The Issue Whether proposed rules 25-4.300 ("Scope and Definition"); 25-4.301 ("Applicability of Fresh Look"); and 25-4.302, ("Termination of Local Exchange Contracts"), Florida Administrative Code, known as "The Fresh Look Provision," constitute an "invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority".
Findings Of Fact Telecommunications carriers/providers may "wear different hats," dependent upon what function they are performing at a given time. Local exchange carriers are abbreviated "LECs" in the proposed rules. For purposes of this case only, Time Warner is an Alternative Local Exchange Carrier ("ALEC") and GTE and BST are Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers ("ILECs"). Both types of companies provide local telephone service over the public switch network. On February 17, 1998, Time Warner filed a Petition to Initiate Rulemaking. Time Warner's Petition requested that the Commission adopt what it described as a "Fresh Look" rule, under which a customer a/k/a "patron" a/k/a "end user" of an ILEC who had agreed to a long-term, discounted contract would have an opportunity to abrogate that ILEC contract without incurring the liability to the ILEC which the customer had agreed to, so that the customer could then enter a new contract with an ALEC. On at least one prior occasion, the Commission had elected to reach a similar result by a Final Order, rather than by enacting a rule. This time, the Commission granted Time Warner's Petition, and the Commission began the rulemaking process. Other states have adopted "Fresh Look" rules or statutes with varying degrees of success. The legislative, administrative, or litigation histories of these extraterritorial matters are immaterial to the rule validity issues herein, which are governed by Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Those histories are likewise non-binding on this forum. The Commission has no way of identifying, let alone notifying, ILEC contract customers as a separate class of the public or as a separate class of potentially interested parties. However, the public, including customers and carriers, received the required statutory notice(s) at each stage of the rulemaking process, and only the following dates and occurrences have significance within the rulemaking process for purposes of the issues herein. A Notice of Rulemaking Development was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly on April 3, 1998. Commission staff held a Rule Development Workshop on April 22, 1998. Based on information received from carriers in response to staff data requests, the rules as proposed April 3, 1998, were revised by staff. On March 4, 1999, staff recommended that the revised rules be adopted by the Commission. At its Agenda Conference on March 19, 1999, the Commission set the rulemaking for hearing. On March 24, 1999, the Commission issued a Notice of Rulemaking, which included further revisions to the proposed rules. The Commission received a letter from JAPC dated April 28, 1999 ("the JAPC letter") which stated, in pertinent part: Article 1, Section 10 of the Florida Constitution prohibits the passage of laws impairing the obligation of contracts. Inasmuch as the rules effectively amend the terms of existing contracts, please reconcile the rules with the Constitution. The JAPC letter was not placed into the rulemaking record, responded-to by the Commission, or specifically addressed on its merits by any interested parties. Interested parties did not find out about it until many months later. A rulemaking hearing on the proposed rules was held before the Commission on May 12, 1999. Interested persons submitted written and oral testimony and comments at the hearing. No customer with a contract that would be affected by these rules participated in the rulemaking proceedings, including the hearing, before the Commission. At no time did anyone formally submit a lower cost regulatory alternative, but it was clear throughout the rulemaking process that Petitioners herein opposed the adoption of the proposed rules. Two Statements of Estimated Regulatory Cost ("SERCs") were prepared by Commission staff. The proposed rules were further revised after the May 12, 1999, hearing. On November 4, 1999, Commission staff issued a recommendation that the Commission adopt the latest rules draft, in part on the basis that the proposed rules will implement the "regulatory mandates" of Section 364.01, Florida Statutes, that the Commission should "promote competition by encouraging new entrants" and "encourage competition through flexible regulatory treatment among providers of telecommunication services." Attached to this recommendation was a revised SERC, dated September 13, 1999. The September 13, 1999, SERC addressed the alternative of not adopting the proposed rules, and found such an alternative was not viable because it would not foster competition. In preparing both SERCs, Commission staff relied solely on market share data for analyzing competition and did not fully account for revenues to which ILECs were contractually entitled, but which potentially could be unilaterally cancelled by the ILEC customer as a result of the proposed rules. Staff did not ask for such data for estimating cost of the proposed rules to the ILECs. At its November 16, 1999, Agenda Conference, the participation of interested parties was limited to addressing the new SERC. During this Agenda Conference, the Commission revised the rules further, limiting the contracts affected by them to contracts entered into before July 1, 1999, and voted to approve the proposed rules as revised. The exact language of the proposed rules under challenge, as published in the December 3, 1999, Florida Administrative Weekly, pursuant to Section 120.54(3)(d), Florida Statutes, is as follows: PART XII - FRESH LOOK: 25-4.300 Scope and Definitions. Scope. For the purposes of this Part, all contracts that include local telecommunications services offered over the public switched network, between LECs and end users, which were entered into prior to June 30, 1999, that are in effect as of the effective date of this rule, and are scheduled to remain in effect for a least one year after the effective date of this rule will be contracts eligible for Fresh Look. Local telecommunications services offered over the public switched network are defined as those services which include provision of dial tone and flat-rated or message-rated usage. If an end user exercises an option to renew or a provision for automatic renewal, this constitutes a new contract for purposes of this Part, unless penalties apply if the end user elects not to exercise such option or provision. This Part does not apply to LECs which had fewer than 100,000 access lines as of July 1, 1995, and have not elected price-cap regulation. Eligible contracts include, but are not limited to, Contract Service Arrangements (CSAs) and tariffed term plans in which the rate varies according to the end user's term commitment. The end user may exercise this provision solely for the purpose of obtaining a new contract. For the purposes of this Part, the definitions to the following terms apply: "Fresh Look Window" - The period of time during which LEC end users may terminate eligible contracts under the limited liability provision specified in Rule 25- 4.302(3). "Notice of Intent to Terminate" - The written notice by an end user of the end user's intent to terminate an eligible contract pursuant to this rule. "Notice of Termination" - The written notice by an end user to terminate an eligible contract pursuant to this rule. "Statement of Termination Liability" - The written statement by a LEC detailing the liability pursuant to 25-4.302(3), if any, for an end user to terminate an eligible contract. 25-4.301 Applicability of Fresh Look. The Fresh Look Window shall apply to all eligible contracts. The Fresh Look Window shall begin 60 days after the effective date of this rule. The Fresh Look Window shall remain open for one year from the starting date of the Fresh Look Window. An end user may only issue one Notice of Intent to Terminate during the Fresh Look Window for each eligible contract. 25-4.302 Termination of LEC Contracts. Each LEC shall respond to all Fresh Look inquiries and shall designate a contact within its company to which all Fresh Look inquiries and requests should be directed. An end user may provide a written Notice of Intent to Terminate an eligible contract to the LEC during the Fresh Look Window. Within ten business days of receiving the Notice of Intent to Terminate, the LEC shall provide a written Statement of Termination Liability. The termination liability shall be limited to any unrecovered, contract specific nonrecurring costs, in an amount not to exceed the termination liability specified in the terms of the contract. The termination liability shall be calculated as follows: For tariffed term plans, the payments shall be recalculated based on the amount that would have been paid under a tariffed term plan that corresponds to the actual time the service has been subscribed to. For CSAs, the termination liability shall be limited to any unrecovered, contract specific nonrecurring costs, in an amount not to exceed the termination liability specified in the terms of the contract. The termination liability shall be calculated from the information contained in the contract or the workpapers supporting the contract. If a discrepancy arises between the contract and the workpapers, the contract shall be controlling. In the Statement of Termination Liability, the LEC shall specify if and how the termination liability will vary depending on the date services are disconnected pursuant to subsections (4) and (6). From the date the end user receives the Statement of Termination Liability from the LEC, the end user shall have 30 days to provide a Notice of Termination. If the end user does not provide a Notice of Termination within 30 days, the eligible contract shall remain in effect. If the end user provides the Notice of Termination, the end user will pay any termination liability in a one-time payment. The LEC shall have 30 days to terminate the subject services from the date the LEC receives the Notice of Termination. (Emphasis provided only to facilitate the following discussion of "timed" provisions) "Tariff term plans" or "tariffed term plans" are telecommunication service plans in which the rate the customer pays depends on the length of the service commitment. The longer the service commitment the customer makes with the company, the lower the monthly rate will be. Ninety-eight percent of the contracts affected by the proposed rules are tariff term plans filed with the Commission. Contract service arrangements (CSAs) have many functions. By tariff term plans and CSAs, carriers and their customers formalize a negotiation whereby the customer signs-on for service for an extended period, in exchange for lower rates than he would get if he committed to shorter periods or under the regular tariff. Both tariff term plans and CSAs are subject to the Commission's regulatory oversight. No reason was given for use of the "included but not limited to" language added in the rules' current draft. The Commission has published that the "specific authority" for the proposed rules is Sections 350.127(2) and 364.19, Florida Statutes. The Commission has published that the "law implemented" by the proposed rules is Sections 364.19 and 364.01, Florida Statutes. The proposed rules would allow customers of ILECs, including Petitioners GTE and BST, to terminate their contracts and tariffed term plans for local exchange services without paying the termination liability stated in those contracts and tariffs. Instead, customers would only be required to pay the ILEC "any unrecovered, contract specific nonrecurring costs" associated with the contracts. (Proposed rule 25-4.302(3)(b)). For tariffed term plans (but not contracts), termination liability would be recalculated as the difference, if any, between the amount the customer paid and the amount he would have paid under a plan corresponding to the period during which he actually subscribed to the service. (Proposed rule 25- 4.302(3)(a)). The "Fresh Look" rule applies to agreements entered into before June 30, 1999, and that remain in effect for at least one year after the date the rule takes effect. (Proposed rule 25-4.300(1)). The window for contract termination starts 60 days after the rules' effective date and lasts for one year thereafter. (Proposed rule 25-4.301). In the case of ILEC customers who may exercise the "opt-out early" (termination) provisions of the proposed rules, the proposed rules would provide the ILECs with the compensation they would have received if the contracts had been made for a shorter period than for the period of time for which the parties had actually negotiated. The proposed rules clearly modify existing contracts. Indeed, they retroactively impair existing contracts. It may reasonably be inferred that the retroactive elimination of the respective durations of the existing contracts would work to the detriment of any ILECs which have waived "start up costs" on individual contracts or which planned or invested in any technological upgrades or committed to any other business components (labor, training, material, development, expansion, etc.) in anticipation of fulfilling the contracts and profiting over the longer contract terms legally entered-into prior to the proposed rules. The purpose of the proposed rules, as reflected in the Commission's rulemaking notices, is to "enable ALECs to compete for existing ILEC customer contracts covering local exchange telecommunications services offered over the public switched network, which were entered into prior to switch-based substitutes for local exchange telecommunications services." However, the Commission now concedes that switch-based substitutes for the ILECs' local exchange services were widely available to consumers prior to June 30, 1999, the date provided in the proposed rule. At hearing, the Commission asserted that it is also the purpose of the proposed rules to actively encourage competition, and that by proposing these rules, the Commission deemed competition to be meaningful or sufficient enough to warrant a "fresh look" at the ILECs' contracts, but not so widespread that the rules would not be necessary. In effect, the Commission made a "judgment call" concerning the existence of "meaningful or sufficient" competition, but has not defined "sufficient" or "meaningful" competition for purposes of the proposed rules. The Commission's selection of June 30, 1999, as the cut-off date for contract eligibility was motivated primarily by a concept that using that date would render approximately 40 percent of existing ILEC contracts eligible for termination. The rulemaking process revealed that the terms of so- called "long-term" agreements range from six months to four years in duration. The Commission selected a one-year term for eligible contracts subject to the proposed rules as a compromise based on this spread of actual contract durations. The one-year window of opportunity in which a customer will be permitted to terminate a contract was selected by the Commission as a compromise among presenters' views expressed during the rulemaking process. The one-year window is to be implemented 60 days after the effective date of the rule to avoid the type of problems incurred when a "fresh look" was previously accomplished by a Commission Order and to allow the ILECs and ALECs time to prepare. Tariffed term plans were developed as a response to competition and have been used at least since 1973. As early as 1984, the Commission had, by Order, given ILECs authority to use CSAs for certain services, upon the condition that there was a competitive alternative available. The Commission has long been aware of the ILECs' use of termination liability provisions in CSAs and tariff term plans, including provisions for customer premises equipment (CPE), and has not affirmatively determined that their use is anticompetitive, discriminatory, or otherwise impermissible. Private branch exchanges (PBXs), which are switches, competed with the ILECs' Centrex systems for medium- to large- size business customers and key telephone systems for smaller businesses, from the early 1980's, as recognized by a Commission Order in 1994. Commission Order No. PSC-94-0285-FOF-TP, dated March 3, 1994, in Docket No. 921074-TP, permitted a "fresh look" for customers of LEC private line and special access services with terms equal to, or greater than, three years. Customers were permitted a limited time to terminate their existing contracts with LECs to take advantage of emerging competitive alternatives, such as alternative access vendors' (AAVs') ability to interconnect with LECs' facilities. Termination liability of the customer to the ILEC was limited to the amount the customer would have paid for the services actually used. Prior to 1996, only ILECs could offer dial tone service, which enables end users to communicate with anyone else who has a telephone. Chapter 364, Florida Statutes, Florida's telecommunication statute, was amended effective January 1, 1996, to allow ALECs to operate in Florida. ILECs had offered tariffed term plans and CSAs for certain services before the 1996 revision of Chapter 364, Florida Statutes, but effective 1996, substantial amendments allowed the entry of ALECs into ILECs' markets. The new amendments codified and expanded the ILECs' ability to use CSAs and term and volume discount contracts in exchange for ILECs losing their exclusive local franchises and deleted statutory language requiring the Commission to determine that there was effective competition for a particular service before an ILEC could be granted pricing flexibility for that service. Tariff filings before the amendments had required Commission approval. The federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 also opened the ILECs' local exchange markets to full competition and imposed upon the ILECs a number of obligations designed to encourage competitive entry by ALECs into the market, including allowing ALECs to interconnect their networks with those of ILECs; "unbundling" ILEC networks to sell the unbundled elements to competitors; and reselling ILEC telecommunications services to ALECs at a wholesale discount. See 47 U.S.C. Section 51 et seq. "Resale" means taking an existing service provided by a LEC and repackaging or remarketing it. The requirement that ILECs resell their services, including contracts and tariffed term plans, to competitors at a wholesale discount, has been very effective in stimulating resale competition, but to resell or not is purely an internal business decision of each ALEC. For instance, Time Warner has elected not to be involved in "resales," and is entirely "facility based." Since 1996, competing carriers could and do sell additional (other) services to customers already committed to long-term ILEC contracts. They may also purchase ILEC CSAs wholesale at discount and resell such agreements to customers. Market share data demonstrates that there has been greater ALEC competition in Florida since the 1996 amendments, but typically, ALECs target big cities with denser populations and denser business concentrations. There is no persuasive evidence that any of the affected ILEC contracts (those post-June 30, 1999) were entered into by customers who did not have competing alternatives from which to choose. In fact, testimony by Commission staff supports a finding that since LECs' CSAs are subject to Commission review and their service tariffs are filed with the Commission, the Commission has not authorized CSAs unless there was an "uneconomic bypass" or competition. "Uneconomic bypass" occurs where a competitor can offer service at a price below the LEC's tariffed rate but above the LEC's cost. The Commission presented an ILEC customer, Mr. Eric Larsen of Tallahassee, who testified that he had had the benefit of competition, not necessarily from an ALEC, when he had entertained a bid from a carrier different from his then-current ILEC in 1999. However, at that time, he renegotiated an expiring contract with his then-current ILEC instead of with the competitor. This renewal contract with an ILEC would not be affected by the proposed rules. Business customers, such as Mr. Larsen, may reasonably perceive business trends. They could reasonably be expected to have factored into their negotiations with competing carriers at the time the contracts were formed that a potential for greater choices would occur in the future, even within the life of their long-term contracts with an ILEC. As of 1999, 80 ALECs were serving Florida customers, 100 more had expressed their intention of serving Florida before the end of the year 2000, and ALECs had obtained some share of the business lines in many exchanges. While this does not mean that every area of Florida has every service, it is indicative of a spread of competition. Petitioner GTE is anchored in the Tampa Bay area. By June 30, 1999, the date expressed in the proposed rules, nine facilities-based competitors were in the same geographic area. One ALEC (MCI) was serving 10,000 lines. Competitors operated 20 switches and 83 percent of the buildings in GTE's franchise area were within 18,000 feet of a competitor's switch. However, in most cases, GTE's CSA or tariff term agreements had been successful against specific competing bids for the respective services. Market share data showed that by June 30, 1999, Petitioner GTE had executed 101 agreements allowing ALECs to provide service by inter-connecting their networks with GTE's networks, reselling GTE's services, and/or taking "unbundled" parts of GTE's network. While market share data is not conclusive, in the absence of any better economic analysis by the Commission or other evidence of existing ALEC presence or of a different prognosis for ALEC penetration, market share is at least one indicator of the state of competition when the contracts addressed by the proposed rules were entered into. The Commission has no data about how many customers currently opt-out of their ILEC contracts prior to natural expiration and pay the termination liability to which those ILEC agreements bind them in order to accept a competing offer from another carrier, but clearly, some do. This evidences current competition. Competing carriers can and do sell to ILEC customers at the natural expiration of their long-term agreements. This evidences current competition. The Commission has no data predicting how many more customers would opt-out if the proposed rules are validated. Therefore, the presumption that "if we publish a rule they will come" is speculative. Likewise the Commission's presumption that customers regard termination liability provisions in ILEC contracts as a barrier to their choices and a bar to competition was not proven. Some of the factors that went into that presumption were speculative because the Commission has not reviewed the termination liability provisions of Petitioners' contracts and has offered no evidence of formal complaints to the Commission by customers who want to opt-out of ILEC contracts. "Informal communication" with Commission staff by customers was undocumented and unquantified. The Commission did present the testimony of Mr. Larsen who explained that because he needs to keep the same business telephone number, he feels that it is not economically feasible for him to opt-out of his several overlapping ILEC contracts unless he can synchronize all his existing contract termination dates and that the proposed "fresh look" rules would permit him to do that. However, his testimony provided no valid predictor that even if the termination of all his existing ILEC contracts were enabled by the proposed rules he would, in fact, be able to find a competitor in his area whose contract(s) were more to his liking. The proposed rules, with their arbitrary date of June 30, 1999, would not allow Mr. Larsen to terminate, without liability, the one ILEC contract he entered into after that date. (See Finding of Fact No. 47). Based on his sincere but unfocused testimony, it remains speculation to presume that Mr. Larsen would be willing to incur contractual liability by early termination of his single non-qualifying ILEC contract just because the proposed rules would let him "opt-out" of the several qualifying ILEC contracts. It is indicative of the proposed rules' possible effect on future competition that Mr. Larsen speculated that if he could terminate all his qualifying ILEC contracts simultaneously under the proposed rules, he might be able to persuade a competitor, perhaps an ALEC, to pay his termination costs on his single non- qualifying ILEC contract if he renegotiated all his business away from his ILEC and to that competitor. The introduction of the proposed rules into the market place could create a "competitive edge" not anticipated by the Commission. Other carriers, including ALECs competing with ILECs, can and do enter into contracts with their customers which, like the contracts which would be affected by the proposed rules, are long-term contracts subject to termination liability, but the long-term contracts of carriers other than ILECs would not be affected by the proposed rules. The proposed rules pertain only to ILECs and their business customers. In effect, the proposed rules apply predominantly to ILECs' large business customers. Under the proposed rules, competitors which had originally bid against the ILECs for an affected contract at the time it was entered-into could get "a second bite at the apple" occasioned solely by the application of the proposed rules.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Rule 25-4.113(1)(f), Florida Administrative Code, is a valid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact History of the Rule The Commission first adopted a rule setting out its policy on disconnection and refusal of service in August of 1955. In re: Adoption of rules and regulations governing telephone companies, Order No. 2195 (June 24, 1955) (O.R. E). (Prehearing stipulation p. 10) Rule 20 provided that: “Service may be denied to any subscriber or applicant for failure to comply with these rules, the telephone company’s tariff, municipal ordinances or state laws.” Id. Effective December 1, 1968, the Commission revised its disconnect rule to specifically provide that a company could disconnect telephone service for nonpayment. In re: Proposed revision of rules and regulations governing telephone companies, Order No. 4439 (October 17, 1968) (O.R. F). (Prehearing stipulation p. 10) Since adoption of Rule 310-4.66(1) in 1968, the Commission’s disconnect rule has been revised seven times: In re: Proposed revision of Chapter 2-4 relating to telephone companies and radio common carriers, Order No. 7132 (March 1, 1976) (O.R. G); In re: Amendment of Rules 25-4.113 and 25-10.74 - Relating to Refusal or Discontinuance of Service, Order No. 13787, 84 F.P.S.C. 10:208 (1984) (O.R. J); In re: Amendment of Rules 25-4.109 - Customer Deposits, 25-4.110 - Customer Billing, and 25-4.113 - Refusal or Discontinuance of Service, Order No. 16727, 86 F.P.S.C. 10:157 (1986) (O.R. K); In re: Amendment of Rule 25-4.113 - F.A.C., pertaining to Refusal or Discontinuance of Service by Company, Order No. 23721, 90 F.P.S.C. 11:75 (1990) (O.R. M); In re: Adoption of Rule 25-4.160, F.A.C., Operation of Telecommunications Relay Service and Amendment of Rules 25-4.113, F.A.C., Refusal or Discontinuance of Service by Company; 25- 4.150, F.A.C., The Administrator; 25-24.475, F.A.C., Company Operations; Rules Incorporated, Order No. PSC-92-0950-FOF-TP, 92 F.P.S.C. 9:208 (1992) (O.R. N); In re: Proposed Amendment of Rule 25-4.113, F.A.C., Prohibiting Refusal or Discontinuance of Service for Nonpayment of a Dishonored Check Service Charge Imposed by the Utility, Order No. PSC-92-1483-FOF-PU, 92 F.P.S.C. 12:543 (1992) (O.R. P); In re: Proposed Amendment to Rule 25- 4.113 F.A.C., Refusal or Discontinuance of Service by Company, Order No. PSC-95-0028-FOF-TL, 95 F.P.S.C. 1:50 (1995) (O.R. T). (Prehearing stipulation p.11) By Order No. 12765, issued December 9, 1983, the Commission expanded its disconnect policy to allow local exchange companies (LECs) that bill for interexchange carriers (IXCs) to disconnect local service for nonpayment of the long distance portion of the bill. In re: Intrastate telephone access charges for toll use of local exchange services, Order No. 12765, 83 F.P.S.C. 12:100, 125 (1983) (O.R. H). (Tr 118-119) The Commission believed that “by granting LECs disconnect authority bad debts for toll charges will be less than without this authority.” Order No. 12765 at 12:125. (Tr 120) In addition, the Commission found that if the IXCs encounter excessive bad debt expense, the IXCs may increase their toll charges to recoup expenses, which would cause Florida subscribers to pay higher toll rates. Order No. 12765 at 12:125. (Tr 120) The disconnect authority for nonpayment for IXC toll charges was limited only to LECs who performed billing and collection services for IXCs. Order No. 12765 at 12:125. (Tr 120) By Order No. 13429, issued June 18, 1984, the Commission ordered Florida’s LECs to file a uniform tariff that specified their billing and collection procedures and rates when billing for IXCs. In re: Intrastate telephone access charges for Toll Use of Local Exchange Services, Order No. 13429, 84 F.P.S.C. 6:221 (1984) (O.R. I). The LECs complied with this requirement. (Tr 126-127; Ex 30) Since the Commission first adopted its disconnect policy, the Legislature has never enacted legislation to invalidate the Commission’s policy. (Tr 155) Nor has the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee ever objected to any version of the Commission’s disconnect rule. (Tr 155-156) The Current Version of Rule 25-4.113(1)(f) Today, Rule 25-4.113(1) provides: the company may refuse or discontinue telephone service under the following conditions provided that, unless otherwise stated, the customer shall be given notice and allowed a reasonable time to comply with any rule or remedy any deficiency: * * * (f) For nonpayment of bills for telephone service, including the telecommunications access system surcharge referred to in Rule 25-4.160(3), provided that suspension or termination of service shall not be made without 5 working days’ written notice to the customer, except in extreme cases. The written notice shall be separate and apart from the regular monthly bill for service. A company shall not, however, refuse or discontinue service for nonpayment of a dishonored check service charge imposed by the company. No company shall discontinue service to any customer for the initial nonpayment of the current bill on a day the company’s business office is closed or on a day preceding a day the business office is closed. * * * (O.R. CC) LECs that bill for IXCs can still disconnect for nonpayment of toll calls. (Tr 122, 158) No company, however, can disconnect for nonpayment of unregulated services, such as customer premises services like inside wire maintenance and information services like voice mail. Rule 25-4.113(4)(e), Florida Administrative Code. (Tr 124-125, 130) In addition, the billing and collection tariffs are not uniform today because LECs have individually lowered many of the rates they charge for billing and collection services. (Tr 128-129; Ex 31). Two Separate, Pertinent Service Contracts It is important for understanding the Commission’s rationale for its disconnect rule to recognize that two separate, pertinent service contracts are involved. (Tr 151-152) One is the billing and collection services contract between the LEC and the IXC. (Tr 126, 152) The other is the contract for service between the company providing telephone service and the subscriber. (Tr 152) As discussed above, LECs who perform billing and collection services for IXCs have a tariff on file with the Commission that sets out the terms, conditions, and rates upon which the LECs offer this service. (Tr 126 -129; Ex 31) Pertaining to the contract for telephone service, the Commission has specified by rule the terms and conditions upon which a company may refuse or disconnect service. (Tr 137) Each company has a tariff on file with the Commission that sets out the terms and conditions upon which it will refuse or disconnect service. (Tr 137; Ex 32) The Commission’s Dispute Policy If service is going to be disconnected for any authorized reason, separate notice must first be provided to the customer. Rule 25-4.113, Florida Administrative Code; In re: Complaint of Aristides Day Against BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. d/b/a Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company regarding interruption of service, Order No. PSC-94-0716-FOF-TL, 94 F.P.S.C. 6:157 (1994) (O.R. R). If a customer has a pending complaint concerning disputed charges, Rule 25-22.032(10), Florida Administrative Code, prohibits disconnection for nonpayment of the disputed charges. (Tr 129) (O.R. FF) The customer, however, is expected to pay the charges not in dispute. In re: Complaint of Ron White against AT&T Communications and GTE Florida Incorporated regarding responsibility for disputed calling card charges, Order No. PSC-92-1321-FOF-TP, 92 F.P.S.C. 11:274 (1992) (O.R. O); In re: Complaint of Leon Plaskett against BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. d/b/a Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company regarding unpaid long distance bills, Order No. PSC-94-0722-FOF-TL, 94 F.P.S.C. 6:177 (1994) (O.R. S). When a LEC contracts with an IXC to perform an IXC’s billing and collection functions, the Commission acts to resolve disputes over both intra and interstate toll calls. In re: Complaint against AT&T Communications of the Southern States, Inc. and United Telephone Company of Florida by Health Management Systems, Inc., regarding interLATA PIC slamming, Order No. PSC- 97-0203-FOF-TP, 97- F.P.S.C. 2:477, 482 (1997) (O.R. AA). (Tr 55) Rationale for Rule 25-4.113(1)(f) The reasons the Commission gave in 1983 to allow companies to disconnect for nonpayment of toll are still viable today. (Tr 122, 158). If LECs could not disconnect for unpaid IXC bills, the IXCs uncollectible expenses would probably increase. (Tr 122-123, 138, 158) Moreover, if local service was not disconnected, a consumer could run up bad debts with different IXCs without ever paying for a toll call. (Tr 124, 135) This bad debt would have to be passed on to Florida consumers through increased rates to cover the uncollectible expenses. (Tr 122-123, 135, 158) Good paying customers should not have to pay for the fraud created by those who switch from carrier to carrier leaving behind unpaid toll charges. (Tr 124, 135) Additional reasons for the policy also exist because of the 1995 changes to Chapter 364, Florida Statutes (1995). If the Commission prohibited LECs from disconnecting local service for nonpayment of toll, LECs would be economically disadvantaged and alternative local exchange companies (ALECs) would be advantaged. (Tr 123, 147-148) This is because LECs could not disconnect local service for nonpayment of toll, but the ALECs could continue to disconnect due to the Commission’s limited jurisdiction and regulation over ALECs. (Tr 123, 147-148) Moreover, deposit requirements are affected by the disconnect policy. If LECs could not disconnect for nonpayment, deposit requirements would probably increase. (Tr 123-124, 195) Large deposits are a barrier to access to telecommunications services and would have an adverse effect on subscribership. (Tr 124) Finally, the Rule puts costs on the cost causer. (Tr 158) The Rule’s Impact on Universal Service The obligation to provide universal service is the obligation to offer access to basic telephone service at reasonable and affordable rates. Section 364.025(1), Florida Statutes (1995). (Tr 139, 167; Ex 29) As long as a customer pays the nondisputed portion of his bill, service will not be disconnected. (Tr 143) Therefore, Rule 25-4.113(1)(f) does not preclude a subscriber from obtaining basic local service, as long as he pays the undisputed portion of his telephone bill. (Tr 142-143) Basic service includes access to all locally available IXCs. Section 364.02(2), Florida Statutes (1995). (Tr 133-134) Any consumer who pays his bill can have access to any available carrier in the market where he resides. (Tr 133-134, 149) The Rule’s Impact on Competition Today the toll market is reasonably competitive. (Tr 144) In 1995, the Legislature authorized competition in the local market. However, very few providers are actually providing basic local service; therefore, market conditions have not substantially changed since Rule 25-4.113 was last amended. (Tr 144-145) The basic local market is still largely a monopoly despite the legislative changes at the state and federal level. (Tr 145; Ex 28) The Commission is charged with regulating telecommunications companies during the transition from monopoly to competitive services. Section 364.01(3), Florida Statutes (1995). (Tr 156, 197-198) To a certain extent, all rules and regulations restrict competition. (Tr 147) In this case, the benefits of the rule outweigh any negative impact the rule may have on competition, because the rule keeps uncollectible expenses lower than they would otherwise be and it also puts costs on the cost causer.
The Issue Whether Department of Transportation acted fraudulently, arbitrarily, capriciously, illegally, or dishonestly in issuing its intent to award RFP-DOT- 91/92-9012 bid to Trauner Consulting Services.
Findings Of Fact Public notice that DOT was seeking competitive bids was given, and DOT prepared a document entitled: Request for Proposal, which set forth in detail all of DOT's requirements. The purpose of the RFP was to inform all potential bidders of the minimum requirements for submitting a responsive bid, and the specific criteria by which the bids would be evaluated. Specific areas of importance to Respondent were as follows: All proposals were to be submitted in two parts; the Technical Proposal and the Cost Proposal. The Technical Proposal was to be divided into an Executive Summary, Proposer's Management Plan and Proposer's Technical Plan. The price proposal was to be filed separately. The RFP requested written proposals from qualified firms to develop and provide training on highway and bridge construction scheduling use as it pertains to Department of Transportation Construction Engineers. Proposals for RFP-DOT-91/92-9012 (hereinafter "RFP"), were received and opened by FDOT on or about December 14, 1992. Eleven companies submitted proposals. The technical portions of the proposals were evaluated by a three (3) person committee comprised of Gordon Burleson, Keith Davis and John Shriner, all FDOT employees. Gordon Burleson is the Engineer of Construction Training for FDOT. He administers the training for FDOT engineers and engineer technicians who work in FDOT's Construction Bureau. John Shriner is the State Construction Scheduling Engineer for FDOT. Keith Davis is the District 7, Construction Scheduling Engineer and Construction Training Engineer for FDOT. The Committee members evaluated the proposals individually then met as a group. The Committee established no formal, uniform evaluation criteria to be used by all committee members. The price proposals were not revealed to the Committee members until after the proposals were technically evaluated and scored. The price proposals were reviewed separately by Charles Johnson of the Contractual Services Office, Department of Transportation. The Committee evaluated the proposals based on the general criteria contained in the RFP. The RFP listed the criteria for evaluation to include: Technical Proposal Technical evaluation is the process of reviewing the Proposer's Executive Summary, Management Plan and Technical Plan for understanding of project qualifications, technical approach and capabilities, to assure a quality project. Price Proposal Price analysis is conducted by comparison of price quotations submitted. The RFP established a point system for scoring proposals. Proposer's management and technical plans were allotted up to 40 points each, 80 percent of the total score. The price proposed was worth up to 20 points, or 20 percent of the total score. Petitioner's proposal was given a total score of 90 points out of a possible 100. Trauner's proposal was given a total score of 92.04 points out of a possible 100. Petitioner's was ranked highest for price proposal, and received a total of 20 points for its proposed price of $18,060. Trauner's proposed price was $24,500, the next lowest after Petitioner and received 14.74 points. The technical portion of Trauner's proposal was given a total of 77.3 points, 38 for its Management Plan and 39.3 for its Technical Plan. The technical portion of Petitioner's proposal was given a total of 70 points, 36.7 for its Management Plan and 33.3 for its Technical Plan. Each plan was reviewed separately by the three Committee members, The individual, pre-averaged scores vary with committee member, Keith Davis' score varying the most from the others. The Committee members did not discuss the proposals until after they had individually reviewed and scored them. The Committee members had discussed the criteria prior to receiving and evaluating the proposals. There was insufficient evidence to show that Committee members scores were determined by fraud, or were arbitrary, capricious, illegal, or dishonest.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Transportation enter a Final Order dismissing the protest filed herein by Petitioner, Systems/Software/Solutions and awarding RFP-DOT-91/92-9012 to Trauner Consulting Services. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of March, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of March, 1992. APPENDIX Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted in substance: paragraphs - 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8, 9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted in substance: paragraphs - 1,5,11(in part) Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of evidence or irrelevant: paragraphs 2,3,4,6,7,8,9,10,11(in part),12 COPIES FURNISHED: Donald F. Louser, Qualified Representative Systems/Software/Solutions 657 Sabal Lake Dr, #101 Longwood, Florida 32779 Susan P. Stephens, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS-58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Attn: Eleanor F. Turner, MS-58 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams, Esquire General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
The Issue Whether the Department of Corrections? action to withdraw its Intent to Award and to reject all replies to ITN 12-DC-8396 is illegal, arbitrary, dishonest, or fraudulent, and if so, whether its Intent to Award is contrary to governing statutes, rules, policies, or the solicitation specifications.
Findings Of Fact The DOC is an agency of the State of Florida that is responsible for the supervisory and protective care, custody, and control of Florida?s inmate population. In carrying out this statutory responsibility, the Department provides access to inmate telephone services. On April 15, 2013, the DOC issued the ITN, entitled “Statewide Inmate Telephone Services, ITN 12-DC-8396,” seeking vendors to provide managed-access inmate telephone service to the DOC. Responses to the ITN were due to be opened on May 21, 2013. The DOC issued Addendum #1 to the ITN on April 23, 2013, revising one page of the ITN. The DOC issued Addendum #2 to the ITN on May 14, 2013, revising a number of pages of the ITN, and including answers to a number of vendor questions. EPSI, GTL, and Securus are providers of inmate telephone systems and services. Securus is the incumbent contractor, and has been providing the Department with services substantially similar to those solicited for over five years. No party filed a notice of protest to the terms, conditions, or specifications contained in the ITN or the Addenda within 72 hours of their posting or a formal written protest within 10 days thereafter. Replies to the ITN were received from EPSI, GTL, Securus, and Telmate, LLC. Telmate?s reply was determined to be not responsive to the ITN. Two-Part ITN As amended by Addendum #2, section 2.4 of the ITN, entitled “ITN Process,” provided that the Invitation to Negotiate process to select qualified vendors would consist of two distinct parts. In Part 1, an interested vendor was to submit a response that described certain Mandatory Responsiveness Requirement elements, as well as a Statement of Qualifications, Technical Response, and Financial Documentation. These responses would then be scored using established evaluation criteria and the scores would be combined with cost points assigned from submitted Cost Proposals. In Part 2, the Department was to select one or more qualified vendors for negotiations. After negotiations, the Department would request a Best and Final Offer from each vendor for final consideration prior to final award decision. The ITN provided that the Department could reject any and all responses at any time. High Commissions and Low Rates Section 2.5 of the ITN, entitled “Initial Cost Response,” provided in part: It is the Department?s intention, through the ITN process, to generate the highest percentage of revenue for the State, while ensuring a quality telephone service with reasonable and justifiable telephone call rate charges for inmate?s family and friends similar to those available to the public-at- large. Section 2.6 of the ITN, entitled “Revenue to be Paid to the Department,” provided in part that the Department intended to enter into a contract to provide inmate telephone service at no cost to the Department. It provided that, “[t]he successful Contractor shall pay to the Department a commission calculated as a percentage of gross revenues.”1/ The commission paid by a vendor is the single largest expense in the industry and is an important aspect of any bid. Contract Term Section 2.8 of the ITN was entitled “Contract Term” and provided: It is anticipated that the initial term of any Contract resulting from this ITN shall be for a five (5) year period. At its sole discretion, the Department may renew the Contract in accordance with Form PUR 1000 #26. The renewal shall be contingent, at a minimum, on satisfactory performance of the Contract by the Contractor as determined by the Department, and subject to the availability of funds. If the Department desires to renew the Contracts resulting from this ITN, it will provide written notice to the Contractor no later than thirty days prior to the Contract expiration date. Own Technology System Section 3.4 of the ITN provided in part: The successful Contractor is required to implement its own technology system to facilitate inmate telephone service. Due to the size and complexity of the anticipated system, the successful Contractor will be allowed a period of transition beginning on the date the contract is executed in which to install and implement the utilization of its own technology system. Transition, implementation and installation are limited to eighty (80) days. The Department realizes that some "down time" will occur during this transition, and Respondents shall propose an implementation plan that reduces this "down time" and allows for a smooth progression to the proposed ITS. GTL emphasizes the language stating that the successful contractor must implement “its own” technology system, and asserts that the technology system which EPSI offers to install is not owned by it, but by Inmate Calling Solutions, LLC (ICS), its subcontractor. However, EPSI demonstrated that while the inmate telephone platform, dubbed the “Enforcer System,” is owned by ICS now, that EPSI has a Master User Agreement with ICS and that an agreement has already been reached that before the contract would be entered into, a Statement of Work would be executed to create actual ownership in EPSI for purposes of the Florida contract. GTL alleges that in EPSI?s reply, EPSI relied upon the experience, qualifications, and resources of its affiliated entities in other areas as well. For example, GTL asserts that EPSI?s claim that it would be providing 83 percent of the manpower is false, since EPSI has acknowledged that EPSI is only a contracting subsidiary of CenturyLink, Inc., and that EPSI has no employees of its own. While it is clear that EPSI?s reply to the ITN relies upon the resources of its parent to carry out the terms of the contract with respect to experience, presence in the state, and personnel, EPSI demonstrated that this arrangement was common, and well understood by the Department. EPSI demonstrated that all required capabilities would be available to it through the resources of its parent and subcontractors at the time the contract was entered into, and that its reply was in conformance with the provisions of the ITN in all material respects. EPSI has the integrity and reliability to assure good faith performance of the contract. Call Recording Section 3.6 of the ITN, entitled “Inmate Telephone System Functionality (General),” provided in part: The system shall provide the capability to flag any individual telephone number in the inmate?s „Approved Number List? as „Do Not Record.? The default setting for each telephone number will be to record until flagged by Department personnel to the contrary. Securus alleges that section 3.6 of the ITN implements Department regulations2/ and that EPSI?s reply was non-responsive because it stated that recording of calls to specific telephone numbers would be deactivated regardless of who called that number. Securus alleges that this creates a security risk because other inmates calling the same number should still have their calls recorded. EPSI indicated in its reply to the ITN that it read, agreed, and would comply with section 3.6. While EPSI went on to say that this capability was not connected to an inmate?s PIN, the language of section 3.6 does not mention an inmate?s PIN either. Read literally, this section requires only the ability to “flag” any individual telephone number that appears in an inmate?s number list as “do not record” and requires that, by default, calls to a telephone number will be recorded until it is flagged. EPSI?s reply indicated it could meet this requirement. This provision says nothing about continuing to record calls to that same number from other inmates. Whether or not this creates a security risk or is what the Department actually desired are issues which might well be discussed as part of the negotiations, but this does not affect the responsiveness of EPSI?s reply to section 3.6. Furthermore, Mr. Cooper testified at hearing that EPSI does have the capability to mark a number as “do not record” only with respect to an individual inmate, at the option of the Department. EPSI?s reply conformed to the call-recording provisions of section 3.6 of the ITN in all material respects. Call Forwarding Section 3.6.8 of the ITN, entitled “System Restriction, Fraud Control and Notification Requirements,” provided that the provided inmate telephone services have the following security capability: Ability to immediately terminate a call if it detects that a called party?s telephone number is call forwarded to another telephone number. The system shall make a “notation” in the database on the inmate?s call. The system shall make this information available, in a report format, to designated department personnel. In response to an inquiry noting that, as worded, the ITN did not technically require a vendor to have the capability to detect call-forwarded calls in the first place, the Department responded that this functionality was required. Securus alleges that EPSI is unable to comply with this requirement, citing as evidence EPSI?s admission, made some months before in connection with an RFP being conducted by the Kansas Department of Corrections, that it did not yet have this capability. EPSI indicated in its reply to the ITN that it read, agreed, and would comply with this requirement. As for the Kansas solicitation, EPSI showed that it now possesses this capability, and has in fact installed it before. EPSI?s reply conformed to the call-forwarding provisions of section 3.6.8 of the ITN in all material respects. Keefe Commissary Network Section 5.2.1 of the ITN, entitled “Respondents? Business/Corporate Experience,” at paragraph e. directed each vendor to: [P]rovide and identify all entities of or related to the Respondent (including parent company and subsidiaries of the parent company; divisions or subdivisions of parent company or of Respondent), that have ever been convicted of fraud or of deceit or unlawful business dealings whether related to the services contemplated by this ITN or not, or entered into any type of settlement agreement concerning a business practice, including services contemplated by this ITN, in response to a civil or criminal action, or have been the subject of any complaint, action, investigation or suit involving any other type of dealings contrary to federal, state, or other regulatory agency regulations. The Respondent shall identify the amount of any payments made as part of any settlement agreement, consent order or conviction. Attachment 6 to the ITN, setting forth Evaluation Criteria, similarly provided guidance regarding the assessment of points for Business/Corporate Experience. Paragraph 1.(f) provided: “If any entities of, or related to, the Respondent were convicted of fraud or of deceit or unlawful business dealings, what were the circumstances that led to the conviction and how was it resolved by the Respondent?” Addendum #2. to the ITN, which included questions and answers, also contained the following: Question 57: In Attachment 6, Article 1.f. regarding respondents “convicted of fraud, deceit, or unlawful business dealing . . .” does this include associated subcontractors proposed in this ITN? Answer 57: Yes, any subcontractors you intend to utilize on this project, would be considered an entity of and related to your firm. As a proposed subcontractor, ICS is an entity of, or related to, EPSI. There is no evidence to indicate that ICS has ever been convicted of fraud or of deceit or unlawful business dealings. There is no evidence to indicate that ICS has entered into any type of settlement agreement concerning a business practice in response to a civil or criminal action. There is no evidence to indicate that ICS has been the subject of any complaint, action, investigation, or suit involving any other type of dealings contrary to federal, state, or other regulatory agency regulations. The only evidence at hearing as to convictions involved “two individuals from the Florida DOC” and “two individuals from a company called AIS, I think that?s American Institutional Services.” No evidence was presented that AIS was “an entity of or related to” EPSI. Conversely, there was no evidence that Keefe Commissary Network (KCN) or anyone employed by it was ever convicted of any crime. There was similarly no evidence that KCN entered into any type of settlement agreement concerning a business practice in response to civil or criminal action. It was shown that KCN “cooperated with the federal government in an investigation” that resulted in criminal convictions, and it is concluded that KCN was therefore itself a subject of an investigation involving any other type of dealings contrary to federal, state, or other regulatory agency regulations. However, KCN is not an entity of, or related to, EPSI. KCN is not a parent company of EPSI, it is not a division, subdivision, or subsidiary of EPSI, and it is not a division, subdivision, or subsidiary of EPSI?s parent company, CenturyLink, Inc. EPSI?s reply conformed to the disclosure requirements of section 5.2.1, Attachment 6, and Addendum #2 of the ITN in all material respects. Phases of the ITN Section 6 describes nine phases of the ITN: Phase 1 – Public Opening and Review of Mandatory Responsiveness Requirements Phase 2 – Review of References and Other Bid Requirements Phase 3 – Evaluations of Statement of Qualifications, Technical Responses, and Managed Access Solutions3/ Phase 4 – CPA Review of Financial Documentation Phase 5 – Review of Initial Cost Sheets Phase 6 – Determination of Final Scores Phase 7 – Negotiations Phase 8 – Best and Final Offers from Respondents Phase 9 – Notice of Intended Decision Evaluation Criteria in the ITN As amended by Addendum #2, the ITN established scoring criteria to evaluate replies in three main categories: Statement of Qualifications (500 points); Technical Response (400 points); and Initial Cost Sheets (100 points). It also provided specific guidance for consideration of the commissions and rates shown on the Initial Cost Sheet that made up the pricing category. Section 6.1.5 of the ITN, entitled “Phase 5 – Review of Initial Cost Sheet,” provided in part: The Initial Cost Proposal with the highest commission (percentage of gross revenue) to be paid to the Department will be awarded 50 points. The price submitted in Table 1 for the Original Contract Term, and the subsequent renewal price pages for Table 1 will be averaged to determine the highest commission submitted. All other commission percentages will receive points according to the following formula: (X/N) x 50 = Z Where: X = Respondents proposed Commission Percentage to be Paid. N = highest Commission Percentage to be Paid of all responses submitted. Z = points awarded. * * * The Initial Cost Proposal with the lowest telephone rate charge will be awarded 50 points. The price submitted in Table 1 for the Original Contract Term, and the subsequent renewal price pages for Table 1 will be averaged to determine the highest commission submitted. All other cost responses will receive points according to the following formula: (N/X) x 50 = Z Where: N = lowest verified telephone rate charge of all responses submitted. X = Respondent?s proposed lowest telephone rate charge. Z = points awarded. The ITN as amended by Addendum #2 provided instructions that initial costs should be submitted with the most favorable terms the Respondent could offer and that final percentages and rates would be determined through the negotiation process. It included the following chart:4/ COST PROPOSAL INITIAL Contract Term 5 years ONE Year Renewal TWO Year Renewal THREE Year Renewal FOUR Year Renewal FIVE Year Renewal Initial Department Commission % Rate Proposed Initial Blended Telephone Rate for All Calls* (inclusive of surcharges) The ITN, including its Addenda, did not specify selection criteria upon which the determination of best value to the state would be based. Allegation that EPSI Reply was Misleading On the Certification/Attestation Page, each vendor was required to certify that the information contained in its reply was true and sufficiently complete so as not to be misleading. While portions of its reply might have provided more detail, EPSI did not mislead the Department regarding its legal structure, affiliations, and subcontractors, or misrepresent what entity would be providing technology or services if EPSI was awarded the contract. EPSI?s reply explained that EPSI was a wholly owned corporate subsidiary of CenturyLink, Inc., and described many aspects of the contract that would be performed using resources of its parent, as well as aspects that would be performed through ICS as its subcontractor. Department Evaluation of Initial Replies The information on the Cost Proposal table was reviewed and scored by Ms. Hussey, who had been appointed as the procurement manager for the ITN. Attempting to follow the instructions provided in section 6.1.5, she added together the six numbers found in the boxes indicating commission percentages on the Cost Proposal sheets. One of these boxes contained the commission percentage for the original five-year contract term and each of the other five boxes contained the commission percentage for one of the five renewal years. She then divided this sum by six, the number of boxes in the computation chart (“divide by six”). In other words, she calculated the arithmetic mean of the six numbers provided in each proposal. The Department had not intended for the commission percentages to be averaged in this manner. Instead, they had intended that a weighted mean would be calculated. That is, they intended that five times the commission percentage shown for the initial contract term would be added to the commission percentages for the five renewal years, with that sum then being divided by ten, the total number of years (“divide by ten”). The Department did not clearly express this intent in section 6.1.5. Mr. Viefhaus testified that based upon the language, Securus believed that in Phase 5 the Department would compute the average commission rate the way that Ms. Hussey actually did it, taking the arithmetic mean of the six commission percentages provided by each vendor, and that therefore Securus prepared its submission with that calculation in mind.5/ Mr. Montanaro testified that based upon the language, GTL believed that in Phase 5 the Department would “divide by ten,” that is, compute the weighted mean covering the ten-year period of the contract, and that GTL filled out its Cost Proposal table based upon that understanding. The DOC posted a notice of its intent to negotiate with GTL, Securus, and EPSI on June 3, 2013. Telmate, LLC, was not chosen for negotiations.6/ Following the Notice of Intent to Negotiate was this statement in bold print: Failure to file a protest within the time prescribed in Section 120.57(3), Florida Statutes, or failure to post the bond or other security required by law within the time allowed for filing a bond shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. On June 14, 2013, the DOC issued a Request for Best and Final Offers (RBAFO), directing that Best and Final Offers (BAFO) be provided to the DOC by June 18, 2013. Location-Based Services The RBAFO included location-based services of called cell phones as an additional negotiated service, requesting a narrative description of the service that could be provided. The capability to provide location-based services had not been part of the original ITN, but discussions took place as part of the negotiations. Securus contends that EPSI was not a responsible vendor because it misrepresented its ability to provide such location-based services through 3Cinteractive, Inc. (3Ci). EPSI demonstrated that it had indicated to the Department during negotiations that it did not have the capability at that time, but that the capability could easily be added. EPSI showed that due to an earlier call it received from 3Ci, it believed that 3Ci would be able to provide location- based services to it. EPSI was also talking at this time to another company, CTI, which could also provide it that capability. In its BAFO, EPSI indicated it could provide these services, explained that they would require payments to a third- party provider, and showed a corresponding financial change to their offer. No competent evidence showed whether or not 3Ci was actually able to provide that service on behalf of EPSI, either at the time the BAFO was submitted, or earlier. EPSI showed that it believed 3Ci was available to provide that service, however, and there is no basis to conclude that EPSI in any way misrepresented its ability to provide location-based services during negotiations or in its BAFO. Language of the RBAFO The RBAFO provided in part: This RBAFO contains Pricing, Additional Negotiated Services, and Value Added Services as discussed during negotiation and outlined below. The other specifications of the original ITN, unless modified in the RBAFO, remain in effect. Respondents are cautioned to clearly read the entire RBAFO for all revisions and changes to the original ITN and any addenda to specifications, which are incorporated herein and made a part of this RBAFO document. Unless otherwise modified in this Request for Best and Final Offer, the initial requirements as set forth in the Department?s Invitation to Negotiate document and any addenda issued thereto have not been revised and remain as previously indicated. Additionally, to the extent that portions of the ITN have not been revised or changed, the previous reply/initial reply provided to the Department will remain in effect. These two introductory paragraphs of the RBAFO were confusing. It was not clear on the face of the RBAFO whether “other specifications” excluded only the pricing information to be supplied or also the specifications indicating how that pricing information would be calculated or evaluated. It was not clear whether “other specifications” were the same thing as “initial requirements” which had not been revised. It was not clear whether scoring procedures constituted “specifications.” While it was clear that, to the extent not revised or changed by the RBAFO, initial replies that had been submitted -- including Statements of Qualifications, Technical Response, Financial Documentation, and Cost Proposals -- would “remain in effect,” it was not clear how, if at all, these would be considered in determining the best value to the State. In the RBAFO under the heading “PRICING,” vendors were instructed to provide their BAFO for rates on a provided Cost Proposal table which was virtually identical to the table that had been provided earlier in the ITN for the evaluation stage, including a single square within which to indicate a commission rate for the initial five-year contract term, and five squares within which to indicate commission rates for each of five renewal years. The RBAFO stated that the Department was seeking pricing that would provide the “best value to the state.” It included a list of 11 additional services that had been addressed in negotiations and stated that, “in order to provide the best value to the state,” the Department reserved the right to accept or reject any or all of these additional services. It provided that after BAFOs were received, the Negotiation Team would prepare a summary of the negotiations and make a recommendation as to which vendor would provide the “best value to the state.” The RBAFO did not specify selection criteria upon which the determination of best value to the State would be based. In considering commission percentages as part of their determination as to which vendor would receive the contract, the Negotiation Team decided not to consider commissions that had been listed by vendors for the renewal years, concluding that the original five-year contract term was all that was assured, since renewals might or might not occur. On June 25, 2013, the DOC posted its Notice of Agency Decision stating its intent to award a contract to EPSI. Protests and the Decision to Reject All Replies Subsequent to timely filing notices of intent to protest the intended award, Securus and GTL filed Formal Written Protests with the DOC on July 5 and 8, 2013, respectively. The Department considered and compared the protests. It determined that language in the ITN directing that in Phase 5 the highest commission would be determined by averaging the price for the original contract term with the prices for the renewal years was ambiguous and flawed. It determined that use of a table with six squares as the initial cost sheet was a mistake. The Department determined that the language and structure of the RBAFO could be read one way to say that the Department would use the same methodology to evaluate the pricing in the negotiation stage as had been used to evaluate the Initial Cost sheets in Phase 5, or could be read another way to mean that BAFO pricing would not be evaluated that way. It determined that the inclusion in the RBAFO of a table virtually identical to the one used as the initial cost sheet was a mistake. The Department determined that the language and the structure of the RBAFO could be read one way to require further consideration of such factors as the Statement of Qualifications and Technical Response in determining best value to the State, or could be read another way to require no further consideration of these factors. The Department prepared some spreadsheets demonstrating the varying results that would be obtained using “divide by six” and “divide by ten” and also considered a spreadsheet that had been prepared by Securus. The Department considered that its own Contract Manager had interpreted the Phase 5 instructions to mean “divide by six,” while the Department had actually intended the instructions to mean “divide by ten.” The Department had intended that the Negotiation Team give some weight to the renewal-year pricing, and had included the pricing table in the RBAFO for that reason, not simply to comply with statutory requirements regarding renewal pricing. The Department determined that the way the RBAFO was written and the inclusion of the chart required at least some consideration of ten-year pricing, and that vendors had therefore been misled when the Negotiation Team gave no consideration to the commission percentages for the renewal years. Specifically, based upon the Securus protest, the Department determined that the RBAFO language had been interpreted by Securus to require that the Phase 5 calculation of average commission percentage be carried over to evaluation of the pricing in the BAFOs, which Securus had concluded meant “divide by six.” The Department further determined that based upon the GTL protest, the RBAFO language had been interpreted by GTL to require the Department to consider the renewal years in pricing, as well as such things as the Statement of Qualifications and Technical Response in the BAFO stage. The Department determined that had “divide by six” been used in evaluating the BAFOs, Securus would have a computed percentage of 70 percent, higher than any other vendor. The Department concluded that the wording and structure of the ITN and RBAFO did not create a level playing field to evaluate replies because they were confusing and ambiguous and were not understood by everyone in the same way. Vendors naturally had structured their replies to maximize their chances of being awarded the contract based upon their understanding of how the replies would be evaluated. The Department concluded that vendor pricing might have been different but for the misleading language and structure of the ITN and RBAFO. The Department did not compute what the final award would have been had it applied the scoring procedures for the initial cost sheets set forth in section 6.1.5 to the cost elements of the BAFOs. The Department did not compute what the final award would have been had it applied the scoring procedures for the Statement of Qualifications and Technical Response set forth in section 6.1.3 to the BAFOs. Ms. Bailey testified that while she had originally approved the ITN, she was unaware of any problems, and that it was only later, after the protests to the Notice of Intended Award had been filed and she had reviewed the specifications again, that she had come to the conclusion that the ITN and RBAFO were flawed. Following the protests of the intended award by GTL and Securus, on July 23, 2013, the DOC posted to the Vendor Bid System a Notice of Revised Agency Decision stating the DOC?s intent to reject all replies and reissue the ITN. On August 5, 2013, EPSI, GTL, and Securus filed formal written protests challenging DOC?s intended decision to reject all replies. Securus subsequently withdrew its protest to DOC?s rejection of all replies. As the vendor initially notified that it would receive the contract, EPSI?s substantial interests were affected by the Department's subsequent decision to reject all replies. GTL alleged the contract had wrongly been awarded to EPSI and that it should have received the award, and its substantial interests were affected by the Department's subsequent decision to reject all replies. The Department did not act arbitrarily in its decision to reject all replies. The Department did not act illegally, dishonestly, or fraudulently in its decision to reject all replies. EPSI would likely be harmed in any re-solicitation of bids relative to its position in the first ITN, because potential competitors would have detailed information about EPSI?s earlier reply that was unavailable to them during the first ITN. An ITN requires a great deal of work by the Department and creates a big demand on Department resources. The decision to reject all replies was not undertaken lightly. The State of Florida would likely benefit in any new competitive solicitation7/ because all vendors would be aware of the replies that had been submitted earlier in response to the ITN, and bidders would likely try to improve upon those proposals to improve their chances of being awarded the contract.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Corrections issue a final order finding that the rejection of all replies submitted in response to ITN 12-DC-8396 was not illegal, arbitrary, dishonest, or fraudulent, and dismissing all four protests. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of November, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S F. SCOTT BOYD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of November, 2013.
The Issue The issue in these cases is whether the Agency for Health Care Administration's (AHCA) proposed award of a contract to Caremark, Inc., based on evaluations of proposals submitted in response to a Request for Proposals (RFP), is clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Findings Of Fact AHCA is the single state agency in Florida authorized to make payments for medical assistance and related services under Title XIX of the Social Security Act (the "Medicaid" program). In order to participate in the federal Medicaid program, AHCA is required to maintain a state plan for Medicaid in compliance with Title XIX of the Social Security Act. AHCA is required to operate the Florida Medicaid program in compliance with the state plan. AHCA is apparently concerned by costs associated with the Florida Medicaid program's hemophilia population. Florida's Medicaid hemophilia beneficiaries constitute a relatively small, but costly population to serve. Hemophilia is a bleeding disorder caused by a deficiency in one of numerous "clotting factors," which normally causes a persons' blood to coagulate. Hemophilia is treated by administration of the deficient clotting factor to the person with the disorder. AHCA seeks to control the cost of providing hemophilia-related services to this population through a combination of case management and medication discounts known as the Medicaid Comprehensive Hemophilia Management (MCHM) program. AHCA believes that a single vendor responsible for operation of the MCHM program can provide managed care to the population while achieving significant drug-cost savings. Through a federal requirement referred to as "freedom of choice," Florida's Medicaid program state plan must provide that any individual eligible for medical assistance (including drugs) may obtain such assistance from any institution, agency, community pharmacy, or person qualified to perform the service and who undertakes to provide such services. The freedom of choice requirement is subject to being waived in accordance with applicable federal law. Such waiver requires approval by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). AHCA began seeking approval from CMS for an amendment to an existing "Managed Care Waiver" to implement the MCHM program in October 2002. By letter dated May 22, 2003, CMS approved AHCA's request to amend the existing waiver to permit implementation of the MCHM program. Subsequent correspondence between the agencies has further established AHCA's authority to implement the MCHM program. AHCA issued the RFP ("RFP AHCA 0403") on October 1, 2003. The RFP seeks to implement the MCHM program. There were no timely challenges filed to the terms and specifications of the RFP. Section 287.057, Florida Statutes (2003), requires that an agency must make a written determination that an invitation to bid is not practicable for procurement of commodities or contractual services prior to issuance of an RFP. AHCA did not make such a written determination prior to issuance of the RFP. Under the terms of the RFP, AHCA will contract with a single provider for a period of two years, with an option to extend the contract for an additional two-year period. RFP Section 10.2 sets out an extensive list of vendor requirements designed to provide care to Medicaid hemophilia beneficiaries and better management of related costs. The RFP provides that the successful vendor will be paid only on the basis of the factor products dispensed to eligible Medicaid beneficiaries. All other services required by the RFP must be delivered within the revenue provided by AHCA's reimbursement for factor product costs. No additional payment beyond payment of factor product costs will be provided. The RFP stated that the successful vendor would be reimbursed for factor product cost based on the average wholesale price (AWP) of the factor product minus a minimum discount of 39 percent. The RFP provided that vendors may offer a greater discount than 39 percent. An Addendum to the RFP indicated that if a vendor proposed a discount greater than 39 percent, the increased discount must apply to all factor products and that vendors could not propose varying discounts for individual factor products. The RFP contains language in the background section referencing budget "proviso" language adopted by the Legislature and referring to the MCHM program as a "revenue enhancement program." HHS asserts that because this RFP does not create a revenue enhancement program, AHCA had no authority to proceed with the RFP. The evidence fails to establish that this program will enhance revenue. The evidence fails to establish that based on the "proviso" language, AHCA is without authority to issue the RFP. RFP Section 20.11 sets forth the "proposal submission requirements." The section included a number of requirements set in capital letters and highlighted in boldface. The terms of each requirement indicated that failure to comply with the requirement was "fatal" and would result in rejection of the proposal submitted. None of the proposals submitted by the parties to this proceeding were rejected pursuant to RFP Section 20.11. The evidence fails to establish that any of the proposals submitted by the parties to this proceeding should have been rejected pursuant to RFP Section 20.11. RFP Section 20.16 provides that AHCA may waive "minor irregularities," which are defined as variations "from the RFP terms and conditions, that [do] not affect the price of the proposal or give one applicant an advantage or benefit not enjoyed by others or adversely affect the state's interest." RFP Section 20.17 provides as follows: Rejection of proposals Proposals that do not conform to all mandatory requirements of this RFP shall be rejected by the Agency. Proposals may be rejected for reasons that include, but are not limited to, the following: The proposal was received after the submission deadline; The proposal was not signed by an authorized representative of the vendor; The proposal was not submitted in accordance with the requirements of Section 20.11 of this RFP; The vendor failed to submit a proposal guarantee in an acceptable form in accordance with the terms identified in Section 20.12 of this RFP or the guarantee was not submitted with the original cost proposal; The proposal contained unauthorized amendments, deletions, or contingencies to the requirements of the RFP; The vendor submitted more than one proposal; and/or The proposal is not deemed to be in the best interest of the state. None of the proposals submitted by the parties to this proceeding were rejected pursuant to RFP Section 20.17. The evidence fails to establish that any of the proposals submitted by the parties to this proceeding should have been rejected pursuant to RFP Section 20.17. RFP Section 30.1 provides that the "total cost of the contract will not exceed $36,000,000 annually." RFP Section 30.2 provides in part that the "total cost for the contract under any renewal will not exceed $36,000,000 per year." The RFP's contract amount apparently was based on historical information and assumed that some level of cost control would occur through case management. The contract amount cannot operate as a "cap" because Medicaid hemophilia beneficiaries are an "entitled" group and services must be provided. If the amount of the contract is exceeded, AHCA is obliged to pay for necessary factor products provided to the beneficiaries; however, in an Addendum to the RFP, AHCA stated that if the contract fails to contain costs "there would be no justification to renew or extend the contract." The RFP required vendors to submit a performance bond based on 20 percent of the $36 million contract amount. The RFP stated that proposals could receive a maximum possible score of 2000 points. The proposal with the highest technical evaluation would receive 1340 weighted points. The proposal with the lowest cost proposal would receive 660 weighted points. The combined technical and cost proposal scores for each vendor determined the ranking for the proposals. The RFP set forth formulas to be used to determine the weighted final score based on raw scores received after evaluation. AHCA conducted a bidder's conference related to the RFP on October 8, 2003. All parties to this proceeding attended the conference. At the conference, AHCA distributed a copy of a spreadsheet chart that listed all factor products provided to Florida's Medicaid hemophilia beneficiaries during the second quarter of 2003. The chart identified the amount of each factor product used and the amount paid by AHCA to vendors for the factor product during the quarter. The chart also showed the amount that would have been paid by AHCA per factor product unit had the vendors been paid at the rate of AWP minus 39 percent. AHCA received six proposals in response to the RFP. The proposals were received from Caremark, HHS, Lynnfield, PDI Pharmacy Services, Inc., Advance PCS/Accordant, and Coram. RFP Section 60 contained the instructions to vendors for preparing their responses to the solicitation. As set forth in RFP Section 60.1, the technical response was identified as "the most important section of the proposal with respect to the organization's ability to perform under the contract." The section requires vendors to include "evidence of the vendor's capability through a detailed response describing its organizational background and experience," which would establish that the vendor was qualified to operate the MCHM program. Vendors were also directed to describe the proposed project staffing and the proposed "technical approach" to accomplish the work required by the RFP. Vendors were encouraged to propose "innovative approaches to the tasks described in the RFP" and to present a detailed implementation plan with a start date of January 10, 2003. The technical responses were opened on October 29, 2003. AHCA deemed all six proposals to be responsive to the technical requirements of the RFP and each technical proposal was evaluated. For purposes of evaluation, AHCA divided the technical requirements of the RFP into 50 separate criteria. AHCA assembled the technical evaluators at an orientation meeting at which time an instruction sheet was issued and verbal instructions for evaluating the technical proposals were delivered. The instruction sheet distributed to the evaluators provided that the evaluators "should" justify their scores in the "comments" section of the score sheets. The five AHCA employees who evaluated the technical proposal were Maresa Corder (Scorer "A"), Bob Brown-Barrios (Scorer "B"), Kay Newman (Scorer "C"), Jerry Wells (Scorer "D"), and Laura Rutledge (Scorer "E"). AHCA employees Dan Gabric and Lawanda Williams performed reference reviews separate from the technical evaluations. Reference review scores were combined with technical evaluation scores resulting in a total technical evaluation score. Reference review scores are not at issue in this proceeding. Kay Newman's review was limited to reviewing the financial audit information provided by the vendors. Technical evaluators reviewed each technical response to the RFP and completed evaluation sheets based on the 50 evaluation criteria. Other than Mr. Wells, evaluators included comments on the score sheets. Mr. Wells did not include comments on his score sheet. The technical proposal scoring scale set forth in the RFP provided as follows: Points Vendor has demonstrated 0 No capability to meet the criterion 1-3 Marginal or poor capability to meet the criterion 4-6 Average capability to meet the criterion 7-9 Above average capability to meet the criterion 10 Excellent capability to meet the criterion Each evaluator worked independently, and they did not confer with each other or with anyone else regarding their evaluations of the responses to the RFP. Janis Williamson was the AHCA employee responsible for distribution of the technical proposals to the evaluators. She received the completed score sheets and evaluation forms from each of the technical evaluators. The RFP set forth a process by which point values would be assigned to technical proposals as follows: The total final point scores for proposals will be compared to the maximum achievable score of 1340 points, and the technical proposal with the highest total technical points will be assigned the maximum achievable point score. All other proposals will be assigned a percentage of the maximum achievable points, based on the ratio derived when a proposal's total technical points are divided by the highest total technical points awarded. S = P X 1340 N Where: N = highest number of final points awarded to t technical proposal P = number of final points awarded to a proposal S = final technical score for a proposal According to the "Summary Report and Recommendation" memorandum dated December 4, 2003, after application of the formula, Caremark received the highest number of technical points (1340 points). Of the parties to this proceeding, HHS was ranked second on the technical proposal evaluation (1132.30 points), and Lynnfield was ranked third (1101.48 points). Lynnfield and HHS assert that the scoring of the technical proposals was arbitrary based on the range of scores between the highest scorer and the lowest scorer of the proposals. Review of the score sheets indicates that Scorer "A" graded "harder" than the other evaluators. The scores she assigned to vendor proposals were substantially lower on many of the criteria than the scores assigned by other evaluators. The range between her scores and the highest scores assigned by other evaluators was greater relative to the Lynnfield and the HHS proposals than they were to the Caremark proposal, indicating that she apparently believed the Caremark technical proposal to be substantially better than others she reviewed. There is no evidence that Scorer "A" was biased either for or against any particular vendor. The evidence fails to establish that her evaluation of the proposals was arbitrary or capricious. The evidence fails to establish that AHCA's evaluation of the technical proposals was inappropriate. After the technical evaluation was completed, cost proposals were opened on November 21, 2003. Section 60.3 addressed the cost proposal requirements for the RFP. RFP Section 60.3.1 provides as follows: The cost proposal shall cover all care management services, hemophilia specific pharmaceuticals dispensing and delivery, and pharmacy benefits management activities contemplated by the RFP. The price the vendor submits must include a detailed budget that fully justifies and explains the proposed costs assigned. This includes salaries, expenses, systems costs, report costs, and any other item the vendor uses in arriving at the final price for which it will agree to perform the work described in the RFP. The maximum reimbursement for the delivery of services and factor products used in factor replacement therapy (inclusive of all plasma-derived and recombinant factor concentrates currently in use and any others approved for use during the term of the contract resulting from this RFP) will be at Average Wholesale Price (AWP) minus 39%. Proposals may bid at a lower reimbursement but not higher. All other drugs not otherwise specified in factor replacement therapy will be paid at the normal Medicaid reimbursement. RFP Section 60.3.2 provides as follows: A vendor's cost proposal shall be defined in terms of Average Wholesale Price (AWP) and conform to the following requirements: The first tab of a vendor's original cost proposal shall be labeled "Proposal Guarantee" and shall include the vendor's proposal guarantee, which shall conform to the requirements specified in this RFP, Section 20.12. Copies of the cost proposal are not required to include the proposal guarantee. The second tab of the cost proposal shall be labeled "Project Budget" and shall include the information called for in the RFP, including the total price proposed, a line item budget for each year of the proposal, a budget narrative, and other information required to justify the costs listed. The RFP does not define the "detailed" budget mentioned in RFP Section 60.3.1 and does not define the "line item" budget mentioned in RFP Section 60.3.2. No examples of such budgets were provided. RFP Section 80.1 provides as follows: Evaluation of the Mandatory Requirements of the Cost Proposal Upon completion of the evaluation of all technical proposals, cost proposals will be opened on the date specified in the RFP Timetable. The Agency will determine if a cost proposal is sufficiently responsive to the requirements of the RFP to permit a complete evaluation. In making this determination, the evaluation team will review each cost proposal against the following criteria: Was the cost proposal received by the Agency no later than time specified in the RFP Timetable? Did the vendor submit an original and ten copies of its cost proposal in a separate sealed package? Was the vendor's cost proposal accompanied by a proposal guarantee meeting the requirements of the RFP? Did the cost proposal contain the detailed budget required by the RFP? Does the proposal contain all other mandatory requirements for the cost proposal? The AHCA employee who opened the cost proposals apparently determined that each proposal met the requirements of RFP Section 80.1, including providing a "detailed" budget. The RFP set forth a process by which point values would be assigned to cost proposals as follows: On the basis of 660 total points, the proposal with the lowest total price will receive 660 points. The other proposals will receive a percentage of the maximum achievable points, based on the ratio derived when the total cost points are divided by the highest total cost points awarded. Where: S = L X 660 N N = price in the proposal (for two years) L = lowest price proposed (for two years) S = cost points awarded The cost proposal scoring process clearly required comparison of each vendor's total price for the initial two-year portion of the contract. Caremark's proposal included estimated total costs of $44,797,207 for FY 2002-2003, $43,245,607 for FY 2003-2004, and $44,542,975 for FY 2004-2005. According to RFP Section 30.1, the maximum annual contract was not to exceed $36,000,000. All of Caremark's estimated annual costs exceeded the contract amount set forth in the RFP. Caremark's proposal also provided as follows: The above budget includes all salary expenses for Caremark employees involved in providing services for the program including the Contract Manager, Clinical Pharmacist, Care manager, additional pharmacist(s), Client Service Specialists in Florida for the expanded hemophilia program. Also included are the support staff such as pharmacy technicians, materials management, field service representatives, warehouse, reimbursement, marketing, sales and administrative staff. Also included are all delivery, data and report development, educational and marketing communication expenses. Product costs including medically necessary ancillary supplies, medical waste disposal and removal, protective gear and therapeutic devices. Caremark's proposal did not include information sufficient to assign specific costs to any of the items that Caremark indicated were included in its annual cost estimate. The HHS proposal projected estimated costs identified by month and year. The HHS proposal estimated total first-year costs of $14,261,954 and second-year costs of $27,333,389. HHS did not propose to assume responsibility for serving all Medicaid hemophilia beneficiaries at the start of the contract, but projected costs as if beneficiaries would "migrate to our service at a rate of 20 per month" during the first year and that full service provision would begin by the beginning of year two. RFP Section 10.2 provides as follows: The purpose of this RFP is to receive offers from qualified vendors wishing to provide the services required by the Florida Medicaid Comprehensive Hemophilia Management Program. The contract resulting from this RFP shall be with a single provider for up to two years commencing on the date signed, with an option to renew for two additional years. Otherwise stated, all Medicaid hemophilia beneficiaries would be served though the program's sole provider from the start of the contract period. The RFP provides no option for a vendor to gradually increase service levels through the first half of the two-year contract. The HHS proposal also included a breakdown of costs by factor product unit, identifying the AWP for each listed factor product and applying a discount of between 39 percent and 45 percent to indicate the product cost-per-unit that would be charged to AHCA. In Addendum 2 to the RFP, AHCA stated that it has received a written inquiry as follows: Knowing that the minimum accepted discount is AWP less 39%, can different products have different discounts. AHCA's response to the inquiry was as follows: No. The proposed discount will apply to all factor products. As to the costs included in the proposal annual total, the HHS proposal provided as follows: The product price above will include the following costs incurred in servicing the patients: The cost of the product dispensed to the patient. The cost of freight and other delivery expense of transporting the product to the patient. Pharmacy, warehouse and patient supplies. Cost incurred for patient protective gear and education materials Salary costs for the following: o Project/Contract Manager Clinical Pharmacist Staff Pharmacist Case Management Coordinator Pharmacy Care Coordinators Shipping Clerk Warehouse Coordinator Community Advocates Insurance Reimbursement Specialist The cost of Information Technology support for systems and reporting The cost of rent, office supplies, equipment, postage, printing. The HHS proposal did not include information sufficient to assign specific costs to any of the items that HHS indicated were included in its annual cost estimate. Lynnfield's proposal estimated total costs of $34,000,000 for calendar year 2004 and $36,000,000 for calendar year 2005. Lynnfield's budget proposal included information identifying the specific expense lines which form the basis for the cost estimation, including salary costs by position, travel costs, employee insurance, postage, equipment costs, and various office expenses. Lynnfield's budget proposal included a significantly greater level of detail than did either the Caremark or the HHS proposals. Jerry Wells was assigned the responsibility to evaluate the cost proposals. Mr. Wells failed to review the RFP or the related Addenda prior to evaluating the cost proposals submitted by the vendors. Mr. Wells asserted that it was not possible, based on the information submitted by the vendors, to perform an "apples- to-apples comparison." Each vendor set forth information in its proposal sufficient to calculate a total price for the initial two-year portion of the contract. Mr. Wells testified at the hearing that his cost review was intended to determine what AHCA would be paying for each of the individual factor products that AHCA provides hemophiliacs through Medicaid because the cost of the products was all AHCA would be paying to the vendors. The RFP did not require vendors to include a detailed list of, or unit prices for, factor products. The RFP specified only that factor products be provided at a minimum of AWP minus 39 percent. AHCA employees, under the direction of Mr. Wells, created a cost comparison chart which purported to identify the price proposed by each vendor for certain factor products and which projects an estimated quarterly factor product cost for each vendor. HHS's cost proposal included a listing of specific prices to be charged for factor products. The list was based on products being used by existing HHS patients. Caremark offered to provide all products at the AWP minus 39 percent cost required by the RFP. Caremark also suggested various "innovative cost savings," which specified use of factor products and indicated discounts greater than the 39 percent required by the RFP. Lynnfield did not include a product-specific listing of factor costs in its proposal, but offered to provide all products at the AWP minus 39 percent cost required by the RFP. The AHCA employees used the HHS cost proposal, including the HHS range of discounts, as the basis for preparation of the cost comparison chart that included the other vendors. The factor products listed on the AHCA cost comparison mirror those listed in the HHS cost proposal. AHCA employees apparently applied the factor product usage information from the second quarter of 2003 that was included on the spreadsheet distributed at the bidder's conference to the HHS factor product list. The AHCA spreadsheet distributed at the bidder conference lists 29 factor products by name and dosage. Of the 29 products, 15 are listed in the HHS cost proposal. The AHCA cost comparison created at Mr. Wells' direction includes only the 15 factor products listed on the HHS cost proposal. AHCA's cost comparison assumed no costs would be incurred, where the AHCA spreadsheet information indicated no usage of the factor product that had been included on the HHS cost proposal. AHCA's cost comparison did not include factor products which have been supplied by AHCA to Medicaid beneficiaries, but which do not appear on the HHS list. Mr. Wells relied on this cost comparison to determine that the cost proposal submitted by HHS offered the lowest cost to the agency and was entitled to the 660 points. Lynnfield and Caremark were both ranked according to cost proposals of AWP minus 39 percent, and according to the Summary Report and Recommendation memorandum, were awarded 652.74 points. Calculation of the points awarded to Lynnfield and Caremark in the Summary Report and Recommendation memorandum does not appear to comply with the formula set forth in the RFP. The AHCA cost comparison spreadsheet identifies the HHS proposed cost as $10,706,425.66 and identifies the AWP minus 39 percent cost as $10,795,477.48 (assigned as the Lynnfield and Caremark cost proposal). The Summary Report and Recommendation memorandum states the lowest cost proposal to be $10,706,405.66 (perhaps a typographical error). The methodology applied by AHCA assumed that all vendors would utilize identical quantities of identical factor products (based on historical usage in Quarter 2 of 2003 of those listed in the HHS cost proposal) and that there would be no cost savings related to disease management. The application of methodology to compare vendor cost proposals outside the process established by the RFP is clearly erroneous, arbitrary, and capricious. The vendors who are party to this proceeding assert that each other vendor's budgetary submission is insufficient, flawed, or unreliable for varying reasons. It is unnecessary to determine whether the budgetary information submitted by the vendors meets the requirements of the RFP because, despite having requested the information, AHCA has no interest in the data. There is no evidence that in making an award of points based on the cost proposals, AHCA relied on any of the budgetary information required by the RFP or submitted by the vendors.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order rejecting all proposals submitted in response to the RFP AHCA 0403. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of April, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Anthony L. Conticello, Esquire Thomas Barnhart, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Geoffrey D. Smith, Esquire Thomas R. McSwain, Esquire Blank, Meenan & Smith, P.A. 204 South Monroe Street Post Office Box 11068 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-3068 Linda Loomis Shelley, Esquire Karen A. Brodeen, Esquire Fowler, White, Boggs, Banker, P.A. 101 North Monroe Street, Suite 1090 Post Office Box 11240 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 J. Riley Davis, Esquire Martin R. Dix, Esquire Akerman & Senterfitt Law Firm 106 East College Avenue, Suite 1200 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Lealand McCharen, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Valda Clark Christian, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the decision of the City of Clearwater Community Development Board (the "Board") to deny the application of Petitioner for flexible development approval to erect a telecommunications tower should be upheld pursuant to the City of Clearwater Land Development Code (the "Code"). (All section references are to the Code adopted on January 21, 1999, unless otherwise stated).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida corporation engaged in the business of building telecommunication towers for co-location of antennae to send and receive cellular telephone signals. Proper location of telecommunication towers is essential to efficient and effective cellular telephone communications. There must be an available tower to pick up the signal as a user moves from a distant tower to the available tower. Without an available tower, the user would lose signal. It is undisputed that three telephone carriers, identified in the record as GTE, Nextel, and PrimeCo, need an available tower in the vicinity of Clearwater High School (the "high school"). Another telephone carrier, identified in the record as AT&T, shares an existing tower at the high school with the Pinellas County School Board (the "school board"). No reasonable use can be made by GTE, Nextel, or PrimeCo of the existing tower at the high school without modification to the tower. The existing tower is not adequate in height and structural capacity to meet the requirements of GTE, Nextel, and PrimeCo. The school board and AT&T repeatedly rejected efforts by GTE, Nextel, and Petitioner to discuss the possibilities of modification of the existing tower to accommodate co-location. In 1996, AT&T advised GTE that the school board was not interested in co-location activity. The school board repeated that position in a separate meeting with GTE. GTE and PrimeCo searched for over two years for an alternative structure, tower, or location that would provide reasonable use for their technical requirements. In 1997, GTE requested a permit from Respondent to build a new tower approximately two blocks from the existing tower at the high school. Respondent contacted the superintendent of the school board to encourage co-location. Respondent did not issue a permit to GTE for a new tower. Early in 1998, GTE and PrimeCo approached Petitioner to locate a site for construction of a new tower in the vicinity of the high school. Over the next eight months, Petitioner searched for a suitable site for building a new tower. Petitioner found a site surrounded by commercial property and bordered by mature trees which are 20 to 40 feet tall. On October 13, 1998, Petitioner optioned the portion of the property on which Petitioner intended to build the tower, and Petitioner now owns the property. On May 17, 1999, Petitioner filed its application for site plan approval. The application proposed the construction of a 160-foot wireless communications tower for co-location by GTE, Nextel, and PrimeCo (the "proposed tower"). Petitioner sent a notice of the proposed tower to Mr. Kevin Becker at AT&T. The staff for the Board conducted a technical review of the application. The staff recommended approval of the application subject to certain conditions. Petitioner complied with each of those conditions. The staff also recommended approval by the Development Review Committee (the "DRC"). The DRC must review each application before it is submitted to the Board. The staff report to the DRC stated that the existing tower at the high school was the only other tower in the area and was in poor condition. The report found that the tower cannot structurally hold more weight and cannot accept more antennae. Before the Board reviewed the application, Nextel again contacted Mr. Becker at AT&T to discuss modification of the existing tower for co-location of Nextel's antenna. Mr. Becker responded for AT&T with a terse e-mail that stated, "This is the THIRD TIME I have told Nextel that . . . tower is not available for anyone." The Board conducted five hearings to review the application by Petitioner. The hearings spanned six months. The Board conducted the first hearing on July 20, 1999, a second hearing on October 5, 1999, a third hearing on November 16, 1999, a fourth hearing on December 14, 1999, and the last hearing on January 25, 2000. The Board did not follow the staff recommendation at the first hearing. After hearing testimony and receiving other evidence, the Board continued the first hearing, in relevant part, to "allow the City to do whatever it may want to do in terms of addressing that issue." The Board directed Petitioner to contact the school board concerning the condition of the tower and directed the City Planning Director to also contact the school board. After the July hearing, Petitioner contacted the school board concerning the existing tower. Neither the school board nor AT&T had any plans for modification of the existing tower at the high school. The City Planner conducted an independent inquiry and determined that there is not much of a desire on the part of the school board or AT&T to "create other opportunities at this time." Petitioner and the City Planner reported their findings to the Board at the second hearing conducted on October 5, 1999. No one from the school board or AT&T appeared at the hearing. Petitioner presented an engineering study concerning the inadequacy of the existing tower at the high school. One Board member asked whether a new tower could be constructed at the high school to replace the existing tower. Petitioner and the Board's attorney stated that the Code encourages the use of existing towers rather than new towers. The Board continued the hearing over objection from Petitioner so that City representatives could contact school board representatives at a higher level and also allow consideration of a new tower at the high school. After the October hearing, the City Manager contacted the superintendent of schools to discuss the tower at the high school. On November 10, 1999, the superintendent stated that he would meet with city representatives only if AT&T representatives were also present. The superintendent eventually met with the City Manager without the presence of an AT&T representative. The superintendent indicated a willingness to consider modification of the existing tower but no agreement was reached due to the absence of AT&T participation. Another Board member prevailed on the superintendent four times to make a decision without success. The Board conducted the third hearing on November 16, 1999. Representatives from GTE, Nextel, and PrimeCo testified at the hearing. Modification to the existing tower at the high school would accommodate one of the three companies but not the other two. The proposed tower is the only tower that would accommodate all three companies. The proposed tower is necessary to provide effective and efficient service to the customers of GTE, Nextel, and PrimeCo. GTE has been at a competitive disadvantage since 1996. The Board voted to approve Petitioner's application. The Board conducted a fourth hearing on December 14, 1999. At that hearing, the Board voted to reconsider Petitioner's application on the ground that the Board had received timely requests for reconsideration from an interested party. The Board determined that Petitioner had misrepresented the position of the school board and AT&T concerning their willingness to modify the existing tower at the high school. The catalyst for the Board's reconsideration was a letter from Mr. Becker, dated September 16, 1999, stating that AT&T was willing to consider co-location. Mr. Becker sent a copy of the letter to the Board the day after the Board approved Petitioner's application. The letter stated that AT&T was very interested in considering co-location with other carriers but that the existing tower at the high school was inadequate for the purpose. The letter represented that AT&T would be willing to discuss replacement of the tower with other carriers. Petitioner had never seen the letter prior to the Board's approval and had no knowledge of the change in position by AT&T. The Board conducted a final hearing of Petitioner's application on January 25, 2000. The Board considered the letter from Mr. Becker and a letter from legal counsel for AT&T. Both letters stated that the existing tower does not have the structural capacity to add additional wireless antennae. A staff member for the Board again concluded that the term "existing" meant a tower in existence at that time. Respondent's expert confirmed that the existing tower, without reconstruction, was not a reasonable alternative to the tower proposed by Petitioner. Mr. Becker testified that AT&T was not proposing to modify the existing tower to accommodate the proposed antennae needed by GTE, Nextel, and PrimeCo and that the existing tower was beyond reinforcement to accommodate additional loading. The Board denied Petitioner's application. The Board found that the existing tower "can be modified to accommodate carriers and thus reasonable use may be made of the existing tower." The evidence does not support a finding that the existing tower can be modified to accommodate GTE, Nextel, and PrimeCo. To do so, the existing tower would need to be replaced rather than modified. Reasonable use of the existing tower cannot be accomplished by modification. Replacement of the existing tower with a new tower would not provide reasonable use of the "existing" tower. As a threshold matter, an interference study would be necessary before a determination could be made that the replacement tower would accommodate all of the carriers. PrimeCo cannot commit to the replacement tower until the interference study is completed. In addition, there are other problems. AT&T proposes to place seven carriers on the replacement tower. That configuration would not provide adequate coverage to each carrier. A second tower would be required in the "short term." AT&T's proposed location of each antenna on the replacement tower would reduce the amount of coverage that is available to each carrier on the tower proposed by Petitioner. Petitioner's proposal locates GTE at 155 feet to accommodate GTE's technical needs. AT&T would locate GTE no higher than 120 feet thereby substantially reducing the area served by GTE. If GTE is located at 120 feet, GTE would need to construct another tower a mile away in order to obtain the coverage achieved at 155 feet in Petitioner's proposal. The replacement tower proposed by AT&T imposes additional limitations on AT&T's competitors. It requires GTE to reduce the size of its antenna to four feet from the eight-foot antenna in Petitioner's application. AT&T imposes a similar reduction on Nextel and requires Nextel to agree to a "compromising antenna" to co-locate on the replacement tower. The continuances ordered by the Board delayed construction of the tower proposed by Petitioner. If Petitioner had received approval of the application in July 1999, Petitioner could have had its proposed tower in service by January 2000. The delay has placed GTE, Nextel, and PrimeCo at a competitive disadvantage. As of the date of the administrative hearing, AT&T had not begun construction of the replacement tower. The school board has the right to approve any co-location agreements for the replacement tower proposed by AT&T. AT&T has not submitted any co-location agreements for school board approval. Board policy considers the timeliness of a replacement tower as one factor in determining whether the replacement tower is "feasible" or a "reasonable alternative" within the meaning of Section 3-2.001D.1. A replacement tower that would require more than one year to construct is neither feasible nor a reasonable alternative. Neither the Board nor its staff enunciates any intelligible standards for adopting a one-year time limit or for applying a one-year time limit, including any standard for identifying the starting point of the one-year limit. For example, Petitioner first applied for approval on May 17, 1999. The Board began the one-year period for determining feasibility of the AT&T replacement tower on September 10, 1999. Respondent failed to explicate why it started the one-year period on September 10, 1999, rather than the date of application. The limitations imposed by AT&T for co-location on the replacement tower and the continuances imposed by the Board, individually and severally, comprise a "legitimate limiting factor" within the meaning of Section 3-2001D.1.g. The limitations and continuances have the effect of placing GTE, Nextel, and PrimeCo at a competitive disadvantage and also have the effect of discriminating against the three companies in violation of Section 3-2001A.
The Issue The issues in these consolidated cases are: (1) whether the decision by Respondent, Department of Transportation, to reject all bids for the contract at issue was illegal, arbitrary, dishonest, or fraudulent; and (2) if so, whether Respondent's actions in cancelling the notice of intent to award the contract at issue to Cyriacks Environmental Consulting Services, Inc., ("CECOS") and requiring the submittal of new price proposals were clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.2/
Findings Of Fact The Parties Respondent is the state agency that issued the RFP to procure the Contract for Respondent's District IV. CECOS is an environmental consulting and services firm that submitted a response to the RFP, seeking award of the Contract. DB is an environmental consulting and services firm that submitted a response to the RFP, seeking award of the Contract. DB was granted party status to DOAH Case No. 16-0769 by Order dated February 29, 2016, and by Order dated March 9, 2016, was determined to have standing in that case as a party whose substantial interests were affected by Respondent's decision to reject all proposals. Overview of the Procurement Process for the Contract Respondent issued the RFP on or about October 1, 2015. The RFP sought to obtain support services related to environmental impacts review for projects in Respondent's District IV work program; wetland mitigation design; construction, monitoring, and maintenance; permitting of mitigation sites; exotic vegetation control and removal in specified locations; relocation of threatened, endangered, or rare flora and fauna; permit compliance monitoring; and other services specified in the RFP. The RFP stated Respondent's intent to award the Contract to the responsive and responsible proposing vendor6/ whose proposal is determined to be most advantageous to Respondent. The responses to the RFP were scored on two components: a technical proposal, worth a total of 60 points, that addressed the proposing vendor's experience, qualifications, and capabilities to provide high-quality desired services; and a price proposal, worth a total of 40 points, that addressed the proposed price without evaluation of the separate cost components and proposed profit of the proposing vendor, compared with that proposed by other vendors. The price proposal evaluation was based on the following formula: (Low Price/Proposer's Price) X Price Points = Proposer's Awarded Points. The Special Conditions section of the Advertisement portion of the RFP, paragraph 3, stated in pertinent part: In accordance with section 287.057(23), Florida Statutes, respondents to this solicitation or persons acting on their behalf may not contact, between the release of the solicitation and the end of the 72- hour period following the agency posting the notice of intended award, . . . any employee or officer of the executive or legislative branch concerning any aspect of this solicitation, except in writing to the procurement officer or as provided in the solicitation documents. Violation of this provision may be grounds for rejecting a response. The period between the release of the solicitation and the 72-hour period after posting of the intended award is commonly referred to as the "cone of silence." The Special Conditions section of the Advertisement portion of the RFP, paragraph 19, informed vendors that Respondent reserved the right to reject any or all proposals it received. Exhibit B to the RFP, addressing compensation, limited compensation for all authorizations for work performed under the Contract to a total of $5,000,000. Exhibit B stated that the schedule of rates listed in the Price Proposal Form C (i.e., the rates submitted for the sections comprising Exhibit C to the RFP) would be used for establishing compensation. On October 7, 2015, Respondent issued Addendum 1 to the advertised RFP. Addendum 1 revised Exhibit A to the RFP, the Scope of Services; and also revised Exhibit C to the RFP, the Bid Sheet, to provide it in Excel format. As revised by Addendum 1, Exhibit C consists of an Excel spreadsheet comprised of six sections, each of which was to be used by the responding vendors to propose their rates for the specified services being procured in each section of the Bid Sheet. Section 6 of the Excel spreadsheet, titled "Trees, Schrubs [sic], and Ground Cover, consists of eight columns and 258 rows, each row constituting a plant item on which a price proposal was to be submitted. The columns are titled, from left to right: No.; Scientific Name; Common Name; Unit; Estimated of [sic] number of Unites [sic]; Rate; Extension (Unit X Rate); and Multiplier 2.5 (Price X 2.5). Each row of the spreadsheet in Section 6 identified, as a fixed requirement for this portion of the proposal, the specified type of plant, unit (i.e., plant size), and estimated number of units (i.e., number of plants). For each row of the Section 6 spreadsheet, only the cells under the "Rate" column could be manipulated. Vendors were to insert in the "Rate" cell, for each row, the proposed rate for each plant item. The cells under all other columns for each row were locked, and the RFP stated that any alteration of the locked cells would disqualify the vendor and render its proposal non-responsive. The instructions to Exhibit C, Section 67/ stated: Trees, Schrubs [sic], and Ground Cover Price of plants shall include project management, field supervision, invoicing, installation, mobilization of traffic, water throughout the warranty period, fertilizer and [sic] six (6) month and demobilization, minor maintenance guarantee. Installation of plant material shall be per the Scope of Services. All planting costs shall include the cost to restore area to pre-existing conditions (i.e., dirt, sod, etc.). On October 20, 2015, Respondent issued Addendum 2, and on October 29, 2015, Respondent issued Addendum 3. Both addenda changed Respondent's schedule for reading the technical proposal scores, opening the sealed price proposals, and posting the intended awards. Addenda 1, 2, and 3 were not challenged. However, a key dispute in these consolidated proceedings is whether the Addendum 1 Bid Sheet in Section 6 and the instructions for completing that Bid Sheet were ambiguous, or whether Respondent reasonably believed them to be ambiguous. The vendors were to submit their responses to the RFP, consisting of their technical proposals and price proposals, by October 16, 2015. CECOS, DB, and four other vendors timely submitted responses to the RFP. On November 2, 2015, the scores for the technical proposals submitted by the vendors were presented to the Selection Committee ("SC") at a noticed meeting. DB received the highest number of points on the technical proposal portion of the RFP. The SC met again on November 3, 2015. At that time, Respondent's Procurement Officer, Jessica Rubio, read the total awarded points for each vendor's price proposal, as well as each vendor's total combined points——i.e., total points for technical proposal and price proposal. CECOS received the highest number of points for the price proposal portion of the RFP, and also received the highest total combined points. Respondent recommended, and the SC concurred, that Respondent should award the Contract to CECOS. At 10:00 a.m. on November 3, 2015, Respondent posted the Proposal Tabulation, constituting its notice of intent that CECOS would be awarded the Contract.8/ CECOS submitted a price proposal of $4,237,603.70. DB submitted a price proposal of $9,083,042.50. The other four vendors' price proposals ranged between $4,540,512.90 and $5,237,598.55. The "cone of silence" commenced upon Respondent's posting of the Proposal Tabulation, and ended 72 hours later, on November 6, 2015, at 10:00 a.m. As discussed in greater detail below, after the Proposal Tabulation was posted, Respondent discovered an apparent ambiguity in Exhibit C, Section 6, regarding the instructions to that section and the inclusion of the "2.5 Multiplier" column on the Bid Sheet. After an internal investigation, Respondent decided to cancel its intent to award the Contract to CECOS. On November 5, 2015, Respondent posted a notice that it was cancelling the intent to award the Contract to CECOS. On November 5, 2015, DB filed a Notice of Protest, stating its intent to challenge the award of the Contract to CECOS. Thereafter, on November 9, 2015, DB contacted Respondent by electronic mail ("email") to withdraw its Notice of Protest.9/ Due to the apparent ambiguity in Exhibit C, Section 6, on November 9, 2015, Respondent issued Addendum 4 to the RFP. Addendum 4 required the responding vendors to submit new price proposals for all sections (i.e., sections 1 through 6) of Exhibit C to the RFP. Addendum 4 also established a new timeline for a mandatory pre-bid conference to be held on November 12, 2016; set a sealed price proposal due date of November 19, 2016; and identified new dates for opening the price proposals and posting the Notice of Intended Award of the Contract. On November 12, 2015, Respondent conducted a mandatory pre-bid conference to address Addendum 4. The participating vendors expressed confusion and posed numerous questions regarding the submittal of new price proposals and their technical proposals. Immediately following the pre-bid conference, Respondent issued Addendum 5, which consisted of a revised Exhibit A, Scope of Services; revised Exhibit C, Bid Sheet in Excel format for all six sections; and responses to the questions posed at the pre-bid conference.10/ The Addendum 5 Bid Sheet comprising Exhibit C, Section 6, was substantially amended from the version that was published in Addendum 1. Specifically, the column previously titled "Rate" was changed to "Rate Per Unit"; the "Extension (Unit X Rate)" and "Multiplier 2.5" columns were deleted; and a new column titled "Proposed Cost (Rate per Unit X Est. No. of Units)" was added. Additionally, the instructions for Section 6 were substantially amended to read: "'Rate Per Unit' must include all costs associated with the purchase, installation, watering, fertilization, project management, field supervision, travel, invoicing, labor, maintenance of traffic, mobilization and demobilization, staking and guying, maintenance of planting site throughout the 180[-]day plant warranty." These amendments were intended to clarify that the proposed rate for each plant unit was to include all overhead costs associated with performance of the Contract with respect to that particular unit. On November 13, 2015, CECOS filed a Notice of Protest to Respondent's issuance of Addendum 4, requiring the vendors to submit new price proposals. Thereafter, on November 23, 2015, CECOS filed the First Petition challenging Respondent's decision, announced in Addendum 4, to require the responding vendors to submit new proposals for the price proposal portion of the RFP, and its decision to cancel the notice of intent to award the Contract to CECOS.11/ Once CECOS filed its Notice of Protest on November 13, 2015, Respondent ceased all procurement activity directed toward awarding the Contract. On December 17, 2015, Respondent posted notice that it was rejecting all proposals and that the Contract would be re- advertised through issuance of a new RFP. On December 22, 2015, CECOS filed a Notice of Protest, and on January 4, 2016, filed its Second Petition challenging Respondent's decision to reject all proposals and re-advertise the Contract. Bases for Respondent's Actions Shortly after Respondent posted the Proposal Tabulation noticing its intent to award the Contract to CECOS, Christine Perretta, owner and president of DB, sent an email to Respondent, then called Rubio to inquire about Respondent's decision to award the Contract to CECOS. The evidence shows that these contacts occurred sometime on or around November 3, 2016.12/ In her telephone discussion with Rubio, Perretta inquired about how to file a notice of protest13/ and also asked whether Respondent had reviewed the vendors' price proposals for correctness or accuracy, or had simply chosen the lowest price proposal. In the course of the discussion, Perretta informed Rubio that DB had submitted a "loaded" rate for each plant unit ——meaning that DB's rate proposed for each plant item in the "Rate" column on the Section 6 Bid Sheet consisted not only of the cost of the plant item, but also the cost for all associated overhead services listed in the instructions to Section 6 and in the RFP Advertisement, paragraph 18(v), plus compensation.14/ Rubio could not clearly recall whether, in the course of their discussion, Perretta had inquired about the use of the 2.5 multiplier, and there is conflicting evidence as to whether Perretta related her view that CECOS may not be able to perform the Contract based on the price proposal it had submitted. In any event, as a result of Rubio's discussion with Perretta, Rubio determined that she needed to review Exhibit C, Section 6. In the course of her investigation, Rubio called Wendy Cyriaks, owner and president of CECOS.15/ Cyriaks confirmed that CECOS had submitted an "unloaded" rate for each plant item—— meaning that it had included only the cost of each plant item in the "Rate" column on the Section 6 Bid Sheet, and had not included, in the proposed rate for each plant item, the cost of the associated overhead services listed in the instructions to Section 6 or RFP Advertisement, paragraph 18(v), or compensation. Cyriaks told Rubio that CECOS expected that its overhead costs and compensation for each item would be covered through use of the 2.5 multiplier. Also in the course of her investigation, Rubio asked Bogardus whether he had intended the 2.5 multiplier to be used to cover all costs, including vendor compensation, associated with obtaining, installing, and maintaining the plant items listed in Section 6. Bogardus initially confirmed that his intent in including the 2.5 multiplier on the Section 6 Bid Sheet was to cover all of the overhead costs and compensation. However, the persuasive evidence establishes that Bogardus subsequently agreed with Rubio that the 2.5 multiplier should not have been included in Section 6. Pursuant to her discussions with Perretta and Cyriaks, Rubio realized that the wide discrepancy between DB's and CECOS' price proposals was due to their differing interpretations of the instructions in Section 6 regarding plant item rates and the inclusion of the "2.5 Multiplier" column in the Section 6 Bid Sheet. Rubio testified, persuasively, that the inclusion of the "2.5 Multiplier" column rendered Exhibit C, Section 6, of the RFP ambiguous. To that point, the RFP does not contain any instructions or discussion on the use of the 2.5 multiplier. Therefore, to the extent the multiplier was intended to be used by the vendors to build overhead costs and compensation into their price proposals, the RFP fails to explain that extremely important intended use——leaving the significance and use of the multiplier open to speculation and subject to assumption by the vendors in preparing their price proposals. Rubio reasonably viewed DB's and CECOS' divergent interpretations of the instructions and the inconsistent use of the 2.5 multiplier as further indication that Section 6 was ambiguous. She explained that in order for Respondent to ensure that it is procuring the most advantageous proposal for the State, it is vitally important that the RFP be clear so that responding vendors clearly understand the type of information the RFP is requesting, and where and how to provide that information in their price proposals. Rubio persuasively testified that in her view, the instructions in Section 6 had, in fact, called for a loaded rate, but that CECOS had erroneously assumed, based on the inclusion of the "2.5 Multiplier" column in the Section 6 Bid Sheet, that overhead and compensation for each plant item would be covered through use of the 2.5 multiplier, and that as a consequence, CECOS incorrectly proposed unloaded rates for the plant items. In Rubio's view, CECOS' error was due to the ambiguity created by the unexplained and unsupported inclusion of the 2.5 multiplier in Section 6. Rubio testified that CECOS had been awarded the Contract because it had submitted the lowest price proposal, but that its proposal was based on an unloaded rate for the plant items, contrary to the instructions for Section 6. In Rubio's view, CECOS' price proposal was unresponsive, and CECOS should not have been awarded the Contract. Rubio also testified, credibly and persuasively, that the use of the 2.5 multiplier in Section 6 for compensation purposes rendered the RFP arbitrary. Respondent's District IV historically has not used a 2.5 multiplier for compensation purposes for commodities contracts, and no data or analyses exist to support such use of a 2.5 multiplier.16/ This rendered the RFP both arbitrary and unverifiable with respect to whether it was structured to obtain the most advantageous proposal for the State. To this point, Rubio credibly explained that Respondent's existing environmental mitigation services contract with Stantec was procured through the "Invitation to Negotiate" ("ITN") process. In that procurement, Respondent negotiated to obtain the best value for the State. The ITN bid sheet contained a 2.5 multiplier that was used only for weighting purposes to evaluate and determine which firms would be "short- listed" for purposes of being invited to negotiate with Respondent for award of the contract. Importantly——and in contrast to the RFP at issue in this case——the multiplier in the ITN was not used to determine the final prices, including compensation, to install trees, shrubs, and ground cover under that contract. Rubio also testified, credibly, that the Bid Sheet was structurally flawed because it did not allow the vendor to clearly indicate the "unit price" inclusive of all overhead costs, and that this defect would result in Respondent being unable to issue letters of authorization to pay invoices for the cost of installing the plant items or compensating for work performed. For these reasons, Respondent determined that it needed to cancel the intent to award the Contract to CECOS. As noted above, Respondent posted the cancellation of the intent to award the Contract on November 5, 2015. At a meeting of the SC conducted on November 9, 2015, Respondent's procurement staff explained that the intent to award the Contract had been cancelled due to ambiguity in the instructions and the Bid Sheet for Exhibit C, Section 6. Ultimately, the SC concurred with Respondent's cancellation of the intent to award the Contract to CECOS and agreed that the vendors should be required to submit new price proposals. Thereafter, on November 9, 2015, Respondent issued Addendum 4, announcing its decision to solicit new price proposals from the responding vendors. Respondent conducted a pre-bid meeting with the vendors on November 12, 2015, and immediately thereafter, issued Addendum 5, consisting of a revised Scope of Services and a substantially revised Bid Sheet for all six sections of Exhibit C. As previously discussed, the Section 6 Bid Sheet issued in Addendum 5 was revised to, among other things, delete the "2.5 Multiplier" column and the column previously titled "Rate" was changed to "Rate Per Unit." Also as discussed above, the instructions to Section 6 were revised to clarify that the "Rate Per Unit" provided for each plant unit must contain all costs associated with the purchase, installation, watering, fertilization, project management, field supervision, invoicing, labor, maintenance of traffic, and other costs specified in the instructions——i.e, constitute a loaded rate. All of these changes were made in an effort to clarify, for the benefit of all vendors, the specific information that Respondent needed to be provided in the price proposals. Rubio testified, credibly, that in requiring the vendors to submit new price proposals pursuant to revised Exhibit C, Respondent did not give, or intend to give, any vendor a competitive advantage over any of the other vendors, nor did Respondent place, or intend to place, CECOS at a competitive disadvantage by requiring the vendors to submit new price proposals pursuant to revised Exhibit C. As noted above, once CECOS filed its Notice of Protest, Respondent ceased all procurement activity directed toward awarding the Contract. Consequently, the vendors did not submit new price proposals and the scheduled meetings at which the new price proposals would be opened and the intended awardee announced were cancelled. On December 17, 2015, Rubio briefed the SC regarding the problems with the RFP and described her concerns about proceeding with the procurement. She explained that Respondent's procurement staff was of the view that the instructions in Section 6, as previously published in Addendum 1, were ambiguous because they did not clearly provide direction on how to complete the Bid Sheet for that section. Additionally, the Section 6 Bid Sheet, as structured in Addendum 1, did not allow the vendors to provide a plant unit rate that was inclusive of all overhead costs. To this point, she noted that unless the vendors provided a loaded rate——i.e., one that included all overhead costs——Respondent would not be able to issue work orders for any plant items in Section 6.17/ She explained that these flaws constituted the bases for Respondent's decision, announced on November 9, 2015, to require the submittal of new price proposals. Rubio further explained that in Respondent's rush to issue a revised Scope of Services as part of Addendum 5, mistakes had been made18/ and Respondent's Environmental Office needed more time to carefully review the Scope of Services and Bid Sheet, to ensure the RFP was correctly drafted and structured so that the Contract could be accurately solicited and procured. Additionally, the vendors——including Mark Clark of CECOS——had expressed confusion regarding the revised Bid Sheet and submitting new price proposals, and some vendors had inquired about submitting new technical proposals. Further, under the revised procurement schedule issued as part of Addendum 4 on November 9, 2015, the vendors had a very compressed timeframe in which to prepare and submit their new price proposals, heightening the potential for mistakes to be made. Because of these substantial problems and concerns with the RFP, Rubio recommended that Addendum 5 be rescinded, that all vendor proposals (both technical and price) be rejected, and that the entire procurement process be re-started. The SC concurred with her recommendation. As noted above, on December 17, 2015, Respondent rejected all proposals and announced that the Contract would be re-solicited in the future through issuance of another RFP. CECOS' Position CECOS takes the position that the RFP and the Section 6 Bid Sheet published in Addendum 1 were not ambiguous. Specifically, CECOS contends that the use of the 2.5 multiplier in Section 6 clearly indicated that Respondent was seeking an unloaded rate for the plant items listed on the Section 6 Bid Sheet. In support of this position, CECOS notes that all of the vendors other than DB had submitted unloaded rates for the plant items in Section 6. CECOS contends that this shows that Section 6 was not ambiguous, and that DB simply did not follow the RFP instructions——of which it was fully aware——in preparing and submitting its price proposal.19/ CECOS also contends that Rubio's failure to contact the other vendors to determine if they found the instructions or use of the 2.5 multiplier in Section 6 ambiguous evidences that Rubio's conclusion that Section 6 was ambiguous lacked any factual basis, so was itself arbitrary. CECOS asserts that Bogardus' intent to use a 2.5 multiplier for compensation purposes was evidenced by its inclusion on the Section 6 Bid Sheet, that its use on the Section 6 Bid Sheet did not render the RFP flawed, and that Bogardus' intent to compensate using the multiplier should control the structure of compensation paid under Section 6.20/ CECOS also notes that the use of the 2.5 multiplier on the Section 6 Bid Sheet mirrors the 2.5 multiplier in the existing environmental mitigation support services contract with the current contractor.21/ CECOs further contends that there was no material difference, with respect to structuring compensation for the plant items, between the ITN process used for procuring the existing contract and the RFP process used to procure this Contract. As additional support for its argument that the use of the 2.5 multiplier in Section 6 was valid, CECOS points to a request for proposal for environmental mitigation services issued by Respondent's District VI. In that contract, a 2.5 multiplier was used for compensation purposes, albeit for specific plant items that were not contained in the original list of specific plant items for which rate proposals had been solicited in the request for proposal. CECOS further contends that Respondent——and, most particularly, Rubio——did not conduct a thorough investigation into the historic use of 2.5 multipliers in Respondent's commodities contracts. CECOS argues that as a consequence, Respondent's determination that the use of the 2.5 multiplier rendered the Section 6 Bid Sheet structurally flawed and arbitrary was unsupported by facts, so was itself arbitrary and capricious. CECOS asserts that cancelling the notice of intent to award the Contract to CECOS and requiring the vendors to submit new price proposals placed CECOS at a competitive disadvantage and was contrary to competition because once the Proposal Tabulation was posted, the other vendors were informed of the price that CECOS had bid, so knew the price they had to beat when the Contract was re-solicited. CECOS also points to what it contends are procedural irregularities with respect to Respondent's treatment of, and communication with, CECOS and DB once Respondent decided to cancel the notice of intent to award the Contract to CECOS. Specifically, CECOS contends that Respondent did not respond to its calls or email asking why the intent to award the Contract to CECOS had been cancelled. CECOS also contends that Respondent communicated with DB on substantive matters during the "cone of silence." CECOS further notes that Respondent did not convene a resolution meeting within the statutorily- established seven-day period after CECOS filed its First Petition, but instead held the meeting over 60 days later, on January 28, 2015, and that even then, Respondent did not engage in good faith negotiation to resolve the challenge. Finally, CECOS contends that Respondent's decision to reject all proposals and start the procurement process anew was predicated on a series of arbitrary and erroneous decisions (discussed above) that created confusion, so that Respondent's ultimate decision to reject all proposals was itself arbitrary and capricious. CECOS asserts that it followed the instructions in the RFP in preparing its price proposal, submitted the lowest price proposal, and is ready, willing, and able to perform the Contract at the rates it proposed in its response for Section 6. On that basis, CECOS contends that it is entitled to the award of the Contract. Findings of Ultimate Fact CECOS bears the burden in this proceeding to prove that Respondent's decision to reject all proposals was arbitrary, illegal, dishonest, or fraudulent.22/ Even if CECOS were to meet this burden, in order to prevail it also must demonstrate that Respondent's actions in cancelling the intent to award the Contract and requiring the submittal of new price proposals were clearly erroneous, arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to competition. For the reasons discussed herein, it is determined that CECOS did not meet either of these burdens. The Multiplier Rendered Section 6 Ambiguous, Arbitrary, and Structurally Flawed As discussed in detail above, Respondent decided to cancel the intent to award the Contract to CECOS and to require the submittal of new price proposals by the vendors only after it had conducted an extensive investigation that included a careful review of numerous provisions in the RFP and the instructions to Section 6 and had analyzed the structure of Section 6 in relation to other provisions in the RFP. That investigation showed that nowhere in the RFP was the use of the 2.5 multiplier in Exhibit C, Section 6, discussed or explained. Thus, to the extent the multiplier was to be used in determining reimbursement for overhead costs and compensation, the RFP failed to explain this extremely important point, leaving the multiplier's purpose, use, and significance open to speculation and assumption by the vendors in submitting their price proposals. This rendered the multiplier's use in Section 6 ambiguous. This ambiguity is further evidenced by DB's and CECOS's widely divergent price proposals for Section 6, and the credible testimony of Perretta and Cyriaks regarding their differing views of the purpose of the 2.5 multiplier. The credible, persuasive evidence establishes that the ambiguity in Section 6 caused the vendors to have differing interpretations of the manner in which they were to propose plant unit rates in Section 6; that the vendors submitted plant price proposals predicated on differing assumptions; and that this resulted in Respondent being unable to fairly compare the price proposals for purposes of obtaining the most advantageous proposal for the State. On these bases, Respondent reasonably concluded23/ that the inclusion of the 2.5 multiplier in Section 6, rendered that portion of the RFP ambiguous. As extensively discussed above, the credible, persuasive evidence also establishes that Respondent concluded, based on its investigation and review of Section 6, that inclusion of the 2.5 multiplier rendered Section 6 both arbitrary and structurally flawed.24/ The credible, persuasive evidence further establishes that Rubio investigated Respondent's use of multipliers in commodities procurements and contracts to the extent necessary and appropriate for her to reasonably conclude that the use of the 2.5 multiplier in Section 6 rendered this portion of the RFP ambiguous, arbitrary, and structurally flawed.25/ In sum, the credible, persuasive evidence establishes that Respondent engaged in a thorough and thoughtful investigation before concluding, reasonably, that the inclusion of the 2.5 multiplier in Exhibit C, Section 6 rendered that portion of the RFP ambiguous. Respondent's Actions Were Not Contrary to Competition Although the evidence shows that CECOS may suffer some competitive disadvantage because competing vendors were informed of the lowest "bottom line" price they would have to beat, it does not support a determination that Respondent's decisions to cancel the intent to award the Contract to CECOS and require the vendors to submit new price proposals were contrary to competition. To that point, in Addendum 5, Respondent substantially restructured the Section 6 Bid Sheet and also amended the Bid Sheet comprising the other price proposal sections in Exhibit C, so that CECOS' and the other vendors' price proposals submitted in response to Addendum 5 may have substantially changed from those submitted in response to Addendum 1. In any event, it cannot be concluded that Respondent's decisions to cancel the intent to award the Contract to CECOS and require submittal of new price proposals are contrary to competition such that they should be overturned in this proceeding. Procedural Irregularities CECOS also points to certain procedural irregularities in Respondent's treatment of, and communication with, CECOS once Respondent decided to cancel the notice of intent to award the Contract to CECOS and require submittal of new price proposals. CECOS apparently raises these issues in an effort to show that Respondent's actions were clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. The undisputed evidence establishes that Rubio communicated with both DB and CECOS during the "cone of silence" following the posting of its intent to award the Contract to CECOS. The undersigned determines that the "cone of silence" applied to Rubio and her communications with DB and CECOS within the 72-hour period following Respondent's posting of the intent to award the Contract. Specifically, she is an employee of Respondent's District IV Office, so is an employee of the executive branch of the State of Florida. Further, the evidence shows that her communications with both DB and CECOS during the "cone of silence" period dealt specifically with substantive, rather than "administrative" issues regarding the RFP and the vendors' price proposals. Accordingly, it is determined that these communications did, in fact, violate the "cone of silence." However, this does not require that Respondent's decision to cancel the intent to award the Contract to CECOS be overturned. The credible, persuasive evidence shows that while DB's conversation with Rubio may have spurred Rubio to decide she should investigate the Section 6 instructions and use of the 2.5 multiplier, it was not the reason why Respondent ultimately determined that the intent to award the Contract should be cancelled. Rather, Respondent's discovery of the ambiguity and structural flaws in Section 6, through Rubio's investigation, was the reason that Respondent determined that the intent to award the Contract to CECOS should be cancelled. In sum, the credible, persuasive evidence shows that notwithstanding Rubio's communications on substantive matters during the "cone of silence" with both DB and CECOS, the integrity of the procurement process was not undermined such that Respondent's decision to cancel the intent to award the Contract to CECOS was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. CECOS failed to present persuasive evidence establishing that other procedural irregularities rendered Respondent's actions in cancelling the intent to award the Contract to CECOS and requiring the vendors to submit new price proposals were clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. Respondent's Decisions to Cancel Intent to Award the Contract and Require Submittal of New Price Proposals Based on the foregoing, it is determined that CECOS did not meet its burden to show that Respondent's decisions in cancelling the intent to award the Contract to CECOS and requiring the vendors to submit new price proposals were clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. Respondent's Decision to Reject All Proposals As noted above, CECOS contends that Respondent's decision to reject all proposals and start the procurement process anew was predicated on a series of arbitrary and erroneous decisions that created confusion, so that Respondent's ultimate decision to reject all proposals was itself arbitrary and capricious. However, the credible, persuasive evidence shows that Respondent's ultimate decision to reject all bids was factually supported and was reasonable. As discussed above, Respondent initially decided to cancel the intent to award the Contract to CECOS and to require the vendors to submit new price proposals after it discovered the ambiguity and structural flaws resulting from the use of the 2.5 multiplier in Section 6. At that point, rather than rejecting all proposals, which would require the vendors to go to the time and expense of preparing completely new proposals, it decided to instead only require the vendors to submit new price proposals. Due to the interrelated nature of the six sections of Exhibit C comprising the complete price proposal for the RFP, Respondent determined revision of Section 6 would also require revision of the other five sections of Exhibit C, in order to ensure that they were internally consistent with each other. At the mandatory pre-bid meeting preceding the issuance of Addendum 5, the participating vendors had numerous questions about the sweeping revisions to all six sections of Exhibit C, and they expressed confusion about the revisions and their effect on preparation of new price proposals. Some vendors also expressed concern that they may have to change their personnel in order to be able to accurately prepare new price proposals, raising the question whether the technical proposals needed to be revised. As a result of vendor confusion and concern, and also because Respondent's Environmental Office needed additional time to carefully review and revise the RFP as needed, Respondent decided to reject all proposals and to start the procurement process anew. Respondent's decision to reject all bids was made after fully considering all of the pertinent information regarding the ambiguity and structural flaws in Section 6, vendor confusion and concern caused by Respondent's revisions to Exhibit C needed to address the ambiguity and flaws in Section 6, and Respondent's need for additional time to ensure that its RFP accurately and clearly solicited the needed environmental mitigation support services. Accordingly, Respondent did not act arbitrarily in deciding to reject all bids. Further, no persuasive evidence was presented to show that Respondent's decision to reject all bids was illegal, dishonest, or fraudulent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation: Issue a final order in Case No. 16-0769 finding that the rejection of all proposals in response to Request for Proposal RFP-DOT-15/16-4004PM was not illegal, arbitrary, dishonest, or fraudulent; and Issue a final order in Case No. 16-3530 finding that the decisions to cancel the award of the Contract for Request for Proposal RFP-DOT-15/16-4004PM to CECOS and to require the vendors to submit new price proposals for Request for Proposal RFP-DOT-15/16-4004PM were not clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of December, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 2016.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Department of Education's ("Respondent"), Notice of Intent to Award the contract for Request for Proposal No. 2005-01 ("RFP"), for Administration of the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test ("FCAT"), is contrary to Respondent's governing statutes, rules or policies, or the bid or proposal specifications. Whether Respondent's proposed action was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Findings Of Fact On the evidence, it is found and determined that: I. The RFP and Stage I, II and III Evaluation Respondent issued the RFP on August 19, 2004, seeking competitive proposals for a contract for administration of the FCAT. Respondent's intent in this procurement is to contract with a qualified vendor who will be capable of performing the contract at the lowest possible cost to the State. This contract impacts all Florida public schools. The RFP included the following provisions regarding the general scope of the requirements and bidder responsibilities. 1.0 . . . A contract, if awarded, will be awarded by written notice to the qualified and responsive bidder whose proposal is determined to be most advantageous to the state, while taking into consideration price and other criteria specified by the RFP. 1.3 . . . This RFP defines the requirements for implementing the FCAT assessment program. The RFP and the selected contractor's proposal, together with clarifying documents, define the work to be conducted under contract. These documents will be incorporated into the contracts resulting from the FCAT project award. Because the FCAT assessment program is technical and complex, it is possible that a responsive proposal may not totally or clearly reflect RFP requirements in all details. If the proposal of a contractor selected as a result of the bidding process is inconsistent with the RFP, the requirements of the RFP prevail; the selected contractor will be expected to perform all RFP requirements without an increase in cost above the proposed cost. * * * 5.18 Acceptance of a Proposal The Department reserves the right, in its sole discretion, to waive minor irregularities in a proposal. A minor irregularity is a variation from the RFP that does not affect the price of the proposal, or give one bidder an advantage or benefit not enjoyed by other bidders, or adversely impact the interest of the Department. Waivers, when granted, shall in no way modify the RFP requirements or excuse the bidder from full compliance with the RFP specifications and other contract requirements if the bidder is awarded the contract. Rejection of Proposals Proposals that do not conform to the requirements of this RFP may be rejected by the Department. Proposals may be rejected for reasons that include, but are not limited to, the following: The proposal contains unauthorized amendments, either additions or deletions, to the requirements of the RFP. The proposal is conditional or contains irregularities that make the proposal indefinite or ambiguous. The proposal is received late. The proposal is not signed by an authorized representative of the bidder. The bidder is not authorized to conduct business in the State of Florida or has not included a statement that such authorization will be secured prior to the award of a contract. A bid bond is not submitted with the proposal. The proposal contains false or misleading statements or provides references that do not support an attribute, capability, assertion, or condition claimed by the bidder. The proposal does not offer to provide all services required by this RFP. Department Reservations and Responsiveness of Proposals The Department reserves the right to accept or reject any or all proposals received. 5.22 . . . In the event of conflict between the language of a proposal and the language of the RFP, the language of the RFP shall prevail. * * * 7.1 Stage I: Evaluation of Mandatory Requirements (Part I) During the Stage I evaluation, the Office of Agency Procurement and Contracting Services will determine if a proposal is sufficiently responsive to the requirements of this RFP to permit a complete evaluation. In making this determination, the Office of Agency Procurement and Contracting Services will evaluate each proposal according to the process described in this section. The RFP required prospective vendors to submit sealed proposals in two parts, a technical proposal and a price proposal. The technical proposals were reviewed and scored by an evaluation committee prior to opening of the sealed cost proposals. Failure of a bidder to meet every item on the Stage I list would not necessarily result in elimination of the proposal from consideration. A proposal would be eliminated only if it contained a material irregularity. "Stage I" of the process was identified in the RFP and is basically a check list of documents and commitments that are to be included with proposals. In accordance with Section 7.1, the purpose of the Stage I review is to determine whether the proposals are sufficiently responsive to be considered by the evaluation committee. Two of Respondent's employees opened the technical proposals and checked the proposals against the Stage I list to make certain "Mandatory Documents and Statements" required by Section 7.1 of the RFP were present. They did not make any substantive judgments about the extent of compliance. In performing this Stage I review, Respondent's employees followed the department's standard operating procedures. No scoring points were associated with the Stage I check list review. The technical portions of the RFP were categorized into two parts: Part II titled, "Bidder Qualification and Experience"; and Part III titled, "Technical Proposal for Administration." Bidders could receive a maximum of 50 points for Part II and a maximum of 50 points for Part III, a total maximum possible points of 100 for the technical proposals. The RFP is designed to ensure that only qualified, responsible bidders will be eligible for award of the contract. In order to be considered eligible, a bidder was required to receive a minimum of 70 cumulative points for the technical proposals. Each of the two parts of the technical proposals was broken down into ten categories or criteria. The RFP provided that an evaluation committee would assign scores from one to five, with five being the highest possible score, for each of the criteria. The RFP consists of approximately 200 pages of technical specifications, instructions, and guidelines including appendices and addenda issued after the original release date. Each of the bidders submitted technical proposals in excess of 400 pages. The RFP provided that evaluation of proposals would be based on a holistic approach so that the proposals could be scored based on consideration of the whole package proposed by the bidders without artificial limitations on the evaluators' ability to evaluate the entire proposal and score it accordingly. The evaluation process was designed to be as objective as possible, but a degree of subjective judgment is involved in the scoring of the proposals. The 20 scoring criteria for Parts II and III were designed to cover broad categories of qualifications against which the proposals were judged. Because of the holistic evaluation approach, there was no intent to evaluate proposals on the basis of an item-by-item determination. The committee evaluating the proposals was selected to include representatives familiar with various aspects of the FCAT, which were covered in the proposals. It also included a person not employed by Respondent as required by new procurement guidelines and also included a parent representative. The evaluation committee was selected so that each member brought a different expertise or perspective to the process. The evaluation committee was instructed on how the evaluation process was to be accomplished. The evaluators took their responsibility seriously and did a thorough job. For Part II, the rating scale ranged from five (excellent) to one (unsatisfactory). A score of five means the evaluator found that the bidder demonstrated superior qualifications and experience to perform the required tasks. A score of one meant the bidder demonstrated insufficient experience and capability to perform the required tasks or did not establish its qualifications and experience. The RFP stressed in bold typeface that "[t]he evaluation of Overall Bidder Qualifications and Experience will be completed by the proposal evaluation committee using 'holistic' ratings. Each proposal evaluation committee member, acting independently, will assign a single rating for each criterion identified in Appendix M." The "holistic" approach referenced in the RFP means that Respondent looks at the proposal as a whole. The RFP and the administration of the FCAT is very complex and the evaluators are not required to look at each component of the proposal, but are to judge the whole proposal. For Part III, the rating scale also ranged from five to one. The criteria for what merited a five or a one changed, however, from Part II. A score of five means that the bidder proposed superior solutions to the requirement of the RFP and has proposed products and services that are desirable for use in the FCAT administration program and are likely to create a high quality assessment program that meets sound psychometric standards that are clearly feasible to implement. A score of one under Part III means that the bidder proposed inferior or incomplete solutions to the requirements of the RFP or has proposed products and services that would be technically indefensible, would create a flawed assessment program not meeting psychometric standards, or would not be feasible to implement. Again, the RFP stressed in bold typeface that "[t]he evaluation of the Technical Proposal will be completed by the proposal evaluation committee using 'holistic' ratings. Each proposal evaluation committee member, acting independently, will assign a single rating for each criterion identified in Appendix N." The proposals were scored independently based upon the proposal's compliance with applicable RFP criteria; the proposals were not scored based upon how they compared to each other. Indeed, the evaluators were instructed not to discuss their scores so that each evaluator would establish their own internal criteria that was consistent across proposals. Although none of the proposals were deemed non- responsive in this stage, there are indications that failure to meet certain RFP requirements were noticed by the evaluation committed and scored accordingly. Stages II and III of the evaluation process took four days. Representatives of the bidders, including its attorney, attended all of the Stage II and III evaluation sessions. Documentation of Subcontractor Information. The RFP included the following specifications relating to documentation of subcontractors and printers. 4.6.1 Subcontractors The test administration contractor may choose to employ subcontractors for the completion of one or more tasks. If the bidder proposes to employ a subcontractor(s), the qualifications and experience of the subcontractor(s) will be documented in the proposal at the same level of detail as those of the bidder. A separate chart in the proposal will identify all of the subcontractors proposed to be involved in the project and the services they are expected to provide. All subcontractors must be approved by the Department. It is assumed that the contractor will use outside printers for some materials. Printers will be documented as subcontractors, and the management plan will identify the proportion of materials to be printed by the contractor and by outside vendors. Procedures for quality control and security during printing are to be described. Destruction of secure materials is addressed in Section 3.7.4. The contractor will assume responsibility for all services offered in the proposal whether or not they are performed or produced by the contractor or by subcontractors. The Department will consider the selected contractor to be the sole point of contact for contractual matters, including payment of any and all charges resulting from the contract. Other specifications in the RFP contained similar or identical language. The RFP also provided the following in Section 5.31 with respect to subcontractors: Any change of subcontractors must be approved in advance by the Department. In the event of poor performance by a subcontractor, the Department reserves the right to direct the contractor to replace that subcontractor. While Item 10 on Page 77 of the RFP required a representation from the vendors that they had identified all subcontractors and the amount of work to be performed directly by each subcontractor, the only investigation that Respondent undertook to confirm the accuracy of these statements was the Stage I evaluation. The Stage II and Stage III evaluators did not check to ensure that all of the subcontractors had been documented as required by the RFP. The RFP specifically required that all printers be identified and documented as subcontractors. Section 6.3 of the RFP requires the management plan to specifically identify the proportion of materials to be printed by outside vendors. Section 4.6.1 of the RFP on Page 53 states that if a bidder proposes to employ a subcontractor, the qualifications and experience of the subcontractors will be documented in their proposal at the same level of detail as the bidder. That section also provides that "printers will be documented as subcontractors." The timeliness, accuracy, and security of the printing operations are very important to the FCAT program; and the qualifications and experience of the printers, who would actually print the materials, is an important component of this procurement. As it relates to the "back-end" printing of the student and parent reports, there are privacy concerns that are particularly sensitive. The RFP provisions were included to ensure that, if a vendor was going to use outside printers for some of the activities, Respondent would be able to tell from the response who all of those printers were and what services they were going to perform. The RFP was drafted to ensure that Respondent was dealing with vendors who were qualified and experienced and able to deliver the products requested in the RFP. There were specific requirements in the RFP as to how the bidders were supposed to identify prior contracts, provide contact information, and document the printers who were going to do any of the actual printing. Section 6.2 on Page 74 of the RFP required that all vendors were to document contracted services for previous assessment projects similar to the one described in the RFP. For each of those projects, the documentation was supposed to include a description of the services and products delivered, the contract period, the name, address, and telephone of the contract person for each of the contracting agencies. This provision was applicable to all of the printers who were involved in this contract. The printers were also supposed to document how they were going to monitor security and provide quality control during the printing process itself. The intent of the RFP was to have bidders document who was going to do the printing, whether it was subcontractors, sub-subcontractors, or sub-sub-subcontractors. Section 5.27 on Page 65 of the RFP states that "if a bidder proposes to employ a subcontractor, the subcontractor's qualifications and experience will be documented in the proposal at the same level of detail as that of the bidder. Procedures for quality control and security of the work tasks performed by the subcontractors are to be described." These provisions are not discretionary. They are mandatory and require all vendors to provide a description of the quality control and security measures to be employed by all subcontractors, including the printers who must be documented as subcontractors. CTB's proposal identified The Grow Network as the entity that would be responsible for printing requirements. The Grow Network is an affiliate of CTB. CTB's proposal included documentation regarding The Grow Network's qualifications to perform the printing. In its response to the RFP, CTB provided extensive documentation and met all of the requirements of the RFP with respect to its front-end printers. Indeed each of those printers was identified in paragraph 10 of the transmittal letter that accompanied the CTB proposal. The Grow Network was also responsible for providing the back-end printing for the reports to be sent to the parents and students. The Grow Network was identified as doing 20 percent of the printing. However, the Grow Network does not actually do any printing themselves. At the hearing, the Grow Network claimed that it was the "print publisher" of the back-end reports. It stated that the Grow Network utilizes a "distributed printing approach." This, in fact, meant that the printing was going to be subcontracted out. The services that would be subcontracted out by the Grow Network include digital printing, collating, packing, distribution, and tracking. CTB's proposal states that GDS, a digital imaging company, will be the print facility utilized by the Grow Network to perform these aspects of the FCAT report printing requirements. CTB's proposal describes the corporate capabilities and experience of GDS, including descriptions of the California and New Jersey projects where GDS was utilized by the Grow Network as its print facility. The RFP also required bidders to provide examples of materials to demonstrate the quality of the work done on similar projects. Accordingly, CTB included sample reports printed by the Grow Network in conjunction with GDS, for the California and New Jersey projects. Notwithstanding the foregoing detailed documentation of both the Grow Network and GDS, Petitioner asserts that CTB failed to comply with the RFP because the CTB proposal indicates that much of the printing work will be out-sourced without disclosing who is actually going to be providing these services. However, CTB's proposal identifies only one printing facility, GDS, that will be utilized as the print facility under its distributed printing approach. CTB's proposal specifically states that "Grow currently uses GDS to support their California and New Jersey projects, and they will employ GDS' services for the Florida reporting project." CTB's proposal identifies other printing facilities, Delzer, R.R. Donnelley, and Bowne, that Grow could utilize on the FCAT with Respondent's approval. These other companies were potential "backup" printers, which were identified in case Respondent preferred using another printing facility. Otherwise, the Grow Network intended to utilize GDS as the sole printing facility on the FCAT and has a commitment from GDS to perform the tasks required. The RFP does not require commitment letters from subcontractors. The RFP required only the identification of the proposed printers, which could be changed with Respondent's approval. CTB has also indicated in its response that it will utilize 180 employees of Kelly Services, at three different locations, to supervise approximately 3,000 scorers. However, nowhere in the proposal has CTB documented Kelly Services as a subcontractor, nor provided information regarding their experience and qualifications to perform this work. CTB uses Kelly Services as a recruiting service provider. CTB is responsible for the hiring, training, and directing of the Kelly Services personnel and ultimately for the deliverables received from those employees. Kelly Services is not a subcontractor as contemplated in the RFP, because they are not held accountable for their deliverables. Accordingly, CTB's proposal is not deficient for failing to document Kelly Services as a subcontractor. Even if the failure to so document Kelly Services were a deficiency in CTB's proposal, the lack of detail would only lower CTB's score, not make it non-responsive. The Post-submittal Clarification Process. The RFP provided at Section 7.0 that each bidder would be required to make a presentation to the evaluation committee after the technical proposals were opened and that information presented or issues clarified during the presentation might affect the number of points an evaluation committee member assigned to a given proposal. On the first day of the evaluation process, the bidders were required to make separate oral presentations to the evaluation committee. Following those oral presentations, the evaluation committee was to begin the process of scoring the proposals based on the various RFP criteria. This was to be a "closed session" during which the vendors were not permitted to interact with the evaluation committee members; likewise, the evaluation committee members were not permitted to direct any questions to the vendors. RFP Section 7.0 spells out the rules and processes for conducting the oral presentations of the vendors. This includes the imposition of time limits on the presentations and questions from evaluators, which were to be strictly followed. Section 7.0 states, in pertinent part: The purpose of the presentation will be for the bidder to describe its offering of products and services and make any statements that will enhance understanding of its offering. The proposal evaluation committee will NOT evaluate the presentations or otherwise award points for the quality of the of the presentation. Information presented or issues clarified during the presentation MAY affect the number of points a proposal evaluation committee member assigns to a given proposal. . . . The presentation shall not exceed 30 minutes with an additional 15 minutes reserved for proposal evaluation committee member questions. These meetings will be open to the public; however, only members of the proposal evaluation committee may ask questions of the bidder. The above-quoted language in the RFP does not contemplate written submissions by vendors following the oral presentations. Nothing else in the RFP specifically authorizes vendors to clarify information in their proposals after the presentations have concluded. Thus, the oral presentation part of the evaluation process is the only RFP-authorized mechanism available to evaluators for seeking clarification of the proposals. Because clarifications are permissible during the vendor presentations, the RFP expressly states that such clarifications may affect scoring of the proposals. By contrast, nothing in the RFP authorizes the evaluators to seek or consider in scoring the proposals any vendor clarification made in any other form or at any other point, whether before or after the oral presentations. In fact, considering any information received from the vendors outside of the oral presentations would be inconsistent with RFP Section 5.3, which restricts communications by bidders with Respondent's staff. In short, to the extent a clarification of a proposal was needed, under the RFP, it should have been provided orally during the vendor presentations. Each of the bidders made a presentation to the evaluation committee. During the presentations, members of the evaluation committee asked bidders various questions relating to their respective responses to the RFP. One of the members sought clarification regarding the total number of full time equivalent ("FTE") hours for the persons identified in the proposals. Although the evaluation team was not given any specific standards or base lines to utilize in scoring the staffing and personnel commitments submitted by the parties, a bidders' commitment of personnel resources was an important factor for several of the criteria in the RFP. The bidder representatives for CTB and Petitioner were not able to provide the requested FTE information at the time of the presentation. Harcourt's representatives, who had had the benefit of hearing the presentations made by Petitioner and CTB, were able to answer the FTE question at the presentation. Because the evaluators had lingering questions on staffing, Respondent made a decision to send out questions to two of the three vendors following completion of the oral presentations. No scoring was done on any of the proposals prior to the time Petitioner's and CTB's responses were presented to the evaluators. At least some of the evaluation committee members felt that the staffing information was critical. The questions were not based on the presentations by the vendors, but were based on the evaluation committee members' concerns that had not been resolved by the oral presentations. The questions reflected areas that the evaluators were not able to understand from the initial proposals submitted. After the presentations, Respondent delivered letters dated August 30, 2004, to Petitioner and CTB, but not to Harcourt, asking them to provide the requested FTE information by the following day. CTB and Petitioner both promptly provided the information requested. CTB's August 31, 2004, written response to the FTE question included a chart that identified all personnel and the associated FTEs that would be assigned to the project. This FTE chart was prepared by Diane Driessen, CTB's senior program manager who was one of two CTB employees primarily responsible for preparing CTB's response to the RFP. As a format for its written response, CTB utilized the existing chart for Professional Personnel Responsible for Major Contract Activity (Figure 9), which was in its proposal. CTB added to this chart the additional personnel to reflect the total FTEs for the project as a whole. CTB took the material in the proposal and presented it in a consolidated format. CTB combined the monthly activities by program chart, which was Table 9, with the key personnel chart, which was Figure 9, and handscoring resources presented in the proposal. The additional named personnel in its response were not named in the original figure of key personnel because they were not considered responsible for major contract activities. It was an oversight that the chart still retained the heading, "Time Task Chart for Key Project Personnel" when it actually reflected the 330 total FTEs for the whole project team as requested by Respondent. The cover letter to Respondent explained that CTB was listing all personnel, not just "key personnel." All of the unnamed persons added to the chart are identified by position in the original proposal. As part of its written response to Respondent's written requests for additional information, CTB also included a written recap of the questions and answers from its oral presentation. The evidence demonstrated that the information provided by CTB after receiving Respondent's staff's questions included corrections of errors contained in CTB's initial response to the RFP. This information was presented to the evaluators for them to review and consider in the scoring process. No one from Respondent made an analysis to determine whether the information in the supplement was contained in the original proposal before it was presented to the evaluators. The RFP also required the vendors to provide all required information by the deadline that the proposals were to be received. Respondent was obligated to follow these provisions and not accept any information in a manner inconsistent with them. In addition, bidders were required to commit to complying with all requirements of the RFP if awarded the contract: I certify that this Proposal is made without prior understanding, agreement, or connection with any corporation firm, or person submitting a proposal for the same materials, supplies or equipment, and is in all respects fair and without collusion or fraud. I agree to abide by all conditions of this Proposal and certify that I am authorized to sign this Proposal for the Proposer and that the Proposer is in compliance with all requirements of the Request for Proposal including but not limited to, certification requirements. . . . The supplemental information submitted by CTB should have been included in CTB's initial submittal. The fifth bullet point of Section 4.6.2 of the RFP on Page 54 required bidders to indicate by name the professional personnel to be responsible for major contract activities with an estimation of the amount of time and full-time equivalencies each person was going to devote to the tasks under the contract. The proposal was also supposed to include a vitae for all such professional personnel. This bullet point was not limited to only those who had a supervisory role. It was the intention of the bullet point that the individuals should be identified by name, including software development staff. Much of CTB's software development staff was not identified by name in its initial response, but they were identified in the supplement. The RFP required vendors to provide the total time commitment for key personnel in the initial submission and required that the bidders identify by name the professional personnel to be responsible for major contract activities. The time commitment for some of the key project personnel that CTB identified in its initial proposal were significantly "revised" in its supplement. These "revisions" purportedly correct "errors" in the initial response and include changes to the time commitment for "key project personnel," including the project manager for manufacturing, senior research scientists and the scoring director for one of the major scoring sites. There are six new names that appear in CTB's supplement, as well as numerous revisions to the time commitment of key personnel. In its written questions to the vendors, Respondent did not request any revisions or corrections of error with respect to any of these key personnel. The evidence is clear that there are "revisions," corrections of errors and significant reformatting that were tailored to address lingering concerns of the evaluators. CTB's supplemental proposal also included a new chart broken down with many different allocations of days that did not appear anywhere in the original proposal. This submittal also included a number of different "to be assigned" categories that were not specifically included on the chart in the initial submittal and a re-categorization of some of the positions. The evaluation committee members would not have had enough time to make an assessment as to whether that information was in the original proposal. Had CTB not provided its supplemental information, the evaluation team would have had a significantly different view point on CTB's staffing. After the oral presentations, Petitioner also received a written question regarding staffing from Respondent. Petitioner's response was a listing of the FTEs taken from the charts already contained in the original proposal. Petitioner was concerned with the procedure that was being implemented, but after seeking advice of counsel, submitted the response nonetheless. Harcourt was not given this opportunity. RFP Section 5.16 does not address proposal clarifications, but it does impose limitations on the consideration of proposal "amendments." Section 5.16 states that, absent a specific request by Respondent, any "amendments, revisions, or alterations to proposals will not be accepted after the deadline for the receipt of proposals." In addition, Section 5.16 does not address when, during the evaluation process, Respondent may request a vendor to amend a proposal. This timing issue is only addressed by statute in Subsection 120.57(3)(f), Florida Statutes (2004), which states that "no submissions made after the bid or proposal opening which amend or supplement the bid or proposal shall be considered." However, the timing of when Respondent could request a proposal amendment under Section 5.16 is not at issue in this case. Respondent acknowledges that it made no such request in this case. Absent a specific request, Section 5.16 precluded Respondent from considering any amendment to a proposal offered by any vendor. CTB's written responses to Respondent's written questions amount to a clarification of their bid proposal, since then were submitted only after Respondent requested the information. The responses do not constitute an amendment or supplement to the proposal. The Evaluation Process Immediately following the bidders' oral presentations and receipt of the bidders' responses to the evaluators' questions, the evaluation committee met as a body and reviewed each of the proposals. Dr. Orr and Dr. Melvin were co-chairpersons of the committee and facilitated the evaluation committee review of the technical proposals. They did not participate in the actual scoring of proposals. The evaluation committee reviewed the three proposals consecutively, evaluating them against the criteria in the RFP. Open discussion about the criteria and the locations within the proposals where criteria were addressed was encouraged and took place. Whether one bidder was slightly better than another bidder was not the basis for determining the contract award. The RFP provided a balanced formula that sought to ensure the competency of the awarded by requiring a minimum technical score of 70 while rewarding the competent bidder that submitted the lowest price. In accordance with the RFP, the evaluation committee assigned holistic ratings to the technical proposals, judging them based on the quality of the proposals as a whole. Each evaluator independently scored the proposals by assigning a score from one to five for each of the 20 criterion in the RFP. The evaluation committee did not compare the proposals to each other. The evaluation committee completed the evaluation of the first proposal before considering the second proposal and completed the evaluation of the second proposal before completing the evaluation of the third proposal. Alternative Proposals. The RFP permitted bidders to propose alternative approaches for meeting Respondent's objectives, but provided that no cost savings or increases for alternative proposals could be referenced in the technical proposal. Any cost savings or increases for alternative proposals were required to be submitted in a separately sealed package and clearly labeled. None of the bidders included any reference to cost savings or increases in their technical proposals. Petitioner's proposal clearly marked its alternatives. CTB sometimes identified its alternatives with a special marker and sometimes simply described them within the text of the RFP. Harcourt generally did not clearly designate its alternatives. During the Stage II and III evaluation process, a committee member raised a question regarding assigning points for alternative proposals. Because the RFP did not provide a mechanism for evaluating the alternatives, an internal decision was made by Respondent not to consider the alternatives at all in connection with scoring the proposals. The members of the evaluation team were told to disregard the references to alternative proposals submitted by each of the bidders. There was no provision in the RFP that was relied upon in making that determination. The evaluators were given no guidance as to which provisions of the various proposals should not be considered. This led to inconsistencies in what was treated as an alternative and not scored, versus what was treated as part of the base proposal and scored. It is clear that the decision not to consider alternatives resulted in confusion and inconsistency in the evaluation process. For example, one evaluator, Clarence Reed, indicated that if a proposal went beyond the requirements of the RFP and offered something that was not required, but was an enhancement, he viewed that as an alternative and would not have considered it. Similarly, the chairperson of the evaluation committee and one of the facilitators for the evaluation process, Dr. Orr, testified that "enhancements" should not have been considered. By contrast, most of the evaluators viewed offerings by vendors that went beyond the requirements of the RFP and did not include a cost to Respondent as "enhancements" that could be considered in their evaluation of the proposals. Likewise, Dr. Melvin, one of Respondent's facilitators for the evaluation team, believed that an "augmentation" was not the same as an "alternative." Thus, in many instances, when a vendor offered something beyond the requirements of the RFP, at no cost to Respondent, and did not identify it as an "option" or "alternative," it was considered in the scoring by at least some of the evaluators. The evidence is clear that there are portions of the proposals submitted by Harcourt and CTB that was essentially the equivalent of no cost "alternatives" that were considered by the evaluators while Petitioner's clearly identified "alternatives" were not. In sum, whether a particular proposal was an "augmentation," "option," "alternative" or an additional clarification created confusion among the evaluators. As a result, there was no consistency in terms of what the evaluators could consider in the proposals and what they could not consider. While it is impossible to quantify the exact impact of the decision not to consider alternatives, it is clear that Petitioner's bid received a disproportionate negative impact because many of its important enhancements, which were being offered to Respondent at no cost were listed as "alternatives" and never factored into the evaluation process. There were several alternatives proposed by Petitioner that would have been enhancements to the current program and would have been made available at no cost to Respondent. Thus, Petitioner's score was artificially influenced in a negative way. By contrast, the evidence is clear that CTB and Harcourt, in many instances presented different ways to accomplish tasks without specifically utilizing the term "alternative" or "option" and such matters were factored into the evaluation. The claim by Respondent and CTB that the decision not to consider alternatives was applied even-handedly is not supported by the evidence. Because there was not a consistent manner in which the various companies presented their "enhancements," "augmentations," "options" or "alternatives," Respondent's determination to exclude consideration of "alternatives" precluded the evaluators from fairly determining what each of the vendors could actually provide to the program. It also meant that the vendors were not evaluated on an equal footing. Thus, the decision was contrary to the bid specifications. In spite of these concerns, the preponderance of the evidence does not demonstrate that Respondent's instruction to evaluators not to consider alternatives rendered the proposed agency action clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, and/or arbitrary and capricious because Respondent was not obligated to accept any of the alternatives offered by a bidder. The Price Proposals. Respondent's evaluation of the three bidders' proposals established that each of the bidders was capable and qualified to perform the work under the contract. The bidders' price proposals remained sealed until after the evaluation committee completed its scoring of the technical proposals. The price proposals were evaluated based on a formula that awarded 50 points to the bidder with the lowest price. The remaining bidders received points based on a proportion or ratio that compared their price to the low bidder's price. The RFP provided at Section 7.4, Page 82, in pertinent part: A total of 50 points will be awarded to the lowest acceptable Cost Proposal. Proposals with higher costs will receive the fraction of 50 points proportional to the ratio of the lowest proposal cost to the higher cost proposal. The fractional value of points to be assigned will be rounded to one decimal place. For example, if the lowest responsive cost were $50,000.00, the bid would receive 50 points. If the next lowest responsive cost proposal were $75,000.00, it would receive 33.3 points. If the highest responsive cost proposal were $100,000.00, it would receive 25 points. Upon opening the three bidders price proposals, it was determined that Petitioner's bid for the base and renewal period was $224,969,699; Harcourt's bid was $167,055,970; and CTB's bid was $140,107,439. On September 23, 2004, Respondent posted a Notice of Intent to Award the contract for the FCAT administration to CTB. The posting showed the final scores of the three vendors as follows: Proposers Mandatory Bidders Technical Total Cost Total Requirement Qualifications/ Quality Points Proposal Points Met Experience Stage III (Stages Stage IV Stage Stage II II&III) V Pearson Yes Educational Assessment 44.6 44.3 88.9 31.4 120.3 Harcourt Yes 42.7 42.2 84.9 42.4 127.3 CTB/McGraw Yes Hill 43.8 44.9 88.8 50 138.8 CTB's price for performing the contract over a five-year period is approximately $85 million less than the price proposed by Petitioner and approximately $27 million less than the price proposed by Harcourt. Over a three year contract period, CTB's price for performing is approximately $53 million less than the price proposed by Petitioner and approximately $14 million less than the price proposed by Harcourt.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner of the Department of Education adopt this Recommended Order and enter an final order awarding the contract for RFP No. 2005-01 to the low bidder, CTB/McGraw-Hill, LLC. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of February, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of February, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: J. Stephen Menton, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 420 Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cynthia S. Tunnicliff, Esquire Pennington, Moore, Wilkinson, Bell & Dunbar, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Second Floor Post Office Box 10095 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-2095 Donna E. Blanton, Esquire Radey, Thomas, Yon & Clark, P.A. 313 North Monroe Street, Suite 200 Post Office Box 10967 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Jason K. Fudge, Esquire Florida Department of Education 1244 Turlington Building 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 W. Robert Vezina, III, Esquire Vezina, Lawrence & Piscitelli, P.A. 318 North Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-7606 Daniel J. Woodring, General Counsel Department of Education 1244 Turlington Building 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Lynn Abbott, Agency Clerk Department of Education Turlington Building 325 West Gaines Street, Suite 1514 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
