Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, Petitioner was licensed as a real estate broker by the Florida Real Estate Commission. In May 1988, he was working as a broker-salesman with G.V. Stewart, Inc., a corporate real estate broker whose active broker is G.V. Stewart. On April 20, 1989, Respondent submitted a Contract for Sale and Purchase to the University of South Florida Credit Union who was attempting to sell a house at 2412 Elm Street in Tampa, Florida, which the seller had acquired in a mortgage foreclosure proceeding. This offer reflected a purchase price of $25,000 with a deposit of $100 (Exhibit 2). The president of the seller rejected the offer by striking out the $25,000 and $100 figures and made a counter offer to sell the property for $29,000 with a $2000 deposit (Exhibit 2). On May 9, 1989, Respondent submitted a new contract for sale and purchase for this same property which offer reflected an offering price of $27,000 with a deposit of $2000 held in escrow by G.V. Stewart (Exhibit 3). This offer, as did Exhibit 2, bore what purported to be the signature of William P. Murphy as buyer and G. Stewart as escrow agent. In fact, neither Murphy nor Stewart signed either Exhibit 2 or Exhibit 3, and neither was aware the offers had been made at the time they were submitted to the seller. This offer was accepted by the seller. This property was an open listing with no brokerage firm having an exclusive agreement with the owner to sell the property. Stewart's firm had been notified by the seller that the property was for sale. Respondent had worked with Stewart for upwards of ten years and had frequently signed Stewart's name on contracts, which practice was condoned by Stewart. Respondent had sold several parcels of property to Murphy, an attorney in Tampa, on contracts signed by him in the name of Murphy, which signatures were subsequently ratified by Murphy. Respondent considers Murphy to be a Class A customer for whom he obtained a deposit only after the offer was accepted by the seller and Murphy confirmed a desire to purchase. Respondent has followed this procedure in selling property to Murphy for a considerable period of time and saw nothing wrong with this practice. At present, Respondent is the active broker at his own real estate firm.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that William H. McCoy's license as a real estate broker be suspended for one year. However, if before the expiration of the year's suspension Respondent can prove, to the satisfaction of the Real Estate Commission, that he fully understands the duty owed by a broker to the seller and the elements of a valid contract, the remaining portion of the suspension be set aside. ENTERED this 29th day of November, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of November, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: John Alexander, Esquire Kenneth E. Easley 400 West Robinson Street General Counsel Orlando, Florida 32802 Department of Professional Regulation William H. McCoy 1940 North Monroe Street 4002 South Pocahontas Avenue Suite 60 Suite 106 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Tampa Florida 33610 Darlene F. Keller Division Director 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 =================================================================
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding are whether the Respondent has committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, whether any disciplinary action against his licensure status is warranted.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence received at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact: At all times material herein, Respondent was a licensed real estate salesman having been issued license number 00335420. The last license issued was as a salesman, c/o Ancla Realty, Inc., 292 Aragon, Coral Gables, Florida 33134. Respondent, on or about January 24, 1983, in Dade County, Florida, did unlawfully obtain or use, or did endeavor to obtain or use the property of another, Steffi Downs or Joann Downs, being a lamp, with the intent to deprive that person of the right to the property or of a benefit therefrom, or to appropriate the property to his own use or to the use of any person not entitled thereto, in violation of Subsection 812.014 (1) and (2)(c), Florida Statutes. As a result thereof, an information alleging petit theft was filed against the Respondent on March 1, 1983. Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to the information and by order of April 22, 1983, Respondent was found guilty of petit theft, adjudication was withheld, Respondent was placed on six months probation and was assessed $100.00 court costs.
Recommendation On the basis of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is Recommended that a Final Order be entered which would: Dismiss Count I of the Administrative Complaint; Find the Respondent guilty of the violation charged in Count II of the Administrative Complaint; and Revoke the Respondent's license, without prejudice to his reapplication for licensure upon a showing of rehabilitation. DONE and ORDERED this 24th day of July, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of July, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Fred Langford, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Mr. Eddie Garcia 1260 N. W. 124th Street North Miami, Florida 33167 Harold Huff, Director Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Orlando Florida 32801
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner’s application for licensure as a mortgage broker should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner resides in Riverwoods, Illinois. He has four children, and is married to Sharon Wheat-Hester. Petitioner received his undergraduate degree from Wake Forest University in North Carolina. Petitioner also received a master’s degree and doctorate degree in theology from Share-A- Prayer and Word Theological School in Whitewater, Wisconsin. Petitioner is currently employed as the director of a ministry called Marketplace Movement Network. The ministry provides advice to businesses on Chritian business ethics. In that regard, Petitioner has published one book on the subject of Christian ethics in business. Petitioner is also the President and shareholder of Hester International, Inc., a Florida Corporation that since 1995, provides mortgage brokerage services in the State of Illinois and several other states. The corporation’s principal office is located in Illinois. The business has an established client list and referral list. Additionally, Petitioner is currently licensed as a mortgage broker in the Illinois, California, North Carolina and Hawaii. He has not had any disciplinary action taken against him in those states. On January 25, 1996, prior to the present license application at issue here, Petitioner sought licensure as a mortgage broker in Florida with the Florida Department of Banking and Finance, Respondent’s predecessor agency. On the 1996 application Petitioner answered “no” to a question that asked whether he had ever had a license revoked. Petitioner’s 1996 application was denied for a material misrepresentation or omission. Petitioner did not challenge the 1996 denial. On February 16, 2004, also prior to the present application, Petitioner again applied for a mortgage broker license. On this application, question number six asked: Have you had a license, or the equivalent, to practice any profession or occupation denied, revoked, suspended, or otherwise acted against which involved fraud, dishonest dealing, or any other act of moral turpitude? Yes No A “Yes” answer to question six required the applicant to attach details, provide a copy of allegations, and also supply documentation of the final disposition of the case. In response to question number six, Petitioner appeared to have marked both the answers “yes” and “no”, but then circled “yes.” On the second page of the application, Petitioner explained his answer to question number six, stating that he had had a real estate license ten years ago and that he had been involved with a dispute for $2,500 and lost the case. The explanation further stated that Petitioner was moving to Illinois at the time, so he voluntarily surrendered his license. On April 1, 2004, without investigating the facts to refresh his memory, Petitioner provided the requested signed letter of explanation. Subsequently, he withdrew his February application because he did not have time to deal with the ongoing questions the agency had regarding his application. Around July 13, 2004, after discussing the February 2004 application with Respondent, Petitioner submitted a revised Application for Licensure as a Mortgage Broker in the State of Florida. In response to question six, Petitioner marked “no” based on his memory that his real estate agent’s license had been “voluntarily surrendered.” Petitioner also submitted character reference letters. Additionally, Petitioner discussed with Respondent any proof of rehabilitation since the “voluntary surrender” of his real estate license. On page two of the July application, Petitioner wrote that his “only blemish” was a voluntary surrender of a real estate license in 1992. Petitioner stated, “[t]his was ‘not’ an act of moral turpitude or fraud.” In a deficiency letter dated July 28, 2004, the Office requested additional information from the Petitioner, including a signed statement explaining his side of the occurrence. On September 30, 2004, the Office received the same statement the Petitioner had previously forwarded to the Office for his February 2004 application. Petitioner again did not avail himself of the opportunity to discover the true facts surrounding the claimed surrender of his license. In the second paragraph of this explanatory letter Petitioner stated that the disciplinary action that led to surrender of his real estate license arose out of a transaction involving one of his customers who rented property to a third- party renter. Petitioner stated that the rental transaction between his customer and the third-party renter occurred in the lobby of Petitioner’s office without his knowledge or help. According to Petitioner’s, somewhat confusing, explanatory letter, the customer did not have the right to rent the house, but collected $2,500 from the renter and then left the state. Later, Petitioner discovered that the customer had closed in escrow and gained temporary occupancy of the home, thereby enabling the customer to ostensibly rent the home. Petitioner further explained that the renter sued him for the $2,500 and prevailed because the transaction took place in Petitioner’s lobby. Petitioner stated he lost the case because his attorney, Scott Hester (also his brother), was unavailable to make the closing argument and Petitioner had to do his own summation. In fact, Petitioner’s brother never represented Petitioner in the renter’s case because he did not have time to undertake the case. Petitioner did not supply the names of the people referenced in the letter because he did not remember them. As will be seen, at the time of the explanatory letter, Petitioner’s memory of the facts surrounding his license surrender is, at best, faulty. On April 19, 2005, the Office issued its Denial Letter, denying Petitioner’s application for licensure as a mortgage broker. As grounds for denial under Section 494.041(2)(c), (g), (i) and (q), Florida Statutes, the letter stated in relevant part: The Office’s background investigation and information you provided revealed the following: You answered Question #6 on your application as “no”, when it asks if you have had a license, or the equivalent, to practice any profession or occupation denied, revoked, suspended, or otherwise acted against which involved fraud, dishonest dealing, or any other act of moral turpitude. On or about May 7, 1996, the Florida Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance, denied your application for a license as a mortgage broker for making a material misstatement of fact on their application. On or about December 8, 1992, after the State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate conducted an investigation, you surrendered your license with that agency and entered into a written agreement stating that you agreed to have your license revoked. Accordingly, the Real Estate Commission did revoke your license in their meeting of January 19, 1993 effective December 8, 1992. The Investigative Report attached to the Final Order to revoke reveals that you were sued for dishonest conduct and subsequently, on March 25, 1992, ordered to pay Johannes Fruhwirt $7,800 plus post- judgment interest. This order was by the County Court of Broward County as a result of a Final Judgment, Case #9103333 CC53 and a Writ of Execution. The investigation revealed that Hester left the State of Florida without leaving word of his whereabouts. Apparently, that judgment was never satisfied. On May 14, 1991 you promised to pay $3000 to Leonard Schoenfeld when closing occurred on a home Mr. Schoenfeld was purchasing. Closing occurred shortly afterward, and you have never made that payment. On or about July 17, 1995, the State of Illinois received an Application Form to Operate as a Residential Mortgage Licensee in the name of Hester International, Inc. on which you were listed as 50% owner. You signed the “Verification” portion of that form and your signature was notarized on June 20, 1995 indicating that you verified as being true all data entered onto that form. However, you responded “N/A” to Part III, Question #10 which asks that you list all licenses which you or your firm have applied for and been denied and/or any and all licenses issued to you or your firm which were subsequently suspended or revoked. You therefore failed to disclose the revocation of your license with the Florida Division of Real Estate that occurred in 1992. On the same application filed with the State of Illinois, in response to Part III, question 19(m), you did not disclose that a judgment had been entered against you on grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit. The renewal for Hester International Inc., with the State of Illinois, states under the section labeled, “Averment of License” in item “s” that the licensee will advise the Commissioner in writing of any changes to the information submitted on the most recent application for license within 30 days of said change. The State of Illinois reports that you never disclosed the denial of a mortgage broker license in 1996 with the State of Florida . (i) On November 18, 2004 in an electronic filing for corporation reinstatement for Hester International, Inc., you certified that as Registered Agent you maintained an office at 6278 N. Federal Highway, Suite #305 in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. In fact, that address is a mail drop leased to one Carl Thames, CPA. The signage required by Section 48.091(2), Florida Statutes, does not appear, and you and Hester International, Inc. are unknown at this location. In pre-hearing interrogatories, the Office asked Petitioner to provide more information about the transaction involving the transaction that had led to the revocation of his real estate license, including the identity of those individuals. Even though the importance of accuracy was apparent since Petitioner was now in litigation, Petitioner, again, without investigating the facts and relying solely on his improving memory answered the interrogatories posed to him. In his answers, Petitioner identified the “customer” who had collected the money as Leonard Schoenfeld and the “renter” as Johannes Fruhwirt. Petitioner went on, in his answers, to describe the transaction with Mr. Schoenfeld and Mr. Fruhwirt. This description is similar to the explanation offered in the explanatory letters supplied for his earlier applications. In his response to Requests for Admissions, Petitioner denied that in May of 1991 he acted as a real estate broker in the auction of a home located at 14884 Equestrian Way in Wellington, Palm Beach County, Florida, and that he had been unable to deliver a mortgage at an agreed interest rate. Petitioner also denied that he had agreed to pay $3,000 for closing costs as deferred interest payments. Despite these denials, Petitioner admitted that he had signed an agreement to pay $3,000 to Mr. Schoenfeld. Petitioner explained these denials by claiming that these funds were never due because the agreement to pay $3,000 was contingent on closing. Since the real estate deal never closed, the $3,000 was never due. At his July 15, 2005, deposition, Petitioner essentially reaffirmed the inaccurate account of events in his interrogatory answers. At the deposition, Petitioner was asked to review documents related to the Schoenfeld transaction. Those documents included: (1) a copy of the May 14, 1991, agreement wherein he agreed to pay Mr. Schoenfeld $3,000, (2) a handwritten letter wherein he agreed to pay Mr. Schoenfeld the money that he owed him, and (3) a warranty deed on property purchased by Mr. Schoenfeld. When he was shown the May 14, 1991, agreement, Respondent testified that he did not know why he would have agreed to pay Mr. Schoenfeld $3,000. Even when he was shown the deed on the property and even though he had notarized the signatures on that deed, Petitioner maintained that the deal never closed and he never owed the $3000. At hearing, Petitioner’s various and growing explanations during discovery significantly differ from his testimony. Petitioner testified that throughout his various explanations he had confused and combined several individuals into one transaction. Even though he knew that the true facts of these transactions were important to consideration of his application and in answering discovery in this case, Petitioner did not make any real attempt to refresh his memory of these transactions until shortly before the hearing. In fact, the Schoenfeld and Fruhwirt transactions involved different real estate deals and had nothing to do with each other. The Schoenfeld transaction occurred in 1991 and involved the sale of real property located at 14884 Equestrian Way in Wellington, Florida. Mr. Schoenfeld was Petitioner’s customer. As part of the transaction, Petitioner guaranteed he could get a mortgage at a certain rate. After failing to get Mr. Schoenfeld a mortgage at a certain rate, Petitioner agreed to pay Mr. Schoenfeld $3,000 upon closing. When Petitioner failed to pay Mr. Schoenfeld the $3,000 on closing, he asked Mr. Schoenfeld if he could make payments of $200 a month. In a letter to Mr.Schoenfeld, Petitioner confirmed that he would pay Mr. Schoenfeld the amount that was owed. Petitioner made two payments and then stopped making payments. In a letter dated July 1, 1991, Mr. Schoenfeld complained about his dealings with Petitioner to the Division of Real Estate. A few days before Mr. Schoenfeld’s deposition on July 25, 2005, Petitioner paid Mr. Schoenfeld $2,600. Mr. Schoenfeld accepted the payment since the money was still owed to him. However, the payment had been delayed for 14 years and did not include interest for those years. Petitioner testified that he made the payment because, once he remembered the details of the transaction, he felt morally obligated to pay Mr. Schoenfeld what he had promised. However, fulfillment of this obligation also occurred with this litigation pending and after denials that any money was due Mr. Schoenfeld. In short, Petitioner did not pay Mr. Schoenfeld the money that was due him for 14 years until Petitioner was forced to acknowledge the true facts of the Schoenfeld transaction in this litigation. The Fruhwirt transaction involved a man named Mark Ritter who was a client of Petitioner. Mr. Fruhwirt met with Mark Ritter at a house he wanted to rent. Eventually, Mr. Ritter sent him to Petitioner to complete a lease agreement. Mr. Ritter did not know about leases and said Petitioner was a friend whose real estate office could set up the lease contract. Mr. Fruhwirt met Petitioner at his real estate office. Since it was lunchtime, they went to a nearby Burger King to finalize the lease. While at Burger King, Mr. Fruhwirt paid Petitioner $2,850 on the lease. Petitioner’s testified that he did not receive any money from Mr. Fruhwirt and did not accompany Mr. Fruhwirt to Burger King. Petitioner testified that Mr. Ritter and Mr. Fruhwirt met in his lobby and both went to Burger King to finalize the lease arrangement. However, given Petitioner’s past faulty memory, Petitioner’s testimony is not credible. At some point, Mr. Fruhwirt moved into the house. Subsequently, Mr. Fruhwirt received a letter from an attorney representing the real owner demanding that he vacate the premises. Mr. Fruhwirt then discovered that Mr. Ritter was not the owner and had to hire an attorney to sort out his continued occupancy of the property. Eventually Mr. Fruwhirt bought this property. Mr. Fruhwirt sued Petitioner and the real estate office for the recovery of the $2,850 he had paid to rent the house. Petitioner was found liable, but the real estate office was found not liable because the transaction happened off its premises at Burger King. On March 25, 1992, the Broward County Court entered a judgment of $7,800 against Petitioner, finding that Petitioner had “breached his duty to disclose that Mark Ritter was not the owner of the involved property.” After Mr. Fruhwirt obtained the judgment, Petitioner declared bankruptcy. Mr. Fruhwirt pursued an adversary action in Petitioner’s bankruptcy proceedings. Subsequently, the Bankruptcy Court cited “11 U.S.C. 523 A(2) and 11 U.S.C. 523 A(4)” and refused to discharge the judgment debt. The Bankruptcy Court’s Order refusing to discharge the debt clearly conflicts with Dr. Hester’s repeated implications and statements that this debt was discharged in bankruptcy. Unable to collect from Petitioner, Mr. Fruhwirt filed with the Florida Real Estate Recovery Fund. The fund paid $2,850 to Mr. Fruhwirt and suspended Petitioner’s license. Mr. Fruhwirt used the money to defray some of his legal expenses. To date, Petitioner has not paid Mr. Fruhwirt any money on the judgment. The Fruwhirt transaction led to the revocation of Petitioner’s real estate license and, on January 19, 1993, the Florida Real Estate Commission entered a final order revoking Petitioner’s real estate license. Despite Petitioner’s testimony that he never received a copy of the documents, the certificate of service for the final order indicates it was sent to Petitioner at 1101 Hidden Cove, Salem, SC 29676, which was the address where Petitioner was living at that time. Again, Petitioner’s testimony is not credible. The Final Order referenced a December 8, 1992, agreement in which Petitioner agreed that his license would be revoked. In the December 8, 1992 agreement, entitled “Affidavit for the Voluntary Surrender of License, Registration, Certificate/Permit for Revocation,” signed by Petitioner, he agreed to the revocation of his license and to not apply for a new real estate license for ten years from the effective date of revocation. In particular, the December 8, 1992 agreement stated, “[t]he effective date of the revocation shall be upon signing this document.” Notwithstanding the clear language revoking the license, at the hearing, Petitioner maintained that because he had voluntarily surrendered his license, he did not believe his license had been revoked. In referring to the agreement he had signed, he testified that the agreement said, “that my license will be inactive, not revoked” and denied ever seeing the other documents revoking his license. This testimony is simply not credible and demonstrates Petitioner’s propensity to see or remember things in a way that is more flattering to him, irrespective of reality. The affidavit signed by Petitioner clearly stated that Petitioner’s license would be and was revoked upon signing. In 1995, Hester International applied to operate as a residential mortgage licensee in Illinois. The application identified Petitioner as the vice president and Sharon Hester as the president. Page one of the application indicated the application had to be executed “by two officers or all directors if the applicant/licensee is a corporation.” The application was signed by Petitioner and his wife. Petitioner did not disclose to Illinois that a judgment had been entered against him in Florida or that his real estate license had been revoked or suspended. Question 10 in Part III of the Application asked: “LIST ALL LICENSES WHICH YOU OR YOUR FIRM HAVE APPLIED FOR AND BEEN DENIED AND/OR ANY AND ALL LICENSES ISSUED TO YOU OR YOUR FIRM WHICH WERE SUBSEQUENTLY SUSPENDED OR REVOKED.” Petitioner responded “N/A.” (Id.). Question 19(m) in Part III of the Application asked: UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY, I(WE) STATE THAT ALL OF THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY (OUR) KNOWLEDGE AND FURTHER STATE THAT AS THE APPLICANT/LICENSEE: . . . (m) Has not committed a crime against the law of this State, any other state or the United States, involving moral turpitude, fraudulent or dishonest dealing, and that no final judgment has been entered against it in a civil action upon grounds of fraud, misrepresentation or deceit which has not previously been reported to the Commissioner. The evidence did not demonstrate that the emphasized clauses in question 10 or the “I(WE)” in 19(m) direct such questions to individuals signing the application. One reasonable interpretation of the language is that the questions are directed to the business entity applying for the license. In short, the I(WE) language is simply language in a form meant to cover multiple types of business entities ranging from sale proprietorships to corporations. Therefore, Petitioner was not required by Illinois to disclose matters which involved him personally. To date, Illinois has not filed any disciplinary action against Petitioner or Hester International. Thus, the failure to disclose personal judgments or license actions to Illinois in a corporate application for licensure does not support a finding of dishonesty or denial of Respondent’s application at issue here. At some point, Hester International’s corporate status had to be reinstated in Florida. Petitioner reinstated the company’s corporate status in November of 2004. Petitioner filed as registered agent at 6278 North Federal Highway #305, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Petitioner had not lived at this address for some 15 years, but had lived there for seven years with his girlfriend. The evidence showed that Petitioner simply forgot to change the registered agent’s address and was not acting dishonestly. Once he discovered his mistake, Petitioner amended his filing to reflect the appropriate address. Again, these facts do not form a basis to deny Petitioner’s license application. Finally, Petitioner testified that until Spring 2005, he and his wife were 50/50 owners of Hester International, Inc., as reflected on the application and license renewals in Illinois. In September 2004, Ms. Hester submitted Hester International, Inc.’s application for Florida licensure as a mortgage broker business. The Hester International business application was submitted after the Office had denied Petitioner’s license application in 1996 and was scrutinizing his July 2004 application. In the application, Ms. Hester identified herself as 100 percent owner of the Hester International. Petitioner did review this application, but he intentionally did not take part in its filing. The purported change in ownership was not adequately explained at hearing and appears to have been done in order to forestall any problems with licensure of the corporation due to Petitioner’s participation in the corporation. While the change of ownership is troubling, given Petitioner’s history, and also adds to the evidence that Petitioner is less than forthright in his memory and past business dealings, the change of ownership for the corporation’s licensure application does not, by itself, support a denial of Petitioner’s application. On the other hand, too many inconsistencies exist between Petitioner’s hearing testimony and his earlier accounts to conclude that Respondent can be trusted to hold a mortgage brokerage license. At worst, the evidence shows that Petitioner is not truthful or acts with integrity. At best, the evidence shows that Respondent has the ability to convince himself of facts that do not quite fit the truth, but are more flattering to him. Under either scenario, Petitioner’s appreciation of honesty, truthfulness and integrity are suspect. Neither Petitioner’s letters supporting his good character, nor his success in his ministry demonstrates sufficient rehabilitation to overcome what appears to be long-time evasive behavior. Therefore, Petitioner’s application for licensure as a mortgage broker should be denied.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: A Final Order be entered denying Petitioner’s application for licensure as a mortgage broker. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of November, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of November, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: C. Scott Hester, Esquire 13843 Longs Landing Road East Jacksonville, Florida 32225 Robert H. Schott, Esquire Gregg Morton, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Fletcher Building, Suite 526 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0376 Carlos G. Muniz, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue At issue herein is whether respondents' real estate licenses should be disciplined for-the alleged violations set forth in the administrative complaint. Based upon all of the evidence, the following facts are determined:
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Juan Rios, was a licensed real estate broker having been issued license number 0155126 by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate. Respondent, Victoria R. Rios, is a licensed real estate broker-salesman having been issued license number 0331183 by petitioner. The Rios are husband and wife and presently reside at 855 80th Street, #1, Miami Beach, Florida. On December 13, 1982, Juan Rios obtained a six-month multiple listing agreement to sell a house located in Hacienda Estates at 11451 S.W. 33rd Lane, Miami, Florida. The agreement was executed by Rios "As Realtor" and by the property owner, Mercedes Garcia. At Mercedes' request, the Rios placed an initial sales price of $145,000 on the home. On December 15, a similar agreement was executed by Rios and Garcia on condominium unit 9B, Laguna Club Condominium, 10710 N. W. 7th Street, Miami, Florida. That property was also owned by Garcia. Although the agreement introduced into evidence does not contain Rios' signature, at final hearing Juan Rios acknowledged that he had executed such an agreement. The listing agreements provided that if the properties were leased during the term of the agreements, the listing realtor would receive a brokerage fee of 10% for such leasing. The agreement also provided that the realtors were not responsible for vandalism, theft or damage of any nature to the property. Garcia is a native and resident of Venezuela, where she owns a radio station. The two properties in question were previously owned by her father. When the father died, apparently sometime in 1982, Mercedes inherited the house and condominium. The Rios were friends of the father, and agreed to list and manage the properties as a favor to the deceased. Mercedes left the country after the agreements were signed, and has apparently not returned. Although she is the complainant who initiated this matter, she did not appear at final hearing. The house at 11451 S. W. 33rd Lane had been vandalized prior to the listing agreement being signed. According to documents introduced into evidence, the property has also been the subject of subsequent vandalisms, the nature and extent of which are unknown. A tenant was eventually procured by Mercedes' aunt in February, 1983 at a monthly rate of $800. The tenant, a Mrs. Ramirez, paid some $4,800 in rents and deposits before she was killed at the home in June, 1983. The Rios spent some $2,644.36 of the $4,800 on repairs to the vandalism and for general maintenance. They also retained a 10% commission for their services, or $480. That left $1,675.64 owed to Mercedes. No lease was apparently ever signed by Ramirez, or at least none was given to the Rios by the relative who procured the tenant. The home was eventually sold to Mercedes' aunt for $85,000.1 None of the rental monies were placed in the Rios' trust account. The condominium unit was rented in June, 1983. The tenant, Oscar Ruiz, had answered an advertisement run by the Rios in a local newspaper. Although Ruiz executed a lease to rent the unit at a monthly rate of $500, the Rios did not have a copy of same, and claimed none was kept in their records. According to the Rios, Ruiz continued to rent the unit through April, 1984, or for eleven months. Total monies collected by the Rios from Ruiz, including a $500 security deposit, were $6,000, of which $3,364.86 was spent for maintenance, utilities, two mortgage payments, and a $500 payment to the owner (Mercedes). An additional $40.33 was spent on a plumbing bill, and $600 was retained as a commission by the Rios. This left $2,724.53 owed to Mercedes. None of the rental monies were placed in the Rios' trust account. In the spring of 1984, Mercedes retained the services of an attorney in Miami to seek her monies due from the Rios. Up to then, she had received no income or accounting on the two properties. The attorney wrote the Rios on several occasions beginning in April 1984, asking for a copy of the lease on the condominium unit, the security deposit, an accounting of the funds, and all other documents relating to the two, properties. He received his first reply from the Rios on May 3, 1984 who advised him that they had attempted to reach Mercedes by telephone on numerous occasions but that she would never return their calls. They explained that rental proceeds had been used to repair vandalism damage and structural defects. When the attorney did not receive the satisfaction that he desired, he filed a civil action against the Rios on October 10, 1984. On October 26, 1984 the Rios sent Mercedes a letter containing an accounting on the two properties reflecting that she was owed $4,400.17 by the Rios. To pay this, they sent a $140 "official check," and a promissory note for the balance to be paid off in 40 monthly installments at 10% interest. They explained that their real estate business had closed, and due to financial problems, they were unable to pay off the monies due any sooner. They also asked that she instruct her attorney to drop the suit. Mercedes rejected this offer and has continued to pursue the civil action. It is still pending in Dade County Circuit Court. At final hearing, the Rios characterized their involvement with Mercedes as a "professional mistake," and one undertaken out of friendship for Mercedes' father. They acknowledged they did not use a trust account on the transactions and that they had used the $4,400 in rental money due Mercedes for their own use. They considered the excess rent proceeds to be compensation for other "services" performed by them on behalf of Mercedes. However, there is no evidence of any such agreement between the parties reflecting that understanding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is Recommended that Juan and Victoria Rios be found guilty as charged in Counts II and III, and be found guilty of culpable negligence and breach of trust in Count I. It is further recommended that Juan Rios' license be suspended for one year and that Victoria Rios' license be suspended for three months. DONE and ORDERED this 20th day of January, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of January, 1986
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto Respondent Marvin M. Kornicki has been a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued License Nos. 0265344 and 0252335. The last license issued was as a broker for Waterway Properties, Inc., t/a Waterway Properties. At all times material hereto, Respondent Waterway Properties, Inc., t/a Waterway Properties, has been a corporation registered as a real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued License No. 0265344. At all times material hereto, Respondent Kornicki was licensed and operating as the qualifying broker and an officer of Respondent Waterway Properties, Inc. On January 7, 1990, Respondents solicited and obtained an offer in the amount of $155,000 from Alda Tedeschi and John Tocchio, buyers, to purchase real property, to-wit: Unit 422 at Mariner Village Garden Condominium, Aventura, Florida, from Arthur Goldstein and Myra Goldstein, sellers. The buyers' offer reflected a $1,000 deposit to be held in trust by the Respondent Waterway Properties, Inc. The offer reflected that if the offer was not executed by and delivered to all parties, or fact of execution communicated in writing between the parties, on or before January 10, 1990, the deposit would be returned to the buyers and the offer would be withdrawn. The offer also reflected that "time is of the essence." On January 8, 1990, Respondents sent the buyers' offer to the sellers in New Jersey by air express. On January 10, 1990, the sellers signed the offer but made it a counteroffer by requiring the buyers to furnish an additional deposit of $14,500 by January 12, 1990, and requiring the buyers to sign a condominium rider and an agency disclosure form. The sellers returned the counteroffer with condominium rider and agency disclosure form to the Respondents. On January 12, 1990, Respondents sent the counteroffer, condominium rider, and agency disclosure form, together with a letter dated January 11, 1990, to the buyers for the buyers' initials and signatures. Although the buyers could not have received the counteroffer until after its expiration date, they advised Respondents by telephone that they had in fact initialed the counteroffer and mailed it back to Respondents. Respondents never received from the buyers that accepted counteroffer. The buyers subsequently verbally demanded the return of their $1,000 deposit, but Respondents wrote to the buyers on February 9, 1990, advising the buyers that they were in default. On February 8, 1990, Respondents had already disbursed the $1,000 deposit to Respondents' operating account since the sellers had told the Respondents to use the deposit to cover the costs incurred advertising the sellers' property. Since he was uncertain as to whether he had "conflicting demands upon an escrow deposit" Respondent Kornicki telephoned the Florida Real Estate Commission and discussed the matter with one of the Commission's attorneys. Because Respondent Kornicki believed that the buyers were "in default," Respondents failed to notify the Florida Real Estate Commission in writing that they had received conflicting demands. No explanation was offered as to why Respondent Kornicki believed the buyers were in default when the counteroffer could not have been signed by the buyers prior to its expiration and when Respondent Kornicki had never seen a fully executed document. Further, no explanation was offered as to why the sellers believed they were entitled to the money. Since that transaction, Respondents have experienced other transactions where conflicting demands were made. In those subsequent instances, they have timely notified the Florida Real Estate Commission in writing as to those conflicting demands. On June 18, 1990, Petitioner's investigator conducted an office inspection and escrow/trust account audit of Respondents' office and escrow/trust account. That audit revealed that Respondents wrote a trust account check on September 1, 1989, in the amount of $369.15, which was returned on October 3, 1989, for insufficient funds. A second trust account check in the amount of $800 was also returned for insufficient funds on October 3, 1989. Respondents had received rental monies from a tenant by check. Respondents had written checks out of those monies for the mortgage payment on the rental property, not knowing that the tenant's check would fail to clear. The worthless check written by the tenant caused these checks written by Respondents to be returned for insufficient funds. Respondents have changed their office policies so that they no longer accept checks from tenants except before tenants move into rental properties and the checks must clear before the tenants are allowed to take possession of the leased premises.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered: Finding Respondent Kornicki guilty of Counts I, III, V, VII, IX, and Finding Respondent Waterway Properties, Inc., guilty of Counts II, IV, VI, VIII, X, and XII; Dismissing Counts XIII and XIV; Ordering Respondent Marvin M. Kornicki to pay a fine of $1,000 to the Division of Real Estate within 60 days and revoking Respondents' licenses should such fine not be timely paid; Placing Respondents on probation for a period of one year if the fine is timely paid; Requiring Respondent Kornicki to complete and provide satisfactory evidence of having completed 60 hours of approved real estate post-licensure education for brokers, 30 hours of which shall include the real estate broker management course, during the probationary period; Establishing terms for the probationary period except that such probationary terms shall not require Respondent Kornicki to retake any state licensure examinations and Requiring Respondent Kornicki to appear before the Commission at the last meeting of the Commission preceding the termination of Respondents' probation. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 13th day of February, 1991. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of February, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 90-5863 Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 1 has been rejected as not constituting a finding of fact but rather as constituting a conclusion of law. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 2-4, 6-14, and 16-19 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 5 has been rejected as being unnecessary for determination of the issues herein. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 15 has been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the credible evidence in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Jack McCray, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Legal Division 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 James H. Gillis, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Marvin M. Kornicki Waterway Properties, Inc. 16560 Biscayne Boulevard North Miami Beach, Florida 33160
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made. At all times pertinent hereto, Respondent has been licensed in the State of Florida as a limited surety agent (bail bondsman), a life and health agent and a general lines agent. Respondent has been licensed as an insurance agent for more than eleven years. He has been a licensed limited surety agent for more than ten years. Pursuant to Section 648.442(3), Florida Statutes, all collateral received by Respondent or others acting under his supervision or control in transactions under his surety agent license constituted trust funds received in a fiduciary capacity. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent has been doing business as Protective Insurance Center, Jenkins Bail Bonds. Until early February of 1991, Respondent's general agent was Banker's Insurance Company. However, in early February, Respondent's relationship with that company was terminated. Respondent's current general agent is American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida. Russell Faibish, Respondent's general agent with American Bankers since February of 1991, has expressed via affidavit that Respondent is in good standing with that company and the company has been satisfied with his performance to date. On January 25, 1991, Respondent, while acting in his capacity as a limited surety agent for Banker's Insurance Company, posted a surety bond, No. 339658, (the "Bond") in the amount of $752.00 to obtain the release of Kim Reinhold Whitford from custody in Clay County, Florida. In connection with the posting of the Bond, Respondent received from Earnest R. Justice (the "Indemnitor") a $75.00 premium payment and a $350.00 cash collateral payment. At the time the Indemnitor arranged with Respondent for the issuance of the bond, the Indemnitor was advised that his collateral would be returned within twenty one days of the receipt of written notice of the discharge of the bond. Respondent was provided with a notice from the Clerk of Court that Ms. Whitford was scheduled for a court appearance on April 3, 1991 for a "plea." Respondent never made any inquiry as to the results of that April 3, 1991 hearing. On April 3, 1991, the Bond was discharged and the obligation of the surety, Banker's Insurance Company, was released in writing by the County Court of Clay County, Florida. Respondent contends that he never received notification of the discharge of the Bond. While the Court document indicates that a notice of the discharge of the Bond was sent to Respondent at the time the requirements for the discharge were satisfied on or about April 3, 1991, no conclusive evidence was presented to establish that the notice of discharge was actually sent to or received by Respondent. Respondent denies ever receiving that document. After Ms. Whitford was released from jail, the Indemnitor contacted Respondent's office several times in April and May of 1991 trying to arrange the return of his collateral. Respondent denies receiving any messages from the Indemnitor. The failure to receive the messages may have been due to office staff turnover. In any event, the evidence was sufficient to establish that the Indemnitor attempted to arrange for the return of his collateral on numerous occasions without success. On August 9, 1991, the Petitioner filed the Administrative Complaint which is the basis for this proceeding against Respondent alleging that he failed to return the Indemnitor's collateral. Upon receipt of the Administrative Complaint, Respondent contacted the Clerk of Court, in Clay County, Florida to determine the status of the bond. On August 30, 1991, the Clerk of Court, Clay County, Florida, sent Respondent a certified copy of the bond discharge. Respondent claims that he first became aware of the discharge of the Bond and the Indemnitor's right to the return of the collateral when he received the August 30 certification from Clay County. Because an Administrative Complaint had already been filed, Respondent did not immediately refund the collateral for fear that such action could be construed as an attempt to influence a witness in the case. In order to avoid the appearance of attempting to influence a witness, Respondent waited until the day of the hearing to arrange to make a refund of the collateral available to the Indemnitor. On January 14, 1992, Respondent sent a Western Union Money Transfer, control no. 7395574746, payable to the Indemnitor in the amount of $350.00 as return of the collateral. Although the Indemnitor did not receive the return of his collateral until approximately eight to nine months after it was due, the collateral was ultimately returned and there is no other evidence in this case of any other financial loss to any member of the public. On average, Respondent has between 100 to 150 active bond cases per month. Most of those bonds are written in Palm Beach County, where Respondent's business is located. In this case, Respondent arranged for a "teletype bond" whereby the arrangements for the bond were made in Palm Beach County and notification of the posting of the bond and authorization for the release of the prisoner were transmitted via teletype to Clay County. Respondent contends that he reviews his active cases on a quarterly basis to confirm the status of the bonds. Nevertheless, it took almost six months for Respondent to determine that the requirements of the Bond in this case had been fully satisfied. No justifiable excuse was given for this delay. However, in mitigation, it does appear that the long distance nature of the transaction, the change in Respondent's general agent and office staff turnover all contributed to the delay in refunding the Indemnitor's collateral. Respondent has had three Administrative Complaints filed against him since 1985. The first Administrative Complaint was filed on June 26, 1985 and alleged that Respondent failed to provide required documentation of his assets to the Department. Pursuant to a Consent Order entered on August 6, 1985, Respondent was fined $200 and placed on probation for one year as a result of this charge. The most serious and pertinent prior administrative proceeding against Respondent was commenced by an Administrative Complaint dated November 17, 1987. That complaint alleged, among other things, that Respondent failed to return collateral to at least two clients. In April of 1989, the parties entered into a settlement stipulation regarding these charges pursuant to which Respondent was suspended for one year and fined $1,000.00. He was also required to make resitution to several individuals who had not been identified in the Administrative Complaint in that case. No explanation has been provided regarding the "restitution" required to be made to those individuals. The third case involved an Emergency Suspension Order entered on March 16, 1988. That Order was dissolved on September 20, 1988 when the underlying criminal charges were nolle prosequi. Respondent has had several IRS liens filed against him and there is currently a foreclosure action pending against his house. However, no specific information was provided regarding the status of those cases. Respondent contends that he is vigorously contesting all of those matters and he believes they will be favorably resolved. The evidence in this case suggests that Respondent is currently involved in disputes with some other customers regarding the return of collateral. The evidence did not establish the exact number or the facts surrounding those disputes. Respondent contends that all of those disputes are related to problems with or caused by his prior General Agent. No conclusions as to the merits of those complaints can be drawn from the evidence presented in this case. Gerald Michael Sandy, a licensed bondsman in the State of Florida and the current president of the Florida Surety Agents Association, testified on behalf of the Respondent in this matter. He indicated that on approximately 40% of the bonds that are executed, the Courts do not provide written notice of the discharge. However, Mr. Sandy conceded that even if written notification from a court is not received, the bail bondsman is primarily responsible for determining whether a bond has been discharged and a bail bondsman must immediately respond to the inquiries of an indemnitor regarding the return of collateral.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered suspending Respondent's licenses for three months, placing him on probation for two years and assessing an administrative fine in the amount of $500. RECOMMENDED this 9th day of March, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of March, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 91-6302 Both parties have submitted Proposed Recommended Orders. The following constitutes my rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. 1. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. 2. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. 3. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 2. 4. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 3. Findings of Fact 5. 7. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5. 8. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 7. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in Subordinate to Findings of Fact 13 and 14 and addressed in the Preliminary Statement. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 6 and 10. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 8. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 18. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 19. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 20. The Respondents's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. 1. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5. 2. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5. 3. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 7. 4. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 10. 5. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 11. 6. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 11. 7. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 12. 8. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 14. 9. Addressed in the Preliminary Statement. 10a. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 10. 10b. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 9. 10c. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 10. 10d. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 10. 10e. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 13. 10f. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 13. 10e.[sic] Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 17. 10f.[sic] Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 16. 10g. Rejected as unnecesdsary. 11a. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 21. 11b. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 21. 11c. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 21. 12. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 4. COPIES FURNISHED: David D. Hershel, Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasury Larson Building, Room 412 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Franklin Prince, Esquire Northbridge Centre, Suite 300-P 515 N. Flagler Drive West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil Deputy General Counsel Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated to facts set forth in paragraphs 1-8, below. Stipulated Facts The Petitioner is the Division of Real Estate of the Department of Professional Regulation. As such, Petitioner acts as the licensing and regulatory agency for real estate broker licensees. The Respondent is Harriet M. Arndt, holder, at all times pertinent to these proceedings, of license number 0002216 issued by Petitioner. Her address of record is One South Ocean Boulevard, Suite 322, Boca Raton, Florida 33431. On January 28, 1987, Respondent received in trust an earnest money deposit in the amount of $39,000 from a buyer for a piece of property listed with another realtor, Merrill Lynch Realty, Inc. At closing of the sales transaction on February 25, 1987, Respondent delivered a check drawn on her trust account in the amount of $15,600 and made payable to Merrill Lynch Realty, Inc. This payment represented payment of one half of the $31,200 real estate brokerage commission. The check was subsequently returned to Merrill Lynch Realty, Inc. due to "non-sufficient funds." On March 27, 1987, Respondent delivered a cashier's check in the amount of $15,600 to Merrill Lynch Realty, Inc., to replace the February 25, 1987, check. The Respondent's real estate brokerage trust account was overdrawn from January 8, 1987 through March 4, 1987, by amounts ranging from $12,991.39 to $14,306.53 on various days during that period. The Respondent failed to maintain the $39,500 earnest money deposit in her trust account from February 2, 1987 until February 25, 1987, because the trust account's daily balance was less than that amount during that period. The Respondent subsequently failed to maintain the $15,660 due to Merrill Lynch Realty Inc., in the trust account from February 25, 1987, through March 25, 1987, because the trust account's daily balance was less than $15,600. From March 19, 1987, through October 29, 1987, Petitioner's investigator requested Respondent to produce for inspection and copying those books and papers relating to Respondent's trust account which are maintained in connection with Respondent's real estate activities. The Respondent failed to make the requested trust account books and records available at any time. Other Facts The Respondent offered mitigating testimony establishing that she was initially licensed in 1978 and has never been censured by Petitioner for any professional violations. She is 57 years of age and her real estate license is her sole source of support. Further, Respondent has borrowed money from her children to make up the deficit in her trust account. The testimony of Respondent also established that she was introduced to a gentleman named Robert H. Lajoie by another realtor in December of 1986. Subsequently, on or about December 8, 1986, Respondent entered into a nefarious arrangement with Lajoie. Under terms of the arrangement, Lajoie gave Respondent a check for $25,500 as a deposit to purchase a property listed with Respondent. In turn, Respondent gave Lajoie back a cash deposit of $10,000 from her trust fund in connection with a contract between the two of them whereby Respondent was to purchase a property of Lajoie's. The closing of the sale of Lajoie's property to Respondent would not take place until May, 1987. Lajoie returned to his native Canada shortly after receiving the $10,000 cash payment from Respondent and died. Shortly thereafter, payment on Lajoie's $25,500 check to Respondent was stopped. The Respondent is not sure whether this action was taken by Lajoie prior to his death or by his estate subsequent to that event. It is Respondent's contention that the loss of the $10,000 cash deposit to Lajoie resulted in a negative net balance in her trust account and eventually all of her financial difficulties in this case. The Respondent was sent an overdraft notice by her bank on January 8, 1987, stating that her trust account was overdrawn by $13,500 and that a check for $25,500 had been returned. Subsequent overdraft notices dated January 13, 1987 and January 21, 1987, were received by Respondent noting the rejection of two of Respondent's checks; one in the amount of $294.90 and the other in the amount of $34.35. The notice of January 13, 1987, indicated a hold on the account in the amount of $2,862.94 against the account's balance of $3,006.19. The January 21, 1987, notice continued this hold on the account's balance of $2,891.45. The Respondent related a series of personal matters at hearing that had prevented her from keeping appointments with Petitioner's investigators to inspect her records. She agreed to make access to those records immediately available.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding Respondent guilty of the offenses charged in the administrative complaint, imposing an administrative fine of $1,000 and suspending her license for a period of six months. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of July, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-1472 The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1-2. Included in finding 1. 3-8. Included in findings 3-8 respectively. Respondent's Proposed Findings 1. Included in finding 2. 2-5. Included finding 10. Included in finding 3. Included in finding 4, 5, and 10. Included in finding 8 and 12. 9-10. Rejected. 11. Included in finding 9. COPIES FURNISHED: Steve W. Johnson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Robert E. Gordon, Esquire 2601 Tenth Avenue North Suite 314 Lake Worth, Florida 33461-3197 William O'Neil, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Darlene F. Keller, Acting Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
Findings Of Fact Louis W. George has been registered as a real estate broker in Florida for seven years; he holds license No. 0030981. At all pertinent times, he has done business as Apollo Realty of Miami, and has been, in addition, co-owner with Allen Scherer of Karma Properties, Inc. In an effort to sell a house he owned at 1105 Sharazad Boulevard in Opa locka, Florida, John F. German placed a classified advertisement in a newspaper. Seeing the ad, respondent George telephoned Mr. German and offered his services as a real estate broker. As a result, Mr. German eventually signed an agreement listing the house with Apollo Realty of Miami for 90 days, which elapsed without a sale, in late 1978 or early 1979. In June of 1979, Mr. German again visited respondent, telling him he would let the property go for $25,000. The following day respondent telephoned Mr. German to say, "I'll take it," to which Mr. German replied, "That was yesterday." Later in the telephone conversation, however, Messrs. George and German agreed on a price of $25,000. On June 29, 1979, respondent presented Mr. German with a form "Deposit Receipt." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. Mr. German lined through $23,500, substituted $25,000, initialled the alteration, and signed the document. Respondent had already signed. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2 recites: Receipt is hereby acknowledged of the sum of . . .$500.00. . .from KARMA PROPERTIES, INC. proceeds to be held in escrow by APOLLO REALTY OF MIAMI subject to the terms hereof. . . This offer is subject to obtaining an FHA commitment of not less than $35,000.00 if commitment is less than-the above $35,000.00 this offer will be null and void . . . [I]n case of default by the purchaser. . .the seller may at his option retain one-half of the deposit herein paid as consideration for the release of the purchaser. . . These written provisions notwithstanding, respondent told Mr. German that he would give the $500 deposit to his attorney, rather than place it in Apollo Realty's escrow account. The deal fell through. On November 19, 1979, Albert I. Caskill, Esquire, wrote Apollo Realty of Miami, on behalf of Mr. German: Demand is herewith made upon you for the $500 deposit being held in your escrow account in relation to the above-referenced transaction. We have been notified by the attorney for the purchasers, Lawrence M. Weiner, that his clients will not be going forward with the purchase, and, accordingly, their failure to complete the transaction pursuant to the contract constitutes a breach of the agreement. Please forward all deposit moneys to this office, same being made payable to the seller, John German. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. The house was off the market from June until the end of November. Mr. German never received any money on account of the transaction. (He did not even get the keys back.) Respondent never deposited any money anywhere on account of this transaction, nor did he pay Mr. German any money directly. He testified that he instructed Allen Scherer, the other principal in Karma Properties, Inc., to deposit $500 with Lawrence Weiner, Esquire; that he read Mr. Caskill's letter of November 19, 1979, and passed it on to Mr. Scherer with instructions to "correct" (T. 36) the situation; but only learned that there was no money in escrow when he received the administrative complaint with which these proceedings began. In these particulars, respondent's testimony has not been credited. The parties stipulated that Mr. Weiner would testify, under oath, that he "never held or received any money in connection with the subject transaction." Petitioner filed a proposed recommended order which has been reviewed and considered. The proposed findings of fact have been adopted in substance for the most part. Proposed findings of fact not adopted have been rejected as immaterial or as inconsistent with the weight of the evidence.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner reprimand respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Joel S. Fass, Esquire 626 Northeast 124 Street North Miami, Florida 33161 Adam Kurlander, Esquire 1820 Northeast 163 Street North Miami Beach, Florida 33162 Samuel R. Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Carlos B. Stafford Executive Director Board of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent is guilty of failing to keep money entrusted to her by a person dealing with her as a broker in her escrow account until properly authorized to disburse those funds. Whether Respondent is guilty of misrepresentation, false promises, culpable negligence, breach of trust in a business transaction and violation of a duty imposed by law and under the terms of a real estate contract by failing to advise, inquire, or otherwise obtain proper authorization from the Buyers prior to disbursing $10,000 from her escrow account, which funds had been entrusted to her by the Buyers under the terms of a real estate contract. At the final hearing in this cause, Petitioner called John Maxwell, Judith Maxwell, Janet Johnson, and Albert M. Johnson as its witnesses. Petitioner offered Petitioner's Exhibits 1 through 7, which were received into evidence. Respondent testified in her own behalf and called Charles R. Frost as a witness. Respondent offered Respondent's Exhibits 1 through 3, which were received into evidence. Both Petitioner and Respondent have offered proposed findings of fact for consideration by the Hearing Officer. To the extent that those proposed findings of fact are not included in this Recommended Order, they have been specifically rejected as being either irrelevant to the issues involved in this cause, or as having been unsupported by the evidence of record.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent was a registered and licensed real estate broker, having been issued license No. 0029188. On August 21, 1981, John A. and Judith E. Maxwell ("Buyers") entered into a contract for the purchase of a home located at 2017 Howard Drive, in Orlando, Florida, owned by Albert M. and Janet T. Johnson ("Sellers"). The Contract for Sale and Purchase was accepted by the Sellers on August 22, 1981. Under the terms of the contract, the Buyers paid a $500 deposit to Respondent's escrow account, and paid an additional $9,500 into Respondent's escrow account upon acceptance of the contract by the Sellers. Paragraph 9 of the Contract for Sale and Purchase under the heading "Special Clauses," provided, in part, as follows: This offer is subject to Buyers selling their home in Austin, Texas, within twelve months from date of this executed contract. Buyer will close on this property upon closing of that property. Buyer will pay a monthly rent to the Seller at $500 per month until closing, and apy[sic] utility bills dur- ing that time. Buyer will occupy premises upon execution of this contract. . . In addition, under the heading STANDARDS FOR REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS, the contract provided as follows: DEFAULT BY BUYER: If the Buyer fails to perform any covenants of this con- tract within the time specified, the deposit this date paid by the Buyer aforesaid may be retained by or for the account of the Seller as consideration for the execution of this contract and in full settlement of any claims for damages and all parties shall be relieved of all obligations under this con- tract, and each party shall execute a separate release of the other party at this time; or the Seller, at his option, may proceed at law or in equity to enforce his legal rights under this contract, including, but not limited to, the right to bring a suit for specific performance. DEFAULT BY SELLER: If the Seller fails to perform any of the covenants of this contract other than the failure of the Seller to render his title marketable after diligent effort, the aforesaid deposit shall at the option of the Buyer be returned to the Buyer on demand and all parties shall execute a release of the other party of their rights and obligations under this contract; the Buyer, however, at his option may proceed in law or equity to enforce his legal rights under this contract, including, but not limited to, the right of specific performance. OTHER AGREEMENTS: No agreements or representations, unless incorporated in this contract shall be binding upon any of the parties. APPLICATION OF DEPOSIT ON DEFAULT: In the event Buyer fails to perform and the deposit aforesaid is retained, the amount of such deposit shall be divided equally between the Realtor and the Seller; provided, however, that the amount to be retained or received by the Realtor shall not exceed the full amount of the commission and any excess shall be paid to the Seller. If the trans- action shall not be closed because of the failure of the Seller to perform, then Seller shall pay said commission in full to the Realtor on demand. The Sellers were in immediate need of cash and, unknown to the Buyers, advised Respondent that they required that any down payment received pursuant to the contract be disbursed immediately to them. Before the Sellers accepted the contract submitted by the Buyers they received an assurance from Respondent that Respondent had fully informed the Buyers that the money was to be paid to the Sellers upon acceptance of the contract. The Sellers made it clear to Respondent that they could not wait for the closing of Buyers' home in Texas to receive the money. Respondent told Sellers that the Buyers were aware that the money was to go to them and that it was nonrefundable. Notwithstanding Respondent's representation to the Sellers, the Respondent, in fact, never informed the Buyers that the Sellers were expecting the money paid upon execution of the contract to be paid over to them immediately. Further, Respondent never advised the Buyers that either the $500 deposit or the $9,500 payments required by the contract would be nonrefundable absent a total default on the contract. The Buyers never had any direct conversations with the Sellers and, accordingly, were never advised by them that the Sellers expected to immediately receive the moneys paid by Buyers upon execution of the contract. The contract was prepared by Respondent's husband. The only parties present during the preparation of the contract were Respondent, her husband, and the Buyers. At no time during the preparation of the contract was the Sellers' financial condition discussed, nor the fact that the Sellers were immediately in need of the moneys deposited by the Buyers with Respondent. As required by the contract, the Buyers paid the $500 deposit to Respondent on August 21, 1981. On August 24, 1981, upon acceptance of the contract by the Sellers, an additional payment of $9,500 was made to Respondent. This latter sum was paid by check from the Buyers made payable to Respondent's escrow account at the request of Respondent. On August 25, 1981, Respondent disbursed $7,000 to the Sellers and $2,000 to herself as partial payment of her real estate commission. Respondent did not obtain the Buyers' authorization or permission to disburse either the $500 deposit or the $9,500 payment. It was not until the middle of September, 1981, that the Buyers learned that the $10,000 paid by them had been disbursed by Respondent. At that time the Buyers called Respondent to request that the total payment of $10,000 be placed in an interest-bearing account. When this request was made, Respondent at first advised the Buyers that she would not tell them where the money was, but the Buyers were later informed by Respondent's husband that the funds had been disbursed to the Sellers. The Buyers immediately requested that the funds be returned to Respondent's escrow account, but, as of the date of final hearing in this cause, none of the funds had been redeposited in that account.
The Issue Whether or not Respondents' Florida real estate licenses should be disciplined for violation of Section 475.25(1)(b) F.S., by dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in any business transaction; Section 475.25(1)(d)1. F.S., failure to account for or deliver funds; Section 475.25(1)(k) F.S., failure to maintain trust funds in their real estate brokerage escrow bank account or some other proper depository until disbursement thereof was properly authorized; and Section 475.25(1)(e) and Rule 61J2-10.032(1) F.A.C. for failure to provide written notification to the Real Estate Commission upon receiving conflicting demands within 15 business days of the last party's demand or upon a good faith doubt as to who is entitled to any trust funds held in the broker's escrow account and failure to institute one of the settlement procedures as set forth in Section 475.25(1)(d)1., F.S. within 15 business days after the date the notification was received by the Division.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular, Section 20.165, F.S., Chapters 120, 455, and 475, F.S. and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. The Respondent Norman Rivers, Jr. is and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker, issued license number 0189212 in the accordance with Chapter 475, F.S. The last license issued was as a broker c/o Route 1, Box 344, Alachua, Florida 32615. Respondent Norman Rivers Jr., Realty, Inc. is and was at all times material hereto a corporation registered as a Florida real estate broker having been issued license number 0214407 in accordance with Chapter 475, F.S. The last license issued was at the address of Route 1, Box 344, Alachua, Florida 32615. At all times material hereto, Respondent Norman Rivers, Jr. was licensed and operating as qualifying broker and officer of Respondent Norman Rivers Jr., Realty, Inc. On December 5, 1994, Respondent showed Charles E. and Elizabeth A. Smith (husband and wife) a tract of land located in Dixie County, Florida. Afterward, Respondent Norman Rivers, Jr. sent a $57,500 offer to Charles E. Smith for his signature. On December 7, 1994, Mr. Smith signed the offer and forwarded it with a $2,875 deposit to the Respondents. The next day, the Seller, Ed Dix, accepted the Smiths' offer. The contract provided that if the deal did not close on December 23, 1994, "...if the said Buyer fails to perform the covenants herein contained within the time specified, therefore said deposit made by the Buyer may be forfeited at the option of the Seller, as liquidated damages, upon 10 days' notice to the Buyer, and one half thereof shall be retained by or paid to said Realtor and the remainder to the Seller, unless because of expense incurred the latter shall agree or had agreed in writing to a greater percentage being paid to the Realtor,..." The property sale did not close on December 23, 1994. At some point in time, Mr. Smith conversed with Respondent Rivers by telephone and told him he could not afford to purchase the property since a greater amount would have to be financed and because his wife could not be persuaded to go through with the deal. He told Mr. Rivers that he would like Mr. Rivers to return any amount remaining in excess of Mr. River's expenses but that Mr. Rivers could retain his expenses. Mr. Rivers told Mr. Smith that his expenses had used up the entire $2,875 binder. Mr. Smith accepted this representation. He testified that he "considered the issue closed" at that point. Neither Mr. or Mrs. Smith made subsequent demands for all or part of the binder. The administrative complaint herein was urged quite some time later by Mrs. Smith. The Respondents affirmatively demonstrated that Mr. Rivers' business practice from 1991 to 1995 and continuing to date, is to promptly refund deposits upon a Buyer's request, if the Seller agrees. The significance of this evidence is that if a clear demand for refund or audit had been made by Mr. Smith, Respondents probably would have made some accounting and refund. In this case, Mr. Rivers did not do so because he did not consider that he had a clear- cut request to refund a deposit. Despite Mr. Smith's testimony that his final telephone conversation with Mr. Rivers as related above in Finding of Fact 11, occurred before Christmas 1994 and Mrs. Smith's deposition testimony that Mr. Smith's and Mr. River's phone conversation occurred on December 21, 1994, before the agreed closing date all other documentary evidence and credible testimony points to the conversation occurring in mid-January 1995. The parties stipulated that on 12/21/94, Alachua County Abstract Company sent the closing package by UPS overnight delivery to Mr. and Mrs. Smith. This package was received by Mr. and Mrs. Smith on 12/22/94. The significance thereof is that Mrs. Smith testified that the telephone call made by her husband in her presence from their home to Mr. Rivers cancelling the contract and demanding the return of their deposit occurred the night before the day they received the closing package, or December 21, 1996. However, the Smiths' long distance telephone records from 12/7/94 to 1/31/95 reveal that no long distance call was made from the Smith home to Mr. Rivers on 12/21/94 or any date other than 12/7/94, the day Mr. Smith initially signed and faxed the contract to Mr. Rivers. It is noted that at one point Mr. Smith wobbled and testified that Mr. Rivers telephoned him for the final phone conversation at some time prior to Christmas 1994. This is contrary to Mrs. Smith's testimony and Respondents' telephone records do not show that Mr. Rivers telephoned the Smith home on December 21, 1994, either. Between 12/30/94 and 01/17/95, Respondents' long distance telephone bills show charges for 15 calls to Mr. Smith's several work phone numbers and the home phone number. In Mr. Rivers' words, "I chased him like a hound," to find out what was going on, including when the deal could close. This demonstrates Mr. Rivers' continued belief after December 21, 1994 that the contract was still going to close and contradicts Mrs. Smith's testimony that Mr. Smith had orally cancelled the contract and demanded the return of his deposit on December 21, 1994. It further contradicts Mr. Smith's testimony this conversation occurred sometime before Christmas, 1994. The agency stipulated that Seller Dix and Norman Rivers, Jr. entered into an agreement whereby any binder forfeiture resulting from the Smiths' failure to close on December 23, 1994 would be used by Norman Rivers, Jr. and Norman Rivers, Jr. Realty, Inc. to cover their expenses incurred in marketing Mr. Dix's property. Respondents established that prior to the contract signing on December 7, 1994, they had expended at least $3,339.00 in advertising in order to market and sell Mr. Dix's property. There is no evidence Mr. Smith ever objected to paying the advertising costs incurred by Respondents or even inquired what Mr. Rivers' expenses were. Mr. Rivers did not remove any amount related to Mr. and Mrs. Smith from his escrow account before January 16, 1995. Then he did so by three checks made out to Norman Rivers Jr. Realty, Inc. Mr. Smith and Mr. Rivers concur that Mr. Smith made no specific demand for an audit of Respondents' expenses. Real Estate Commission Investigator Russell Lambert audited Respondents' accounts. He testified he "found no violations."
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing the administrative complaint herein. RECOMMENDED this 2nd day of December, 1996, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of December, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Steve W. Johnson, Esquire Department of Business & Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N-308 Orlando, Florida 32801-1772 James F. Gray, Esquire Post Office Box 7100 Gainesville, Florida 32605 Lynda L. Goodgame, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Henry M. Solares Division Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900
