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DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION vs MARK F. GERMAIN, LEESBURG'S OLDEST FILLING STATION, INC., AND JOHN DOE 1-5, 12-004008EF (2012)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tavares, Florida Dec. 14, 2012 Number: 12-004008EF Latest Update: Mar. 23, 2016

The Issue The issues to be determined in this case are whether Respondents should pay the administrative penalty, investigative costs, and attorney’s fees and undertake the corrective actions that are demanded by the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (the “Department”) as set forth in the Final Amended Notice of Violation, Orders for Corrective Action, and Administrative Penalty Assessment.

Findings Of Fact The Parties The Department is the administrative agency of the state of Florida having the power and duty to protect Florida’s air and water resources and to administer and enforce the provisions of chapters 376 and 403, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated thereunder in Florida Administrative Code Title 62. Germain is a licensed Florida attorney. From May 2006 to January 2013, Germain was the record owner of the real property at 1120 West Main Street, Leesburg, Lake County, Florida (the “Germain property”). Leesburg’s is an active Florida corporation that was incorporated in January 2013 by Germain. Germain is Leesburg’s sole corporate officer and sole shareholder and has managerial authority over the Germain property. John Doe 1-5 is a placeholder designation used by the Department for the purpose of covering all potential entities to which Germain might transfer the property. No other such entity materialized. Background A gas station was operated on the Germain property continually from the 1920s through the late 1980s. During the 1980s and perhaps for a longer period, C.E. Griner operated the gas station under the name Griner’s Service Station. Griner’s Service Station had at least three underground storage tanks (“USTs”) used to store leaded and unleaded gasoline. In 1989 or 1990, Griner ceased operation of the gas station and the USTs were filled with concrete and abandoned in place. The Germain property has not been used as a gas station since that time. In 1990, the Department inspected the Germain property and prepared a report. The inspection report noted that the USTs at the Germain property “were not cleaned properly prior to filling with concrete.” The report also noted that the tanks were not properly abandoned in place. No evidence was presented to explain in what way the tanks were not properly abandoned, or to indicate whether the Department took any enforcement action based on this report. In 1996, Gustavo Garcia purchased the Germain property from Griner. In May 2006, Germain purchased the property from Garcia. Another gas station, operating for many years under several names (now “Sunoco”), is located at 1200 West Main Street, across a side street and west of the Germain property. Since 1990, one or more discharges of petroleum contaminants occurred on the Sunoco property. There were also gas stations at the other two corners of the Main Street intersection, but no evidence was presented about their operations or conditions. In March 2003, apparently as part of a pre-purchase investigation, testing was conducted at the Sunoco property that revealed petroleum contamination in the groundwater. Soil contamination was not reported. S&ME, Inc. (“S&ME”), an environmental consulting firm, subsequently submitted a discharge report to the Department’s Central District Office in Orlando. Later in 2003, S&ME conducted an initial site assessment for the Sunoco property. In the report it produced, S&ME noted that it found concentrations of petroleum contaminants in the groundwater that were above the Department’s Groundwater Cleanup Target Levels (“GCTLs”). The concentrations exceeding GCTLs were in samples taken from the eastern side of the Sunoco property, closest to the Germain property. In 2004, S&ME completed a Templated Site Assessment Report for the Sunoco property. Groundwater samples from the eastern portion of the Sunoco property again revealed petroleum contamination exceeding GCTLs. Garcia, who owned the Germain property at the time, allowed S&ME to conduct soil testing on the Germain property. The soil samples were taken by direct push methods and were tested with an organic vapor analyzer (“OVA”), which revealed toluene, ethylbenzene, total xylenes, naphthalene, 1-methyl naphthalene, and total recoverable petroleum hydrocarbons exceeding the Department’s Soil Cleanup Target Levels (“SCTLs”). In 2005, another private environmental consulting firm, ATC Associates, Inc. (“ATC”), performed a Supplemental Site Assessment on the Sunoco property and produced a report. As part of its assessment, ATC installed three monitoring wells on the Germain property and collected groundwater samples. These groundwater samples revealed petroleum constituent concentrations that exceeded GCTLs and were higher than concentrations found in groundwater samples taken under the Sunoco property. Both the 2004 and 2005 site assessment reports concluded that the groundwater in the area flowed from the southeast to the northwest; that is, from the Germain property toward the Sunoco property. Germain referred to a figure in S&ME’s 2004 report that he claimed indicated a southeasterly flow of groundwater from Sunoco toward the Germain property. However, a preponderance of the evidence establishes that groundwater flow in the area is generally northwesterly from the Germain property toward the Sunoco property. Based on the results of its testing, ATC concluded in its site assessment report that the groundwater contamination on the eastern portion of the Sunoco property had migrated from the Germain property. ATC also took soil samples from the Germain property. It screened the soil samples with an OVA and reported petroleum contamination exceeding the Department’s SCTLs. Petroleum contamination in soil typically does not travel far horizontally. It remains in the vicinity of the source. Therefore, the soil contamination found on the Germain property indicates an onsite source of the contamination. All of the assessment reports were filed with Seminole County, presumably with the Department of Public Safety, Emergency Management Division, which is the local entity with which the Department contracted to inspect and manage petroleum facilities in the area. These reports were public records before Germain purchased his property. A June 2005 Memorandum from Seminole County informed Bret LeRoux at the Department’s Central District Office that ATC’s 2005 site assessment report indicated the Germain property was the source of petroleum contamination. The Memorandum recommended that the Department contact the owner of the property about the contamination. The Memorandum was filed at the Department. After the Department received the Memorandum, it requested and received the site assessment reports from Seminole County. The Department did not notify Garcia or the public about the contamination in 2005. The Department did not notify Germain about the contamination until August 2007. All Appropriate Inquiry The principal factual dispute in this case is whether Germain undertook “all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and use of” the Germain property before purchasing it, as required by section 376.308(1)(c)1/: [A person acquiring title to petroleum- contaminated property after July 1992] must also establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she undertook, at the time of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and use of the property consistent with good commercial or customary practice in an effort to minimize liability. Before he purchased the Germain property in 2006, Germain knew that it had been a gas station for a number of years. Garcia told Germain that the USTs had been filled with concrete and were “within the law.” Germain was also aware that the Sunoco USTs had recently been excavated and that there was a problem with the tanks and possible contamination there. Germain said he spoke with neighbors about the property, but he did not say what he learned from them. Before the purchase, Germain conducted a visual inspection of the property and saw “several little metal plates” in the parking lot. Germain claimed it was only later that he learned that some of the plates were covers for groundwater monitoring wells. Germain said he visited and reviewed files at a Lake County office, but he was not specific about which county offices he visited. He also went to the Leesburg Historic Board to review property records. Germain’s testimony was not clear about what records he saw on these visits. Germain did not go to the office of the Seminole County Department of Public Safety, Emergency Management Division, to view records pertaining to the Germain property. He did not claim to have gone to the Department’s Central District Office in Orlando. In other words, Germain did not go to the offices of the agencies responsible for regulating petroleum USTs. Nor did Germain say that he talked to any knowledgeable employee of these agencies by telephone about possible contamination issues on the Germain property. While at a Lake County office, Germain searched the DEP website and saw two documents that indicated the USTs on the Germain property had been closed in place. One of the documents indicated a cleanup status of “no contamination.” Germain claimed that he relied on these documents to conclude that the property was clean. The Department explained that the phrase “no contamination” is used in its database as a default where no contamination has been reported and no discharge form has been filed. It is not a determination based on a site investigation that the site is free of contamination. However, the Department had received information that the Germain property was contaminated, so its explanation of the “no contamination” status for the Germain property was unsatisfactory. Germain does not practice environmental law. He neither claimed nor demonstrated knowledge or experience with the legal or factual issues associated with petroleum contamination. Germain did not present evidence to establish that he followed “good commercial or customary practice” in his investigation of the property as required by section 376.308(1)(c). Good commercial practice in the purchase of property upon which potentially contaminating activities have occurred entails consultation with a person with appropriate knowledge and experience. Germain did not consult with an environmental attorney or environmental consultant regarding the potential liability associated with property used as a gas station. If Germain had hired an environmental consultant to assist him, the consultant would have known where to find public records about the gas station, including any soil and groundwater analyses. An environmental consultant would have seen the site assessment reports and other public records that indicated petroleum contamination on the Germain property. A consultant would likely have recommended a Phase I environmental site assessment (“ESA”). A Phase I ESA entails, generally, determining past uses of a property, inspecting the property for visible indications of potential contamination, and reviewing aerial photographs, historical documents, and public records related to the property and its surroundings. A Phase II ESA would follow if potential contamination is discovered and usually includes taking soil and groundwater samples. In considering whether all appropriate inquiry was undertaken by a purchaser of contaminated property, section 376.308(1)(c) directs the court or administrative law judge to take into account: any specialized knowledge or experience on the part of the defendant, the relationship of the purchase price to the value of the property if uncontaminated, commonly known or reasonably ascertainable information about the property, the obviousness of the presence or likely presence of contamination at the property, and the ability to detect such contamination by appropriate inspection. Germain did not have specialized knowledge regarding the regulation of petroleum USTs. However, as a lawyer, he was familiar with the practice of employing or working with professionals with specialized knowledge in order to achieve the objectives or solve the problems of his clients. If Germain’s legal assistance had been sought by a client to solve an environmental problem, Germain would have declined to proceed because he did not possess the requisite knowledge or he would have sought the assistance of an environmental lawyer or environmental consultant. In purchasing the Germain property, Germain did not undertake the reasonable steps a lawyer must take for a client. No evidence was presented about the relationship of the purchase price to the value of the Germain property. Germain did not show that the site assessment reports and other documents discussed above were not “reasonably ascertainable information.” Although a visual inspection by a lay person would not have disclosed the presence of contamination at the property, an environmental consultant would have recognized the groundwater monitor wells and would have known to seek information about the reason for their installation and the groundwater sampling results. Taking all relevant considerations into account, Germain failed to show that he made all appropriate inquiry before he purchased the Germain property. Germain transferred the property to Leesburg’s in January 2013 in part to limit his potential personal liability for petroleum contamination. The Germain property is Leesburg’s primary asset. Because Leesburg’s took title to the Germain property after the NOV was issued, it had full knowledge of the contamination and cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser. Post-Purchase Investigation In August 2007, the Department sent Germain a letter informing him that the Department had reason to believe his property was contaminated with petroleum and requiring him to conduct a site assessment pursuant to rule 62-770.600(1).2/ In September 2007, the Department sent Germain the 2004 and 2005 site assessment reports. Germain did not conduct a site assessment. At the final hearing, the Department did not state whether it had made any effort to take enforcement action against Griner, whom the record evidence indicates was the owner of the gas station when the discharge occurred. In 2012, the Department issued Germain a notice of violation for failing to conduct a site assessment and remediation. After Germain transferred the property to Leesburg’s, the Department issued the Final NOV to add Leesburg’s as a Respondent. The Final NOV seeks penalties of $10,000 against Germain, and $10,000 against Leesburg’s. While investigating this matter, the Department incurred expenses of $11,380.37 in investigative costs. Confirmation of On-site Contamination Despite the site assessment reports that documented contamination on the Germain property, Germain disputed the Department’s claim that the property was contaminated. The Department conducted testing and completed a Site Investigation Report in 2010. Because Germain would not allow the Department onto his property, the Department installed groundwater monitoring wells adjacent to the Germain property to the west and south, and collected groundwater samples. The Department confirmed the northwesterly flow of groundwater documented in previous reports and found elevated levels of petroleum contaminants above GCTLs, including benzene, ethylbenzene, toluene, xylene, total lead, EDB, and total recoverable petroleum hydrocarbons. Monitoring wells west of, or downgradient of, the Germain property showed high levels of groundwater contamination, while monitoring wells to the south and southeast, or upgradient of the property showed no signs of contamination, indicating that the source of the groundwater contamination was on the Germain property. Based on the site assessments and its own investigation, the Department determined that the Germain property is the source of petroleum contamination detected along the eastern portion of the Sunoco property. Germain and Leesburg’s did not present any expert testimony to support their claim that the Germain property is not contaminated or that the contamination migrated to the Germain property from offsite. A preponderance of the record evidence shows that the Germain property is the source of the petroleum contamination found in the onsite soil and groundwater, as well as in groundwater on the eastern portion of the Sunoco property.

CFR (1) 40 CFR 312.20 Florida Laws (14) 120.569120.57120.595120.68376.302376.30702376.30715376.308376.313376.315403.121403.14190.70490.801
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SUNSET SQUARE GENERAL PARTNERSHIP (TUX CLEANERS) vs DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 98-005236 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Nov. 30, 1998 Number: 98-005236 Latest Update: May 03, 2003

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is eligible to continue participating in the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Sunset Square General Partnership, is the owner of Sunset Square Shopping Center located in Clearwater, Florida, and in which Tux Cleaners, Department of Environmental Protection Identification No. 529501419, was a tenant conducting a drycleaning business. At all times relevant hereto, the Sunset Square Shopping Center was managed by the Stuart S. Golding Company on behalf of Sunset Square General Partnership. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Tux Cleaners was owned and operated by Angelo Guarnieri. In June 1996, Petitioner submitted an application to participate in the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program (Program/ Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program). The application was signed by a representative of Petitioner and by Guarnieri. David Scher, an employee of the Stuart S. Golding Company, was listed on the application as the contact person for Petitioner. All applications to the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program are joint applications that include the real property owner, the operator of the drycleaning facility, and the owner of the drycleaning facility. Thus, in this instance, the applicant was Petitioner, the owner of the real property on which the drycleaning facility was located, and Guarnieri, the owner and operator of the facility. Petitioner was listed as the "designated applicant" on the aforementioned application filed with the Department. The "designated applicant" served to advise and provide the Department with a single point of contact. Upon review of Petitioner's application, the Department determined that Petitioner met the prescribed eligibility requirements for participation in the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program. Thereafter, by letter dated September 27, 1996, the Department notified Petitioner that its site, Tux Cleaners, was eligible for participation in the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program. The letter advised Petitioner that its "participation in the Program is contingent upon continual compliance with the conditions of eligibility set forth in Section 376.3078(3), F.S." At the time Petitioner's letter of eligibility was issued, Section 376.3078(7), Florida Statutes (1995), required that owners and operators of drycleaning facilities install secondary containment by January 1, 1997. This statute was enacted in 1995, the year before Petitioner was determined eligible for participation in the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program. To maintain its eligibility in the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program, Petitioner was required to install secondary containment at Tux Cleaners by January 1, 1997. As of January 1, 1997, secondary containment had not been installed at Tux Cleaners. Consequently, on January 2, 1997, Petitioner and Tux Cleaners were no longer in compliance with the eligibility requirements for participation in the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program. On January 21, 1998, Margaret Hennis, a Pinellas County environmental inspector, conducted an inspection of Tux Cleaners as part of a Title V compliance inspection. During the inspection, Hennis discovered that Tux Cleaners did not have the required secondary containment and advised Guarnieri that secondary containment needed to be installed. Guarnieri then informed Hennis that the equipment had been ordered in late 1997. Guarnieri initially ordered secondary containment for Tux Cleaners in June 1997 but cancelled the order because he thought the business had been sold. When the business was not sold, Guarnieri reordered the secondary containment in late 1997, almost one year after it should have been installed. There is no evidence that the secondary containment was ever delivered to Tux Cleaners; and it clearly was never installed at Tux Cleaners. Prior to becoming eligible for the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program, Petitioner hired an environmental consultant, who subsequently advised Petitioner to apply for participation in the Program. After the application of Petitioner and Tux Cleaners was approved, Petitioner believed that the environmental consultant would monitor the drycleaning facility to ensure that the site was in continual compliance with Program eligibility requirements. Although Petitioner and Guarnieri submitted a joint application to the Department, they never discussed the need to install secondary containment at Tux Cleaners. It was only after receiving the February 26, 1998, letter described below that Petitioner had actual knowledge of the secondary containment requirement. Accordingly, Petitioner never asked Guarnieri whether the secondary containment had been installed or directed Guarnieri to install the required secondary containment. Furthermore, Guarnieri never discussed with Petitioner the January 1997 inspection of Tux Cleaners, Hennis' notification that secondary containment needed to be installed, or any matters relative to Guarnieri's ordering and reordering of the secondary containment. By letter dated February 26, 1998 (notice of cancellation), the Department notified Petitioner of its intent to cancel Petitioner's eligibility for participation in the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program and of the reason for the cancellation. According to the notice of cancellation, the reason for the cancellation was that Tux Cleaners had "fail[ed] to continuously comply with the conditions of eligibility set forth in s. 376.3078(3), F.S." The February 26, 1998, letter stated, in pertinent part, the following: The Department has determined that the referenced site is no longer eligible to participate in the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program for the following reason: Pursuant to s. 376.3078(7)(a), Florida Statutes (F.S.), owners or operators of drycleaning facilities shall by January 1, 1997, install dikes or other containment structures around each machine or item of equipment in which drycleaning solvents are used and around any area in which solvents or waste- containing solvents are stored. As of January 21, 1998, secondary containment had not been installed at the referenced facility. Failure to meet this requirement constitutes gross negligence (s. 376.3078(7)(d), F.S.). Also, failure to meet this requirement constitutes a failure to continuously comply with the conditions of eligibility set forth in s. 376.3078(3). Pursuant to s. 376.3078(3)(n)1., F.S., the Department shall have the authority to cancel the eligibility of any drycleaning facility or wholesale supply facility that fails to continuously comply with the conditions of eligibility set forth in s. 376.3078(3), F.S. Persons whose substantial interests are affected by this Order of Eligibility Cancellation have a right, pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57, F.S., to petition for an administrative determination (hearing). The Petition must conform to the requirements of Chapters 62-103 and 28-5, F.A.C., and must be filed (received) with the Department's Office of General Counsel, 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000, within forty-five (45) calendar days of receipt of this Notice. Failure to file a petition within the forty-five (45) calendar days constitutes a waiver or any right such persons have to an administrative determination (hearing) pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57, F.S. * * * If a petition is filed, the administrative hearing process is designed to formulate agency action. Accordingly, the Department's final action may be different from the position taken by it in this Notice. * * * This Order of Eligibility Cancellation is final and effective forty-five (45) calendar days after the date of receipt of this Order unless the attached site access form is signed and returned to the Department or unless a petition is filed in accordance with the preceding paragraph. Upon the timely filing of such petition, this Order will not be effective until further order of the Department. Please be advised that mediation of administrative disputes arising from or relating to this Order of Eligibility Cancellation is not available [s.] 120.573, F.S.; when requested the Department will continue to meet and discuss disputed issues with parties adversely affected by this order. The February 26, 1998, notice of cancellation contained a typographical error in that it referenced an "attached site access form." That reference was as follows: "This Order of eligibility cancellation is final and effective forty-five (45) calendar days after the date of receipt of this Order unless the site access form is signed and returned to the Department or unless a petition is filed in accordance with the preceding paragraph." The reference in the notice of cancellation to the site access form was irrelevant to the notice and improperly and inadvertently included in the notice. That reference should have been omitted from the notice of cancellation and the sentence which mistakenly referred to the site access form should have stated: This Order of Eligibility Cancellation is final and effective forty-five (45) calendar days after receipt of this Order unless a petition is filed in accordance with the preceding paragraph. The February 26, 1998, notice of cancellation complies with the requirements of Section 376.3078(3)(n)2., Florida Statutes, notwithstanding the aforementioned typographical error contained therein. Consistent with the statutory requirements, the letter gives written notice to the applicant of the Department's intent to cancel Petitioner's program eligibility and also states the reason for the cancellation. Section 376.3078(3)(n)2., Florida Statutes, provides that the "applicant shall have 45 days to resolve the reason for the cancellation to the satisfaction of the Department." Typically, the Department's cancellation notices do not state that applicants or participants have 45 days to resolve the reason or reasons for cancellation of their eligibility. Nevertheless, the Department affords this opportunity to adversely affected parties. To facilitate this process, the Department's cancellation notices advise these parties that, when requested, the Department will "continue to meet and discuss disputed issues with parties adversely affected by this Order." Petitioner availed itself of the opportunity to discuss the disputed issues with the Department. In fact, shortly after receiving the notice of cancellation, Petitioner contacted the Department officials to determine what steps it could take to remain eligible for participation in the Drycleaning Solvent Cleaning Program. Thereafter, Petitioner took immediate steps in an attempt to resolve the reasons for cancellation of its eligibility. After extensive discussions between Petitioner and Department officials, the Department concluded that the notice of cancellation had been properly issued. The Department reached this conclusion after Petitioner acknowledged that Tux Cleaners did not have secondary containment installed by the January 1, 1997, the statutorily prescribed deadline for such installation. Having determined that the secondary containment had not been installed by the January 1997 deadline, the Department concluded that the reason for the cancellation of Petitioner's eligibility could not be resolved or corrected. The Department has interpreted the 45-day language in Section 376.3078(3)(n)2., Florida Statutes, to allow Program applicants or participants the opportunity to resolve items that do not constitute gross negligence within the meaning of the statute. In an attempt to bring the facility into compliance, Petitioner insisted that Guarnieri shut down all drycleaning operations at Tux Cleaners and remove all machines and solvents from the property. By mid-March 1998, Tux Cleaners had shut down all drycleaning operations and by the end of March 1998, all drycleaning machines were removed from the facility. Moreover, in mid-March 1998, after the drycleaning operations ceased, Tux Cleaners continued only as a dry drop-off facility. Any store operating solely as a dry drop-off facility is not required to have secondary containment. Secondary containment was not installed at Tux Cleaners by January 1, 1997, the statutorily prescribed deadline, even though it operated as a drycleaning facility from January 1, 1997, until mid-March 1998. Consequently, beginning in January 1, 1997, and through March 1998, Petitioner and Tux Cleaners were not in compliance with the eligibility requirements of the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby: RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order finding that Petitioner's facility is not eligible to participate in the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of January, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of January, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Martha L. Nebelsiek, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Richard M. Hanchett, Esquire Trenam, Kemker, Scharf, Barkin, Frye, O'Neill & Mullis, P.A. 2700 Barnett Plaza 101 East Kennedy Boulevard Post Office Box 1102 Tampa, Florida 33601-1102 Kathy Carter, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Teri Donaldson, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57120.573376.3078
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METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY vs ANGIE`S QUALITY CLEANERS/TONY`S CLEANERS AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 96-006057 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Dec. 24, 1996 Number: 96-006057 Latest Update: Jun. 08, 1998

The Issue The issue for determination is whether Angie's Quality Cleaners, d/b/a Tony's Cleaners, DEP Facility No. 139500552 is eligible for state-administered cleanup under the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program pursuant to Section 376.3078, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Angie's Quality Cleaners, d/b/a Tony's Cleaners, DEP Facility No. 139500552 (Respondent Cleaners) operates as a drycleaning facility at 1197 West 35th Street, Hialeah, Florida. Colombina Holding Company, N.V., Inc. (Intervenor) is the owner of the real property located at 1197 West 35th Street, Hialeah, Florida. Respondent Cleaners made application with the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (Respondent DEP) for state-administered cleanup under the Drycleaning Solvent Contamination Cleanup Program (Drycleaning Cleanup Program). By letter dated October 25, 1996, Respondent DEP notified Respondent Cleaners, among other things, that its application was approved and that it was eligible to participate in the Drycleaning Cleanup Program. Prior to Respondent Cleaner's approval to participate in the Drycleaning Cleanup Program, Metropolitan Dade County (Petitioner) issued to Respondent Cleaners a Notice of Violation and Orders for Corrective Action (NOV) for contamination at the drycleaning facility. The NOV required Respondent Cleaners to assess and remediate the contamination and to pump out and clean a soakage pit. Having received the NOV, Respondent Cleaners obtained the services of an environmental consultant to assess the contamination on the site and to propose a plan of remediation. Respondent Cleaners maintained contact with Petitioner and advised Petitioner of the progress. Petitioner required Respondent Cleaners to submit a Contamination Assessment Report (CAR) and IW Process Change Plans for the facility. Respondent Cleaners complied with the requirement. By letter dated November 21, 1996, counsel for Respondent Cleaners made inquiry to Respondent DEP as to whether pump out or cleaning of contamination in a soakage pit was included within the Drycleaning Cleanup Program. On November 20, 1996, Petitioner's Department of Environmental Resources Management (DERM) conducted a routine inspection and a receptor survey of Respondent Cleaners. No violations were observed by the inspector. Respondent Cleaners has not remediated the contamination at the facility site.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order finding Angie's Quality Cleaners, d/b/a Tony's Cleaners, DEP Facility No. 139500552 eligible to participate in the Drycleaning Solvent Contamination Cleanup Program. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of April, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of April, 1998.

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57376.305376.3078376.315376.70376.75
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CHARLOTTE COUNTY MOSQUITO CONT ROL C/O CHARLOTTE COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 86-000084 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-000084 Latest Update: Nov. 19, 1986

The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner's "groundwater monitoring plan," embodied as a condition in the present operating permit, should be modified at the behest of the Department of Environmental Regulation.

Findings Of Fact On October 2, 1985, the Department issued to Charlotte County a permit to operate a Class I Sanitary landfill, pursuant to Section 403.087 and 403.707, Florida Statutes. A groundwater monitoring plan was part of that permit. One of the purposes of the groundwater monitoring plan was to detect any leachate plume of pollutants which might migrate off the site of the landfill in the groundwater. In accordance with the groundwater monitoring plan, as part of its conditions, the landfill has four monitoring wells, MW-1 - MW-4. One of those monitoring wells, MW-1, was established as a background well. Two of the monitoring wells, numbers 2 and 4, were installed as "interceptor" and "intermediate" wells. The fourth monitoring well is a "compliance well." The purpose of the background well at the landfill site is to determine the quality of the groundwater as it comes onto or enters the property subject to the operating permit. Specific condition number 2 of the monitoring plan incorporated, in the permit, required that once a year, beginning with the first quarter, sampling wells MW-1 and MW-2 should be analyzed for certain synthetic, organic compounds. Eight synthetic, organic compounds (SOCs) were tested for in accordance with Rule 17-22.104(1)(g), Florida Administrative Code. Those compounds were as follows: Trichloroethylene; Tetrachloroethylene; Carbon Tetrachloride; Vinyl Chloride; 1, 1, 1-Trichloroethane; 1, 2-Dichloroethane; Benzene; and Ethylene-dibromide. On December 9, 1985, the Department received the results of the chemical analysis performed by its laboratory in Tallahassee on the samples collected by district personnel on August 5, 1985. Those test results indicate the presence of the following compounds in well MW-1: Ethylbenzene at a concentration of 1.0 micrograms per liter, Methylenechloride at a concentration of 4.5 micrograms per liter, Trichloroethane at a concentration of 3.2 micrograms per liter, Toluene at 2 micrograms per liter, Xylene at 2.4 micrograms per liter, and Acetone at 40 micrograms per liter, as well as other "purgables" at an aggregate of 30 micrograms per liter. On the basis of this analysis, the Department informed the County that it would modify the County's groundwater monitoring plan by requiring it to monitor for "purgables", (synthetic, organic compounds) in all four wells on a quarterly basis. The original groundwater monitoring plan had required monitoring for the eight original SOCs in two of the four wells on an annual basis. This proposed modification would thus modify the conditions of the landfill operation permit held by the County. Since the samples taken on August 5, 1985, further tests have been performed on water samples taken from the four subject wells at the landfill site by both the County and the Department. On December 9, 1985, the County obtained water samples from wells MW-1 and MW-2, which were analyzed for the eight primary SOCs enumerated in the original water monitoring plan. That analysis showed the following: MW-1 1, 1, 1-Trichloroethane - 1.8 micrograms per liter MW-2 1, 1, 1-Trichloroethane - 4.1 micrograms per liter 1, 2-Dichloroethane - 1.1 micrograms per liter The Department took water samples on January 16, 1986, from all four wells. Results of the analyses for SOCs showed that as of that date, MW-1, which had been the well testing "positive," which resulted in the proposed change in the permit and monitoring plan was, on January 16, free of synthetic, organic compounds. Wells MW-2 and MW-3 were also free of purgables. The analysis of water sample from well MW-4 showed that it contained 4.67 micrograms per liter of Benzene, 1.58 micrograms per liter of Chlorobenzene, and 8.27 micrograms per liter of 1, 2- Dichloroethane. Sampling the wells MW-1 and MW-2 on March 13, 1986, the County analyzed for the complete list of "purgables" or SOCs with the result that well MW-1 was shown to contain 1.8 micrograms per liter of Ethylbenzene and 2.7 micrograms per liter of Toluene. Well MW-2 contained 1.3 micrograms per liter of Ethylbenzene and 2.0 micrograms per liter of Toluene. Almost two months later, on May 5, 1986, the Department sampled wells MW-1, MW-3 and MW-4, finding that MW-1 contained no purgables; MW-3 contained 1 microgram per liter of Methylenechloride (an isolated occurrence of this compound); and well MW-4 contained 1 microgram per liter of Chlorobenzene, 2 micrograms per liter of 1, 3-Dichlorobenzene, 10 micrograms per liter of Toluene, 2 micrograms per liter of Cis-1, 2, Dichloroethane and 6 micrograms per liter of "other purgables. Thus, it can be seen that in the August 1985 test, the first monitoring well tested, MW-1, contained SOCs. At the later test performed in December, that well contained SOCs in the form of Trichloroethane and yet on January 16, 1986, the well was free of detectable SOCs. On March 13, 1986, however, that well was shown to contain Ethylbenzene and Toluene. On the other hand, on the May 5, 1986, sample, the well contained no detectable purgable compounds. On the December 9 test, it can be seen that well MW-2 contained Trichloroethane and Dichloroethane and yet on January 16 was free of any detectable SOCs. However, on March 13, 1986, well MW-2 contained Ethylbenze and Toluene. Well MW-3 was free of SOCs at the December test, but on May 5, 1986, contained Methylenechloride, although in a very slight concentration, which could have resulted from contaminated testing equipment. Well MW-4 contained, in December, the above-noted concentrations of Benzene, Chlorobenzene, and Dichloroethane. On March 13, 1986, wells MW-3 and MW-4 were not tested. The Department's test of May 5, 1986, sampled MW-1, MW-3 and MW-4. On that date MW-4 contained Chlorobenzene, Dichlorobenzene, Toluene, Dichloroethane, and "other purgables." Thus, in consecutive samples taken and analyzed by the Department and the County since the date of its proposed modification of the groundwater monitoring plan, it has appeared that organic compounds detected in one sampling did not appear or were below the detection limits in subsequent analyses and yet showed up in other monitoring wells. It is especially significant, however, that well MW-4, which is the well farthest "down" the groundwater gradient and is indeed the compliance well for assessing whether the landfill is performing within the regulatory bounds of its operating permit has, whenever tested, demonstrated the presence of the above-noted contaminants. The fact that some wells demonstrate the presence of contaminants and on a later test, test negative for those contaminants was shown by the Department to likely occur because of variables attributable to rainfall. The amounts and occurrence of rainfall' can play a significant role in determining whether the concentrations in any amount exist in the monitoring wells and can determine in part what concentrations are found in samples from those monitoring wells. The compounds move through the soil or reside in the soil and the rainfall may cause certain compounds to be washed or leached out of the soil in varying amounts and at varying rates. Sampling shortly after a heavy rainfall might result in detection of certain compounds not detectable during a dry period or might increase the amounts detectable. The absence or slight concentrations of the subject contaminants in a well which increase with later samples would indicate that the leachate or contaminant "plume" in the groundwater is passing through that well. The down gradient well, MW-4, is the compliance well and is located down gradient from the perimeter ditch around the landfill. On both the samples taken in January and in May, that well was shown to be contaminated with SOCs as depicted above. Thus, it has been established that there are some leachate contaminant plumes moving in the groundwater through the location of that well, which establishes the likelihood that the leachate in the landfill will migrate off site by the flow of the groundwater. Thus, since DER issued the proposed modification of the monitoring plan, four additional groundwater samplings have revealed more SOCs at the landfill site. SOCs have been found in all wells at one time or another in detectable amounts. The presence or absence of SOCs and the varying amounts present at various sampling times at various wells is explained by variations in the migration rate of the contaminants due to variations in frequency and amount of rainfall percolating into and flowing through the substrate in which the wells are located. Groundwater in the area of the landfill is not well-protected from waste contamination. The landfill is located in an area where the groundwater table is one to two feet above the surface level during the wet season and only four to five feet below the surface level in the dry season. The landfill is not lined with clay or another impervious or semi-impervious material which could retard the migration of contaminants from the landfill itself into the groundwater acquifer. Because of this, ground water can migrate upward into the waste in the landfill during the wet season and the waste in the landfill can percolate into the groundwater acquifer in a downward and outward direction during the dry season. Additionally, the south and west slopes of the landfill are exposed and waste is thus exposed to the water contained in the perimeter ditch around the landfill, which water is connected hydrologically to the groundwater acquifer. The landfill is the only public solid waste disposal site in Charlotte County and thus receives all manner of waste, including some hazardous waste. Leachate contaminant plumes have already developed on the landfill site and may be in the process or may already have migrated off the site. This site is the only municipal landfill in the seven-county South Florida District of the Department where the SOCs are being detected in the groundwater. The groundwater in the area outside the landfill is designated as G-II, which is usable as a drinking water source. It is appropriate to sample the groundwater more frequently in the vicinity of such a landfill when that groundwater is designated as a drinking water supply. Although well number 1 was originally designated as a background well to check the background chemical status of the water before it migrates down gradient to the landfill site, that well, although located generally up gradient of the groundwater flow, has been shown to contain SOCs which in all probability emanated from the landfill. This is because the County has periodically added water from the landfill itself into the perimeter ditch around the landfill causing groundwater flow to move in both directions laterally from the ditch. Finally, although the Petitioner contends that some of the contamination found in the samples is a result of improper testing and contamination with laboratory solvents, the potential for laboratory contamination of the samples and sampling equipment is a possible explanation (although not proven) only for those SOCs found that are common laboratory solvents. Only Methylchloride, which occurred in one isolated sample, and the compound Toluene fit into this category of possible laboratory contaminants. The remaining SOCs found in the samples are not common laboratory solvents and therefore are present in the samples due to their presence in the groundwater itself from which the sample was taken.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the modified groundwater plan proposed by the Department in the December 18, 1985, letter to Charlotte County should be adopted into the groundwater monitoring plan for the Charlotte County landfill. DONE and ORDERED this 19th day of November 1986 in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November 1986. APPENDIX - CASE NO. 86-0084 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1 - 18. Accepted Rejected as not established by the evidence presented. Accepted, but dispositive of the material issues presented. Rejected as to its asserted import. Accepted, but not dispositive of the material issues presented. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected as not dispositive of the material issues presented. Accepted, but not in itself dispositive. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted, but not dispositive of the material issues presented. Accepted, except as to the last clause. Accepted. Rejected as to its asserted import. Accepted, but not dispositive of the materia issues presented. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1 - 20. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Matthew G. Minter, Esquire Assistant County Attorney Charlotte County 18500 Murdock Circle Port Charlotte, Florida 33948 Douglas L. MacLaughlin, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Victoria Tschinkel, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mary F. Smallwood, Esquire General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (3) 120.57403.087403.707
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CJC PROPERTIES LTD. vs DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 06-002007 (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jun. 07, 2006 Number: 06-002007 Latest Update: Oct. 07, 2008

The Issue The issue to be determined in this case is whether CJC Properties, Ltd. (CJC), is eligible for state restoration funding assistance under the Petroleum Contamination Participation Program or the Florida Petroleum Liability and Restoration Insurance Program for one or more discharges of gasoline at DEP Facility No. 378943938 (“the facility”).

Findings Of Fact The Facility CJC is a Florida Limited Partnership. It is the current owner of property located at 5691 U.S. Highway 27 North, in Tallahassee. Prior to CJC’s acquisition of the property, the property was owned by Carolyn J. Chapman, John W. Chapman, Jane Chapman Latina, and Carolyn Chapman Landrum (“the Chapmans”). The property was leased to various entities and operated as a gas station. The tanks and dispensers remained in service until November, 1995. The last operator of the facility was Lake Jackson 76, Inc. There were five underground petroleum storage tanks at the facility. Before 1991, one of the tanks at the facility was used for regular, leaded, gasoline. When leaded gasoline was phased out, the tank was used for unleaded gasoline. Site Assessments and Sampling Data On November 30, 1995, the Chapmans employed Petroleum Contractors, Inc., to remove the five storage tanks. During the tank removal, Environmental and Geotechnical Specialists, Inc. (“EGS”) performed an assessment to determine whether the facility was contaminated with petroleum or petroleum products. The Underground Storage Tank Removal Report prepared by EGS noted that all five tanks appeared to be intact. Soils in the tank pit wall and bottom were not discolored. No significant contamination was observed directly below the tanks. Soil from the tank pit was stockpiled on the site. EGS observed no significant signs of contamination of this soil. The soil stockpile was also screened with a Flame Ionization Detector Organic Vapor Analyzer (OVA). No organic vapors were detected. An OVA detects any organic vapor, but is used as a screening tool to find petroleum vapors. Department rules require that an OVA reading be performed both unfiltered and filtered. The filtered reading screens out everything but methane and is “subtracted” from the unfiltered reading to determine the presence of petroleum vapors. Twenty-four soil samples were taken from various depths at nine locations in the tank pit. These samples were tested using an OVA. Nine of the soil samples, taken from four locations, had corrected OVA readings indicative of petroleum contamination. EGS concluded that “soil contamination detected in the tank pit is likely the result of a leak in the piping” between the dispensers and the tanks. Soil samples were also taken from three borings in the vicinity of the dispenser island and OVA-tested. In boring D-2, organic vapors were detected from the surface to a depth of approximately seven feet. The OVA readings from D-2 declined with depth. EGS reported that “some contamination was detected beneath a dispenser; however, it does not ‘appear’ to significantly extend below six (6) feet.” EGS did not report both filtered and unfiltered OVA readings for the soil samples taken from the dispenser area, as it had done for soil samples taken from the tank pit and the stockpile. For the dispenser area soil samples, EGS reported a single OVA reading for each sample, without indicating whether the reading was “corrected” after filtering. For this reason, the Department contends that these data are unreliable. CJC points out that EGS stated in the text of its report that the soil samples were filtered. CJC also argues that, because the filtered OVA readings for soil samples taken from the tank pit area were not different from their unfiltered readings, the OVA readings for the soil samples from the dispenser area would not have changed after filtering. The preponderance of the evidence is that the contamination in the dispenser area was petroleum. Based on EGS’ findings during the tank removal in November 1995, Petroleum Contractors, Inc., filed a Discharge Reporting Form on December 1, 1995, stating that there had been a discharge of unleaded gasoline at the facility. In January 1996, the Chapmans applied to participate in FPLRIP based on the discharge reported on December 1, 1995. By order dated January 26, 1996, the Department determined that the reported discharge was eligible for state-funded remediation assistance under FPLRIP. In 1997, another consultant, Levine Fricke Recon (LFR) conducted a site assessment at the facility and submitted its Interim Site Assessment Report to the Department. As part of its own soil sampling at the site, LFR collected a “direct push” soil boring in the dispenser island area, near the place where EGS had reported organic vapors. The boring data showed no petroleum vapors until the interval 16-to-20 feet below ground surface. LFR also collected and analyzed groundwater samples from the site. It reported that a sample taken from beneath the former diesel dispenser contained lead. Because lead occurs naturally in soils, its presence in a water sample does not confirm that a discharge of leaded gasoline occurred. In 1998, LFR conducted a second assessment of the facility site. It installed and sampled four shallow monitoring wells, designated MW-1S through MW-4S, and three deep monitoring wells, designated MW-2D through MW-4D. Groundwater samples from MW-3S and MW-3D were analyzed for lead, ethylene dibromide (EDB), and 1,2-Dichloroethane. All three substances are usually detected in a groundwater sample contaminated with leaded gasoline. On August 28, 1998, LFR submitted its Interim Site Assessment II to the Department, which shows lead and EDB were found in a sample taken from MW-3S, but not 1,2-Dichloroethane. LFR did not conclude or express a suspicion in either of its two assessment reports that leaded gasoline had been discharged at the facility. The deadline for submitting a Discharge Reporting Form or written report of contamination was December 31, 1998. A site assessment report received by the Department before January 1, 1999, which contained evidence of a petroleum discharge, was accepted by the Department as a “report of contamination.” The petroleum discharge information received by the Department before January 1, 1999, consisted of the Underground Storage Tank Removal Report, the FPLRIP claim, the Interim Site Assessment Report, and the Interim Site Assessment Report II. Post Deadline Site Assessment Data After the statutory deadline, LFR submitted its Interim Site Assessment III. This report includes January 1999 groundwater sampling data from four monitoring wells which show the presence of low levels of EDB. When EDB is found in a groundwater sample, it is a common practice to re-sample the well from which the sample was taken. Of the wells that showed the presence of EDB, only MW- 10D was re-sampled, after January 1, 1999. There was no EDB present in the groundwater when MS-10D was re-sampled. In June 2000, as part of the remediation of the contamination at the facility, an area of contaminated soil was removed to a depth of 14 feet. The area of soil removed included the former dispenser area. In January 2003, the Department notified CJC that the $300,000 FPLRIP funding cap would soon be reached. In March 2003, CJC signed a Funding Cap Transition Agreement, acknowledging that “At no time will the DEP be obligated to pay for cleanup of this discharge any amount that exceeds the funding cap.” CJC further acknowledged that it “is responsible for completing the remediation of the discharge in accordance with Chapter 62-770, F.A.C.” In 2005, CJC re-sampled one of the monitoring wells for lead and EDB. Neither substance was present. The site is not currently being actively remediated. Periodic groundwater sampling indicates that concentrations of contaminants are dropping. No further active remediation has been proposed. The cost to complete remediation is a matter of speculation. The record evidence is insufficient to make a finding about future remediation costs. Eligibility Determinations On September 2, 2003, CJC submitted a PCPP Affidavit to the Department, seeking state funding under PCPP. On October 30, 2003, the Department denied CJC eligibility for PCPP funding on the basis that the contamination was covered under FPLRIP and, therefore, was excluded from funding under PCPP. The Department has never granted PCPP eligibility for the cleanup of a discharge previously being funded under FPLRIP. Apparently, in 2005, CJC hired Glenn R. MacGraw, an expert in the assessment of petroleum-contaminated sites, to review the EGS and LFR assessments. In a letter to CJC’s attorney dated August 19, 2005, MacGraw expressed the opinion that “at least 2 discharges have occurred on this site, one in the former tank area, and one in the former dispenser area.” MacGraw’s opinion that there had been a discharge of leaded gasoline was based on the detection of EDB and lead in the groundwater. He also thought the presence of methyl tetra-butyl ether (MTBE) in groundwater samples taken from the tank pit area showed a tank leak of unleaded gasoline. CJC requested FPLRIP funding for the other alleged discharges at the facility. On March 23, 2006, the Department issued a letter formally stating its disagreement that there were other reported discharges and denying eligibility for FPLRIP funding. On March 30, 2006, the Department issued an Amended Order of Ineligibility under PCPP. The amended order added a second ground for denial, that the reported discharge was not shown to have occurred before January 1, 1995. Whether There Was A Second Discharge Eligible for Funding CJC argues that the presence of lead and EDB in the groundwater sample taken from MW-3S shows that there was a discharge of leaded gasoline at the facility. However, LFR reported that the well screen for MW-3S had probably been damaged during installation, because a significant amount of filter sand was observed in the purge water. The Department contends, therefore, that the source of the lead detected in the groundwater sample from MW-3S could have been (naturally) in the soil that entered the well. The Department also discounts the detection of EDB in the groundwater sample because EDB is an ingredient of some pesticides and can show up in groundwater when pesticide has been applied to the overlying land. Furthermore, EDB was not detected in the groundwater sample taken from MW-3D, a deeper well located near MW-3S. MacGraw does not think the EDB came from a pesticide application, because the EDB contamination at the site occurs in an elongated “plume,” in the former dispenser area, whereas one would expect to see EDB distributed evenly over the site if the source was a pesticide application. MacGraw mapped the plume of EDB by using data obtained after the discharge reporting deadline. Michael J. Bland, a Department employee and expert in geology and petroleum site assessment, believes the data from the facility are insufficient to confirm the presence of EDB or its distribution. LFR reported in its Interim Site Assessment that no significant soil contamination was found near the dispenser island. Groundwater samples from MW-3D, a deep monitoring well near MW-S3, showed no EDB, lead, or 1,2-dichlorothane. Bland opined that, if the detection of EDB in the shallow well was reliable, EDB would have been detected in the deep well, too, because EDB is a “sinker.” EDB is persistent in groundwater, so when it is not detected when a well is re-sampled, reasonable doubt arises about the detection in the first sample. Of all the wells sampled in 1999 that showed EDB, only MW-10D was re-sampled in 2003. When the well was re-sampled, there was no EDB. CJC contends that EDB was not found in the re-sampling of MW-10D because of the soil removal in 2000, but the Department contends that the soil removal would not have affected the presence of EDB in MW-10D, because the well is significantly down-gradient of the area of soil removal. It was undisputed that the presence of 1,2- dichoroethane in MW-S3 was not reliably determined. There is insufficient evidence in the record to establish that the contamination reported in the dispenser area is the source of contamination which persists at the facility. The reported contamination only affected the top six feet of soil. The soil removal to a depth of 14 feet in that area in 2000 should have fully remediated the reported contamination. The data upon which CJC relies in claiming eligibility under FPLRIP or PCPP for a second discharge are, at best, incomplete and ambiguous. CJC failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a discharge of leaded gasoline occurred. CJC also failed to prove that the reported contamination in the dispenser is associated with a discharge that still exists to be remediated with state assistance.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order determining that CJC is ineligible to participate in the Petroleum Cleanup Participation Program for the discharge reported to the Department on December 1, 1995, and that CJC has not demonstrated eligibility to participate in the Petroleum Cleanup Participation Program or the Florida Petroleum Liability and Restoration Program for any other discharges. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of July, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 2008.

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57376.3071
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SOAP OPERA LAUNDRY AND DRYCLEANERS vs DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 98-004177 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Crestview, Florida Sep. 24, 1998 Number: 98-004177 Latest Update: Nov. 05, 1999

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent properly denied Petitioner's application to participate in the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner and her husband, Lynn Labado, bought the Soap Opera Laundry and Drycleaners as an on-going business in 1984. Since that time, they have operated the business, without interruption, at the same location in a shopping center owned by a third party. Petitioner's drycleaning machine is located in a storage room with the hatch opening through the front wall of the storage room and the body of the machine enclosed in the storage room. Petitioner purchased and installed a new drycleaning machine in 1995. The new machine has a tank capacity of 46 gallons. Petitioner may have subjectively believed that the new machine met all statutory requirements. However, there is no evidence that she attempted to contact Respondent to determine whether the new machine was in compliance with existing law. In 1994, the Florida Legislature created a program to clean-up properties contaminated with drycleaning solvents, i.e. perchloroethylene. The program is funded, in part, by a tax on gross receipts of drycleaning sales and a per-gallon tax on perchloroethylene imported or produced in the state of Florida. Petitioner paid these taxes at all times material hereto. The 1994 Florida Legislature gave Respondent the duty to establish a registration program for drycleaning facilities and wholesale supply facilities. Respondent was required to use reasonable efforts to identify and notify drycleaning facilities and wholesale supply facilities of the registration requirement. All existing facilities were required to register with Respondent by June 30, 1995. Initially, Respondent secured a list of facilities identified as perchloroethylene users from its Division of Air Resources Management. Respondent's air resource management division was an excellent source from which to identify drycleaning facilities because a federal program under Title V of the Clean Air Act required all perchloroethylene users to obtain an air permit. Respondent then contacted the Department of Revenue seeking the identity of facilities that paid taxes on gross receipts of drycleaning sales and taxes on production or importation of perchloroethylene. The Department of Revenue provided Respondent with a short list of laundries which used laundry soaps and solvents. However, the Department of Revenue invoked a legal privilege preventing complete disclosure of the requested information. Next, Respondent contacted the Florida Drycleaning Coalition for assistance in ascertaining the names of drycleaning facilities in the state. The coalition membership includes individual drycleaners, wholesale suppliers of perchloroethylene and other drycleaning solvents and supplies, and owners of real property that own drycleaners or have drycleaners located on their property. The Florida Drycleaning Coalition provided Respondent with information from wholesale suppliers regarding the identification of their customers who were perchloroethylene users. Finally, Respondent contacted two of the suppliers directly for additional information concerning drycleaning facilities. Respondent eventually compiled a list containing approximately 1700 names of drycleaning facilities and wholesale suppliers. Between 50 and 100 drycleaning establishments were not included in the list because they did not have an air permit, they were not members of the Florida Drycleaning Coalition, or they purchased their perchloroethylene from an out-of-state supplier. Nevertheless, Respondent's efforts to identify all drycleaning facilities in the state were reasonable. Respondent sent registered letters to everyone on its master list in April 1994. The letter included an interim registration form. It provided information about the statutory registration requirements and gave a brief description of the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program. Petitioner did not receive one of the April 1994 letters because her name was not on the master mailing list. Petitioner did not belong to the Florida Drycleaning Coalition. She always purchased drycleaning solvent from suppliers in Mobile, Alabama. The 1995 Florida Legislature amended the statutory requirements for drycleaning facilities. Section 376.3078(7)(a), Florida Statutes (1995), stated as follows in pertinent part: Owners or operators of drycleaning facilities shall by January 1, 1997, install dikes or other containment structures around each machine or item of equipment in which solvents were used and around any area in which solvents or waste-containing solvents were stored. Such dikes or containment structures shall be capable of containing 110 percent of the capacity of each such machine and each such storage area. To the extent practicable, each owner or operator of a drycleaning facility shall seal or otherwise render impervious those portions of all dikes' floor surfaces upon which any drycleaning solvents may leak, spill, or otherwise be released. In August 1995, Respondent mailed each facility on the mailing list a copy of a Fall 1995 Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program Update. This document advised each facility about the registration requirement (then past due). It also gave notice about a workshop for a proposed rule to implement the program. In 1995, Respondent conducted several workshops through-out the state in conjunction with the Florida Drycleaners Coalition. The workshops provided information to the public on the drycleaning solvent clean-up rule. The workshops included information regarding secondary containment requirements. Additionally, an industry periodical addressed the requirements for secondary containment. In January 1996, Respondent mailed each registered facility on the mailing list a copy of a January 1996 Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program Update. This document provided information related to the status of the proposed rule, payment of registration fees, and third party liability insurance. The January 1996 advisory also referenced future guidance that Respondent would provide on secondary containment requirements. In March 1996, Respondent mailed each registered facility on its mailing list a copy of a March 1996 Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program Update. This March 1996 notice provided information pertaining to the status of the proposed rule, payment of registration fees, and third liability insurance. It also referenced a general program information document and guidelines for compliance with secondary containment, which accompanied the March 1996 advisory. The general program information document included detailed information describing secondary containment requirements. The document advised drycleaners that the deadline for installing secondary containment was January 1, 1997. The Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program rule (Rule 62-781, Florida Administrative Code) became effective on March 13, 1996. In July 1996, Respondent mailed each registered facility a copy of a July 1996 Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program Update. Included with the advisory was a detailed memorandum entitled, "What you need to know about . . . Secondary Containment Requirements for Drycleaning Facilities." In December 1996, Respondent mailed each registered facility a copy of a December 1996 Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program Update. This document provided information pertinent to the drycleaning solvent clean-up rule, applications to the Drycleaning Cleanup Solution Program, and requirements for secondary containment. Except for the initial April 1994 letter, all advisories referenced and described Respondent's "fax-on-demand" system. Some of the notices included the telephone numbers of Respondent's staff. The "fax-on-demand" system consisted of a toll-free number which drycleaners could use to obtain updated program information. Drycleaners could use the system to request facsimile copies of registration forms, copies of the rule, and copies of the guidelines for secondary containment. Respondent's statutorily required efforts to notify all drycleaners about the registration requirement by certified mail were reasonable. Respondent was not required by statute or rule to provide drycleaners with individual notice of the secondary containment requirements by mail or otherwise. Respondent undertook this responsibility, as to the registered facilities on its master mailing list, and as to the public via the "fax-on- demand" system, in an effort to provide good customer relations and to help drycleaners comply with the law. Petitioner did not receive any of the above-referenced notices from Respondent because she was not on the master mailing list. There is no evidence that she was aware of the "fax-on- demand" system. By December 1996, Respondent was aware of the drycleaning industry's concerns about the secondary containment requirements. Specifically, industry members represented to Respondent that vendors of secondary containment equipment would be unable to complete work by January 1, 1997. In response to industry concerns, Respondent's Director of the Division of Waste Management issued a memorandum dated December 13, 1996, relative to the January 1, 1997, secondary containment deadline. The memorandum was directed to the division's district managers. The memorandum stated as follows, in pertinent part: The statute has been in effect since October 1995; so drycleaner owners and operators have had sufficient notice of the requirement. In addition, drycleaning owners and operators have been reminded of the deadline by notices mailed to each registered drycleaning facility. The Department does not have authority to extend this deadline. Drycleaning facility owners missing the deadline are subject to enforcement. However, due to the apparent shortage of vendors and installation contractors . . . Directors of District Management may wish to consider exercising a short term deferral of enforcement action. In determining whether to make such a deferral, the following conditions should be considered: The facility owner or operator should demonstrate that the facility began operations prior to January 1, 1996. Facilities that began operation after that date were required to have secondary when operation commenced. The facility owner should have a signed, binding contract, in accordance with Florida Statutes, which can not [sic] be cancelled or modified without substantial loss, that was executed by January 1, 1997. The installation shall be completed by April 30, 1997. (Emphasis in original). The memorandum did not expressly address the issue of whether facilities that met the stated conditions, but did not meet the statutory deadline, would be deemed eligible for participation in the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program. Respondent selected the April 30, 1997, date because its staff believed that approximately 120 days would be sufficient time for facilities to comply with the secondary containment requirements. Respondent subsequently took the position that facilities meeting the conditions of the memorandum were in substantial compliance with secondary containment requirements. Respondent determined that such facilities were eligible for participation in the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program despite their failure to comply with the January 1, 1997, deadline. Respondent now admits that it did not have discretion to grant eligibility to facilities after the deadline. Respondent's December 13, 1996, memorandum should only have affected its discretion involving enforcement decisions. Notwithstanding Respondent's error in implementation of the December 13, 1996, memorandum, Petitioner failed to install secondary containment by the January 1, 1997, deadline. Moreover, she did not install it by the April 30, 1997, installation deadline described in Respondent's memorandum. Respondent has never had a policy that the "state of mind" of a facility, or relative diligence of a facility, would suffice to excuse its failure to meet the secondary containment deadline. Respondent has never deemed a facility eligible to participate in the program simply because it did not receive notice that all registered facilities received. Except for cases that fell within the terms of Respondent's December 13, 1996, memorandum, Respondent has never granted an application in circumstances where a facility failed to timely install secondary containment dikes or structures around a drycleaning machine. In the summer of 1997, the company that owned the property where Petitioner's drycleaning business is located, decided to sell the shopping center. In conjunction with the sale, the shopping center's property management company hired environmental consultants to determine whether Petitioner's business site was contaminated by drycleaning solvent. A soil sample taken at the site in July 1997 indicated that further environmental assessment was warranted. In September 1997, the environmental consultants hired by the shopping center's property management company performed a subsurface investigation to determine the potential for contamination at Petitioner's business site. The investigation showed evidence of contamination by drycleaning solvent below the building's slab floor in the vicinity of the drycleaning machine. Sometime between September and November 1997, Petitioner learned that there was contamination at or around the site. At about the same time, Petitioner learned for the first time of the need to register with Respondent and to install secondary containment. The property management company advised Petitioner to place sealant on the floor and to install a "ridge" around the edge of the floor in the area of the drycleaning machine. The property management company gave Petitioner a copy of Respondent's registration form. Petitioner also received an application for the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program. Petitioner and her husband prepared the application. In response to questions on the application, they indicated that Petitioner had not installed secondary containment around and beneath each machine or item of equipment which used drycleaning solvent. They also indicated that Petitioner had not installed secondary containment structures around or beneath each area used to store drycleaning solvents or waste which contained drycleaning solvents. The program application indicates that the facility was operating as a drycleaning establishment at that time. Petitioner signed the registration form and the program application in November 1997. She filed both with Respondent on December 1, 1997. Petitioner installed a "ridge" on the floor behind the drycleaning machine in the storage room sometime in the fall of 1997. Petitioner applied sealant to the "ridge" and the floor behind the machine. Petitioner did not install any type of containment structure or sealant on the floor in front of the machine in the retail area of the business. In order for an application to be complete, a site- screening report must accompany it. A registered professional geologist or engineer must certify the report. In this case, the shopping center's property management company retained Environmental Consulting Technologies, Inc. to perform the site screening in April 1998. The site-screening report was completed in May 1998. It was filed with Respondent on May 29, 1998, together with a copy of Petitioner's original application. By letter dated August 5, 1998, Respondent denied Petitioner's application. The notice stated that the application was denied for the following reason: Pursuant to Section 376.3078(7)(a), Florida Statutes (F.S.), by January 1, 1997, secondary containment must be installed around and beneath all items of equipment which utilize dry cleaning solvents. Failure to meet this requirement constitutes gross negligence. On September 15, 1998, Respondent's compliance inspector visited Petitioner's facility to determine whether it was in compliance with drycleaning program regulation. He subsequently prepared a report of his observations. Among other violations of state and federal laws, the inspector determined that Petitioner's containment structure around the back of the drycleaning machine was inadequate. He concluded that there was no secondary containment at the facility. The report provides as follows, in pertinent part: This inspection revealed that Soap Opera did not have a metal secondary containment pan around their dry-cleaning unit. However, the floor behind the dry-cleaning unit was sealed. It was later learned that the floors were sealed in November 1997 with Bondcrete sealant. In addition, Soap Opera installed a concrete berm which is approximately one inch high around the back perimeter of the dry- cleaning unit. The berm appeared to be sealed with sealant. An inspection of the front of the machine revealed carpet with no concrete berm. The floor was not sealed. The specifications for the Multimatic Princess indicates that the working tank has a volume of 46 gallons. If a spill did occur, a containment structure [metal pan or berm] is not in place to contain at least 110% of the capacity of the machine or item of equipment and waste containers stored behind the drycleaning unit. If a spill did occur, it is very likely that perc or waste perc would not be contained with the current containment system since no secondary containment is installed in front of the unit. The inspector's September 1998 visit was the first time there was any direct contact between Petitioner and Respondent. Respondent's compliance inspector visited Petitioner's premises again on December 16, 1998. During the second visit, Respondent's inspector measured the dimensions of the containment structures that were in place around the drycleaning machine. The measurements revealed that the existing berm had the capacity to contain only a 38.8-gallon spill. That amount is less than 110 percent of the volume of the largest working tank at the facility. It was unlikely that a spill could be contained because there was no secondary containment in front of the drycleaning machine. On March 22, 1999, Respondent and Petitioner executed a consent order to address Petitioner's deficiencies. Petitioner has installed appropriate secondary containment and is in compliance with the terms and conditions of the consent order.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order finding that Petitioner is not entitled to participate in the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of September, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of September, 1999.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57376.3078376.70376.75
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FLORIDA PETROLEUM MARKETERS AND CONVENIENCE STORE ASSOCIATION vs DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 05-002343F (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jun. 29, 2005 Number: 05-002343F Latest Update: Feb. 23, 2007

The Issue The issue is whether Florida Petroleum Markers and Convenience Store Association (Florida Petroleum) is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Section 120.595(2), Florida Statutes, and if so, in what amount.1

Findings Of Fact Introduction Florida Petroleum is the prevailing party in the underlying rule challenge and requests an award of reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to Section 120.595(2), Florida Statutes.2 Florida Petroleum prevailed in DOAH Case No. 05-0529RP on one of two challenged proposed rule revisions to Florida Administrative Code Chapter 62-770, which governs cleanup of petroleum contamination. Proposed rule 62-770.220(3)(b) was held to be an "invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority." Proposed rule 62-770.220(4), was "not an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, except insofar as notice must be given every five years to persons other than 'local governments and owners of any property into which the point of compliance is allowed to extend,' as provided in Section 376.3071(5)(b)2., Florida Statutes."3 The Department argues that its actions were "substantially justified" because there was a reasonable basis in law and fact at the time its actions were taken. The proposed rules were approved by the Environmental Regulation Commission (ERC) on February 2, 2005, which is the time when the Department's "actions were taken." The Department does not argue that special circumstances exist that would make the award of fees unjust. Department Contamination Programs The Department's Division of Waste Management is comprised of the Bureau of Petroleum Storage Systems, the Bureau of Waste Cleanup, and the Bureau of Solid and Hazardous Waste. The Bureau of Petroleum Storage Systems administers the state's petroleum contamination cleanup program. This cleanup program encompasses the technical oversight, management, and administrative activities necessary to prioritize, assess, and cleanup sites contaminated by discharges of petroleum and petroleum products from petroleum storage systems. There are approximately 23,000 petroleum-contaminated sites statewide. Florida Administrative Code Chapter 62-770 establishes petroleum contamination site cleanup criteria. These criteria are established for the purposes of protecting the public health and the environment and for determining, on a site-specific basis, the rehabilitation program tasks that comprise a site rehabilitation program and the levels at which a rehabilitation program task and site rehabilitation program may be deemed complete. Fla. Admin. Code R. 62-770.160(8). The petroleum contamination cleanup program incorporates risk-based corrective action (RBCA) principles to achieve protection of human health, public safety, and the environment in a cost-effective manner. The phased RBCA process is iterative and tailors site rehabilitation tasks to site-specific conditions and risks. Fla. Admin. Code R. 62-770.160(8). The Bureau of Waste Cleanup administers the state's drycleaning solvent cleanup program. This program is for the cleanup of property that is contaminated with drycleaning solvents as a result of the operations of a drycleaning facility or wholesale supply facility. Florida Administrative Code Chapter 62-782 establishes drycleaning solvent cleanup criteria, established for the purposes of protecting the human health, public safety and the environment under actual circumstances of exposure and for determining, on a site-specific basis, the rehabilitation program tasks that comprise a site rehabilitation program and the levels at which a rehabilitation program task and site rehabilitation program may be deemed complete. Fla. Admin. Code R. 62-782.150(1). The drycleaning solvent cleanup program, like the petroleum contamination cleanup program, the brownfield site rehabilitation program, and the global RBCA contamination cleanup program mentioned below, incorporates RBCA principles to achieve protection of human health and the environment in a cost-effective manner. Fla. Admin. Code R. 62-782.150(1) and 62-785.150(1). In 2003, the Legislature adopted Section 376.30701, Florida Statutes, which authorizes the Department to adopt rule criteria for the implementation of what is referred to as "global RBCA," which extends the RBCA process to contaminated sites where legal responsibility for site rehabilitation exists pursuant to Chapter 376 or Chapter 403, Florida Statutes. Global RBCA is a cleanup program for contaminated sites that do not fall within one of the Department's other contamination cleanup programs. Department Rulemaking Efforts After the passage of Section 376.30701(2), Florida Statutes, the Department initiated rulemaking to develop Florida Administrative Code Chapter 62-780 (global RBCA). Section 376.30701(2) established July 1, 2004, as the date the Department was to adopt rule criteria to implement the global RBCA contamination cleanup program. At the same time, the Department initiated rulemaking with respect to revisions to Florida Administrative Code Chapters 62-770 (petroleum), Chapter 62-782 (drycleaning solvents), and Chapter 62-785 (brownfields). This decision was predicated on the similarities among the four waste cleanup programs and the Department's desire to ensure a consistent approach across the four programs and pursuant to one large rulemaking effort. As such, the Department sought to include the same notification provisions in each rule for consistency purposes. (T 33-34, 55). However, the Department also recognized at the time that the notice provision for RBCA for petroleum contamination cleanups, i.e., Section 376.3071(5)(b)2., was different from the notice provisions for RBCA cleanups for the drycleaning solvent (Section 376.3078(4)(b)), brownfields (Section 376.81(1)(b)), and global RBCA (Section 376.30701(2)(b)) programs. (T 69, 115, 126-129). In each of these three statutes, the Legislature expressly expanded the class of persons to whom notice is required to be given and expressly referred to a specific type of notice to be given (actual or constructive) depending on the class of persons designated to receive notice. Each of the latter statutes was enacted after, and presumably with knowledge of Section 376.3071(5)(b)2., which was materially amended in material part in 1996 to add, in part, the notice provision. See Ch. 96-277, § 5, at 1131, 1135-1136, Laws of Fla. In May 2004, the Department became aware of concerns with regard to on-going efforts to assess the groundwater contamination at the former American Beryllium plant in Tallevast, Manatee County, Florida. (The party's refer to the city as Tallavast, whereas the Transcript (T 36) and DEP Exhibit 1 refer to the city as Tallevast.) For approximately two years, the owner of the plant, Lockheed Martin, had been conducting an on-going assessment of the extent of the solvent (trichloroethylene) contamination. The Department was concerned that there were residential areas located adjacent to and in the immediate vicinity of the former industrial plant. In May 2004, it became apparent that there were problems with certain assumptions concerning the assessment of the groundwater contamination. First, there had been an erroneous assumption that the contamination plume was small and located predominantly on-site. Second, based on well surveys, there was an assumption that there were no human health exposure points in the form of contaminated off-site potable water wells. Significant concerns arose when it became apparent the contamination plume was more extensive than anticipated and had migrated off-site. These concerns were exacerbated when it became apparent that groundwater contamination was impacting off-site potable water wells. Tallevast residents raised concerns that they were being exposed to contamination and that they were never properly notified by the Department, upon the initial discovery of the groundwater contamination. Tallevast residents were also concerned about whether the Department had failed to properly notify then once it was discovered the groundwater contamination had migrated off-site. The problems experienced at Tallevast emphasized to the Department the need to explore available avenues to enhance public notification procedures as a whole.4, 5 The Department asserted as to a reasonable basis in fact for the proposed rules, that contamination affecting Tallevast residents provided an impetus for the Department in May 2004 to address notification of contamination to affected off-site property owners. The situation in Tallevast arose because well surveys failed to indicate the extent of the contamination plume and that residents were using private wells for potable water. The Department's objective was to make sure that if there was exposure potential, the potentially affected parties should be notified. The Department seems to agree that the failure to discover the contamination of the potable wells in Tallevast occurred during the assessment phase of the cleanup and that it had not yet gotten to the stage of determining the remediation strategy. (T 45-46). The Department's stated concerns regarding Tallevast are not specifically addressed by proposed rule 62-770.220(3)(b) and (4). (T 74-75, 95-96). The Department’s procedure for granting a temporary extension of the point of compliance is that the responsible party will propose such an extension in its remedial action plan. (The four cleanup programs provide for the establishment of a TPOC.) The Department will then issue its notice of intended agency action, notice of the agency action will be provided to the enumerated persons, and the persons receiving notice will have a 30-day comment period. (T 149-155). (Pursuant to proposed rule 62-770.220(3)(a), the person responsible for site rehabilitation (PRSR) "shall provide" actual notice "to the appropriate County Health Department and all record owners of any real property into which the point of compliance is allowed to extend . . . ." In this regard, as Mr. Chisolm testified, the process is "similar to a permit.") Mr. Sole testified that, in the course of rulemaking, Florida Petroleum argued to the Department that the "petroleum statute under 376.3071 is different as it addresses the temporary point of compliance. It's not as prescriptive as the other statutory provisions for Risk-Based Corrective Action and the dry-cleaning, the Brownfields, and now the Global RBCA [statutes]. And their concern was that because it's not as prescriptive, [the Department] should not be establishing these additional notice provisions, such as constructive notice . . . But their fear was or concerns . . . were that you're going to engender a lot of litigation that's unnecessary because, as soon as you say the word 'contamination,' somebody is going to want to sue me . . . . And I understood that position. But at the same time, the lessons that we learned were that failure to provide that notice, unfortunately, can cause exposure and can cause a public health concern; and [the Department] needed to balance the two." (T 63-64, 122). Mr. Chisolm testified, in part, about the development of the constructive notice provision in proposed rule 62- 770.220(3)(b) and explained that the global RBCA, brownfields, and drycleaning solvent statutes required constructive notice to residents and business tenants of impacted properties.6 Mr. Chisolm further explained: So, if you're going to give notice to the legal owners of a piece of property, many cases there are tenants there. And they may not get the word, and they may be the ones that are drinking the water. The same with business tenants. So the idea was let's give notice to the people who are going to be or potentially going to be affected by this contamination, which is, after all, under the property which they may be inhabiting and using. So that was the purpose for the rule change in this case. Let's give notice to everybody who could potentially be affected by the rule, by the contamination beyond the property boundaries . . . . The whole idea behind RBCA, Risk- Based Corrective Actions, is that, if there's no exposure, there's no risk. There's no danger to the individual, to any individual. (T 116-117).

Florida Laws (12) 120.52120.54120.56120.595120.68376.303376.30701376.3071376.3078376.8157.10557.111
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MARR EXXON SERVICE CENTER vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 89-003256F (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 89-003256F Latest Update: Feb. 20, 1990

The Issue The issue in this case is whether, under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, Respondent is liable for attorneys' fees and costs incurred by Petitioner in an earlier proceeding. The purpose of the earlier proceeding was to determine the eligibility of Petitioner's site for state-administered cleanup of discharge from a petroleum storage system under the Early Detection Incentive program described in Section 376.3071(9), Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner informed Respondent of a pollutant discharge at Petitioner's gasoline station by filing a Discharge Notification Form on March 9, 1987. The form states that the discovery was made on March 5, 1987, as a result of a manual test of one or more monitoring wells. The form is marked "unknown" in response to questions concerning the estimated gallons lost, the part of storage system leaking, the type of tank, the cause of leak, and the type of pollutant discharged, although next to the last response are the typewritten words: "appears to be motor oil." A cover letter from Petitioner dated March 5, 1987, accompanied the Discharge Notification Form. The letter restates that the source of pollution is unknown, but adds that "there is a possibility that [the pollution] is the result of a septic tank, drain field discharge." The letter discloses that Blackhawk Environmental Services, Inc. ("Blackhawk") and NEPCCO/IT are investigating "to determine the extent of the contamination as well as the source." The letter provides the name and telephone number of the Blackhawk employee for further information. A separate cover letter from the Blackhawk employee to Respondent states that the notification was being submitted for consideration for Site Rehabilitation Reimbursement Costs. The letter also states that the site has been the subject of groundwater contamination from an "unknown source." Following the notification, Orlando Laboratories, Inc. submitted to Blackhawk a written analysis of the groundwater at the site. The report, which is dated March 19, 1987, contains quantitative data without any interpretation and was submitted without interpretation to Respondent on March 20, 1987. Petitioner applied to participate in the Early Detection Incentive ("EDI") Program by filing an EDI Program Notification Application dated March 23, 1987, together with a cover letter of the same date. The application supplied no more information than did the notification form. In response to the question as to the type of product discharged, Petitioner circled the choice, "used oil," but added the word, "possibility." Although the application may not have been immediately filed, Respondent received it prior to July, 1987. As part of a site inspection, an employee of Respondent prepared an Early Detection Incentive Program Compliance Verification Checklist, which was dated April 28, 1987. The checklist notes that Blackhawk "is looking into problem [and] will forward results from lab when available." The checklist also states: Odor found in E[ast] & W[est] M[onitoring] W[ells]. No other contamination found on site. Site has old waste oil tank on site that could possibly be contaminating drainfield next to tank. Also old abandoned tank (since 1967) on site. Asked owner to investigate tank's conditions. If not needed, he will remove & adjust registration accordingly. Floordrain in shop area dumps into on-site septic tank which could also contribute. The repeated mention of motor oil is due to at least two factors. First, a Blackhawk employee had mentioned to Belvin Marr, who owns and operates Petitioner, that the contaminant "looked like" motor oil. Second, Mr. Marr knew that he had, for many years, discarded used motor oil down a floordrain leading into a septic tank with an onsite drainfield. By letter dated July 22, 1989, Respondent informed Petitioner that its site was ineligible for state-administered cleanup under for the EDI program described in Section 376.3071(9), Florida Statutes. The letter states that the decision was "based upon information given in this [Notification Application] and a compliance verification evaluation of your reported site." The July 22 letter explains that the site is ineligible because, according to the application and district inspection: the source of contamination at Marr's Exxon has been attributed to used oil. Petroleum, as defined by Section 376.301(9), Florida Statutes (F.S.), included [sic] only crude oil and other hydrocarbons in the form in which they are originally produced at the well. Petroleum product, as defined by Section 376.301(10), F.S., means fuel in its refined state which is similar in nature to fuels such as diesel fuel, kerosene, or gasoline. Used oil cannot be considered "petroleum" or "petroleum products" because it has become unsuitable for its original purpose due to the presence of impurities or loss of original properties. Therefore, your site, which is contaminated by unrefined used oil, is not eligible for participation in Early Detection Incentive (EDI) Program. The July 22 letter advises Petitioner that he could obtain administrative and judicial review of the decision by filing a petition within 21 days of the date of receipt of the letter. The letter thus provided Petitioner with a clear point of entry. By letter dated July 30, 1987, Petitioner requested a 30-day extension to allow for retesting. Additional testing took place in early August, 1987. However, there is no indication that the resulting data, which again omit textual interpretation, were submitted to Respondent until the filing of the more definite statement described in the following paragraph. The next communication between Petitioner and Respondent took place when Petitioner requested a formal hearing by filing a Petition for Hearing dated August 26, 1987. By Order for More Definite Statement entered September 14, 1987, Respondent ordered Petitioner to file a more definite statement. By Response to Order for More Definite Statement dated September 28, 1987, Petitioner filed a more definite statement. The additional test data were attached to the more definite statement, although they are not in the DOAH case file. The Response offers the following chronology with all dates being approximate dates. March 5, 1987: Respondent notified of groundwater contamination from unknown source. March 20, 1987: analysis of contamination conducted by Orlando Laboratories, Inc. and forwarded to Respondent. March 23, 1987: Petitioner applied for participation in Early Detection Incentive ("EDI") program, and the application is attached to the More Definite Statement. April 27, 1987: Compliance Verification checklist issued. July 22, 1987: Respondent denied Petitioner's application. July 30, 1987: Petitioner requested 30-day extension to conduct further testing, the results of which are attached to the More Definite Statement. August 26, 1987: Petitioner requested formal administrative hearing. Following receipt of the more definite statement, Respondent forwarded the pleadings to the Division of Administrative Hearings for assignment of a Hearing Officer to conduct a hearing. The pleadings were received on October 9, 1987, and the file was assigned DOAH Case No. 87-4448. In a Motion for Continuance filed on January 14, 1988, Respondent asserted that the case involves the issue whether "used oil," which was what had been discharged at Petitioner's facility, is a "petroleum product." The motion refers to a pending case, Puckett Oil v. Department of Environmental Regulation, and states that this case, which had been heard in September, 1987, involves the same question. By Motion for Continuance filed on May 13, 1988, Respondent requested a continuance on the same grounds as previously cited and represented that Petitioner had no objection. An internal memorandum of Respondent dated March 17, 1988, acknowledges that Petitioner requested a review of the available data based on an "inaccurate assessment by his contractor." Reviewing the data, some of which had been provided after July 22, 1987, the memorandum notes that the majority of the contamination is from gasoline, but the involvement of the drainfield as the source of contamination "is the reason eligibility was denied." After the issuance of the final order in Puckett Oil v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 10 FALR 5525 (September 1, 1988), Respondent, filing a Motion to Set Hearing Date, disclosed that "[Respondent's] review of the Final Order indicates that Petitioner's site remains ineligible for SUPER Act funding." However, on July 28, 1989, the parties filed a fully executed Joint Stipulation and Motion to Dismiss. An Order Closing File, which was entered the same date, returned the matter to Respondent for final disposition consistent with the stipulation. The Joint Stipulation and Motion to Dismiss states: On July, 22, 1987, [Respondent] denied eligibility for the [EDI] Program, Section 376.3071(9), Florida Statutes, to [Petitioner's) site . . .. The basis for the denial was that the site was contaminated with used oil. Subsequent to [Respondent's] denial, Petitioner conducted a series of ground water tests to more accurately determine the nature and extent of contamination at the site. The results of that testing indicate that the site was contaminated with significant amounts of gasoline constituents and minor amounts of used oil constituents emanating possibly from a septic tank drainfield and a used oil storage facility. The gasoline constituents exist at levels many times that of the other constituents. Based upon the overwhelming contribution to the overall contamination presented by the gasoline constituents, [Respondent] agrees that the presence of minor amounts of contaminants from something other than a tank should not preclude [Petitioner's] site from being eligible for the EDI Program. [Respondent reserves the right not to pay for the cost of cleanup of contamination not related to discharge from a tank.] WHEREFORE Petitioner . . . and Respondent request that the hearing officer adopt this stipulation . . . and retain jurisdiction for an award of attorney's fees and costs (Fla. Stat. Sect. 57.111 (1986 Supp.) and Fla. Admin. Code Rule 22I-6.035). . .. The parties stipulated that Petitioner was a small business party. The parties also stipulated to reasonable attorneys' fees of $6625 and costs of $4690. Following the final hearing, Petitioner filed supplemental affidavits showing, in connection with the prosecution of the subject case and not the earlier proceeding, additional attorneys' fees of $1875 and costs of $490.85.

Florida Laws (5) 120.57120.68376.301376.307157.111
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UNION 76 (NO. 138503963) vs DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 92-000678 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jan. 31, 1992 Number: 92-000678 Latest Update: Oct. 21, 1992

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the owner of the site known as Union 76 #702 or as Taylor's 76, Inc., located at 9700 East Indigo Street, Perrine, Dade County, Florida. The prior owner of that site was Lawrence Oil Company. There appears to be a commonality of principals between Petitioner TYU, Inc., and its predecessor in title, Lawrence Oil Company. In 1986 the Legislature created the Early Detection Incentive Program (hereinafter "EDI") to encourage early detection, reporting, and cleanup of contamination from leaking petroleum storage systems. Essentially, the Legislature created a 30-month grace period ending on December 31, 1988, for owners of sites with contamination from petroleum storage systems to apply for reimbursement for cleanup expenses due to the contamination, without retribution from the State. The statute also provided several bases for which an applicant would be deemed ineligible. Prior to the December 31, 1988, deadline Petitioner checked the various sites owned by it, including the site which is the subject of this proceeding, to determine whether contamination was present. The subject site had been a service station, selling gasoline for 30 to 35 years. From 1986 forward, however, gasoline was no longer being dispensed at the site although the underground gasoline tanks were still present. It is unknown whether the tanks were emptied at the time that they were taken out of service. Automobile repairs were still performed at the site. By 1989, the site was also occupied by a lawn maintenance company and a pool company. In 1988 and 1989 a 55-gallon drum of used oil was located on the site. The lawn company employees used that oil to lubricate their chain saws. The remainder of the used oil and the solvents from the small parts washer were picked up from that site for recycling. In November or December of 1988, Harry Barkett, president of Lawrence Oil Company, personally visited the site. He sampled the monitoring wells. Because he smelled gasoline in the monitoring wells, he retained Seyfried & Associates, Inc., an environmental consultant, to prepare a report to be submitted to the Department. That report is dated December 15, 1988. Petitioner's application for participation in the EDI program, together with the report of Seyfried & Associates, Inc., was submitted to the Department prior to the December 31, 1988, deadline. At the time, Metropolitan Dade County's Department of Environmental Resources Management (hereinafter "DERM") was performing EDI inspections for the Department pursuant to a contract. On March 22, 1989, a DERM employee who performed only industrial waste inspections went to the subject site. He specifically was not there to inspect the petroleum storage systems, and he did not do so. That employee went into the service bays where the routine auto repair and maintenance services were performed. He noticed the floor drains going from the service bays to the oil/water separator. He then inspected the oil/water separator. He noted that a hole had been cut at the top of the effluent pipe, which breached the system and which might allow oil to flow into either a drain field or a septic tank system. He did not check further to ascertain which. He took three samples from inside the oil/water separator, one for oil and grease, one for phenols, and one for metals, specifically cadmium, chromium, and lead. Not surprisingly, the laboratory analysis of those samples indicated the presence of phenols, oil, and grease. The only sampling done by that employee was of the contents of the oil/water separator. No investigation was made of, and no samples were taken from, the soil or groundwater anywhere on the site. Such sampling was not part of that employee's authority or responsibility. On October 11, 1989, Dade County DERM sent a different employee to perform the EDI inspection at the subject site. To determine the presence of contamination from petroleum or petroleum products, that employee dipped an acrylic bailer into each of the monitoring wells and then "sniffed the bailer" to ascertain if the odor of gasoline could be detected. He did not dip the bailer lower than the top foot of water since he did not wish to bring the bailer up through a column of water before sniffing. Dade County DERM employees no longer "sniff the bailer" due to the health risk involved in such a procedure. In 1989, however, it was the common practice for DERM employees to "sniff the bailer," albeit cautiously. That employee failed to detect the odor of gasoline and did not see any petroleum contamination in the monitoring wells. He issued a report to that effect. He took no samples from the soil or groundwater to determine if there were contamination from petroleum or petroleum products at the site. Based upon the second report indicating the absence of gasoline odor and based upon the first report indicating the presence of oil, grease, and phenols inside the oil/water separator, Dade County DERM recommended to the Department that Petitioner's application for participation in the EDI program be denied. Based upon that recommendation, the Department sent Petitioner a letter dated May 23, 1990, denying Petitioner's application for participation in the EDI program. That letter stated as the two reasons for denial the following: Contamination is not the result of a discharge from a petroleum storage facility as defined in Section 376.301(11), Florida Statutes. Waste oil contamination found on the ground and groundwater was the result of poor maintenance practices by site owner/ operator. Participation in the Early Detection Incentive Program is restricted to contamination from such storage facilities pursuant to 376.3071(9), Florida Statutes. Contamination is a mixture of waste oil, grease and phenolic compounds. Participation in the Early Detection Incentive Program is limited to petroleum or petroleum products as defined in Section 37.301 [sic] (9) and (10), Florida Statutes. That letter further advised Petitioner of its right to request a hearing regarding that determination and advised Petitioner that its failure to timely request an administrative hearing would render that correspondence to be a final Order of Determination of Ineligibility. When Petitioner received that correspondence, one of its employees interpreted the letter to mean that the Department had determined that the site did not have contamination from petroleum or a petroleum product. Viewing that as good news, that employee merely put the letter in a file. No request for an administrative hearing was made by Petitioner, and the correspondence became a final Order of Determination of Ineligibility by its own terms. In 1990 the Legislature determined that all sites which had been declared ineligible by the Department would be re-determined for eligibility. The Legislature established March 31, 1991, as the new deadline by which owners or operators could request the Department to reevaluate eligibility for sites for which a timely EDI application had been filed but which had been deemed ineligible by the Department. The new legislation set forth several circumstances under which the Department would not redetermine the eligibility of a previously denied site. One of those exceptions related to the reason for which a site had initially been denied. Petitioner had remained convinced that the subject site was contaminated by petroleum or petroleum products prior to the original deadline for filing EDI applications. Petitioner was aware of the new legislation and new deadline by which sites determined ineligible could have their eligibility redetermined. Petitioner therefore retained Kiefer-Block Environmental Services, Inc., to do a site analysis to verify Petitioner's belief that the site had a petroleum contamination. That company issued a report indicating that was the case. Petitioner timely filed its application for redetermination before the March 31, 1991, deadline and submitted to the Department the information obtained from Kiefer-Block, the second environmental consultant to verify the presence of petroleum contamination. In reviewing applications for redetermination, the Department established a procedure whereby it simply looked at its original letter denying eligibility to ascertain the reason for denial. If that reason matched one of the exclusions under the new legislation, the Department advised the applicant that it was not eligible to have its site redetermined. The Department did not review the Department's files relating to a site and did no additional inspection. In 1991 the Legislature again amended the statute, this time carving out an exception to those sites excluded from redetermination of eligibility by directing that sites excluded due to an absence of contamination be redetermined for eligibility if contamination had in fact existed. That amendment went into effect July 1, 1991. Accordingly, that amendment was part of the law in effect when the Department made its decision as to whether it would redetermine Petitioner's eligibility. By letter dated September 3, 1991, the Department advised Petitioner that it was not eligible to participate in the redetermination process. That letter specifically provided as follows: This Order is to inform you that this site is not eligible to participate in the eligibility redetermination process pursuant to Section 376.3071(9)(b), F.S., because the original reasons for ineligibility were: Contamination is not the result of a discharge from a petroleum storage facility as defined in Section 376.301(11), Florida Statutes [definition in Section 376.301(15), F.S., current revision]. Waste oil contamination found on the ground and groundwater was the result of poor maintenance practices by site owner/ operator. Participation in the Early Detection Incentive Program is restricted to contamination from such storage facilities pursuant to 376.3071(9), F.S. Contamination is a mixture of waste oil, grease and phenolic compounds. Participation in the Early Detection Incentive Program is limited to petroleum or petroleum products as defined in Section 376.301(9) and (10), Florida Statutes [definitions in Section 376.301(13) and (14), F.S., current revision]. Section 376.3071(9)(b)3.c., F.S., states that redetermination of eligibility is not available to facilities that were denied eligibility due to contamination from substances that were not petroleum or a petroleum product, or contamination that was not from a petroleum storage system. Petitioner timely filed its request for an administrative hearing regarding that letter, contesting the Department's refusal to redetermine Petitioner's eligibility to participate in the EDI program.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered: (1) granting Petitioner's application for redetermination of eligibility and (2) finding Petitioner ineligible to participate in the Early Detection Incentive Program. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of August, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of August, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 92-0678 Petitioner's three unnumbered paragraphs contained in its post-hearing submittal have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting conclusions of law or argument. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-3, 5-18, and 20 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 4 has been rejected as being unnecessary to the issues involved herein. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 19 has been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the competent evidence in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: C. Vittorino Special Projects Manager TYU, Inc. 1601 McCloskey Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33605-6710 Brigette A. Ffolkes, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Carol Browner, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson, General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400

Florida Laws (5) 120.57120.68376.301376.303376.3071
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THOMAS P. CIMAGLIA vs DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 90-001521F (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Mar. 05, 1990 Number: 90-001521F Latest Update: Nov. 05, 1992

Findings Of Fact The following findings are based on the stipulation of the parties: Thomas P. Cimaglia is the owner and operator of the Oasis Truck-N-Tel located at 5750 South State Road 7, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. On October 14, 1985, underground storage tanks at the facility were closed, i.e., they were excavated and removed. At the time the tanks were removed, diesel fuel contamination was discovered from fuel which had escaped from the tanks. The removal was observed by representatives of the Broward County Environmental Quality Control Board (County Board). At the County Board's request, monitoring wells were installed around the excavated area. The monitoring wells contained free petroleum product (diesel fuel). On or about January 21, 1986, Richard Valentine, Inc., submitted a proposal to Mr. Cimaglia for a scavenger system designed to recover the free product. On February 24, 1986, the County Board issued a "conceptual approval to construct and operate the recovery system." The system was subsequently installed. Much of the upkeep of the system was performed by Andy Greene and Mr. Cimaglia. Mr. Greene was a salaried employee of Petitioner involved in the day to day operations at the Oasis Truck-N-Tel. On July 15, 1986, Mr. Cimaglia advised the Department in Tallahassee, in writing, of his intent to file for reimbursement of cleanup costs. On September 18, 1986, Mr. Cimaglia was notified by the Department that the site would be inspected to determine eligibility for reimbursement. The inspection was performed during the week of September 22, 1986. On January 29, 1987, Mr. Cimaglia submitted to the Department a "proposal to recover diesel fuel from groundwater and clean up contaminated soil." The proposal indicated that the scavenger system had proven ineffective, for only 50 to 60 gallons of free product had been recovered. The new proposal suggested that the contamination area be excavated, the soil treated and diesel fuel on the water surface of the excavation be removed by a pump truck and soaking rags. On March 16, 1987, the County Board approved the "Remedial Action Plan." On May 19, 1987, Mr. Cimaglia was advised by the Department in writing that his facility had been found eligible for reimbursement of allowable costs of cleanup pursuant to Section 376.3071(12), Florida Statutes. Mr. Cimaglia submitted his reimbursement application to the Department before September 1, 1988. On September 17, and October 24, 1988, he submitted further information and supporting documentation as requested by the Department. On December 20, 1988, the Department issued its notice of agency action which denied reimbursement of cleanup costs. The bases for denial of reimbursement were (1)the scavenger product recovery system was not effective ($18,757.13), (2)no supporting documentation was provided for the personnel costs of Mr. Cimaglia and Mr. Green ($3,745.00) and (3)areas of clean fill and paving were not delineated ($8,661.70). On December 29, 1988, Mr. Cimaglia informed the Department by letter that the area of asphalt and paving consisted of a 75 foot by 75 foot area of 1 inch thick asphalt, underlain by 6 to 8 inches of hard rock base. On January 6, 1989, he filed a petition for a determination of his right to reimbursement of the costs the Department had denied. After the information about the paving was received, reimbursement for the repaving was approved and paid. In August 1989, the parties met in the offices of the County Board to review the County Board's files in this matter. It was determined that the County Board had specifically approved the original scavenger recovery system, which later had proven ineffective. Based upon Mr. Cimaglia's receipt of approval from that unit of local government, the Department agreed to reimburse Mr. Cimaglia for the costs of that system. It was also agreed that the Department would review further documentation, if submitted by Mr. Cimaglia, concerning the denial of reimbursement of personnel costs. On September 11, 1989, Mr. Cimaglia filed an affidavit attesting to the time that Mr. Greene spent working on the treatment system rather than his normal tasks at the facility. The affidavit was accompanied by a summary of Mr. Cimaglia records which documented the hours expended by Mr. Greene on the cleanup. The summary was submitted in lieu of the actual records, submission of which was impracticable due to their volume. On December 1, 1989, the parties entered the Joint Stipulation which settled the underlying case and determined all of the disputed costs to be reimbursable. The Final Order was entered on March 1, 1990. The following facts are based on the evidence at the final hearing: At the hearing, Mr. Cimaglia withdrew the request for reimbursement of the attorneys fees he paid to Richard A. Herald, in the amount of $1,280. The amount at issue still exceeds $15,000. The Department's denial of rehabilitation costs focused on three items: The recovery system installed and operated in 1986, personnel costs, and paving costs. The Department should have known that the initial treatment system, which ultimately did not prove to be effective, had been given conceptual approval by the County Board on February 24, 1986. While the Department believed, when reviewing the Cimaglia reimbursement application, that the County Board had only given tentative approval to the general idea, that was not true. The Department now lays the blame for its misapprehension at the feet of Mr. Cimaglia, because the Department had received no engineering drawings, installation reports or technical data regarding the treatment system, and the absence of any specific order from the County Board authorizing the treatment system. At the time the first treatment system was approved by the County Board, the county was operating under a local ordinance which gave it independent authority to enforce county pollution control laws, and to direct cleanups. It is significant, however, that after 1986 the Department had contracted with the County Board to supervise petroleum contamination cleanups and to supervise and administer reimbursement. This matter was not handled by the County Board, even though Mr. Cimaglia's application was filed in 1988; it was handled by the Department directly. The Department failed to communicate effectively with the County Board when it contacted the County Board to determine whether that agency had approved the initial cleanup plan. Where a system for cleanup has been specifically approved by a local government agency as an appropriate technology, the Department will pay the costs for using that system, even if it ultimately proves ineffective. It was only in August 1989, after the initial denial of the reimbursement application that a meeting was held with Mr. Cimaglia, representatives of the County Board, and the Department, during which the Department finally came to understand that the initial cleanup method had been approved by the County Board. It is unreasonable for the Department to blame Mr. Cimaglia for the Department's failure to have communicated effectively with the County Board earlier. This is one of the first reimbursement applications which the Department processed. Its procedure for handling applications, and its standards for judging whether a reimbursement applications would be granted, was just developing. The Department had not promulgated rules which would have told an applicant, such as Mr. Cimaglia, precisely what sort of information should have been submitted with an application so that the Department would have known that the County Board had approved the initial treatment system. That information was readily available to the Department, and there is no satisfactory explanation in this record of why the Department did not know it, for a Department employee did telephone the County Board, and should have been told that the treatment system had been approved. This inadequate investigation of the application by the Department caused Mr. Cimaglia to incur attorneys fees in attempting to process his application, and is an appropriate item to be reimbursed under the Equal Access to Justice Act in these circumstances. The Department justifies its failure to have initially approved personnel costs on the basis that the Department believed Mr. Cimaglia had provided all supporting documentation before it made its initial decision on December 20, 1988, on the reimbursement application. While the application had copies of many invoices, bills, receipts, or cancelled checks to show direct costs, the Department received no specific documentation of personnel costs until after its initial denial of personnel costs on December 20, 1988. No rule of the Department stated the manner in which these applications would be handled, and there was no way for Mr. Cimaglia to know what to send. Because he had to incur attorneys fees to make the matter more specific, those fees should be reimbursable under the Equal Access to Justice Act. Mr. Cimaglia could not have known to send with his application information of the type the Department ultimately accepted. Paving costs should be treated similarly. Mr. Cimaglia did submit a map which showed an area from which the diesel fuel tanks had been removed and where remedial activities occurred. That area had to be repaved with asphalt. He had submitted a paver's invoice for $3,700. Information about the size of the excavated area and the thickness of the pavement had been available in the files of the County Board since that work had been performed. The fact that the Department had, at the time it was processing early applications, little experience in determining the reasonableness of paving costs is not an adequate reason to have denied the costs here. A paver's invoice had been submitted. The Department had no reasonable basis to reject it, and indeed ultimately accepted those costs. The Department's actions required Mr. Cimaglia to incur attorneys fees, and these fees ought to be reimbursable under the Equal Access to Justice Act.

Florida Laws (3) 120.68376.307157.111
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