The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner was subjected to an unlawful employment practice by Respondent due to Petitioner's race, age, sex, or as retaliation in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent employed Petitioner, a 56-year-old African- American female, as a Food Support Worker at Florida State Hospital in Chattahoochee, Florida, at all times relevant to these proceedings. Petitioner was promoted to the position of Food Service Worker on May 10, 2002, with probationary status until May 10, 2003. On February 12, 2003, Petitioner was terminated from her employment for failure to satisfactorily complete her probationary period in the career service. In the course of her employment with Florida State Hospital, Petitioner was aware of the strict safety guidelines implemented by Respondent to protect employees from injury. Petitioner also knew that violation of the safety rules could result in dismissal of an erring employee. Violations of these policies had resulted in dismissal of both non-minority and minority employees in the past. On February 9, 2003, due to an unsafe act and violation of Respondent’s safety rules, Petitioner proceeded to cut the tip of her left thumb in the process of slicing cabbage. Petitioner was not using a cutting glove, a mandatory requirement of the safety rules. As a result of this rule violation, Respondent terminated Petitioner’s employment on February 12, 2003. At final hearing, Petitioner admitted the cutting injury to her finger, but contended that termination of employment had not been effected for other younger white employees for similar offenses in the past. These allegations of Petitioner were non-specific and uncorroborated; they are not credited.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of November, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Annette Carroll 10202 Northwest Third Street Bristol, Florida 32321 Kathi Lee Kilpatrick, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 1000 Chattahoochee, Florida 32324-1000 Jacqueline H. Smith, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 1000 Chattahoochee, Florida 32324-1000 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice in violation of Sections 760.10(1), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Beard Equipment Company, Inc., sells and maintains heavy equipment in Panama City, Florida. The Petitioner, Robert G. Harrison began employment with the Respondent in Panama City, Florida, in September, 1988. The Petitioner was employed as a janitor. Petitioner's duties included running numerous and varied errands which required driving of a motor vehicle. In April of 1989, Petitioner was hospitalized in order to adjust his medication for what he indicated was a bipolar disorder. However, at the hearing, Petitioner produced no expert testimony to establish that he was mentally handicapped or had bipolar disorder. At that time, Respondent became aware that Petitioner had a medical problem. Later, Petitioner was hospitalized in order to adjust his medication on two more occasions in 1989, and twice in 1992. On each occasion the Respondent accommodated Petitioner by making arrangements to hire temporary employees or readjust other employees' duties so that they could perform Petitioner's duties while he was hospitalized. In early 1992, the Respondent's liability insurance company conducted a random audit of employee driving records. The Respondent was notified by its insurance company that no coverage would be provided for any accident where the employee/driver had a DUI conviction. This random audit prompted Respondent to conduct a complete company- wide internal audit of driving records of all employees. The driving record audit resulted in some transfers for those employees for whom driving was an essential part of their job duties, but whose driving records would prohibit them from being covered under Respondent's liability policy. Employees who could not fulfill the duties of a non-driving position were terminated. Respondent could not afford to allow employees to drive who could not be insured by Respondent's liability carrier. The in-house driving record audit revealed that Petitioner had a DUI conviction on his record. Respondent had no other non-driving positions for which the Petitioner was qualified. Respondent was therefore forced to discharge the Petitioner since he could no longer fulfill the duties of his employment. Petitioner was discharged in November of 1992. When Petitioner was terminated, Petitioner was advised by Mark Veal, his supervisor, that the driving record audit had revealed that Petitioner had a DUI conviction, and because he would not be covered under the company insurance policy, they had no alternative but to discharge him. Within a day or so, Petitioner's wife called and requested his discharge letter in writing. Veal prepared the letter, indicating that due to Petitioner's medical history, his operating a motor vehicle would be too much of a liability. Although the real reason for Petitioner's discharge and the reason given him at the time was the DUI conviction, Veal tried to write the discharge letter in such a way as to minimize any embarrassment for the Petitioner due to his DUI conviction. Therefore, the termination letter does not support the conclusion that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on a mental handicap. In fact, there was no substantial evidence that Respondent terminated Petitioner based on a mental handicap. The evidence clearly showed Respondent was terminated for his driving record and his lack of qualifications to fill any other non-driving position. Moreover, Petitioner failed to establish that his position was filled by a person not in a protected class or that Respondent is an employer employing more than 15 employees. Given these facts, Petitioner has not established a prima facie case that Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is accordingly, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was discriminated against because of his alleged handicap in violation of the Florida Human Rights Act and that the petition be dismissed. DONE AND ORDERED this 22nd day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 1994.
The Issue The issue is whether this case should be dismissed based on Petitioner's failure to appear at the hearing and apparent intent to withdraw her request for an administrative hearing.
Findings Of Fact The Notice of Hearing in this case was issued on May 22, 2012, setting the hearing for July 17, 2012, at 9:30 a.m., by video teleconference at sites in Tallahassee and Fort Myers, Florida. Also, on May 22, 2012, an Order of Pre-hearing Instructions was entered. Respondent timely complied with the pre-hearing requirements by filing a witness list and exhibit list and tendering its proposed exhibits, all of which were served on Petitioner. Petitioner did not file or exchange a witness list, exhibit list, or proposed exhibits. Petitioner spoke by telephone with a secretary at DOAH on July 16, 2012, the day before the scheduled hearing, and indicated that she had sent a letter withdrawing her hearing request; however, to this day, no such letter has been received. Petitioner was advised to send another written statement confirming that she was withdrawing her hearing request, and she indicated she would do so by facsimile that day. However, no such facsimile was received by DOAH. After hours on July 16, 2012, a typed, but unsigned letter, was sent by facsimile to counsel for Respondent. The letter appears to have been sent by Petitioner and states that she wished to cancel the hearing scheduled for July 17, 2012. Petitioner did not make an appearance at the scheduled hearing at the start time or within 25 minutes after the scheduled start time. While it would have been better practice for Petitioner to file a written, signed statement with DOAH to withdraw her hearing request, it is found that Petitioner intended to withdraw her hearing request, and that is why Petitioner did not appear at the scheduled hearing. Petitioner should have made her intentions clear sufficiently in advance of the scheduled hearing to avoid the inconvenience and expense of convening a hearing by video teleconference and assembling all of those who were prepared to go forward.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of August, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of August, 2012. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Lawrence F. Kranert, Jr., General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Todd Evan Studley, Esquire Florida Department of Corrections 501 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Natalie Goldenberg Post Office Box 7388 Fort Myers, Florida 33911
The Issue Whether the Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction to conduct a formal hearing under the provisions of Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if the Petition for Relief does not allege that Respondent is an "employer" under Section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes, and if the Petition for Relief was not timely filed pursuant to Section 760.11(7), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing facts and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing with prejudice the Petition of Maria Oliveras in DOAH Case No. 01-3928; FCHR Case No. 21-01229. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. _____________________________________ DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of November, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Christopher J. Coleman, Esquire Schillinger & Coleman, P.A. 1329 Bedford Drive, Suite 1 Melbourne, Florida 32940 Maria Oliveras 339 Galicia Street Southwest Palm Bay, Florida 32908
The Issue Whether respondent is guilty of an unlawful employment practice as alleged by petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the entire record, the following findings of fact are determined: This discrimination case involves an allegation by petitioner, David Coleman, that he was denied employment by respondent, City of Jacksonville (City), because of his handicap. The City denies this allegation. A preliminary investigation by the Commission on Human Relations (Commission) found no probable cause that an unlawful employment practice had occurred. By way of background, petitioner has been employed by the City on four separate occasions, the last time as an employee in the mosquito control department in 1984. He was "released" the same year for "unacceptable leave." Since 1990, he has applied for at least twenty separate positions with the City. In conjunction with those and earlier efforts to obtain a job with the City, he has filed several job applications, including one in December 1987 and another in June 1992. Such applications are valid for a period of two years after they are signed and filed with the City. Therefore, if petitioner applied for a position with the City in March 1991, he did not have a valid job application on file. The petition for relief filed by Coleman describes the unlawful employment practice allegedly committed by the City as follows: unlawful hired or employment practice: with veteran preference that I have, and a handicap, which is alleged. The petition for relief does not describe the handicap. At hearing, however, petitioner contended he suffers from paranoia schizophrenia. Petitioner says that he applied for a job as a "traffic checker" with the City's engineering department in March 1991. City records reveal, however, that it has no such position called "traffic checker," and thus it hired no one for that job in 1991. It does have a position called "parking enforcement specialist," but since no description of the functions of that job is of record, it is unknown if the two positions are the same. Even so, City records do not show that petitioner made application for that position in March 1991. Notwithstanding this shortcoming, petitioner says that he interviewed for the position with an unidentified "supervisor," and he was told to prepare a resume, which he later gave to the interviewer's secretary. Thereafter, he made inquiry with the City's affirmative action office and learned that a veteran, not disabled, had been hired to fill the slot. Petitioner then brought this action charging the City with an unlawful employment practice. It is noted he has subsequently filed a second discrimination claim pertaining to another job application with the City. At hearing, petitioner contended that he suffers from paranoia schizophrenia. Other than his own assertion, however, no evidence was produced to confirm this disability, and as to this issue it is found that insufficient credible evidence exists to support a finding in petitioner's favor. The City admits that in one of petitioner's job applications filed with the City, petitioner attached a copy of a DD214 form reflecting that he was honorably discharged from the military. Also, the City acknowledges that in one of the applications is found a statement that petitioner had a 30 percent service related disability but the type of disability is not described. Whether the service related disability was still valid in March 1991 is not of record. Finally, petitioner's exhibit 1 is a copy of what purports to be a "statement of patient's treatment" from a VA outpatient clinic prepared in February 1985, but this document is hearsay, and in any event, is so dated as to have no probative value in this case. The more credible evidence shows that petitioner did not apply for the position of "traffic checker" or parking enforcement specialist in 1991. Moreover, petitioner had no valid application on file at that time, and there is no credible evidence as to who, if anyone, was hired to fill the position or what were the qualifications of the person hired. Even if one assumes an application was filed, the record is silent as to why petitioner's application may have been denied or, assuming he had a handicap, whether he could adequately perform the essential functions of the job. Given these considerations, and the lack of evidence to establish that petitioner is disabled with a handicap, it is found that the City did not commit an unlawful employment practice.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order denying the petition for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of May, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of May, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-5926 Respondent: Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. Note - Where a proposed finding of fact has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary, subordinate, not supported by the evidence, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commissioin Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana C. Baird, Esquire Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Mr. David Coleman 1071 Ontario Street Jacksonville, FL 32205 Brian M. Flaherty, Esquire 600 City Hall 220 East Bay Street Jacksonville, FL 32202
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent should reimburse Petitioner for the attorneys' fees and costs Petitioner expended in its successful defense of Respondent's Stop-Work Order.
Findings Of Fact Hernandez, Inc., was a contractor based in the Jacksonville, Florida area, and was in the business of installing dry wall, among other construction-related activities. Its principal owner, Jorge Hernandez, founded the company in 1981. The Department of Financial Services is the state agency responsible for enforcing the Workers' Compensation Law. This duty is delegated to the Division of Workers' Compensation. The Division is a state agency. It is not a nominal party. On February 5, 2004, Hernandez, Inc., was engaged in installing drywall in the Bennett Federal Building in Jacksonville, Florida, using its own personnel, who were leased from Matrix, Inc., an employee leasing company, and two subcontractors, GIO & Sons (GIO), of Norfolk, Virginia, and U&M Contractors, Inc., (U&M), of Charlotte, North Carolina. The leased employees were properly covered by workers' compensation insurance provided by the lessor. Prior to contracting with GIO and U&M, Hernandez, Inc., asked for and received ACORD certificates of insurance, which on their face indicated that the subcontractors had both liability coverage and workers' compensation coverage. It is the practice of Hernandez, Inc., to ensure that certificates of insurance are provided by subcontractors. The office staff of Hernandez, Inc., at all times prior to going out of business, tracked the certificates and ensured that they were kept current. Hernandez, Inc. had relied on hundreds of these ACORD certificates in the past. During times pertinent, neither GIO or U&M maintained workers' compensation insurance on their employees that complied with the requirements of Section 440.38(7), Florida Statutes. On February 5, 2004, Katina Johnson, an investigator with the Division's Jacksonville office, made a routine visit to the Bennett Federal Building with another investigator. She observed personnel from Hernandez, Inc., and its subcontractors GIO and U&M, installing dry wall. She also determined that Hernandez, Inc., had a contract to install dry wall as a subcontractor participating in the construction of the Mayport Naval Station BEQ. U&M worked at both the Bennett Federal Building site and the Mayport BEQ site as a subcontractor of Hernandez, Inc. Ms. Johnson discovered that neither U&M nor GIO had workers' compensation coverage for its employers. Ms. Johnson asked for and received the certificates of insurance that Hernandez, Inc., had obtained from GIO and U&M, which facially suggested that Hernandez, Inc., had determined that its subcontractors had appropriate coverage. Nevertheless, she issued a SWO on February 26, 2004, to Hernandez, Inc., as well as GIO, and U&M. By the SWO, Hernandez, Inc., was charged with failure to ensure that workers' compensation meeting the requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, and the Florida Insurance Code, was in place for GIO and U&M. She also issued an Order of Penalty Assessment that eventually became an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment dated March 19, 2004. The SWO stated, in bold print, that Hernandez, Inc., was, "Ordered to Stop Work and Cease All Business Operations in the State." Hernandez, Inc., was, at the time, also engaged in construction at the new Jacksonville Library and at the Carlington Apartments, both of which were located in Florida. By the terms of the SWO, Hernandez was required to stop work in those sites also. The Division had no evidence that might cause it to believe that Hernandez, Inc., was operating in violation of the law at those sites. The SWO contained with it a Notice of Rights advising that a formal or informal administrative hearing might be had and required that a petition for a hearing be filed within 21 days of receipt of the SWO, if a hearing was desired. Hernandez, Inc., was not informed that it had the right to an immediate hearing. Hernandez, Inc., timely filed a petition demanding a formal hearing. In an effort to get back to work, Hernandez, Inc., entered into an agreement with the Division, whereby it paid a partial penalty of $46,694.03, but admitted no liability. The formal hearing did not take place until August 16, 2005. Ms. Johnson had the power to issue a stop-work order. She did not have to get approval from a neutral magistrate or from the Division. Because she was a recent employee of the Division, she conferred with her supervisor Robert Lambert before taking action, and he approved her action in writing. In February 2004, it was the policy of the Division to issue SWO's for all work sites even though it concluded that a violation had occurred in only the site or sites visited. The Division policy did not require an investigation into all worksites as a prerequisite to shutting down all worksites. The policy requiring a contractor to cease work at all worksites was not adopted as a rule. In February 2004, the Division asserted that compliance with Section 440.10(1)(c), Florida Statutes, required a general contractor to look beyond an ACORD certificate of insurance to determine if subcontractors had complied with the requirement to maintain the required workers' compensation coverage ". . . under a Florida endorsement using Florida rates and rules pursuant to payroll reporting that accurately reflects the work performed in this state by such employees." This policy was not adopted as a rule and was subsequently abandoned. The Division, in implementing this policy, asserted that a general contractor must actually review the policy of a subcontractor presenting an ACORD certificate and determine if it was in effect and if it complied with Florida law. This policy was not adopted as a rule and the policy was subsequently abandoned. The Division further asserted that the employees of the subcontractor of a general contractor were to be viewed as if they were employees of the general contractor, when contemplating workers' compensation coverage. This policy was not adopted as a rule. Ms. Johnson acted in conformance with the Division's policies in effect at the time the SWO was issued. The net worth of Hernandez, Inc., was a negative $1,821,599, on December 31, 2003. Hernandez, Inc., was struggling financially in February 2004, but was on the way to recovery until the SWO was issued. On November 30, 2004, the net worth of Hernandez, Inc., was a negative $1,161,865, and this figure included the sum of $978,000 that Mr. Hernandez put into the business. Accordingly, Hernandez, Inc., was a small business party for purposes of Subsection 57.111(4)(a), Florida Statutes, during times pertinent. The SWO, which terminated work at all Hernandez work sites, torpedoed any chance the company had to continue in business. Mr. Hernandez mortgaged his house, which he subsequently lost to creditors, in an effort to keep Hernandez, Inc., in business. All of his efforts failed. The failure was a direct result of the actions of the Division. The Division's interpretations of the law that precipitated their policies, and thus the failure of the business, were both wrong and unreasonable. Subsequent to the hearing and Recommended Order in Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation v. Hernandez, Inc., Case No. 04-1174 (DOAH October 3, 2005), the Chief Financial Officer entered a Final Order styled, In the Matter of: Hernandez, Enterprises, Inc., Case No. 75492-05-WC (Florida Department of Financial Services, January 25, 2006). The Final Order noted that the contractor, Hernandez, Inc., complied with the extant law when it, ". . . demanded and received proof of insurance. . . . " The Final Order also noted that there was no authority produced by the Division that would permit the imposition of a fine on Hernandez, Inc. The Final Order further recited that there was no statutory duty on the part of a contractor to ensure (emphasis supplied) that its subcontractors had secured workers' compensation coverage for its employees. It noted that, ". . . without some formal delineation of the specific obligations of a contractor in ascertaining proof of insurance from a subcontractor, the Department cannot impose a penalty upon the facts presented in the instant case." The Division was ordered to rescind the SWO issued February 26, 2004, and the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment dated March 19, 2004, and was further ordered to repay the amount of $46,694.03, which had been paid to persuade the Division to abate the SWO. The action was initiated by the Division, which is a state agency. At the time the SWO was initiated, there was no reasonable basis in law and fact to do so. The actions of the Division were not "substantially justified." Hernandez, Inc., prevailed in the hearing because the Chief Financial Officer entered a Final Order in its favor and the Order has not been reversed on appeal and the time for seeking judicial review of the Final Order has expired. Hernandez, Inc., is, therefore, a "prevailing small business party." Hernandez, Inc., paid its law firm, Holbrook, Akel, Cold, Stiefel & Ray, P.A., $51,815.50 in attorneys' fees, and paid $8,837.00 in costs, in its successful defense of the Division's actions.
