Findings Of Fact Background Petitioner, Chrysler Corporation (Chrysler), is a "manufacturer" of motor vehicles as that term is defined by Section 681.102(10), Florida Statutes (1992 Supp.), 1/ and, as such, is subject to the provisions of Chapter 681, Florida Statutes, the "Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act." Consequently, Chrysler is substantially affected by the rules promulgated by respondent, Department of Legal Affairs (Department) to implement Chapter 681, and the parties have stipulated that it has standing to maintain this rule challenge proceeding. The Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act (the "Lemon Law") imposes upon manufacturers, as defined by Section 681.102(10), a duty to repair nonconformities which are first reported by consumers during the "Lemon Law rights period," and liability for the refund of the purchase price or replacement of those motor vehicles if their nonconformities are not corrected within a reasonable number of repair attempts. A consumer's right to exercise the remedies provided by the Lemon Law accrue from the date the consumer takes delivery of the motor vehicle. The "Lemon Law rights period" is defined by Section 681.102(9), Florida Statutes, as follows: "Lemon Law rights period" means the period ending 18 months after the date of the original delivery of a motor vehicle to a consumer or the first 24,000 miles of operation, whichever occurs first. On October 9, 1992, the Department published notice, inter alia, of proposed rule 2-30.001(3)(e), in volume 18, number 41, of the Florida Administrative Weekly. Such rule would define "24,000 miles of operation," for purposes of calculating the running of the Lemon Law rights period established by Section 681.102(9), Florida Statutes, as "miles of operation by the consumer." By petition filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on October 30, 1992, Chrysler timely challenged the validity of such proposed rule as an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. The predicate for Chrysler's challenge was its contention that the proposed rule enlarges, modifies or contravenes Section 618.102(9), Florida Statutes, the provision of law sought to be implemented. 2/ The proposed rule Proposed rule 2-30.001(3)(e) provides: When calculating the running of the Lemon Law rights period as defined by s. 681.102(9), FS., "24,000 miles of operation" means miles of operation by the consumer. If the consumer is a subsequent transferee as defined in s. 681.102(4), FS., "24,000 miles of operation" means miles of operation by both the original consumer and the subsequent transferee. The gravamen of the dispute between the parties concerning the propriety of the proposed rule is a disagreement regarding the interpretation to be accorded Section 681.102(9), Florida Statutes, which defines the "Lemon Law rights period" as: . . . the period ending 18 months after the date of the original delivery of a motor vehicle to a consumer or the first 24,000 miles of operation, whichever occurs first. Chrysler contends that the "Lemon Law rights period," as defined by Section 681.102(9), is clear and unambiguous, and that the "first 24,000 miles of operation" refers to the actual mileage shown on the odometer of the motor vehicle, without regard to when or by whom the mileage was accrued. So read, proposed rule 2-30.001(3)(e) conflicts with the law sought to be implemented. The position advanced by Chrysler is of import to it since Chrysler impresses new motor vehicles into use as company cars and permits its dealers to purchase and use new vehicles for demonstration purposes for customers or personal use, prior to their retail sale. During this period, the motor vehicle accumulates mileage on its odometer as a result of such "demonstrator" use. Excluding the mileage so accrued from the running of the "Lemon Law rights period," as contemplated by the proposed rule, could extend Chrysler's liability under the Lemon Law beyond the first 24,000 miles of operation registered on the vehicle, if it issued a warranty as a condition of sale to the consumer. See Section 681.102(14), definition of "motor vehicle," discussed infra. Contrasted with Chrysler's position, the Department interprets the "first 24,000 miles of operation" provision of Section 681.102(9), to relate to operation by a consumer, and would exclude any mileage accrued on the vehicle prior to its delivery to the consumer when calculating the "Lemon Law rights period." So interpreted, the proposed rule is consistent with the law sought to be implemented. The Department's interpretation is premised on its reading of Section 681.102(9) in pari materia with Section 681.102(14) which defines a "motor vehicle" as: . . . a new vehicle, . . . and includes a vehicle used as a demonstrator or leased vehicle if a manufacturer's warranty was issued as a condition of sale, or the lessee is responsible for repairs. . . . So read, a demonstrator is considered a new vehicle, and no distinction is made in applying the Lemon Law rights period between consumers who purchase a motor vehicle with no or minimal mileage on its odometer at delivery and those who purchase a demonstrator. The proposed rule's predecessor Pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 88-95, Laws of Florida, Chapter 681, Florida Statutes, was amended effective January 1, 1989, to establish what has been referred to as the Lemon Law. At that time, the "Lemon Law rights period" was defined as: . . . the period ending 1 year after the date of the original delivery of a motor vehicle to a consumer or the first 12,000 miles of operation, whichever occurs first. Section 681.102(7), Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.). To implement the provisions of the Lemon Law, the Department adopted Rule 2-30.001, Florida Administrative Code, in or about January 1989. At that time, the rule included the following definition of the "Lemon Law rights period": The "Lemon Law Rights period" is the period ending one year after the date of the original delivery of the motor vehicle to the consumer, or the first 12,000 miles of operation, whichever occurs first. This period may be extended if a substantial defect or condition is reported to the manufacturer or its authorized dealer during the Lemon Law Rights period, but has not been cured by the expiration of the period. If you put 12,000 miles on your vehicle (miles driven minus miles on the vehicle on the date of delivery) before the end of the first year of operation, you should note that date in your personal records. If a warranty problem is examined or repaired during the Lemon Law Rights period, be sure you get and keep a copy of the work order which contains the date, odometer reading, and a description of that problem. Your work order copy provides the best proof as to when the problem was first reported. [Respondent's exhibits 3 and 15]. Consistent with the foregoing rule, the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board, which is charged with the responsibility of arbitrating disputes under the Lemon Law, has consistently construed the provisions of the "Lemon Law rights period" concerning "miles of operation" to relate to operation by the consumer, and has excluded any mileage accrued on the vehicle prior to its delivery to the consumer when calculating the "Lemon Law rights period." [See e.g., Respondent's exhibits 5, 8 and 9]. Since the Lemon Law was enacted, there has been no change in the definition of "Lemon Law rights period," or the Department's rule, until the passage of Chapter 92-88, Laws of Florida, effective July 1, 1992. Under such law, the "Lemon Law rights period" was amended to read as follows: (9)(7) "Lemon Law rights period" means the period ending 18 months 1 year after the date of the original delivery of a motor vehicle to a consumer or the first 24,000 12,000 miles of operation, whichever occurs first. Section 681.102(9), Florida Statutes. Here, the proposed rule is designed to reflect the change in the "Lemon Law rights period" from one year or 12,000 miles to 18 months or 24,000 miles, occasioned by the aforesaid amendment to Chapter 681. The Department's interpretation of the "Lemon Law rights period" concerning "miles of operation" to relate to operation by the consumer remains, however, consistent with its prior rule and interpretation.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's request for arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board pursuant to Chapter 681, Florida Statutes, should be denied on the ground that the request was not timely filed with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Division of Consumer Services (hereinafter referred to as the "Department")?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, the factual stipulations into which the parties have entered, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner purchased the motor vehicle that is the subject of the instant controversy, a 1991 Mitsubishi Eclipse, on May 23, 1991, from King Mitsubishi, a Mitsubishi dealership located in Lighthouse Point, Florida (hereinafter referred to as the "Dealership"). Various problems developed with the vehicle which Petitioner reported to the Dealership, but the Dealership was unable to rectify within 18 months of the date of purchase. During this 18-month time frame Petitioner drove the vehicle less than 24,000 miles. Several of the problems that Petitioner reported during the first 18 months of her ownership of the vehicle still persist today. In June or July of 1993, Petitioner began considering the possibility of seeking arbitration under the State of Florida's "Lemon Law." To find out more about her rights, she obtained from a friend, and reviewed, a Florida state government publication on the "Lemon Law." In September of 1993, Petitioner sent a completed Motor Vehicle Defect Notification form to the Dealership requesting that it "make a final attempt to correct the . . . reported . . defects." On November 12, 1993, Petitioner brought the vehicle to the Dealership for such repairs to be made. When she picked up the vehicle five days later, she discovered that the defects she had reported had not been remedied. Dissatisfied with these results, Petitioner telephoned the Department and asked to be sent a Request for Arbitration form. She received the form on November 29, 1993. Petitioner then proceeded to gather the documentation that she needed to fill out the form. After gathering this documentation, Petitioner telephoned the Department a second time because she had some questions regarding certain items on the form. Her questions having been answered by the Department representative to whom she spoke, Petitioner completed the form and, on December 2, 1993, mailed the completed form to the Department. The Department received the completed form on December 6, 1993. At no time did Petitioner, a layperson acting without the benefit of legal counsel, ever intend to forfeit her right to request arbitration under Chapter 681, Florida Statutes. She was not under the impression, nor did the Department representatives to whom she spoke give her reason to believe, that if she failed to file her request for arbitration on or before November 23, 1993, her inaction would be deemed a waiver of her right to request arbitration under Chapter 681, Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order finding Petitioner's request for arbitration to have been timely filed and therefore not subject to dismissal on the ground of untimely filing. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 11th day of May, 1994. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 94-0755 The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on the "findings of facts" proposed by the parties in their post-hearing submittals: Petitioner's Proposed Findings Accepted and incorporated in substance, although not necessarily repeated verbatim, in this Recommended Order.. Not incorporated in this Recommended Order because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. Accepted and incorporated in substance. 4-5. Rejected as findings of fact because they are more in the nature of conclusions of law. 6-7. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected as a finding of fact because it is more in the nature of a summary of evidence adduced at hearing than a finding of fact based upon such evidence. First sentence: Rejected as a finding of fact because it is more in the nature of a summary of testimony adduced at hearing than a finding of fact based upon such testimony; Second sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected as a finding of fact because it is more in the nature of a summary of testimony adduced at hearing than a finding of fact based upon such testimony. The Department's Proposed Findings 1-4. Accepted and incorporated in substance COPIES FURNISHED: Robert Feldman, Esquire Berman & Feldman 2424 Northeast 22nd Street Pompano Beach, Florida 33062-3099 Barbara Edwards, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 515 Mayo Building 2002 Old St. Augustine Road, B-12 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford, Commissioner Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to arbitration under Chapter 681, Florida Statutes, Florida's "lemon law."
Findings Of Fact Petitioner took delivery of the motor vehicle at issue on December 31, 1996, at which time she received information on the requirements of Florida's "lemon law." Petitioner began to have trouble with the vehicle almost immediately. She notified the dealer that there was a serious problem, and Palm Kia in Ocala, Florida, performed some repairs. The Ocala dealer's repair shop did not inform her that the problem was a computer failure. Sometime during the next 18 months, there was a second period during which the car was in some repair shop. Petitioner first contacted the Department on January 8, 1999, by telephone. She was informed that the statutory time period for requesting arbitration under Florida's "lemon law" had expired, and the suggestion was made that she try contacting the Better Business Bureau. Petitioner testified that she would have filed a request for arbitration with the Department in January 1999, if the Department had not referred her to the Better Business Bureau. Petitioner signed her first and only written request for arbitration on February 2, 1999. This written request for arbitration by the Board was received by the Department on February 11, 1999. In her written arbitration request, Petitioner indicated that her vehicle had reached 24,000 miles "around the end" of 1997. However, at formal hearing, Petitioner confirmed that on January 19, 1998, the mileage on her vehicle was 32,763. In her written arbitration request, Petitioner did not provide proof that she had provided written notice of the alleged defect to the manufacturer, Kia Motors, within the "lemon law" rights period. Petitioner testified that sometime in the 18-month period specified by Florida's "lemon law" she had telephoned the manufacturer to complain about her car. However, Petitioner also testified that she did not notify the manufacturer by certified letter of the nonconformity until October 1998. Petitioner testified that on December 28, 1998, Gatorland Toyota in Gainesville, Florida, requested that the motor vehicle be towed to them. The motor vehicle had been towed the previous day, Sunday, December 27, 1998, to Billy Shell's Garage because Kia was closed and the motor vehicle could not be locked away. The motor vehicle was not diagnosed by Gatorland Toyota as having a computer problem until the first part of January 1999. Petitioner took possession of her vehicle in January 1999. At that time, she notified the dealer by telephone that the engine light was on. The car has continued to have difficulties.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order upholding the February 25, 1999 denial of Petitioner's request for arbitration before the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of August, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of August, 1999.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: On June 16, 1993, Petitioner took delivery of a new 1/ 1994 Mitsubishi Galant ES that he had leased (for a 42-month period) from Potamkin Mitsubishi (hereinafter referred to as "Potamkin"), a Florida Mitsubishi Motors of America (hereinafter referred to as "Mitsubishi") dealership. Thereafter, problems developed with the vehicle's braking system, which caused the steering wheel to vibrate. Petitioner, who, under his lease agreement, was responsible for having the necessary repairs made to the vehicle, reported these problems to Potamkin. Potamkin was unable to completely remedy these problems within 18 months of the date of delivery (hereinafter referred to as the "18-month post- delivery period"). During the "18-month post-delivery period," Petitioner drove the vehicle less than 24,000 miles. The problems that Petitioner reported during the "18-month post- delivery" period still persist today. On or about January 24, 1995, Petitioner sent a completed Motor Vehicle Defect Notification form to the manufacturer of the vehicle, Mitsubishi, requesting that it "make a final attempt to correct the continued substantial defects" plaguing the vehicle. The defects were not remedied. On June 21, 1996, Petitioner filed with the Department a Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board. By letter dated June 26, 1996, the Department advised Petitioner that "a determination ha[d] been made in accordance with Chapter 681.109(6) Florida Statutes, and Rule 2-32.009(2)(b), Florida Administrative Code, to reject [his request because t]he request was not submitted in a timely manner."
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for arbitration because it is time-barred. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 5th day of December, 1996. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of December, 1996.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to arbitration before the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board under Chapter 681, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On November 30, 1993, Petitioner took delivery of a new, 1994 Mercedes Benz SL600, bearing vehicle identification number WDBFA76EORF093081. The selling dealer was Regency Autohaus, Inc. in Naples, Florida, which is where delivery to Petitioner took place. Petitioner experienced numerous mechanical problems with the vehicle starting shortly after taking delivery. Problems during the first year of ownership included air conditioning that would not work and a transmission problem that would not permit use of gears other than third. On February 22, 1995, Petitioner sent to Mercedes Benz a Motor Vehicle Defect Notification. Petitioner continued to experience problems with the car and, on May 9, 1996, sent Mercedes Benz a second Motor Vehicle Defect Notification. Despite repeated attempts by Mercedes Benz to repair largely recurring problems with the car, Petitioner was unable to obtain satisfactory repairs. Twice, the Mercedes Benz dealer in Louisville, Kentucky, where Petitioner lives part of the year, towed the car to the shop to repair a failure of the car to start. Keeping the car 11 days the first time and six days the second time, the Louisville dealer could not determine the source of the problem. Later, in September 1996, the Louisville dealer kept the car for 13 days trying to fix several problems. At this time, the car had 23,692 miles on it. The issue in this case is whether Petitioner made a timely demand for arbitration under the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board, Chapter 681, Florida Statutes. The Motor Vehicle Defect Notifications that Petitioner sent to Mercedes Benz are not demands for arbitration. The forms state that, under the Florida Lemon Law, the purchaser is “requesting that [the manufacturer] make a final attempt to correct the continuing substantial defect(s) or condition(s).” In the spring of 1996, Petitioner spoke with several representatives of Mercedes Benz and Respondent about arbitration and procedures under the Florida Lemon Law. By letter to a national Mercedes Benz representative dated April 24, 1996, Petitioner complained about the car and the discourteous treatment he had received from another Mercedes Benz employee. The letter explains why Petitioner does “not want to keep this vehicle” and warns that, if Petitioner did not hear from someone at Mercedes Benz within five days, he would “have no alternative but take further action.” By letter dated May 9, 1996, Petitioner sent the Office of the Attorney General a letter with a copy of the second Motor Vehicle Defect Notification. The letter notes that the car was in the shop for repairs for more than 15 days prior to the expiration of 18 months and thus appears to be covered by the Florida Lemon Law. The letter concludes: “I have requested that the purchase price be refunded or that the vehicle be repaired.” By letter dated May 23, 1996, Petitioner informed a Mercedes Benz representative in St. Petersburg, Florida, that Petitioner had researched his rights under the Florida Lemon Law. Petitioner stated that Mercedes Benz had to replace the vehicle or refund the purchase price. Petitioner added, “If your company fails to do this, then the only alternative would be to arbitrate the matter . . ..” The letter concludes: “It would seem to me that your company should be willing to go ahead and do this rather than go through the arbitration and be ordered to do something that you could voluntarily do. Please advise your thoughts on the matter.” On July 5, 1996, Petitioner filed a Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board. Immediately above Petitioner’s signature, which is dated June 28, 1996, the form warns that persons making false statements with the intent to mislead a public servant in the performance of his official duty are guilty of misdemeanor violations of cited Florida Statutes. The form adds: I hereby request arbitration of my case with the Florida New Motor Vehicle Board. I certify that all statements made in connection with this request are true and correct to the best of my knowledge. I understand that this document and its attachments are public records. The letters of April 29 and May 9 and 23 are not demands for arbitration. They are demands for the remedies that are available under the Florida Lemon Law, but they are not demands for arbitration. Nowhere in these three letters does Petitioner, who is an attorney, make a definitive demand of Mercedes Benz or Respondent for arbitration. The letters mention Mercedes Benz’s liability under the Florida Lemon Law and the remedies available under the law. The letters implicitly warn of arbitration, but continue to reflect Petitioner’s strategy during this period to try to work out this matter without the necessity of legal proceedings. Mercedes Benz does not maintain a certified procedure for the resolution of disputes of the type involved in this case.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order denying Petitioner’s request for arbitration before the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board under Chapter 681, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 29th day of January, 1997. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of January, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert L. Bertram Post Office Box 25 Jamestown, Kentucky 42629-0025 Attorney Rhonda Long Bass Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Room 515, Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: On February 12, 1993, Petitioner took delivery of a new 1/ 1993 Chevrolet C-1500 truck that he had purchased from Maroone Chevrolet, a Florida Chevrolet dealership. Thereafter, various problems developed with the vehicle. Petitioner reported these problems to Steve Moore Chevrolet, the Chevrolet dealership to which he brought the vehicle to be serviced (hereinafter referred to as the "Servicing Dealership"). The Servicing Dealership, however, was unable to remedy these problems within 18 months of the date of delivery (hereinafter referred to as the "18-month post-delivery period"). During the 18-month post-delivery period, Petitioner drove the vehicle more than 24,000 miles. By June 14, 1994 (approximately 16 months after the date of delivery), he had already driven the vehicle 26,569 miles. 2/ At least some of the problems that Petitioner reported during the 18- month post-delivery period still persist today. In the summer of 1995, Petitioner sent a completed Motor Vehicle Defect Notification form to the manufacturer of the vehicle, the Chevrolet Motor Division of General Motors (hereinafter referred to as "Chevrolet"), requesting that it "make a final attempt to correct the . . . reported . . defects." The notice was received by Chevrolet's customer assistance branch office in Tampa on August 16, 1995. Chevrolet, through its employee, Jennifer Kenyon, responded to the notice by sending the following letter, dated August 18, 1995, to Petitioner: This is to acknowledge receipt on August 18, 1995 by the Chevrolet Motor Division of your demand letter dated July 28, 1995. Please be advised that Chevrolet Motor Division stands ready to make any necessary adjustments, repairs, or replacements to any component contained on or in the motor vehicle now belonging to you bearing Vehicle Identification Number . . . which does not conform to the purpose for which they were intended or manufactured and which fall within the limitation set forth in the New Vehicle Limited Warranty supplied with said vehicle by General Motors, Chevrolet Motor Division. Should Chevrolet Motor Division's attempts to adjust, repair, or replace said component(s) to your satisfaction fail, you would be offered the arbitration process as a means of settling your dispute with General Motors, Chevrolet Motor Division. Please contact Steve Moore Chevrolet so they may assist in making arrangements for an inspection and/or repair. Petitioner telephoned Kenyon after receiving Kenyon's letter. During their telephone conversation, Kenyon told Petitioner that Chevrolet would probably "buy the vehicle back" from him, but that no final decision would be made until it was determined whether he "qualified for the Lemon Law." During a subsequent telephone conversation, Kenyon told Petitioner that a determination had been made that Petitioner did not "qualify for the Lemon Law" and that, although Chevrolet would not repurchase his vehicle, it would "work with him." Petitioner subsequently telephoned the Florida Attorney General's Office (hereinafter referred to the "AGO"). The AGO referred Petitioner to the Department. When Petitioner contacted the Department, he was advised to file a complaint/arbitration request with the Better Business Bureau's Auto Line program (hereinafter referred to as the "BBB program"), a certified arbitration program in which Chevrolet participates. Petitioner followed the advice he was given. On or about September 22, 1995, he filed a complaint/arbitration request with the BBB program. On September 27, 1995, the BBB program sent Petitioner a letter which read as follows: After careful review of your case, we have determined that your complaint is not eligible for further handling in the BBB AUTO LINE program. We have made this determination for the following reasons: The claim was not filed with the BBB within 6 months after the end of the Lemon Law Rights Period in order to pursue arbitration requesting assistance in replacement or repurchase of the vehicle. While we refer all cases to the manufacturer for review, we cannot require the manufacturer to submit to arbitration unless the claim is within the specific program limits. The program eligibility information is explained in the program summary. You may want to contact the Division of Consumer Services at 1-800-321-5366 to see if you qualify under the lemon law. While I am sorry we were not able to help you with your automotive complaint, I want to thank you for your interest in the BBB AUTO LINE program. Please contact us if you have any questions or if you believe we have made an error. On November 2, 1995, Petitioner filed with the Department a Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board. By letter dated November 3, 1995, the Department advised Petitioner that "a determination ha[d] been made to reject [his request because t]he request was not submitted in a timely manner."
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for arbitration because it is time-barred. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 22nd day of March, 1996. STUART M. LERNER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 1996.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this matter is whether Petitioner's request for arbitration before the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board should be denied as untimely.
Findings Of Fact The Department's Division of Consumer Services is the state agency in Florida charged with the responsibility to receive and evaluate requests for arbitration before the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board (Board), submitted by purchasers of new motor vehicles in this state. If a request qualifies for arbitration and is timely filed, the matter is referred to the Florida Attorney General for further processing and action. On September 10, 1993, Petitioner took delivery of a new Ford Escort automobile from Ken Marks Ford in Clearwater, Florida. The mileage reflected on the odometer at the time of delivery was 26 miles. Petitioner claims that at the time he took delivery of the vehicle, he was not furnished with a copy of the Attorney General's brochure entitled Preserving Your Rights Under the Florida Lemon Law, nor was he given any other information, either in person or in writing, from the dealer or from anyone else, regarding the operation of the Lemon Law program. However, at hearing he indicated that he had a copy of the pamphlet as early as October 13, 1995, when he signed the Defect Notification form which is included within the pamphlet. The pamphlet clearly outlines the benefits, requirements and time limits pertinent to the program. From the very beginning of his ownership, Petitioner experienced difficulty with the vehicle. His first problem, requiring the replacement of the right head lamp assembly, took place on September 13, 1993, only three days after delivery and continued until December, 1995. He experienced problems with several systems at least three times each. These included squealing brakes, the right seat belt, the alarm light, the tachometer, the gas pedal and the idle. By the time he took the vehicle in for the third time for the most recent problem, the odometer registered 30,710 miles. He claims to have notified the manufacturer in writing of this problem on October 18, 1995. Mr. Maxwell accumulated 24,000 miles on his vehicle on or before January 4, 1995. It was on that date, when he brought the vehicle to the dealer for the third time for the squeaking brakes, the alarm light and the seat belt problems, that the odometer showed 24,035 miles. Even though the initial Lemon law period expired at 24,000 miles, Petitioner was potentially eligible for a six month extension of the original rights period because several complaints registered with the dealer during the initial period remained uncorrected at that time. The six months extension expired on or before July 4, 1995. Under the Florida Lemon Law, consumers are entitled to file for relief under the statute for a period of up to six months after the expiration of the Lemon Law rights period. In this case, because of the six month extension, the filing deadline of six months expired no later than January 4, 1996. In October 1995, Petitioner contacted Ford's Customer Assistance Center and requested information regarding correction of his problems. In response he received a customer satisfaction questionnaire but no assistance with his difficulties. Thereafter, he contacted the Department to request the form for filing the Request for Arbitration on November 11, 1995. Subsequent to the receipt of the Request for Arbitration from the Division, Mr. Maxwell engaged in several telephone negotiations with representatives of Ford Motor Company and received oral settlement offers from the company, including either a replacement automobile or a total refund. When Mr. Maxwell elected to receive a refund, he was told that the Ford representative would get back to him but no one from either Ford Motor Company or Ken Marks Ford ever did. Petitioner believes he was misled by both so that he would thereafter become ineligible for participation in the arbitration program. Ford Motor Company has no state- certified settlement procedure. Petitioner's Request for Arbitration reflects January 6, 1996 as the date of execution. It was received in the Division of Consumer Services on January 10, 1996. It was subsequently reviewed and rejected as untimely by the Division on January 16, 1996.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's Request for Arbitration as untimely. DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul D. Maxwell 775 Lantana Avenue Clearwater Beach, Florida 34630 Rhonda Long Bass, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners’ request for arbitration under the Florida Lemon Law was timely.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners took delivery in Florida of a 1995 Saturn automobile on September 16, 1994. Thirteen months after taking delivery, Petitioners returned the car to a Saturn dealer for repairs to the cruise control. At this time, the car had less than 9000 miles on it. About 12 months later, Petitioners returned the car to the dealer twice more in the same week with problems with the cruise control. The mileage at the time of the third repair attempt was 17,298. By letter dated March 13, 1997, and received four days later, Petitioners notified the manufacturer of the problems with the cruise control. Petitioners then filed a claim with the manufacturer’s informal dispute settlement program on April 28, 1997. The program operator, BBB Autoline, issued a decision on May 9, 1997, denying the claim because it was untimely filed. Petitioners filed their request for arbitration under the Florida Lemon Law on May 21, 1997. Respondent has determined that the request is untimely, and this hearing addresses that determination.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order denying Petitioners’ request for arbitration. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of December, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: H. R. and T. J. Reagan, pro se 5601 Duncan Road, No. 96 Punta Gorda, Florida 33982-4754 Attorney Rhonda Long Bass Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Room 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Bob Crawford, Commissioner Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
