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BOARD OF MEDICINE vs ANACLETO GUZMAN CAPUA, 89-006874 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Petersburg, Florida Dec. 15, 1989 Number: 89-006874 Latest Update: Jul. 05, 1990

Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent has been licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME-0027913, and was employed by the Norton Seminole Medical Group in Pinellas County, Florida. Respondent has been licensed in Florida since 1976. At approximately 3:50 p.m. on November 1, 1983, a 31 year old white male, with the initials R. L., arrived at the emergency room of Lake Seminole Hospital, Seminole, Florida, and was examined by the emergency room physician on duty. R. L. complained of substernal mid-chest pain radiating to his back, which had begun the night before. He was agitated and exhibited a great deal of emotional stress. The emergency room physician on duty treated R. L. for suspected cardiac pathology, placed him on a cardiac monitor, inserted a heparin lock into a vein, and ordered lab work which included a chest x-ray, electrocardiogram, electrolytes, cardiac enzymes, CBC (complete blood count), blood sugar, creatinine and BUN (blood urea nitrogen). These were appropriate tests under the circumstances. When the Respondent came on duty in the emergency room at 7:00 p.m., all lab work had been completed, except for the cardiac enzymes. The emergency room physician who had been on duty when R. L. appeared at the emergency room briefed Respondent about R. L.'s medical history, condition while in the emergency room, and the test results which had been received. After the cardiac enzyme values were received, Respondent reviewed R. L.'s medical history and lab test results, which he determined to be normal, and discharged R. L. at approximately 7:35 p.m. on November 1, 1983, with instructions that he see his family physician the next morning. Respondent's discharge diagnosis for R. L. was atypical chest pain secondary to anxiety. At approximately 11:21 p.m. on November 1, 1983, R. L. expired from cardiopulmonary arrest at the emergency room of Metropolitan Hospital, Pinellas Park, Florida. The autopsy report notes extensive coronary artery disease, but makes no mention of acute myocardial infarction. It was not established by clear and convincing evidence that R. L. suffered an acute myocardial infarction. There is conflicting expert testimony from Steven R Newman, M.D., and Stephen J. Dresnick, M.D., concerning whether Respondent should have admitted R. L. to Lake Seminole Hospital instead of discharging him from the emergency room, and also whether his E.K.G. taken at the emergency room was normal. Drs. Newman and Dresnick are experts in the care and treatment of patients in an emergency room, but their testimony was received by deposition instead of through live testimony at hearing. Thus, based upon this conflict in testimony, and the fact that the demeanor of these witnesses cannot be assessed, it is found that it was not established by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent failed to practice medicine with that level of care and skill which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances when he discharged R. L., and evaluated the tests which were administered to the patient while in the emergency room as within normal limits. A patient who appears at a hospital emergency room with unstable angina, such as R. L., does not necessarily require admission to the hospital. While serial electrocardiograms and serial cardiac enzymes are called for with patients whose symptoms of cardiac discomfort warrant hospitalization, these procedures are not usually and customarily performed in an emergency room. Therefore, since it was not established that Respondent should have admitted R. L. to the hospital as an in-patient, it was also not established that he failed to exercise the required level of skill and care by failing to order such serial tests while R. L. was in the emergency room. Although the emergency room physician on duty when R. L. arrived at the emergency room at approximately 3:50 p.m. on November 1, 1983, was initially responsible for obtaining a patient history and ordering the tests which were performed, when Respondent came on duty at 7:00 p.m. and took over this case, he was also responsible for insuring that his medical records concerning his evaluation and treatment of R. L., as well as his decision to discharge the patient, were full and complete. Respondent failed to document his review and findings based upon the lab tests and chest x-ray which had been completed, as well as the patient's medical history, and the specific reason or basis for his decision to discharge R. L. Respondent relied almost completely on the medical records compiled by the emergency room physician who was initially on duty when R. L. arrived at the emergency room, and made no significant additions to those records while the patient was under his care, or which would justify his course of treatment, including discharge, of this patient.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that the Board of Medicine enter a Final Order reprimanding Respondent for his violation of Section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes, and placing him on probation for a period of six months from the entry of the Final Order in this case, conditioned upon his complying with such reasonable terms and conditions as the Board may impose, including review and verification of the completeness of medical records prepared by the Respondent while on probation. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of July, 1990 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of July, 1990. APPENDIX (DOAH CASE NO. 89-6874) Rulings on the Department's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 3-4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 5-6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. 8-9. Rejected in Finding of Fact 5. 10. Rejected in Finding of Fact 4. 11-12 Rejected in Finding of Fact 6. 13. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact Rejected in Findings 5 and 6. 7, but otherwise Rulings on the Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in Findings of Fact 2 and 3. 4-5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 7-9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Rejected in Finding of Fact 5. Rejected in Finding of Fact 7. 12-13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 2, but otherwise Rejected in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Rejected in Finding of Fact 7. COPIES FURNISHED: Andrea Bateman, Esquire Kevin F. Dugan, Esquire 1940 North Monroe Street Wittner Centre West Suite 60 Suite 103 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 5999 Central Avenue St. Petersburg, FL 33710 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire General Counsel 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Board of Medicine Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792

Florida Laws (2) 120.57458.331
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF MEDICINE vs TEODULO REYES MATIONG, JR., 02-004285PL (2002)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Nov. 04, 2002 Number: 02-004285PL Latest Update: Oct. 28, 2003

The Issue Whether Respondent violated Subsections 458.331(1)(m) and 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes, and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact The Department is the State agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to Section 20.43 and Chapters 456 and 458, Florida Statutes. At all times material to this proceeding, Dr. Mationg was a licensed physician in the State of Florida. His license, numbered ME 0028183, was issued on April 13, 1976. Dr. Mationg is the primary care physician of A.A. Dr. Mationg referred A.A. to Dr. Steven Schafer, an orthopedic surgeon, for pain in the right shoulder, which was found to require arthroscopic surgery and repair of a rotator cuff. On January 10, 2000, A.A. was admitted to Regional Medical Center Bayonet Point (Bayonet Point) for surgery. At the time of his admission to the hospital, A.A. was 65 years old and suffered from numerous medical problems. He had cardiomyopathy, meaning his heart was enlarged and not functioning properly. A.A. had high blood pressure and a history of heavy smoking. He had generalized arteriosclerosis and peripheral artery disease. A.A. had previously had surgeries involving the placement of a stint and angioplasty. Based on his medical history, A.A. was subject to a stroke and a heart attack. Prior to his admission to the hospital, A.A. had been taking aspirin daily. Approximately three days prior to surgery, A.A. was directed by Dr. Schafer to discontinue taking aspirin. The aspirin was discontinued to reduce the risk of A.A.'s blood not being able to clot sufficiently. The hospital records of A.A. contain a request for consultation with Dr. Mationg for medical management dated January 10, 2000. The discharge summary shows that the medical evaluation was obtained so that A.A. could be followed by his primary care physician for his hypertension and other medical history. Dr. Schafer performed the surgical procedure on A.A. on January 10, 2000. A.A. had some respiratory problems, and Dr. Mationg ordered a pulmonary consultation with Dr. Patel the afternoon of January 10, 2000. Because of the respiratory problems, A.A. was placed on a ventilator and transferred to the intensive care unit. On January 11, 2000, Dr. Patel extubated A.A., which means that A.A. was taken off the ventilator. On January 11, 2000, Dr. Mationg saw A.A. at 9:00 a.m. and wrote and signed an order for lasix and lanoxin for A.A. Around 3:15 a.m. on January 12, 2000, A.A. was awakened for respiratory therapy and experienced numbness in his left arm and slurring of speech. When A.A. smiled, the left side of his mouth remained flat while the right side turned up. The nurse on duty was called, and he observed A.A.'s symptoms. A.A.'s symptoms indicated that he was having a stroke. Nurse Culligan notified Drs. Schafer and Mationg. Dr. Mationg did not come to the hospital to evaluate A.A. The standard of care would have required him to come to the hospital to evaluate A.A. because A.A. was exhibiting the symptoms of a stroke. Instead of coming to the hospital to do an evaluation, Dr. Mationg gave the following orders telephonically to Nurse Culligan at 4 a.m., on January 12, 2000: T.O. Dr. Mationg/M. Culligan do CT head [without] contrast today a.m. do carotid doppler study today a.m. consult Dr. S. Shah for neuro eval. get speech therapy eval. and video swallow today. Nurse Culligan wrote the orders on A.A.'s chart; Dr. Mationg later countersigned the orders. The term "stat" in medical parlance means immediately or as soon as possible. An order is not presumed to be stat if the order does not specify that it is stat. The tests and consultation which Dr. Mationg ordered at 4 a.m., on January 12, 2000, were not ordered to be implemented stat. The standard of care for treating A.A. required that Dr. Mationg order a stat neurological consultation and a stat head CT scan. Bayonet Point has established policies for its imaging services department, including CT services. The normal hours for CT services are 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., Monday through Sunday. After normal hours, the services are provided on-call. Bayonet Point's call-back procedures include the following: When an emergent radiologic procedure is ordered after hours, the Radiology personnel will contact the appropriate on call technologist via the hospital operator. Once the procedure is complete, the Technologist will call the Radiologist on call and then transmit those images via Teleradiography. Definition of an emergent procedure: In- house STAT, Emergency Department physician requesting radiologist interpretation, any outpatient whose physician requests immediate radiologist interpretation or "wet reading." Prior to A.A.'s experiencing the symptoms of a stroke at 3:15 a.m., no orders had been given for A.A. to resume taking aspirin. At 10 p.m. on January 10, 2000, Dr. Schafer ordered that "till further notified" all medications taken by mouth which could be taken intravenously were to be administered via an IV. Aspirin could not be administered intravenously. Because Dr. Schafer had ordered that aspirin therapy be stopped prior to surgery, it would be the responsibility of Dr. Schafer to order the aspirin to be restarted. Dr. Schafer was at A.A.'s bedside at 8:30 a.m., on January 12, 2000. Dr. Schafer noted that a head CT scan was ordered for that morning and that the patient was on his way down for the test. Dr. Schafer also noted that a neurological evaluation had been ordered for A.A. for that morning. The hospital records show that at 8:50 a.m., on January 12, 2000, a call was made to Dr. Shah's answering service, requesting a neurological consultation. The request for consultation form, which was filled out after Dr. Schafer's visit at 8:30 a.m., indicated that the request was an emergency request. The request for consultation form was filled out by someone other than the nurse who charted Dr. Mationg's verbal order for a neurological consultation. Based on the evidence presented, the request for a neurological consultation was not treated as an emergency request until after Dr. Schafer saw A.A. at 8:30 a.m. Tissue Plaminogen Activators (TPA) are used to dissolve clots which may be causing a stroke. The use of TPA is limited to a three-hour window following the onset of stroke symptoms. Dr. Mationg did consider the use of TPA, but felt that it was contraindicated based on the recent surgery. This opinion was confirmed at final hearing by a neurologist.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Dr. Mationg violated Subsection 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes; finding that Dr. Mationg did not violate Subsection 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes; placing Dr. Mationg on two years probation; imposing an administrative fine of $5,000; and requiring that Dr. Mationg attend ten hours of continuing medical education courses in the diagnosis and treatment of strokes and four hours of continuing medical education courses in risk management. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of July, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ___________________________________ SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of July, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: James W. Earl, Esquire Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 A. S. Weekley, Jr., Esquire Holland & Knight, LLP 400 North Ashley Drive, Suite 2300 Tampa, Florida 33602 Larry McPherson, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.5720.43458.331
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF MEDICINE vs WAGID GUIRGIS, M.D., 00-004968PL (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Daytona Beach, Florida Dec. 11, 2000 Number: 00-004968PL Latest Update: Jul. 08, 2024
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BOARD OF MEDICINE vs RAUL ENRIQUE PORTELA, 96-002703 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jun. 05, 1996 Number: 96-002703 Latest Update: Jan. 29, 1999

The Issue Whether Respondent, a physician, violated the provisions of Sections 458.331(1)(t) and 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the administrative complaint and the penalties, if any, that should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was licensed as a physician in the State of Florida and held medical license number ME00597713. Respondent graduated from medical school in the Dominican Republic in 1981. Subsequent to medical school, Respondent completed a year residency at St. Clare's Hospital and Memorial Center in New York City, which was affiliated with New York Medical College. Respondent completed a second year of surgical residency at University of Miami, Jackson Memorial Hospital. Respondent then completed one year of flexible residency and three years of internal medicine residency at Mercy Catholic Medical Center, which was affiliated with Thomas Jefferson University in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Respondent has practiced as an emergency medicine physician since 1988. Respondent has served as the medical director of the emergency department of Palm Springs General Hospital, Hialeah, Florida, since 1990. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was not board certified in any specialty. The administrative complaint centers on Respondent's treatment of patient R. A., a 48 year old male, at the Palm Springs emergency room on December 24, 1991. EMERGENCY ROOM TREATMENT ON DECEMBER 23, 1991 R. A. presented to the Palm Springs emergency room on December 23, 1991, at 3:50 p.m., via ambulance. He complained of severe epigastric pain over the past 24 hours that radiated to the right quadrant of his back. His blood pressure reading was 230 over 110. R. A. reported that he smoked a pack of cigarettes a day, did not drink alcohol, and had no allergies. R. A. also reported that he had not been vomiting. On December 23, 1991, R. A. was treated by Dr. Wilfred P. Fernandez, an emergency room physician employed by Palm Springs. Dr. Fernandez took the patient's medical history and then proceeded with his physical examination. The examination of the head, ears, eyes, nose, and throat were within normal limits. The lungs were clear and the heart rate and rhythm were regular. The abdominal evaluation demonstrated positive bowel sounds and positive epigastric tenderness. There was no guarding or rebound tenderness. A rectal exam revealed there was no blood in the stool. The extremity evaluation was within normal limits, as was the neurological evaluation. Dr. Fernandez ordered several diagnostic studies, including a complete blood count, an EKG, chest x-ray, abdominal film, and gallbladder sonogram. For reasons that were not made clear, the gallbladder sonogram was not performed. All other diagnostic tests were unremarkable. At 4:45 p.m. on December 23, 1991, Dr. Fernandez prescribed the following medications for R. A.: Donnatal, Maalox, Procardia, and Reglan. Donnatal contains a mild sedative and belladonna contains alkaloids to treat spasms. Maalox is an anti-acid. Procardia contains a channel blocker and was used to treat his hypertension. Reglan was administered via IV to clear R. A.'s bowels. R. A. was discharged from the Palm Springs emergency room at approximately 6:30 p.m. on December 23, 1991. On discharge, Dr. Fernandez gave R. A. a tablet of Clondine for his hypertension and prescriptions for Clondine 1 mg. and Zantac 150 mg. Dr. Fernandez instructed R. A. not to smoke, not to drink, and not to operate dangerous machinery while on the prescribed medication. R. A. was instructed to see his personal physician or return to the emergency room if his condition worsened. R. A. did not have his prescription for Clondine or for Zantac filled before his second admission to Palm Springs emergency room on December 24, 1991. EMERGENCY ROOM TREATMENT ON DECEMBER 24, 1991 On December 24, 1991, R. A. presented to Palm Springs emergency room for the second time. R. A. was transported to the emergency room by Hialeah Fire Rescue and arrived at approximately 6:05 p.m. On arrival, R. A. complained of epigastric pain. His vital signs at 6:10 p.m. included his blood pressure reading of 230 over 130. The nurses notes for this visit reflect that the patient had been seen the day before and had received a GI (gastrointestinal) cocktail, which is a reference to the concoction given to him to relieve his epigastric pain. Respondent treated R. A. while he was at the Palm Springs emergency room on December 24, 1991.1 At 6:20 p.m., Respondent performed his initial evaluation of R. A. Respondent took a history from the patient and observed the patient's appearance and composure. R. A. reported that he had not filled his prescriptions from the prior day. He reported to Respondent that he had epigastric pain in the mid-epigastric region that had been ongoing for several days. R. A. also reported that the medications he had received the previous day had helped him. Respondent noted the initial blood pressure on admission and that the patient had not filled his prescription for Clondine. Respondent discussed with R. A. the importance of taking Clondine for his hypertension. After observing the patient initially and obtaining a history, Respondent requested the emergency room records for R. A. from the previous day. He noted that Dr. Fernandez diagnosed the patient's condition as dyspepsia and hypertension. He also noted the laboratory and radiological studies that had been ordered, including that a gallbladder ultrasound had been ordered. The records did not at that time indicate that the gallbladder ultrasound had not been performed. Respondent discussed R. A.'s prior visit with an emergency room nurse who had participated in his treatment on December 23, 1991. The nurse told Respondent that all tests were normal. Respondent understood from what the nurse had told him that the gallbladder ultrasound was also normal. It is common practice for an emergency room doctor to rely on such statements from an emergency room nurse. Respondent thereafter performed an appropriate physical examination of R. A. The patient's eyes were found to be slightly jaundiced (icteric), which was a factor in leading Respondent to suspect that the patient may have had an illness affecting his liver, such as hepatitis. The abdominal evaluation revealed epigastric tenderness on palpation but no rebound. The patient's blood pressure was elevated. All other physical findings were within normal limits. A consistent blood pressure of 230 over 130 or higher is considered hypertension that warrants treatment before discharge. Labile hypertension is the acute elevation of blood pressure caused by anxiety, stress, or pain. Labile hypertension will often resolve itself without treatment once stressors or pain is resolved. A patient with a blood pressure of 230 over 130 who is suspected of suffering labile hypertension should have his blood pressure checked no less than every fifteen minutes to observe whether the hypertension resolves itself. Based on the patient's history and his evaluation and observation of the patient, Respondent determined that R. A. was more likely suffering from labile hypertension than from an emergent condition that warranted emergency treatment of the patient's hypertension. Respondent thereafter administered to the patient what was referred to as a GI cocktail to relieve his epigastric distress. The GI cocktail consisted of Zantac, Connatal, and Viscous Lidocaine and was administered at approximately 6:30 p.m. Respondent believed it likely that the GI cocktail would reduce the patient's pain and result in a lowering of the patient's blood pressure. The emergency room staff checked R. A.'s blood pressure every fifteen minutes and advised Respondent of the readings. Respondent ordered additional tests to evaluate whether the patient's epigastric pains were symptoms of a condition that required emergency care. Respondent ordered a complete blood count, a liver profile, and EKG and an abdominal x-ray. The blood studies came back within normal limits. The liver profile indicated an elevation of serum bilirubin as well as an elevation of the liver enzymes. All other tests were within normal limits. The GI cocktail relieved most of R. A.'s epigastric pain. Because he had lingering discomfort, Respondent administered a small dose of Demerol and Vistaril, which completely relieved R. A.'s pain. Respondent determined that R. A. was not suffering from a condition that required emergency care. He formed the opinion that the patient had hepatitis, but that his condition did not require immediate hospitalization. At approximately 9:00 p.m., R. A. was discharged from the Palm Springs emergency room. At the time of his discharge, R. A.'s blood pressure was approximately 160 over 80, which is within acceptable limits. Prior to his discharge, Respondent spoke with the physician who he thought would be following R. A.'s condition. This physician had treated R. A.'s wife, but he had not treated R. A. The patient was also given the name of a doctor who was on the hospitals primary physician call list. Also prior to discharge the patient was instructed not to drink any alcohol while taking his medication, to fill his prescriptions for Zantac and Clondine, and to follow-up with his primary care physician in three to four days. He was also instructed to eat lightly and increase fluid intake. Respondent told R. A. to return to the emergency room or go to his primary physician if his condition worsened. Respondent's care and treatment of R. A., including his determination that the patient did not require further emergency treatment did not fall below the standard of care imposed on emergency room physicians. As will be discussed below, his diagnosis of hepatitis was incorrect. The testimony of Dr. Dellerson established that the incorrect diagnosis did not fall below the standard of care imposed on emergency room physicians. THE MEDICAL RECORDS FOR DECEMBER 24, 1991 R. A.'s records for the emergency room visit to Palm Springs on December 24, 1991, indicate that his blood pressure reading at 6:45 p.m. was 230 over 170. This is the last recorded blood pressure reading for R. A. on December 24, 1991. Respondent testified, credibly, that R. A.'s blood pressure was checked approximately every 15 minutes and that his blood pressure came down to an acceptable level during the course of his emergency room stay on December 24, 1991,2 but that the records do not reflect those blood pressure readings. While it was the emergency room nurse's responsibility to take and to record that blood pressure, Respondent had the ultimate responsibility for the records as the treating physician. Although Respondent's practice did not fall below the standard of care imposed on emergency room physicians, the records that were kept were inadequate to reflect the patient's condition or to justify the Respondent's course of treatment.3 EMERGENCY ROOM TREATMENT ON DECEMBER 25, 1991 On December 25, 1991, R. A. presented to Jackson Memorial Hospital at approximately 2:10 p.m. He complained of epigastric pain that radiated to his back. He had vomited earlier that morning and had noticed blood in his vomit and blood in his stool. These were complaints and symptoms that were not present the day before. At the time of his presentation, his blood pressure was 160 over 110. The following day a CT scan was performed that led to a diagnosis of gall stones in the gallbladder and in the distal common bile duct, which did not require emergency surgery. R. A. was also diagnosed as having suffered a recent hypertensive stroke. This stroke most likely occurred after the patient presented at Jackson Memorial Hospital.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order that dismisses count one of the Administrative Complaint, but finds Respondent guilty of violating Section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes, as alleged in count two of the Administrative Complaint. It is further recommended that Respondent be reprimanded and assessed an administrative fine in the amount of $250.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of July, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Hearings Hearings CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative this 14th day of July, 1997

Florida Laws (2) 120.57458.331
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KIRK A. WOODSON vs BOARD OF MEDICINE, 91-004278F (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jul. 09, 1991 Number: 91-004278F Latest Update: Oct. 31, 1991

The Issue The issue for determination in this proceeding is whether the Respondent, the Department of Professional Regulation, should pay the Petitioner, Kirk A. Woodson, M.D., attorney fees and costs under Section 57.011, Fla. Stat. (1989), the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act. As reflected in the Preliminary Statement, the parties stipulate that the Petitioner is a "prevailing small business party" and that reasonable fees and costs exceed $15,000, the statutory cap. The only remaining issue under the statute is whether the Respondent was "substantially justified" in filing the Administrative Complaint in Case No. 90- 5986 against the Petitioner. 1/

Findings Of Fact On or about June 7, 1988, a complaint was filed against the license of the Petitioner, Kirk A. Woodson, M.D., subsequent to closure of a professional malpractice liability claim against him without payment of indemnity. The substance of the complaint was that, on January 1, 1986, Woodson saw and performed a hysterectomy on a patient who had presented at the emergency room at University Community Hospital in Tampa, Florida, with heavy and continuous vaginal bleeding. The complaint stated that post-surgery the patient developed Adult Respiratory Distress Syndrome (ARDS) and died. The complaint questioned whether Woodson failed to practice medicine with that level of care, skill and treatment which a reasonably prudent similar physician recognizes as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. By letter dated June 30, 1988, the Department of Professional Regulation (the Department or DPR) notified Woodson that it had received the complaint and that it was initiating an investigation. DPR subpoenaed the hospital records which revealed that the patient arrived at the UCH emergency room at 5:28 a.m. on January 1, 1986, with at least a three-day history of vaginal hemorraging. An emergency room physician saw the patient, gave her two units of packed blood cells, and admitted her to Woodson's service. Woodson was called at approximately 8:30 a.m. and saw the patient later that morning. The patient's admission to surgery to determine the cause of the bleeding and perform necessary procedures was delayed until at least approximately 2:00 p.m. because the patient refused to consent to a dilation and curettage (D and C); she was insisting on a hysterectomy only. She finally consented to a D and C to be followed by a hysterectomy if Woodson found it to be medically necessary. During this delay, the patient continued to bleed and was transfused with two more units of packed blood cells at approximately 1:45 p.m. After the consent was given, there was a further delay, not explained by the records, until approximately 6:00 p.m. in getting the patient to surgery. The patient continued to bleed. Surgery took almost five hours. During surgery, the patient's bleeding got worse, and she was transfused with four more units of whole blood during the surgery. The DPR investigator was unable to ascertain from the hospital records the reason for the length of the surgery. The DPR investigator attempted to arrange an interview with Dr. Woodson and his attorney on or about February 28, 1989. The appointment was cancelled. When the DPR investigator contacted Woodson to reschedule the interview, Dr. Woodson questioned why DPR was pursuing the complaint when the malpractice claim was closed without payment of indemnity. Dr. Woodson agreed to be interviewed but expressed his preference that the investigator first review the "extensive depositions" taken in the malpractice litigation. 4/ Having already determined to request an expert evaluation of the case, the investigator decided to postpone the interview with Dr. Woodson. On July 10, 1989, the DPR asked a probable cause panel of the Board of Medicine to authorize the retention of an expert in gynecology to review the information obtained through investigation to that point in time to assist in the determination whether Woodson's treatment of the patient fell below that level of care, skill and treatment which a reasonably prudent similar physician recognizes as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. On July 22, 1989, the probable cause met and authorized the expert review. On or about November 2, 1989, the DPR requested an expert review by Doris N. Carson, M.D., a Board-certified gynecologist with extensive surgical experience, including emergency room experience. Dr. Carson reviewed the hospital records supplied by DPR, some of which were difficult to read. By letter dated November 20, 1989, Dr. Carson reported her impressions. Dr. Carson believed the records supported Dr. Woodson's diagnosis and ultimate course of treatment. In the patient's condition, the proper course of treatment was to attempt to stop the vaginal bleeding by doing a D and C; a hysterectomy only should have been attempted if the D and C did not stop the bleeding. However, Dr. Carson perceived other problems that were not explained to her satisfaction by the hospital records. First, Dr. Carson did not see anything in the records to justify the length of the surgical procedures performed by Dr. Woodson. She reported: Careful review indicated that the subject attempted to remove the fibroids vaginally, and when this only increased the bleeding, then decided to do a laparotomy. The uterus, although enlarged, was not huge and the procedure as described seemed to move along without difficulty. When, however, the time is reviewed five hours would indicate very serious problems of technique or what seems more likely a lot if indecision about how to proceed. Evidently there was no physician surgical assistant, and the subject proceeded alone. In retrospect better operationg room help should have been available. Second, Dr. Carson felt that the patient received too much whole blood replacement during the course of the day and the surgery. Her reading of the hospital records indicated to her that five units of whole blood were given to the patient in addition to four units of packed cells. She felt: "Packed cells altogether would have been a better choice in light of the volume given to the patient." Her concern was that "volume overload," rather than ARDS, may have resulted ultimately in the death of the patient. However, she disclaimed the necessary expertise to render a conclusive opinion on the question and recommended that, if the DPR wanted a conclusive opinion on the cause of death, it should have a specialist in intensive care or a respiratory expert review the records. Dr. Carson had some difficulty with the delay in getting the patient to the operating room. The records indicated that at least some of the delay was caused by the patient's unwillingness to give consent to the recommended D and C. But Dr. Carson nonetheless had concerns that the delay added to the amount of blood transfused. Dr. Carson closed her letter with this remark: "In conclusion: A poorly done sugical proceeding below the recognized normal level of care." For reasons not apparent from the evidence presented, DPR did not interview Dr. Woodson before asking the probable cause panel to find probable cause and file a draft Administrative Complaint against Dr. Woodson based on Dr. Carson's expert review and the rest of the investigative report, including the hospital records. The draft Administrative Complaint, drawn in two counts, sought to discipline Dr. Woodson under Count I for failure to practice medicine with that level of care, skill and treatment which a reasonably prudent similar physician recognizes as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances, in two respects: first, for allegedly causing volume overload in the patient by ordering units of whole blood, instead of packed blood, to replace the patient's blood loss; and, second, for allegedly taking too long, without justification, to perform the necessary surgery. Count II alleged that Woodson failed to keep written medical records justifying the course of treatment of the patient, specifically with respect to ordering whole blood instead of packed units and with respect to the length of the surgical procedures. The probable cause panel considered the matter at its meeting on June 22, 1990. Counsel for the panel pointed out that the "extensive depositions" Woodson had indicated he wanted the DPR investigator to read before Woodson was interviewed were not in the packet of materials reviewed by the panel. 5/ But members of the panel indicated that they had reviewed the material that was in the packet and that they thought the information contained in it was adequate to make a probable cause determination. One of the doctors on the panel called it a "horrendous case." She felt that Woodson had "swamped out the patient" and had performed "inappropriate types of fluid therapy and blood therapy." The other member mentioned the "five-hour operating time . . . without any real explanation." The panel's attorney pointed out the part of the report of investigation that referenced the patient's refusal to consent to Dr. Woodson's proposed surgery and asked whether it constituted "any semblance of an explanation for a delay?" It is not clear from the transcript of the probable cause proceeding how the panel resolved the attorney's question, but the panel voted to find probable cause notwithstanding the question. 6/ There is information in the materials reviewed by Dr. Carson, and by the probable cause panel, which tends to explain some of the time it took for Dr. Woodson to perform surgery on the patient. Some of this partially exculpatory information was difficult to read and decipher in the records. Some of the partially exculpatory information was acknowledged by Dr. Carson and may also have been taken into account independently by the panel. Notwithstanding this partially exculpatory information in the record, the finding of probable cause was substantially justified.

Florida Laws (3) 120.6857.01157.111
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF MEDICINE vs WALTER RAY DEAL, M.D., 01-004923PL (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Dec. 27, 2001 Number: 01-004923PL Latest Update: Aug. 28, 2002

The Issue Whether or not Respondent, Walter Ray Deal, M.D., violated Subsection 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes, and, if so, what discipline should be imposed?

Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence and the testimony of witnesses presented and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner, Department of Health, Board of Medicine, is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to Section 20.42, Florida Statutes, Chapter 456, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 458, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Walter Ray Deal, M.D., is and has been, at all times material to the Administrative Complaint filed in this matter, a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 0056589. At or around 6:25 p.m. on April 6, 2000, Patient E.R. presented at the Emergency Room of Morton Plant Mease Health Care/North Bay Hospital, with pain and swelling in the right lower extremity. The Emergency Triage/Assessment Form, which is completed by nurses in the Emergency Room, reports that Patient E.R., who was first seen at 6:30 p.m., was 73 years old and had a chief complaint of "pain to RLE [right lower extremity] for a very long time, swollen . . ." This form also contains information on Patient E.R.'s current medical status including medications and a medical history. Respondent first examined Patient E.R. at approximately 7:15 p.m.; she reported her chief complaint to be chronic pain in the right knee which had worsened since Dr. Zaidi, a rheumatologist, had drained the knee. During his examination, Respondent checked (placed a checkmark) on the Emergency Physician Record indicating that in his examination he found the patient's heart had regular rate and rhythm and normal heart sounds. At 7:30 p.m., Respondent noted in Patient E.R.'s treatment plan: "Labs, Pain Meds, IV Antibx." This record reflects that Respondent ordered that the patient be administered 50 mg of Demerol and 50 mg Phenergan and 500 mg of Leviquin intramuscularly and the ESR (erythrocytic sedimentation rate), which is a nonspecific test for inflammatory responses. The pain medication appears to have been administered almost immediately (7:35 p.m.); the antibiotic at approximately 8:12 p.m. There is controversy about what "Labs" were ordered by Respondent. His testimony indicates that he ordered the CBC, the comprehensive metabolic, and the urine laboratory chemistries. The hospital records indicate that the following additional diagnostic tests were ordered: Cardiac Enzymes and Troponin chemistries, an E.K.G. and portable chest x-ray. It appears from the hospital records that a different writing instrument (the ink colors are different) and, perhaps, a different hand ordered the diagnostic tests mentioned in this paragraph. The results of the chemistries ordered by Respondent are reported on the Emergency Physician Record; the Emergency Physician Record does not contained results of an E.K.G. or x- ray. In addition, laboratory reports for non-cardiac-related chemistries are on Lab Acn# 54968; laboratory reports for cardiac related chemistries are on Lab Acn# 54984. While the sample collection time for the blood tests is 7:20 p.m., the cardiac-related tests were conducted later in the evening than the non-cardiac related tests. The controversy regarding what tests were ordered by Respondent is further clouded by the testimony of Rajesh Dave, M.D., who in the late evening of July 6, 2000, admitted Patient E.R. to the hospital, and Respondent's narrative letter dated February 1, 2001, directed to the Agency for Health Care Administration, in which he acknowledges ordering all of the diagnostic tests mentioned hereinabove. Prior to hearing, Respondent retracted the admission contained in his letter to the Agency for Health Care Administration to ordering the Cardiac Enzymes and Troponin chemistries, the E.K.G. and chest x-ray. The retraction was based on confusion between Respondent and his attorney which was confirmed by the testimony of Edward Copeland, Esquire, the attorney who prepared the narrative letter signed by Respondent. I find that the testimonies of Respondent and Mr. Copeland are credible and find that someone other than Respondent ordered the diagnostic tests which are in question. Dr. Dave denied ordering the cardiac-related tests; he denies even being in the hospital that evening. His testimony is in conflict with Respondent's and Emergency Room Nurse Don Giffin's nursing notes, which state: "Dr. Dave here to examine patient and wrote orders." Dr. Dave became responsible for Patient E.R.'s care and treatment when she was ordered admitted to the hospital at 9:45 p.m. Respondent testified that he had two conversations with Dr. Dave on July 6, 2002; the first, a telephone conversation, immediately prior to first seeing Patient E.R. and the second, a face-to-face conversation, at approximately 9:30 p.m. at the front desk of the Emergency Room. After the second conversation, Respondent wrote orders to admit Patient E.R. for a "23 hour admission" to the hospital as Dr. Dave's patient and ordered consultations with other physicians. He wrote other admission orders, ordered medications and "ivf d5 1/2 NS 40 meq kcl/l @ 125cc hr" (intravenous fluids one-half normal saline with 40ml equivalents of potassium chloride per liter at 125 cc per hour). North Bay Hospital protocol does not allow an Emergency Room physician to admit a patient to the hospital. Respondent was acting as a scrivener for Dr. Dave when he entered the orders admitting Patient E.R. to the hospital. At 8:17 p.m. the laboratory reported to the Emergency Room that Patient E.R. had a low serum potassium level. Petitioner's expert witness opined that Respondent fell below the standard of care when, after becoming aware of the low serum potassium level (which the expert deemed "critically low"), he did not immediately order an E.K.G. to determine the appropriate speed of potassium supplementation. He further opined that Respondent either did not read the E.K.G. or did not properly evaluate it. He further opined that the rate of potassium supplementation as ordered by Respondent was completely inadequate. The results of the Cardiac Enzymes and Troponin tests were normal. The E.K.G. test was given and the results simultaneously published at 10:04 p.m. The E.K.G. showed a run of non-sustained ventricular tachycardia which is a potentially fatal arrhythmia. After being ordered admitted as a 23-hour admission as Dr. Dave's patient at 9:45 p.m., Patient E.R. arrived at the 23- hour floor at 10:30 p.m. The hospital records reflect that at 10:20 p.m., the floor nurse was advised by the Emergency Room nurse of the low serum potassium, of the physician's orders for potassium supplementation, and that the potassium supplementation ordered was not available in the Emergency Room. The 23-hour floor nurse's notes reflect that she "advised that we have none at this time." Following Patient E.R.'s admission, at approximately 10:45 p.m., Dr. Dave was called and advised of the admitting orders including the rate of potassium supplementation. While he changed some of the orders, he did not change the rate of potassium supplementation. He did change Patient E.R.'s admission from a 23-hour admission to a full admission which necessitated transferring Patient E.R. to the Third Floor of the hospital. At 11:10 p.m. the 23-hour floor nurse received a bed assignment on the Third Floor and gave a report to the Third Floor nurse; the 23-hour floor nurse's notes include the following: "report . . . including low K [potassium] and need for D5 1/2 NS c 40 meq KCL [the ordered potassium supplementation] she said they had on 3rd floor and will be able to start fluids." The 11:55 p.m. Third Floor nurse's notes reflect that the "IVF started." Patient E.R. expired shortly after 3:00 a.m. Respondent's expert witness opined that Respondent did not fall below the standard of care in his treatment of Patient E.R.; that is, that Respondent practiced medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. He opined that Respondent rendered appropriate treatment to Patient E.R., who presented with knee pain and had no cardiac or respiratory complaints. He further opined that, while the serum potassium level was low and needed to be addressed, no symptoms or complaints were demonstrated pertaining to low potassium level and nothing was evident that raised cardiac issues; the low potassium was not critically important in this clinical situation and was a common presentation for an older person. He opined that based on the clinical evaluation and findings by the Emergency Room staff and physician, even with the low potassium, no E.K.G. was warranted. I find the opinion rendered by Respondent's expert witness to be more credible than the opinion offered by Petitioner's expert witness and accept the opinion of Respondent's expert. Respondent's expert's opinion was reinforced, in part, by the continuing treatment afforded Patient E.R. by Dr. Dave after she was admitted to the hospital.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order finding that Respondent is not guilty of violating Subsection 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of July, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of July, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Ephraim D. Livingston, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Post Office Box 14229, Mail Stop 39A Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229 William Taylor, Esquire Macfarlane, Ferguson & McMullen Post Office Box 1531 Tampa, Florida 33601 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 R.S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Tanya Williams, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701

Florida Laws (3) 120.5720.42458.331
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BOARD OF MEDICINE vs JAYAPRAKASH KAMATH, 91-006669 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Oct. 17, 1991 Number: 91-006669 Latest Update: Nov. 24, 1992

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Jayaprakash Kamath, M.D., is a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having license ME 0036704. He is board certified in internal medicine and gastroenterology. He has had no prior complaints of any kind against him since he began practicing medicine in Florida in 1980, and he has a reputation for being a competent and caring physician. On the morning of August 1, 1988, while making rounds at Morton Plant Hospital in Clearwater, Florida, the Respondent was paged by one of his partners, Belur Sreenath, M.D. The Respondent returned the call and was asked to see a patient whom Sreenath had just accepted and admitted on a 23-hour basis at Morton Plant. Sreenath reported that the patient was a referral from the Morton Plant emergency room. The patient's regular physician was on vacation, and the regular physician's on-call cover had recommended to the emergency room physician that the patient be referred to the Respondent and Sreenath to treat the patient for diagnosed fecal impaction. It was reported to the Respondent, through Sreenath, that the patient had come into the emergency room at about five in the morning complaining of abdominal pain and constipation. The emergency room physician, Jerry Julius Chase, M.D., had three X-rays done and had done his own "wet reads" of the X-rays before sending them to the radiology department for a definitive interpretation. According to Chase, the X-rays showed "much fecal matter, no obstruction." Chase did not mention any other significant findings. Chase's preliminary diagnosis was "fecal impaction." Sreenath also reported that he (Sreenath) had ordered enemas for the patient. Soon after the Respondent received the call from his partner, the Respondent called Chase, who was still in the emergency room and still had the X-rays. Chase confirmed what Sreenath had told the Respondent, again not mentioning any other significant findings. After talking to Chase, the Respondent visited the patient in his hospital room. By this time it was about 10:00 a.m. The Respondent took a history from the patient, examined the patient, and read the patient's chart. The chart included the results of lab work and the "ER sheet," which included the emergency room physician's diagnosis of abdominal pain and impaction and the results of his "wet-read" of the X-rays, but it did not yet include a report from the radiology department or the X-rays themselves. The Respondent did not contact the radiology department for a definitive interpretation of the X-rays or obtain the X-rays for his own review. By the time the Respondent saw the patient, the patient already had one enema and seemed to be responding to the treatment. Based on the information he had, the Respondent made a diagnosis of fecal impaction, confirmed his partner's orders for enemas for the patient, and added a stool softener. The nursing staff was ordered to monitor the patient's progress. The patient continued to respond satisfactorily to treatment during the day. Between ten and eleven in the evening of August 1, 1988, the patient complained of some abdominal pain or cramping (symptoms that are consistent with a diagnosis of fecal impaction and enema treatments) and the nurses on duty contacted the Respondent's partner, who was on call. Sreenath ordered a combination of demerol and vistaril as an analgesic. One small dose was enough to relieve the patient's pain, and the patient slept through most of the night. He ate 80% of his breakfast the next morning and was not complaining of pain or asking to see a doctor. At approximately 9:15 a.m. on August 2, 1988, a nurse telephoned the Respondent for a decision whether the patient was being discharged or was being admitted as an inpatient. The Respondent still had not seen the patient's X- rays, seen or had reported to him the radiology report on them, or spoken to the radiologist. On questioning, the nurse reported the patient's status to the Respondent. The nurse's report satisfied the Respondent that the patient was responding to the treatment for fecal impaction and could be discharged. The nurse was given orders to have arrangements made for the patient to see his regular physician within a week and to instruct the patient on symptoms to report if they occurred between discharge and seeing his regular physician. In accordance with the Respondent's telephone instructions, the patient was discharged at approximately 9:30 a.m. on August 2, 1988. Although there were no clinical signs or symptoms of it during the patient's stay at Morton Plant, the patient had a large aortic aneurysm, approximately eight centimeters in diameter, in his abdomen just below the renal arteries. The aneurysm was readily apparent on the X-rays, yet Chase did not report it to either the Respondent or to his partner, Sreenath. The radiologist either did not contact Dr. Chase to point out to him that the report of Chases's "wet read" of the X-rays omitted the aneurysm or, if he did, Chase did not relay this information to the Respondent or his partner. The radiologist's written report, stating that the X-rays revealed the large aneurysm, was sent to Chase, not to the Respondent, and Chase did not relay the information in it to the Respondent or his partner. If the Respondent had known about the aneurysm, he would have considered the aneurysm to be the patient's most serious medical concern. He might not have accepted the patient or, if he did, he probably would have brought a vascular surgeon into the case and had the vascular surgeon, or perhaps a cardiologist, closely monitor the patient for possible leaking or dissecting or rupture of the aneurysm. The Respondent also would have had to give consideration to whether the aneurysm was a cause of the patient's abdominal pain. In addition to treating the aneurysm as the patient's most serious medical concern, giving consideration to whether the aneurysm was a cause of the patient's abdominal pain, the Respondent would have had to give consideration to altering his diagnosis for the patient had he reviewed the X-rays or the radiologist report, or had spoken with the radiologist. In addition to showing the existence of the aneurysm, the X-rays indicated that the patient technically may not have been impacted. (The gas pattern was non-specific.) With respect to this patient, the Respondent practiced medicine below that level of care, skill and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physicians as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances (below the standard of care) in that he did not either personally review the X-rays on the patient, read or have reported to him the contents of the radiologist's report, or talk to the radiologist. Instead, he relied totally on the emergency room physician's "wet read." As a result, the Respondent's diagnosis of "fecal impaction" may not have been correct, and he did not give proper consideration to the aneurysm. However, except for the failure regarding the X-rays, the DPR otherwise did not prove that it was below the standard of care for the Respondent, who was treating the patient for fecal impaction, to discharge the patient without seeing him on the morning of August 2, 1988, based on the nurse's report to the Respondent. Although it was below the standard of care for the Respondent not to either read the X-rays himself or obtain the radiologist's definitive interpretation, it was reasonable for the Respondent to expect that the emergency room physician would have told him, and noted in the "ER sheet," that the patient he was being referred had an aneurysm of the kind and size of the one the patient had in this case. Even if the emergency doctor had not initially communicated to the Respondent the existence of the aneurysm, either directly or through the "ER sheet," it was reasonable for the Respondent to expect that, in the normal course, the radiologist reviewing the X-rays would have noted that, according to the "ER sheet," the ER doctor "missed" the aneurysm and would have contacted the ER physician to bring this to his attention, and that the ER doctor then would have contacted the Respondent to advise him of the omission. The patient did not experience abdominal pain after his discharge from Morton Plant, but he began to experience back and groin pain. The aneurysm was becoming symptomatic. The patient's symptoms markedly worsened in the early morning hours of August 4, 1988. The patient's wife had him taken to the emergency room at HCA New Port Richey Hospital at approximately half past midnight. The patient was confused, and was complaining of pain in the back and groin area. His blood sugars were three times normal. He was diagnosed preliminarily in the emergency room as having out-of-control diabetes and confusion and as being near sycope. No X-rays were taken in the emergency room at New Port Richey Hospital, and no information was obtained from Morton Plant Hospital. Because the patient and his wife did not know about the aneurysm, they were unable to report it when the emergency room physician took the patient's history. The patient was admitted to New Port Richey Hospital at approximately 2:30 a.m. on August 4, 1988. However, the admitting physician did not see the patient or order diagnostic medical imaging at that time. The admitting physician saw the patient at approximately 9:00 a.m., and ordered X-rays and a CAT scan. Before the X-rays or CT scan were taken, at approximately ten o'clock, the patient suffered an acute hypotensive event while in his hospital room. An emergency abdominal sonogram was ordered, and it was determined that the patient was suffering from the rupture of the abdominal aortic aneurysm (the same one that was evident on the X-rays taken at Morton Plant). Surgery was attempted to resect the ruptured aneurysm. The patient was a poor candidate for surgery of that kind due to his age and other health factors. The patient died on August 6, 1988. If the patient knew of the aneurysm, it is likely that his treatment on August 4, 1988, would have been far different. First, when the aneurysm became symptomatic, they probably would have contacted the vascular surgeon, who would have been on the case already, either immediately or on arrival at the emergency room. The aneurysm would have been closely monitored from the time of arrival at the hospital, and the vascular surgeon would have been prepared for surgery when indicated. 2/ At the very least, the patient and his wife probably would have reported the aneurysm during the taking of a history in the emergency room at HCA New Port Richey Hospital, and the emergency room surgeon could have immediately taken appropriate steps, such as contacting a vascular surgeon and immediately ordering appropriate diagnostic medical imaging. 3/ The Respondent did not dictate admission notes for the patient until August 17, 1988. The Respondent did not dictate discharge notes. The DPR did not prove that it was below the standard of care for the Respondent to delay the dictation of admission notes or for him not to prepare a discharge summary for a patient in the hospital on a 23-hour basis. The DPR also did not prove that the Respondent failed to keep written medical records justifying the course of treatment of the patient.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Board of Medicine enter a final order: (1) finding the Respondent, Jayaprakash Kamath, M.D., guilty of one count of violating Section 458.331(1)(t), but dismissing the other count of the Administrative Complaint; reprimanding him; and (3) fining him $2,000. RECOMMENDED this 27th day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of July, 1992.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57458.331
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INDIAN RIVER MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC. vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 97-004794 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Vero Beach, Florida Oct. 15, 1997 Number: 97-004794 Latest Update: Feb. 07, 1999

The Issue Whether Respondent should recoup Medicaid payments made to Petitioner for health care services provided to eight patients.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Indian River Memorial Hospital, Inc., (Hospital), has contracted with Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA), to provide services to Medicaid patients. The parties have agreed that there is a dispute for Medicaid reimbursement for goods and services provided to eight patients: S.G., J.D., R.J., C.A., G.M., S.S., M.P., and C.T. The Agency has paid the Hospital for the services rendered to these eight patients and seeks to recoup the payment based on a retrospective review by a peer review organization, Keystone Peer Review Organization (KePro). The Agency claims that either the admission or a portion of the length-of-stay for the eight patients was medically unnecessary. Services were provided to C.T. in 1994 and to the remainder of the patients at issue in 1995. Payment for Medicaid services is on a per diem basis. The rate for 1994 is $473.22 per day, and the rate for 1995 is $752.14. The Agency contracted with KePro to do a review of the Medicaid payments to the Hospital. KePro employs nurses to review the patient files based on criteria on discharge screens. If the services meet the criteria, there is no further review and the payment is approved. If the nurse determines that the services do not meet the criteria on the discharge screens, the patient's files are reviewed by a board certified physician, who in this case would be a psychiatrist. If the physician determines that the services are not medically necessary, a letter is sent to the Medicaid provider, giving the provider an opportunity to submit additional information. Additional information submitted by the provider is reviewed by a board certified physician. If the doctor concludes that the services are still medically unnecessary, the provider is notified that that services do not qualify for reimbursement and the provider may ask for a reconsideration of the denial. If the provider seeks reconsideration, the file is reviewed by a physician, and the provider has an opportunity to be present during the review. If the physician determines that the services are medically unnecessary, KePro sends a letter to the Agency stating the reasons for denial. The denial letters that KePro sends to the Agency are reviewed by the Medical Director of KePro, who is not a psychiatrist. Dr. John Sullenberger, the Agency's Medicaid physician, reviews the KePro denial letters sent to the Agency, and 99.9 percent of the time he agrees with the findings of KePro regarding whether the services were medically necessary. Dr. Sullenberger does not review the patient's charts when he does this review. The Agency sends a recoupment letter to the Medicaid provider requesting repayment for services provided. Patient S.G., a 12 year-old boy, was being treated pursuant to the Baker Act. He was admitted to the Hospital on March 8, 1995, and discharged on March 25, 1995. The Agency denied Medicaid reimbursement for the admission and the entire length-of-stay for S.G. based on KePro's determination that it was not medically necessary for the services to S.G. to be rendered in an acute care setting because the patient was neither suicidal nor homicidal. Three to five days prior to his admission to the Hospital, S.G. had attempted to stab his father. He also had further violent episodes, including jumping his father from behind and choking him and pulling knives on his parents. S.G. had a history of attention deficit and hyperactive disorder. He had been using multiple substances, such as alcohol, LSD, cocaine, and marijuana, prior to his admission. His behavior was a clear reference that he was suffering from a psychosis. A psychosis is a significant inability to understand what is reality, including delusions of false beliefs, hallucinations, hearing and seeing things which do not exist, and ways of thinking that are bizarre. Psychosis is a reason to admit a patient, particularly combined with substance abuse. S.G.'s treating psychiatrist noted that S.G. had tangentiality, which means that his thoughts did not stay together. He did not have a connection between thoughts, which is a sign of a psychosis. The chart demonstrated that S.G. had disorder thinking, which includes the possibility of a psychosis. There was also a reference in the charts to organic mental disturbance which could infer brain damage as the cause for the mental disturbance. Two days after admission, there was an issue of possible drug withdrawal because S.G. was agitated and anxious and showed other symptoms. Drug withdrawal, psychosis, and a demonstration of overt violence require a stay in an acute care facility. There was some indication that S.G. was suicidal. While in the Hospital he was placed under close observation, which is a schedule of 15-minute checks to determine if the patient was physically out of harm's way. S.G. was started on an antidepressant, Wellbutrin, because the treating physician thought S.G. was becoming increasingly depressed and was having trouble organizing his thoughts. Antidepressants, as contrasted to a medication such as an antibiotic, may take a minimum of two to three weeks before the patient will benefit from the full effect of the drug. It is difficult to stabilize the dosage for an antidepressant on an outpatient basis. S.G. was taking Ritalin, which is commonly used for children with attention deficit, hyperactivity disorders. During his stay at the Hospital, S.G. was engaging in strange behavior, including absence seizures. On March 16, 1995, he was still lunging and threatening harm. On March 20, 1995, he was still unstable and at risk. The dosage of Wellbutrin was increased. On March 21 and 22, 1995, S.G. was still threatening and confused. S.G. was discharged on March 25, 1995. The admission and length-of-stay for S.G. were medically necessary. Patient J.D. was a 16 year-old boy who was admitted to the Hospital on March 7, 1995, and discharged on March 14, 1995. The Agency denied the admission and entire length-of-stay based on KePro's determination that the patient was not actively suicidal or psychotic and services could have been rendered in a less acute setting. J.D. was admitted from a partial hospitalization program pursuant to the Baker Act because he was observed by a health care professional banging his head against the wall and throwing himself on the floor. He had a history of depression and out-of-control behavior, including being a danger to himself and running away. At the time of his admission, he was taking Prozac. Banging his head against the wall can mean that the patient is psychotic, can cause brain damage, and can be dangerous if the cause of the behavior is unknown. Admission to the Hospital was justified because the patient was extremely agitated and self abusive, requiring restraints and medication to decrease his agitation and self abusiveness. One of the tests administered during his hospital stay indicated that J.D. was a moderate risk for suicidal behavior. During his hospital stay, it was discovered that J.D. had threatened to kill himself while at school. He had been in a partial treatment program during the day, but that environment was not working. There was violence in the home, and J.D. was becoming overtly depressed. During his stay at the Hospital, J.D. was placed on close observation with 15-minute checks. His dosage of Prozac was increased. The admission and length-of-stay for J.D. were medically necessary. R.J., a 10 year-old male, was admitted to the Hospital on January 1, 1995, and discharged on February 9, 1995. The Agency denied Medicaid reimbursement based on a determination by KePro that the treatment in an acute care facility was not medically necessary because R.J. was not psychotic, not suicidal, and not a threat to others; thus treatment could have been provided in an alternate setting. R.J. had been referred by a health care professional at Horizon Center, an outpatient center, because of progressive deterioration over the previous fourteen months despite outpatient treatment. His deterioration included anger with temper outbursts, uncontrollable behavior at school, failing grades, sadness, depressed mood, extreme anxiety, extensive worrying and a fear of his grandmother. R.J. also suffered from encopresis, a bowel incontinence. He was agitated, lacked energy, neglected his hygiene, experienced crying spells, and had difficulty concentrating. R.J. needed to be admitted for an evaluation to rule out a paranoid psychosis. It was necessary to do a 24-hour EEG as opposed to a 45-minute EEG. In order to do a 24-hour EEG, the patient is typically placed in an acute care facility. The EEG showed abnormal discharge in the brain, which could be contributing to a psychiatric illness. At school R.J. had smeared feces on the walls, behavior that could be seen in psychotic persons. There was evidence that he had been hitting and throwing his stepbrother and 3 year-old brother. He was fearful of his grandmother and, based on his family history, there was reason to fear her. R.J. was placed on Buspar, a medication which generally takes two weeks to take effect. Contrary to the Agency's determination, R.J. was disorganized. He was also violent in terms of threatening danger and extreme anger. The admission and length-of-stay for R.J. at the Hospital were medically necessary. Patient C.A., a 9 year-old male, was admitted to the Hospital on June 1, 1995, and discharged on June 12, 1995. The Agency disallowed one day of the length-of-stay based on a determination by KePro that the services provided on June 11, 1995, could have been provided in a less restrictive setting. C.A. was admitted for violent and disruptive behavior. He also had an attention deficit, hyperactivity disorder and was taking Lithium and Depakote. These medications are used for patients who experience serious mood swings and abrupt changes in mood, going from depression to anger to euphoria. To be effective, medicating with Lithium and Depakote requires that the blood levels of the patient be monitored and the dosage titrated according to blood level. C.A. also was given Wellbutrin during his hospital stay. On June 11, 1995, C.A. was given an eight-hour pass to leave the hospital in the care of his mother. The physician's orders indicated that the pass was to determine how well C.A. did in a less restrictive setting. He returned to the Hospital without incident. He was discharged the next day to his mother. The treatment on June 11, 1995, could have been provided in an environment other than an acute facility; thus the stay on June 11, 1995, was not medically necessary for Medicaid reimbursement purposes. Patient G.M., an 11 year-old male with a history of being physically and sexually abused by his parents, was admitted to the Hospital on March 21, 1995, and was discharged on April 3, 1995. The Agency denied Medicaid reimbursement for inpatient hospital treatment from March 28 to April 3, 1995, based on KePro's determination that the length of hospital stay exceeded health care needs at an inpatient level and could have been provided in a less acute setting. At the time of admission, G.M. had suicidal ideation. His school had reported that G.M. had mutilated himself with a pencil, banged himself on the knuckles, and told the school nurse that he wanted to die. Prior to admission, G.M. had been taking Ritalin. His treating physician took G.M. off the Ritalin so that she could assess his condition and start another medication after a base-line period. The doctor prescribed Clonidine for G.M. Clonidine is a drug used in children to control reckless, agressive and angry behavior. Clonidine must be titrated in order to establish the correct dosage for the patient. During his hospital stay, G.M. was yelling and threatening staff. He was placed in locked seclusion, where he began hitting the wall. G.M. was put in a papoose, which is similar to a straitjacket. The papoose is used when there is no other way to control the patient. The patient cannot use his arms or legs while in a papoose. This type of behavior and confinement was occurring as late as March 31, 1995. G.M. was given a pass to go to his grandparents on April 2, 1995. He did well during his pass, and was discharged on April 3, 1995. Treatment in an acute facility was medically necessary through April 1, 1995. Treatment on April 2, 1995, could have been provided in a less acute setting. Patient S.S., a 5 year-old male, was admitted to the Hospital on March 9, 1995, and was discharged on April 3, 1995. The Agency denied Medicaid reimbursement for the admission and entire length of his hospital stay based on a determination by KePro that S.S. was not psychotic or an immediate danger to himself or others and the evaluation and treatment could have been rendered in a less acute setting. Prior to admission to the Hospital, S.S. was threatening suicide, ran into a chalk board at school, scratched his arms until they bled, and showed aggressive intent toward his sister, saying that he would kill her with a saw. S.S.'s condition had been deteriorating for approximately three months before his admission. At the time of admission, he had been suicidal, hyperactive, restless, and experiencing hallucinations. The hallucinations imply a psychosis. S.S. was put on Trofanil, an antidepressant which needs to be titrated. The patient's blood level had to be monitored while taking this drug. During his hospital stay, S.S. was on close observation. All objects which he could use to harm himself were removed from his possession. After he ate his meals, the hospital staff would immediately remove all eating utensils. On March 28, 1995, S.S. threatened to kill himself and became self-abusive. His blood level on March 31, 1995, was sub-therapeutic, and his medication dosage was increased. On April 1, 1995, S.S. had a temper tantrum. The admission and length-of-stay for the treatment of S.S. were medically necessary. Patient M.P., a 10 year-old male, was admitted to the Hospital on April 27, 1995, and was discharged on May 6, 1995. The Agency denied Medicaid reimbursement for the admission and entire length-of-stay based on a determination by KePro that the patient functions on an eighteen to twenty-four month level but is not psychotic and the treatment could have been provided in a less acute setting. M.P.'s IQ is between 44 and 51. He was diagnosed with a pervasive development disorder, which is a serious lack of development attributed to significant brain damage. His condition had deteriorated in the six months prior to his admission. He had episodes of inappropriate laughter, fits of anger, hit his head, hit windows, and put his arm in contact with the broken glass through the window. At the time of his admission, he had a seizure disorder. An EEG and an MRI needed to be performed on M.P. in order to evaluate his condition. M.P. had to have a regular EEG, a 24-hour EEG, and a neurological examination. The patient was aggressive, restless, and uncooperative. In order for the MRI to be performed, M.P. had to be anesthetized. The admission and length-of-stay for M.P. were medically necessary. Patient C.T., a 34 year-old female, was admitted to the Hospital on November 11, 1994, and was discharged on November 26, 1994. The Agency denied the treatment from November 17, 1994, to November 26, 1994, based on a determination by a peer review organization that the patient was stable by November 17, 1994, and psychiatric follow-up could have been performed in an outpatient setting. C.T. was admitted for kidney stones. She did pass the kidney stones but continued to have severe pain. Her doctor asked for a psychiatric consult. The psychiatrist diagnosed C.T. as having a personality disorder, chronic psychogenic pain disorder, and an eating disorder. Her depressive disorder exacerbated pain. C.T. had been given narcotics for the pain associated with the kidney stones. In order to assess her mental status, the physicians needed to taper the dosage of Demerol which she had been receiving. She was started on Sinequan, which is an anti-depressant given to alleviate the psychological condition and to help with the physical complaints. C.T. was later put on Vicodin, an oral narcotic, which seemed to bring the pain under control. The drugs used could cause a drop in blood pressure; therefore, they had to be titrated slowly. Her treating physician was trying to find an appropriate anti-depressant, while weaning the patient from intramuscular narcotics. On November 17, 1994, C.T. left her room and went to the hospital lobby, where she was found by nursing staff. C.T. was crying and saying that she was in pain and wanted to die. During her hospital stay, C.T. was in much distress; she would scream out that she was in pain. On November 18, 1994, she was found crying on the floor of the hospital chapel and had to be returned to her room. It was the opinion of Dr. Bernard Frankel, an expert retained by the Hospital, that C.T. probably could have been discharged a day earlier. The hospital stay for C.T. from November 17, 1994, to November 25, 1994, was medically necessary. The last day of her stay was not medically necessary.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered requiring Indian River Memorial Hospital, Inc., to pay to the Agency $752.14 for one day of service provided to G.M., $752.14 for one day of service provided to C.A., and $473.22 for one day of service provided to C.T. and finding that the Hospital is not liable for payment for any of the other services at issue in this proceeding. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of November, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of November, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Falkinburg, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 John D. Buchanan, Jr., Esquire Henry, Buchanan, Hudson, Suber & Williams, P.A. 117 South Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Paul J. Martin, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308

Florida Laws (2) 120.57409.913 Florida Administrative Code (1) 59G-1.010
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