The Issue Whether or not Petitioner Robert R. Hambley is entitled to an award of attorney's fees pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact This case arises in the wake of Robert R. Hambley v. Department of Professional Regulation, DOAH Case No. 88-4788, for formal administrative proceeding stemming from a complaint filed against Petitioner on September 28, 1987. On July 5, 1989, the undersigned Hearing Officer entered a Recommended Order imposing an administrative fine against the Petitioner in the amount of $1,000.00 and placing the Petitioner's license on probation for a period of one (1) year. Petitioner did not file exceptions to the subject recommended order. On August 22, 1989, the Respondent, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, rejected the proposed order and revoked the Respondent's license. Thereafter, Petitioner retained the services of the law firm of LARSON, CONKLIN, STANLEY, PROBST & BOBENHAUSEN, P.A. to represent him, which attorney's filed an appeal in the Second District Court of Appeal contesting the Division of Real Estate's Final Order, specifically the aggravation of the penalty, to wit, revocation of Petitioner's license. In connection with Petitioner's legal representation, he incurred reasonable costs and fees in the amount of $504.49 and $3,393.00, respectively. On October 5, 1990, the Second District Court of Appeal entered its order affirming the findings as found by Recommended Order, but reversed and remanded for implementation of the recommended penalty of $1000.00 and rejecting the recommended penalty of probation, since that was not an authorized penalty at the time of the hearing. The basis of the Court's decision is that Respondent failed to adequately comply with Section 120.57(1)(b)(10), Florida Statutes, in order to properly increase the severity of the recommended penalty. See Bernal v. Department of Professional Regulation, 517 So.2d 113, (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), affirmed 531 So.2d 967 (Fla. 1988). Thereafter, on October 10, 1990, the Respondent filed a motion for rehearing which motion was denied on November 1, 1990. On November 11, 1990, a Mandate issued from the Second District Court of Appeal and Petitioner's license was reinstated on November 21, 1990, with Respondent issuing a Final Order rescinding its prior order of August 15, 1989, and by issuing a supplemental Final Order on December 4, 1990. That December 4, 1990, order implemented the recommended penalty with the exception of probation which was not statutorily authorized. The Administrative Complaint which was filed jointly against Petitioner was a six count administrative complaint and the entity through which he dealt, Real Pro Associates, Inc. Petitioner was found guilty of participating in five transactions which conduct amounted to proscribed conduct within the purview of Subsection 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes, by paying real estate commissions totaling over $28,500.00 to Paul George, an unlicensed person. Petitioner was also found guilty of culpable negligence and breach of trust in a business transaction in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, for having failed to inform or otherwise disclose to Stewart Fidelity Title Company, the company which handled the closing for the transactions, that the stated escrow deposits were never placed in an escrow account as represented in the contracts for sale and purchase which would alert the lender that the purported purchaser had a "no equity" position in the purchases. Petitioner was, via Recommended Order, required to pay an administrative fine of $1,000.00 within thirty (30) days of the entry of the Final Order. Petitioner was found guilty of all violations for which he was cited in the Administrative Complaint filed by Respondent and a monetary penalty was imposed. Respondent was substantially justified in asserting that the Petitioner was in violation of the real estate licensing law when it issued the subject complaint. That proceeding was premised on a reasonable basis in law and fact when it was initiated. See Miller v. Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, DOAH Case No. 89-5042F, 12 FALR 2312, 2314 filed 5/16/90. The Florida Real Estate Commission enhanced the penalty to recommendations which were within the parameters set forth in the disciplinary guidelines of the Florida Real Estate Commission as provided for by Rule Sections 21V-24.001(2) and (3), Florida Administrative Code. The rule sections provided that the Petitioner Hambley could have been fined, for such violations, up to $1,000.00 per count and may have had all his licenses, registrations, certifications and permits penalized as follows: (h) 475.25(1)(b) - Up to 5 years suspension or revocation. [Emphasis supplied] (n) 475.25(1)(h) - Up to 2 years suspension. Petitioner has not demonstrated that it was a prevailing small business party under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. Moreover, the actions of the Florida Division of Real Estate were substantially justified as defined by Subsection 57.111(3)(e), Florida Statutes. This is borne out by the findings as found by the undersigned Hearing Officer, which provides both a reasonable basis in law and fact as well as substantial justification of the administrative action when it was initiated. Particularly, the complaint against Petitioner was reviewed by a probable cause panel on September 15, 1987. That material which was reviewed by the panel included an investigative report and documentary evidence, all of which was presented to the panel and ultimately to the undersigned Hearing Officer. Appended to the investigative report was some 30 pages of exhibits which provided an adequate basis to support the charges of culpable negligence and breach of trust in a business transaction.
Findings Of Fact On October 5, 1989, Respondent filed an Order to Show Cause seeking to take disciplinary action against the certification of authority issued to Petitioner, The Administrators Corporation, and the insurance licenses issued to Petitioner, Charles N. Zalis. Petitioners timely requested a formal hearing, and the case was transferred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the conduct of a formal hearing regarding the allegations contained in that Order to Show Cause. Upon receipt, the matter was assigned DOAH Case No. 89-5981. The final hearing in that disciplinary matter was conducted on May 14, 1990. Thereafter, a Recommended Order was entered on July 9, 1990, recommending to Respondent that a final order be entered finding Petitioners not guilty of the allegations contained in the Order to Show Cause and dismissing the Order to Show Cause filed against them. None of the parties filed exceptions to the Recommended Order. On August 15, 1990, the Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner entered a Final Order adopting in full the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation contained within that Recommended Order; finding the Petitioners not guilty of the allegations contained in the Order to Show Cause filed against them, and dismissing the Order to Show Cause. On September 21, 1990, Petitioners filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings their Petitions for Costs and Fees, pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, and Rule 221-6.035, Florida Administrative Code. On September 27, 1990, an Initial Order was entered in each of the above-captioned causes. The Initial Order is a form order automatically prepared by the Clerk's Office and signed by the Director of the Division of Administrative Hearings in every case filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, except for those proceedings conducted on an expedited basis pursuant to statutory directives. The Initial Order advises the parties as to the name of the Hearing Officer assigned to hear the matter, provides certain procedural information, and solicits specific information from the parties so that the matter can be scheduled for an evidentiary hearing appropriately. On October 8, 1990, Respondent filed a joint Response to Initial Order on behalf of all parties, and on October 10, 1990, Respondent filed a joint Amended Response to Initial Order on behalf of all parties in this proceeding. The Amended Response to Initial Order advised that the parties had agreed that the final hearing should be scheduled for one day during the month of February, 1991, in Tallahassee. Pursuant to the agreement of the parties regarding the scheduling of the evidentiary hearing in this cause, on October 19, 1990, these causes were consolidated sua sponte, and a formal hearing was scheduled in these consolidated causes for February 14, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. No response by Respondent to either the Petition for Costs and Fees filed by The Administrators Corporation or the Petition for Costs and Fees filed by Charles N. Zalis has ever been filed in this cause even in the face of the Motion for Summary Final Order based upon Respondent's failure to respond. Accordingly, this matter is decided on the basis of the petitions filed in these consolidated causes, together with the documentation attached to those petitions, Petitioners' Motion for Summary Final Order, together with the documentation attached to that motion, and Respondent's Response to Motion for Summary Final Order. Since the Respondent has failed to controvert or dispute any of the factual allegations contained within those pleadings, there is no factual allegation in dispute in these consolidated causes. Petitioners are small business parties as defined by Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. By virtue of the Final Order entered in DOAH Case No. 89- 5981, Petitioners are prevailing small business parties in an administrative proceeding pursuant to Chapter 120 initiated by a state agency. The actions of Respondent both in initiating and in pursuing the Order to Show Cause filed in DOAH Case No. 89-5981 were substantially unjustified, and no special circumstance exists which would make unjust the award of attorney's fees and costs to Petitioners in these consolidated causes. The itemized affidavits filed in these consolidated causes reveal the nature, extent, and monetary value of the services rendered by Petitioners' attorneys, as well as the costs incurred in the underlying proceeding. Petitioners incurred attorney's fees in the amount of $49,581.25 and costs in the amount of $7,351.72 in the underlying administrative proceeding. The amounts of attorney's fees and costs claimed by Petitioners are reasonable and necessary. The Department of Insurance and Treasurer was not a nominal party only in the underlying administrative proceeding. Petitioners filed their Petitions for Costs and Fees within 60 days after the date that they became prevailing small business parties.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the stipulated record submitted by the parties, the following Findings of Facts arc made: Following the issuance of its October 13, 1989, jeopardy assessment against Petitioner, Respondent began its efforts to recover the monies allegedly owed by Petitioner. Collectable assets were identified. These identified assets included a bank account at Barnett Bank of South Florida, N.A. (Account No. 1595012259) in the name of John M. Brumley Racing Engines, Inc. (Corporation) with a balance of $176.29 and real property that appeared to be owned by the Corporation. Respondent gave written notice of its October 13, 1989, jeopardy assessment against Petitioner to Barnett Bank. In the notice, Respondent requested that the bank not transfer nor otherwise dispose of the funds in Account No 1595012259 without Respondent's consent. Subsequently, the bank notified Respondent that it had taken measures to comply with Respondent's request.
Findings Of Fact This cause originated in a disciplinary action resulting from an administrative complaint filed by the Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate against the Petitioners herein, Malcolm Lewis Hardy and Aquatic Realty, Inc. The Petitioners herein were the Respondents in the licensure disciplinary proceeding. That proceeding was resolved in their favor by the Recommended Order of the Hearing Officer and by the Final Order filed April 15, 1988 by the Department of Professional Regulation. They have accordingly filed a request for attorney's fees and costs on the ground that the prosecution involved in the underlying case was not "substantially justified." The cause came on for a brief hearing. The parties elected to dispense with calling witnesses at the hearing because they entered into a factual stipulation whereby all germane facts were placed of record. It was thus established that Petitioners Malcolm Lewis Hardy and Aquatic Realty, Inc. (hereafter Hardy) were the Respondents in a licensure disciplinary action brought against them by the above-named Respondent. That disciplinary action was resolved by Final Order filed April 15, 1988 by the Department of Professional Regulation. The Respondents in that case, the Petitioners herein, were totally absolved of any wrongdoing with regard to the charges in the administrative complaint in that proceeding. A copy of that Final Order was mailed by the agency to "Diane Cleavinger, Esquire, 300 East 15th Street, Panama City, Florida 32405." Ms. Jan Nelson, a secretary at that address, and employed by Ms. Cleavinger's former law firm, received a copy of that order and executed the return receipt appearing on the envelope on April 18, 1988. Ms. Nelson was not Ms. Cleavinger's secretary, but rather the secretary of Ms. Fitzpatrick, one of Ms. Cleavinger's former law partners. In any event, Ms. Nelson executed the return receipt on April 18, 1988, but Ms. Cleavinger never received the Final Order nor notification of its filing or receipt by Ms. Nelson. Mr. Hardy never became aware of or received a copy of the Final Order either, until the agency sent another copy to him on September 12, 1988. The affidavit and request for attorney's fees was filed within sixty days of that date. Ms. Cleavinger had left her law firm on January 1, 1988 to become a Hearing Officer with the Division of Administrative Hearings. Mr. Hardy only learned of the Order when he made a direct contact with the Department of Professional Regulation and they learned that he had not received the Final Order. It was thus mailed to him on September 12, 1988 and received on September 14, 1988. That Order dismissed all claims against Hardy and Aquatic Realty, Inc. and thus those parties are in fact "prevailing, small business parties," within the meaning of Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. It was stipulated at hearing, as well, that these Petitioners are small business, prevailing parties and that they incurred attorney's fees in the amount of $1,642.04 for services rendered by Ms. Cleavinger when she represented them in the underlying case-in-chief and that costs amount to $333.71. Additionally, Mr. Hardy further incurred attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $500 in connection with the pursuit of this fee claim by attorney Whitton. It was stipulated that that amount is reasonable. Additionally, the Department accepted its burden of establishing that its action was "substantially justified," within the meaning of Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, and have stipulated that they have not done so. Thus the only issue for resolution concerns whether the claim of Hardy was time-barred.
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to attorneys' fees and costs and, if so, in what amount.
Findings Of Fact On or about April 29, 1993, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services issued an agency action letter which rejected certain of Petitioner's cost reports in calculating the Medicaid reimbursement to which Petitioner was entitled. As a result, the Medicaid reimbursement to Petitioner was reduced. Thereafter, Petitioner timely filed a challenge to the agency action, and the matter was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings for formal proceedings, DOAH Case No. 93-3687. Such case was assigned to Judge Arrington and scheduled for hearing in Miami for October 14-15, 1993. On October 12, 1993, the Department filed a suggestion of mootness which led to the withdrawal of the agency action letter, the acceptance of Petitioner's cost reports, and, presumably, to the recalculation of the Medicaid reimbursement favorable to Petitioner. On May 2, 1996, the agency, now the Agency for Health Care Administration, entered a final order adopting the recommended order. On July 1, 1996, the Petitioner filed the instant motion for attorney's fees and costs and supporting memorandum of law together with the exhibits thereto. On or about September 6, 1996, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss or alternatively motion to strike Petitioner's motion for attorney's fees and costs, and argued that the Petitioner is not entitled to fees pursuant to Section 57.105, Florida Statutes; that the affidavit submitted by Petitioner does not comply with the statute; that Petitioner is not a prevailing party under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes; and that the relief requested exceeds the maximum award of $15,000.00. Such responses relate only to the initial pleading filed, however, and not to the amended request filed on February 12, 1997. Petitioner has a net worth of not more than $2,000,000.00 and its principal place of business is Dade County, Florida. Petitioner's attorney's normal billing rate for general matters is $250.00 and he expended in excess of 100 hours of time in the litigation of the underlying matter. Petitioner has requested $87,500.00 in attorney's fees as the prevailing party in the principal case and $21,875 for litigation on the issue of fees and costs. Petitioner alleged it is entitled to fees and costs pursuant to Sections 57.105 and 57.111, Florida Statutes.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Patricia Smithwick Valz, is entitled to an award of attorney's fees as a "prevailing small business party" in the underlying administrative proceeding.
Findings Of Fact Sutton is a "small business party" incorporated under the laws of Florida and has its principal office located at 3054 Skyview Drive, Lakeland, Florida with less than 25 employees and a net worth of less than $2 million dollars. The Department previously initiated action against Sutton by denying an application for renewal of its license to operate a group home in Lakeland, Florida. A timely request for a hearing on the denial was filed by Sutton, and the matter transferred by the Department to the Division of Administrative Hearings where it was assigned Case Number 90-2928. The final hearing was held in Lakeland, Florida, on August 16, 1990, before K. N. Ayers, Hearing Officer, and thereafter a Recommended Order was filed on August 30, 1990, which recommended that Department enter a Final Order granting Sutton a license to operate a group home. The Department approved and adopted this recommendation in its Final Order entered on October 17, 1990, by the terms of which Sutton prevailed in the prior action initiated by the Department. The Department was not a nominal party to the prior proceedings, and there is nothing in the record to show that the Department was substantially justified in denying Sutton's application for renewal of license to operate a group home, or that any special circumstances exist which would make an award of fees and costs unjust. On December 24, 1990, a Motion For Attorney's Fees and Costs was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings by Sutton. The authority cited for the award was Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. Therefore, the motion was treated as a petition under Rule 22I-6.035, Florida Statutes, and by order of January 16, 1991 was dismissed for failure to comply with that rule, with leave to amend within twenty days. On January 24, 1991, an Amended Motion For Attorney's Fees and Costs was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings by Sutton. The motion is accompanied by an affidavit and supporting documents which are uncontroverted, and which establish that Sutton incurred legal fees in the amount of $3,945.00 and costs of $369.72, as a result of the prior proceedings in Case Number 90-2928. No evidentiary hearing was requested by either Sutton or the Department. The Department was advised by order dated January 16, 1991 that if Sutton filed an amended petition the Department would have twenty days from the date that Sutton filed the amended petition to file its response in accordance with Rule 22I-6.035(5), Florida Administrative Code, and that failure to timely respond would result in the waiver of the opportunity to dispute the allegations contained in the petition. No responsive pleading of any kind has been filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on behalf of the Department to the Amended Motion For Attorney's Fees and Costs.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner Michael A. Crane, d/b/a Accent Builders of Florida, Inc., is entitled to an award of attorney's fees against Respondent, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On October 14, 2005, Petitioner filed a Motion for Reimbursement of Attorney's Fees and Costs. Petitioner seeks reimbursement of attorney's fees and costs incurred in DOAH Case No. 04-4040PL, pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. Petitioner is the prevailing party in the underlying proceeding, DOAH Case No. 04-4040PL. On September 23, 2005, the Construction Industry Licensing Board entered its Final Order in the underlying case, in which it adopted the Recommended Order entered in the DOAH proceeding, thereby dismissing the charges that Petitioner had violated certain provisions of Chapter 489, Florida Statutes. In the underlying proceeding, Respondent charged Michael A. Crane with violations of Chapter 489, Florida Statutes, in his capacity as a certified general contractor holding Florida license No. CGC8644. Petitioner had entered into the contract which gave rise to the underlying proceeding as Accent Builders of Florida, Inc. (Accent). Respondent's disciplinary action was not directed at Accent Builders of Florida, Inc., but at Petitioner as the qualifying agent for the company. Petitioner is not a sole proprietor of an unincorporated business. Petitioner is neither a partnership nor a corporation. Petitioner does business in Florida as Accent, but at the time the underlying proceeding was initiated, Petitioner had not applied for and been granted a certificate of authority for Accent through himself as the qualifying agent. In September 2004, while the underlying proceeding was pending, Petitioner applied for and was granted a certificate of authority for Accent with Michael A. Crane as the qualifying agent. Despite the fact that Petitioner was granted a certificate of authority for Accent, the underlying proceeding was brought against the certified general contractor, Michael A. Crane, not against Accent as a corporate entity. In order to determine whether the underlying action brought by Respondent against Petitioner was substantially justified at the time it was initiated by the Agency, the information that was before the probable cause panel that directed the filing of the Administrative Complaint must be examined. In the underlying matter giving rise to Petitioner's request for attorney's fees, the Probable Cause Panel had before it a 188-page Investigative Report, as well as three supplemental Investigative Reports related to the alleged defects in the construction performed by Petitioner. The Probable Cause Panel convened on April 27, 2004, at which time it made a finding of probable cause that Petitioner had violated Subsections 489.129(1)(g)1., (i), (k), and (m), Florida Statutes. The panel members reported that they had reviewed the investigative reports and draft complaints, and were advised by a member of the Attorney General's staff regarding their responsibilities in determining whether probable cause existed to file an Administrative Complaint against Petitioner. The consumer complaint accompanying the Investigative Report alleged that the contractor did not properly supervise the project; that the construction has resulted in numerous leaks; that the steam shower was not installed as required by the manufacturer; that the decking was not installed according to the manufacturer's instructions; and that most of the punch list items had been left unaddressed. The Investigative Report also contained Petitioner's response, which stated that Petitioner was precluded from correcting the deficiencies by the consumer, and that, although responsive to the consumer regarding the leaks, Petitioner saw no damage as a result of the leaks. The Investigative Report contained numerous documents describing the efforts of contractors hired by the consumer to remedy the leaks and alleged defects in construction. The report also included documentation of payments made by the consumer to the various contractors called in to eliminate the problems the consumer was experiencing. The Probable Cause Panel's review of the materials before it resulted in a determination that a reasonable investigation had been conducted, and that a reasonable person could conclude that sufficient evidence existed to charge Petitioner with violations of Chapter 489, Florida Statutes. At the time the Probable Cause Panel reviewed the Investigative Report, it appeared that Petitioner's work had resulted in water damage, and that a valid subcontractor's lien had been placed against the consumer's property resulting in financial harm. The Probable Cause Panel's determination to direct Respondent to file an Administrative Complaint had a reasonable basis in law and fact at the time it was made. Respondent was not a "nominal party" to the underlying proceeding according to the meaning of that term in Subsection 57.111(4)(d)1., Florida Statutes.
