The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner is eligible for a consumer certificate of exemption as a charitable institution pursuant to subsection 212.08(7)(o), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Jewish Federation of Brevard, Inc. (Federation) is an umbrella organization comprised of numerous Jewish organizations from Brevard County, the purpose of which is to benefit the total Jewish population in the county and to assist the Jewish population worldwide. Its local programs also benefit the non-Jewish community to a certain degree. There are approximately 200 similar organizations all over the country. They collect contributions which benefit local programs and which are also passed on to the United Jewish Appeal, a separate worldwide organization which funds Jewish social welfare programs and the resettlement of Jewish people. The United Jewish Appeal is the single largest recipient of the Federation’s contributions. The United Jewish Appeal holds a Department of Revenue Consumer’s Certificate of Exemption. The Federation is exempt from federal income tax under section 509(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, and has been so exempt since 1975. Internal Revenue Service Forms 990 (Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax) for the years 1989-1995 accurately reflect the expenditures of the Federation for those years. At hearing, the Federation’s treasurer, Haim Bar-Navon, further explained the three categories of expenditures: administration of the organization, contributions to United Jewish Appeal and contributions or expenditures for local programs. The Federation’s administrative expenses include basic costs of operating the organization and raising funds: salaries, rent, office supplies, printing costs and the like. Without question, in all but two years of its operation the Federation spent less than 50 percent of its annual expenditures on administration. For two years, 1995 and 1996, administrative expenditures were higher than 50 percent. The Federation hoped that by hiring an executive director, rather than depending on its volunteers, it could generate more contributions to disburse to the United Jewish Appeal and to local programs. The hoped-for result was not attained, and after hiring one individual, then another, the Federation has given up that paid position. The resulting excessive administrative costs for 1995 and 1996 were wholly unintended and will not likely reoccur, as the Federation now hires only a single staff person, an office manager, for $18,300 annually. The adopted operating budget for 1997 more accurately reflects the past and future break-out of expenditures. This budget reflects total expenditures of $160,000, allocated as follows: EXPENSES National Programs UJA 50,000 Allocations (local [sic] & national) 5,000 Local Programs Community Relations 8,000 Cultural 8,000 Educational 2,000 Newsletter 14,000 Social Services (including Elderly) 5,000 Scholarships (youth) 10,000 Bar/Bat Mitzvah 3,000 Youth 2,000 Fund Raising 5,000 President’s Discretionary Fund 2,000 Contingency 1,100 Administrative Accountant 1,100 Federation Dues & Fees 1,500 Office Employees & Payroll Taxes 18,300 Office Expenses 14,000 Replenish Working Capital 10,000 TOTAL EXPENSES 160,000 (Joint exhibit no. 5) Even if “Fund Raising”, “President’s Discretionary Fund” and “Contingency” are all considered administrative costs, the total is still less than 50 percent of total expenditures, leaving the majority of the funds for “national programs” and “local programs”. The exact figures for 1996 were not available at the time of hearing and the Federation’s representative could only candidly estimate that administrative costs for that year, when compiled, would exceed 50 percent. Other accurate data from 1989-1995 are available from the Federation’s forms 900: Total Revenue Other UJA Contributions Local Programs Adm. Costs Fund- Raising Costs 1995 159,504 50,000 4,750 41,962 90,295 2,822 1994 297,700 140,009 8,000 40,314 77,813 13,734 1993 213,827 108,770 8,000 42,765 39,601 - 1992 173,269 90,429 11,650 21,971 30,530 - 1991 209,548 118,781 29,960 19,375 31,970 - 1990 152,023 81,400 10,065 18,261 22,127 - 1989 128,393 70,000 15,363 21,512 20,380 - (Joint exhibit no. 4) From this data it is evident that, prior to 1995, administrative costs, including a separate item for “fund raising costs” never approached or exceeded 50 percent of the Federations revenue. More significantly, it is evident that allocations to the United Jewish Appeal (UJA) did approach or exceed 50 percent of the Federation’s revenue prior to 1995. This is significant because, as found in paragraph 3, above, the United Jewish Appeal itself holds a certificate of exemption. In 1995, and thereafter, allocations to the United Jewish Appeal are substantially less than 50 percent of total revenue. This would not be a problem if the “other” allocations and expenditures for local programs could be determined eligible as “charitable” pursuant to statute and rule. However, they cannot be determined eligible. Organizations which received the contributions reflected in the “other” category above, and on forms 900, vary from year to year. These are primarily organizations like the United Appeal. Recipients in 1995 included Hillel of Florida, for maintenance of a site for Jewish students at universities in Florida; Hebrew Union College; the Holocaust Memorial Museum in Maitland, Florida; the U.S. Holocaust Museum; Yeshiva University; Sharing Centers of Brevard (North, Central and South); Serene Harbour; Space Coast Early Intervention Center; Ventures in Living; and the Women’s Center. No evidence was provided to establish that these organizations qualify as “charitable” pursuant to section 212.08, Florida Statutes. “Local programs” also benefit substantially from the Federation each year. The amounts and recipients vary according to the annual budgets, but the 1997 budget total of $52,000.00 is broken out as follows: Community relations - air time paid to a radio station to broadcast a program, “The World from the Jewish Perspective”; Cultural - a Holocaust memorial event, a Jewish community festival, a Jewish film festival and occasional lectures; Educational - workshops for teachers, convention expenses for teachers, and books and materials for a teachers’ resource center; Newsletter - a publication of news and events to everyone on the Federation’s mailing list, Jewish and non-Jewish; Social Services - includes services to the elderly; Scholarships - expenses for Jewish youngsters to attend Jewish camps based on financial statements of need provided by the parents, or for trips to Israel, not based on need; Bar/Bat Mitzvah - when youths reach age 13 and make their Bar or Bat Mitzvah, $500 each is set aside that they can use towards a trip to Israel; Youth - two or three social get-togethers per year for students from all of the various temples or congregations in the local area. There is no evidence that these activities or programs are services described as “charitable” in section 212.08(7), Florida Statutes.
The Issue The issues in the case are whether the allegations of the Second Administrative Complaint are correct, and, if so, what penalty, if any, should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, Respondent was an insurance agent, holding Florida license number A020887, and was licensed as a Resident Life, Health & Variable Annuity (2-15); Life (20-16); Life & Health (2-18); General Lines, Property & Casualty Insurance (2-20); and Health (2-40) agent. Respondent has been licensed in Florida since February 14, 1994, and has consistently met all continuing education requirements applicable to his licensure. At all times material to this case, Respondent was employed as an account executive by HRH of Southwest Florida, Inc. HRH of Southwest Florida, Inc., is a subsidiary of HRH, Inc., a large provider of insurance agency services. Respondent is not and has never been an officer, director, manager, or shareholder of HRH of Southwest Florida, Inc. HRH of Southwest Florida, Inc., provided insurance and risk management services to businesses. Insofar as is relevant to this case, HRH of Southwest Florida, Inc., offered to its clients both fully insured health benefit plans and partially self-funded health benefit plans. Fully insured health benefit plans are those in which an employer pays a premium (sometimes with an employee contribution) to an insurer, and health benefit insurance coverage is provided to participants in the plan. Petitioner has the responsibility for regulating fully insured health benefit plans sold in the State of Florida. Partially self-funded health benefit plans include those where an employer's funds (again sometimes with an employee contribution) are used to cover health expenses of plan participants. The employer's funds are collected by a third- party administrator responsible for paying claims out of the employer's funds, and for obtaining stop-loss insurance to cover claims in excess of the funds available from the employer. Properly created, partially self-funded health benefit plans may be exempt from regulation by state authorities under the provisions of the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). In the April 2001, HRH of Southwest Florida, Inc., began offering to clients in Lee, Manatee, and Sarasota Counties, a health benefit product made available by Meridian Benefit, Inc. (MBI). MBI had no authorization to operate as an insurer in the State of Florida. Based on information provided to HRH of Southwest Florida, Inc., MBI was operating as a third-party administrator for partially self-funded health benefit plans. The information provided to HRH of Southwest Florida, Inc., initially came from Thomas Mestmaker and Associates, a managing general agency representing MBI, and was confirmed through information subsequently provided by MBI. The plans were presumed by Respondent to be exempt from regulation by Petitioner under the provisions of ERISA based on the information provided by MBI. According to the information provided to Respondent and to HRH of Southwest Florida, Inc., the MBI plan included establishment of a single employer trust (SET) on behalf of each business. Health claims from each business' employees would be paid from the funds contributed to the trust by the employer. "Stop-loss" insurance would be obtained to cover claims in excess of an employer's contribution. The information provided by Respondent to his clients was provided to Respondent or to HRH of Southwest Florida, Inc., by MBI and affiliated other sources. Based on such information, Respondent presumed that MBI was a stable organization and that the stop-loss coverage was in place. Respondent had no specific training related to ERISA- qualification of health benefit plans. He has sold other plans that he believed were ERISA-qualified plans to other employers in Florida. Typically, a business owner would initially contact HRH of Southwest Florida, Inc., seeking health benefits for employees. A representative of HRH of Southwest Florida, Inc., such as Respondent, would research a variety of options for the business owner and then present the options to the client. The evidence establishes that the MBI health benefit plan was one of several options (including both fully-insured and partially self-funded plans) presented to clients. A client was free to choose the MBI plan, another plan presented, or no plan at all. Clients generally reviewed health benefit plans on an annual basis, at which point the process of presenting various options was repeated. Respondent eventually sold the MBI plan to ten or twelve business clients seeking to provide health benefits to employees. Clients choosing to obtain health benefits through the MBI plan submitted information related to the client's employees through Respondent and HRH of Southwest Florida, Inc., to MBI, which would respond with a preliminary rate proposal. After a client chose to accept the rate proposal, representatives from HRH of Southwest Florida, Inc., including Respondent, would assist client employees in completing applications. The applications were submitted to MBI, which in turn established actual rates and communicated the actual rate directly to the client. Clients who chose to accept the final rate proposal then executed documents purportedly establishing an SET. The documents apparently were created by MBI, and were delivered to clients through representatives of HRH of Southwest Florida, Inc., including Petitioner. After execution by the clients, the documents were returned to MBI. Some clients received a general document on MBI letterhead titled "Technical Aspects of SET SINGLE EMPLOYER TRUST" wherein clients were advised that the SET was an "Employee Welfare Benefit Plan" that was "designed to conform to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended." The document described the process of establishing rates and advised that MBI was the plan administrator. The document also referenced a trust document and stated that the trust custodian was First Union National Bank. The document stated as follows: At First Union an account will be established for each single employer trust into which all contributions received by the trust from the employer group will be deposited. Any income earned from funds deposited in that account will be credited to that account and any fees charged by the bank will be charged to that account. Some clients received a disclosure document from "Hilb, Rogal and Hamilton of Sarasota" specifically applicable to the client, which provided that the client "intends to establish a SINGLE EMPLOYER TRUST Employee Welfare Benefit Plan," that client contributions would be made to a trust, and that "all benefits funded by the Plan will be paid out of the assets of the Trust." The document further provided that "[I]n its discretion, the Trust may purchase stop-loss insurance to pay any claims in excess of the amounts held in the Trust." Clients were provided with a document titled "DIRECTIVE TO ESTABLISH A HEALTH AND WELFARE BENEFIT PLAN UNDER ERISA" wherein each client provided information, including the number of total and participating employees and the plan coverage sought. The document required the signature of a client's representative and authorized MBI to establish a "Health and Welfare Benefit Plan under ERISA." Clients were provided with a document titled "HEALTH AND WELFARE PLAN - PLAN DOCUMENT," a lengthy document that set forth the specific health care benefits provided to each client under the selected benefit plan. Each client was provided with a document titled "HEALTH AND WELFARE PLAN SUMMARY" which essentially summarized the plan being provided to the client, identified as the "Plan Sponsor." The document identified MBI as the plan administrator and the claim administrator. The document provided as follows: The Plan conforms to and is governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended ("ERISA"). The Plan is not a policy of insurance. Neither the Plan Sponsor, nor any trust established to fund the benefits hereunder, is an insurance company. At various times, clients were provided with a document titled "WELFARE BENEFIT PLAN TRUST." In some instances, the document purported to be a trust agreement between the client and First Union, the designated custodian. In other instances, the "WELFARE BENEFIT PLAN TRUST" document did not identify the name of the trust custodian. In all cases, the document identified the plan administrator as MBI, and provided that MBI could "elect such financial institution as it deems appropriate to serve as the custodian with respect to the Trust. . . ." The document further provided that the plan administrator could "remove the Custodian at any time upon sixty (60) days notice in writing to the Custodian . . ." and that the custodian could resign with like notice to the plan administrator. In the agreements where First Union was designated the custodian, removal of the custodian required the client to designate a replacement custodian. In the agreements where no designation was made, the document provided that the plan administrator would designate the replacement custodian. Once the documents were executed and returned to MBI, MBI directly invoiced clients for payment of funds, and clients paid such funds directly to MBI. There is no evidence that Respondent was involved in handling funds transferred from the client to MBI. There is no evidence that Respondent received any information related to any trust accounts that may or may not have been established under the agreement between the client, a trust custodian, and MBI. There is no evidence that Respondent received cancelled checks or copies of account statements. There is no credible evidence that custodial accounts were established by MBI or that contributions submitted to MBI by employers were deposited into custodial accounts. Some checks from multiple employers appear to have been deposited into a single account at First Union. Some checks were deposited into the PNC Bank. There is no credible evidence as to the distribution of the deposited funds. Although under the terms of the trust agreement not all clients were required to approve substitute custodians, there is no evidence that any client required to approve a substitute custodian was ever asked to do so. There is no evidence that the plan administrator complied with the trust document language related to removal of the custodian. At some point in 2002, questions arose about the source of funds available to pay claims in excess of employer contributions. The information initially provided to clients by Respondent was that stop-loss insurance was in place to cover such claims. However, according to a letter on MBI letterhead dated February 25, 2002, to Thomas E. Mestmaker and Associates, "MBI is responsible for any amounts due under adjudicated claims in excess of the contribution amount of its client, assuming that all payments, obligations and bills submitted to the client are timely paid, and the Plan is in good standing with MBI." The letter further states, "MBI is responsible for any excess, subject to the terms and conditions of the initial Directive together with the Plan Trust Agreement, as applicable." There were apparently concerns regarding the soundness of MBI and their ability to handle losses. In March of 2002, information available to Respondent indicated that the stop-loss coverage MBI had supposedly obtained would not be renewed. Respondent began to prepare to move his MBI clients to other benefit plans. A letter to Respondent dated April 11, 2002, on MBI letterhead and purportedly from the Controller of MBI states in part as follows: Meridian Benefit Inc. has acted as an administrator for ERISA-based health plans that it has developed for years. Meridian Benefit Inc. has credibly sufficient contributions and reserves necessary to pay claims for these plans. Moreover, the finances of Meridian Benefit Inc. have been and continue to be sound. Since Meridian Benefit Inc. is a privately held company, we cannot share our detailed financial data, however through management and underwriting Meridian Benefit Inc. has been able to control claims and group losses. MBI then advised Respondent and others that the stop- loss insurance was in place via a statement dated June 19, 2002, indicating that "reinsurance" was being provided by American National Life Insurance Company effective July 1, 2002. As MBI or affiliated entities issued statements regarding the soundness of the MBI plan and the availability of stop-loss coverage, Respondent made the information, including the aforementioned letters, available to clients. The parties have stipulated that American National Life Insurance Company did not provide "reinsurance" or stop-loss insurance relative to any health and welfare benefit plan with MBI as plan administrator. There is no credible evidence that any stop-loss insurance was actually ever obtained by MBI on behalf of employers. In early 2003, MBI informed employers that the employers would be responsible for payment of claims in excess of contributions. By letter dated February 19, 2003, MBI issued a letter to clients which indicated that if a client's claims exceeded contributions, MBI would "advance funds" against the employer's account and then would "approach the employer for repayment of the deficit." The letter further provided that if MBI and the employer "cannot successfully negotiate repayment for the advance, MBI will unfortunately, be forced to stop payment on any existing or future claims." The February 19 letter clearly contradicted earlier affirmations that stop-loss insurance was in place to cover claims in excess of contributions. The evidence fails to establish from where funds "advanced" by MBI would have come. Respondent testified that he did not know the source of the funds. The evidence establishes that Respondent made no independent effort to review MBI or the MBI plan being offered to clients, to determine whether or not stop-loss insurance was actually in place by contacting the insurer identified by MBI as the stop-loss insurer, or to determine whether client funds were being deposited into custodial accounts. By letters dated February 20, 2003 (the day after notifying employers that they would be required to reimburse MBI for funds "advanced"), MBI advised employers of account deficits and directed the employers to pay the deficits. On or about May 15, 2003, MBI filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in the United States District Court in New Jersey. MBI had an agreement with Healthcare Sarasota, a local employer organization with an existing network of healthcare providers (a preferred provider organization or "PPO"), to permit MBI plan participants to utilize the Healthcare Sarasota provider network. Client benefit claims were handled between the PPO and MBI. On occasion, representatives of HRH of Southwest Florida, Inc., including Petitioner, became involved in resolving claim issues at the request of clients, but Petitioner had no direct involvement in paying claims. Prior to and by the time MBI filed for bankruptcy, there were numerous unpaid health benefits claims incurred by employees of the employers who became involved with the MBI plan through Respondent. Some employers have paid the claims and are seeking restitution from various parties. Other claims remain unpaid. Although the evidence fails to clearly establish the amount of the remaining unpaid claims, it is clear that at the time of the hearing, thousands of dollars in health benefit claims remain unpaid by any responsible party. Some employees of businesses that participated in the MBI plan have had unpaid claims forwarded by health providers to debt collection agencies. Petitioner has disseminated information to the public and to licensed agents about potential difficulties that may result from participating in health benefit plans that are not subject to state regulation. There is no evidence that licensed agents are required to read the information disseminated by Petitioner, and there is no evidence that Respondent did so. Child Development Center In mid-2001, Respondent met with a representative of the Child Development Center (CDC) to present various options for health benefit coverage for CDC employees. CDC chose to provide health benefits through the MBI plan. A CDC representative executed the document titled "DIRECTIVE TO ESTABLISH A HEALTH & WELFARE BENEFIT PLAN UNDER ERISA." The document was dated June 21, 2001, with an effective date of July 1, 2001, and signed by Respondent, identified as the "Benefit Consultant." A CDC representative executed the document titled "WELFARE BENEFIT PLAN TRUST." The document provided an effective date of July 1, 2001, but was executed on September 19, 2001. The document stated that the trust custodian would be First Union. Nothing on the document indicated that First Union had agreed to be the custodian. Included with the information provided by Respondent to CDC was the letter dated February 25, 2002, from MBI to Thomas Mestmaker and Associates stating that MBI was responsible for amounts due under adjudicated claims in excess of the employer's contribution. By July 2002, there were no apparent problems with coverage or claims paid, and CDC renewed its participation in the MBI plan. By January 2003, problems with CDC claims payments were occurring and CDC representatives requested from Respondent an accounting of claims paid. The accounting was not immediately made available, although at some subsequent and unidentified time CDC received the information. In March 2003, an employee of CDC located information on the internet indicating that the States of Colorado and North Carolina had issued "cease and desist" orders against MBI. The CDC representative forwarded the information to "Tyla Heatherly" an employee at HRH of Southwest Florida, Inc., and asked that it be provided to Respondent. Respondent thereafter advised the CDC representative that the problems in other states were related to the type of plans that were being offered in those states, and that the CDC plan was an ERISA-qualified SET. By letter from MBI to CDC dated May 5, 2003, MBI advised CDC that MBI was "experiencing severe financial problems and is in the process of winding-down its business." The letter advised CDC to "make immediate arrangements" to obtain either a different third party administrator or to obtain other health benefit coverage. Beginning June 20, 2001, CDC paid funds by check to MBI pursuant to the invoices that MBI delivered directly to CDC. Although the CDC checks to MBI were deposited, the evidence fails to establish that the CDC funds were deposited into a custodial trust account for the benefit of CDC. Family Counseling Center of Sarasota, Inc. At some point in 2001, Respondent met with a representative of the Family Counseling Center of Sarasota, Inc. (FCCS), to present various options for health benefit coverage for FCCS employees. FCCS chose to provide health benefits through the MBI plan. An FCCS representative executed the document titled "DIRECTIVE TO ESTABLISH A HEALTH & WELFARE BENEFIT PLAN UNDER ERISA" dated October 31, 2001, and signed by Respondent, as the "Benefit Consultant." By his signature, an FCCS representative acknowledged receipt of the "HEALTH AND WELFARE PLAN SUMMARY" document indicating an effective date of December 1, 2001, which was also signed by Respondent. An FCCS representative executed the document titled "WELFARE BENEFIT PLAN TRUST." The document has an effective date of December 1, 2001, but the date of execution was January 3, 2002. The document stated that the trust custodian would be First Union. Nothing on the document indicated that First Union had agreed to be the custodian. Included with the information provided by Respondent to FCCS was the letter dated February 25, 2002, from MBI to Thomas Mestmaker and Associates stating that MBI was responsible for amounts due under adjudicated claims in excess of the employer's contribution. Respondent provided to FCCS the MBI letter to Respondent dated April 11, 2002, advising that MBI had sufficient contributions and reserves necessary to pay claims and was in sound condition. Respondent provided to FCCS the document on MBI letterhead dated June 19, 2002, stating that American National Life Insurance Company was providing "reinsurance." Towards the end of the first year of the MBI plan, FCCS learned that renewal of the MBI plan would involve a substantial cost increase. FCCS initially intended to change benefit plans due to the cost increase, but Respondent apparently negotiated with MBI to reduce the price increase to 40 percent over the initial year cost. FCCS renewed the MBI plan because even with the rate increase the MBI plan was still less expensive than other available benefit plans. FCCS received the MBI letter dated February 19, 2003, stating that if a client's claims exceeded contributions, MBI would "advance funds" against the client's account and then would "approach the employer for repayment of the deficit." The evidence fails to establish whether the letter was provided to FCCS by Respondent or by MBI. By letter from MBI to FCCS dated February 20, 2003, MBI advised FCCS that the client needed to submit "a one-time payment of $163,670.75 to bring your account into a positive position or an increase in your contribution of 200% effective 5/1/2003." The letters of February 19 and 20, 2003, contradicted the assurances by Respondent to FCCS that stop-loss coverage was in place to address claims in excess of employer contributions. FCCS contacted Respondent to advise him of the situation. By letter from FCCS to the chief executive officer of HRH of Southwest Florida, Inc., dated April 25, 2003, FCCS advised that MBI was not paying claims and that some of the staff were having accounts turned over to collection agencies for non-payment. By letter from MBI to FCCS dated May 5, 2003, MBI advised FCCS that MBI was "experiencing severe financial problems and is in the process of winding-down its business." The letter advised FCCS to "make immediate arrangements" to obtain either a different third party administrator or to obtain other health benefit coverage. FCCS paid funds by check to MBI pursuant to the invoices that MBI delivered directly to FCCS. Although the FCCS checks to MBI were deposited, the evidence fails to establish that the FCCS funds were deposited into a custodial account for the benefit of FCCS. Sarasota Land Services In the beginning of 2002, Respondent met with a representative of Sarasota Land Services (SLS) to present various options for health benefit coverage for SLS employees. SLS chose to provide health benefits though the MBI plan. An SLS representative executed the document titled "DIRECTIVE TO ESTABLISH A HEALTH & WELFARE BENEFIT PLAN UNDER ERISA." The document was executed on February 11, 2002, with an effective date of March 1, 2002, and was signed by Respondent, as the "Benefit Consultant." By her signature, the SLS representative acknowledged receipt of the "HEALTH AND WELFARE PLAN SUMMARY" document indicating an effective date of March 1, 2002, which was also signed by Respondent. An SLS representative executed the document titled "WELFARE BENEFIT PLAN TRUST." The document indicates the agreement was executed on February 11, 2002, and was effective as of March 1, 2002, but the SLS representative's signature was dated September 10, 2002. The document did not identify the name of the trust custodian, but provided that MBI could "elect such financial institution as it deems appropriate to serve as the custodian with respect to the Trust. " SLS received the disclosure document from "Hilb, Rogal and Hamilton of Sarasota" titled "DISCLOSURE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT REGARDING THE SARASOTA LAND SERVICES BENEFIT PLAN" dated March 1, 2002. The SLS representative's signature on the disclosure form is dated September 10, 2002. By letter from MBI to SLS dated February 20, 2003, MBI advised SLS that the claims history required an increase in SLS's contribution of 100 percent effective March 1, 2003. Upon receipt of the letter, the SLS representative contacted Respondent and discussed the situation. The discussion included references to the stop-loss insurance coverage that the SLS representative expected to cover claims in excess of contributions. SLS did not renew its participation in the MBI plan. Beginning February 12, 2002, SLS paid funds by check to MBI pursuant to the invoices that MBI delivered directly to SLS. Although the SLS checks to MBI were deposited, the evidence fails to establish that the SLS funds were deposited into a custodial account for the benefit of SLS. SLS also paid an administrative fee directly to HRH of Southwest Florida, Inc. The evidence does not establish what, if any, of the administrative fee was paid to Respondent. Center For Sight In the fall of 2001, the Center For Sight (CFS) entered into an agreement with MBI to obtain health benefit services for CFS employees. CFS was already participating in the MBI plan in March 2002, at the time the CFS representative who testified at the hearing became employed at CFS. A CFS representative executed on July 17, 2001, the document titled "DIRECTIVE TO ESTABLISH A HEALTH & WELFARE BENEFIT PLAN UNDER ERISA." The document indicated an effective date of August 1, 2001, and was signed by Respondent, as the "Benefit Consultant." By their signatures, CFS representatives acknowledged receipt of the "HEALTH AND WELFARE PLAN SUMMARY" document indicating an effective date of August 1, 2001. CFS representatives executed the document titled "WELFARE BENEFIT PLAN TRUST" with an effective date of August 1, 2001, although the document was executed on September 1, 2001. The document indicated that the trust custodian would be First Union. Nothing on the document indicated that First Union had agreed to be the custodian. The CFS representative who testified at the hearing was the chief operating officer for CFS. He reviewed the MBI plan upon beginning his employment. He testified that claims payment problems began "instantaneously," but stated that Respondent was helpful in getting claims processed and paid. He testified that he had no problems with Respondent. The CFS representative had concerns about the provision of stop-loss insurance and asked Respondent to obtain a copy of a policy, but the policy was never provided to CFS. However, prior to renewal in July 2002, Respondent provided to CFS the MBI document dated June 19, 2002, stating that American National Life Insurance Company was providing "reinsurance." At the end of the first year, Respondent presented various health benefit options to CFS, but despite the claims payment problems, CFS renewed the MBI plan in July 2002 because the MBI plan was substantially less expensive than other benefit plans. At some subsequent time, Sarasota Memorial Hospital and other local providers began to refuse services to CFS employees covered under the MBI plan, apparently because claims were not being paid. CFS received the MBI letter dated February 19, 2003, stating that if a client's claims exceeded contributions, MBI would "advance funds" against the client's account and then would "approach the employer for repayment of the deficit." By letter from MBI to CFS dated February 20, 2003, MBI advised FCCS that the client needed to submit "a one-time payment of $5,471.66 to bring your account into a positive position or an increase in your contribution of 15% effective 4/1/2003." By letter dated April 18, 2003, to MBI and copied to Respondent, CFS set forth a list of concerns related to claims which were unpaid or had been denied and to "high administrative cost" and asked that there be a resolution to the problems. Eventually CFS paid approximately $300,000 in pending employee claims using CFS funds and sought health benefits from another source. Beginning July 19, 2001, CFS paid funds by check to MBI pursuant to the invoices that MBI delivered directly to CFS. Although CFS checks to MBI were deposited, the evidence fails to establish that the CFS funds were deposited into a custodial account for the benefit of CFS. Michael's Gourmet Group Prior to 2002, Respondent had an existing relationship with Michael's Gourmet Group (MGG) and had previously assisted MGG in obtaining health benefits from various sources. In March of 2002, Respondent met with a representative of MGG to present various options for health benefit coverage for MGG employees. MGG chose to provide health benefits through the MBI plan. As he did in presenting available health benefit options to clients, Respondent informed MGG that the MBI plan was a partially self-funded plan and that stop-loss insurance would cover claims in excess of the MGG contributions. An MGG representative executed the document titled "DIRECTIVE TO ESTABLISH A HEALTH & WELFARE BENEFIT PLAN UNDER ERISA." The document was executed on February 27, 2002, with an effective date of March 1, 2002, and was signed by Respondent, as the "Benefit Consultant." Although the evidence includes a "HEALTH AND WELFARE PLAN SUMMARY" document applicable to MGG and indicating an effective date of March 1, 2002, there are no signatures on the document. An MGG representative executed the document titled "WELFARE BENEFIT PLAN TRUST" with an effective date of March 1, 2002, although the document was executed July 24, 2002. The document did not identify the name of the trust custodian, but provided that MBI may "elect such financial institution as it deems appropriate to serve as the custodian with respect to the Trust. " MGG received a document from "Hilb, Rogal and Hamilton of Sarasota" titled "DISCLOSURE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT REGARDING THE SARASOTA LAND SERVICES BENEFIT PLAN" dated March 15, 2002. The MGG representative's signature on the disclosure form is dated July 24, 2002. MGG received the MBI letter dated February 19, 2003, which stated that if a client's claims exceeded contributions, MBI would "advance funds" against the client's account and then would "approach the employer for repayment of the deficit." By letter from MBI to MGG dated February 20, 2003, MBI advised MGG that the claims history required an increase in MGG's contribution of 300 percent effective March 1, 2003. Subsequent to receipt of the two letters, MGG discontinued its participation in the MBI plan. Beginning February 27, 2002, MGG paid funds by check to MBI pursuant to the invoices that MBI delivered directly to MGG. Although MGG's checks to MBI were deposited, the evidence fails to establish that MGG's funds were deposited into a custodial account for the benefit of MGG. MGG also paid an administrative fee directly to HRH of Southwest Florida, Inc. The evidence does not establish what, if any, of the administrative fee was paid to Respondent. Cheddar's Casual Cafe In September 2001, Respondent met with a representative of a restaurant chain known as Cheddar's Casual Cafe (Cheddar's). Respondent presented various options for health benefits to Cheddar's, and the Cheddar's representative chose to provide health benefits through the MBI plan. A Cheddar's representative executed the document titled "DIRECTIVE TO ESTABLISH A HEALTH & WELFARE BENEFIT PLAN UNDER ERISA" dated December 18, 2001, and signed by Respondent, as the "Benefit Consultant." By his signature, the Cheddar's representative acknowledged receipt of the "HEALTH AND WELFARE PLAN SUMMARY" document indicating an effective date of January 1, 2002. By his signature, the Cheddar's representative on January 14, 2002, executed the document titled "WELFARE BENEFIT PLAN TRUST" with an effective date of January 1, 2002. The document indicated that the trust custodian would be First Union. Nothing on the document indicated that First Union had agreed to be the custodian. Beginning February 5, 2002, Cheddar's paid funds by check to MBI pursuant to the invoices that MBI delivered directly to Cheddar's. Although Cheddar's checks to MBI were deposited, the evidence fails to establish that Cheddar's funds were deposited into a custodial account for the benefit of Cheddar's. Cheddar's also paid an administrative fee directly to HRH of Southwest Florida, Inc. The evidence does not establish what, if any, of the administrative fee was paid to Respondent. Cheddar's representative inquired as to the stability of MBI and was advised by Respondent that MBI was stable. The Cheddar's representative relied on Respondent's representation when the Cheddar's health benefit plan came up for renewal towards the end of 2002. Although Respondent presented health benefit plans from several companies, Cheddar's renewed the MBI plan, even though some employees had experienced late claims payments. By claim denial dated February 28, 2003, MBI denied the hospital claim for a Cheddar's employee because the claim was over 120 days old, but there is no evidence that Respondent was advised of the denied claim. By letter dated April 29, 2003, to MBI, Cheddar's cancelled coverage as of April 1, 2003. The letter states that "there are a substantial number of unpaid claims from calendar years 2002 and 2003" and asserts that MBI has been unresponsive to complaints about the problems. A copy of the April 29, 2003, letter was sent to Respondent with a cover letter expressing dissatisfaction with the MBI plan, with the MBI operation, and with Respondent's representation of MBI.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order suspending the insurance licensure of Bradley W. Beshore for a period of 78 months. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of March, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of March, 2005.
The Issue As the parties have stipulated, the issue in this case is whether Respondent Florida Housing Finance Corporation (the “Corporation”) properly interpreted Rule 67-48.032(2), Florida Administrative Code, and the corresponding provisions on the same subject found in paragraph 2, at page 2, of the Corporation’s 2000 Qualified Allocation Plan (collectively, the "Instructions"), when it applied the Instructions to determine the substantial interests of Petitioners and Intervenors.
Findings Of Fact The evidence presented at final hearing established the facts that follow. The Corporation and Its Duty to Allocate Federal Income Tax Credits The Corporation is a public corporation that administers governmental programs relating to the financing and refinancing of housing and related facilities in Florida. It is governed by a nine-member board composed of eight persons whom the governor appoints plus the Secretary of the Department of Community Affairs, sitting ex-officio. Among other things, the Corporation is the state's designated "housing credit agency" as defined in the Internal Revenue Code. As such, the Corporation has the responsibility and authority to establish procedures necessary for the allocation and distribution of low-income housing federal tax credits, which are created under and governed almost entirely by federal law. These tax credits, which are designed to encourage the development of low-income housing for families, provide a dollar-for-dollar reduction of the holder’s federal income tax liability and can be taken each year, for up to ten years, that the low-income housing project for which the credits were awarded continues to satisfy Internal Revenue Code requirements. Housing tax credits are allotted annually to the states on a per capita basis and then awarded, through state-administered programs, to developers of rental housing for low-income and very low-income families. Once awarded, there is a market for these tax credits; consequently, a developer may sell them at a discount to obtain immediate cash for its project. As a populous state, Florida receives between $18 million and $18.5 million in federal tax credits each year. The Corporation allocates the state's share of tax credits to eligible recipients pursuant to a Qualified Allocation Plan ("QAP") that federal law requires be prepared. The QAP, which must be approved by the governor, is incorporated by reference in Rule 67-48.025, Florida Administrative Code. In accordance with the QAP, the Corporation employs various set-asides and special targeting goals that play a substantial part in determining which applicants will receive tax credits in a particular year. While targeting goals are "aspirational" in nature, set-asides are relatively inflexible. Thus, special targeting goals may be met if credits are available. In contrast, credits that were reserved (or "set- aside") for specific project types will be awarded to applicants whose developments fall within the defined set-aside. The set-asides that have spawned the instant dispute are the Geographic Set-Asides and the Non-Profit Set-Aside. The Geographic Set-Asides require that a pre-determined portion of the available tax credits be awarded to applicants in each of the following county groups: Large County, Medium County, and Small County. In 2000, the allocation percentages for these groups were 64%, 26%, and 10%, respectively. The Non-Profit Set-Aside, which is a function of federal law, requires that at least 12% of the credits be awarded to non-profit applicants. None of the other set-asides is either at issue here or affects the analysis or outcome. The same is true of the special targeting goals. For simplicity's sake, therefore, special targeting goals will be ignored in the discussion that follows, and it will be assumed, unless otherwise stated, that the Geographic and Non-Profit Set-Asides are the only factors (besides merit) that affect the Corporation's award of tax credits. The Petitioners and Intervenors (Collectively, "Petitioners") Lakesmart is a Florida limited partnership which has as one of its general partners a non-profit corporation. In the 2000 application cycle, Lakesmart applied to the Corporation for an award of tax credits from the Medium County allocation. Lakesmart is a "Non-Profit Applicant" for purposes of the Non- Profit Set-Aside. RPK is a Florida limited partnership. In the 2000 application cycle, RPK applied to the Corporation for an award of tax credits from the Large County allocation. For purposes of the Non-Profit Set-Aside, RPK is a "for-profit Applicant." Meadow Glen and Coral Village are Florida limited partnerships. Each has a non-profit corporation as one of its general partners. Both applied to the Corporation in the 2000 application cycle for an award of tax credits from the Medium County allocation. Each is considered a "Non-Profit Applicant" for purposes of the Non-Profit Set-Aside. Evaluation, Ranking, and the Tentative Funding Range To distribute the finite amount of tax credits available each year, the Corporation has designed a competitive process whereby potential recipients file applications that the Corporation grades according to selection criteria set forth in the QAP. Points are assigned based on compliance with these criteria. At the end of the evaluation process, each applicant that met the threshold requirements will have earned a final score that determines its rank in terms of relative merit, with higher-scored projects being "better" than lower-scored projects. Because of the set-asides, however, credits are not awarded simply on the basis of comparative scores. Instead, the Geographic Set-Asides require that the applicants be sorted and ranked, according to their scores, within the Large County, Medium County, and Small County groups to which they belong and from whose credit allocations the successful applicants will be funded. As a result, therefore, if the several applicants with the three highest scores in the entire applicant pool were all in the Large County group and the applicant with the fourth highest score were in the Small County group, for example, then the latter applicant would be ranked first in the Small County group. This means, to continue with the example, that if the first- and second-ranked projects in the Large County group were to exhaust the credits allocated to that group, then the applicant with the third highest score overall would not be funded, while the applicant with the fourth highest score in the applicant pool (but ranked first in a county group) would be funded. 16/ After the Corporation has sorted the applicants by county group and ranked them, within their respective groups, from highest to lowest based on the applicants' final scores, it draws a tentative funding line within each group. Applicants above these lines are within the tentative funding range and thus apparently successful. Conversely, an applicant below the tentative funding line in its county group will not receive tax credits unless, to satisfy a set-aside or fulfill a special targeting goal, it is moved into the funding range. In the 2000 application cycle, a preliminary outcome which had occurred only once before, in 1997, happened again: the aggregate of credits requested by the non-profit applicants within the tentative funding range did not amount to the Non- Profit Set-Aside percentage — 12% in 2000 — of total available credits. Therefore, the Corporation needed to elevate as many apparently unsuccessful non-profit applicants into the funding range — and concomitantly to remove as many apparently successful for-profit applicants from the funding range to make room for the favored non-profit applicant(s) — as necessary to fulfill the 12% quota. An Aside on Categorical Ranking The separation of applicants into three groups according to the Geographic Set-Asides, and the effect that has on determining which applicants will receive credits, was mentioned above. To better understand the parties' dispute regarding the procedure for satisfying the Non-Profit Set-Aside when, as in 2000, it is necessary to award credits to a putatively unsuccessful non-profit applicant at the expense of a putatively successful for-profit applicant, a second, more detailed look at the implications of categorical ranking will be helpful. Because of the Non-Profit Set-Aside, the set of all qualified applicants ("Applicant Pool") is divided into two classes: non-profit and for-profit corporations. As will be seen, the class of non-profit corporations is further separated, for purposes of the Non-Profit Set-Aside, into two subclasses: domestic non-profits and out-of-state, or foreign, non-profits. Finally, to repeat for emphasis, all qualified applicants, regardless of class or subclass (if applicable), fall within one of three groups according to the Geographic Set-Asides: Small County, Medium County, and Large County. The following chart depicts the relevant classification of applicants within the Applicant Pool: Applicant Pool Non-profits For-profits Domestic Foreign Small County Medium County Large County Because, as the chart shows, each applicant fits into several categories, applicants may be ranked in order of their comparative scores in a variety of combinations, depending on how they are sorted, e.g. all applicants, all Large County for- profits, all foreign non-profits, etc. Once the Corporation has drawn the tentative funding lines (which, recall, are county group-specific) and determined preliminarily which applicants will receive funding and which will not, two additional categories exist: applicants within the funding range and applicants below (or outside) the funding range. Owing to the nature of the instant dispute, however, the only non-profits discussed below are those outside the tentative funding range, unless otherwise stated, and the only for-profits considered are those within the tentative funding range, unless otherwise stated. 1/ The above makes clear, it is hoped, that a reference to the "highest scored" applicant, without more, may describe many applicants, such as the highest scored domestic non-profit, the highest scored non-profit in the Small County group, the highest scored foreign non-profit in the Large County group, and so on. More information is needed to pinpoint a particular entity. For ease of reference, and to facilitate the discussion and disposition of the present dispute, the following abbreviations will be used in this Recommended Order as shorthand descriptions of applicants’ defining characteristics: Abbreviation Meaning NP Non-profit applicant FP For-profit applicant High- highest scored Low- lowest scored D domestic entity (i.e. organized under Florida law) F foreign entity (i.e. organized under the law of a state other than Florida) S, M, and L Small, Medium and Large County, respectively ! highest or lowest scored within the indicated category; e.g. High- NP(S!) means highest scored non- profit within the Small County group; Low-FP(S!) means lowest scored for-profit in the Small county group x, y variables Combining these abbreviations provides an increasingly precise description, as more information is added. For example: Combination Description High-NP Highest scored non-profit in some, unknown category High-NP[D!] Highest scored domestic non- profit, unknown group; is not necessarily the highest scored non-profit in the class of non- profits High-NP[F!] Highest scored foreign non-profit, unknown group; is not necessarily the highest scored non-profit in the class of non-profits High-NP[D!](S) Highest scored domestic non- profit, located in the Small County group; not the highest scored non-profit within the Small County group High-NP[D](S!) Highest scored non-profit in the Small County group; is a domestic corporation but is neither the highest scored non-profit nor highest scored domestic non-profit High-NP[D](S) Highest scored domestic non-profit in the Small County group; is neither the highest scored non- profit, the highest scored domestic non-profit, nor the highest scored non-profit in the Small County group Low-FP! Lowest scored for-profit in the class of for-profits Low-FP(M!) Lowest scored for-profit in Medium County group; is not necessarily the lowest scored for- profit in the class of for-profits The Controversy: Gored Oxen and Leapt-Over Frogs The solution to the problem that arose in the 2000 application cycle when an insufficient number of non-profit applicants wound up initially within the tentative funding range is found in two places: Rule 67-48.032, Florida Administrative Code, and the 2000 QAP. Although the language of the two is not identical, the parties agree that the rule and the pertinent QAP provisions have the same meaning, despite their differences in wording. The undersigned has concluded, however, that the differences, though subtle, substantially affect the outcome of this case. It is necessary, therefore, to read them carefully. Rule 67-48.032(2), Florida Administrative Code, provides in pertinent part: To ensure that the minimum 10% is set aside, the Corporation has determined that an initial allocation of 12% to qualified Non- Profits will be met. In order to achieve the initial 12% set aside, Applications from Applicants that qualify or whose General Partner qualifies as a Non-Profit entity pursuant to Rule 67.48.002(71), F.A.C., HUD Regulations, Section 42(h)(5)(c), subsection 501(c)(3) or 501(c)(4) of the Code and organized under Chapter 617, Florida Statutes, or organized under similar state law if organized in a jurisdiction other than Florida and meet scoring threshold requirements shall be moved into the funding range, in order of their comparative scores, with Applicants whose Non-Profit entity is organized under Florida law receiving priority over Non-Profit entities of other jurisdictions, until the set-aside is achieved. The last Non-Profit Development that is moved into the funding range in order to achieve the 12% initial set-aside shall be fully funded even though that may result in a higher Non-Profit set-aside. This will be accomplished by removing the lowest scored Application of a for-profit Applicant from the funding range and replacing it with the highest scored Non- Profit Application below the funding range within the applicable Geographic Set-Aside pursuant to the QAP. This procedure will be used again on or after October 1, if necessary, to ensure that the Agency allocates at least 10% of its Allocation Authority to qualified Non-Profit Applicants. Any for-profit Applicant so removed from the funding range will NOT be entitled to any consideration or priority for the receipt of current or future Housing Credits other than placement on the current ranking and scoring list in accordance with its score. Binding Commitments for Housing Credits from a future year will not be issued for Applicants so displaced. Paragraph 2, at page 2, of the Corporation’s 2000 QAP states: [The Corporation] has determined that an initial allocation of 12% to qualified Non- Profits will ensure that the 10% requirement will be met in the event that all Developments included in the initial 12% do not receive an allocation. In order to achieve the initial 12% set-aside a tentative funding line will be drawn. Then, Applications from Non-Profit Applicants that meet scoring threshold requirements shall be moved into the tentative funding range, in order of their scores with Applicants whose Non-Profit entities are organized under Chapter 617, Florida Statutes, having priority, until the 12% set-aside is achieved. This will be accomplished by moving the lowest scored Application of a for-profit Applicant in the funding range down in ranking so it is ranked below the lowest Non-Profit Applicant within the funding range and moving the highest scored Non-Profit Applicant organized under Chapter 617, Florida Statutes below the funding range within the applicable Geographic Set- Aside pursuant to the QAP up in ranking so it is ranked one ranking space above the for-profit Applicant that was moved down in ranking. If no such Applicant exists, the highest Non-Profit Applicant organized under similar statutes from another state which is below the funding range within the applicable Geographic Set-Aside pursuant to the QAP, will be moved into funding range in the same manner as stated in the previous sentence. This procedure will be used again on or after October 1, 2000, if necessary, to ensure that the [Corporation] allocates at least 10% of its Allocation Authority for 2000 to qualified Non-Profit Applicants. Any for-profit Applicant so removed from the funding range will NOT be entitled to any consideration or priority for the receipt of current or future housing credits other than placement on the current ranking and scoring list in accordance with its score. Binding Commitments for housing credits from a future year will not be issued for Applicants so displaced. The last Non- Profit Applicant moved into the funding range, in order to meet the initial 12% set- aside or in order to meet the minimum 10% set-aside after October 1, 2000, will be fully funded contingent upon successful credit underwriting even though that may result in a higher Non-Profit set-aside. After the full Non-Profit set-aside amount has been allocated, remaining Applications from Non-Profit organizations shall compete with all other Applications in the HC Program for remaining Allocation Authority. The Corporation's interpretation of Rule 67-48.032, Florida Administrative Code, and paragraph 2 of the 2000 QAP (collectively, the "Instructions") to determine the procedure for satisfying the Non-Profit Set-Aside in connection with the 2000 application cycle has caused considerable controversy — and led to this proceeding. The controversial interpretation was publicly manifested on September 15, 2000, when the Corporation published a preliminary ranking sheet on its web site which reflected adjustments that its staff had made to fulfill the Non-Profit Set-Aside. Within days, adversely affected applicants were complaining that the Corporation's staff had misinterpreted the Instructions. The Corporation's staff had construed the Instructions to mean that when it is necessary to displace a for-profit within the tentative funding range to satisfy the Non-Profit Set-Aside, the following procedure must be followed: Remove Low-FP!(x!) and replace it with High- NP[D](x). 2/ If there is no domestic non- profit in county group x, then replace Low- FP!(x!) with High-NP[F](x!). 3/ This construction permits High-NP[D!], if there is one, High- NP![F!] if not, to remain outside the funding range, because it might not be in county group x. In practice, the process that the Corporation’s staff had settled upon operated, in the circumstances presented, to the detriment of Petitioners. Here is how it worked. After the tentative funding range was established, the lowest scored for- profit in the class of for-profits was in the Small County group. 4/ There were no non-profits, domestic or foreign, in that group to elevate, however, and so Low-FP!(S!) could not be removed; the fall-back procedure was followed. See endnote 4. As it happened, RPK was Low-FP(L!) and had a lower score than Low-FP(M!). Thus, under the Corporation's staff's interpretation of the Instructions, as revealed by the rankings posted on September 15, 2000, High-NP[D](L!) was moved into the funding range in the place of RPK, even though High-NP[D](L!)'s final score was lower than that of Lakesmart — which was High- NP. (Coral Village and Meadow Glen were the second- and third-ranked domestic non-profits, respectively, in the Medium County Group. Sorted by class, Lakesmart, Coral Village, and Meadow Glen would be ranked first, second, and sixth in the class of non-profit applicants.) 5/ The second lowest-scored for-profit in the class of for-profits was also in the Large County group. Thus, it became Low-FP!(L!) after RPK was removed. It, too, was replaced by the Large County non-profits that became, in turn, High-NP[D](L!) as the next highest-ranked non-profit in that group was moved up into the funding range to satisfy the 12% Non-Profit Set-Aside. In all, the Corporation's staff proposed to elevate — and hence award tax credits to — four non-profit applicants whose final scores were lower than Lakesmart's and Coral Village's. One of those four putative beneficiaries had a lower final score than Meadow Glen's. Lakesmart and others who disagreed with the Corporation’s staff advanced an alternative interpretation of the Instructions. In their view, to ensure that the Non-Profit Set-Aside is met requires the following maneuver: Remove Low-FP(x!) and replace it with High- NP[D!](x). 6/ If there is no domestic non- profit outside the funding range, then replace Low-FP(x!) with High-NP. 7/ This interpretation admits the possibility that Low-FP! might remain in the funding range, because it might not be in county group x. Under this interpretation, favored by all Petitioners, Lakesmart and Coral Village would be elevated into the funding range, rather than being "leap-frogged" by lower-scored non- profits, and RPK would not be displaced. (Of course, Petitioners' interpretation would require that some other for- profit ox be gored — one having a higher score than RPK's.) These competing interpretations of the Instructions were presented to the Corporation's board for consideration at its public meeting on September 22, 2000. After a discussion of the issues, in which members of the public participated, the board voted unanimously to accept the interpretation that the staff had acted upon in preparing the September 15, 2000, rankings. Later in the same meeting the board adopted final rankings, which were prepared in accordance with the approved interpretation, that resulted in the denial of Petitioners' applications for tax credits. The 1997 Awards: Precedent or Peculiarity? Petitioners maintain that their interpretation of the Instructions is supported by a supposed precedent allegedly set in 1997 that, they say, was binding on the Corporation in 2000. In the 1997 cycle, it so happened that after drawing the tentative funding lines, the sum total of credits sought by non-profits within the preliminary funding range failed to reach the then-required threshold of 10%. Thus, for the first time, the Corporation faced the need to replace higher-scored for- profits (that were apparently in line for funding) with lower- scored non-profits that otherwise would not have received credits. The QAP that governed the 1997 awards provided for the Non-Profit Set-Aside but was silent on the procedure for satisfying it: The Agency will allocate not less than 10% of the state’s allocation authority to projects involving qualified, non-profit Applicants, provided they are non-profits organized under Chapter 617, Florida Statutes, and as set forth in Section 42(h)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and Rule Chapter 9I-48, Florida Administrative Code. Respondent's Exhibit 2, page 8. Rule 9I-48.024(3), Florida Administrative Code (1997), did contain directions for carrying out the required substitution. It prescribed the following procedure for elevating non-profits: If 10% of the total Allocation Authority is not utilized by Projects with Non-Profit Applicants, Applications from Non-Profit Applicants that meet scoring threshold requirements shall be moved into the funding range, in order of their comparative scores, until the 10% set-aside is achieved. This will be accomplished by removing the lowest scored Application of a for-profit Applicant from the funding range and replacing it with the highest scored Non-Profit Application below the funding range within the applicable Geographic Set-Aside pursuant to section (2) above. Petitioners' Exhibit 1. These provisions will be referred to hereafter as the "1997 Directions," to distinguish them from the Instructions. Gwen Lightfoot was the Corporation's Deputy Development Officer in 1997. In that capacity, she was directly responsible for implementing the rules relating to the award of low-income housing tax credits. To satisfy the Non-Profit Set- Aside, Ms. Lightfoot followed the 1997 Directions as she understood them. In so doing, she sorted the eligible non- profits by class (i.e. without regard to their respective county groups) and ranked them in score order, from the highest scoring project to the lowest scoring project. 8/ Then, Ms. Lightfoot moved the highest scoring non-profit in the class of non-profits to a position immediately above the for-profit with the lowest score in the same geographic set-aside as the favored non-profit so that the non-profit project would be fully funded. That is, she replaced Low-FP(x!) with High-NP!(x!). This process was repeated, moving the next highest ranked non-profit to a position immediately above the lowest-ranked for-profit in the same geographic set-aside as the elevated non-profit, until the Non-Profit Set-Aside was met. Although the Corporation presently argues that its board was not fully informed in 1997 as to the procedure that Ms. Lightfoot followed in fulfilling the mandate of the Non- Profit Set-Aside, a preponderance of evidence established that Ms. Lightfoot's actions were within the scope of her authority and taken in furtherance of her official duties; that the board was aware of what she had done; and that the board took no action to change the results that followed from Ms. Lightfoot's interpretation and implementation of the 1997 Directions. Ms. Lightfoot's application of the 1997 Directions, in short, was not the unauthorized act of a rogue employee. Rather, as a matter of fact, her action was the Corporation's action, irrespective of what any individual board member might subjectively have understood at the time. In the years following the 1997 awards, Rule 9I- 48.032, Florida Administrative Code, was re-numbered Rule 67- 48.032 and amended three times, the most recent amendment becoming effective on February 24, 2000. As a result, the 1997 Directions evolved into the language of Rule 67-48.032(2) which, though not identical, retains the essential meaning of its predecessor. During the same period, the QAP was also amended three times, the version controlling the 2000 application cycle having been approved by the governor on December 16, 1999, and adopted by reference in the Florida Administrative Code on February 24, 2000. Unlike the revisions to Rule 9I-48.032(3), however, the changes in the QAP that relate to the issue at hand are significant, because the 2000 QAP sets forth a procedure for fulfilling the Non-Profit Set-Aside when the collective amount of credits sought by non-profits in the tentative funding range falls short of the mandated mark, whereas the 1997 QAP did not.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Corporation enter a final order dismissing the petitions of Petitioner Lakesmart, Petitioner RPK, and Intervenors Meadow Glen and Coral Village. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of February, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 2001.
The Issue At issue herein is whether or not the City of North Miami or the Special Policemen's Fund of the City of North Miami is entitled to participate in the distribution of the tax fund established pursuant to Chapter 185, Florida Statutes, for calendar years 1976 and 1977. The parties have stipulated to the following facts: The Wyatt valuation as of 1-1-73 required payments of $517,011 from all sources and $419,554 from the City of North Miami (City) in order to fund the normal cost and actuarial deficiency of the North Miami Employees Retirement System Pond (Fund) for the Fund's 1974 calendar year. The City contributed $328,275 for that fund year. Due to the underfunding, the State tax revenues for the 1974 calendar year derived from Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, were withheld by the Department of Insurance. The Wyatt valuation as of 1-1-75 indicated that $919,430 was due from all sources and $743,653 from the City to fund the normal cost and actuarial deficiency of the North Miami Employees Retirement System Fund for the Fund's calendar year 1975. The City paid $282,187 for the fund year. Due to the underfunding in 1974 and 1975, the calendar year 1975, Chapter 175 and 185 funds were withheld by the Department of Insurance. The Wyatt valuation as of 1-1-75 again indicated that $919,430 was due from all sources and $743,653 from the City in order to fund the normal cost and actuarial deficiency of the North Miami Employees Retirement System Fund for the Fund's calendar year 1976. Due to the adoption of a fiscal accounting year by the Fund, no funds were contributed by the City to the North Miami Employees Retirement System Fund for the first nine months of 1976. The Wyatt valuation as' of 1-1-75 also indicated that $743,653 was required to be paid during the City's 1976-1977 fiscal year. The City budgeted and paid $755,000 to the North Miami Employees Retirement System Fund during the City's 1976-1977 fiscal year. In November of 1976 the Department of Insurance released tax revenues for calendar years 1974 and 1975 which had previously been withhold. The Coopers-Lybrand valuation as of 1-1-77 indicated that the City was required to contribute $765,006 to fund the normal cost and actuarial deficiency of the North Miami Employees Retirement System Fund for the Fund's fiscal year 1977-1978. That amount was budgeted by the City of North Miami for payment during the City's fiscal year 1977-1978. In addition to the stipulated facts, evidence reveals that the valuation for North Miami Employees Retirement System Fund performed by The Wyatt Company as of 1-1-75 was based on financial data up to December 31, 1974. That valuation added all previously required amounts which had at been paid into that Fund prior to December 31, 1974, to the actuarial deficiency of the Fund and indicated that if the City paid a total of $743,653 into the Fund during its 1976-1977 and 1977-1978 fiscal years, the underfunding which had previously occurred could he remedied over the course of the years remaining in the forty- year funding period, October 1, 1972, to September 30, 2012. The Department of Insurance (Department) released the 1974 tax revenues derived pursuant to Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, on November 8, 1976, based upon proof that the City of North Miami had budgeted $755,000 for the North Miami Employees Retirement System Fund during the City's 1976-1977 fiscal year. In addition to the release of the Chapters 175 and 185 revenues for the 1974 calendar year on November 8, 1976, the Department also released the 1975 calendar year revenues at that same time. There was conflicting testimony as to the reason for the release of the 1975 revenues. The City contends that the Department of Insurance knew or should have known of the funding deficiency for the 1975 calendar year of the North Miami Employees Retirement System Fund and agreed that deficiency and any other required amounts which had not been paid prior to the 1976-1977 fiscal year of the City could be added to the actuarial deficiency of the Fund. On the other hand, the Department contends that it did not know of the funding deficiency for the 1975 calendar year of the North Miami Employees Retirement System Fund and agreed only that required amounts which had not been paid by the City to the North Miami Employees Retirement System Fund prior to January 1, 1975, could be added to the actuarial deficiency of the Fund inasmuch as the 1974 calendar year of the Fund was the first funding year after the commencement of an amended plan and new forty year funding period in accordance with The Wyatt Company valuation as of 1-1-73. The facts centering around the dispute are as follows. Myles J. Trailins, Esquire, was the City Attorney for the City of North Miami, Florida, from September, 1975, through January, 1977. Based on a dispute between the State Insurance Commissioner, the State Comptroller, and the City of North Miami and the Special Policemen's Fund of North Miami concerning the funding of the North Miami Employees Retirement System Fund in June, 1976, City Attorney Trailins filed on behalf of the City, a petition for the issuance of an Alternative Writ of Mandamus against Gerald Lewis as State Comptroller to compel the release of warrants which had been cut and issued but which were being withheld by the State Insurance Commissioner. Following the issuance of the writ by the Supreme Court of Florida and after telephone and written communications between the parties, an agreement was reached that resulted in dismissal of the aforementioned litigation, Supreme Court Case No. 49,692, following the immediate disbursement of past due sums which the City contended were unlawfully retained by the Respondent and the Comptroller, Gerald A. Lewis. Additionally, the parties agreed to the following covenants: Beginning fiscal year 1976-1977 and successive years thereafter, the City of North Miami agreed to fully fund the North Miami Employees Retirement System Fund in the amount determined by the City's actuaries. For each year thereafter for so long as the City continued to contribute the full amount as determined by the City's actuaries, the Respondent, the State Insurance Commissioner, and the then State Comptroller, Gerald Lewis, would not withhold or prevent the disbursal of monies due Petitioners, the City of North Miami and the Special Policemen's Fund, in accordance with Chapter 185, Florida Statutes. Any and all monies then outstanding from the City of North Miami due the North Miami Employees Retirement System Fund prior to fiscal year 1976- 1977 would be amortized and paid in accordance with Sub-section 189.07(4), Florida States. That Gerald Lewis as Comptroller of the State of Florida (at that time) would forthwith prepare and forward warrants due the City of North Miami and the Special Policemen's Fund for 1974 and 1975 and the Insurance Commissioner would not block the release of said warrants. The City of North Miami and the Special Policemen's Fund would enter into a stipulation for dismissal with Gerald Lewis as the then Comptroller of the State in Supreme Court Case No. 49,692. The agreement resulted in dismissal of the litigation which was initially agreed to verbally on November 4, 1976, in a telephone conversation between Attorney Trailins and James R. Vereen, acting on behalf of Philip F. Aschler, the then Insurance Commissioner and Treasurer. Said agreement was reduced to writing and the correspondence attached to an Affidavit dated November 2, 1976, and November 5, 1976. The State Insurance Commissioner and Treasurer takes the position that an additional cash payment in the amount of $452,669 was required to be made by the City to the Fund for fully funding the pension fund for the fiscal year 1976-1977. This position appears to be contrary to the agreement entered into by and between the parties on or about November 5, 1976. Evidence reveals that said amount was not budgeted by the City of North Miami nor was such amount due or required to be paid to the pension fund as calculated by the City's actuaries since the City had already contributed the actuarily determined amount required to fully fund the pension fund for fiscal years 1976-1977 pursuant to the stipulation and agreement between the parties. Additionally, it was noted that the Comptroller, apparently noting full compliance pursuant to Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, certified the City's full compliance for fiscal years 1974 through 1976 by disbursing all sums collected on behalf of the City from the premium excise tax for said years. Section 185.35, Florida Statutes, sets forth certain requirements for cities to participate in the distribution of the tax fund establishing Sections 185.07, 185.08 and 185.09, Florida Statutes. Subsection (1)(j) of Section 185.35, Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part that commencing on July 1, 1964 (the municipality) shall contribute to the plan annually an amount which together with the contributions from the police officers, the amount derived from the premium tax provided in Section 185.08, and other income sources will be sufficient to meet the normal costs of the plan and to fund the actuarial deficiency over a period not longer than forty years. Subsection 185.07(4) provides that the Municipal Police Officers Retirement Trust Fund in each municipality...shall be created and maintained in the following manner: (4) By payment by the municipality or other sources of a sum equal to the normal costs and the amount required to fund over a forty year basis any actuarial deficiency shown by a quinquennial actuarial valuation. The first actuarial valuation shall be conducted for the calendar year ending December 31, 1963. Based on the above factors and since the City has recognized the above referred to actuarial deficiencies as legal obligations of the City and is amortizing the actuarial deficiencies over a forty year period in accordance with Florida Statutes, Subsection 185.07(4), I shall recommend that the Petitioners are entitled to the Chapter 185 monies for calendar years 1976 and 1977.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Insurance Commissioner authorize the warrants for the Chapter 185 monies due the City of North Miami and the Special Policemen's Fund of the City of North Miami for the years 1976 and 1977 be cut by the Comptroller and remitted to the petitioners in accordance with Chapter 185, Florida Statutes. ENTERED this 31st day of August, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Willard K. Splittstoesser, Esquire City Attorney of North Miami 776 Northeast 125th Street North Miami, Florida 33161 Donald A. Dowdell, Esquire Legal Division Office of Insurance Commissioner and Treasurer 428-A Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether, pursuant to section 112.3173, Florida Statutes, Petitioner forfeited his retirement benefits under the City of Longwood's (City's) Police Officers' and Firefighters' Pension Trust Fund (Pension Fund) by having pled nolo contendere to felony counts of burglary with assault/battery while armed (firearm) and aggravated assault with a firearm while on duty.
Findings Of Fact The City is a small municipality in southwestern Seminole County lying just north of Altamonte Springs and west of Winter Springs. Petitioner was employed as a patrol corporal by the City Police Department and was a member of the Pension Fund. On January 29, 2011, while on duty, Petitioner was involved in an incident at a residence in the City where his former wife, Kimberly Zeh, also a police officer and then separated but not yet divorced from Petitioner, was temporarily living with a friend, Carol Ericson. At the time of the incident, Petitioner was on duty, in uniform, and in possession of City issued equipment, including a firearm. Around 4:00 p.m. that day, Petitioner drove to the residence in his police cruiser and first attempted to telephone his wife, then rang the door bell, and finally knocked on the door. When there was no response, without permission Petitioner entered the dwelling through a sliding glass door in the kitchen. He did not have a warrant relating to the residence and there were no exigent circumstances that warranted his entry into the residence. Petitioner's mannerisms upon entering the home demonstrated and were consistent with the emotion of anger. After entering the dwelling, Petitioner observed his former wife "walk[ing] across the hallway partially dressed" and Bennett Feld in the bedroom. Mr. Feld is a physician assistant then employed by the Zeh's family physician. Petitioner believed Mr. Feld was having an affair with his wife. Petitioner drew his service weapon, entered the bedroom, and pushed Mr. Feld against a wall. He then pointed his service weapon at Mr. Feld's head and asked: "Do you think you're going to take my wife?" He also stated that if his former wife did not move back home then three dead bodies would be found at the residence. After holstering the weapon, he struck Mr. Feld in the face. Prior to leaving the residence, Petitioner requested that his former wife return home and stated that the incident that just took place would be forgiven. On March 1, 2011, an Information was filed in State of Florida v. John W. Zeh, Case No. 2011-00503-CFA, in the Circuit Court of the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Seminole County, charging Petitioner for the incident occurring on January 29, 2011. In relevant part, the Information states: Count I: In that John W. Zeh, on or about January 29, 2011, in the County of Seminole and State of Florida, did violate F.S. 810.02(1) by knowingly entering or remaining in a dwelling, the property of Carol Ericson as owner or Kimberly Zeh as custodian, with the intent to commit an offense therein, and in the course of committing the burglary made an assault or battery upon Kimberly Zeh and/or Bennett Feld, and during the commission of the burglary John Zeh was in actual possession of a firearm, contrary to Florida Statute 810.02(2)(a), 810.02(2)(b) and 775.087. (1 DEB FEL, PBL). * * * COUNT IV: In that John W. Zeh on or about January 29, 2011, in the County of Seminole and State of Florida, while in possession of a firearm, did intentionally and unlawfully threaten by word or act to do violence to the person of Bennett Feld, coupled with an apparent ability to do so, which created well-founded fear in that such violence was imminent, and further did commit the assault with a handgun, a firearm or deadly weapon, contrary to Florida Statutes 784.021(1)(a) and 775.087(2). (3 DEG FEL). On October 11, 2011, Petitioner, represented by counsel, entered a plea of nolo contendere to, in relevant part, the following: (1) burglary with assault/battery while armed in violation of sections 810.02(2)(b) and 775.087(1)(a); and (2) aggravated assault with a firearm in violation of section 784.021(1)(a). On January 4, 2012, Petitioner was adjudicated guilty of the above crimes and was sentenced accordingly. After the incident, Petitioner voluntarily resigned from his position as a City police officer. Upon becoming aware of Petitioner's plea, the Pension Fund initiated proceedings to determine whether Petitioner's pension fund benefits should be forfeited pursuant to chapter 112 and/or the Pension Fund's terms and conditions. On October 15, 2013, the Pension Fund conducted a probable cause hearing resulting in the determination that Petitioner's rights and benefits be forfeited under the Pension Fund. Contrary to Petitioner's assertion, the Notice of that decision was sufficient to apprise him of the intended action. The Notice precipitated the filing of Mr. Zeh's request for a hearing. Paragraphs A.-G. of section 21 of the Pension Plan are identical with section 112.3173(2)(e), cited in the Conclusions of Law, so the Plan provisions will not be restated here. Like the cited statute, subsection (2) of section 21 provides in part that "[c]onviction shall be defined as . . . a plea of guilty or nolo contendere."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Trustees for the City of Longwood Police Officers' and Firefighters' Pension Trust Fund enter a final order determining that Petitioner has forfeited his rights and benefits under the Pension Fund, except for the return of his accumulated contributions as of the date of his termination. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 2014. COPIES FURNISHED: Jamison Jessup 557 Noremac Avenue Deltona, Florida 32738-7313 Scott R. Christiansen, Esquire Christiansen & Dehner, P.A. Suite 107 63 Sarasota Center Boulevard Sarasota, Florida 34240-9385 Christopher R. Conley, Esquire Fishback, Dominick, Bennett, Ardaman, Ahlers, Langley & Geller, LLP 1947 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789-1834
The Issue The issue presented for decision in this case is whether the Holiday Rotary Endowment Fund, Inc. (“Holiday Endowment”) is eligible for a consumer certificate of exemption as a charitable institution pursuant to Section 212.08(7)(o), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner, the Holiday Endowment, is an organization incorporated in the State of Florida as a not-for-profit corporation under Chapter 617, Florida Statutes. It was formed in October 1996 by the Holiday Rotary Club of Holiday, Florida, as a vehicle for accruing funds to contribute to the various charities supported by the Holiday Rotary Club. The Holiday Endowment is exempt from federal income tax under Section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code as an organization described in Section 501(c)(3), having obtained an exemption letter from the Internal Revenue Service on May 30, 1997. Larry Schalles, Treasurer of the Holiday Endowment, testified that annual fundraising achieves variable results, and that the membership of the Holiday Rotary Club seeks to attain stability in its philanthropic endeavors by placing a portion of its funds into the Holiday Endowment each year. Once the endowment is built up, the interest can be used to pay for scholarships each year, leaving the principal intact. At all times relevant to this proceeding, the sole active function of the Holiday Endowment has been to raise moneys to establish the endowment fund. All moneys raised by the Holiday Endowment are invested in the fund to provide scholarships in the future. All of the Holiday Endowment’s fund raising activities are conducted by unpaid volunteers. At all times relevant to this proceeding, the Holiday Endowment has made no expenditures of any kind. The Department denied the Holiday Endowment’s application for a certificate of exemption on the ground that the Holiday Endowment did not qualify as a charitable institution under the seven criteria set forth in Section 212.08(7)(o)2.b., Florida Statutes. In particular, the Department found that the Holiday Endowment does not expend in excess of 50% of its operational expenditures toward qualified charitable services, meaning that the provision of a charitable service is not the organization’s sole or primary function. As set forth above, the Holiday Endowment has in fact made no expenditures of any kind. The Department also found that the Holiday Endowment does not provide a reasonable percentage of services free of charge or at a substantially reduced cost to persons unable to pay for such service. The Holiday Endowment’s response is that the exemption should nonetheless be granted, because any expenditures it makes in the future will be for charitable purposes.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Revenue enter a final order denying the certificate of exemption sought by the Holiday Rotary Endowment Fund, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of October, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of October, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry C. Schalles, C.P.A. Treasurer, Holiday Rotary Endowment Fund, Inc. 5728 Main Street New Port Richey, Florida 34652 William B. Nickell Assistant General Counsel Department of Revenue 501 South Calhoun Street, Suite 304 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue Whether Respondent is entitled to a Consumer Certificate of Exemption under Section 212.08?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Respondent is a nonprofit Florida corporation that was formed in 1980 to promote economic development and revitalization (and the resultant creation and retention of jobs) in targeted areas in the City of Miami and Dade County, Florida, by lending money to business desiring to locate or remain in these targeted areas. Article II of Respondent's Articles of Incorporation sets forth the "purposes" of the corporation. It reads as follows: This corporation is organized exclusively for charitable, education and economic development purposes which include promotion of community welfare by: (i) lessening of neighborhood tensions, (ii) lessening discrimination and (iii) combatting community deterioration by promoting and fostering the economic development of the City of Miami and Dade County, Florida. In furtherance of these purposes the corporation intends to engage in the following types of activities: Making investments in, and loans to, corporate or other business entities with monies which are directly or indirectly attributable to funds provided by the City of Miami, Dade County, Florida or other funds provided by the United States, the State of Florida or any agency or instrumentality of any of the foregoing, with funds generated by the repayment of the principal amount and accrued interest thereon of any loans made with such funds, or any dividends or other distributions paid to the corporation by any entity in which the corporation has an ownership interest, and with any funds contributed to the corporation by any individual or entity; Providing assistance for individuals, groups and organizations in planning and executing successful economic development projects; Providing professional assistance and counseling of all types, including business planning for individuals, organizations and their members where such counseling may be necessary for the economic development of low income or low employment areas; Acting as an intermediary, where appropriate, between various economic development programs and between organizations and individuals which may be involved in any capacity in economic development; Acquiring charitable contributions and assistance capital including seed money, which may be necessary for successful economic development projects; and Engaging in such other activities as the Board of Directors shall from time to time approve, provided that in no event shall this corporation be operated for purposes other than those permitted under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 or corresponding sections of any prior or future law. The corporation shall have the power, either directly or indirectly, either alone or in conjunction or cooperation with others, to do any and all lawful acts and things and to engage in any and all lawful activities which may be necessary, useful, suitable, desirable or proper for any and all of the purposes for which the corporation is organized, and to aid or assist other organizations whose activities are such as to further accomplish, foster or attain any of such purposes. Such activities shall include, but shall not be limited to, acceptance of gifts, grants, devises or bequests of funds, or any other property from any public or other governmental body and any private person, including but not limited to, private and public foundations, corporations and individuals. 2/ Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, this corporation may exercise any and all, but not other, powers as are in furtherance of the exempt purposes of organizations set forth in Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and its regulations as the same now exist, or as they may be hereafter amended from time to time. No part of the income or principal of this corporation shall inure to the benefit of or be distributed to any member, director or officer of the corporation or any other private individual in such a fashion as to constitute an application of funds not within the purpose of exempt organizations described in Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. However, reimbursement for expenditures or the payment of reasonable compensation for services rendered shall not be deemed to be a distribution of income or principal. In the event of the complete or partial liquidation or dissolution of the corporation whether voluntary or involuntary, no member, director or officer shall be entitled to any distribution or division of the corporation's property or its proceeds, and the balance of all money and other property received by the corporation from any source shall, after the payment of all debts and obligations of the corporation in accordance with Chapter 617 of the Florida Statutes, be distributed and paid over by the Board of Directors to the City of Miami for public purposes. The corporation does not contemplate receiving any pecuniary gain or profit, incidental or otherwise. No substantial part of the activities of the corporation shall be the carrying on of propaganda or otherwise attempting to influence legislation, and the corporation shall not participate or intervene in, directly or indirectly, (including the publishing or distribution of statements) any political campaign on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public office. Over the past 16 years, Respondent has made 472 direct low interest business loans amounting to approximately $31.4 million. 3/ The recipients of these loans have collectively received from both public and private sources nearly $16.3 million in additional, matching funds. A potential borrower need not be disadvantaged or suffering from a hardship in order to receive a loan from Respondent. Indeed, as a general rule, Respondent will not make a loan unless the applicant demonstrates, during the application process, an ability to repay the loan. To this extent, and to this extent alone, Respondent takes into consideration the applicant's economic status in determining whether to grant the applicant's loan application. An intended 4/ by-product of Respondent's lending activities has been the creation and preservation of jobs in the targeted areas. The business investment that Respondent's activities have made possible has produced approximately 3,313 new jobs and preserved an estimated 1,391 jobs in these areas. The Internal Revenue Service treats Respondent as an exempt organization under Section 501(3)(c) of the Internal Revenue Code. In 1991, Respondent received from the Department a Consumer Certificate of Exemption, which, according to the cover letter that accompanied the Certificate, was "granted to [Respondent] in accordance with Section 212.08(7), Florida Statutes" and "exempt[ed Respondent] from the payment of sales and use tax on purchases of tangible personal property." The Certificate had an "issue date" of February 7, 1991, and an "expiration date" of February 7, 1996. Prior to the "expiration date," Respondent filed an application with the Department to renew the Certificate. The Department has preliminarily determined that the Certificate should not be renewed. It is this preliminary determination that is the subject of the instant controversy
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order finding that Respondent is not entitled to the Consumer Certificate of Exemption it is seeking pursuant to Section 212.08(7)(o)2.b.(IV), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16th day of January, 1997. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of January, 1997.
The Issue The issue for determination in this proceeding is whether Petitioner qualifies for a certificate of exemption as a charitable organization within the meaning of Section 212.08(7)(o)2.b., Florida Statutes. 1/
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida corporation with its principal place of business located in Winter Park, Florida. Petitioner operates 10 additional offices throughout Florida. Petitioner is a non-profit corporation for purposes of the federal income tax. Petitioner obtained an exemption from federal income tax in accordance with Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Petitioner is engaged in the business of providing financial counseling services to the general public. Financial counseling services include debt consolidation, debt management, financial counseling, and budgeting. Debt consolidation services are those in which Petitioner negotiates a payment plan between its clients and the clients' creditors. Debt management services are those in which a client makes one payment to Petitioner and Petitioner disburses the client's money in multiple payments to the client's various creditors. Financial counseling involves assistance in the management of client cash flow and the avoidance of default on client debts. Budgeting services are incidents of the other services. Petitioner does not provide its services free of charge. Petitioner derives its revenue from client fees and payments from creditors for collection and remittance on debts owed by clients. Client fees make up approximately 25 to 35 percent of Petitioner's revenues. Creditor payments make up approximately 65 to 75 percent of Petitioner's revenues. Client fees consist of a $20 registration fee and a monthly fee of up to $15 per month for disbursing payments to creditors. The amount of the monthly fee is determined at the discretion of Petitioner's counselors based on such factors as the total debt, number of creditors, nature of the bills, and the ability of the client to pay. Petitioner's counselors are instructed to offer services to anyone who requests it without charge. Counselors have the authority to waive the $20 registration fee in particular cases. Clients are required to sign a service agreement in which they employ Petitioner to represent them in negotiating with creditors and making payments required under the terms of a negotiated plan. A client who does not pay monthly payments required under a negotiated plan for three months is dropped as a client. Client funds are deposited into a regular checking account maintained by Petitioner. The client checking account is separate from Petitioner's checking account but does not pay interest on client funds. Petitioner has approximately 3,000 clients in Florida. The annual income of Petitioner's clients ranges from $6,000 to $120,000. 2/ Approximately 73 percent of client creditors are credit card companies, finance companies, and medical groups. The remaining 27 percent are other creditors. Approximately half of the clients' creditors pay Petitioner for collecting money from their debtors and remitting payments to them. The majority of creditors who pay Petitioner a fee for debt collection pay approximately 10 to 12 percent of the debt amount collected and remitted. Approximately 10 percent of the creditors pay Petitioner 15 percent of the debt amounts collected and remitted. Petitioner does not raise funds for any other charitable organization. Petitioner does not provide volunteers for other charitable organizations. Petitioner is not a member of the National Foundation for Consumer Credit Counseling. Petitioner does not receive any contributions from any charitable or civic organizations, including United Way. Petitioner does not provide any of the services prescribed under applicable state statutes or rules for qualification as a charitable organization. Petitioner does not provide social welfare services and does not provide the services it renders free of charge or at a substantially reduced rate. A reasonable percentage of Petitioner's clients are not persons who are unable to pay, disadvantaged, or who suffer a hardship.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's application for exemption from sales tax as a charitable organization. RECOMMENDED this 22d day of September, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22d day of September, 1995.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner, Affordable Home Ownership Corporation, is eligible for a consumer certificate of exemption as a charitable institution pursuant to Section 212.08(7)(o), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Affordable Home Ownership Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "AHO"), is a Florida nonprofit corporation. Respondent, the Department of Revenue (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is an agency of the State of Florida. Among other things, the Department is charged with responsibility for implementing and administering Florida tax laws, including Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. During 1996, AHO submitted an application for an exemption under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, as a charitable organization. According to the Articles of Corporation of AHO, its purpose is: To raise the economic, educational and social levels of the underprivileged residents of Lake City (Columbia County), Florida, and its trade area, who are substantially underemployed and have low income, by fostering and promoting community-wide interest and concern for the problems of such residents, and to that end; Racial tension, prejudice, and discrimination of economic and otherwise may be eliminated; Sickness, poverty and crime may be lessened and; Educational and economic opportunities may be expanded among the residents of Lake City (Columbia County), Florida, and its trade area. To expand the opportunities available to said residents to own, manage, and operate business enterprises in economically underprivileged or depressed areas; to assist said residents and groups in developing management skills necessary for the successful operation of business enterprises; to provide financial support for the successful operation of business enterprises by said residents and to assist said residents in obtaining such financial support from other sources. To aid, support and assist by gifts, contributions or otherwise, other corporations, community chests, funds and foundations organized and operated exclusively for charitable, religious, scientific, literary or educational purposes, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholders or individuals, and no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation. To do any and all lawful activities which may be necessary, useful or desirable for the furtherance, accomplishment, fostering or attainment of the foregoing purposes, either directly or indirectly, and either along or in conjunction or cooperation with others, whether such others be persons or organizations of any kind or nature such as corporations, firms, associations, trust, institutions, foundations, or governmental bureaus, departments or agencies. The Department conceded in its proposed recommended order that AHO meets the requirement for exemption in this matter that it be designated a Section 501(c)(3) charitable organization by the United States Internal Revenue Service. The services provided by AHO are provided without charge to its clients. Those services include recruiting families who are qualified for federal home loans who are committed and able to provide their time and labor to construct their own housing. AHO brings several such families together to share the labor and effort necessary to build housing for each family. Each family shares in the labor of constructing the home of each other family in the group. AHO assists the families prepare mortgage applications necessary to receive federally subsidized loans and provides credit counseling necessary for families to qualify for such loans. Once a family qualifies for a loan, AHO assists in the selection of house plans, the selection of construction materials, the organization of the family groups, teaches general construction techniques and assists with all aspects of completing construction of housing. AHO also assists in bookkeeping necessary to administer mortgage loans. AHO does not act as a general contractor. Nor does AHO provide construction labor or materials, or the funds necessary for construction. AHO receives administrative grants through the state's Housing Finance Agency as a Community Housing Development Organization. AHO's expenses in providing its services are entirely expenses of the organization. AHO's total expenditures are for its day-to-day operations. No funds are expended directly for clients.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Revenue denying the certificate of exemption sough by Affordable Home Ownership Corporation. DONE AND ORDERED this 2nd day of June, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this this 2nd day of June, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Rufus L. Smith Executive Director, A.H.O.C. Affordable Home Ownership Corporation Post Office Box 7347 Lake City, Florida 32055 Kevin J. ODonnell Assistant General Counsel Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Linda Lettera General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Larry Fuchs Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
