The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner was subjected to an unlawful employment practice by Respondent due to Petitioner's race, age, or sex in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent employed Petitioner, an African-American male, as a paraprofessional, non-instructional employee at all times relevant to these proceedings. Respondent School Board is the body politic responsible for the administration of public schools within the Suwannee County School District. Petitioner was a member of the non-instructional chapter of the United Teachers of Suwannee County, Florida, and was subject to the terms and conditions of the collective bargaining agreement between that organization and Respondent. Additionally, Petitioner’s employment was subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the Continuing Contract of Employment Non-Instructional Education Support Employees of the Public Schools executed between Petitioner and Respondent. Petitioner worked at the Suwannee Primary School in Live Oak, Florida. Petitioner’s work schedule required him to work Monday through Friday of each work week. Petitioner’s duty day started at 7:30 a.m. and ended at 2:40 p.m. Marilyn K. Jones, the principal of the Primary School, was Petitioner’s immediate supervisor. Although their surnames are the same, Principal Jones and Petitioner are not related. Petitioner approached Jones on February 14, 2005, and spoke with her regarding his recent employment with a state prison. Petitioner informed Jones that he had been hired as a corrections officer and that he was required to attend orientation and training sessions. Petitioner informed Jones that the initial orientation and training sessions were held during times he was required to work at the Primary School. Petitioner asked for a couple days off from his work at the Primary School to attend these initial sessions. Petitioner was hopeful that once the training and orientation sessions were completed, his work hours with the state prison would be from 4:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. and would not interfere with his employment with Respondent. Jones informed the Petitioner that he could use personal leave time that he had accumulated to attend the orientation and training sessions. Jones requested that Petitioner keep her posted regarding the days he would be absent and directed him to complete and submit the forms required to take leave prior to the actual absences so that arrangements could be made for substitute personnel to assume Petitioner's duties. Petitioner did not, however, submit the proper leave forms and the training period at the prison was longer than the originally expected. Additionally, after discussions with the payroll Department, Jones learned that the Petitioner did not have enough accumulated leave time to allow for his previous absences. Jones and the Petitioner had a telephone conversation on March 5, 2005. Jones informed Petitioner that he had been absent more times than their initial understanding, that he had failed to submit the leave forms in advance of the days he would be absent, and that he did not have leave time available. Petitioner apologized for the additional time that he had been absent and again noted that he thought that after the first few days of training, his work at hours at the prison would be from 4:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. Jones told Petitioner that his continued absences would be unauthorized and that she did not want him to be fired for taking unauthorized leave. Jones informed the Petitioner that if he wished to resign, he could submit his resignation to her. On March 7, 2005, Petitioner met with Jones and her assistant principal Betty Ann Sumner, along with Sheryl Daniels, the president of the Teacher’s Union, to discuss Petitioner’s absences. Petitioner expressed his desire to work three days a week at the Suwannee Primary School and the other two days at his job with the prison. Jones reiterated her previous statements to Petitioner that she was concerned for him and did not want the School Board to terminate his employment based on his absenteeism. Jones informed Petitioner that he had taken days off from work without providing any advance notice and advised that in the event of future absences, Petitioner must submit the appropriate forms in advance. When Petitioner raised the subject of a leave of absence until the fall semester so that he could schedule his employment with the prison and Respondent to avoid time conflicts, he was referred to Respondent's district office. Subsequently, Petitioner requested a 10 week leave of absence with the Superintendent of the Suwannee County School District, J. Walter Boatright, to continue to pursue training as a corrections officer. Under School Board policy, an absence in excess of five days has to be approved by the School Board. Boatright declined to bring Petitioner’s request for leave to the Suwannee County School Board based on his view that the Board’s policies did not allow an employee an extended leave of absence to receive training for an unrelated second job, that the end of the school year was approaching, and that the School District needed the presence of all of its employees. As established by Boatright's testimony, Respondent often has difficulty finding substitute personnel when its employees are absent for wholly legitimate reasons. Boatright informed Petitioner that he would not recommend that the School Board approve Petitioner’s request and would not bring Petitioner’s request to the School Board for its consideration. Additionally, Boatright recommended that the School Board deny Petitioner’s request for leave for the days that he had already been absent. Petitioner never personally appeared before the School Board to submit his request for personal leave. After Boatright's decision was communicated to him, Petitioner was again absent without leave on several occasions. Petitioner met with Boatright on March 24, 2005. At that meeting, Boatright warned Petitioner that he faced disciplinary action, including termination from employment if he continued to be absent from his non-instructional position without leave. In response to Boatright’s warnings, Petitioner said, “Anybody can do what I do” and suggested that Boatright simply obtain a substitute teacher to fill his position. Following Petitioner's remarks, Boatright informed Petitioner that his role with the Suwannee County School District as a paraprofessional, non-instructional employee was important. Sheryl Daniels, the president of the United Teachers of Suwannee County was also present at the meeting on March 24, 2005, with Boatright and Petitioner. Daniels asked Boatright to reconsider Petitioner’s request for leave because Petitioner had been a good employee in the past and this should merit some additional consideration. Boatright, however, denied Petitioner’s request for leave. Later, Petitioner received a letter dated April 20, 2005, from Boatright, confirming and reiterating the warning delivered to Petitioner during the March 24, 2005. In this letter, Boatright, advised Petitioner “that any further absence without leave on your part after the receipt of this letter will result in my recommendation to the Suwannee County School Board for your termination.” Subsequent to Petitioner’s receipt of the April 20, 2005, letter from Superintendent Boatright, Petitioner was again absent without leave in late April and in May of 2005. On April 28, 2005, Petitioner received his annual employment evaluation. The evaluation was performed by Jones, his principal. An employee’s overall evaluation rating is determined by adding the employees’ scores in seven different categories. Although Petitioner received an overall rating of “Effective,” Petitioner’s rating with respect to his professional responsibilities was “Needs Improvement.” Jones’ evaluation noted that although Petitioner did a good job in the computer lab, his frequent absences were a concern and that student behavior had deteriorated in Petitioner’s classes when he was absent. On April 28, 2005, Boatright filed a petition with the School Board to terminate Petitioner’s employment. A hearing was scheduled for May 15, 2005. The School Board rescheduled the May 15, 2005, hearing, however, when Petitioner requested additional time to prepare for the hearing. Thereafter, Petitioner was served with an Amended Petition for Termination of Employment filed by Boatright. The Superintendent’s Petition for Termination of Employment charged Petitioner with violating Suwannee County School Board Policy Section 6.22, which states, “[a]ny employee of the District who is willfully absent from duty without leave shall forfeit compensation for the time of the absence and the employee contract shall be subject to cancellation by the School Board.” By letter dated May 31, 2005, Petitioner submitted a letter of resignation to Respondent. In that letter, Petitioner wrote that he was submitting his resignation due to the denial of his request for an unpaid leave of absence and the need to avoid further damage to his reputation. Petitioner also stated in the letter that he thought he had been the subject of discrimination and was left with no alternative but to resign his position.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of July, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of July, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Mike Jones Post Office Box 372 Live Oak, Florida 32064 Andrew J. Decker, IV, Esquire Andrew J. Decker, III, Esquire Post Office Box 1288 Live Oak, Florida 32064 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was initially employed as a non-degree teacher in Putnam County, Florida, beginning with the 1951-52 school year. During the 1952-53 school year, Petitioner attended the University of Florida where she obtained her degree. She then returned to the Putnam County school system for the school year beginning in 1953. Petitioner was a member of TRS from 1945 until her retirement in 1970, and seeks to purchase retirement credit for the 1952-53 school year in order to qualify for a 25-year pension. The issue to be determined is whether or not she was on an approved leave of absence in 1952-53, or whether she was merely reemployed in the Putnam County school system after completing her degree program. Petitioner was encouraged to obtain her degree by W.M. Thomas, who was then Superintendent of Putnam County Schools, and was advised by him that her absence would be considered an approved professional leave. Mr. Thomas subsequently corroborated this by letter. Additionally, a former school board member, Mr. Clyde Middleton, stated that Mrs. Carter was granted professional leave for this period. See Exhibit One. Mrs. Carter made no written request for the leave of absence nor do school board records reflect any consideration of this matter. However, the current superintendent has accepted Mrs. Carter's statement and those of Mr. Thomas and Mr. Middleton, and has certified approval of this leave to TRS. See Exhibit One. Respondent rejects this after-the-fact documentation and maintains that the only acceptable evidence of prior approval would be the school board minutes or other records reflecting official action by the board.
Recommendation From the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order authorizing Petitioner to purchase credit in the Florida Teachers' Retirement System for the 1952-53 school year. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of July, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of July, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Mrs. Melcene L. Carter 401 Kersey Street Hazlehurst, Georgia 31539 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire Assistant Division Attorney Department of Administration Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C--Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 A. J. McMullian, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION DIVISION OF RETIREMENT MELCENE L. CARTER, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 82-234 DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, Respondent. /
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent was a career-service employee of Respondent. She served as a health service representative assigned to the Seminole County Public Health Unit. Her specific task was to investigate and follow up on contacts for sexually transmitted diseases. Petitioner's Employee Handbook, which Respondent received when she was hired, states: You may request annual leave for any purpose desired, but you must obtain Your supervisor's approval before taking annual leave. If an emergency develops, tell your supervisor of the emergency and ask for verbal approval to use annual leave. When you return to work, complete the leave request form for your supervisor's signature. The Handbook also Provides that certain employees are entitled to one eight-hour personal holiday "at a time which is mutually agreeable to the individual and the immediate supervisor." The local policy of the Seminole County Public Health Unit required each employee to request leave by filling out the back of a timesheet. In this manner, the employee would show the type of leave requested, the date and time of the leave, the employee's initials. The form provided spaces for the signature of the supervisor and the date described in detail in the Paragraph 5 below. The back of the timesheet states: "All Leave and Overtime must be requested and approved in advance." The Handbook requires advance approval of annual leave. Although the blanket statement on the back of the timesheet requires advance approval of all leave and overtime, the Seminole County Public Health Unit routinely did not require advance approval for all types of leave. For instance, sick leave, overtime, and annual leave for less than a few hours were normally approved after the fact. On at least two occasions, including one involving Respondent, annual leave for an entire day was also approved after it had beef taken. However, the Seminole County Public Health Unit normally requires advance approval of annual leave for a Period of one day or more. The instructions on the timesheet direct that the date next to the supervisor's signature indicate the date of the request for leave. Consistent with the varying policies governing leave, the date beside the supervisor's signature on the timesheet was used to show the date of approval of a request for annual leave and the date of the request for sick leave and certain other types of leave. By negative implication, the Handbook also requires written approval of annual leave for nonemergencies because it expressly permits "verbal approval" for annual leave for emergencies. There are no requirements in the Handbook or the timesheets for written approval of requests for other forms of leave, and the Seminole County Public Health Unit did not maintain enforceable policies to that effect. Two persons were authorized to approve requests of Respondent for annual leave. The first person was Charlotte Blades, who was the coordinator of the sexually transmitted disease program of the Seminole County Public Health Unit. Ms. Blades was Respondent's immediate supervisor The other person authorized to approve requests for annual leave was Bernice Duncan, who was the senior community health nurse of the Seminole County Public Health Unit and Ms. Blades' supervisor. In practice, the written approval of Ms. Blades could be revoked by Ms. Duncan. On one occasion, Respondent requested eight hours' annual leave to attend her son's high school graduation on June 9, 1989. Ms. Blades signed the timesheet on May 23, 1989. Between that date and the date of the leave, Ms. Duncan told Respondent that, although Ms. Blades had signed the timesheet, the leave was not approved. Ultimately, Respondent received approval for leave through 2:30 p.m., rather than 5:00 p.m., on the day of the graduation. In late July or early August, 1989, Respondent submitted a timesheet requesting 32 hours' annual leave from August 28-31, 1989. About one week later, before Ms. Blades or Ms. Duncan had acted on the request, Respondent changed the request to September 1, which was the Friday before Labor Day weekend, and September 13-14, 1989. In addition, she requested leave with pay for September 15, 1989, as her personal holiday. According to the timesheets, Ms. Blades approved the September 1 leave request on August 25, 1989, which was a Saturday. She assured Respondent that she would discuss with Ms. Duncan the remaining requests for leave. Respondent followed up with Ms. Blades several times, explaining that she wanted the leave to attend her son's graduation ceremonies from military basic training in South Carolina. Despite her assurances, Ms. Blades had not mentioned Respondent's request to Ms. Duncan before Ms. Blades became sick and missed work from September 6-9. On the second day of Ms. Blades' absence, Respondent took her request to Ms. Duncan, who said that she had not been aware of Respondent's request. Ms. Duncan told Respondent that Ms. Blades was on sick leave and did not respond further. The following day, Respondent spoke again with Ms. Duncan, who this time assured her that if Ms. Blades were not at work on Monday, September 11, Ms. Duncan would sign the timesheet approving the leave requested for September 13-15. Ms. Blades returned to work on Monday, September 11. When Respondent asked her in the morning to sign the timesheet, Ms. Blades refused to do so and told her that it had not yet been approved. Consistent with her prior conversations with Respondent, though, Ms. Blades did not say that the request had been disapproved. Respondent then left the office for much of the day. When she returned, Ms. Blades and Ms. Duncan were both out. The next day, Tuesday, September 12, Ms. Blades spoke with Respondent, but still declined to say whether the request was approved or rejected. She continued to say merely that the request had not yet been approved. Tuesday afternoon, Respondent told a coworker to tell Ms. Blades that Respondent was going to South Carolina and would be back the following Monday morning. While still in town, Respondent telephoned both supervisors shortly after 8:00 a.m. on Wednesday, but they had not arrived at work yet. Respondent asked the receptionist to remind Ms. Blades that Respondent had gone to South Carolina and would return the following Monday morning. Both messages were delivered to Ms. Blades, who relayed them to Ms. Duncan. Respondent then departed for South Carolina, where she remained through at least September 15. At the time of her departure, Respondent knew that her request for annual leave had not been approved and that she was taking unauthorized annual leave. When she arrived back in the office on September 18, Respondent received a copy of a letter dated September 15 that had been mailed to her the prior Friday. The letter states that Respondent had been separated from State service for abandonment of position, effective at the close of business on September 15, 1989. The second paragraph of the letter contains material misstatements of fact. It states that Respondent had been advised that, due to the present work situation, her leave could not be approved. The letter also states that she did not contact her supervisor that she would be absent. No one ever advised Respondent that her leave could not be approved or in fact was rejected until after her return from South Carolina. Also, Respondent informed both supervisors, directly and through third parties, that she would be absent, where she was going, why, and when she would return. However, she did not contact them during the three-day absence. Concerning the request for leave for a personal holiday, neither Ms. Blades nor Ms. Duncan ever informed Respondent that the date was inconvenient. Under the circumstances, Respondent could reasonably infer that the date was agreeable with Ms. Blades. At no time did Respondent intend to abandon her career-service position. The facts do not support a reasonable inference that Respondent abandoned her job during the three days in question.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a Final Order finding that Respondent has not abandoned her position in Career Service employment with the State of Florida. ENTERED this 28th day of February, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT D. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda L. Parkinson Attorney Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 701 Orlando, FL 32801 Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Gregory L. Coler Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Alva J. Barfield 1010 Locust Avenue Sanford, FL 32771
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner, Bay County School Board (School Board), had just cause under Subsection 1012.67, Florida Statutes (2008), to terminate the employment of Respondent, Thomas Walker, because of his absence without leave.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is employed under a Professional Services Contract and teaches at Bozeman School in Bay County. Respondent, without approval or notice to the administrator or staff of Bozeman School, failed to appear for his teaching assignment in the latter part of November 2008. After repeated attempts to reach Respondent, Dr. Tommye Lou Richardson, Director of Human Resources for Bay District Schools, ascertained that Respondent was incarcerated in the Coffee County Jail in New Brockton, Alabama, for his failure to pay child support. Respondent's absence was willful and without approved leave.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board enter a final order terminating the employment of Respondent and finding that he has forfeited any compensation since January 14, 2009, the date of his suspension without pay by the School Board. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of May, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Franklin R. Harrison, Esquire Harrison, Sale, McCloy Duncan & Jackson Post Office Drawer 1579 Panama City, Florida 32402-1579 J. E. Sawyer, Esquire 203 South Edward Street Enterprise, Alabama 36330 Thomas Walker 26802 Highway 69A, North Altha, Florida 32421 Dr. Eric J. Smith Commissioner of Education Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Deborah K. Kearney, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 William V. Husfelt, Superintendent Bay County School Board 1311 Balboa Avenue Panama City, Florida 32401-2080
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner has just cause to terminate the employment of the Respondent.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the School Board of Lake County, Florida (Board)(Petitioner). It is charged with operating and managing the public school system in Lake County, Florida, otherwise known as the Lake County School District. The Respondent, at times pertinent hereto, was employed by the Board as a school guidance counselor at Sawgrass Elementary School. Her principal was Rhonda Hunt. During the 2005-2006 school year, the Respondent missed 71 days from her job. In the 2006-2007 year, she missed 97 days. In the 2007-2008 school year, the Respondent missed 87 days from work. The contract for a guidance counselor requires that they work for 221 days per school year. During these times, especially in the 2007-2008 school year, the Respondent had been making repeated requests for leave. Ms. Hunt, her principal, became concerned and in May of 2008 reported the situation about extensive absences, and leave requests, to Ms. Rebecca Nelsen, the Board's Supervisor of Compensation, Benefits and Employee Relations. In the 2007-2008 school year, when Ms. Hunt brought the issue to Ms. Nelsen's attention, the Respondent had missed work the number of days found above, which represented all the days in the school year from February 13th through the end of the school year. In the previous year, she had missed work from the middle of January through the end of the school year. Ms. Nelsen prepared a memo to Deke DeLoach, the Board's Chief of Human Resources, apprising him of the situation regarding the Respondent's absences. She explained to him the situation involving the excessive absences over a 5-year period. She explained to Mr. DeLoach that when an employee has been on extended unpaid leave that, according to Board policy 6.50, her return to employment is dependant upon a position being available. Therefore, while an individual is on extended leave, which is approved, their position becomes available to be filled at the decision of an individual school administrator. Moreover, unpaid leave, the status applicable to the Respondent's situation, must be approved in advance. An employee may not go off-duty on unpaid leave and then get approval for it at a later time. Approval must be requested in advance. A formal request must be made to the Superintendent, for the Superintendent's recommendation to the Board. Extended Illness Leave is a leave category that is required to be approved by the Board as well. Ms. Nelsen therefore explained to Mr. DeLoach that the Respondent had been on extended unpaid leave and, according to the above-referenced Board policy, her return to employment was dependent upon a position being available. Employees are required to have approval for some form of leave before they take leave or miss time from work. If an employee does not have approval for some form of leave and does not come to work, then under Board policy they are deemed to be absent without leave. If that is the situation, the employee can be terminated under Board policy. The School Board must have a recommendation from the Superintendent in order to be able to act on any sort of leave request. Under Board policies, an Extended Illness Leave is required to be approved by the Board. The school fiscal year ends June 30th. July 1, 2008, therefore, was the beginning of the new fiscal year for the 2008-2009 school year. The regular school session then began near the end of August 2008. Ms. Nelsen wrote to Ms. Chavous on August 19, 2008, explaining to her that she had been on unpaid sick leave numerous days, and giving her options to consider. Ms. Nelsen informed her that she must report to work or be considered absent without approved leave, that she could explain to her supervisor any accommodations that she may need, or that she could request Extended Illness Leave. That communication, from Ms. Nelsen to Ms. Chavous, references a July 29, 2008, request for sick leave. Ms. Chavous completed the July 29, 2008, request for sick leave on a Request for Leave of Absence form, which is the form required to be completed by employees who are requesting any kind of leave from the School Board. The July 29, 2008, leave form depicted a request for leave from August 4, 2008, through August 19, 2008. The reason for the leave requested was indicated as "Illness of self.” The Respondent did not have any sick leave available to her at that time. In the 2008-2009, school year, the Respondent was not eligible for leave under the Family Medical Leave Act. This was because she had not worked enough days in order to trigger eligibility under that law. This leave request was denied because the Respondent was on unpaid sick leave the prior year, had missed 87 days, and had never offered an explanation for her need to use sick leave. Therefore, the Board had no basis on which to approve the additional leave request and the Respondent's approved leave ended June 30, 2008. Any leave that the Respondent would have received for any extended illness would have been for the previous school year which was over at the end of the fiscal year, June 30, 2008. Ms. Nelsen gave the Respondent two options in her August 19, 2008, letter: To report to work or be considered absent without approved leave, or To submit a leave request form asking for extended illness leave for the remainder of the year. On August 28, 2008, a request was faxed from the Respondent seeking extended illness leave. The attached doctor's note did not explain the nature of the medical situation or condition, in terms of providing justification for the leave requested. The Respondent submitted a leave request form with that August 28, 2008, request. It did not confirm that she was asking for extended illness leave for the school year. Instead she requested leave from August 4, 2008, until October 30, 2008. Since School Board policy required the Respondent, in this situation, to request leave for the remainder of the school year, Ms. Nelsen sent an e-mail to the Respondent telling her that she had no available sick leave to use and again telling her that she had the option to either report to work or to request an extended illness leave for the remainder of the year. That communication was sent on August 29, 2008, the day after the Respondent faxed the form requesting leave through October. The Respondent then sent Ms. Nelsen another leave request form in response to the August 29, 2008, e-mail. It again requested leave from August 4, 2008, through October 30, 2008. On September 9, 2008, a letter was sent from the Superintendent to the Respondent, explaining that the Respondent had not reported to work and that she had not requested extended illness leave. Consequently she was informed that she was now considered “absent without approved leave” and would be recommended to the School Board for termination of employment. When the Superintendent sent the letter to the Respondent, on September 9, 2008, the Respondent was not on approved leave. She was absent without leave under the terms of the School Board policy. Pursuant to that policy she was therefore subject to being terminated. Ms. Nelsen received three leave request forms from the Respondent, none of which requested leave for the remainder of the school year, and none of which gave an explanation for the basis of the medical condition. The Respondent's response to these facts was her statement to the effect that "[I]t was just always told to me that you can't request for more leave than what your doctor has put on the form. So, therefore, that's why I put the dates there." She also acknowledged that sometimes she does not remember some things or doesn't respond as fast as she should. Therefore she simply stated that she believed, in effect, that she had submitted everything that she could and had explained her situation to the best of her ability at the time. The collective bargaining agreement between the Lake County School District and the Lake County Education Association includes the position of guidance counselor. That contract references the Board policy which makes it a terminable offense to be absent without leave. The recommendation to the Board, prior to the Respondent making a Request for Hearing, was that she be terminated for being absent without leave. The Respondent's prior leave had expired at the end of the 2007-2008 school year. When the first day of school started in the current school year of 2008-2009, the Respondent did not report to work. The Respondent probably would have been unable to work because of her illness before January 2009. She would therefore have missed all of August, September, October, November, and December.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Lake County School Board finding that the employment of the Respondent, Latonya Chavous, be terminated for just cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of June, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of June, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen W. Johnson, Esquire McLin & Burnsed Post Office Box 491357 Leesburg, Florida 34749-1357 Latonya Chavous 136 Desiree Aurora Street Winter Garden, Florida 34787 Dr. Susan Moxley, Superintendent Lake County Schools 201 West Burleigh Boulevard Tavares, Florida 32778-2496 Deborah K. Kearney, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Dr. Eric J. Smith Commissioner of Education Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue Whether Respondent's teacher's certificate should be revoked pursuant to Section 231.28, Florida Statutes, for alleged sale of marijuana, as set forth in Petition, dated May 11, 1979. The parties stipulated to the expected testimony of Petitioner's witnesses, and Respondent did not call any witnesses at the hearing. The parties further stipulated to the admission of Petitioner's Exhibits 1-5 and to Respondent's Composite Exhibit 1. This is an administrative proceeding whereby the Petitioner seeks to take adverse action concerning the teaching certificate of the Respondent based on an allegation the Respondent sold marijuana to a police officer on September 1, 1978. The matter was reported by the Superintendent, Polk County Public Schools, to Petitioner by letter of February 21, 1979. (Petitioner's Exhibit 3) The Petition herein was thereafter filed pursuant to directions of the State Commissioner of Education who on May 11, 1979, found probable cause to justify disciplinary action under the provisions of Section 231.28, Florida Statutes. Respondent requested an administrative hearing by Answer, dated May 22, 1979. Respondent filed a prehearing Motion to Strike the Petition on the grounds that the Polk County Superintendent improperly referred the matter to Petitioner on the basis of Respondent's nolo contendere plea in a criminal proceeding, and had suspended her from employment without an evidentiary hearing. The motion further alleged that Petitioner based its probable cause finding upon hearsay evidence and that it has no authority to make a finding of criminal guilt without a judicial adjudication of the same. Respondent's Motion is denied. Petitioner's Rule 6A-4.37, Florida Administrative Code, prescribes procedures for revoking or suspending certificates. It provides, inter alia, that when a superintendent has "cause to believe" that a certificate holder is "guilty of any offense" for which the penalty is revocation or suspension, it is his duty to file a "signed report" with any supporting documentation with Petitioner. Such a report merely triggers an investigation by Petitioner's staff for consideration by its Executive Committee and ultimate finding of probable cause by the Commissioner of Education. All of these procedures are preliminary in nature. No definitive action can be taken against a certificate holder and no final adverse action may be taken without an opportunity for an adversary hearing. The cases cited by Respondent in support of the notion deal with evidentiary standards for the issuance of final orders and do not relate to such preliminary matters. Petitioner observed the requirements of its rules procedurally in this case.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Judy A. Cain holds Florida Teaching Certificate No. 339186, Post Graduate Rank II, valid through June 30, 1983, covering the areas of English and junior college. She was employed in the public schools of Polk County at Wahneta Elementary School as a teacher in September, 1978. (Stipulation) During the evening of September 1, 1978, a police officer of the City of Dundee, Florida, who was working in an undercover capacity, had a conversation with a woman later identified as Respondent and another woman named "Candy" at Walker's Bar in Dundee. They told the officer that they were going to buy a "bag" and get "high." The officer asked if they knew where he could pick up a "bag," and Respondent told him that she would have to have money to get it herself. The officer gave Respondent $20.00 and the two women left the establishment. They returned a short time later, and the woman known as Candy took a plastic bag containing a brownish vegetable matter from her purse and both women stated that it was "dynamite dope." Thereafter, laboratory tests established that the bag contained 18 grams of marijuana. (Stipulated testimony of Castro, Petitioner's Exhibit 1) On October 17, 1978, Respondent was arrested for the offense of sale of marijuana. On February 8, 1979, upon Respondent's plea of nolo contendere to sale and possession of a controlled substance, in the Polk County Circuit Court, an order was issued by the Court withholding adjudication of guilt and placing the Respondent on probation for a period of three years. Respondent was dismissed from employment by the School Board of Polk County on May 21, 1979, for immorality based on the sale of marijuana. Evidence concerning the foregoing disposition of judicial and school board proceedings was received at the hearing upon stipulation of the parties, but will not be considered herein for purposes of determining grounds for disciplinary action under Section 231.28, F.S. (Stipulated testimony of Castro, Wilson, Petitioner's Exhibits 1- 2, 5) In the opinion of Respondent's former principal, the Polk County School Board Director of Employee Relations, the Chairman of the School Board, and several parents, a teacher who commits the offense of sale of marijuana would thereby set an improper example for students and seriously reduce the teacher's effectiveness as an employee of the school system. (Stipulated testimony of Miles, S. Wilson, Qualls, D. Wilson, Aggelis, supplemented by Petitioner's Exhibit 4) During the school year 1975-76 in the Polk County School System, Respondent received a "satisfactory" rating on her annual teacher assessment report. She received the highest rating of "good" during the 1976-77 school year, and a "satisfactory" rating for the 1977-78 year. (Respondent's Composite Exhibit 1)
Recommendation That Respondent's teaching certificate be revoked for a period of two years. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of February, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of February, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: J. David Holder, Esquire 110 North Magnolia Drive Suite 224 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Wallace L. Storey Post Office Box 796 Bartow, Florida 33830 Hugh Ingram, Administrator Professional Practices Council 319 West Madison Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent is guilty of an unlawful employment practice by discrimination against Petitioner on the basis of handicap.1/
Findings Of Fact Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination arises out of her employment with Respondent Children's Home Society (CHS) and a series of medical leaves in the years 2000-2001, which ultimately resulted in loss of her position. Respondent CHS is a non-profit social service organization established over 100 years ago. It is the oldest private child welfare service in Florida. It provides a range of services for the benefit of children and families throughout the state, including but not limited to counseling and support services, adoption, residential care, and home-based services. Petitioner appeared at the November 7, 2003, disputed- fact hearing using a cane. The undersigned observed that she seemed to experience pain at movement of her back and one leg. She presented no supportive medical evidence that she is currently disabled/handicapped and little to explain the cause of her present mobility problems or when they first appeared, except that one of her explanations for her current condition is that she was held against her will in a psychiatric center, in June 2002, pursuant to a circuit court Order, and at that time she fell and broke her back and leg. This occurred a year after Respondent had declared Petitioner's position vacant. Petitioner also testified that on March 29, 1999, on her way to work with CHS, her back and legs were injured, her face was crushed, and her teeth were shattered in an automobile accident that totaled her car. There is no evidence that she was off work with CHS for any period of time in 1999 or that any workers' compensation claim was made by her to CHS at that time. Petitioner did request a wage statement from CHS in connection with some automobile insurance claims in 1999. Also, in 2001, Petitioner also made a claim to CHS's insurance company for long-term disability benefits on the basis of this automobile accident, as more fully described below.3/ It is significant that her September 29, 2001 Charge of Discrimination did not list her back and legs as her handicap. Her November 14, 2002 Petition for Relief mentions the 1999 automobile accident. In 2000-2001, Petitioner was Program Supervisor I for CHS's Healthy Families Program in the Lake County area of CHS's Mid-Florida Division. She was in charge of the North Lake area, which encompasses Fruitland Park, Tavares, Leesburg, Lady Lake, Mt. Dora, Astor, Paisley, Sorrento, and other unincorporated areas of North Lake County. The Healthy Families Program is a very demanding one. Its Program Supervisors I have multiple and complicated responsibilities. As a Program Supervisor I for the Healthy Families Program, it was Petitioner's job to provide hands-on supervision to six paraprofessional Family Support Workers (FSW); ensure that rigorous program standards were maintained by them and other paraprofessionals and interns through weekly (two-hour minimum) formal staffings of each case; conduct ongoing case file reviews for quality of documentation; conduct year-end performance evaluations of supervised staff through information gained during the weekly staffings, file reviews, data related to stated objectives, home visits, and telephone quality assurance contacts with all clients; coordinate activities among and between staff (such as Christmas food and toy drives); coordinate comprehensive training and orientation for staff; provide staff with ongoing coaching throughout program implementation; oversee new case staffing and assignments with Family Assessment Workers (FAW); provide professional intervention for difficult cases; conduct joint home visits with all case load families every quarter; generate and/or oversee the reporting of program data; provide monthly comprehensive regular reports to a Program Manager on the status of all program activity; provide home visits and documentation in the absence of an FSW; cross-train to be an FAW; and assume new case assessment and documentation in the absence of an FAW. Program supervisors, with peers, conduct six to eight weeks of intensive training for each new FSW. After the initial training, the Supervisor is responsible for an additional 40 hours of ongoing training. The weekly staffing on every case is mandatory. Healthy Families Florida allows no excuses for a missed staffing on even one case in one caseload in one week. The program either meets the standard or it does not. This is also true for program objectives in which seventeen measurable goals must be met for every case. Program supervisors are required to assure constant and accurate data entry of all program information. Accuracy and timeliness of the data provide a measure of the program's success or failure in achieving program objectives. Program supervisors must meet every new family within the first month of service and conduct joint home visits with each family each quarter. Quality assurance telephone calls must be conducted with each family every quarter. Case files must be reviewed constantly to assure that the required documentation is in place. Finally, program supervisors must meet with the Health Families Program Specialist each quarter for a file audit and program review. In June 2000, Petitioner took her first Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave. She was out on FMLA leave for four weeks and two days, returning in July 2000. During this period of time, Petitioner gave birth to a live male infant. The child died while Petitioner was strapped to the table in the delivery room and hospital personnel dropped the infant. Quite naturally, this tragic event, over which she had no control, caused Petitioner psychological trauma and enormous grief. She also maintained that the lack of appropriate after-care at that time might have resulted in her subsequent need for FMLA leave and a hysterectomy, as more fully described below. CHS's FMLA policy was contained in its Employee Handbook. In 1995, Petitioner acknowledged, in writing, receipt of the Employee Handbook. In 1996, CHS's leave policies were amended, and a clear equal employment opportunity and anti- discrimination policy was added to the Handbook. Petitioner maintained that she had signed the receipt for the Handbook before the foregoing amendments. That testimony by Petitioner is credible, but it is also clear that Petitioner subsequently became aware of CHS's leave policy via explanations in a series of letters to her from CHS's Human Resources Department over the course of her second FMLA leave of absence, which began in November 2000. FMLA leave is calculated on a twelve-month rolling calendar period. Under the FMLA, Petitioner was guaranteed reinstatement to her former position as Program Supervisor I or an equivalent job with the same pay, benefits, terms, and conditions of employment as long as her total FMLA leave (including all leave periods) did not exceed twelve weeks in a twelve-month period. CHS characterizes all medical leave as FMLA leave if the employee is eligible for FMLA leave. CHS requires that accrued paid vacation and sick leave be utilized before utilizing unpaid FMLA leave. This allows the employee to draw full salary and continue to receive health insurance benefits as long as possible before having to resort to unpaid leave, but it means that FMLA leave, vacation leave, and sick leave are depleted simultaneously. CHS automatically offers any employee who is on FMLA leave for a serious health condition an opportunity to convert the leave to disability leave after his or her FMLA leave expires. Under this CHS leave policy, an employee does not have to be handicapped or disabled to qualify for disability leave. At all times material, Julie Ormond, Healthy Families Program Manager, was Petitioner's immediate supervisor. Ms. Ormond reported to Glenna Osborne. Glenna Osborne was the Director of Program Operations for CHS's Mid-Florida Division. She supervised three programs: Family Builders, Healthy Families, and Responsible Fatherhood. Ms. Osborne was in charge of 77 employees and 10 supervisors. Ms. Osborne has a Master's Degree in Human Development and 25 years' experience in management. On or about October 11, 2000, Ms. Ormond wrote a memo to two Healthy Families supervisors, one of whom was Petitioner. The memo detailed certain problems with both supervisors' areas: supervision duties, data entry requirements, and report completions. Ms. Ormond requested that the problems be corrected and in place no later than October 30, 2000. On November 3, 2000 and November 7, 2000, Ms. Ormond copied Ms. Osborne with memos sent only to Petitioner on the same dates, detailing that some of Petitioner's programs had serious problems, now including complete absences of some data entry, late data entry, and both failure to classify and inaccuracy of classification of some clients. There also were problems in Petitioner's area with meeting State requirements and registering childhood immunizations. Petitioner was instructed to resolve the problems in her area as soon as possible. Ms. Ormond also copied Ms. Osborne with a memo along the same lines, dated November 7, 2000, from another CHS employee, Jean Plescow. When data entry is incomplete or late, it is not always possible to readily determine whether the problem is just a delayed data entry or if there also has been an actual failure to accomplish the act, plans, staffings, trainings, and immunizations for which the data was supposed to be entered. Over time, as related more fully below, it appeared that there were more problems with Petitioner's job performance, and the performance of the staff she supposedly had trained, than merely a failure to transpose information to a computer from other records. Before her work problems had been resolved, Petitioner went out a second time on leave associated with a medical problem. It was Petitioner's affirmative duty to apply for leave initially and to seek extensions, if necessary, of any leave granted. Although Petitioner testified that she filled out all the vacation and sick leave forms necessary before going out on "medical leave"; that she left in October 2000; and that when she left, she fully intended to be back at work before her accrued vacation and sick leave ran out, the following facts are found upon the greater weight of the credible evidence as a whole. At Petitioner's request dated November 21, 2000, CHS again placed her on FMLA leave as of that date. Petitioner's last day of work before this second period of FMLA leave was November 19, 2000. On November 21, 2000, Petitioner informed CHS that she expected to return to work on or about January 23, 2001. Ms. Osborne's testimony was credible to the effect that she believed that Petitioner was going out on leave in November 2000 for surgery related to the June 2000 birth of Petitioner's child and not for surgery related to any prior automobile accident. Ms. Osborne is also credible that although she knew that Petitioner had been in an automobile accident in 1999, she never knew the extent of Petitioner's injuries from that accident and had never received any doctors' reports or any requests for accommodation of a handicap from Petitioner. Ms. Osborne did not perceive Petitioner as handicapped for any reason at any time between 1999 and November 19, 2000. Petitioner claimed that she only took the Program Supervisor I job on the condition "that if it were too hard, I could have my old [CHS] job back." Petitioner testified about how excellent she believed she performed her Program Supervisor I job prior to November 19, 2000, and that her work was up to date and commendatory when she took her second medical leave. She further stated that, as of November 19, 2000, she had accrued enough vacation and sick leave to cover the time she expected to be out on her second medical leave. Upon the facts found in Findings of Fact 23 and 24, it is further found that Petitioner never requested or received from CHS any workplace accommodations for a handicap dealing with her back or legs prior to her absence beginning in November 2000. Furthermore, all the medical excuses Petitioner supplied to CHS after November 19, 2000, support a finding that iron deficiency anemia from a uterine fibroid and a surgical hysterectomy with resultant recovery time caused Petitioner's absence from work after November 19, 2000, even though Petitioner supplied a different explanation to CHS's long-term disability insurance company after her leave ran out, as more fully discussed below. As Director of CHS's Mid-Florida Division's Human Resources Department, Linda Barry was responsible, in 2000-2001 for implementing and interpreting CHS's policies and procedures; benefits administration; approving transfers and promotions; approving and administering FMLA leaves and other leaves of absence; making termination decisions; and keeping apprised of CHS's hiring needs. On November 28, 2000, Ms. Barry sent, and Petitioner received, a letter advising that because of her June 2000 leave, only seven weeks and two days remained of Petitioner's FMLA leave and requesting that Petitioner complete and return the FMLA paperwork. In the meantime, Ms. Osborne assessed the North Lake staffing situation and documented her concerns in a November 30, 2000 memo to Ms. Ormand. Ms. Osborne noted some of Petitioner's program documentation was satisfactory and some was exemplary, but that there still existed serious problems with missing, incomplete, or inaccurate program documentation and inadequate training and supervision of Petitioner's team. Ms. Osborne requested that Ms. Ormand bring these deficiencies to Petitioner's attention as soon as Petitioner returned from FMLA leave, and that if Ms. Osborne's observations were confirmed by Ms. Ormand, the problems should be addressed at that time by Ms. Ormond in Petitioner's evaluation. During Petitioner's absence beginning November 19, 2000 and continuing into 2001, three other area supervisors performed their own full-time responsibilities and divided Petitioner's job responsibilities among themselves. Janie Counts, Sumter County Supervisor, traveled several times a week to provide fill-in supervision for two of Petitioner's FSWs. The South Lake Supervisor, Stephanie Ellis, provided fill-in supervision for two more of Petitioner's FSWs. Ms. Ormand traveled from Tavares to Leesburg to provide fill-in supervision for Petitioner's two remaining FSWs. If one of the three fill- in supervisors was ill or on leave, the remaining two fill-in supervisors oversaw Petitioner's two remaining FSWs, continued to cover their own teams, and covered the other absent supervisor's six FSWs. In the course of scrambling to carry on CHS's regular workload in Petitioner's absence, these three supervisors reported to Ormand and Osborne more problems they uncovered in Petitioner's operation. Ms. Counts sent Ormand and Osborne written reports. Her December 10, 2000 report reflected that Petitioner had left behind inadequate program documentation, had failed to prepare her supervision notes, had missing family support plan updates, had late data and missing data, and had failed to provide adequate training to her FSWs. Ms. Counts reported to Ormand and Osborne in a December 15, 2003 memo that she had uncovered even more problems that had existed in Petitioner's program before Petitioner went on leave. She also related that Petitioner had come to the office that day for the office's Christmas Lunch. CHS's FMLA leave policy required the existence of a "serious health condition." A doctor's certification supporting an FMLA leave is required. Physicians are provided an instruction sheet explaining the definition of "serious health condition", so they can categorize the patient's illness. Sometime in December 2000, Petitioner's doctor, Dr. Grousse, provided Ms. Barry with medical certifications to support Petitioner's then-current FMLA leave. Dr. Grousse listed Petitioner's condition as severe iron deficiency anemia and stated that she needed a hysterectomy soon. Dr. Grousse advised that Petitioner could not perform any work at that time. On December 20, 2000, Ms. Barry sent Petitioner a memo explaining her FMLA leave rights and requesting a medical certification from her surgeon. She also informed Petitioner of CHS's policy of applying vacation and sick leave concurrent with FMLA leave and stated the balance of Petitioner's FMLA leave remaining after her leave in June 2000 had been seven weeks and three days. She noted that as of CHS's December 15, 2000 payroll, Petitioner had 313.32 hours accrued vacation time and 124.22 hours accrued sick time. On December 27, 2000, Dr. Boggus provided Ms. Barry with medical certification to support Petitioner's FMLA leave. He indicated that Petitioner needed pelvic surgery, that she could not perform any work at that time, and that she would need six weeks off work after the surgery for recovery. He categorized Petitioner's condition as a "1" and "2", which meant that her condition required a stay in the hospital and a work absence plus treatment. He did not categorize her condition as "chronic" (requiring periodic treatment), nor did he categorize her condition as "permanent/long term" (requiring supervision). In the meantime, Petitioner's job duties still had to be covered and her team re-educated and brought up to grade if CHS's program objectives were to be met. Ms. Barry sent, and Petitioner received, a certified letter dated January 10, 2001, advising Petitioner that her FMLA leave would expire on January 12, 2001; extending her leave to January 22, 2001, as unpaid disability leave; advising her that she could continue to use any remaining accrued vacation time; and requesting that she submit a physician's statement for any leave she would require beyond January 22, 2001. The FMLA does not require that employees who are absent more than 12 weeks in a 12 month-period be returned to the same or a comparable position. Significantly, Ms. Barry's January 10, 2001 letter stated that although it was not guaranteed that Petitioner's Program Supervisor I position would be available when she was ready to return from leave, an effort would be made to place Petitioner in her previous position or a comparable one, or if no such position were available when Petitioner was ready to come back, she might be eligible for re- hire should a position later become available and her past work history warranted re-hire. The crucial point here is that CHS expressed no obligation to hold Petitioner's job for her after her FMLA leave ran out, but stated that it would try to give her a job in the same capacity when she returned. In fact, on January 12, 2001, Petitioner had her hysterectomy, which, according to Dr. Boggus's December 27, 2000 certification, meant that Petitioner would have then needed an additional six weeks, or until approximately February 23, 2001, before she could return to work in any capacity. However, Petitioner's FMLA leave expired on January 12, 2001. She did not contact CHS until after that date, and only then did she send in medical information about the date of her surgery. (See Finding of Fact 45.) By the time Petitioner's FMLA leave had expired on January 12, 2001, the fill-in supervisors had reported to Ms. Osborne that they were burned out with having to work their own full loads and also deal with the deficiencies left behind by Petitioner. One fill-in supervisor found it impossible to find the time to retrain the two FSWs assigned her from Petitioner's team while trying to maintain her own workload as a full-time supervisor. Another fill-in supervisor requested a transfer to a less demanding program and a demotion. By the middle of January 2001, Osborne and Barry had concluded that the undue hardship on the fill-in supervisors was so great that it was impossible to hold Petitioner's position open any longer. They felt to do so would seriously compromise the extent and quality of services that CHS could offer its clients and would jeopardize the well being of the other supervisors who were covering for Petitioner. Faced with Petitioner's not returning to work in any capacity for an indeterminate period of time, Barry and Osborne decided they had no choice but to replace Petitioner when her FMLA leave expired. According to Ms. Barry, Dr. Neil Finkler provided a medical certification update on behalf of Petitioner to her "toward the end of January 2001." Because Dr. Finkler's undated certification is referenced in her January 23, 2001 letter to Petitioner (see Finding of Fact 46), it is concluded that Ms. Barry received Dr. Finkler's certification before January 23, 2001, and probably received it by the January 22, 2001 date she had required in her January 10, 2001 letter for a reply from Petitioner. Dr. Finkler's certification advised that surgery had been performed on January 12, 2001, and that Petitioner would be incapacitated until February 23, 2001. Dr. Finkler categorized Petitioner as a "1", which is defined as requiring a stay in the hospital and a work absence plus subsequent treatment. Dr. Finkler did not categorize Petitioner's condition as chronic, requiring periodic treatment or as a permanent/long term condition requiring supervision. On January 23, 2001, Ms. Barry sent, and Petitioner received, a certified letter confirming that CHS had received Dr. Finkler's certification; notifying Petitioner that CHS had extended her leave to February 23, 2001, as unpaid disability leave, but that Petitioner could continue to use any remaining accrued vacation time; notifying her that as of CHS's January 15, 2001 payroll, her vacation balance was 269.54 hours; and advising that when Petitioner was ready to return to work she would have to provide a fitness-for-duty certification. The letter also stated: Because the operations of CHS require that vacant positions be filled, a disability leave of absence does not guarantee that your job will be available when you return. An effort, however, will be made to place you in your previous position or a comparable one. If no such position is available, you may be eligible for re-hire should a position become available for which you are qualified and your work history warrants rehire. The representation that an effort would be made to return Petitioner to her former position was probably untrue, given that Ms. Barry already knew that a replacement had to be hired soon. However, comparable positions might be available. (See Findings of Fact 48 and 49.) On January 26, 2001, Ms. Counts submitted a report of her fill-in supervision for Petitioner to Ms. Ormand. She reported that Petitioner's subordinates had not been trained by Petitioner on charting requirements and had not even been given certain forms. Effective January 29, 2001, after the automatic extension to January 22, 2001, given Petitioner in Ms. Barry's January 10, 2001 letter, had expired, but before the February 23, 2001 extension specified in Ms. Barry's January 23, 2001 letter, had been reached, CHS selected Belinda Henson to replace Petitioner as the Program Supervisor I for the Healthy Families Program in Lake County. Ms. Hensen would be on probation for six months, but she was considered a permanent employee as of her date of hire, to the extent that she would not be ousted from Petitioner's old Program Supervisor I position even if Petitioner chose to return to work. Although Petitioner was replaced as Program Supervisor I in her area on January 29, 2001, CHS still considered Petitioner to be an employee on leave status. CHS did not foreclose the possibility that it could have other Program Supervisor I openings available when Petitioner was ready to return from her leave. On February 16, 2001, Ms. Ormand sent a memo to Ms. Barry and Ms. Osborne, stating the problems with Petitioner's past job performance as expressed by the fill-in supervisors. When Petitioner's extended leave expired on February 23, 2001, Ms. Barry sent, and Petitioner received, a letter of that date, stating that CHS had not received any further medical certification to authorize leave beyond February 23, 2001, and that if Petitioner needed to continue her leave, she must provide an updated physician's statement showing such leave to be necessary. Ms. Barry's letter also informed Petitioner that her previous position had been filled, but Should you be able to return to work, an effort will be made to place you in a comparable position, should one be available. If no such position is available, you may be eligible for rehire as a new employee if you should apply for an available position in the future. On February 27, 2001, Petitioner faxed Ms. Barry a copy of a note from Dr. Boggus, advising, "No lifting over 5 lbs for one month. She may return 25 hours/wk for next one month." Dr. Finkler also provided a note stating that Petitioner could return to work on February 27, 2001, "but only work up to 25 hours/week with no heavy lifting for the next 1 month." There were no part-time openings in the Mid-Florida Division as of February 27, 2001. Petitioner's accrued paid vacation leave must have run out at about this time. Ms. Barry sent, and Petitioner received, a certified letter dated March 5, 2001, advising Petitioner that Ms. Barry had received the two doctors' notes restricting Petitioner to part-time work and that there were no part-time positions currently available in CHS's Mid-Florida Division. However, Ms. Barry extended Petitioner's leave for one month to March 27, 2001, the time period of her restriction to part-time work. Petitioner could have applied in other CHS divisions for any available part-time position for which she was qualified. The record is silent as to whether there were any such part-time positions available then, but it affirmatively appears that Petitioner did not inquire into, or apply for, any part-time positions that may have been available outside of the Mid-Florida Division. Petitioner testified that she drove to a CHS office in Orlando either to get copies of her records or to apply for a position (her purpose is not entirely clear from her testimony). Because the parking lot was undergoing excavation, she just drove away. This is not a reasonable explanation for not applying for a position.4/ As set out above, Petitioner had established a pattern of not taking affirmative action to timely supply the necessary medical information to Ms. Barry. Petitioner repeatedly had waited until her leave expired before submitting any medical documentation. Nonetheless, CHS still considered her an employee through March 27, 2001.5/ Petitioner testified that she made an unemployment compensation claim and CHS fought it. She further testified that she was denied her unemployment compensation benefits, but someone in the Governor's Office intervened and she was then paid one unemployment compensation check only. The testimony concerning the Governor's Office is uncorroborated and not credible. However, Exhibit P-7, shows that on January 3, 2002, an Unemployment Compensation Appeals Referee entered a "Decision", which reads, in pertinent part, as follows: Issues involved: SEPARATION: Whether the claimant [Petitioner] was discharged for misconduct connected with work or voluntarily left work without good cause (including cause attributable to the employing unit or illness or disability of the claimant requiring separation); pursuant to Sections 443.101(1), (9), (10), (11); 443.036(29), Florida Statutes; and Rule 38B- 3.020, Florida Administrative Code. LEAVE: Whether the claimant's unemployment is due to a leave of absence voluntarily initiated by the claimant, pursuant to Sections 443.036(28) and 443.101(1)(c), Florida Statutes. Findings of Fact: the claimant became employed by a children's home in August, 1994. Her last position was program supervisor. The employer was subject to the terms of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). In June, 2000, the claimant used four weeks and two days of FMLA leave. That left a remaining balance of FMLA leave of seven weeks and three days to be used within 12 months. Effective November 21, 2000, the claimant again began FMLA leave which expired on January 12, 2001. At that time the claimant was unable to return to the full duties of her position because of a temporary disability. The employer had no part-time, light duty work for the claimant. The employer did not terminate her employment, but could no longer guarantee the claimant her position would be held open for her after the FMLA leave expired. The claimant underwent surgery on January 12, 2001. When she was released by her physician for full duty work, her position had been filled. The claimant filed an initial claim for unemployment benefits effective March 18, 2001. Conclusions of law: The law provides that a claimant shall be disqualified for benefits for any week of unemployment due to a leave of absence, if the leave of absence was voluntarily initiated by the claimant. A bona fide leave of absence exists only when the employer and claimant have agreed upon a specific term and the claimant is guaranteed reinstatement to the same or a substantially similar position upon expiration of the leave. The testimony in this case shows that the employer did not guarantee reinstatement to the clamant after her FMLA leave expired on January 12, 2001. Therefore, the claimant was not on a bona fide leave of absence after January 12, 2001, and she was not on a bona fide leave of absence when she filed her initial claim for unemployment benefits. When the claimant did not return to work upon the expiration of the bona fide leave of absence, she became separated from her employment. Because it was the claimant who did not return to her full duty position at that time, and not the employer preventing her from returning to her full duty position, the job separation is considered a voluntary leaving. The law provides that a claimant who has voluntarily left work without good cause as defined in the statute shall be disqualified from receiving benefits. "Good cause" includes only such cause as is attributable to the employing unit or which consists of an illness or a disability of the claimant requiring separation from the work. The term "work" means any work, whether full- time, part-time or temporary. The record and evidence in this case show that the claimant voluntarily separated from her employment on January 13, 2001, because she underwent surgery on January 12, 2001, and she was unable to return to work due to a temporary disability. Thus, the claimant became separated from her employment due to a disability requiring separation. Accordingly, it is held that the claimant voluntarily left her employment with good cause consisting of a disability requiring separation, and she is not disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. Decision: The determination of the claims adjudicator dated April 16, 2001, is MODIFIED to hold that the claimant voluntarily left her employment with good cause consisting of a disability requiring separation. [Bracketed material and emphasis supplied] It is not certain from the record herein that the foregoing January 3, 2002, unemployment compensation decision ever became final, pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Even if final, and therefore binding on the parties, the decision was made under statutory definitions and tests different from those found in Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and therefore, the decision is not binding in this case. However, the decision remains instructive as to matters of timeline, such as when CHS knew that Petitioner was claiming to be handicapped and from what cause. (See, below.) Clearly, it appears that Petitioner was not acknowledging any back and leg trouble to the unemployment compensation forum at least as late April 16, 2001, and probably not as of January 3, 2002. Accordingly, it is found, on the basis of Exhibit P-7, that on March 18, 2001, Petitioner filed an initial claim for unemployment compensation benefits. Exhibit P-7 shows that the claim was apparently defended through CHS's Winter Park Office, and the record is unclear as to when Ms. Barry, whose office was located in Jacksonville, or Ms. Osborne, whose office was located in Tavares, found out about the claim. (However, see Findings of Fact 67 and 74.) Because Ms. Barry had not received any further medical certification from Petitioner before Petitioner's leave extension expired on March 27, 2001, she legitimately could have terminated Petitioner's employment on the basis that Petitioner had neither returned to work nor requested an extension of her leave. Instead, On April 3, 2001, Ms. Barry sent, and Petitioner received, a letter advising that CHS had not received any further medical certification indicating Petitioner needed leave beyond March 27, 2001, and stating that Petitioner needed to provide medical certification if she had a continued medical need preventing her from returning to work or that required continued restrictions in the type of work she could perform. The letter further stated that if Petitioner were able to return to work, she must submit a fitness-for-duty certification. Ms. Barry requested that Petitioner submit any documentation regarding her medical status no later than April 16, 2001. On April 4, 2001, Ms. Barry received a telephone call from an attorney, Mr. Larry Colleton, requesting information on how Petitioner could apply for long-term disability insurance benefits. Ms. Barry did not believe Petitioner was eligible for long-term disability benefits because Petitioner had already been released for part-time work (see Finding of Fact 52), but she sent Petitioner an explanation of long-term disability benefits, including information that they applied to any employee who was disabled for six months or longer; an explanatory booklet; and forms to apply directly to the insurance company for that type of benefit. Ms. Barry copied Mr. Colleton with her explanatory cover letter to Petitioner. Exhibit P-7 shows Mr. Colleton as Petitioner's lawyer in the unemployment compensation case. The record is silent as to whether Ms. Barry knew, on April 4, 2001, that there was an unemployment compensation claim or of Mr. Colleton's involvement therein. Ms. Barry testified that she did not interpret Mr. Colleton's telephone request concerning long-term disability benefits to be notification of a handicap or a request for an accommodation for a handicap. On April 11, 2001, Petitioner faxed Ms. Barry a March 28, 2001 letter from Dr. Boggus advising that although Petitioner had been "completely and totally disabled from her usual occupation through March 23," she was now cleared to return to work. The fax also included a copy of Petitioner's completed application form for long-term disability benefits directed to CHS's insurance company. This form, signed by Petitioner, represented that she was disabled due to the 1999 automobile accident and the absence of any jobs within CHS that fit her limitations. Upon receiving the application for long-term disability benefits signed by Petitioner, Ms. Barry assumed that Petitioner would thereafter deal directly with CHS's insurance company to support her application for long-term disability benefits, including sending it a medical excuse dated after the March 28, 2001 release by Dr. Boggus, which Ms. Barry had received. Ms. Barry submitted the employer portion of the long- term disability paperwork to the insurance company on April 30, 2001. Exhibit P-7 shows that on April 16, 2001, an unemployment compensation claims adjudicator entered an order, which held Petitioner ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits. The undersigned is persuaded that this would be the last date reasonable to suppose that Ms. Barry did not know about the unemployment compensation claim. By letter dated May 9, 2001, the long-term disability insurance company sent Petitioner a letter requesting a statement from her doctor to support her long-term disability application. Ms. Barry received a copy of this letter. By letter dated June 4, 2001, the insurance company advised Petitioner that because Petitioner had previously been asked for proof of disability, and disability documentation had not been received, the insurance company was closing her file on long-term disability benefits. Ms. Barry received a copy of this letter, too. The last medical release that Ms. Barry ever received from Petitioner was Dr. Boggus's unrestricted return to work release, dated March 28, 2001, which Ms. Barry received on April 11, 2001. (See Finding of Fact 65.) By letter dated June 11, 2001, Ms. Barry notified Petitioner that she was being removed as an active CHS employee and that CHS was closing her personnel file because she had not submitted any doctor's certification indicating a medical need for a continued leave of absence and she also had not applied for any vacant open positions within CHS. This letter was the effective termination of Petitioner by Respondent. The decision to terminate Petitioner was made by Ms. Barry and Ms. Osborne. There is no persuasive evidence that, between March 28, 2001, when she was medically released to return to work and June 11, 2001, when she was terminated, Petitioner had applied for any CHS positions. Barry and Osborne each credibly testified that they had no reason to believe at any time material that Petitioner was handicapped, because Petitioner's physician, Dr. Boggus, had released her as being fully able to perform the functions of her job on March 28, 2001, and as of the date of her termination, Petitioner had never complained to Barry or Osborne that she believed that she was being discriminated against on any basis. On June 19, 2001, after the first unemployment compensation decision which apparently went against her (see Finding of Fact 67), Petitioner wrote Heidi Burkett, an employee in the same Jacksonville CHS Human Resources Office as Ms. Barry. The letter referenced Petitioner's unemployment compensation claim number. By this letter, Petitioner requested reinstatement to the position of "Program Supervisor in the Lake County area or an elevated position." This letter mentioned nothing about any handicap. On June 19, 2001, there were no Program Supervisor I openings in CHS, and Petitioner was not qualified for a position above Program Supervisor I. Petitioner testified that she had a "Paralegal Master's," but in Ms. Osborne's view, that degree would not render Petitioner eligible for any open elevated position. Petitioner would have had to have an advanced degree in a field related to childcare or in social work in order to fit the qualifications of any higher position with CHS. Furthermore, Petitioner would not have been promoted to an elevated position until her supervisors had an opportunity to work with her to make sure she had resolved the performance issues which were uncovered in her Program Supervisor I position while she was on leave. There is no evidence that Petitioner made any further contacts after her June 19, 2001 letter in an attempt to return to CHS, or that she applied for, or expressed any interest in, any positions below Program Supervisor I inside or outside of Lake County. The September 29, 2001 Charge of Discrimination was the first notice Ms. Barry had that Petitioner was claiming discrimination. Petitioner claims that after June 2001, she was gainfully employed as a teacher "for a while" by the Lake County School Board and/or a technical institute. She did not demonstrate that any accommodation for handicap was necessary in these employments. The record is silent as to her earnings since her separation from CHS.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief and Charge of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of March 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 2004.
The Issue A notice dated July 2, 1996 and an administrative complaint dated September 30, 1996, charge Respondent with willful neglect of duty. The issue for disposition is whether he committed this violation and if so, whether he should be terminated as a member of the instructional staff of the Palm Beach County School Board.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Walter Auerbach, has been employed as a classroom teacher with the Palm Beach County school district since the 1976-77 school year and is employed pursuant to a continuing contract from which he may be discharged only in accordance with the terms of section 231.36, Florida Statutes. (Stipulation of the parties) Respondent was administratively placed in the district’s Department of Information Management in the 1994-95 school year pending resolution of allegations of misconduct brought by a female student. He was transferred to the district’s textbook/library media service office for the 1995-96 school year. (Stipulation of the parties) The reassignment was by agreement between Respondent’s representative, Clarence Gunn, Associate Executive Director of the Palm Beach County Classroom Teachers’ Association (CTA) and district staff. In December 1994, Respondent entered into a deferred prosecution agreement in the criminal case related to the student’s allegations. An investigation and proceedings by Professional Practices Services continued, however, and any disposition of that proceeding is not a matter of record here. Respondent satisfied the terms of his deferred prosecution agreement in December 1995. Jane Terwillegar was Respondent’s supervisor in the district’s library media services department. His duties were primarily computer searches for bibliographic records. When he came to work Respondent did his assignments, worked quietly and left; there were no concerns about his performance. However, he attended only sporadically in the fall of 1995, and starting in January 1996 he attended very rarely. At one point Ms. Terwillegar said something to him about showing up to earn his money, but he responded that he had a great deal of sick leave. By early 1996, Respondent had depleted all of his sick leave, but continued to be absent far more than he attended. Vernon Crawford is the district’s director of multimedia services and is Jane Terwillegar’s immediate supervisor. Because of budget cuts in his department, Mr. Crawford has a standing request for assistance from employees with available time. He is happy to take on individuals placed on special or temporary assignment by Dr. Walter Pierce, assistant superintendent for personnel relations. The understanding that he has with the personnel department is that the individuals are assigned on a temporary or day-to-day basis. Mr. Crawford does not question why the individual is assigned and he usually asks his staff not to question the circumstances. From time to time, Ms. Terwillegar advised Mr. Crawford that Respondent was absent; and after the first part of 1996, when the absences were increasing, Mr. Crawford sought the guidance of Dr. Pierce’s office in addressing the problem with Respondent. On the advice of Paul LaChance, an administrative assistant for employee relations, Mr. Crawford sent this letter to Respondent on April 17, 1996: Dear Mr. Auerbach: Since your interim assignment to the Department of Multimedia Services on August 15, 1995, you have taken one hundred twenty five (125) days of sick leave without medical documentation. You have not requested nor received approval for short term or long term leave of absence. Consequently, I am directing you to provide Jane Terwillegar, Specialist for Library/Media Support and your assigned supervisor, with a written, signed statement from your doctor documenting the necessity of your sick leave as well as a date when s/he projects you able to return to work. Your failure to provide this information within ten (10) days of receipt of this letter may result in my recommending disciplinary action for violation of proper reporting procedures and use of sick leave as outlined in School Board Policy 3.80, Leaves of Absence, and leave provisions contained in Article V, Section A.2 and Section B.1(f), and any other pertinent provision of the Agreement between the School Board of Palm Beach County and the Classroom Teachers Association. (Respondent’s exhibit 1) Respondent took the letter to his representative, Mr. Gunn, who told him to take a doctor’s statement to his supervisor, so that he could work out the appropriate leave based on the doctor’s determination. In response, Respondent turned in to Jane Terwillegar a statement from his chiropractor, Dr. Brian Soroka, dated April 26, 1996 stating: This is to certify that Walter Auerbach has recovered sufficiently to be able to return to regular work. Restrictions: none. (Petitioner’s exhibit 1) Instead of returning to work, Respondent continued his practice of calling in every morning early and leaving a message on the office answering machine. Jonathan Leahy, an employee in the Library/Media Services Department at the McKesson Building answered the phone when Respondent called in after 8:00 a.m., but most frequently he took Respondent’s messages from the answering machine. Starting in mid-April, at Mr. Crawford’s instruction, he wrote the messages down, verbatim. The messages were typically brief: “I’m not going to make it today”; or “I’m under the weather”; or, on a couple of occasions, Respondent said that he needed to meet with his lawyer. Between April 16 and June 14, 1996, Respondent was absent forty-two work days. Meanwhile, on May 7, 1996, Mr. Crawford sent another letter to Respondent: Dear Mr. Auerbach: Yesterday, May 6, 1996, Jane Terwillegar, your assigned supervisor, brought me a work release form from the Family Chiropractic Center, dated April 26, 1996, that you were able to return to regular work duty with no restrictions. Be advised that your actions to date remain in noncompliance with my April 17, 1996 letter to you. Further, even though the Family Chiropractic Center cleared you on April 26, 1996, to return to work, you have not done so and have remained continuously absent. At this point, I am directing you to provide me with the information I directed you in my April 17, 1996 letter to provide me: medical verification from your attending physician as to the specific reason(s) and need for your continual absenteeism. Such documentation is to be provided to Jane Terwillegar or to my office within five (5) working days from your receipt of this letter. Failure to provide this information may result in my recommending disciplinary action outlined in my April 17, 1996, letter which you received and signed for on April 18, 1996. (Petitioner’s exhibit 3) There was no response by Respondent to the May 7th letter and a meeting was convened on June 14, 1996 with Respondent, Mr. Gunn, Mr. LaChance and Mr. Crawford. Respondent was given another opportunity to present a physician’s statement justifying his absences. Respondent returned to Dr. Soroka and obtained this statement dated June 18, 1996: Mr. Auerbach has been treating in this office for low back pain and stress related complaints. He treats on a supportive care basis as his symptoms necessitate. On occasion, he is unable to work due to the severity of his symptoms. (Respondent’s exhibit 3) On July 2, 1996, the superintendent, Dr. Kowal, notified Respondent of her recommendation that he be terminated for willful neglect of duties based on his excessive use of sick leave without approved leave and his failure to return to duty after being released by his doctor. There are leave forms indicating that Respondent’s sick leave was “approved”. These forms are ordinarily turned in when an employee returns from an illness. Many of the forms were not completed or signed by Respondent, but rather were signed by someone else, when he never returned during a pay period and the forms needed to go to the payroll office. The leave forms are marked “approved”. Mr. Crawford approved the leave because Respondent called in and because Respondent was only a temporarily-assigned employee. Nevertheless, after the early part of 1996 when the absences increased in frequency, Mr. Crawford appropriately sought advice of the personnel office and he followed that advice regarding a physician’s statement to justify Respondent’s absences. Dr. Soroka was the only medical professional treating Respondent during the relevant period. Based on Respondent’s complaints to him, Dr. Soroka performed chiropractic adjustments to relieve muscle strains and irritations to his nervous system. Nothing in Dr. Soroka’s records indicated that Respondent was incapable of working and he never told Respondent to not return to work. Respondent contends that his absences were justified by the stress that he was suffering from his legal problems. He was the caregiver for aged and ailing parents; and he also suffered from anxiety attacks, headaches and lower back pain. Respondent’s contract with the district was for 196 days in the 1995/96 school year. Of those 196 days, he was absent approximately 167 days. The Collective Bargaining Agreement between Palm Beach County Classroom Teachers Association and the School District of Palm Beach County, Florida, July 1, 1995 - June 30, 1997, governs Respondent’s employment during the relevant period. Paid leave is available for illness of an employee and the employee’s family. All absences from duty must be covered by leave applications which are duly authorized. Leave for sickness or other emergencies will be deemed granted in advance if prompt report is made to the proper authority. When misuse of sick leave is suspected, the superintendent may investigate and require verification of illness. (Respondent’s exhibit 2, Collective Bargaining Agreement, Article V, Section A). When employees have used all accumulated leave, but are still qualified for sick leave, they are entitled to sick leave without pay. Except in emergency situations, short or long-term leaves of absences without pay must be approved in advance. As with paid leave, leave for sickness or other emergencies may be deemed granted in advance if prompt report is made to the proper authority. An eligible employee may be granted family medical leave under procedures described in the collective bargaining agreement. (Respondent’s exhibit 2, Collective Bargaining Agreement, Article V, Sections C and D) Respondent did not request leave in advance for his own illness or for that of his parents or for his meetings or depositions related to his pending professional practices case. Instead, he apparently relied on the automatic approval process described above when he called in day after day, for weeks at a time. By April it was entirely appropriate for his supervisor and her superiors to require that he provide some evidence of his need for leave. He failed to comply with two requests for that evidence. The collective bargaining agreement describes procedures for discipline of employees, including this: Without the consent of the employee and the Association, disciplinary action may not be taken against an employee except for just cause, and this must be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence which supports the recommended disciplinary action. The collective bargaining agreement also requires progressive discipline (reprimand through dismissal) ...[e]xcept in cases which clearly constitute a real and immediate danger to the district or the actions/inactions of the employee constitute such clearly flagrant and purposeful violations of reasonable school rules and regulations. (Respondent’s exhibit 2, Collective Bargaining Agreement, Section M)
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to an unpaid leave of absence from employment as a teacher of the Flagler School District, from July 1, 1996 until expiration of her commission as School Board member on November 19, 1996.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a teacher employed by the Flagler County School District. Petitioner has been employed for more than three years, has been recommended by the School Board and reappointed and has become eligible for, and has received, a Professional Services Contract with tenure. Petitioner has been employed by the Flagler County School System for six years. She is enrolled in the Florida Retirement System, and her eligible employment under that system consists entirely of her service in the Flagler County School System. Petitioner was appointed by the Governor as a School Board member on or about September 5, 1995. She had just begun School Year 1995-1996 as an elementary teacher at Bunnell Elementary School. Petitioner was appointed to serve as a School Board member until November 19, 1996. Her appointment expires upon the election and start of a member to fill the remaining two years of the term of a deceased member of the School Board. Following her appointment to the School Board, Petitioner applied for a leave of absence as teacher in order to take her position as a School Board member. Petitioner sought an unpaid leave of absence from the time of her appointment to the School Board until the end of the 1995-1996 School Year. The Superintendent recommended that her request be approved and the School Board approved it. At that time, the Superintendent made clear to her that any leave of absence beyond June 30, 1996 would be subject to the School Board's approval, notwithstanding the Superintendent's current or future recommendations. Petitioner's request for leave of absence near the commencement of School Year 1995-1996 presented no administrative inconvenience to the School District, and minimal disruption of the routine of her students. Petitioner was tendered renewal of her teaching contract for the 1996- 1997 School Year, apparently effective August 13, 1996. Petitioner timely applied to the Superintendent for an extension of her leave of absence as a teacher for that part of School Year 1996-1997 that overlapped the time up to the expiration of her term as a School Board member, November 19, 1996. The Superintendent recommended that Petitioner's request for extension of leave of absence without pay for the applicable portion of School Year 1996- 1997 be granted. In considering Petitioner's request for an extension of her leave of absence into School Year 1996-1997, the Superintendent considered the requirements of efficient operation of the School District, including tentative discussions with his staff about possible positions suitable to Petitioner's experience upon her projected return November 19, 1996 from her requested extended leave of absence. The position to which Petitioner has been appointed at Bunnell Elementary School commencing August 13, 1996 is not being held open by Respondent, but has been filled by another teacher irrespective of these proceedings. There is a tentatively identified position suitable to Petitioner's experience. Mr. Bowen, Director of Personnel, Transportation, and Insurance, opined that if the tentatively identified position were not filled until November 19, 1996, it might be disruptive to good education of the particular type of students targeted for the program. The School District has no imminent need to fill the tentatively identified position, but there is no guarantee it still will be available on November 19, 1996. In the interim, other positions may open through maternity leave, illness, death, etc. or they may not. On average, there are three or four teaching positions that open and that must be re-filled every school year. There is no evidence that a position which opens, if any, will be one for which Petitioner is qualified. If there is no position for which Petitioner is suitable available on November 19, 1996 she cannot be placed in Flagler County. Seniority has no effect; suitability by educational qualifications and credentials does. If Petitioner's leave of absence is not approved and she fails to commence work on August 13, 1996, she will forfeit her contract as a teacher. If, after November 19, 1996, Petitioner is neither a School Board member nor a teacher on approved leave of absence, she will no longer be covered by the Florida Retirement System. If Petitioner is denied leave and returns to the position which is now available she will lose no employment benefits. The Superintendent recommended to the Respondent Board that the extension of Petitioner's leave of absence be approved because of the extraordinary circumstance of her gubernatorial appointment to the position of School Board member, and because the requested leave period was for such a short portion of School Year 1996-1997, (approximately 96 days including weekends and autumn holidays when no teaching occurs), that it was acceptable within his expert educator administrative experience. On April 23, 1996, the Respondent School Board voted to refuse the Superintendent's recommendation to extend Petitioner's leave of absence without pay for the additional time she would otherwise be teaching. Petitioner's request was the only recommended leave request not approved at that School Board meeting. An extended leave for over one school year has not been granted by the Flagler County School Board since 1978. The Respondent Board had no evidence before it other than the Superintendent's recommendation when it considered the extension of Petitioner's leave. During the Superintendent's thirteen-year experience which has been since 1983, the Board has always accepted his recommendations with respect to leaves of absence. Due to the death of another School Board member and the inability of Petitioner to participate in the vote, only three Board members participated in the vote on the Superintendent's recommendation for extension of Petitioner's leave of absence. Member Dance moved that the leave be denied because the Board had never before granted an extended leave for an employee to accept a full time salaried position. The motion was approved by two members, Ms. Dance and Mr. Marier. The only "concerns" expressed by Ms. Dance and Mr. Marier, who testified at formal hearing, related to speculation and assumptions that Petitioner presented a case of first impression, certainly for their School Board and probably for the State of Florida, and that if Petitioner were granted an extended leave of absence, it might be difficult to administer the system in the event of a deluge of similar requests from teachers requesting leave without pay to take other salaried positions. Ms. Dance has served on the School Board for twelve years and felt that in a growing school system, such as the Flagler County School District, it is inefficient to remove teachers and then attempt to have positions made available to them upon return from leave. If extended leave is granted, Petitioner will not teach for roughly 96 days of the 1996-1997 School Year and will only teach in Flagler County if re- employed in a position actually available on November 19, 1996. See, Findings of Fact 12-16 supra. Superintendent Kaupke shared Ms. Dance's concern for orderly administration but still recommended approval of extended leave for Petitioner. On average, leaves of absence of varying duration are recommended and granted for a dozen or more teachers each School Year, and there are three to four permanent teacher replacements each year without any significant effect on efficiency of the system or disruption of the education of even elementary school students. In the past, the Superintendent has consistently denied requests of employees to take other salaried positions and the School Board has not granted any. In one instance, a teacher lied to Dr. Kaupe about his reason for requesting a leave of absence without pay and took a salaried teaching position in another state. The Superintendent would not have recommended a leave of absence be granted had he known the true circumstances. During her employment as a teacher, Petitioner also worked part-time in a separate job as a child care apprenticeship instructor. The School Board has no rules, policies or past precedents which forbid dual employment by school teachers, so long as the second job does not interfere with their responsibilities under their teaching contracts with the School Board. For the balance of 1996, all regular School Board meetings are scheduled to be held at 7:30 p.m. on the third Tuesday of each month. Although this schedule is subject to change, at the time of formal hearing herein, there were no scheduled events for School Board members during a school teacher's normal duty hours. Petitioner's requested extended leave of absence was volitional, but was not submitted for the purpose of accepting another salaried position which would physically prevent the performance of her duties as a teacher. Rather, it was submitted in order to conform to the requirements of Section 112.313(10) F.S. and the holding in Wright v. Commission on Ethics, 389 So.2d 662 (Fla. 1980).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board of Flagler County enter a Final Order granting Petitioner's request for extension of unpaid leave of absence through November 19, 1996. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of August, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of August, 1996.
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Respondent unlawfully discriminated against the Petitioner on the basis of a handicap or disability.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner became employed on an annual non-renewing contract as a paraprofessional at Park Elementary School during the 1993-94 school year. The Petitioner was assigned to work in a classroom program for developmentally disabled preschool children. The children were three to four years of age and very active. There were between five to nine children in the classroom. The Petitioner was generally assigned to work with two children and was responsible for monitoring their activity. She was also responsible for physically controlling the children and changing diapers when required. The substantial part of the workday was spent standing, bending, lifting, and moving about with the children. The Petitioner continued her employment in the 1994-95 school year and received satisfactory evaluations. During the 1995-96 school year, the Petitioner continued her employment as a paraprofessional. Although there is evidence that the Petitioner's job performance was of some concern to the class teacher and to the school principal, the Petitioner was not formally evaluated because her employment was interrupted as set forth herein. There is no evidence that anyone discussed the concerns with her or that she had an opportunity to remedy any alleged deficit in her job performance. On January 2, 1996, the Petitioner was riding in a car being driven by her husband and was involved in an automobile accident when another driver struck the Petitioner's car. The Petitioner was injured in the accident and was taken to a hospital where she was treated and released. Subsequent to the accident, the Petitioner continued to have pain in her neck and sought treatment from a chiropractor. Eventually, the chiropractor referred the Petitioner to a neurologist in an attempt to determine the cause of the pain. The medical professionals determined that the Petitioner's injuries were not permanent. The Petitioner's chiropractor described the pain as a "typical soft tissue injury" and eventually stopped treating the pain because the pain did not improve and was not supported by diagnostic testing. The Petitioner's neurologist opined that the neck pain was not a "disability." The Petitioner returned to the school on February 14, 1996, and discussed her physical limitations with the school principal. She showed the principal a copy of a letter from her chiropractor to an insurer that stated that she was "able to work in a limited capacity . . . with a 15 pound limit" and that "she is to avoid excessive bending, stooping and standing." The Petitioner asserts that the school principal told her to go home and return a week later. The Respondent asserts that the Petitioner informed the Principal that she could do the job but only under the restrictions set forth in the chiropractor's letter. The evidence establishes that the discussion related to whether or not the Petitioner was able to return to work was centered on her ability to perform her responsibilities and that the Petitioner decided she was unable to return to work at that time and would return a week later. By letter dated February 15, 1996, the School Board's personnel coordinator advised the Petitioner that she had used all of her sick leave and would not receive any additional pay until she returned to work. The letter suggested that she request an official leave of absence effective January 2, 1996, in order to permit her retirement benefits to be maintained because "time spent on an official leave of absence can be bought back by the employee from the Division of Retirement." On February 21, 1996, the Petitioner contacted the school principal and informed him she would be unable to return on that day due to family matters. On February 22, 1996, the Petitioner returned to the campus and spoke with the principal. The Petitioner told the principal she did not feel physically capable of working as a paraprofessional in the preschool classroom and asked him to provide her with other employment. The principal told the Respondent he did not have any open positions at the school for which she would be physically suited. The principal was also concerned that because the Respondent was physically restricted from bending, stooping, and standing for an extended time, she would not be able to perform the responsibilities of her employment. There is no evidence that on February 22, 1996, or at any time during the remainder of the 1995-96 school year, there were jobs available at the school that did not require physical activity beyond the Petitioner's abilities. On February 26, 1996, the Petitioner contacted the school principal and said she wanted to take a leave of absence as suggested by the personnel coordinator. The principal believed there was a misunderstanding about the availability of the leave of absence to an annual contract employee and suggested that she speak to the personnel coordinator. The principal also called the coordinator and requested that he clarify the matter with the Petitioner. On February 27, 1996, the personnel coordinator telephoned the school principal and said that the Petitioner had been informed that she was not eligible for a leave of absence and said that the Petitioner had suggested she would resign her employment. On March 1, 1996, the Petitioner contacted the principal and said she wanted to apply for a leave of absence. The principal contacted the personnel coordinator who suggested that the Petitioner submit to the school superintendent a letter requesting the leave along with a copy of the chiropractor's letter and then let the superintendent decide whether or not he would recommend to the school board that her leave request be granted. The information was relayed to the Petitioner, who stated that she would submit the letter. By letter dated March 7, 1996, the Petitioner relayed the events to the superintendent and requested "any consideration you can give in resolving this matter." In the March 7 letter, the Petitioner writes, "[d]ue to the activeness of the children in this class the possibility of re-injuring myself is very high." She also advises that she informed the principal that the personnel coordinator suggested that she request the leave of absence and that the principal suggested that she write the letter to the superintendent. The Petitioner asserted that she would not resign from her position. Attached to the March 7 letter were past evaluations, a March 6 letter "to whom it may concern" from her chiropractor restating the symptoms of her injury, and the February 15 letter she received from the personnel coordinator suggesting the leave of absence. By letter dated March 19, 1996, the Petitioner referenced a March 15 meeting with the superintendent and states "[i]f there are no reasonable accommodations for a job replacement, I would like to request a medical leave of absence for the remainder of this year." She enclosed the letter from the chiropractor with the letter to the superintendent. There appears to have been no response from the superintendent to the Petitioner's request for a leave of absence. By letter dated June 4, 1996, the personnel coordinator responded to the request for leave of absence by stating that because the Petitioner was on an annual contract, the request for a leave of absence could not be granted. The letter also stated that due to a lack of funding, some employees would not be called back to work in the 1996-97 school year, and suggested that she should apply for a future vacant position "when you are again able " According to the leave policy set forth in the school board's employment handbook, any employee may request a leave of absence. Such requests must be made at least seven days prior to the requested leave period except in the case of emergency when the request must be made "as soon as possible." The policy requires that the leave application be made in writing and on the form provided for such requests. The policy provides that the School Board "may grant leave, with or without pay." The evidence fails to establish that the Petitioner followed the school system policy in requesting a leave of absence after her accident. The Petitioner did not complete and sign a form requesting a leave of absence. The first written request to the school superintendent for a leave of absence was the letter of March 19, approximately 70 days after the accident. The first time the issue of a leave of absence was verbally addressed by the Petitioner was on February 26, 1996, approximately 50 days after the accident, when she told the school principal that she wanted to take a leave of absence as suggested by the personnel coordinator in his letter of February 15. The evidence fails to establish that the Petitioner has a handicap or disability as those terms are defined under applicable statutes and case law. The evidence fails to establish that the Respondent discriminated against the Petitioner in any employment decision on the basis of a handicap or disability. There is no credible evidence that the Petitioner filed a Request for Disability Accommodation at any time prior to the end of the 1995-96 school year. For the remainder of the 1995-96 school year, a substitute teacher filled in for the Petitioner. The job remained open and available to the Petitioner through the end of the school year. The position was not filled on a permanent basis because school officials were uncertain about whether the Petitioner would be able to return for work. Paraprofessional employees working for the Highlands County School System are employed as annual employees for the first three years. After successful completion of the third year, the paraprofessional becomes eligible for consideration for continuing contract employment. An employee under an annual contract has no automatic right to re-employment. Continuing contract employment provides increased job security to an employee because termination of employment must be for "just cause" or when required by a "reduction in force." Continuing contract employees also receive preference over non-contract employees when workers are recalled after a reduction in force. The successful completion of the third year does not guarantee that the paraprofessional will receive the continuing contract, but only provides that such employee is eligible to receive such a contract The Respondent requires that in order to work a "complete" year, an employee must work for at least 150 days in a school term. Because the Petitioner did not work for at least 150 days in the 1995-96 school term, she did not complete the third year of employment and is not currently eligible for a continuing contract as a paraprofessional employee. The Respondent may permit a paraprofessional employee to work a fourth year, after which the employee automatically receives a continuing contract. Because there were concerns related to the Petitioner's job performance in the 1995-96 school year, the principal of the school would not likely have recommended that a fourth year of employment (and a resulting automatic continuing contract) be permitted.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Mary Ann Kerney. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of June, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Azizi M. Dixon, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Katherine B. Heyward, Esquire John K. McClure, P.A. 230 South Commerce Avenue Sebring, Mary Ann Florida Kerney 33870 4524 Elm Sebring, Avenue Florida 33870 Honorable Charlie Crist Commissioner of Education Department of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Wallace Cox, Superintendent Highlands County School Board 426 School Street Sebring, Florida 33870-4048
