Findings Of Fact The policy being challenged provides that: The hearing may be cancelled if a petitioner or intervenor fails to timely file its prehearing statement. This provision is routinely and customarily embodied in the notices issued by Respondent to parties before it in matters arising under Florida Statutes 447.307 and 447.503. The Respondent acknowledges that it did not adopt and promulgate the policy pursuant to Florida Statutes 120.54 or any other relevant provision of Chapter 120. On 12 July 1979 Petitioner filed a petition with Respondent in which Petitioner sought to represent certain employees employed by the Collier County Board of County Commissioners. This petition was accepted by Respondent and on 30 July 1979 Respondent issued a Notice of Representation Hearing and a Prehearing Order. This Prehearing Order directed the parties to that proceeding to file with Respondent at least seven (7) days prior to the date of the hearing, and serve upon each other, a prehearing statement, identifying: Those fact disputes to be presented for resolution. Any and all legal questions to be presented for resolution. The legal authority to be relied upon by each party in presenting its arguments. Those witnesses to be called at the hearing, except rebuttal witnesses. The approximate time necessary to present the party's case. Any outstanding motions or procedural questions to be resolved. This Pre-Hearing Order then provided: The hearing may be cancelled if a petitioner or intervenor fails to timely file its prehearing statement. Petitioner did not file its prehearing statement within the prescribed 7-day period and on 21 August 1979 Petitioner was notified that the hearing scheduled to commence 23 August had been cancelled. On 22 August Petitioner was advised that a written order cancelling the 23 August hearing had been entered by the Commission. Thereafter Petitioner filed the petition here under consideration contending that the policy of Respondent to enter the cancellation-of-hearing notice in prehearing orders is a rule and invalid by reason of not being promulgated pursuant to Chapter 120. Respondent takes the position that the provision in the prehearing order is not a rule, but even if it could otherwise be considered to be a statement of general applicability, it is exempt from being so found by 447.207(6), Florida Statutes.
The Issue The amount of attorneys’ fees and costs to be assessed against Respondent, to be paid to Petitioner pursuant to section 120.595(4), Florida Statutes, and the First District Court of Appeal’s Order of Remand.
Findings Of Fact Based on the parties’ Stipulation, the following facts are found: On June 8, 2016, Petitioner filed a Petition to Determine Invalidity of Agency Statements (Petition), pursuant to section 120.56(4), Florida Statutes. In its Petition, Petitioner also sought reasonable trial-level attorneys’ fees and costs under section 120.595.3/ By Final Order dated August 26, 2016, the Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition, concluding that the challenged agency statement did not meet the definition of a rule under chapter 120. Grabba-Leaf, LLC v. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Reg., Case No. 16-3160RU (Fla. DOAH Aug. 26, 2016). The Final Order was appealed to the First District Court of Appeal in Grabba-Leaf, LLC v. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Case No. 1D16-4273. In the appeal, Grabba-Leaf moved for appellate fees and costs pursuant to section 120.595. On November 6, 2018, the First District Court of Appeal reversed the Final Order, and held that the challenged agency statement constitutes an unadopted and unenforceable rule. Grabba-Leaf, LLC. v. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Reg., 257 So. 3d 1205 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). Also on November 6, 2018, the First District Court of Appeal issued an Order granting Grabba-Leaf’s motion for appellate attorney’s fees and costs under section 120.595, and remanding the matter to the lower tribunal with instructions to assess the amount (Order of Remand). On November 27, 2018, the Mandate issued. The matter is now pending at DOAH on remand from the First District Court of Appeal to assess the amount of appellate attorneys’ fees to Grabba-Leaf, as well as on Petitioner’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs for the administrative hearing, made in its unadopted rule challenge petition. Petitioner’s Motion to Set Attorneys’ Fees and Costs was filed on February 11, 2019. The Motion represented that the parties had been trying to reach a settlement as to both the request for trial-level attorneys’ fees and costs and the appellate attorneys’ fees and costs ordered by the First District Court of Appeal. Grabba-Leaf represented that although it believed that the parties had reached an agreement as to the total amount, the written agreement had not been executed by Respondent. Accordingly, Grabba-Leaf asked that a hearing be held to determine attorneys’ fees and costs for the trial level and the appeal. Attached to the Motion was an affidavit attesting to the attorneys’ fees and costs for both the administrative hearing and the appeal, documented by records attached to the affidavit. The next day, on February 12, 2019, Grabba-Leaf filed Petitioner’s Notice of Withdrawal of Motion to Set Attorneys’ Fees and Costs. Petitioner also filed Petitioner’s Notice of Filing to which the parties’ Stipulation was attached. By the Stipulation, Petitioner and Respondent agree to the entry of a final order assessing the sum of $150,000.00 for attorneys’ fees and costs for both the trial level and appeal, to be paid by the Department to Grabba-Leaf within 60 days of entry of the final order. The agreed amount for fees and costs set forth in the Stipulation is generally consistent with the affidavit and records attached to Petitioner’s Motion to Set Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (later withdrawn), albeit in the context of a compromise by both parties to avoid the expense and risk associated with litigating the attorneys’ fees and costs matter.
The Issue Whether the petitioner is entitled to an award under section 57.111, Florida Statutes, of attorney’s fees and costs incurred in the appellate matter Witmer v. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, 631 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), and, if so, the amount of such award.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, is the state agency responsible for issuing occupational licenses to veterinarians with access to the backside of a racetrack and for regulating such licensees. Sections 550.10(1)(b) and .105(2)(d)2, Florida Statutes. Dr. Witmer has been licensed to practice veterinary medicine in Florida since January 1, 1993, and, as of October 19, 1993, he was authorized to practice veterinary medicine at Florida racetracks by virtue of a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license (“license”) issued by the Department. He has been domiciled in Florida at all times material to this matter. On October 19, 1993, Dr. Witmer was a partner in a professional practice in veterinary medicine with its principal office at 1450 Southwest Third Street, Pompano Park, Broward County, Florida. His professional practice had three full-time employees and a net worth, including both personal and business investments, of less than $2 million. In the Administrative Complaint and Emergency Order of Suspension dated October 19, 1993, the Department took two actions with respect to Dr. Witmer’s license.1 First, in the administrative complaint, it put Dr. Witmer on notice that the Department had initiated a disciplinary action against him, charging him with violations of a statute and a rule governing his license which, if proven, would justify the imposition of penalties, including revocation or suspension of his license. Secondly, in the emergency order of suspension, it summarily suspended Dr. Witmer’s license. Dr. Witmer requested a formal administrative hearing pursuant to section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, to challenge the truth of the allegations contained in the administrative complaint. The request was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings and assigned DOAH Case Number 93-6638. That action was pending at the time Dr. Witmer filed the application for attorney’s fees and costs at issue in this proceeding. Underlying proceeding On the basis of the allegations contained in the administrative complaint and its determination that Dr. Witmer’s interest in his license was “far outweighed by the immediate danger to the public health and safety and to the integrity of harness racing in the State of Florida,” the Department suspended Dr. Witmer’s pari-mutuel wagering occupational license as of October 19, 1993, ordered him to cease and desist from all activities authorized by the license, and barred him from entering any pari-mutuel establishment as a patron for the duration of the emergency suspension. Dr. Witmer chose to seek immediate judicial review of the emergency order pursuant to sections 120.60(8) and 120.54(9)(a)3, Florida Statutes (1993). It is this appellate proceeding which is the proceeding underlying Dr. Witmer’s application for attorney’s fees and costs at issue herein. State agencies are authorized by section 120.60(8), Florida Statutes (1995) to immediately suspend a license under the following circumstances and subject to the following conditions: If the agency finds that immediate serious danger to the public health, safety, or welfare requires emergency suspension, restriction, or limitation of a license, it shall show compliance in its order with the requirements imposed by s. 120.54(9) on agencies making emergency rules. Summary suspension, restriction, or limitation may be ordered, but a formal suspension or revocation proceeding under this section shall also be promptly instituted and acted upon. Section 120.54(9)(a), Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part: If an agency finds that an immediate danger to the public health, safety, or welfare requires emergency action, the agency may adopt any rule necessitated by the immediate danger by any procedure which is fair under the circumstances and necessary to protect the public interest, provided that: * * * 3. The agency publishes in writing at the time of, or prior to, its action the specific facts and reasons for finding an immediate danger to the public health, safety, or welfare and its reasons for concluding that the procedure used is fair under the circumstances. . . . The agency’s findings of immediate danger, necessity, and procedural fairness shall be judicially reviewable. On February 2, 1994, the District Court of Appeal for the Fourth District of Florida issued its opinion in Witmer v. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, Case Number 93-3232, reported at 631 So. 2d 338. The court quashed the Emergency Order of Suspension, concluding that the order was “facially inadequate,” and ruling that “the Department’s findings of immediate danger to the public welfare are not supported by specific facts and reasons as required by 120.54(9)(a)3, Florida Statutes.” Id. at 340, 343. The district court in Witmer observed that its review was limited to a determination of whether the order complied with the requirements of section 120.54(9)(a)3 and based its analysis upon the following rules of law: If the facts alleged in the complaint and [emergency] order are sufficient to demonstrate immediacy, necessity and fairness, no hearing is required prior to the emergency suspension. . . . The factual allegations contained in the emergency order must sufficiently identify particularized facts which demonstrate an immediate danger to the public. (Citation omitted.) Where, as here, no hearing was held prior to the entry of the emergency order, every element necessary to its validity must appear on the face of the order. (Citation omitted.) The order must be “factually explicit and persuasive concerning the existence of a genuine emergency.” (Citation omitted.) Witmer, 631 So. 2d at 341. In reaching its conclusion that the emergency order was facially inadequate, the court in Witmer held that the Department failed to allege facts in the complaint and order to establish the essential elements of the violations upon which the emergency suspension was based. Firstly, the court found that the charge in the emergency order that Dr. Witmer had failed to report gratuities was not supported by any allegations of fact in the complaint and order. Id. at 341. Secondly, the court found that the Department failed to allege that Dr. Witmer’s actions related to horse racing or to race horses, an essential element of a violation of section 550.235(2), Florida Statutes, and of rule 61D-1.002(10), Florida Administrative Code. Id. at 342. Thirdly, the court found that the Department failed to allege that Dr. Witmer reached an agreement with a second person to commit the violation, an essential element of any conspiracy, including one to violate section 550.235(2) and rule 61D-1.002(10). Id. Finally, the court concluded that the public harm alleged by the Department in the order was too attenuated to support the emergency suspension of Dr. Witmer’s license. Id. at 343. The district court issued its mandate to the Department on February 18, 1994, directing it to act in accordance with the opinion quashing the Emergency Order of Suspension. The Department did not seek review of the decision of the district court in the Florida Supreme Court. Consequently, the decision of the district court had the effect of nullifying the emergency suspension of Dr. Witmer’s license. Summary Dr. Witmer was a small business party, as that term is defined for purposes of section 57.111, at the time the Department entered the emergency order.2 The evidence is sufficient to establish that the Department initiated an action against Dr. Witmer when it entered an Emergency Order of Suspension. This order was issued under the authority granted state agencies in section 120.60(8), Florida Statutes. The order had the effect of immediately and summarily suspending Dr. Witmer’s pari-mutuel wagering occupational license. Dr. Witmer had the right to seek immediate judicial review of the emergency order pursuant to section 120.54(9)(a)3. The appellate court quashed the emergency order because it was legally insufficient to support the suspension of Dr. Witmer’s license under the standards of section 120.54(9)(a)3. The Department did not appeal or seek further review of the appellate court’s decision. Dr. Witmer, therefore, prevailed in the administrative proceeding initiated by the Department. The Department presented no evidence to establish that its action in ordering the emergency suspension of Dr. Witmer’s license had a reasonable basis in law and fact or that any special circumstances exist which would make an award of attorney’s fees and costs in this case unjust.3 The monetary value of the attorney’s fees rendered in connection with the appellate proceeding culminating in the decision quashing the Emergency Order of Suspension is $9,715.00, and the costs incurred total $250. These fees and costs are reasonable and were necessary to prosecute the appellate proceeding.4
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent violated the provisions of chapter 440, Florida Statutes,1/ by failing to secure the payment of workers’ compensation, as alleged in the Stop-Work Order and Third Amended Order of Penalty Assessment.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for enforcing the statutory requirement that employers secure workers’ compensation coverage for the benefit of their employees. Respondent is a corporation with its principal office 3981 North W Street, Unit 36, Pensacola, Florida 32505. At all relevant time periods, Respondent has been engaged in business as a contractor in the construction industry. On March 28, 2012, after receiving a public referral regarding alleged uninsured construction activity at 2544 North D Street in Pensacola, Florida (the Site), Department Compliance Investigator Angelia Brown visited the Site. Upon Ms. Brown's arrival, there were plumbers and a siding company at the Site. According to Ms. Brown, she also saw an individual attaching u- shaped metal clips between the inside beams and the roof and soffits of the house that was being constructed at the Site. The plumbers had a workers' compensation policy and the siding workers had exemptions from workers' compensation requirements. Ms. Brown spoke to the man who appeared to be attaching the metal clips. Based upon that conversation, Ms. Brown concluded that the man was a subcontractor and Respondent's employee. The evidence, however, does not support that conclusion. The man, whose name is apparently Robert Madron, was not called as a witness at the final hearing. According to Ms. Brown, Mr. Madron told her he had his own company. Ms. Brown, however, was unable to obtain information verifying that assertion. Further, while Mr. Howard had paid Mr. Madron prior to Ms. Brown's visit for unsolicited work Mr. Madron had performed for Mr. Howard, consisting of picking up trash and repairing some equipment owned by Mr. Howard, Mr. Howard denied that Respondent ever employed Mr. Madron. Rather than showing that Mr. Madron was a subcontractor with his own business or an employee of Respondent, the evidence adduced at the final hearing indicated that Mr. Madron, who was known as "Gomer" by Mr. Howard, was an unemployed, homeless person, living in nearby woods. Mr. Madron would often come to the Site and surrounding neighborhood looking for work and food. Mr. Howard was surprised that Ms. Brown had taken Mr. Madron seriously, because Mr. Howard believes that Mr. Madron's facial expressions and unbalanced, awkward gait are obvious indicators that Mr. Madron is unstable and has mental problems. Ms. Brown issued a Stop-Work Order to Mr. Madron the day of her first visit at the Site, March 28, 2012. The evidence presented at the final hearing, however, failed to show that Mr. Madron was ever employed by Respondent. The next day, March 29, 2012, Ms. Brown returned and observed four other individuals working at the Site. The individuals included Robert Jones, Charles Lyons, Martin Shaughnessy, and Allen Weeden. While Ms. Brown concluded that these individuals were Respondent's employees on March 29, 2012, the evidence shows that they were paid for the work that day by Pacesetter Personnel, an employee-leasing company. Aside from alleging that Respondent employed Mr. Madron, the Third Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is based upon Respondent's alleged employment and failure to provide workers' compensation coverage for Mr. Jones, Mr. Lyons, Mr. Shaughnessy, and Mr. Weeden. In addition, the Third Amended Order of Penalty Assessment alleges that Respondent employed its officer, Mr. Howard, during a lapse in Mr. Howard's exemption from workers' compensation. There was no testimony from Robert Jones, Charles Lyons, Martin Shaughnessy, or Allen Weeden offered at the final hearing and the evidence is otherwise insufficient to show that those individuals were employed by Respondent on March 29, 2012. The Department's investigator, Ms. Brown, further concluded that Pacesetter Personnel had not provided worker's compensation coverage for those four men on March 29, 2012. Her conclusion, however, was based on a conversation she said she had with Pacesetter Personnel. The Department did not offer the testimony from anyone at Pacesetter, nor did it offer any non- hearsay evidence to support Ms. Brown's conclusion that Pacesetter Personnel was not providing workers' compensation to those four individuals. Further, the only evidence that the Department offered to prove that Messrs. Jones, Lyons, Shaughnessy, and Weeden were ever employed by Respondent, or to support the Third Amended Penalty Assessment, consists of Mr. Howard's cancelled checks to those individuals. The Third Amended Penalty Assessment seeks an assessment for Robert Jones from January 1 to March 28, 2012. At the final hearing, Mr. Howard testified that Mr. Jones is a relative, and the payment to Mr. Jones was a loan to help Mr. Jones with moving expenses. There is no contrary evidence. The Third Amended Penalty Assessment provides an assessment for Charles Lyons for the periods from July 1, 2010 to December 31, 2010, and from January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2011. The assessment is based upon one check to Mr. Lyons in the amount to $480. Mr. Howard testified that Mr. Lyons had an exemption from workers' compensation. The Department presented no contradictory evidence. The Third Amended Penalty Assessment seeks an assessment for Martin Shaughnessy for several time periods based upon several checks from Mr. Howard. Mr. Howard testified that Mr. Shaughnessy had an exemption and the Department presented no contrary evidence. The Third Amended Penalty assessment also seeks an assessment for James Howard, individually, from July 17 to August 11, 2011, during which time there was a lapse in his certificate of exemption from workers' compensation. The evidence showed that, other than that 26-day lapse, Mr. Howard has maintained his exemption since 2003. The Department presented no evidence that Mr. Howard provided services to, or was paid by, Respondent during the time that his exemption had lapsed. The only evidence presented was a check from Respondent's checking account showing a payment to Mr. Howard's mother during the lapse period. Mr. Howard testified that the check was to reimburse his mother for the use of her American Express card to purchase materials and supplies. The Department presented no countervailing evidence. In sum, the evidence presented at the final hearing was insufficient to support the Stop Work Order or Third Amended Penalty Assessment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Workers’ Compensation enter a final order dismissing the Stop-Work Order and Third Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of June, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 2013.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the pleadings and oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following facts are found: On or about September 12, 1977, the respondent Port Everglades Authority published its Advertisement for Bids, Specifications and Contract Documents for Contract No. 12-76, involving the installation of a lighting system for Berths 4 and 5. The advertisement alerted the attention of bidders to the requirements as to the conditions of employment to be observed and the minimum wage rates to be paid under the contract. Page 6 of the Instructions to Bidders directs the attention of bidders to the provisions of Resolution No. 9- 1977. Resolution No. 9-1977 is applicable to every construction contract for an amount in excess of $5,000.00 to which the Port Everglades Authority is a party. In summary form, the resolution provides that all labor employed maintain permanent residence within Broward County, unless such labor is unavailable. It further requires that the rate of wages to be paid be not less than the prevailing rate of wages as furnished by the Division of Labor, Florida Department of Commerce (unless the contract involves Federal funding, whereupon the Davis-Bacon Act is applicable) and that the fringe benefits payments be those published in the applicable issue of the Federal Register. The petitioner, an electrical contracting firm, sent an employee to the Port Everglades Authority to secure a copy of the contract documents, plans and specifications. Petitioner's president, James Branam, reviewed these documents with a view toward bidding for the work as the prime contractor and filled out an internal corporate form known as a prebid sheet. It was ultimately decided by the petitioner not to submit a bid for the work. The reason for this decision was that petitioner could not submit a competitive bid because of the prevailing wage rate and fringe benefit requirements and the Broward County residence requirement. On May 17, 1979, after the filing of the instant rule challenge petition but before the date of the hearing, the respondent repealed Resolution No. 9-1977 and enacted Resolution No. 3-1979. The only substantial difference between the two resolutions is the method of determining the prevailing wage rate. The latter resolution came about as a result of the Florida legislature's repeal of the Florida prevailing wage provision--Section 215.19. Resolution No. 3-1979 now requires that the prevailing wage rate, as well as the fringe benefits, shall be those last published in the Federal Register prior to the date of issuance of specifications by the Port Everglades Authority. As noted above, the petitioner's motion to amend its petition so as to name Resolution No. 3-1979 as the challenged rule" was granted.
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Destin is entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to section 120.569(2)(e), from Respondents related to litigation between the parties in DOAH Case No. 19-3356.
Findings Of Fact On November 14, 2016, DEP issued a Permit Modification to the Corps which modified the location upon which spoil from the dredging of East Pass in Destin, Florida could be placed, from being on “a portion of the beach on Eglin Air Force Base (to the west of East Pass),” to “the Gulf-front beaches on the eastern and western sides of East Pass.” The modification deleted language from an original permit that prohibited, with minor exception, placement of dredged material “on any beach east of the Main Channel.” On November 16, 2018, John S. Donovan, David H. Sherry, and Rebecca R. Sherry filed a Petition for Administrative Hearing challenging the Permit Modification, which was referred to DOAH and assigned as DOAH Case No. 19-1915. The Petition in Case No. 19-1915 was dismissed as not being timely filed. A full account of the procedural history of that case is contained in the docket of Case No. 19-1915. On June 5, 2019, Thomas Wilson filed his Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing (Wilson Petition). The Wilson Petition was substantively identical to that filed in Case No. 19-1915. The Wilson Petition was referred to DOAH on June 19, 2019, and assigned as DOAH Case No. 19-3356. On June 28, 2019, David H. Sherry, Rebecca R. Sherry, and John S. Donovan filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene in Case No. 19-3356, which was granted on July 8, 2019. On August 20, 2019, Destin moved to intervene in DOAH Case No. 19-3356, which was granted on August 26, 2019. On August 21, 2019, DEP filed a proposed amendment to the Permit Modification, which changed the condition directing placement of dredged material to “the eastern and western sides of East Pass” to one requiring that “[b]each compatible material dredged from the initial maintenance dredge event following issuance of [the Permit Modification], shall be placed to the east of East Pass” (the Proposed Change). The Proposed Change also extended the term of the Permit. On September 4, 2019, John S. Donovan, David H. Sherry, and Rebecca R. Sherry filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing to challenge the Proposed Change, which was referred to DOAH and assigned as DOAH Case No. 19-4979. On September 20, 2019, Case No. 19-4979 was consolidated with Case No. 20-3356.1 On October 21, 2019, Petitioners filed a First Amended Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing (Amended Petition) to address the August 21, 2019, Proposed Change. On November 5, 2019, the Amended Petition was accepted as filed. On November 15, 2019, Destin filed its Motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to the authority in section 120.569(2)(e). Also on November 15, 2019, Petitioners filed a Second Amended Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing. 2 The final hearing was convened on November 20, 2019, as scheduled. Issues related to the disposition of DOAH Case No. 19-1844 were taken up at the final hearing as a preliminary matter. Case No. 19-1844 involved the issuance of a permit to Destin to perform maintenance dredging of East Pass north of the U.S. Highway 98 bridge, with placement of dredged material to the beaches to the east of East Pass. A Recommended Order had 1 At the commencement of the final hearing, DOAH Case No. 19-4979 was severed, and a written Order Granting Renewed Motion to Dismiss, Relinquishing Jurisdiction, and Closing File was entered on January 29, 2020. Since the May 1, 2020, Renewed Motion was filed only with regard to Case No. 19-3356, further discussion of Case No. 19-4979 is unnecessary. 2 The purpose of the Second Amended Petition was primarily to drop Petitioners’ objection to the extended term of the Permit authorized by the Proposed Change, and is of no consequence to the disposition of this proceeding. been entered on October 14, 2019, which determined that dredged material from the maintenance dredging of East Pass should, to be compliant with section 161.142, Florida Statutes, be placed on adjacent eroding beaches east of the inlet. It also determined that the East Pass IMP is not an unadopted rule as described in section 120.57(1)(e). At the commencement of the final hearing, a Final Order in Case No. 19-1844 had not yet been entered. The substantial similarities in the issues of law and fact between Case No. 19-1844 and this case were discussed, and it was determined that if the Final Order in Case No. 19-1844 substantially adopted the Recommended Order, an Order to Show Cause would be entered, asking the parties to address whether collateral estoppel applied to some or all of the issues in this case. During the pendency of Case No. 19-1844, Destin filed a Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Expenses and Costs pursuant to sections 120.569(2)(e) and 120.595. The Recommended Order in Case No. 19-1844 reserved ruling on Destin’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Expenses and Costs under section 120.569(2)(e), “provided [Destin] renews its Motion within 30 days of DEP’s entry of the final order” in Case No. 19-1844. No renewed motion was filed. With regard to section 120.595 fees, the Recommended Order included a “determination” that John S. Donovan, David H. Sherry, and Rebecca R. Sherry did not participate in Case No. 19-1844 “for an improper purpose, i.e., primarily to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or for frivolous purpose or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation, licensing, or securing the approval of an activity…,” and recommended that the motion for attorney’s fees be denied. On November 20, 2019, after the final hearing in Case No. 19-3356 had convened, DEP entered its Final Order in Case No. 19-1844. The Final Order adopted the Recommended Order with minor modifications that are not pertinent here. An Order to Show Cause was issued on November 22, 2019, as to whether disposition of issues in Case No. 19-1844 would collaterally estop the challengers to the Permit in Case No. 19-3356 as to some or all of the issues in that case. It was thereafter determined, for reasons set forth in the Recommended Order in Case No. 19-3356, that Respondents were not estopped from challenging the Corps’ Permit Modification and Proposed Change. The Recommended Order in Case No. 19-3356 was entered on February 20, 2020. The Recommended Order considered the evidence offered by Destin, DEP, and Respondents, primarily expert in nature except for testimony as to standing, and found and concluded that the Corps was entitled to the Permit Modification as modified by the Proposed Change. Destin filed its Renewed Motion as authorized in the Recommended Order, and Respondents filed a Response. On July 27, 2020, oral argument was held on the Motion and Amended Motion as renewed. It was noted by the undersigned during a series of questions that the Motions did not identify a specific “pleading, motion, or other paper” alleged to have been filed for an improper purpose. Counsel for Destin thereupon stated that the pleadings alleged to have been signed for an improper purpose were the June 5, 2019, Wilson Petition, and the October 21, 2019, Amended Petition. No other pleadings, motions, or papers were identified as having been signed for an improper purpose. Thus, the analysis in this Order is limited to those pleadings.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order dismissing, with prejudice, the Second Amended Petition to Intervene in Licensing and Administrative Proceeding and for Formal Administrative Hearing filed in each of these cases by LEAF and Suzi Ruhl. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of November, 1996, at Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON, Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of November, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: David A. Ludder, Esquire Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation, Inc. 1115 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Cynthia K. Christen, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Anthony Cleveland, Esquire Segundo J. Fernandez, Esquire Oertel, Hoffman, Fernandez and Cole Post Office Box 6507 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6507 Virginia B. Wetherall, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Perry Odom General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
Findings Of Fact On August 17, 1992, Petitioner Donald filed a Charge of Discrimination alleging that Respondent Winn Dixie was guilty of an unlawful employment practice, to wit, racial discrimination in failure to "promote" Petitioner from a part-time position to a full-time position because he is black, the most recent non-promotion date being July 22, 1992. After investigation, the Florida Commission on Human Relations entered and mailed a Notice of Determination: No Cause and Determination: No Cause on March 23, 1993. That Notice contained the following pertinent language: If redetermination is not requested, the Request for Hearing/Petition for Relief must be filed within 30 days of the date of mailing of this Notice and should be in compliance with the provisions of Rule 22T-9.008 and Chapter 22T-8, Florida Administrative Code . . . Failure of Complainant to timely file either a request or petition will result in the dismissal of the complaint pursuant to Rule 22T-9.006, Florida Administrative Code. (See "Exhibit A" attached to, and incorporated in, this Recommended Order). Petitioner mailed his Petition for Relief and it was stamped in as filed at the Florida Commission on Human Relations on April 28, 1993. The Commission did not enter an order of dismissal or otherwise reject the petition as untimely. On May 5, 1993, the Commission transmitted the Petition to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) for formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), F.S. On May 5, 1993, and simultaneously with its transmittal of the Petition to DOAH, the Commission served/mailed the Petition to Respondent with a Notice to Respondent of Filing of Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice. The Commission's transmittal of Petition had included a Notice to Respondent containing the following specific language: You are required to file an answer with the Commission within 20 days of the date of service of the Petition. Your attention is directed generally to Chapter 22T-8, Florida Administrative Code, which pertains to general procedures before the Commission. You are also referred to Rule 22T-9.008(5) which sets forth those matters which must be included in the Respondent's answer. Please note that the filing of a motion to dismiss does not toll the time for filing an answer. (See "Exhibit A" to this Recommended Order). On May 11, 1994, DOAH's Clerk mailed an Initial Order to both parties. The parties were charged by Rule 60Q-2.003(6), F.A.C. and by DOAH's Initial Order in this case with serving upon each other a copy of every pleading either party filed with DOAH. The Initial Order also permitted the parties to advise the undersigned hearing officer of dates and locations they preferred for scheduling the de novo evidentiary hearing on the merits. Petitioner responded to the Initial Order. Respondent did not. Respondent also filed no Answer to the Petition for Relief within 20 days as required by Rule 22T-9.008, F.A.C., [renumbered 60Y-5.008(5)(a), F.A.C.]. If a Respondent fails to file a timely answer, such failure shall be deemed to constitute an admission of the material facts alleged in the petition. See, renumbered Rule 60Y-5.008(5)(d) F.A.C. By DOAH Notice of Hearing mailed May 27, 1993, the cause was scheduled for formal hearing on the merits for October 18, 1993. Simultaneous with that Notice of Hearing, an Order of Prehearing Instructions was entered and mailed. The Order of Prehearing Instructions was directed to both parties and was very specific as to what was required of them, including but not limited to listing witnesses and exhibits, clarifying which issues of material fact were disputed, and listing any pending motions. A copy of the entire order is attached and incorporated in this Recommended Order by reference as "Exhibit B". A joint prehearing stipulation was not timely filed as required by the order of prehearing instructions, and neither party filed a unilateral statement on or before September 29, 1993 as permitted by the order of prehearing instructions. In short, neither party timely complied with the first Order of Prehearing Instructions. On October 1, 1993, certain unsigned, confusing, contradictory, and incomplete papers were filed. This filing, which turned out to be filed by Petitioner (see Finding of Fact 22) among other things requested that the hearing officer subpoena the listed witnesses, listed "stipulations" not signed by anyone, and listed motions never filed at DOAH. This ambiguous item not only was unsigned, but did not reflect who, if anyone, it had been served upon. Common practice and procedure require subpoenas to be sent by DOAH to a party for service by that party on witnesses, and subpoenas may not be served upon witnesses by the hearing officer. The October 1, 1993 filing prompted the entry and service upon both parties of an order on October 12, 1993 which had attached to it the unsigned filings of October 1, 1993. The October 12, 1993 order, with the unsigned and ambiguous attachments is attached and incorporated in this recommended order by reference as "Exhibit C". That order cancelled the October 18, 1993 formal hearing on the merits, subject to rescheduling of the formal hearing on the merits upon clarification of the unsigned papers filed. This order was entered instead of automatically precluding either party from presenting evidence, an option permitted by the prior Order of Prehearing Instructions. The order gave both parties an equal opportunity to do what was procedurally necessary to advance the case to formal hearing on the merits. The October 12, 1993 order granted both parties 45 days in which to confer with one another and file the joint prehearing stipulation contemplated by the prior order of prehearing instructions and to submit several agreeable dates for rescheduling formal hearing on the merits. In further pertinent part, the October 12, 1993 order provided that if a joint stipulation could not be agreed upon between the parties, they could still proceed to formal hearing on the merits by timely submitting unilateral statements listing their respective exhibits and witnesses. The order also went on to specifically provide as follows: Failure of either party to submit at least the names of witnesses to be called by that party and a list of exhibits to be introduced by that party will result in exclusion of that evidence at formal hearing in this cause. Under the terms of the October 12, 1993 order, the date for filing of unilateral witness and exhibit lists was November 26, 1993. Neither party timely filed witness or exhibit lists. On December 14, 1993, which was eighteen days after the last date for compliance with the October 12, 1993 order had passed with Petitioner and Respondent each failing to timely comply therewith, another order was entered. That order advised the parties that since, by the terms of the October 12, 1993 order, both parties were now precluded from presenting any evidence in support of, or contrary to, Petitioner's claim, it appeared that there was no need to conduct an evidentiary hearing. However, the order also granted the parties 30 days in which to show cause why Petitioner's Petition for Relief should not be dismissed for failure to comply with the October 12, 1993 order. A copy of the December 14, 1993 order is attached and incorporated in this recommended order as "Exhibit D". That same day, Petitioner filed a request for 22 blank subpoenas and to reschedule formal hearing, but no witness or exhibit list. A copy of this item is attached and incorporated in this recommended order by reference as "Exhibit E." The date for filing of responses to the December 14, 1993 order to show cause was January 13, 1994. Respondent did not file any response to the December 14, 1993 order or the December 14, 1993 pleading. 1/ However, on January 13, 1994, Petitioner timely filed a paper captioned "Pleadings Motions". This paper, a copy of which is attached and incorporated in this recommended order as "Exhibit F," was similar, but not identical to, the unsigned papers filed October 1, 1993. It again requested subpoenas be served by the hearing officer, listed names and addresses of potential witnesses, and requested that the case not be dismissed because Petitioner was without legal counsel and because it is "a very hard case". It specifically stated, "Please consider hearing my testimony and others on this matter." Petitioner's January 13, 1994 pleading could be read as a motion to allow Petitioner to testify and present witnesses and exhibits. In an abundance of caution, the undersigned mailed a copy of it to Respondent on January 18, 1994. Respondent did not file any response to Petitioner's January 13, 1994 pleading. As required by law, the undersigned had served Respondent with all DOAH orders and notices. Also, in an abundance of caution, the undersigned had served Respondent with Petitioner's January 13, 1994 pleading and the unsigned October 1, 1993 papers at the address of record for Respondent's "in-house" counsel, which name and address was provided in the Florida Commission on Human Relations referral papers. No documents were returned to the Division of Administrative Hearings, creating the legal presumption that all materials had been received by Respondent. Still, Respondent had failed to comply with any DOAH order whatsoever and for nine months had not taken any affirmative action to defend against the Petition for Relief. No Answer to the Petition for Relief, timely or otherwise, had ever been filed by Respondent. The record, as reviewed by the undersigned as of February 3, 1994, also indicated that Petitioner's original Charge of Discrimination before the Florida Commission on Human Relations had been directed to Respondent, not at a Jacksonville address, but at a Quincy address. Therefore, because the law and the undersigned are loathe to cut off any legitimate litigation, and in a further abundance of caution, the undersigned determined that Petitioner and Respondent should have one last opportunity to explain why they had not timely complied with prior orders and why, if at all, a formal hearing with witnesses and exhibits on the merits of the Petition for Relief should be rescheduled. To that end, and still in an abundance of caution, an order was entered on February 3, 1994, a copy of which order is attached and incorporated in this recommended order by reference as "Exhibit G". The decretal portion of that order read: A hearing on the limited issue of whether or not either party should be permitted to present evidence at a rescheduled formal hearing will be held at 10:00 a.m., March 1, 1994, at the Division of Administ- rative Hearings, the DeSoto Building, 1230 Apalachee Parkway, Tallahassee, Florida.* Witnesses need not appear at that time. Only parties or their legal counsel shall appear. Failure of Petitioner to appear in person or through legal counsel at that date, time and place WILL result in dismissal of this cause. Failure of Respondent to appear in person or through legal counsel at that date, time and place WILL result in the exclusion of all of Respondent's witnesses and evidence. 4. [sic] Whether or not a formal hearing on the merits will be rescheduled at all will be determined by an order entered after the undersigned has heard what the parties may have to say at the hearing now scheduled for March 1, 1994. (Emphasis in the original). Still in an abundance of caution, the foregoing order was served by the undersigned upon Respondent at both its Quincy and Jacksonville addresses. No court reporter was present at the March 1, 1994 interlocutory hearing. Petitioner appeared and represented himself at the March 1, 1994 hearing. Respondent's "in-house" counsel from Jacksonville did not appear at the Tallahassee hearing but authorized Winn-Dixie's District Manager W. E. Carroll and its Quincy Store Manager Terry Miller to appear. Mr. Carroll works in Tallahassee. Mr. Miller drove 23 miles from Quincy for the hearing. After examination by the undersigned in open court pursuant to Rule 60Q-2.008, F.A.C., Mr. Carroll was accepted as a qualified representative for Respondent. Inquiry was also made by the undersigned at the March 1, 1994 hearing as to any reason a formal hearing on the merits should be rescheduled. Each prior order and pleading 2/ was explored orally in open court. Oral argument was also invited as to why either party should be permitted to present evidence. Oral admissions and stipulations of the parties were received. At that hearing, Petitioner contended that he had not understood the prior orders and that the unsigned papers filed October 1, 1993 (see Findings of Fact 8-9 supra.) were his attempt to provide a witness list. Petitioner also contended that he thought he was represented by legal counsel at one point and to support that assertion, he presented a December 6, 1993 letter he had received from Legal Services of North Florida, Inc. The original of this letter (exhibit) is attached and incorporated in this recommended order as "Exhibit H". At that hearing, no clear explanation was given of why Respondent had failed to Answer the Petition for Relief and also had filed no response to any prior DOAH order or pleading by Petitioner. Still in an abundance of caution, and because the undersigned is loathe to enter defaults or impose sanctions at any time, each party was permitted 10 days after the March 1, 1994 formal hearing in which to file any further written clarification of the record or pleadings. Petitioner filed a response dated March 10, 1994 on March 10, 1994, but Respondent still filed no Answer to the Petition for Relief, despite numerous questions by the undersigned at the March 1, 1994 hearing concerning what facts asserted in the Petition for Relief were admitted and which were denied by Respondent and inquiring why no Answer had been filed by Respondent. On March 4, 1994, Respondent filed a written response dated March 3, 1994. A copy of Petitioner's March 10, 1994 response, without attachments, is attached and incorporated herein as "Exhibit I." A copy of Respondent's March 4, 1994 response, without attachments, is attached and incorporated herein as "Exhibit J." Respondent's March 4, 1994 letter ("Exhibit J") was directed primarily to providing the hearing officer with a history of settlement negotiations and copies of proposed settlement documents. This is a practice contrary to Section 90.408, F.S., The Florida Evidence Code. Respondent had filed no Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Relief and no Answer, and although by rule, even a motion to dismiss may not toll the 20 days provided by rule for Respondent to answer the Petition for Relief, Respondent's March 4, 1994 letter response also raised, for the first time, the untimeliness of the Petition for Relief as grounds to dismiss this cause. However, Respondent's March 4, 1994 allegations based on untimeliness of the Petition were not persuasive, in that the rule that Respondent cited in support thereof applied only to what the Florida Commission on Human Relations or its Executive Director may do either sua sponte or upon motion regarding Requests for Redetermination. The rule cited therein was inapplicable to the legal principle for which Respondent cited it. Therefore, Respondent's argument against the Petition was incorrect or incomplete. Also, due to the complexity of the several statutes and rules involved, ruling on the issue of untimeliness vel non of the Petition for Relief required the taking of factual evidence. For instance, there is a Commission rule which tolls the 30 days for filing the Petition if the Petitioner applies for, or the Commission grants, an extension of time for filing the Petition. Consequently, Petitioner was entitled to an opportunity to present all the facts concerning his filing of the Petition in response to the allegations of the Respondent's March 4, 1994 letter. The representations of Respondent's qualified representative at the March 1, 1994 hearing and the materials filed after that hearing by Respondent's "in house" counsel ("Exhibit J") did not show good cause why Respondent should be permitted to put on a defense by way of undisclosed oral testimony or exhibits. Likewise, Petitioner did not demonstrate by his oral argument, exhibit, and post-hearing response ("Exhibit I"), any legal good cause why his noncompliance with prior orders should be excused so as to permit him to call any witnesses or put in evidence any exhibits not disclosed to Respondent. More specifically, the date and contents of the December 6, 1993 letter to Petitioner from Legal Services (original is "Exhibit H" hereto) did not support Petitioner's oral assertions at the March 1, 1994 hearing that he had been represented in this case by legal counsel, had relied on a lawyer to meet his November 26, 1993 filing date, or that Legal Services' retention of his documents at a critical time had prevented his timely compliance with any of the prior orders herein. Accordingly, an order was entered on April 21, 1994. A complete copy of that order is attached and incorporated in this recommended order by reference as "Exhibit K". That order provided, in pertinent part, as follows: The representations of Respondent's qualified representative at the March 1, 1994 hearing and the materials filed after that hearing by Respondent's legal counsel have not shown good cause why Respondent should be permitted to put on a defense by way of undisclosed oral testimony or exhibits. Likewise, Petitioner has not demonstrated good cause why his noncompliance with prior orders should be excused so as to permit him to call any witnesses or put on any exhibits not disclosed to Respondent. However, since Petitioner clearly has always been an appropriate witness and his oral testimony could be reasonably anticipated by Respondent, a formal evidentiary hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1) F.S. will be convened solely for the taking of Petitioner Donald's oral testimony, subject to cross examination by Respondent. Also, the materials filed by Respondent's counsel after the March 1, 1994 hearing state for the first time that Respondent believes the Petition for Relief is subject to discretionary dismissal for untimeliness, pursuant to Rule 22T-9.07 F.A.C. [new number, if one exists, was not given]. However, Respondent still did not see fit to put this observation or belief in the form of a motion. Jurisdictional issues may be raised at any time. The jurisdictional issue requires evidence to sustain a motion, if a motion is made. Should Respondent see fit to defend on that issue by motion and evidence, Respondent remains free to do. (Emphasis supplied) Simultaneous with the entry of the April 21, 1994 Order, a Notice of Hearing was mailed to the parties. It provided for a formal hearing on June 13, 1994 and stated the issues as: "As set forth in the order entered simultaneously herewith. [The only witness will be K.E. Donald.]" Despite the language employed in the April 21, 1994 order, which still permitted Respondent to assert the untimeliness of the petition for Relief as a bar or jurisdictional issue, Respondent did not file a written motion or submit supporting documentation (evidence) on that issue prior to the June 13, 1994 formal hearing. At formal hearing on June 13, 1994, Respondent moved orally to dismiss the Petition for Relief due to its late filing. Hearing Officer Composite "Exhibit A" was admitted in evidence. Hearing Officer Composite "Exhibit A" consisted of The Florida Human Relations Commission Transmittal of Petition (one page), Charge of Discrimination (one page), Petition for Relief (three pages), Notice of Determination: No Cause (two pages) and Determination of No Cause (two pages). The original of this composite exhibit as received in evidence at formal hearing is attached and incorporated in this recommended order as "Exhibit A" to this Recommended Order. At formal hearing, Petitioner testified that he had not moved the Florida Commission on Human Relations for an order extending his time to file his petition, no order extending time had been entered, and he had neither a postmark nor any clear recollection of the date he mailed his Petition to the Commission. If Florida Commission on Human Relations Rules 60Y-4.004, 60Y- 4.007(1), 60Y-4.008(2), F.A.C., are not applicable, the Petition for Relief should have been filed with the Commission on April 22, 1993, a Thursday, and was filed late by six days, since it was filed with the Commission on April 28, 1993, the following Wednesday. These foregoing rules provide that when a document is received by mail, the date of filing shall relate back to the date of the postmark, provide three days for mailing where notice is mailed, and provide an extra day for filing when the last day falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. If those rules apply, then the Petitioner's delay is shorter than six days or indeterminable. The Petition for Relief was admittedly received by Respondent's "in- house" counsel on or before May 6, 1993. Respondent was specifically asked by the undersigned hearing officer how the late filing of the Petition for Relief had prejudiced Respondent's position. Respondent asserted that Respondent could not have foreseen that Petitioner would ultimately have been permitted to testify on his own behalf, and that, but for the Petition for Relief being filed six days late, Respondent might have filed an answer, would not have assumed that the Petition was barred and would not have, due to a conflict in the rules, failed to respond to all pleadings and orders, might have secured "out of house" counsel, would not have expended the cost of trying to negotiate a settlement with Petitioner after the cancellation of the October 18, 1993 formal hearing, and would not have incurred "enormous expense" during the Florida Commission on Human Relations' investigatory phase, in sending Messrs. Carroll and Miller to the March 1, 1994 DOAH hearing, and in filing its only written materials on March 4, 1994. Since the investigatory phase before the Florida Commission on Human Relations predated that agency's March 23, 1993 Determination of No Cause and also predated the filing of the April 28, 1993 Petition for Relief, that portion of Respondent's argument related to incurring enormous expense is patently absurd, as is Respondent's assertion that Respondent could not have foreseen that Petitioner would be permitted to testify on his own behalf. The expense incurred by Respondent in having one layman travel twenty three miles to Tallahassee and the other travel across town to formal hearing, even considering the value of those gentlemen's time to the corporation, and in having "in-house" counsel file Respondent's March 4, 1994 letter is de minimus, and these expenses have no nexus to the lateness by six days of the April 28, 1993 Petition for Relief. Respondent failed to demonstrate how the filing of the Petition for Relief on April 28, 1993 instead of on April 22, 1993 could have reasonably prevented Respondent from filing an Answer within 20 days as required by Rule 22T-9.008(5), F.A.C., [now renumbered as 60Y-5.008(5), F.A.C.], and as specifically instructed by the Florida Commission on Human Relations in its Transmittal of the Petition to Respondent. (See Finding of Fact No. 4, supra and "Exhibit A"). Respondent also failed to demonstrate how, under the circumstances of the language contained in the Florida Commission on Human Relations Transmittal of Petition and the DOAH orders, Respondent could have been misled by conflicting language in Rules 22T-9.07 [now renumbered 60Y- 5.007(9) and (12)], 22T-9.08 [now renumbered 60Y-5.008(1) and (5)] and 60Q- 2.004(5), F.A.C., 3/ into not answering the Petition for Relief for more than thirteen months, indeed, never answering it, or how such circumstances prevented Respondent responding to other motions and orders or prevented Respondent from obtaining "out of house" counsel. Settlement negotiations are not cognizable by the trier of fact, are always undertaken at the parties' mutual risk, and have never been deemed sufficient to toll filing dates. See, Section 90.408, F.S. After Respondent had been given the opportunity to present any further evidence on its oral motion to dismiss the Petition for Relief, the oral motion to dismiss was taken under advisement for resolution in this Recommended Order. (See Conclusions of Law, infra.) Respondent then orally moved for clarification of the April 21, 1994 Notice of Hearing and Order Limiting Scope of Formal Hearing, which was resolved by rereading that order and notice into the record. Respondent next orally moved for leave to present witnesses, contrary to the decretal portion of the April 21, 1994 order. No good cause was shown to vacate the April 21, 1994 order limiting evidence. To permit Respondent to put on undisclosed witnesses while Petitioner was precluded from doing so after Petitioner had appeared at formal hearing believing that Respondent's failure to answer constituted an admission of the material facts alleged in the petition and Petitioner had come prepared only for direct and cross-examination of himself would be unduly prejudicial. The motion was denied. The facts that Rule 60Y-5.008(5)(d) F.A.C. presumes admitted under the unanswered Petition for Relief are those set out in the Petition itself. They are fully set out in "Exhibit A" hereto and provide, in part, as follows: "The company had followed discriminatory hiring assignment and promotion policies against minority group members on an equal basis with white people. My fourteenth amendment were [sic] violated. That white get hired off the street and get full time without any training, the first day. * * * Discriminatory hiring, firing, assignment and promotion policies against Negroes using their position and power to destroy black worker jobs in order to bestow them on white workers." ("Exhibit A") Petitioner's unrefuted testimony elaborated on the foregoing admitted facts to show that Respondent employed fifteen or more employees and that Petitioner, a black male, had been employed part-time for nearly four years by Respondent in its Quincy store managed by Mr. Terry Miller; Mr. Miller's assistant had hired Petitioner as a member of a truck unloading crew. Petitioner also showed that other white workers were hired off the street without job training for full-time positions. However, Petitioner was hired by Mr. Miller as a full-time employee effective June 9, 1994, four days before formal hearing. Petitioner admitted that at some time before June 9, 1994, he had been "written up" for not meeting the employer's dress code and appearance standards and had also been "written up" for not meeting the employer's performance standards of moving at least 45 cases per hour. Petitioner maintained, without refutation, that these "write-ups" were unwarranted, pretextual citations because he was black. Petitioner testified, without refutation, that on at least one occasion he was "written up" in a category that did not include his regular job duties. This admission is no different that the expanded allegations included in an attachment to the Petition ("Exhibit A"), all of which allegations have been admitted by Respondent by its failure to answer the Petition. Petitioner also conceded, upon cross-examination, that in July 1992 there were some black full-time associates in the Quincy store and that promotions have been based on job performance, not seniority. However, no similarity of these other black full-time employees' employment situations or job duties was drawn to compare with Petitioner's personal employment situation or job duties. Consequently, the "write-ups" of Petitioner are found to be pretextual reasons for the employer's refusal to promote him. No stipulation or order bifurcating damage evidence from evidence of discrimination was entered in this case. Petitioner asserted that he was entitled to "compensation" from July 22, 1992 to June 9, 1994, but he presented no evidence of his pay rate per hour in either the full time or part time positions, nor any other nexus upon which lost compensation damages could be calculated. There also is no record evidence of what increases and/or decreases occurred in pay, pay rate, or emoluments for either position over that period of time. Likewise, there is no record evidence of how many hours Petitioner worked or could have worked in either the part-time or full-time position so that damages based on a pay differential can be calculated. Respondent orally moved to dismiss for failure of Petitioner to state a prima facie case. That motion was also taken under advisement for resolution in this Recommended Order.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order FINDING: That Petitioner has shown a prima facie violation of the Human Rights Act of 1977, Section 760.10 F.S. [1989], to wit: failure of a covered employer to "promote" Petitioner-employee to a full-time position because he is black; That Respondent has articulated, but has not substantiated, legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the actions complained of; and That Petitioner has shown the articulated reasons to be pretextual; AND ORDERING: That Respondent employ Petitioner in a full-time position. RECOMMENDED this 15th day of August, 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of August, 1994.
The Issue Whether a proposed amendment to Rule 33-5.006(8), Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated authority?
Findings Of Fact Standing. The Petitioner, W. Gerry Hargrove, is an inmate in the custody of the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioner is housed in Tamoka Correctional Institution. The Petitioner is subject to the rules of the Respondent, including the proposed rule amendment at issue in this proceeding. The Respondent. Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that the Respondent, an agency of the State of Florida, adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. Among other things, Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that rules be adopted by the Respondent governing visiting hours and privileges and all other aspects of the operation of the prison system in Florida. The Proposed Amendment to Rule 33-5.006(8), Florida Administrative Code. Section 944.23, Florida Statutes, provides, in pertinent part: The following persons shall be authorized to visit at their pleasure all state correctional institutions: The Governor, all Cabinet members, members of the Legislature, judges of state courts, state attorneys, public defenders, and authorized representatives of the commission. No other person not otherwise authorized by law shall be permitted to enter a state correctional institution except under such regulations as the department may prescribe. . . . [Emphasis added]. Pursuant to the authority of Sections 944.09 and 944.23, Florida Statutes, the Respondent has adopted Chapter 33-5, Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33-5.006(1), Florida Administrative Code, provides, in pertinent part, the following: Upon being committed to the custody of the Department, each inmate shall be given the opportunity to submit a list of persons from whom he wishes to receive visits. The initial list . . . shall be limited to members of the inmate's immediate family. Once the inmate has been assigned to a permanent institution, additional relatives and friends, business associates and others may be considered, but only after a criminal history background inquiry has been made. Rule 33-5.006(7), Florida Administrative Code, provides: (7) Inmate visits with approved family members or friends should be encouraged for the positive purpose of maintaining home and community ties, which after release should provide a deterrent to recidivism. To the extent that it is safe and practicable to do so, such visiting should be allowed to take place in a relaxed atmosphere. Rule 33-5.006, Florida Administrative Code, also provides certain circumstances when a person may be excluded from an inmate's visitors list. For example, persons convicted of a felony may be excluded. Rule 33-5.006(5), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33-5.007, Florida Administrative Code, is titled "Visitation Denial." Pursuant to this rule, it is provided that visitation may be denied under certain circumstances, i.e., if a visit would present a clear and present danger to the security and order of an institution. Rule 33-5.007, Florida Administrative Code, also provides: (3) No visit should be denied: . . . . (c) for any reason unrelated to the security, order or rehabilitative objectives of the institution. At issue in this proceeding is a proposed amendment to Rule 33- 5.006(8), Florida Administrative Code: (8)(a) An unmarried i[I]nmate[s] [not married] may be allowed to have one single non-immediate family member of the opposite sex on the visiting list, after approval. A married inmate may be allowed to have one single, non-immediate family member of the opposite sex on the visiting list, after approval, if a pending divorce or separation of long duration can be verified and the spouse is removed from the list. Married or unmarried inmates may have non- immediate family member couples on the visiting list after approval, but the member of the couple who is the opposite sex of the inmate may not visit the inmate without the spouse. New proposed language of the rule is denoted by underlining and words or letters removed are indicated by brackets. In this proceeding the Petitioner has only challenged proposed paragraph (c) of Rule 33-5.006(8), Florida Administrative Code (hereinafter referred to as the "Proposed Rule Amendment"). The Respondent has indicated it proposed the addition of paragraph (c) to Rule 33-5.006(8), Florida Administrative Code, because of security concerns. As explained by a representative of the Respondent the following are those security concerns: One spouses (i.e., the wife) may be visiting an inmate without the knowledge of the other spouse (i.e., the husband). If the husband becomes aware of the fact that his wife is visiting an inmate the husband may become alarmed and complain to the Respondent and his wife about the visitation. When the husband complains to his spouse or the Respondent and the inmate learns of the problem, the inmate may become upset. The Respondent indicated that there have been a few instances where inmates who, upon learning that husband of the inmate's visitor has been making it difficult for the visiting spouse to continue with visitation, have attempted to escape to get to the husband. The evidence failed to prove that there is a significant security problem if inmates are allowed to have visitation from a married visitor without requiring that both spouses visit the inmate at the same time. The evidence concerning escape attempts (at best, 5 to 10 attempts during the past thirty years) was speculative. No specifics concerning such attempts were provided when the Petitioner asked for specifics. Nor did the evidence prove that the Respondent's security is inadequate to handle the relatively low number of such escape attempts or that any such escape attempt has been successful. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the Proposed Rule Amendment included a "Summary of the Estimate of Economic Impact of the Rule". Although the Petitioner challenged the adequacy of the Respondent's determination of the economic impact of the Proposed Rule Amendment, the evidence presented during the final hearing of this case failed to prove that the economic impact statement was inadequate.
