry response; the sounds of Ms. Rasmussen hitting Respondent; Responding placing her under arrest and reciting her rights; and Ms. Rasmussen’s angry response and cries for help and for Respondent to let her go. Respondent’s supervisor, Sergeant Ronnie Baker, testified that Respondent was a great employee who went “above and beyond,” and who prior to this incident (which Sergeant Baker did not witness), had no complaints against him. Sergeant Baker, among others, testified that Ms. Rasmussen had a reputation for untruthfulness. The undersigned reviewed the tape several times. It is of limited assistance in deciphering what is, in reality, an event where the only witnesses are the participants, Respondent and Ms. Rasmussen. However, after listening to the tape and observing the demeanor of witnesses (both at hearing and in the tape), Ms. Rasmussen’s account of the incident is simply not credible. The sounds on the tape clearly support the testimony that Ms. Rasmussen was hitting Respondent repeatedly as they went up the stairs. There are no corresponding sounds to support her contention that he slammed her head into the wall or dragged her down the stairs. Moreover, the pictures of Ms. Rasmussen do not clearly depict bruising or swelling consistent with her description of the incident. There are slight red marks on Ms. Rasmussen’s wrists, but they do not provide clear and convincing evidence that he dragged her anywhere, much less down the stairs. The marks on her arms are just as likely to indicate her resisting his efforts to carry her down the stairs. Moreover, her claim that he threatened to kill her and dispose of her body in the pond on the property is totally inconsistent with Respondent’s actions in placing a 1024 request for assistance, and waiting at the front of the property for assistance to arrive. The Administrative Complaint charges Respondent with use of excessive force by slamming Ms. Rasmussen’s head and/or placing handcuffs on the victim tightly and/or dragging her down the stairs while handcuffed. There is no clear and convincing evidence that Respondent slammed Ms. Rasmussen’s head against anything; that he put the handcuffs on her too tightly; or that he dragged her down the stairs while handcuffed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of January, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of January, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Linton B. Eason, Esquire Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Philip S. Spaziante (Address of record) Sandra Renee Coulter, Esquire Room A432 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Gerald M. Bailey, Commissioner Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issues in the case are whether the allegations set forth in the Administrative Complaint filed against the Respondent are true, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility for certification of correctional officers within the State of Florida. Respondent holds Correctional Certificate No. 200857, issued to her by Petitioner. Shortly after 2:00 a.m., on January 8, 2005, Corporal Andrew Markham of the City of Sebring Police Department was dispatched to the scene of a reported traffic crash at the intersection of Center Street and Northeast Lakeview Drive in Sebring, Florida. Corporal Markham found no vehicles in the intersection or any evidence of a crash there. Adjacent to the intersection, in the parking lot of the Sebring Public Library, Corporal Markham saw a car with its brake lights illuminated. He approached the car to determine whether the occupants could provide any information about the reported traffic accident. Corporal Markham observed that the front of the car was damaged from its collision with a low barrier wall that bordered the parking lot. The windshield was also damaged from what Corporal Markham concluded was the impact of the occupants' heads with the windshield when the car hit the barrier. When Corporal Markham approached the car, he saw Respondent exit the driver's seat and begin to walk away. Corporal Markham stopped Respondent to speak with her. Respondent had blood on her face, as did the other occupant of the car. At the time of the incident, Respondent denied being the driver of the car. At the hearing, Respondent admitted that she was the driver. During his conversation with Respondent at the scene, Corporal Markham smelled the odor of alcohol on Respondent, noted that she was unsteady, and that her eyes were red. When Corporal Markham asked Respondent to take field sobriety tests, she continued to insist that she was not the driver of the car and would not take the tests. Based on his observations at the scene, his training, and his 13 years of experience as a police officer, Corporal Markham believed Respondent was under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that her normal faculties were impaired. Therefore, he arrested Respondent for the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol. Corporal Markham first transported Respondent to the Highlands County Medical Center to receive treatment for her injury. At the Medical Center, Respondent refused medical treatment, and Corporal Markham transported her to the Highlands County Jail. At the jail, Respondent was taken to the area where breath tests are conducted. Corporal Markham read Respondent the "Implied Consent" that informed her that if she refused to take the test, she could lose her driving privilege for up to one year. Respondent refused to take a breath test at the jail. Deputy Loran Danielson of the Highlands County Sheriff's Office was the officer on duty to conduct the breath tests at the jail. When Deputy Danielson met Respondent, he noted that her breath smelled strongly of alcohol, her eyes were bloodshot, her speech was slurred, and she was unsteady on her feet. Based on his observations of Respondent, his training, and his 10 years of experience as a Deputy Sheriff, Deputy Danielson was of the opinion that Respondent was under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that her normal faculties were impaired. During the time that Deputy Danielson talked to Respondent, she told him that she had consumed "many" drinks, and if she took the breath test, it would show "I'm drunk." On September 27, 2004, less than four months before the incident at issue in this case, Petitioner issued Respondent a Letter of Acknowledgement for an earlier driving under the influence (DUI) violation by Respondent. At the hearing, Respondent admitted that she had "a few drinks" with friends at a bar just prior to her arrest, but she denied that she was intoxicated. Respondent said the crash occurred because she had taken her eyes off the road to speak to passengers in the back seat. Respondent said she refused to take the field sobriety tests or the breath test at the jail because she was scared. Respondent explained that one term of her probation for the prior DUI conviction was that she was not to drink alcohol. Respondent expressed remorse for her behavior on January 8, 2005, and claimed she has stopped drinking alcohol. Respondent stated that her career as a correctional officer is very important to her, and she requested another opportunity to prove she is a responsible person and capable correctional officer.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, enter a final order finding that Respondent Tena D. Grant failed to demonstrate good moral character as required by Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, and ordering that her certification as a correctional officer be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of April, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of April, 2006.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of assaulting his supervisor, in violation of Section 493.319(1)(j), Florida Statutes, and sleeping while on duty as a security guard, in violation of Section 493.319(1)(f), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent has held a Class "D" license, number D86-05626. On January 4, 1989, Respondent was employed as a security guard and on duty at a remote water-pumping facility. The equipment was at the bottom of a hill and enclosed by two fences. The outer fence was about 100 yards from the equipment, and the inner fence was located only a few yards from the equipment. The site was dimly lighted. At approximately 9:55 p.m., Respondent's supervisor approached the outer gate. As was her custom, she flashed the headlights to attract Respondent's attention. She did not honk the horn. At this time, the supervisor was in radio contact with another supervisor and a radio dispatcher. The supervisor at the site then informed her coworkers that she was going to unlock the gate and find Respondent. Her coworkers told her to keep the microphone button depressed, so they could hear everything. As the supervisor walked down the hill, Respondent's dog approached her and barked. The coworkers heard her talk to the dog, which recognized her. The supervisor then told her coworkers that she saw Respondent stirring in his truck and she would be off the radio for awhile. The evidence is unclear whether Respondent had been sleeping. The supervisor believed that he had been and so accused him. Respondent became angered and vehemently denied sleeping while on duty. The supervisor suggested that Respondent go home. Very upset, Respondent prepared to leave the site. Realizing that she needed Respondent's key to secure the site, the supervisor got to the top of the hill in advance of Respondent. When he drove his truck to the top of the hill, the supervisor demanded his key. Respondent refused to surrender his key. Now enraged, Respondent climbed out of his truck and approached the supervisor until he was about two inches from her face. Although Respondent is in his early 70's and the supervisor is in her 30's, Respondent is apparently in good shape and is much bigger than the supervisor, who at the time was considerably overnourished. Doubtlessly, Respondent is capable of inflicting serious injury upon the female supervisor. The coworkers could hear Respondent's truck door slam when he reached the top of the hill. While standing two inches away from the supervisor, Respondent threatened, "If you open your mouth one more time, I'm going to kick you in the mouth and kick your ass. Open your mouth. Give me a reason." The supervisor said nothing. She stood in stunned silence and, during the entire exchange at the top of the hill, had experienced a well-founded fear of imminent violence. After a few moments, Respondent drove away. Deeply concerned for the safety of the onsite supervisor, her coworkers, who had been listening the entire time, summoned the police, and one of them immediately drove out to the site to assist the supervisor on the site. By Final Order entered July 3, 1990, in DOAH Case No. 90-0738F, Hearing Officer Mary Clark ordered that Petitioner pay Respondent attorneys' fees in connection with an earlier proceeding. In DOAH Case No. 89-1377, Petitioner had charged in an administrative complaint that Respondent's guard license should be revoked based on his violation of Section 493.319(3), Florida Statutes. This statute provides for revocation when the licensee has been convicted of a felony until civil rights have been restored and ten years have elapsed. The factual basis alleged for the violation was that on September 3, 1974, Respondent had been found guilty of one count of felony aggravated assault in Orange County, Florida. Respondent was initially licensed on May 12, 1986, or 12 years after the felony conviction. The statutory provision revoking the licenses of persons convicted of a felony, which also denies licensure to such persons, was enacted effective October 1, 1986. Petitioner dismissed Case No. 89-1377 after the Ninth Judicial Circuit Court, on November 8, 1989, sealed the record concerning the aggravated assault matter. The Final Order determined that Respondent had been a prevailing small business party and, under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, was entitled to attorneys' fees and costs. The Hearing Officer reasoned that the retroactive application of the felony-conviction statutory provision was not substantially justified. Nothing in the Administrative Complaint filed in Case No. 89-1377 alleges any of the facts that are the subject of the present case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of State enter a final order imposing an administrative fine upon Respondent in the amount of $1000 and suspending his license for six months. ENTERED this 18th day of December, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT D. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division pf Administrative Hearings this 18th day of December, 1990. APPENDIX Treatment Accorded Proposed Findings of Petitioner 1: adopted. 2: rejected as subordinate. 3-4: rejected as irrelevant. 5: adopted in substance. 6: rejected as subordinate and recitation of testimony. 7: rejected as subordinate and irrelevant. 8-9: rejected as irrelevant. 10-11: rejected as recitation of testimony and legal argument. 12 & 14: adopted in substance. 13: adopted. 15: rejected as subordinate and legal argument. 16: rejected as irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Hon. Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Ken Rouse General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, LL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Ann Cowles-Fewox Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, MS 4 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Richard I. Wallsh Troum & Wallsh 2699 Lee Road, Suite 505 Winter Park, FL 32789
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent North Dade Security, Ltd., has held a Class "s" security guard agency license. At all times material hereto, Respondent Rollins Donald has held a Class "K" firearms instructor license. At all times material hereto, Respondent Linda Donald has held a Class "K" firearms instructor license. At all times material hereto, Linda and Rollins Donald have been the principal owners, corporate officers, and directors of Respondent North Dade Security, Ltd., and as such are responsible for the control and operation of the agency. There is no licensed manager for the agency. At all times material hereto, Raymond Curtis Foxwood was an employee of North Dade Security, Ltd. Foxwood has never been licensed as a firearms instructor. An applicant for a statewide gun permit, also known as a Class "G" armed guard license, must submit to Petitioner an application for such license. The application form contains a Certificate of Firearms Proficiency which verifies that the applicant has received the statutorily-required firearms training by a licensed firarms instructor prior to the filing of that application for licensure.- on October 7, 1985, Foxwood submitted to Petitioner on behalf of North Dade Security, Ltd., approximately 20 applications for licensure as unarmed and armed guards. Although Foxwood was advised at that time by one of Petitioner's employees that the applications could not be processed due to the absence of licensure fees and due to deficiencies in completeness, the applicants were sent by North Dade Security to Petitioner's office to pick up their temporary licenses on the morning of October 8. When questioned about their applications, some of the applicants advised Petitioner's employee that they had received no firearms training, although their applications certified that they had. After the applicants were refused temporary licenses by Petitioner, North Dade Security sent the applicants to a gun range where Foxwood administered some firearms training for approximately four hours. Neither Rollins Donald nor Linda Donald was present at that training session. As of October 1985, several other persons employed by North Dade Security as armed guards had received no firearms training in conjunction with that employment. Most of the Certificates of Firearms Proficiency a contained within the applications of those latter employees and of the October 7 applicants were signed by Rollins Donald and by Linda Donald. 11. The numerous applications submitted by North Dadee La Security, Ltd., on October 7, 1985 was occasioned by a large contract entered into by North Dade Security, Ltd. requiring the immediate employment of a large number of armed guards.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondents North Dade Security, Ltd., Rollins Donald and Linda Donald guilty of the allegations contained within the Administrative Complaint filed herein, and revoking the Class "B.' license of North Dade Security, Ltd., and further revoking the Class "K" firearms instructor licenses of Respondents Rollins Donald and Linda Donald. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 25th day of February, 1987, at Tallahassee' Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of February, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth J. Plante, Esquire Department of State The Capitol Room LL-10 Tallahassee Florida 32399-0250 Jackie L. Gabe, Esquire Charles C. Mays, Esquire McCRARY & VALENTINE Executive Plaza 3050 Biscayne Boulevard. Suite 800, Miami, Florida 33137-4198 Honorable George Firestone Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 APPENDIX The testimony at the final hearing in this cause was preserved by tape recorder using cassette tapes rather than by use of the court reporter. At the conclusion of the final hearing, Respondents determined that they would provide a transcript of proceedings for use by the undersigned and would therefore have the cassette tapes of the final hearing transcribed. The parties were afforded thirty (30) days from the filing of that transcript in which to submit proposed findings of fact in the form of proposed recommended orders. On June 23, 1986, a transcript was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings. The parties hereto subsequently agreed that that transcript was incomplete, and a complete transcript was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on September 22, 1986. Accordingly, the parties' proposed recommended orders became due to be filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings no later than October 22, 1986. Respondents filed their proposed recommended order on October 20, 1986. However, Petitioner did. not file its proposed recommended order until October 23, 1986. On October 24, 1986, Petitioner also filed what it considered to be an uncertified "corrected transcript. A series of correspondence and conference calls then ensued due to the Respondents' inability to accept the "corrected~ transcript, and the parties were afforded additional time in which to resolve their differences regarding the September 22, 1986 transcript, which was determined by the undersigned to be the official transcript of this proceeding. By correspondence from Petitioner's substituted attorney filed on February 2, 1987, Petitioner withdrew its "corrected" transcript and agreed to the use of the official transcript filed on September 22, 1986. Since Petitioner's proposed recommended order was filed late and no extension of time for the filing of that proposed recommended order was requested or granted, no rulings are made herein on Petitioner's proposed findings of fact. Although Respondents' proposed recommended order was timely filed, only Respondent's finding of fact numbered 1 has been adopted in this Recommended Order. The remainder of Respondents' proposed findings of fact have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting recitations of the testimony of each witness. ================================================================= FIRST DISTRICT COURT OPINION ================================================================= IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA NORTH DADE SECURITY LTD. NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES CORPORATION, LINDA H. TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND DONALD and ROLLINS DONALD, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED. Appellants, CASE NO. 97-1350 DOAH CASE NO. 85-4192 Vs. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISION OF LICENSING, Appellee. / Opinion filed September 1, 1988. An appeal from an order of the Department of State. Michael J. Cherniga, of Roberts, Baggett, LaFace & Richard, C Tallahassee, for appellants. R. Timothy Jansen, Assistant General Counsel, Department of State, Tallahassee, for appellee. THOMPSON, Judgee. This is an appeal from a final order of the Department of State (Department) approving and adopting the hearing officer's recommended order holding that the firearms instructor licenses of the individual appellants should be revoked and that the security agency license of the corporate appellant should be revoked. We reverse and remand. The appellants raise, inter alia, the following two questions: (1) Whether the Department's failure to accurately and completely preserve the testimony adduced at the final hearing constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of law and a violation of appellants' due process rights, and (2) whether the Department's failure to preserve the testimony adduced at the final hearing has materially prejudiced the appellants' rights to judicial review of this cause. At the final hearing in this case the Department attempted to preserve the testimony presented by tape recorder using cassette tapes rather than by the use of a court reporter. The Department notified appellants prior to the final hearing that it intended to preserve the hearing testimony in this manner, and that appellants would be responsible for furnishing any transcript they might need for review of the hearing officer's findings. Appellants were advised they were free to either hire a court reporter to produce such transcript or that they could use the Department's tapes t make their own transcript. Appellants neither hired a court reporter nor objected to the Department's announcement that it would tape record the proceedings. Unfortunately, the tape recorder malfunctioned, and numerous substantial and material portions of the testimony taken at the hearing were not transcribable because they were not recorded at all, or because the tapes were inaudible or unintelligible. The final hearing was concluded February 18, 1986. At the conclusion of the hearing the appellants determined that they would provide a transcript of the proceedings for use by the parties and would have the cassette tapes of the final hearing transcribed. The parties were afforded 30 days from the filing of the transcript in which to submit proposed findings of fact in the form of proposed recommended orders. On June 23,1986, a transcript was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) but the parties subsequently agreed that the transcript was incomplete. An allegedly complete transcript was filed with DOAH on September 22, 1986, and the parties' proposed recommended orders were due to be filed no later than October 22, 1986. Appellants filed their proposed recommended order on October 20, 1986 and the Department filed its recommended order October 23, 1986 together with what it labeled a "corrected" transcript. The appellants refused to accept the "corrected" transcript and the parties were afforded additional time to resolve their differences regarding the September 22 transcript. Ultimately, the transcript filed September 22 was determined by the hearing officer to be the official transcript of the final hearing. On February 2, 1987, the Department withdrew its "corrected" transcript and agreed to use the transcript filed September 22, 1986. The hearing officer's recommended order was entered February 25, 1987, and the final order of the agency was entered September 23, 1987, more than one and one-half years after the date of the final hearing. Section 120.57(1)(b)6, Fla. Stat. (1985) provides in part: The agency shall accurately and completely preserve all testimony in the proceeding, and, on the request of any party, it shall make a full or partial transcript available at no more than actual cost. The statute requires agencies to accurately and completely preserve all testimony in §120.57(1) proceedings held before them, and this mandatory duty cannot be avoided or escaped by simply advising an opposing party that the agency proposes to preserve the testimony by tape recording and that the opposing party has the right to hire a court reporter. The appellants were entitled to rely upon the Department to accurately and completely preserve the testimony taken at the final hearing, yet review of the transcript herein reveals that the Department failed to perform its duty. There are numerous obvious omissions of substantial and material portions of the testimony received, and the answers to many of the questions posed are incomplete or inaudible. Because of the condition of the record the appellants are unable to obtain any meaningful review of the proceedings. Booker Creek Preservation. Inc. v. State of Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, 415 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) and Florida Department of Corrections v. Bradley, 510 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) are not applicable, as these cases involved a factual situation where the appellant failed to furnish a written transcript although one could have and should have been obtained by the appellant. In this case the appellants made every effort to obtain a complete and accurate written transcript of the testimony but were unable to do so through no fault of their own. As the parties were unable to agree on a statement of the evidence, the appellants are entitled to a hearing de novo. The order of the Department is vacated and the cause is remanded for a hearing de novo on the petition. SHIVERS and ZEHMER, JJ ., CONCUR.
The Issue Whether or not Charles D. Reynolds, on January 7th, 1976, was arrested and charged with DWI, Aggravated Assault, and Resisting Arrest without Violence; the charge of DWI was reduced to driving with an unauthorized blood alcohol level; Charles D. Reynolds plead guilty, was adjudicated guilty and paid a fine of $200 plus court costs; the aggravated assault charge was nol prossed; he plead guilty and was adjudicated guilty of Resisting Arrest without Violence and paid a fine of $250 plus court costs, his license was revoked, and he was sentenced to DWI School; and due to the above misconduct has failed to perform his duties as an educator as described in Section 231.09, Florida Statutes, thereby subjecting himself to the penalties found in Section 231.28, Florida Statutes. Whether or not Charles D. Reynolds, on December 25th, 1976, was arrested and charged with DWI, and resisting arrest with violence; he plead guilty to the lesser including Offense of Assault on a Law Officer, was put on one year's probation, sentenced to spend weekends in Jail for a period of three months beginning June 11th, 1977; he was allowed to vacate the guilty plea and plead nolo contendere to the charge of Assault on a Law Enforcement Officer with the same conditions as the guilty plea; and due to the above misconduct has failed to perform his duties as an educator as described in Section 231.09, Florida Statutes, thereby subjecting himself to the penalties found in Section 231.28, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Charles D. Reynolds, is presently the holder of Florida Teacher's Certificate Number 316529, Graduate Rank III and is employed in the public schools of Duval County, Florida. This cause has been brought for consideration based upon a recommendation by the State of Florida, Department of Education, Professional Practices Council, Executive Committee, dated May 17th, 1977. Upon examination of the recommendation, the Commissioner of Education found probable cause for filing a petition for the suspension of the Respondent's Florida Teacher's Certificate within the meaning of Section 231.28, Florida Statutes, and in accordance with Rule 6A-4.37, F.A.C. This determination was made on May 17th, 1977. On May 23rd, 1977, a petition for the suspension of the Respondent's Florida Teacher's Certificate was filed. The Respondent has filed his answer to the petition and has opposed the entry of an order of suspension. The case has been forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings for consideration by correspondence from the Petitioner dated July 14th, 1977. On January 7th, 1976, Respondent, Charles D. Reynolds a/k/a Chuck Daniel Reynolds was involved in an automobile accident in the parking lot of his residence at the Arrowhead Apartments located in Jacksonville, Florida. Officers of the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office investigated the case and in the course of the investigation asked to enter Respondent's apartment to obtain his driver's license. Reynolds was opposed to them entering his apartment, but they did go in. Reynolds went to the bedroom and obtained the license and came back into the living room area. At that point he became angry with the officers and took a swing in the general direction of a Sergeant Branch. The other officers subdued Reynolds and handcuffed him. He was subsequently taken to the hospital for treatment of wounds received in the scuffle. In addition to the events described, Reynolds also made verbal threats against the witnesses to the accident, to the effect that he would get even with them. During the course of this entire exchange, Reynolds appeared intoxicated as evidenced in slurred speech, erratic actions, excitability and a strong odor of the substance alcohol. He continued to be belligerent and kicked the side of the police car while being transported. It should be indicated that the Respondent did not carry out any of the verbal threats that he made. As a result of the incident, the Respondent was charged with DWI, aggravated assault, and resisting arrest without violence. The charge of DWI was reduced to driving with an unauthorized blood alcohol level and a guilty plea was entered for which he was fined in the amount of $200.00. The aggravated assault charge was nol prossed. The further provision of his sentence was that he attend the DWI school. The particulars of this case may be found in the Petitioner's composite exhibit 1 admitted into evidence, which describes the pleas and the judgment and sentence. The Respondent was fined in the amount of $250.00 for his plea of guilty to resisting arrest without violence. The second incident for which Respondent is charged in the Petition for Suspension, pertains to events on December 25th, 1976. On that date officers of the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office were traveling east on 103rd Street, in Jacksonville, Florida. Reynolds was going west, driving with his bright lights on and straying into the oncoming lane in which the officers were driving. The time was approximately 1:30-2:00 a.m. The officers turned around and pursued Reynolds, who at one point in the pursuit pulled off the road to avoid the officers. The officers finally caught Reynolds on Interstate 295 in Duval County, Florida. After making the stop, they removed Reynolds from the car and noted that he had a strong odor of alcohol about his person, and was staggering around. One officer administered so-called field sobriety tests , specifically the finger to nose and balance test. In the finger to nose test the individual tries to place an index finger on his nose while standing in a certain posture. Reynolds was unable to do this and was also unable to stand on one foot in attempting the balance test. The officers felt that Reynolds was driving while under the influence of alcohol; however, being Christmas Day they intended to give Reynolds the opportunity to have someone come and pick him up and drive his car home, and waive charges. When this was explained to Reynolds, Reynolds replied that he wanted to get back in his car, for purposes of driving away. The officers prohibited him from getting in the car, at which point a struggle ensued between the officers and Reynolds for a period of minutes. Most of the struggle was in the traffic lanes of Interstate 295. In the end, Reynolds was charged with DWI, a couple of traffic violations and resisting arrest with violence. After the struggle Reynolds indicated that the officers were going to be sorry for, "screwing with me." He was taken to the Duval County, Florida Jail and booked for the offenses and given a breathalizer examination which showed his reading to be .27 percent blood alcohol level. This reading nay be found in Petitioner's Exhibit 3 admitted into evidence. He entered a plea of guilty to the lesser included offense under resisting arrest with violence, to wit assault on a law enforcement officer. The Court withheld the adjudication of guilt and placed the Respondent on probation for a period of one year on the condition that he spend weekends in jail for a period of three (3) months, beginning on June 11th, 1977, and pay $10.00 per month for cost of supervision. This plea was subsequently withdrawn and the Court allowed a plea of nolo contendere to be entered in lieu of the guilty plea. The Court also allowed a motion to mitigate the sentence, which motion was filed prior to the imposition of the petition for suspension made by the Petitioner in this cause. The Court's Order Granting the Motion to Mitigate was entered subsequent to the Petition for Suspension made by the Petitioner. The probation terms were modified by memorandum of June 9th, 1977, from the Court, deleting the provision to spend weekends in jail. Subsequently, the Respondent was required to spend time working in a program known as the Jacksonville Probation and Restitution Center, working with young offenders. (The Director of that program testified in the hearing and indicated that Mr. Reynolds did an admirable job of assisting in the program.) For the violations alleged on January 6th, 1976 and December 25th, 1976, the Petitioner has charged Respondent with violations of Section 231.09 and .28, F.S. The two incidents will be discussed chronologically in considering whether the Petitioner has proven the violations or not. The first factual incident discussed pertains to the events of January 7th, 1976. In reviewing the events that led to the arrest and charges previously discussed and the subsequent disposition of those charges in terms of a possible substitute violation of Section 231.09, F.S., the only provision of that section which would seen to have any application would be Section 231.09(2) F.S. No other sub-paragraphs of Section 231.09, F.S. seem to have application under the evidential facts established. The subsection that does have application, i.e., Section 231.09(2), F.S. reads as follows: "EXAMPLES FOR PUPILS -- Labor faithfully and earnestly for the advancement of the pupils in their studies, deportment and morals, and embrace every opportunity to inculcate, by precept and example, the principles of truth, honesty and pat- riotism and the practice of every Christian virtue." This provision of the chapter has been considered in the case of Meltzer vs. Board of Public Instruction of Orange County, Florida, etc., et al., 548 F.2d 559 (5th Circuit Court of Appeals), in that opinion the Court held Section 231.09(2), F.S., to be unconstitutional. However, on petition for rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc, reported at 553 F.2d 1008, The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, granted rehearing with the right for oral agreement and the opportunity to submit supplemental briefs, with the date of the oral agreement to be announced in the future. The rehearing has not been held at the time of this recommended order, to the knowledge of the undersigned. Consequently, the undersigned will report whether the evidential facts as demonstrated established a violation under the language of Section 231.09(2), F.S., with a caveat that this section may not withstand the final order of the Court in Meltzer, supra. Should Section 231.09(2), F.S. be upheld, the acts of being arrested and pleading guilty to driving with an unlawful blood alcohol level and resisting or opposing a police officer without violence constitute violations of Section 231.09(2), F.S., both in terms of the entry of the plea in those two counts and in terms of the underlying evidential facts which led to the plea of guilty. These facts establish that the Respondent failed to labor faithfully and honestly for the advancement of the pupils in their department and morals, in accordance with Section 231.09(2), F.S., assuming this latter section of the law to be constitutional. Again, the evidential facts spoken of are those established in the events reported in the hearing pertaining to the incident of January 7th, 1976, in which Respondent was driving with an unlawful blood alcohol level and resisted the police without violence. In connection with the events of January 7th, 1976, there is a further allegation of a violation of Section 231.28, F.S. In pertinent part, Section 231.28(1), F.S., states that the license can be suspended in accordance with the following language: * * * "(1) It can be shown that such person obtained the teaching certificate by fraudulent means, or has proved to be incompetent to teach or to perform his duties as an employee of the public school system, or to teach in or to operate a private school, or has been guilty of gross immorality or an act involving moral turpitude, or has had his certificate revoked in another state, or has been convicted of a mis- demeanor, felony, or any other criminal charge, other than a minor traffic vio- lation , or upon investigation has been found guilty of personal conduct which seriously reduces his effectiveness as an employee of the school board, or has otherwise violated the provisions of the law, the penalty for which is the revocation of the teaching certificate, or has refused to comply with the re- gulations of the State Board of Education or the school board in the district in which he is employed." In reviewing the language of that section in comparison to the facts established in the events of January 7th, 1976, it is established that Respondent is guilty of a violation of that section because he has plead guilty to driving with an unauthorized blood alcohol level and resisting arrest without violence, which are misdemeanors or other criminal charges, other than minor traffic violations. This activity was also an act involving moral turpitude. No other violations of this section were shown as a result of the matters of January 7th, 1976. Turning to a consideration of the factual matters established in this hearing as it pertains to December 25th, 1976, and in view of the discussion of Section 231.09(2), F.S., pertaining to January 7th, 1976, a violation has been shown. The events of December 25th, 1976, are likewise subject to the caveat pertaining to the case of Meltzer, supra. The events of the arrest and subsequent pleas in Court after the factual events of December 25th, 1976, have shown the Respondent has failed to labor faithfully and honestly to the advancement of pupils and their deportment and morals, by his condition while driving and by his resistance to the authorities who were trying to enforce the laws of the State of Florida. No other violations of Section 231.09, F.S., were shown for the December 25th, 1976 incident. The events of December 25th, 1976, show a violation of Section 231.28(1), F.S., in that the act of the Respondent's driving and resistance to the authorities who were enforcing the laws of the State of Florida were acts involving moral turpitude. Also by the entry of the plea of nolo contendere which the Court accepted in lieu of the guilty plea, the Respondent has been convicted of a misdemeanor other than a minor traffic violation. No other violations of Section 231.28, F.S. were shown for the events of December 25th, 1976. By the guilty plea entered to the offenses of driving with an unlawful blood alcohol level and resistance without violence in the charges of January 7th, 1976, and the nolo contendere plea to the offense of assault on a law enforcement for the events of December 25th, 1976, the Petitioner has made a prima facie proof of grounds for revocation of the Respondent's teaching certificate, as set forth in Section 231.28(3), F.S. These prima facie grounds have not been refuted by the Respondent.
Recommendation In the course of the hearing, certain witnesses testified as to the Respondent's good character and teaching proficiency. These witnesses were various members of the community and members of the staff of the school in which the Respondent teaches and pupils of the Respondent. Although these witnesses were not aware of the events involved in the incidents of January 7th, 1976, and December 25th, 1976, they were nonetheless impressed with Respondent's abilities as a teacher. In considering their testimony and the testimony offered which established the alleged violations, it is
The Issue Whether or not Petitioner may be granted an exemption to work in a position of special trust.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has been continuously employed with North Florida Evaluation and Treatment Center (NFETC) since November 9, 1994. NFETC is a facility operated by DCF. NFETC houses mentally unstable, criminally charged adult male patients. Petitioner began work at NFETC as a custodial worker. In 1996, he was sought out by his superiors to be trained as a Unit Treatment and Rehabilitation Specialist (UTR). UTRs have direct care and treatment of patients. He completed 180 training hours on or about December 31, 1996. In early 1997, he was promoted to the position of UTR. On January 10, 1997, Petitioner was certified as having completed ACT training. ACT involves DCF-approved methods for safely subduing violent patients. Since his promotion to UTR, Petitioner has performed adequately as a UTR. He has never been involved in a violent incident involving patients. He has not had any disciplinary actions taken against him. A letter from Petitioner's supervisor at NFETC was admitted in evidence without objection. That letter attests to a four-year working relationship with Petitioner during which he has always been "intelligent, creative, dedicated, energetic, and resourceful. . . . He has always remained calm and served as a stabilizing force for others." Prior to the summer of 1998, the position of UTR was not considered a "position of special trust." In the summer of 1998, DCF authorities at NFETC designated all UTR positions as "positions of special trust," and a screening revealed Petitioner's criminal record, which barred him from employment as a UTR. Since then, and pending resolution of the issue herein, Petitioner has continued to be employed at NFETC in a non-direct care position, at a lesser rate of pay. Petitioner's disqualifying criminal offense involved his plea of nolo contendere to a charge of domestic battery (statute number unspecified) on June 16, 1995. At that time, the court withheld an adjudication of guilt; placed Petitioner on probation for one year, with a special condition that he attend the Batterer's Intervention Program; and waived all court costs. On October 4, 1995, Petitioner was in court for violating his probation. Although Petitioner testified that this court appearance was the result of missing or being late for a scheduled meeting with his probation officer due to his brother's death, court documents indicate that Petitioner once again had been arrested for domestic battery (statute unspecified), a charge to which he plead guilty. Petitioner conceded that he spent seventeen days in jail on this occasion. Where Petitioner's version of the facts differs from the court documents admitted in evidence, I find the court documents to be more credible. However, the court documents also show that on this occasion, Petitioner was reinstated to supervised probation. By July 1996, Petitioner had completed all 26 sessions of the Batterer's Intervention Program, spanning six months. Apparently, he did not begin the program until after the last act of domestic violence. During these sessions, Petitioner participated in "acting out" possible physical altercation scenarios and was trained in new methods of avoiding them, new ways of dealing with anger, and how to anticipate ways in which to handle similar situations without violence in the future. On August 5, 1996, a Petition for Unsuccessful Termination of Probation was presented to the court, because Petitioner "would be unable to comply with the [probation] requirements in a timely manner." As a result of this petition, the court discharged Petitioner from probation unsuccessfully and waived the remaining costs of supervision. The most information that can be gleaned from the court documents and Petitioner's testimony concerning the reasons behind the unsuccessful termination of his probation in 1996, is that Petitioner was unable to pay all supervision costs on time, had lost some period of reporting to his probation officer due to his jail time in October 1995, and had unsuccessfully completed his probation due to the domestic battery guilty plea on October 4, 1995. Petitioner testified that he has not been arrested since October 4, 1995. However, he also acknowledged that prior to the initial June 16, 1995, domestic violence charge, there may have been as many as three other arrests as a result of physical altercations with his ex-wife. Petitioner testified that the nature of the June 1995 incident which gave rise to the disqualifying offense was merely that he "put his hands on" his wife to stop her from hitting him, during a period of time in which he was under great stress due to several deaths in his immediate family, the birth of a new baby, and his job as a long-haul trucker. His ex-wife confirmed each of these elements of stress in Petitioner's life at that time, but she was asked no questions concerning the physicality of the disqualifying June 1995 incident, and Petitioner's continuous employment at NFETC since November 1994, would seem to negate his story of being a long-haul trucker in June 1995. Upon all the evidence, I do not find Petitioner credible as to his description of the disqualifying incident. Upon all the evidence, I also do not find credible Petitioner's and his ex-wife's testimony that Petitioner did not strike his wife after 1994. At some point subsequent to October 1995, the couple divorced. Petitioner pays his child support regularly. His NFETC employment provides insurance for his two children. He visits his children regularly at his ex-wife's home and entertains them in his own home. He has a good relationship with both children. He has become friends with his ex-wife Petitioner lives with and cares for his aged and infirm mother. Petitioner attends no church regularly but does attend several churches occasionally. He contributes to the Boys and Girls Clubs of America through the United Way collection at NFETC. He has completed sixteen hours of a writing class in spelling and grammar, which should enhance his performance as a UTR.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Children and Family Services enter a Final Order denying the requested exemption to work in a position of special trust at this time and specifying therein the earliest date that Petitioner may reapply (one year from his last application) if he chooses to do so. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of February, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of February, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Lucy Goddard, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 1000 Northeast 16 Avenue, Box 3 Gainesville, Florida 32601 Willie Williams, Jr. 821 Southeast 12th Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32601 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John S. Slye, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent's Class "D" Security Officer License and/or Class "G" Statewide Firearm License should be revoked or otherwise disciplined based upon the alleged violations of Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, set forth in the Third Amended Administrative Complaint filed by Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence introduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: On or about June 7, 1989, Respondent filed an application for a Class "D" Security Officer License with the Department. The application form asked the applicant whether he had ever been arrested and to list any and all arrests. The application specifically provided that "falsification of this question may be grounds for denial of your license." Respondent answered affirmatively that he had been arrested. The only specific incident listed on the application was an arrest in 1979 for a charge of "asault [sic] with a deadly weapon intemp [sic] to kill Fay N.C. [sic]." The Application also required the applicant to set forth the outcome of all arrests. Respondent replied that the "charges was [sic] drop [sic]." On or about July 17, 1990, Respondent submitted an application with the Department for a Class "G" Statewide Firearms License. The application form for this license included an identical request regarding prior arrests. In response, Respondent checked the box indicating he had never been arrested and wrote "N/A" where he was supposed to indicate the date, charge and outcome of the arrests. Respondent has not provided any explanation for why his Class "D" Application disclosed an arrest in 1979, but his Class "G" Application did not reference this arrest. This discrepancy is not alleged in the Third Amended Administrative Complaint. Petitioner has submitted a certificate from the Cumberland County, North Carolina Superior Court which indicates that a criminal summons was issued for "Angelo Louis Lugo" on or about May 5, 1987, for a charge of "M Assault By Pointing A Gun." It is not clear whether this summons is directed at Respondent nor is it clear whether the Summons was ever served and/or the subject was arrested. The ultimate disposition of this criminal case is not clear. Respondent denies ever being served with the summons referenced in this court record. The evidence was insufficient to establish that Respondent was ever arrested in connection with this matter. Petitioner has submitted a second certified record from the Cumberland County, North Carolina Superior Court, which indicates that Respondent was issued a "Citation" on March 10, 1986, for the charge of "M Shoplifting Concealment Goods." No other evidence or explanation of this record has been provided. Respondent admits that he was issued a Notice to Appear in court after he was caught by store security personnel taking aspirin from a bottle. He testified that he did not list this matter on his applications because he was not "arrested." Instead, he claims that he was merely issued a citation to appear in court. The evidence presented in this case did not refute Respondent's version of the events surrounding this court record. In sum, the evidence was not clear and convincing that Respondent was ever formally "arrested" for this incident. The ultimate disposition of this criminal charge is not clear from the record in this proceeding. Counts III and IV of the Third Amended Administrative Complaint are based upon an incident that occurred on February 9, 1993 between Respondent and Jorge Ruiz. There is a good deal of conflicting evidence regarding this incident. Both Respondent and Ruiz have testified and/or given statements on several occasions about the incident including statements to the police, testimony in a related criminal proceeding against Respondent and depositions taken in connection with a civil lawsuit filed by Ruiz against Respondent, Respondent's employer and the Bank where Respondent worked. It is impossible and unnecessary to resolve all of the conflicts in the differing accounts of the incident as described by Respondent and Ruiz at various times. After considering all of the evidence presented, including the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, the findings in this Recommended Order are based upon the clear and convincing evidence presented. On February 9, 1993, Respondent was working as an armed security guard at a Barnett Bank in Plantation, Florida. At approximately 1:30 p.m., Respondent was working outside the bank in the vicinity of the drive-thru lanes. He was there to direct traffic and monitor the area. Around this time, Jorge Ruiz pulled into the paved area in front of the drive-thru booths. Ruiz had been to the Bank on numerous occasions in the past and he had often used the drive-thru windows. Ruiz has a very powerful radio in his pick-up truck and he admits that he tends to play music at a loud volume. On at least one prior occasion, Ruiz had proceeded to the drive-thru station with his radio blasting. The tellers had complained about the noise coming through the intercom system. During the week or so prior to February 9, 1993, Ruiz and Respondent had at least one minor confrontation. During this prior instance, Respondent advised Ruiz that he had to turn his radio down before he reached the drive-thru booth because the intercom system picked up the background noise and it interfered with the tellers' ability to communicate with the customers. Ruiz replied that he would turn down the radio when he got to the window. When Ruiz entered the Bank's parking lot on February 9, 1993, his radio was playing loudly. Respondent approached the driver's side window of Ruiz' vehicle and asked Ruiz to turn his radio down. Ruiz responded with a number of obscenities. Respondent told Ruiz that unless he turned his radio down, he could not use the drive-thru facility. Ruiz refused to comply. Respondent stood in front of Ruiz' vehicle and directed him away from the drive-thru lane. Ruiz' vehicle moved forward and bumped into Respondent. Respondent drew his gun and shouted at Ruiz to stop the car and get out. Respondent claims that he intended to hold Ruiz while he called the police. The parties exchanged words and Ruiz' truck again moved forward striking Respondent. Respondent was not knocked down or otherwise injured, however, his gun discharged. The bullet penetrated the windshield of Ruiz' truck and hit the steering wheel. A fragment from the steering wheel struck Ruiz in the neck or chest area, causing a minor wound. Respondent contends that he was justified in drawing his weapon and/or using deadly force "to prevent the escape from custody of a person who committed a felony in his presence." This contention is rejected because there is no evidence that Ruiz was attempting to escape. Furthermore, it is not clear that Ruiz in fact committed a felony, nor does it appear that the use of force was reasonably necessary under the circumstances of this case. Respondent also contends that he was justified in drawing his weapon in self-defense because he was being threatened by a deadly weapon, i.e. Ruiz' truck, and he had no reasonable means of escape. Respondent claims that he was boxed in by a vehicle in front of the truck and had no reasonable way to retreat from the "deadly force" that confronted him. Respondent's contention that he had no reasonable means of escape is rejected as not credible. Contrary to Respondent's claim, the evidence was clear that Respondent had reasonable means of escape. Moreover, there were alternate ways to handle the situation which would have diffused rather than exacerbated the tension and danger. Respondent claims that the gun discharged accidently when the truck hit him. No persuasive evidence was presented to refute this contention. Indeed, in some of his statements, Ruiz admitted that the gun may have gone off by accident when his truck struck Respondent. In sum, it is clear that Ruiz was belligerent and abusive and that his car bumped into Respondent twice. Nonetheless, Respondent's contention that he was justified in drawing his weapon and that he had no reasonable means of escape is rejected. While it can not be concluded from the evidence presented that Respondent deliberately shot at Ruiz, the evidence did establish that Respondent was guilty of negligence, misconduct and/or incompetency when he drew and pointed his loaded weapon at Ruiz. The circumstances did not justify Respondent pointing a loaded weapon at Ruiz. Without question, Respondent failed to demonstrate that level of discretion and caution that is expected of a person licensed to carry a firearm in the course of his employment. After the gun went off, Respondent immediately jumped into the truck and took Ruiz to a nearby hospital where Ruiz' minor injury was treated and he was released.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Department of State, Division of Licensing enter a Final Order dismissing Counts I, II, and III of the Third Amended Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent and finding Respondent guilty of the allegations contained in Count IV of that Third Amended Administrative Complaint. As a penalty for the violation, Respondent should be fined $1,500.00, his Class "G" Firearms License should be revoked and his Class "D" Security Guard License should be placed on probation for three years. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of December, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-2566 Petitioner has not submitted any proposed Findings of Fact. Respondent's proposed recommended order included a section entitled Findings of Fact. However, that section does not include any individually numbered proposed findings of fact and the paragraphs contained in this section of Respondent's proposal include a mixture factual assertions, argument and legal conclusions. The proposal has been fully reviewed and considered. However, because proposed findings of fact have not been separately identified, no rulings are made with respect to Respondent's proposal. COPIES FURNISHED: Henri C. Cawthon Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, MS #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 James S. Benjamin, Esquire Benjamin & Aaronson, P.A. 100 Northeast Third Avenue, Suite 850 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner, Kenneth Gilbert, should be granted an exemption from disqualification to work as a direct service provider with the developmentally disabled pursuant to Chapter 435, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On December 23, 1997, B.H. filed a Petition for Protection Against Domestic Violence in the Circuit Court of the 14th Judicial Circuit, Jackson County. The Respondent in the case was Kenneth Gilbert. B.H. alleged that on December 22, 1997, Mr. Gilbert committed acts of domestic violence including entry into B.H.'s home on December 22, 1997, after she denied Mr. Gilbert permission to enter. B.H. averred that Mr. Gilbert committed a battery upon her and made physical threats of violence to her. She further averred that Mr. Gilbert ripped a phone off of the wall. A Final Order of Injunction For Protection Against Domestic Violence and Order to Law Enforcement was entered on December 29, 1997. The injunction order provided, in part that "an immediate and present danger of domestic violence exists and that irreparable harm and injury will probably occur in the form of violence to Petitioner or persons lawfully with Petitioner unless this injunction is made permanent." Mr. Gilbert was ordered to "not come to any place where Petitioner [B.H.] is located" and "not harass, shadow, threaten or intimidate Petitioner." On May 4, 1998, Kenneth Gilbert was arrested by the Jackson County Sheriff's Department for the criminal offense of violating the injunction referred to in paragraph 2, above. B.H. drove into a gas station where Mr. Gilbert was, and Mr. Gilbert approached her car and attempted to kiss her. This created a disturbance and Mr. Gilbert was arrested. On May 5, 1998, the court detained Kenneth Gilbert on the charge of Violation of an Injunction for Protection Against Domestic Violence, a misdemeanor of the first degree pursuant to Section 741.31, Florida Statutes (1998). Kenneth Gilbert was referred by the court to pre-trial intervention and a counseling program called the Group Assistance Program. Although the program to which he was referred was a 26- week program, Mr. Gilbert was permitted to terminate participation after only 14 weeks for financial reasons. Based upon Mr. Gilbert's participation, the State's Attorney's Office ultimately dropped the Violation of an Injunction charge. Mr. Gilbert appears to have learned a great deal in these sessions. B.H. and Kenneth Gilbert have a daughter approximately two years of age. There have been continuing disputes regarding visitation and the unannounced appearances by Mr. Gilbert at B.H.'s place of residence. Petitioner indicated his desire to support and care for his daughter. B.H. does not want to have contact with Petitioner and views his desire to see the child as disruptive. No court ordered visitation has been established. B.H. works at the Sunland in Marianna and is familiar with the care required to be provided. She opined that Petitioner could provide such care without risk to residents based on her knowledge of Petitioner and the work. B.H.'s allegations of continued threats of personal violence by Kenneth Gilbert are not credible.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Department of Children and Family Services granting Petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification pursuant to Chapter 435, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of May, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth Gilbert Post Office Box 522 Greenwood, Florida 32443 Steven Wallace, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Suite 252-A 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John S. Slye, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
