The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of marital status or sex.
Findings Of Fact In August, 1992, two special learning disabilities (SLD) teaching positions were available at Key Largo Elementary School. Petitioner, Steve J. Longariello (Longariello), a single male, applied for a SLD position with the Monroe County School Board. At the time he applied, Longariello was certified to teach a SLD class. In addition to Longariello, twelve other candidates, including five men, applied for the two available SLD teaching positions at Key Largo Elementary School. On August 7, 1992, Longariello interviewed for a SLD position at Key Largo Elementary School. The interview was conducted by the principal of the school, Frances McCormick-St. James, and Annette Hall. At the time of the interview Ms. McCormick-St. James was unmarried. The interview lasted approximately 20 to 25 minutes. No questions were asked concerning Longariello's marital status, and Longariello did not volunteer any information concerning his marital status. The application did not indicate Longariello's marital status. Longariello has no information available to him to make him believe that either Ms. McCormick-St. James or Ms. Hall was aware of his marital status at the time of the interview. No evidence has been presented to show that either Ms. McCormick-St. James or Ms. Hall knew that Longariello was single. Longariello recalls that during the interview that Ms. McCormick-St. James had two statues on her desk with comments concerning men on the statues. He does not recall what the comments were or what the statues looked like. Neither Ms. Hall nor Ms. McCormick-St. James asked him any questions which he considered offensive based on gender. A couple of days after the interview, Longariello called the school and was told that the position had been filled. The position was filled by a married female, Katherine Walker. The parties have stipulated that Ms. Walker was as qualified as Longariello. Gregory Kickasola, a single male, submitted an application dated September 4, 1992 to Key Largo Elementary School. He was hired for one of the SLD teaching positions for which Longariello applied. During the 1992-1993 school year, Longariello called the Monroe County School Board to see if any positions were available. He considered his telephoning to be equivalent to applying for whatever positions were available at the time. In November, 1993, Longariello was offered a teaching position by the Monroe County School Board at Marathon High School. It was a seven-month position. Longariello declined the position because he felt that it would cost him too much money to take the position and not be assured of being rehired the following year. There were no guarantees for a rehire for the next year for any position for which Longariello could have applied. Longariello did not renew his teaching certificate with the State of Florida in October, 1993, and presently does not have a teaching certificate. For the 1991-1992 school year, Monroe County School Board hired 30 single teachers and 33 married teachers. Of the single teachers, nine were male. Of the married teachers, 5 were male. During the same school year, six single teachers and five married teachers were hired at Key Largo Elementary. Two of the single teachers were male and two of the married teachers were male. For the 1992-1993 school year, Monroe County School Board hired 45 single teachers and 55 married teachers. Fourteen of the single teachers were male and nine of the married teachers were male. During the same school year, six single teachers and twelve married teachers were hired at Key Largo Elementary. One of the single teachers was male and one of the married teachers was male. For the 1993-1994 school year, Monroe County School Board hired 55 single teachers and 49 married teachers. Twenty-five of the single teachers were male and 7 of the married teachers were male. During the same school year, 8 single teachers and 6 married teachers were hired at Key Largo Elementary. Six of the single teachers were male and none of the married teachers were male. At the beginning of the 92-93 school year, the total number of instructional staff in Florida public schools consisted of 92,402 females and 26,467 males. Thus, 22.27 percent of the total instructional staff were male. At the beginning of the 93-94 school year, the total number of instructional staff in Florida public schools (excluding Monroe County) 1/ consisted of 96,010 females and 27,512 males. Thus, 22.27 percent of the total instructional staff, excluding Monroe County, were male. At the beginning of the 94-95 school year, the total number of instructional staff in Florida public schools consisted of 100,346 females and 28,883 males. Thus, 22.35 percent of the total instructional staff were male. On July 8, 1993, Longariello filed a complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations, alleging that Respondent had discriminated against him on the basis of sex and marital status. On August 8, 1993, Longariello filed complaint with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging Respondent discriminated against him based on sex and marital status. On May 23, 1995, the EEOC issued a Letter of Determination, stating that the investigation failed to reveal evidence which would support a case of discrimination based either on sex or marital status. Longariello was advised that he could file suit against the Respondent in Federal District Court within 90 days of the receipt of the Letter of Determination. On August 4, 1995, Longariello wrote to the Commission and requested an administrative hearing on his complaint. In his letter to the Commission, Longariello stated: To date, I have not received a registered letter that would indicate a determination has been made. From what I understand of Title XLIV, Civil Rights, Chapter 760, I can proceed in one of two ways: (1) Bring Civil Action, or (2) Request an Administrative Hearing under Section 120.57. * * * Because a EEOC investigation has found no violation of T. VII, the main focus of this hearing should be MARITAL STATUS DISCRIMINATION. This is because marital status is not a protected class under T. VII. If I decide to proceed with my sex discrimination claims in Federal District Court, it may not be necessary to pursue sex disc. at the State level. On August 17, 1995, Longariello filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida against Respondents alleging sex discrimination based on the same facts which are the subject of this administrative proceeding. Steve J. Longariello v. School Board of Monroe County, Florida, Monroe County Public Schools, Case No. 95-10055.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing Longariello's claims for discrimination based on sex and marital status against Monroe County Public Schools, Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of January, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of January, 1997.
The Issue Whether the Respondent's motion to dismiss should be granted.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's claim of discrimination based on marital status and recognizing Petitioner has elected to bring a civil action in federal court which is a court of competent jurisdiction to resolve all other claims against this Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of January, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of January, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Jonathan D. Fishbane, Esquire Roetzel & Andress 850 Park Shore Drive Naples, Florida 33490 Steve J. Longariello, pro se 9999 Summerbreeze Drive Apartment 422 Sunrise, Florida 33322 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Petitioner's termination from employment by Respondent on November 12, 2004, for Petitioner's refusal to take a DNA test to affirmatively establish the paternity of a child he wanted to add to his company-provided insurance coverage was discriminatory in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act, Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2004).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by Respondent from May 1998 until his termination on November 12, 2004. Petitioner had performed his duties adequately during his employment period and had no major disciplinary reports in his record. Petitioner was at the time of his termination from employment a single, divorced, white male, and he was living with his girlfriend, Shannon Mitchell. On September 28, 2004, Petitioner received a message while he was at work that his girlfriend had called and was in distress, purportedly suffering from back pains. Petitioner requested and was given permission to go home to attend to her. Upon arrival at home, Petitioner discovered that his girlfriend had in fact given birth to a child. Petitioner may or may not have known about the birth before he left work; his testimony on that issue was contradictory. Petitioner had only learned of his girlfriend's pregnancy about one week before the birth despite the fact they had lived together for almost a year. Petitioner notified Respondent about the birth the next day (September 29) in accordance with company policies. He also requested and was granted leave from work. The child was immediately added to Petitioner's health insurance coverage in accordance with Respondent's normal practice. Even though Respondent added the child to Petitioner's family insurance coverage, there were several concerns about the unusual circumstances surrounding Petitioner's reporting of the birth, to wit: That he didn't tell his employer about the birth when he left to go home that day even though he likely knew it had occurred; that he represented a lack of knowledge about the pregnancy even though he was living with the child's mother; that the hospital records did not list Petitioner as the father. Respondent's insurance plan is self-funded and is administered directly by management of the company. Each employee's cost of insurance is determined by the prior year's costs and expenses. The company pays about 99.5 percent of the employee's cost; the employee pays the remainder plus the cost of coverage for family members. Proper administration of the health plan is therefore important to both management and employees alike. Respondent employs over 250 people. The employee handbook is silent on the degree or kind of proof necessary to establish paternity of a child for insurance purposes. Neither Respondent nor its insurance program has an established policy requiring employees to obtain a paternity test in order to prove relationship to their child. There is no prohibition against an unmarried person adding his or her child and, in fact, the company has provided benefits for such children. It is not common for Respondent to ask an employee to submit to a DNA examination in order to establish paternity for insurance coverage purposes. The only other time such a test had been required was for an unmarried male employee who was not able to provide a birth certificate for his child showing he was the father. That situation, like the present matter, had certain unusual facts associated with it. While working for the company during the years of 1998 to 2003, Petitioner was married. During that time he and his wife had two children, both of whom were added to his family insurance coverage. He was not required to provide proof of paternity for those children other than a birth certificate. Based upon the unusual circumstances regarding Petitioner's reporting of his most recent child's birth, Respondent demanded further proof of paternity. On October 12, 2004, Respondent's human resources director, Sandra Ho, asked Petitioner to have a DNA test performed and to provide Respondent with the results on or before November 12, 2004. Respondent did not offer to pay for the required test. Petitioner acknowledged receipt of this demand from his employer which included an ultimatum regarding his continued employment should he fail to comply. In response to the request for proof of paternity, Petitioner provided Respondent a Social Security document for the child and a hospital discharge notice for Shannon Mitchell. Neither of these documents listed Petitioner as the child's father. On or about November 10, 2004 (two days prior to the DNA test deadline), Petitioner provided Respondent with a copy of the child's birth certificate listing him as the father. He had filled out "paperwork" at the hospital to obtain the birth certificate. There was no evidence in the record as to what the paperwork entailed. Respondent had accepted birth certificates as proof of paternity for other employees. Petitioner did not obtain or provide to Respondent a DNA test result. In fact, he did not make any effort to obtain such a test. He did discuss with Respondent his concerns about the costs of such a test. Based upon Petitioner's refusal to comply with his employer's directives, he was terminated from employment on November 15, 2004, effective November 12, 2004. The basis for termination was Petitioner's insubordination and refusal to follow the orders of his employer. Petitioner supervised approximately six people on a regular basis. Respondent was concerned about Petitioner's continued ability to properly supervise others while he was refusing to cooperate with management.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of July, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of July, 2006.
The Issue The issue to be determined in this case is whether Respondent has committed an unlawful employment practice in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and if so, what remedy should be ordered.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners Diana Sexton and Freddie Sexton were carriage drivers for Gam-San, Inc., which was known by the fictitious name of St. Augustine Transfer Company. They conducted ghost tours and history tours in the historic district of St. Augustine. No evidence was presented regarding Mr. Sexton's race or either Petitioners' age. At the time of the incident giving rise to this proceeding, Diana Sexton had worked for Respondent for approximately one and a half years. Freddie Sexton has worked for the company in the same type of position for a shorter period of time. Petitioners are married to each other. Petitioners drove carriages pulled by horses, and gave tours to the public. They sometimes stayed overnight at the barn owned by Respondent in order to water the horses. They did not have permission to stay at the barn, but Ms. Sexton considered it to be a benefit in exchange for watering the horses at night. Diana Sexton acknowledged that Petitioners had been informed that they were expected to find another place to stay before the end of the "Nights of Lights" (although no explanation was provided regarding what time frame this entailed), but denied that Petitioners were ever told to leave or not to stay at the barn. Employees hired by St. Augustine Transfer were usually hired as carriage drivers, stall people, or barn managers. Both stall people and barn managers were paid minimum wage. Carriage drivers, like waitresses, receive tips from customers as part of their pay. Generally, with tips, drivers are the highest paid employees of the business. It would not be considered a promotion to go from a position as driver to either stall person or barn manager. Petitioners did not work on December 25, 2007. They apparently spent the night at the barn the night before and left the work premises in the morning. At some time in the evening, Petitioners returned to the business premises, ostensibly to retrieve some of their belongings that were in the barn. While they were present on the property, the police came, indicating that they had received a call complaining of a disturbance. Petitioners were believed to be the cause of the disturbance and were asked to leave. Petitioners refused to leave without speaking to Stuart Gamsey, and denied creating any type of disturbance. Eventually they left the premises at the insistence of the police. They claim they were not allowed to return to retrieve their belongings for several days, and were discharged from their jobs. The evidence is in conflict over what, if anything, was occurring on the premises of the business the evening of December 25, 2007. However, the more credible admissible evidence indicates that at least two calls were made to Stuart Gamsey, the then owner of St. Augustine Transfer Co. The calls involved complaints about Petitioners' drinking, yelling, and generally creating a disturbance on the property. One call was made by police officers on the scene. Mr. Gamsey had not given Petitioners, or any other employees, permission to stay on the premises when not working. He could not say whether there was actually a disturbance on the premises, but confirmed that in response to the calls he received, he asked the police to do "whatever it took" to get Petitioners to leave the property. His goal was simply to end whatever disturbance might be occurring. Petitioners' employment was terminated by St. Augustine Transfer. It is not entirely clear from the evidence presented whether the December 25, 2007, incident formed the basis for the termination or whether other factors were involved. It is clear, however, that Petitioners resisted leaving the premises at a time when they did not have permission to be there. Stuart Gamsey sold the business in the summer of 2008. He currently has no responsibility for the hiring practices of St. Augustine Transfer Co. or its successor. No competent, credible evidence was presented indicating that any other employee was allowed to stay on the premises outside of work hours. Petitioners also claim that Mr. Sexton was discriminated against based upon his marital status because someone, presumably another employee, left K-Y jelly in his carriage, and on one occasion, a patron tipped another employee to make sure she could ride in his carriage and engage in inappropriate behavior designed to seduce him. However, no competent, credible evidence was presented to show who placed the K-Y jelly in Mr. Sexton's carriage or for what purpose, if any, it was left. Likewise, no competent, credible evidence was presented to support the allegation that placing the patron in Mr. Sexton's carriage was for any discriminatory purpose. No evidence was presented regarding any other proceedings of any type involving Petitioners and Respondent.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing Petitioners' Petitions for Relief and denying Respondent's Motion for Attorney's Fees. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of January, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of January, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Freddie J. Sexton Diana J. Sexton Post Office Box 105 St. Augustine, Florida 32084 Regina Sargeant, Esquire 2820 US 1 South, Suite F St. Augustine, Florida 32086 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Robert Owens was employed by UPARC from December, 1979, until his release on 13 December 1981. He was placed on leave with pay and was terminated 22 January 1982. Roberta Egan commenced working at UPARC in October, 1980. Both Owens and Egan worked as Horticulture Instructors. In November, 1981, the Horticulture Department at UPARC consisted of one Landscape Supervisor, one Retail Sales Supervisor, one Assistant Salesperson, and two Horticulture Instructors. Owens and Egan began dating around April, 1981, and on or about 16 November 1981, Owens posted a notice on the bulletin board at UPARC inviting UPARC employees to his wedding on November 20, 1981, to Roberta Egan. William Dean, supervisor of both Owens and Egan, heard about the notice, verified its existence, and, on 17 November 1981, talked to Owens about his pending marriage and the nepotism rule at UPARC. Owens admitted that Dean told him the nepotism rule might apply to him if he married someone also working at UPARC; however, Owens testified that Dean indicated he was unaware of the application of the nepotism rule and the final decision would be made by the Executive Director, James Leach. Following his discussion with Owens, Dean went to the Personnel Director to apprise him of the situation. The Personnel Director, Michael Thompson, discussed the nepotism rule with Owens on Thursday before he was married on Friday, November 20, 1981. Owens testified he recalled the discussion with Thompson occurred after the wedding, but he does not remember the date. In response to Owens' query that was it true he might lose his job if married to a fellow employee, Thompson told him that was his understanding of the nepotism rule and, in his opinion, one of them (Owens or Egan) would have to leave if they were married. During the week beginning November 16, 1981, James Leach, the Executive Director at UPARC, was out of town on business. When he returned on Monday, November 23, 1981, following the Friday wedding of Owens and Egan, he learned of the marriage almost as soon as he arrived in his office, and further learned that Owens did not believe the nepotism rule applied to him. Leach sent for the newly married couple and explained to them the rule, the reasons therefor, and told them that one of them would have to resign. Owens was quite incensed with the determination that one of them would have to resign, and Leach agreed to extend their employment for sixty days to allow them more time to decide which would leave and find a new job. In letter to the Owenses dated November 23, 1981 (Exhibit 11), Leach confirmed the directions given at the meeting and advised that one of them must be gone by January 22, 1982. After a week or two passed with no indication either of the Owenses would resign, Leach, on 11 December 1981, held a meeting with the Owenses to inquire if they had made a decision regarding who would resign and learned that neither would submit a resignation. He then placed Petitioner on administrative leave until January 22, 1982, at which time Owens was terminated. Leach offered to help Owens find other work and, in fact, lined up a job as a Horticulture Instructor for Petitioner with Pinellas Association for Retarded Children (PARC). PARC is a nonprofit charitable organization similar to Respondent. Petitioner did not go to PARC to inquire about the job Leach had told him was available, ostensibly because it was located on the other side of town from where Respondent lived, and he would have a longer commute to and from that job than from UPARC. UPARC is a community-based, nonprofit organization set up to train mentally retarded children and adults. UPARC employs approximately 85 people and serves some 220 clients daily. About 60 percent of its funds are derived from government sources and the remainder from fund-raising activities. Its public image and the trust engendered thereby is vital to its success. As Horticulture Instructors, the Owenses worked with the same clients and often assisted each other in preparing evaluations. Robert Owens delivered products outside UPARC two days per week, during which time his wife had charge of his clients. Although Owens testified that there were other qualified Horticulture Instructors in the department, the Owenses were the only ones so designated. One policy at UPARC is that two people from the same department cannot take leave at the same time. Furthermore, as the only two Horticulture Instructors in the five- or seven-man department (Owen testified there were seven in that department), the absence of both at the same time would deprive the facility of the ability to provide training for some 22 clients. The nepotism rule at UPARC prior to October, 1979, forbade related persons to work at UPARC. During the period October, 1979, to July, 1981, this policy was modified to permit the employment of relatives if approved by the Executive Director. During this period, on two occasions, a man and a woman employed at UPARC married each other and were allowed to remain at UPARC. Both of these couples presented difficulties. In one case disciplinary action taken against the wife led to a degradation of the husband's performance and both subsequently left UPARC. In the other case the wife's disagreements with her supervisor led to her resignation and to the husband orally tendering his resignation when his wife's demands were not met. After this wife resigned the husband withdrew his resignation and is still working at UPARC. Leach described the work at UPARC, dealing with mentally retarded clients, to be very stressful. If both husband and wife suffer these stresses at work, there is less likelihood of relief at home from these stresses than there would be if the stressed partner comes home to a partner who is not subject to similar stresses. He attributes some of the problems encountered by the two married couples working at UPARC in early 1980 to these stresses. Leach became Executive Director while the modified nepotism rule was in effect. After his experience with the two couples noted in paragraph 9 above, he concluded there should be no exception to the rule against married couples working at UPARC and instituted the move to change the nepotism rule back to what it was before October, 1979. This change became effective in July, 1981, and the rule in effect when Owens and Egan married states: "Immediate relatives of UPARC employees will not be eligible for employment." On 17 July 1981 before the UPARC Employee Handbook containing changes from the previous Handbook was printed, all employees were called together in order to explain the changes in the new Employee Handbook, which included the change to the nepotism rule. Exhibit 8 contains the minutes of the staff meeting at which these changes were explained to all employees. Exhibit 9 contains the signatures of Bobbie Egan and Robert Owens indicating they were present at the July 17, 1981, staff meeting. When the Employee Handbook was printed, copies were given to all employees. Petitioner never contended to be unaware of the nepotism policy. He did not think it applied to one already working at UPARC who married a fellow employee. Both Robert Owens and Roberta Egan Owens acknowledged that they were aware of the nepotism rule before they got married, knew the rule placed one of their jobs at UPARC in jeopardy, but concluded the rule did not explicitly cover them. Most of the employees at UPARC are married, as is the person who replaced Petitioner when he was fired.
Findings Of Fact After the motion for continuance was again denied, petitioners declined to offer any evidence and petitioners announced that they would be pursuing certain supposed federal remedies.
The Issue The issue is whether the Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice under section 760.10, Florida Statutes, by discriminating against Petitioner on the basis of handicap or disability, and if so, what is the appropriate remedy.
Findings Of Fact North Florida Sales Company (North Florida), the Respondent in this case, is a beer and ale wholesaler that does business in Florida and employs over 15 people. Window Mitchell, Petitioner in this case, began working at North Florida as a custodian in the maintenance department on June 22, 2009. His normal schedule at North Florida was Monday through Friday. Near the time he was hired, Petitioner received a copy of Respondent's "Employee Information Handbook." The handbook advised Petitioner of North Florida's "open door" policy that permitted employees to take any complaints or problems directly to the Human Resources Manager, the General Manager, or the President. It further advised employees that it was North Florida policy to treat all employees equally without regard to race, color, religion, sex, age, marital status, disability, or national origin. It stated that any violation of North Florida's equal opportunity policies must be reported immediately to the Human Resources Manager or General Manager without delay. The employee handbook also advised Petitioner of North Florida's policies on attendance. It required employees to give advance notice of any absence or lateness, and noted that employees who fail to maintain an acceptable attendance record would be subject to disciplinary action. On September 10, 2009, Petitioner received an Employee Warning Report noting that Petitioner had missed six days of work during his 90-day probationary period. The report stated that this amount of absenteeism was considered excessive and that immediate improvement was expected. It was signed by Petitioner and Petitioner's supervisor. On November 10, 2009, Petitioner received another Employee Warning Report. It stated that Petitioner's attendance continued to be a problem and that it was creating a burden on the maintenance department. It stated that further incidents of absenteeism, or arriving late or leaving early, would result in termination. It was signed by Petitioner, Petitioner's supervisor, and Margaret Lombardi, Human Resources Manager. There is no evidence that Petitioner ever received any further "Employee Warning Reports." On June 3, 2010, Petitioner received an Employee Performance Review. In his review, Petitioner was given a rating of "3" out of "10" on "dependability." The comment under that heading indicated that Petitioner was "out from work too many days." Petitioner received two other "3"s on his evaluation and received no evaluation above a "5" in any area. In the final section, entitled "Objectives for the Next Review Period," the first of two objectives listed was "keep all curbs in warehouse painted." The second was, "try to be at work all of the time." On July 17, 2010, Petitioner was returning from a barbecue with four friends. He testified that he had not been drinking. The car he was driving ran into a pole head-on. Petitioner's knee and leg hurt and became badly swollen. He had "little chunks of meat" missing from his left elbow and forearm. He was seen by an emergency doctor at Baptist Medical Center about 9:45 p.m., released, and given discharge instructions. On July 19 or 20, 2010, Ms. Lombardi received a paper entitled Adult Discharge Instructions on a Baptist Health form dated July 17, 2010. It indicated that Petitioner had been in the vehicle collision and had been treated for abrasions and a contusion on his right knee. In the instructions, Petitioner was told to take medications as instructed, follow up with the doctor in two days, and return to the emergency room for worsening symptoms. A box was checked indicating "no work for 2 days." Ms. Lombardi interpreted the note as excusing Petitioner from work on Sunday and Monday, and therefore expected Petitioner to return to work on Tuesday, July 20, 2010. When Petitioner did not return to work on Tuesday, Ms. Lombardi called him. Petitioner said he did not realize that the doctor's note had excused him for only two days. Ms. Lombardi told Petitioner that it did, and she told him he needed to come to work that day. Petitioner complained that his arm and leg were still hurting. Petitioner said he would return to work that afternoon, but did not. Petitioner did not come to work on Wednesday, July 21, 2010. Petitioner left a message for Ms. Lombardi and she called him about 10 a.m. Petitioner told Ms. Lombardi that he had gone to the doctor the day before and had another note excusing him from work. Ms. Lombardi asked Petitioner why he had not called her or the supervisor to let them know. Petitioner stated that he had called the supervisor, but had been unable to reach him and had been asked to call back. Petitioner said he did not call back because he did not get out of the doctor's office until after 5:00 pm. Ms. Lombardi directed him to have the note sent to her by facsimile transmission (fax). Ms. Lombardi received a form faxed from Baptist Health entitled "Discharge Instruction" about 4:38 p.m. that day, as indicated in her note prepared for Petitioner's file. It had a subtitle of "Work Release Form." The form stated that Petitioner had been seen again on July 21, 2010, and that he could return to work on July 25, 2010. The form had date and time blocks indicating "July 21, 2010" and "4:31 p.m." Ms. Lombardi testified that the form from Baptist Health indicated that Petitioner had been seen by a doctor that same day and that "I received it shortly after-–there was a discharge time on it." On the following day, July 22, 2010, Ms. Lombardi again called Petitioner. When asked about an excuse from the doctor whom Petitioner had seen on July 20, 2010, Petitioner replied, "Oh, that was a different doctor." Petitioner said that the excuse from the visit on July 21, 2010, was from the same doctor he saw on July 17, 2010. Ms. Lombardi's file note stated that this was "the second time that Mitchell has incurred absences with inconsistency in the facts surrounding that absence." Petitioner gave evasive and inconsistent testimony at hearing about whether there was ever a third doctor's excuse, in addition to the excuses of July 17, 2010 and July 21, 2010. Any of Petitioner's testimony suggesting that there was third excuse was not credible. There were only two doctor's excuses. On July 22, 2010, Ms. Lombardi filled out a "Status/Payroll Change Report" that discharged Petitioner from employment at North Florida. In the "Reason" portion of the form, Ms. Lombardi wrote, "Excessive absenteeism and multiple incidences of inconsistent facts surrounding his absences." Petitioner was immediately notified by telephone that his employment had been terminated. In that conversation, Petitioner asked Ms. Lombardi why he was being discharged. Ms. Lombardi told Petitioner that the basis for his discharge was his poor attendance. Petitioner was recovering from the injuries he received in the accident for about a week-and-a-half. After that he was fully recovered. Petitioner's substantial interests are affected by Respondent's decision to discharge him. It has been difficult to find work in the depressed economy and Petitioner has financial responsibilities. Petitioner has three children. Petitioner was employed by Wage Solutions, working the warehouse at Liberty Furniture, unloading furniture and bringing it to the showroom from March 2011 to August 2011. Petitioner lost that job because that business closed. At the time of hearing Petitioner was not employed. Petitioner went to the Florida Commission on Human Relations. He did not complain to them that he had been discriminated against on the basis of a handicap or disability. He just wanted an investigation into his discharge because he believed he had been terminated unfairly. He testified: Doing – I guess, telling my side of the story to file whatever they wanted me to file. I didn't even know it was doing – about the disability or not. I didn't know they signed me up under that. The only thing I thought, they were going to investigate to see why I got terminated. * * * And from there, I guess that – that's it. I knew I had to come to court from there, so I was just really based on that. I knew I had to show up to court for – I wasn't looking for all of this to come down to this. The only thing – I just wanted to know why I got fired, because I – about my attendance or being absent, but I had excuses for them. On October 12, 2011, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief against Respondent claiming an unlawful employment practice, alleging that he was wrongfully fired because of a mishap, which was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings the same day.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of May, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S F. SCOTT BOYD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of May, 2012.
Findings Of Fact Progressive American Insurance Company is a property and casualty insurance company. It markets auto insurance to drivers who are ordinarily non- insurable by standard insurance companies. The Company's claims organization includes 18 claims offices throughout the state, including the relevant Gainesville claims office. The Petitioner was hired as a claims office assistant on December 17, 1986. She worked in that capacity in the Gainesville office throughout the course of her employment. Claims office assistants are clerical employees who perform secretarial tasks, such as typing, filing and answering the telephone, and also perform insurance work related to the claims processing, such as personal injury protection (PIP) and small loss claims. Claims office assistants, such as the Petitioner, also provide support to the adjusters in the office by typing their dictation and taking down information on accident reports or loss reports, as well as creating files. The Gainesville claims office is a small branch office and as of December 1, 1986, was staffed by a Branch Manager, Douglas Helton, two claims adjusters and two claims office assistants, one of whom was the Petitioner. Douglas Helton was promoted to the position of Branch Manager in the Gainesville office in mid-1986. He hired Debbie Fuller and supervised her throughout her tenure with the Company. Progressive has adopted a business philosophy known as "management by objectives." Under this philosophy, each employee is assigned objectives which explain what is expected and the standards involved with the job. The employee's performance is then measured against those standards. Employees receive an overall numerical assessment of their performance on a 1-4 scale. The average score on performance evaluations in the Florida division of the Company has ranged from about 2.86 to 2.92. When the Petitioner was hired, she was placed in a three-month training plan by the Branch Manager and was assigned a set of objectives. Her performance was evaluated against these objectives at the end of 90 days, and she was given a 2.44 overall rating. Mr. Helton regarded her work as satisfactory at that time. The Petitioner was then assigned another set of three-month objectives. These objectives included the assignment to her of personal injury protection work, as well as small losses work for the first time. She was given individualized training by Helton and the other claims office assistant, Christine Bivens. She applied for and obtained a temporary license to do PIP claims work, which was valid from March of 1987 to March of 1988. She received another performance evaluation at the end of the second three-month period, with a score of 2.597. Mr. Helton, again, described her performance as satisfactory, although her score was below average. In June of 1987, Helton assigned the Petitioner another set of performance objectives, this time for six months. These objectives also included the assignment to her of PIP claims work. Her performance was evaluated again at the end of six months in December of 1987. This time, she scored 2.0, which is the lowest score an employee can receive before he or she is put on a 30-day performance probation, also known as "short term objectives." The Petitioner's performance was deficient because of non-timely processing of claims. Although her PIP case load was only about one-quarter of that of claims assistant, Christine Bivens, she allowed PIP files to "fall off her diary." This means that the medical bills involved were not being paid or timely paid. One such failure to pay medical bills actually resulted in a lawsuit being filed against her employer. When Mr. Helton reviewed some of her files in the process of preparing her performance evaluation, he discovered that most of the files had not been timely processed. She also received a poor rating for her work in typing dictation. Mr. Helton received complaints from all of the workers in the office concerning the Petitioner's typing skills and had orally counseled her in the past regarding this aspect of her work. Another major area of performance deficiency involved the Petitioner's failure to secure a permanent PIP and small loss license. She took the examination for the license and did not pass it. She was scheduled to take it again in November of 1987, but failed to do so. Mike Painter, the claims adjuster, had a bad experience with the Petitioner's work performance. He had a problem with her typing, which was characterized by a high level of inaccuracy and delay. He became sufficiently dissatisfied with her typing that he began doing his own typing. He discussed these problems with Mr. Helton on a number of occasions. He also had experience with the Petitioner taking down inaccurate information on loss reports. Mr. Painter found the Petitioner erratic in her attention to detail and that her work pace was significantly slower than the rest of the people in the office. Christine Bivens, another co-worker, also testified regarding the Petitioner's performance. Her initial performance during the first six months was acceptable, but then she began slowing down her work production. Because of this, Ms. Bivens had to put more time, herself, into the dictation typing and the loss reports She complained to Mr. Helton, as well; and Mr. Helton counseled the Petitioner concerning these deficiencies. After these counseling sessions, she would improve her performance for a short while; but the improvement was only temporary. Mr. Helton prepared Ms. Fuller's final performance evaluation around December 17, 1987. The two of them discussed the evaluation; and although she was not content with it, she ultimately accepted it. In the meantime, the Petitioner had become pregnant and began discussing the matter of maternity leave with Mr. Helton. In October or November of 1987, she had several conferences with him about the subject matter of her leave. Two of these conferences were attended by Christine Bivens. During the course of these meetings, Ms. Fuller requested a maternity leave of eight to 12 weeks. Mr. Helton told Ms. Fuller that she would not be provided a 12-week leave. Ms. Bivens testified that Mr. Helton told Ms. Fuller that he could not approve a 12-week leave. Sometime in December of 1987, Ms. Fuller began having premature contractions and told Mr. Helton she would not be able to work a full eight-hour day. Mr. Helton accepted that situation and told her she could work whatever hours per day she wanted to work. She thus began working five or six hour days. On December 17, 1987, Mr. Helton wrote a memorandum to the Human Resources Office of his Company, regarding Ms. Fuller's performance and her upcoming maternity leave. In that memorandum, he criticized her performance, writing that she demonstrated "minimal commitment to excellence and handles her responsibilities in a passive manner." He also noted that Ms. Fuller had requested a three-month leave of absence which he had refused. In this memorandum, Mr. Helton also indicated that he intended to hold her employment position open for her for a period of only four weeks. When he drafted this memorandum and prepared the Petitioner's performance evaluation, he gave some consideration to putting her on "thirty-day objectives." Under the circumstances of her imminent maternity leave, he decided that such an action would be inappropriate and assigned her objectives for May 17, 1988 instead. The Respondent has a policy concerning leaves of absence by which employees with less than one year of service are eligible for a four week leave of absence. Employees with between one and five years of service are eligible for a six-week leave. The Petitioner had one year of service, effective December 17, 1987. Therefore, she was qualified; and, indeed, the Respondent determined that she should have a six-week leave of absence related to her pregnancy. The Petitioner's supervisor, Mr. Helton, advised the Petitioner that she was not entitled to and would not receive a 12-week leave of absence, as she requested. Ms. Fuller also acknowledged in her testimony that Tammy Taylor, who worked in the Human Resources or personnel office of the Respondent, had informed her that she was entitled to a six-week leave of absence. Her colleague, Ms. Bivens, recalled that both Mr. Helton and Ms. Fuller had checked with the Human Resources office of Progressive and that both had learned that she was entitled to a six-week leave. Robin Hart, who worked in the Human Resources office at the time, told Ms. Fuller that she was entitled to and could take a six-week leave of absence and that any leave past that six-week period would be unapproved, as not being in accordance with Company policy. The Petitioner received a note from her treating physician on December 22, 1987 instructing her to discontinue her activities, including regular employment as of that date. Ms. Fuller initially testified at the hearing that she then met with Mr. Helton on that date, gave him the note and had a conversation with him concerning her leave of absence. She later changed her testimony, however, upon introduction by Progressive of evidence showing that Mr. Helton was on vacation on that date. She also changed her testimony regarding her last day at work. She had initially testified that the date was January 4, 1988, but following testimony by Christine Bivens, her co-worker, to the effect that her last day was December 29, 1987, she agreed that was her last day of work. Thus, she continued to work after her doctor had instructed her to cease her employment pending her delivery. Ms. Fuller, instead of personally discussing her leave with Mr. Helton on the final occasion before she actually left her employment, left a note for him on his desk while he was on vacation, along with her request for a 12-week leave of absence from January 4, 1988 through March 29, 1988. Upon his return from his Christmas vacation, Mr. Helton saw the leave request and reviewed it. He checked the box on the form marked "cannot approve" and wrote on the form "maximum allowed for 1 yr. employee is 4 weeks. Debbie requests excess of 12 weeks." Mr. Helton then submitted the leave of absence form to the Human Resources office in Tampa and conversed with Marilyn Kaschner of that office concerning the length of the requested leave and how long he should leave the Petitioner's job open for her. Ms. Kaschner informed him that the Petitioner was entitled to a six-week leave of absence based upon her tenure with the Company, and Mr. Helton agreed with that. That conversation occurred sometime between January 15th and the end of January of 1988. At approximately this time, Mr. Helton hired Wendy Rosenberg, as a full-time claims office assistant, and Renee Jackson, as a part-time claims office assistant. Ms. Fuller's replacement was required because the Gainesville office was very busy during the fall of 1987 and the early part of 1988. Ms. Rosenberg began employment on January 15, 1988, and Ms. Jackson was employed on January 25, 1988. Ms. Jackson was hired into a newly-approved part-time position, and Ms. Rosenberg replaced Ms. Fuller. Both employees were advised when they were hired that if Ms. Fuller returned upon the expiration of her maternity leave, she would have her choice of either the full-time or part-time positions which Ms. Rosenberg and Ms. Jackson were filling. In fact, Ms. Fuller did not return within the six-week time period. Mr. Helton subsequently contacted his supervisor, Jim Krahn; and they decided voluntarily to hold her position open for another week. She was eventually terminated, effective February 29, 1988, some nine weeks after her last day of work. Mr. Krahn at this time authorized Mr. Helton to permanently hire Ms. Rosenberg and Ms. Jackson. Ms. Fuller testified about a number of conversations she allegedly had with Mr. Helton during 1988. According to Ms. Fuller, the first one took place about the second week of January at the Gainesville office, attended by Ms. Fuller, Mr. Helton, Ms. Bivens and two claims adjusters in the office. Ms. Fuller maintains that Mr. Helton told her that he had turned in her "leave papers" and that things were fine and that there was no problem. Mr. Helton did not recall the conversation, but was positive that he would not have told her that everything was fine with her leave request because it was an excessive request. In any event, Ms. Bivens, who was present during the conversation, had no recollection of the tenor of it. However, under the circumstances under which the conversation apparently was made with a number of other employees present, it is unlikely that any in-depth discussion of the propriety of the leave request was entered into. In any event, Ms. Fuller had been informed otherwise, by the Human Resources office in Tampa, that she was only entitled to six weeks of leave. Both Mr. Helton and Ms. Fuller had conversations in March regarding her employment. Mr. Helton noted that the dates of the conversations were March 16 and 21, 1988, as he noted them on Ms. Fuller's termination form. During the first conversation, he advised Ms. Fuller that he did not have a position for her in his office. This is when Ms. Fuller learned of her ultimate termination. He did not have a conversation with her between February 29th and March 16th because he thought that Human Resources was going to send her a termination letter. The first conversation with her thus occurred on March 16th concerning the subject of her termination. Following this conversation, Ms. Fuller called Ms. Hart at the Human Resources office and informed her that Mr. Helton had guaranteed her a job when she wanted to return from maternity leave. Ms. Hart advised Mr. Helton of this representation and he denied it. Subsequently, on March 21st, there was an angry conversation between Mr. Helton and Ms. Fuller concerning what Mr. Helton believed to be Ms. Fuller's misrepresentation of his earlier statement concerning her job tenure and the availability of a position whenever she wanted to return. In any event, Mr. Helton, on March 21, 1988 executed Ms. Fuller's termination form and on the second page of the form, indicated she was ineligible for rehire. He considered her ineligible because her past performance bad been substandard and also because he felt that she had made misrepresentations to the Human Resources office concerning the conditions under which he had informed her that she could return to work. Accordingly, when there was later an opening in the Gainesville office for a claims office assistant, he did not consider offering Ms. Fuller that employment. Ms. Marilyn Kaschner testified about the company leave policy and statistical records of leaves of absence for the claims organization of Progressive. She reviewed and compiled a list of all leaves of absence for the last two and one-half years for the claims office portion of the company's operations in Florida. This list showed that eight employees, in addition to Ms. Fuller, had taken leaves of absence during that time period. Four of those leaves of absence were for childbirth. In each instance, the employee was allowed to return to her job. In those instances, the employees had taken leaves of absence which were in accordance with the company's leave of absence duration policy. It is also noteworthy that the Petitioner was accorded short- term disability insurance benefits during her leave of absence in accordance with company policy.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Petition of Debbie Fuller be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of December, 1989, in Tallahassee Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of December, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-480 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on the subject matter. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on the subject matter. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted, except for the last sentence. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on the subject matter. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected, as contrary to the Preponderant weight of the evidence and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on the subject matter. Rejected, as contrary to the Preponderant weight of the evidence and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on the subject matter. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter and as not itself material and dispositive. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter and as not itself material and dispositive. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter and as not itself material and dispositive. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter and as not itself material and dispositive. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted. Accepted Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: John P. McAdams, Esq. CARLTON, FIELDS, WARD, EMMANUEL, SMITH & CUTLER, P.A. P.O. Box 3239 Tampa, FL 33601 Carla D. Franklin, Esq. P.O. Box 694 Gainesville, FL 32601 Dana Baird, Esq. General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Mr. Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570
Findings Of Fact Vince Campbell was employed as a corrections officer for the Alachua County Department of Criminal Justice Services from 1985 until his termination on August 8, 1991. Numerous incidents led up to his termination. During 1985-1987, Campbell had repeated problems with tardiness and absenteeism, for which he received numerous disciplinary actions including warnings and suspension at no pay. On August 2, 1989, Campbell was arrested by the Alachua Police Department for multiple charges including resisting arrest with and without violence. Campbell was observed running two stop signs. When he was stopped, he became agitated and refused to give his name or driver's license. He resisted arrest and struggled with the officers. One officer was injured. At the police station, Campbell continued to struggle and kicked an officer in the stomach. Throughout this time, Campbell was exhibiting vast mood swings and was alternating among belligerence, laughing, crying, and making irrational threats, such as telling the officers that they would have to kill him before he would let himself be taken to the jail in which he worked. After Campbell was released, he was advised that he could return to work pending resolution of the criminal charges. Nevertheless, Campbell failed to appear for work on August 3 or 4, 1989, and did not call in to advise that he would not be at work. He received a warning for his failure to come to work or call in. On April 23, 1990, Campbell instigated an incident at work which involved his verbal abuse, pounding on a window, cursing and yelling at coworkers and finally publicly giving the finger and saying "fuck you" to a coworker. He received another warning for that incident. Campbell received another warning and letter of reprimand on May 14, 1990, for an incident where his negligence allowed an inmate to receive money belonging to another inmate. On May 5, 1990, Campbell was again arrested for resisting arrest, battery on a law enforcement officer and breach of the peace. This arrest occurred in Union County even though Campbell was on probation for the first criminal offenses and was not allowed to leave Alachua County without permission of his probation officer. The Union County arrest involved an altercation which occurred at a hospital after Campbell had taken his brother there for treatment of injuries received in a melee at a local bar and dance hall. Campbell was cursing and yelling at the nurses. The Union County Sheriff, Jerry Whitehead, went to the scene and Campbell screamed and swore at the sheriff. When he was told to leave the hospital, he refused and he was placed under arrest. He resisted arrest and fought with Sheriff Whitehead and a deputy, causing injuries to the sheriff. As a result of that incident, Campbell was suspended with pay until May 25, 1990, at which time he was suspended without pay pending resolution of the charges. Sentencing occurred on July 8, 1991, and Campbell met with his superiors on July 11, 1991. Major Garrahan, Chief of Security, proposed termination on July 17, 1991, and held a pre-termination hearing on July 29, 1991. As a result of Garrahan's recommendation and having reviewed all the relevant information, the Department Director, Walter P. Byrd, terminated Campbell on August 8, 1991. In addition to the incidents described above, Byrd also had information regarding other events involving Campbell. On one occasion, Campbell was at the firing range for routine in-service firearms instruction. While on the line with his firearms, he was displaying severe mood swings, including alternately laughing hysterically and crying and becoming angry when one of the instructor cautioned him about safety on the firing line. All firing had to be delayed while Campbell regained his composure. He had to lay his shotgun on the ground to wipe tears from his eyes. On another occasion at the firing range, Campbell requested to speak with "Melda," a fellow officer. He was anxious, nervous, and crying. He told Melda that he was seeing officers hiding in the woods around his house and that they were after him. Campbell was referred to Employee Assistance for a review of his mental state and stability. Byrd was also advised that Campbell's driver's license had been suspended on two occasions because of failure to pay traffic fines, but Campbell had not advised his employer that his license was suspended. Possession of a valid driver's license is one job requirement for a correctional officer. Byrd considered the arrests and convictions, Garrahan's recommendation, the in-house incidents, Campbell's emotional stability and the danger to Campbell's safety and that of inmates. He was very concerned that the County may be exposed to liability for Campbell's actions and apparent volatility and uncontrolled outbursts, if Campbell remained employed by the department. Byrd did not believe that Campbell was fit for continued employment because he was not emotionally stable. Byrd is black, as is Campbell. At no time was race a consideration in Campbell's termination. Campbell alleges that two white male employees were reinstated with back pay despite similar criminal charges. However, Campbell presented no evidence to support these allegations. One of the others resigned rather than be terminated and the other was not shown to have had similar charges or to have been reemployed by the department.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Vince Campbell. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of November, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of November, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert M. Ott Litigation Attorney Office of Alachua County Attorney Post Office Box 2877 Gainesville, FL 32602-2877 Vince Campbell Post Office Box 964 Alachua, FL 32615 Margaret Jones, Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149
