The Issue The issues in this case concern an administrative complaint brought by the State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Opticianry (Petitioner) against Samuel Rosenberg (Respondent).The allegations in that administrative complaint are directed to claimed improprieties on the part of the Respondent in his actions as a sponsoring optician for the benefit of David Somerville, an apprentice optician, both men licensed in the state of Florida. Respondent is said to have violated various provisions of Chapters 455 and 484, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 21P, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Part A The following facts are found based upon the stipulation entered into by the parties: Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of opticianry, pursuant to Section 20.30, Florida Statutes; Chapter 455, Florida Statutes; and Chapter 484, Florida Statutes. Respondent is a licensed optician in the state of Florida, having been issued license number 0001618. Respondent's last known address is 542 White Street, Daytona Beach, Florida. David Somerville is not a licensed optician in the state of Florida. He is currently registered as an apprentice. A successful completion of this apprenticeship would enable him to sit for the Florida Examination to become licensed as an optician. An individual who is registered as an apprentice can perform no independent opticianry functions. An apprentice optician's activities must be directly supervised by a licensed optician. The Respondent is David Somerville's supervising apprentice sponsor. In February 1985, for a period of two or three weeks, Respondent had been an employee at Brandywine Optical, the business premises of David Somerville. Respondent then agreed to act as Somerville's sponsoring optician, supervising Somerville for forty hours per week. Part B Factual findings based upon the testimony adduced at hearing and in consideration of exhibits admitted at hearing: As reflected in Petitioner's Exhibit 7 admitted into evidence, on March 14, 1985, Samuel Rosenberg made application as sponsor of an apprenticeship program for the benefit of David Somerville. In that application it was indicated that Rosenberg would supervise the apprenticeship of Somerville for a period of forty hours a week. Rosenberg believes that Somerville is capable of performing opticianry work. He states that based upon Somerville's past experience and performance, he, Rosenberg, can afford to step out for a cup of coffee, and while he is out of Brandywine Optical, Somerville can do as fine a job of adjusting a pair of glasses as Rosenberg could. He also feels that it would be acceptable to leave Somerville alone while Rosenberg goes to the post office to mail things. Rosenberg does not feel responsible to monitor Somerville's activities at the Brandywine Optical business other than within the forty hours for which he is involved with Somerville. In supervising Somerville, Rosenberg had an arrangement early on in which twelve hours' supervision was given at a flea market and an additional twenty-eight hours at the Brandywine Optical store. This changed to eight hours on Saturday at the flea market and thirty-two hours a week at Brandywine Optical. The thirty-two hours is from Monday through Thursday. On Friday, Rosenberg understands that an optometrist is in attendance at the Brandywine Optical, and Somerville is only answering the phone and showing frames to customers. Nonetheless, Rosenberg admits that he has never been at the Brandywine Optical on Friday to confirm this arrangement in which Somerville is purported to do no opticianry work. Rosenberg assumes that Somerville in good conscience will not do anything irregular related to activities by an apprentice optician while Rosenberg is not attendance on Fridays. Otherwise, Rosenberg assumes that the optometrist at the business on Friday is responsible for Somervilles activities. Robert Schwalm, a licensed optician in the state of Florida, on March 20, 1985; March 27, 1985; April 3, 1985;. and April 17, 1985, while seated in the parking lot adjacent to the Brandywine Optical store and using 50 power binoculars, observed Somerville without supervision of an optician, optometrist or opthalmologist, practice opticianry, to wit, adjusting, delivering, fitting and collecting money for glasses. Adjustments would include working on frames etc. Rosenberg was not in attendance while these activities were being conducted by Somerville. On these occasions, when Rosenberg would arrive at the store, the witness Schwalm would depart. Similarly, Harry Rowley, licensed optician in the state of Florida, on March 20, 1985; March 27, 1985; April 3, 1985; and April 17, 1985, observed Somerville's participating in the practice of opticianry. Except for one of these instances in which Rosenberg came into the store, Somerville was practicing opticianry outside the presence of Rosenberg. Somerville's practice of opticianry included dispensing glasses, adjusting glasses and collecting fees. On July 22, 1985, an investigator with the Department of Professional Regulation, Philip T. Hundermann, went to the Brandywine Optical store and parked outside the store. He arrived between 9:30 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. At 10:00 a.m. a person was observed leaving the store. At 10:05 a.m. Rosenberg was seen parking his car and then was observed entering the premises. The investigator went into the store at 10:10 a.m. and observed Somerville talking to a male customer while Rosenberg was standing at the counter. The investigator then requested that Rosenberg participate in an interview. Rosenberg and the investigator left the business premises and in another location held a discussion about concerns related to a complaint against Rosenberg's license. Rosenberg told the investigator that he supervised Somerville for a period of forty hours a week as the sponsoring optician. Rosenberg said that typically he would arrive at the Brandywine Optical store at 10:00 a.m. and leave around 4:00 or 4:30 p.m. This would mean that Somerville was unsupervised from 9:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. and from 4:00 or 4:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. On August 27, 1985, Douglas Vanderbllt, an investigator with the Department of Professional Regulation, went to the Brandywine Optical store. When he entered the store, Somerville and another customer were the only persons in attendance. The customer was trying on frames and making a selection of frames, with the assistance of Somerville. Vanderbilt picked out some frames that he wanted to buy. Somerville took the glasses that Vanderbilt had and made measurements from those glasses. This was in furtherance of the preparation of a new pair of spectacles at a cost of $1lO. Sixty dollars was paid down. Some of the measurements Somerville made pertaining to Vanderbilt involved bifocals. No prescription had been presented by Vanderbilt and Somerville used the old glasses which Vanderbilt had as a basis for measurement. Vanderbilt was presented with a business card which may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 1 admitted into evidence. The business card reflects Brandywine Optical, prescriptions filled, eye glasses and contact lenses. It gives the business address and indicates that David Somerville is the dispensing optician. This card is similar to a card sitting on the counter where Vanderbilt was seated. Respondent was aware of the information set forth on the card received as an exhibit. Somerville, upon the questioning of Vanderbilt, confirmed that the name Somerville reflected on the card and the Respondent Somerville were one and the same person. On September 9, 1985, Vanderbilt returned to the business premises at Brandywine Optical. At that time, only Somerville was present. Somerville broke the black stainlesse steel frame across the bridge of the new glasses. Consequently, Vanderbilt picked out a brown frame, and Somerville fitted the brown pair of glasses on Vanderbilt.
The Issue The issue presented for decision herein is whether or not Respondent engaged in the conduct set forth in the preceeding paragraphs, and, if so, what, if any, disciplinary action is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, and the entire record compiled herein, I make the following relevant factual findings. Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of optometry pursuant to chapters 455, 463, and 20, Florida Statutes. The Respondent is licensed to practice optometry in the state of Florida, having been issued license number OP-0001674. Respondent shares office space with Robert's Optical Center at 23 East Prospect Road in Fort Lauderdale. On or about January 8, 1986, Respondent performed an examination of visual analysis upon DPR's investigator Allison Lichtenstein. Lichtenstein used the alias, Allison Smith. During the course of the examination of Allison Lichtenstein Respondent failed to perform visual field testing. In addition to Respondent's failure to conduct a visual field test of Lichtenstein, Respondent also failed to perform the following minimum procedures: Pupillary examination, biomicroscopy and extra-ocular muscle balance assessment. At Lichtenstein's request, Respondent did not perform tonometry. After the Respondent's examination of Lichtenstein, she paid the examination fee to Robert Mann, an optician with Robert's Optical Center, Inc. Mann provided Lichtenstein with a copy of her prescription written on the Respondent's prescription form. (Petitioner's Exhibit 3). Mann is not a salaried employee of Respondent. Prior to Respondent's examination of Lichtenstein, Respondent was aware that Mann was writing prescriptions on his prescription pad. Despite this knowledge, Respondent allowed Mann to continue this practice and Respondent continues to allow Mann to collect fees and dispense receipts on his behalf. On or about January 8, 1986, Respondent performed an examination for visual analysis upon Petitioner's investigator, Mary Pfab. Pfab used the alias, Mary Parker. Dr. Mary Pfab is licensed to practice optometry in Florida, Tennessee, Virginia and North Carolina. She is currently engaged in the practice of optometry in Virginia. Pfab is familiar with the minimum procedures for vision analysis as required by rule 21Q-3.007, Florida Administrative Code. She was tendered and accepted as an expert witness in the practice of optometry. At the time of the examination, Pfab was wearing rigid contact lenses. Pfab told Respondent that she was then 28 years old and was taking the medication Ibruprofen. During Respondent's examination of Pfab, the following minimum procedures for vision analysis were not performed: pupillary examination and visual field testing. At Pfab's request, tonometry was not performed on her by Respondent. At the conclusion of Respondent's examination of Pfab, Pfab paid Robert Mann the examination fee. Respondent gave Pfab a copy of her prescription and Mann provided Pfab with a receipt on Respondent's prescription pad. Mann wrote Pfab's prescription on his pad. (Petitioner's Exhibit 2b). On or about April 2, 1986, Petitioner's investigator, Allison Lichtenstein revisited Respondent's office and conducted an investigation. She found that Respondent did not have a tangent screen, which is necessary to perform visual field testing. Corrective action has subsequently been taken by Respondent, and Respondent has now purchased a tangent screen. Respondent now includes visual field testing in routine eye examinations. Dr. David Chambers, a Florida licensed optometrist who has been engaged in the practice of Optometry in Florida since 1974, was accepted as an expert witness in the practice of optometry in Florida. Chambers testified as to the consequences which could result to a patient when an optometrist fails to perform the various required minimum procedures. A pupillary examination detects neurological problems produced by tumors, aneurysms or other diseases, particularly neurosyphilis. An optometrist who does not perform the pupillary examination could miss these problems and patients accordingly will not be referred to a neurologist as they should be. Visual field testing indicates the integrity of the eye's retina and detects a large family of diseases including glaucoma, pigmentation degeneration, diabetes and cataracts. Failure to performs visual field testing could result in the optometrist's missing these types of diseases which affect the visual system and the controlling nerve systems. Visual field testing and tonometry are two of the three procedures which detect glaucoma. The importance of performing visual field testing is increased when tonometry is not performed at the patient's request. Biomicroscopy detects lid and corneal diseases including allergic conjunctivitis, bacterial conjunctivitis, herpes, chlazions and aureola. These lid and corneal diseases could not be detected, diagnosed and/or referred for treatment by an optometrist who fails to perform biomicroscopy. The extraocular muscle balance assessment determines how well the two eyes work together. By failing to perform the extraocular muscle balance assessment, an optometrist could fail to diagnose a phoria or tropia problem. A phoria problem is a tendency for the eye to turn and a tropia problem is an actual turning of the eye. Failure to detect and treat these problems could result in the patient having headaches, seeing double, or using only one eye. John C. Danner is a real estate appraiser engaged in appraising commercial real estate property since 1975. Danner was received as an expert appraiser in commercial real estate. He is familiar with market rental values of commercial property in the Fort Lauderdale/Broward County area. Surveys conducted by Danner to determine the market rent for space near the Respondent's office reveal that the market rent for similar space is between $90 to $100 per month. Additionally, it would cost an optometrist between $300 to $400 per month to lease the type of equipment which has been provided by Robert's Optical to Respondent. Robert's Optical provides Respondent with both his office space and equipment for $50 per month. By the inducement of paying only nominal rent for office space and equipment, Respondent has engaged in the practice of optometry with Robert's Optical Center, Inc. Respondent does not maintain full and total responsibility and control of all files and records relating to patients. Rather, an optician with Robert's Optical Center provides patients with prescriptions written on the Respondent's prescription forms, and Respondent's patients pay their examination fees to an optician affiliated with Robert's Optical. Respondent charged Lichtenstein $25 for an "eye exam" (Petitioner's Exhibit 3) and charged Pfab $35 for a "contact lens exam" (Petitioner's Exhibit 2b). These examinations were not complete in that a number of the required minimum procedures were omitted.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: Respondent's license to practice optometry be suspended for three (3) months, and upon the conclusion of the suspension Respondent be placed on probation for a period of twelve (12) months under such terms and conditions as required by the Board of Optometry. An administrative fine be imposed upon Respondent in the amount of twenty-five hundred dollars ($2,500) payable to Petitioner within thirty (30) days after the entry of the Petitioner's Final Order. DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of November, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of November, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert Newell, Jr., Esquire Phillip B. Miller, Esquire 102 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Edward Paul Kreiling, Esquire Parkway Professional Building 6151 Miramar Parkway Miramar Florida 33023 Tom Gallagher, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 William O'Neil General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Mildred Gardner Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is entitled to an award of additional points sufficient to achieve a passing score on the July 1997 optometry exam.
Findings Of Fact Susan J. Summerton-Madison (Petitioner) took the July 1997 examination for licensure as an optometrist in the State of Florida. A portion of the examination tests the clinical skills of the applicant for licensure. Each applicant performs a number of tasks while two examiners observe. Prior to administration of the test, all examiners receive standardization training providing a baseline for grading the individual performance of each applicant. Examiners grade each applicant independently of each other. During the clinical part of the test, a viewing system known as a "teaching tube" is attached to the optometrist's equipment used by the applicant. The applicant performs each task twice because only one examiner at a time can observe the performance through the tube. Prior to beginning the clinical portion of the exam, the applicant and the examiners set the tube focusing mechanism so that both the applicant and the examiner have a clear view of the procedures being demonstrated. By grade report dated August 27, 1997, the Petitioner was advised that she had scored 68.80 on the clinical portion of the examination. A score of at least 75 points is required to pass the clinical portion of the examination for licensure as an optometrist. The Petitioner challenges the grading of the following questions: Section 1, questions 4a and 4b. Section 2, questions 3a, 3b, 5c, 6a, 7b, 10a, 11a, 11b, 12a, 12b, 13a, 14a, 15a, 18a, 18b, 21a, 21b, 24a, 25a, and 26a. The Petitioner asserts that her pregnancy during the examination resulted in ocular changes which caused focusing anomalies. The anomalies allegedly caused the viewing equipment through which the examiners observed her performance to be out of focus. The Petitioner received score deductions related to lack of focus on numerous questions; specifically section 2, questions 3a, 3b, 5c, 6a, 7b, 10a, 13a, 14a, 15a, 18a, 21a, 24a, 25a, and 26a. There are multiple causes of temporary ocular changes, including nervousness. Although there is evidence that pregnancy can result in ocular changes, the evidence fails to establish that any focusing problems which occurred during the Petitioner's performance on the July 1997 examination were related to pregnancy. Refocusing the viewing mechanism takes approximately five seconds. There is no evidence that an applicant is prevented from refocusing the equipment during the clinical examination. Although examiners are under no obligation to advise applicants during the test, one of the examiners observing the Petitioner suggested that she refocus the equipment. The Petitioner asserts that the request caused her to run out of time on section 2, questions 11a, 11b, 12a, and 12b. The evidence fails to establish that any problems related to insufficient time for the examination were related to the examiner's suggestion. The Petitioner asserts that points were deducted for poor focus on tasks which did not include focus as grading criteria. The evidence establishes that because the clinical portion of the test involves examination of ocular systems in a patient, almost all procedures require correct focus. The Petitioner asserts that on section 2, question 21b, ("foveal reflex") she received no points, but that another optometrist's examination of the test patient indicated that the foveal reflex was acceptable. Review of the examination indicates that the Petitioner's score was lowered because of focusing problems. The fact that a qualified optometrist determined the patient to be normal does not entitle the Petitioner to additional points or indicate that the scoring of her performance was unfair. Because examiners view separate procedures, it is not unlikely that examiners may award different scores. It is possible to evaluate the performance of examiners through use of "agreement ratings." Agreement ratings indicate the frequency of which each examiner agrees with the other examiner in testing the same applicant. The Petitioner notes that the examiners grading her performance differed in grading section 1, questions 4a and section 2, questions 3a, 3b, 7b, 10a, 13a, 14a, 15a, 18b, 21a, 21b, and 25a, and asserts that such indicates she was graded unfairly. Although the agreement ratings of the examiners who observed the Petitioner were slightly lower than average, the examiner agreement ratings fail to establish that she was graded arbitrarily or unfairly. The sample size is so small as to be subject to influence by borderline candidates, where one examiner believes an applicant's performance to be more acceptable than does the other examiner. The Petitioner asserts that on section 2, question 18b, the lack of agreement between the examiners reflects arbitrary grading because both supposedly view the same procedure through the viewing tube. The evidence fails to establish that the Petitioner is entitled to additional points or that the scoring of her performance was unfair. The Petitioner asserts that she informed the examiners that she was pregnant prior to administration of the clinical portion of the exam and that she should have received special accommodation of some type based on her condition. Procedures set forth in Rule 61-11.008, Florida Administrative Code, address special assistance to certain persons submitting to examination by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Office of Examination Services, which administered the examination in the instant case. Such assistance is available to persons with learning disabilities or physical handicap as defined in the rule. There is no evidence that the Petitioner sought to utilize such procedures. There is no evidence that the Petitioner's condition would have been regarded as a learning disability or physical handicap by the agency. The Petitioner asserts that an examiner exited the room while she was addressing section 1, questions 4a and 4b, and that the confusion of the departure caused the examiners to err. The evidence establishes that the scores reflect the inappropriate performance of the task involved, which involved measurement of the patient's pupil.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby recommended that the Department of Health enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner's challenge to the grading of the July 1997 examination for licensure as an optometrist. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of May, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of May, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan J. Summerton-Madison 559 99th Avenue North Naples, Florida 34108 Anne Marie Williamson, Esquire Department of Health Building 6, Room 102 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health Building 6, Room 136 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Eric G. Walker, Executive Director Board of Optometry Department of Health 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact On July 15, 1994, Petitioner applied to be licensed as an optician in Florida. She evidenced her intentions by completing the license application form, together with various supporting documents. Respondent denied the license application through an order dated August 25, 1994. This preliminary decision by the Respondent was contested by Petitioner when Petitioner sought an informal hearing. To resolve their dispute the Respondent received supplemental documents from Petitioner, to include tax returns. Petitioner submitted this information in September 1994. On November 4, 1994, Respondent conducted an informal hearing. On December 9, 1994, a final order was entered finding that Petitioner did not meet statutory criteria for licensure under Section 484.007(1)(d), Florida Statutes. Petitioner did not seek appellate review following entry of the final order. On July 12, 1995, Petitioner filed a second application to be licensed to practice opticianry in Florida. On August 29, 1995, Respondent entered a preliminary order denying the reapplication. As reasons for the denial it was stated: . . . The Board hereby states as the basis of this decision that you were previously denied licensure August 5, 1994; and there are three discrepancies of material fact regarding your work experience between your application dated July 18, 1994 and your subsequent application of July 21, 1995. See Sections 484.014(1)(a), Florida Statutes. . . . There were factual differences in the July 15, 1994 application compared to the July 12, 1995 application related to Petitioner's work experience. The July 15, 1994 application did not refer to work experience between May 1994 and December 1994 at Vision Work, Inc., an establishment located at 9480 Arlington Expressway, Regency Point, Jacksonville, Florida. The July 12, 1995 application did describe that experience. To explain this discrepancy, Petitioner indicated that the job at Vision Work had been a temporary/part-time job that she did not expect to last as long as it did. This is taken to mean that the reference to Vision Work was not set forth in the July 15, 1994 application in that it was a temporary position at that time. Petitioner indicated that when she filled out the July 15, 1994 application she had only worked at Vision Work since May, one Saturday a month. After being there through August she started working nights and every Saturday and Sunday, making it a more permanent position. In the July 15, 1994 application Petitioner related work experience for National Optical at No. 9 Best Square, Norfolk, Virginia, from August 19, 1987 until March 19, 1993. In the July 12, 1995 application the National Optical work experience was described as March 19, 1989 through March 19, 1993. Otherwise reference to the work experience for National Optical set forth in the two applications remained consistent. In explanation, Petitioner stated that she had worked part-time from August 19, 1987 until 1989 when she began full-time employment at National Optical. The reason for making the change between the two applications was based upon discussions at an appearance before the Respondent in which someone had asked Petitioner about working two jobs that overlapped. This is referring to an appearance before the Board associated with the 1994 application. By the change in the 1995 application concerning Petitioner's work experience, she sought to clarify the circumstance related to working two jobs at the same time by pointing out the date upon which the National Optical job became a full-time job. In the discussions held with the Respondent related to the 1994 application, Petitioner made the Respondent aware that the National Optical employment became full-time on March 19, 1989. This beginning date coincides with the information in the July 12, 1995 application. The July 15, 1994 application stated that Petitioner had worked for the Navy Exchange Optical at Bldg C-9 in Norfolk, Virginia from April 24, 1984 until March 7, 1987. In the July 12, 1994 application the concluding date became March 3, 1989. Otherwise the two applications were essentially the same. In explanation, Petitioner stated that she had made a mistake in the 1994 application as to the concluding date and that this had been brought to her attention in the hearing before Respondent to consider the 1994 application. After Petitioner had been denied licensure in the 1994 informal hearing, someone pointed out that Petitioner had worked with the Navy Exchange Optical for a period of three years. Petitioner then realized that she had been in that position for a longer period. As a consequence the 1995 application was corrected to reflect the proper end date. The reference which Petitioner made before Respondent to working two jobs corresponds to a part-time position at National Optical while working full- time at the Navy Exchange Optical, both in Norfolk, Virginia. When Petitioner made reapplication on July 12, 1995, she was aware that the Respondent had received and reviewed the prior application dated July 15, 1994. Under that circumstance and given the explanations at hearing for the discrepancies between the two applications as reported in the facts, Petitioner is not found to have intended to misrepresent or commit fraud when reapplying for licensure or to have misrepresented or committed fraud.
Recommendation Based upon a consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered which denies the 1995 application for a license to practice opticianry on the merits, but sets aside the grounds for denial related to alleged discrepancies of material fact pertaining to the 1994 application when compared to the 1995 application. DONE and ENTERED this 5th day of January, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of January, 1996.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Respondent's license as an optometrist in Florida should be disciplined because of the matters alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed herein.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Petitioner, Board of Optometry, was responsible for the licensing of optometrists and the regulation of the practice of optometry in this state. Respondent was licensed as an optometrist in Florida, practicing under license number OP0001451, originally issued on September 21, 1978. Some time prior to or during 1987, Respondent, Dr. Brian L. Weber, dissatisfied with what he found to be the practice of large optical dispensers with regard to pressuring optometrists to prescribe lenses, decided to open a facility where patients needing glasses could receive an eye examination from a licensed optometrist and also, if the patient so desired, obtain the eye wear prescribed. Consistent with what he perceived to be the rules of the Board of Optometry at that time, Dr. Weber entered into a business venture with Mr. Record, a licensed optician, through which a patient could do just that. In 1990, Dr. Weber and Mr. Record changed the name of the business to 29/49 Optical, Inc., and as of March 2, 1990, operated five separate stores under that name. Dr. Weber and Mr. Record incorporated the company within which each ultimately owned 50 percent of the stock of the corporation. Dr. Weber provided the funds to start the business, and Mr. Record, the "sweat equity." Mr. Record was made president of the company because he had the experience in opticianry and was responsible for operations. Weber was the "money man," and provided the overall business goals and strategy. Once the corporation was established and the initial filing was completed, Mr. Record was responsible for recurring filings as a matter of course. The firm, 29/49 Optical, Inc., was in the business of providing optician services. The leases for the stores were taken out in the name of the company which, in essence, provided a "turn-key" office to a licensed optometrist who was one of those individuals associated with Respondent in the optometry practice known as Brian L. Weber and Associates. Each of the optometrists in the association was an independent contractor, associated in practice with Respondent. None of them were employees of 29/49 Optical, Inc. In each of the offices of 29/49 Optical, Inc., was a display area where glass frames were displayed and fitted, a waiting room used both by customers of the optical shop and patients of the resident optometrist, a storage room, and, for the exclusive use of an optometrist, an examining room equipped with those items and supplies necessary for the accomplishment of eye examinations. As was the custom in the profession at the time, this office, owned or leased by 29/49 Optical, Inc., was furnished to the optometrist at little or no cost. Though it was hoped that the optometry patients would choose to have their prescriptions for glasses or contact lenses filled at 29/49 Optical, Inc., they were under no obligation to do so, and many did not. Patients seen by an optometrist in the 29/49 Optical, Inc. offices were billed by the optometrist for the optometry services and by the optical company for the cost of any glasses or contact lenses purchased. The two charges were paid separately, the payments placed in separate accounts. Payments for eye examinations by an optometrist were deposited to the account of Brian L. Weber, optometrist. Payments for glasses or lenses were deposited to the accounts of 29/49 Optical, Inc. The funds were neither mixed nor co-mingled, and funds placed in the account of Brian L. Weber were not used to pay the expenses of the 29/49 Optical, Inc. stores. Each optometrist maintained his or her own patient records which were stored in a filing cabinet maintained for that purpose separate and apart from the files relating to the operation of the 29/49 Optical, Inc. stores. Only the optometrists made entries to those records. Since the optometrists who manned the offices in the 29/49 Optical, Inc., stores were independent contractors, within basic guidelines as to routine procedures and office hours, they were free to work such hours as they chose and to charge what they believed to be appropriate fees for other than routine procedures. They were paid with funds drawn from the account of Brian L. Weber, into which the patient fees for optometry services were deposited. In addition to the associates who practiced at the individual shops, Dr. Weber also practiced at each and all of the shops periodically. Mr. Record was paid from the checking account maintained by 29/49 Optical, Inc., on which account either Record or the Respondent could write checks. Dr. Weber is quick to admit that the advertisement for 29/49 Optical, Inc., which appeared in the March 1, 1990, edition of the St. Petersburg Times is a poorly worded advertisement. So much of the advertisement which implies a total price to be paid to 29/49 which includes examination and glasses is admittedly inappropriate, and when he saw the proof prior to publication, he claims to have made appropriate changes which would have corrected the deficiencies. However, the corrections dictated by Respondent were not made, and the inappropriate advertisement was published. His immediate complaint to the newspaper after the first publication date resulted in an immediate correction. Respondent claims that when the disciplinary action was initiated against him in 1992, he immediately contacted the newspaper and requested a letter which would clarify the situation. He did not tell the paper what to say, and the subsequent letter from the paper relates to a failure to have his name appear in the March 1, 1990, advertisement. This is not the defect in the advertisement of which the Board complains. Dr. Liane, a Board certified optometric physician, a former Chairman of the Board of Optometry and now an expert for and consultant to the Board, reviewed the case file in this matter for the Board, along with the transcripts of other cases relating to Dr. Weber. None of the other matters was based on disciplinary action. To his recollection, the Board's rule on corporate practice was promulgated in 1986, at the time he was a member of the Board. At that time, the Board conducted numerous workshops around the state to advice practitioners of the standard of practice in that regard. Dr. Liane was also on the Board's legislative committee when Chapter 463, Florida Statutes, was enacted. The Board of Optometry was concerned with the protection of the public from the danger of allowing opticians or unlicensed entities to have input into whether lenses were needed. The Board, and the legislature, wanted to allow optometrists to practice with other licensed health care practitioners, but not with unlicensed opticians. After the legislation was passed, the Board promulgated its Rule 21O-3.008, which outlines factors which must be shown in order to prove corporate practice. One of the prohibitions in the rule relates to any practice or pronouncement which "implies" that the corporate or unlicensed entity is providing professional services. In the instant case, Dr. Liane is of the opinion that the original advertisement in question implies that 29/49 Optical, Inc., is offering a complete eye examination. As was noted previously, Respondent agrees, and it is so found. Having considered all the evidence available to him, including the advertisement of March 2, 1990, and the assumption of the lease arrangements existing prior and up to 1990, Dr. Liane concluded that Respondent was involved in an unauthorized corporate practice. While a side-by side practice between optometrists and opticians is common and approved, it may not be within a corporate practice by the same individuals who are in business together.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Board of Optometry enter a Final Order dismissing Counts I and II of the Administrative Complaint; finding him guilty of Count III thereof and imposing an administrative fine of $250.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of November, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Alexandria E. Walters, Esquire William C. Childers, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229 Angela T. Hall Agency Clerk Department of Health 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Grover Freeman, Esquire 201 East Kennedy Boulevard Suite 1950 Tampa, Florida 33602 Eric G. Walker Executive Director Board of Optometry 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Pete Peterson General Counsel Department of Health 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 6, Room 102-E Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent has been licensed to practice optometry in Florida. Respondent's license was suspended for 60 days and placed on probation for one year beginning in 1979, after he pled guilty to charges of violating rules relating to competence in the practice of optometry and patient record maintenance. The charges in the instant proceeding arose from his treatment of Linda (age 13) and Judy Agnew (age 11), beginning in June, 1981. He prescribed corrective glasses for both girls. Their mother, Mrs. Jean Braybrooks, had Linda's prescription filled, but became immediately dissatisfied when Linda could not see properly with the glasses. Mrs. Braybrooks advised Respondent she was stopping payment on her check to him and took the children to another optometrist, Dr. Palmisano. She received new prescriptions for her daughters from Dr. Palmisano and her daughters have had no difficulty with these glasses. Mrs. Braybrooks subsequently filed a complaint in this matter and Petitioner's investigators sought to obtain patient records on Linda and Judy Agnew from Respondent. The investigators contacted Respondent in October and November, 1981, but were advised on both occasions that he had destroyed those records. Petitioner presented the testimony of Dr. John Walesby, who was qualified as an expert witness in the practice of optometry, including accepted standards of optometric care in the Tampa Bay area. Dr. Walesby examined the Agnew children in December, 1981, and determined that the prescriptions they received from Respondent were improper. Dr. Walesby determined that the prescription for Linda Agnew was at considerable variance with the correct prescription and was unacceptable by community optometric care standards. 1/ The prescription for Judy Agnew, while not miscalculated, did not allow for the child's ability to adapt to the prescription. Again, this treatment failed to conform to accepted community standards. Apparently one of the prescriptions at issue was signed by an unlicensed employee of Respondent in his behalf. It was not established that this was done outside Respondent's supervision or that it was improper.
Recommendation In consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of the charges contained in the Administrative Complaint to the extent set forth herein and revoking his license to practice optometry in Florida. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of April, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of April, 1983.
The Issue Whether Respondents committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaints, and, if so, what penalties should be imposed on either or both of them.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent, Eduardo Enrique Mendez ("Mendez"), at all times material to this matter, was a licensed insurance agent subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Petitioner. Petitioner issued Mendez license number A176292. Mendez is licensed as a 2-18 life and health agent and a 2-20 general lines agent for the sale of property and casualty. Mendez first started in the insurance business in 1969 while in Panamá. He came to the United States in 1988. In South Florida, he has been known as "Mr. Panama" in the insurance industry for approximately 20 years. Respondent, Insurance Resources of the Americas, Inc. ("Insurance Resources"), is and was, at all times material in this matter, a corporation registered as a Florida insurance agent subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of Petitioner, having been issued license number R054007. Mendez is the corporation's owner and president. Insurance Resources typically handles all kinds of property and casualty insurance, but for approximately the last six years has specialized in the used car dealer business by providing bonds for the car dealers to open their operation. Bass Underwriters ("Bass") is a managing general agent which works with insurance agents who purchase insurance for their customers. Bass has no direct relationship with the customers only with the retail agent who is responsible for collecting the premium. On January 22, 2003, Insurance Resources, as producer, and Bass signed a producer agreement which allowed Insurance Resources to sell insurance through Bass or certain carriers that Bass obtains as a wholesaler. Insurance Resources received commissions as compensation under the agreement. The agreement contained a provision which guaranteed the collection of additional premiums that might arise as a result of an audit of the insurance customers. The provision provided in relevant part: Producer shall be liable to Bass Underwriters, Inc. for the full amount of premium, fees and applicable sum taxes, less commission, including additional and/or adjustable premiums developed under audits or applicable rating plan on every insurance contract placed by Producer through Bass Underwriters, Inc. Producer shall remit Twenty Five Percent (25%) of the premium upon binding. The full amount of premium, fees and applicable state taxes, less commission is due to Bass Underwriters, Inc. not later than the 15th day of the first (1st) month after the effective date of such contract, audit, rating plan, or other adjustment. During the term of the producer agreement, three policies were issued that Bass determined additional premiums were owed by Insurance Resources. On June 29, 2005, Bass notified Insurance Resources by invoice that an additional premium was owed for the insured, L. Boulevard Café, in the amount of $6,955.00. L. Boulevard Cafe, a restaurant, obtained a Century Surety policy through Insurance Resources effective November 15, 2004. In making the application, the restaurant declared a certain amount of projected sales. The premium was based upon the total sales recorded by the customer. Century Surety did a self audit and determined that the amount of sales was significantly more than the coverage. Subsequently, the carrier went back and assessed additional premiums to make up the difference between the amount of coverage represented and the self reported amount, which totaled $6,955.00. Around August 2005, after receiving the Bass invoice with the additional premiums, Insurance Resources notified L. Boulevard Café about the invoice and explained that the additional insurance premium of $6,955.00 was owed because of the difference in the amount calculated from the audit. Mendez notified Rafael Garcia, prior owner of L. Boulevard Café, about the additional insurance premium but L. Boulevard Cafe was having financial problems. L. Boulevard Café never made the additional premium payment. On July 1, 2005, Bass notified Insurance Resources by invoice that an additional premium was owed for the insured, Winner's Circle, in the amount of $418.00. Winner's Circle obtained a XL Specialty Insurance Company policy through Insurance Resources effective May 23, 2005. An inspection was performed after the policy quote was bound and issued. The subsequent inspection concluded that the construction code of the building was different from the construction code represented on the application. The difference triggered a premium increase of $418.00. When Insurance Resources found out about the additional premium for Winner's Circle, Mendez sent an invoice explaining the increase and requesting payment. Winner's Circle refused to pay the amount because the policy was issued under a lower premium. Winner's Circle decided not to keep the policy when Respondent requested that they make payment of the additional premium amount and the balance of the premium on the policy. Payment was never made. The policy was cancelled. The account was credited and the final total owed was $160.40, which Bass became responsible for with the carrier. On July 11, 2005, Bass notified Insurance Resources by invoice that an additional premium was owed for the insured, Venecar, Inc., in the amount of $1,298.00. Venecar, a small used car dealership, obtained a Century Surety policy through Insurance Resources effective July 18, 2004. The insurance inspectors did an inspection after the policy was issued and determined that one more employee and driver than had been represented in the application existed and that employee generated a change in the rating for the premium, which Bass ultimately decided was an additional premium of $1,298.00. After Insurance Resources learned about the results of the inspection, Mendez called Bass and told Ms. Rodriguez, the accountant, that the premium increase of $1,298.00 was too high and could not be the proper rate for one driver because one driver should be around $400.00. Bass ignored Mendez's proposition. Subsequently, Mendez told Venecar about the outstanding premium amount owed and they refused to pay. Insurance Resources followed up and contacted Venecar several more times requesting the additional premium payment to no avail. Soon thereafter, Venecar closed. Mendez reported his efforts to Bass while he tried to collect the three changed premium amounts. Insurance Resources never collected the additional premium from L. Boulevard Café, Winner's Circle, or Venecar even though Mendez repeatedly sought to get the outstanding premiums from all three insured customers. Despite Respondents best efforts, they never received any of the additional premiums that accrued. Bass still expected Insurance Resources to pay the additional premiums pursuant to the producer agreement. On May 1, 2006, Bass sent Insurance Resources a statement of account. The invoice statement informed Insurance Resources that the premium due for the three different accounts totaled $8,021.39. The statement outlined the amount owed from each insured. After Bass made several demands for the three accounts, Bass submitted the account to collections and the matter ultimately ended in litigation. On November 5, 2007, a final judgment was entered against Insurance Resources in favor of Bass for the principal of $8,021.39, costs of $275.00, and prejudgment interest of $1,298.14, for a total of $9,594.53. The judgment remains unsatisfied. On February 15, 2008, Insurance Resources paid $1,919.00 on the judgment. On February 29, 2008, Insurance Resources paid $640.00 on the judgment. There is a balance owed of $7,035.53. Insurance Resources also had a relationship with AAPCO, a premium finance company that financed the balance of what an insured could not pay. Respondent Insurance Resources was an authorized entity to accept premium finance contracts utilizing AAPCO premium finance. Insurance Resources had the authority to write check drafts on AAPCO's bank account for the entire premium amount owed on a customer's insurance policy and remit it to the insurer. Respondent would then submit the policy application together with the premium down payment received from the consumer to AAPCO, which would finance the rest of the policy premium. In 2009, Insurance Resources was having problems financially. Mendez approached Mrs. Blanco, AAPCO's office manager, and told her Insurance Resources sales had dropped fifty percent. Mendez, on behalf of Insurance Resources requested to make a payment arrangement.1 Blanco refused to make any type of arrangements. She insisted that Insurance Resources pay everything up front. Mendez approached her several more times but she would not negotiate. At one point, Mendez even requested that AAPCO place the $4,000.00 in producers fees owed to Insurance Resources against the monies owed and she refused to pay Respondent the $4,000.00 In 2009, Mendez submitted three checks to AAPCO's as down payments for insureds' accounts. Check number 1347 was for $10,228.47. The check was from account number 2000034377804 Mr. Panama Inc.'s account. Check number 1342 was from the same account in the amount of $2,828.15. However, check number 159 was for $3,368.44 from Insurance Resources account number 2000040742805. Checks 1347, 1342, and 159 totaled approximately $16,425.00. The funds were intended to be premium down payments on insurance policies purchased by Florida insurance consumers. Insurance policies were issued for each of the checks for down payments for insured's accounts Insurance Resources submitted. AAPCO deposited the three checks and they were submitted to the bank for negotiation. Each check was returned for insufficient funds. AAPCO attempted to collect the money for the three checks that were returned for non-sufficient funds. AAPCO demanded payment of the funds and even called Mendez in an effort to collect the funds. Mendez admitted at hearing that the three checks bounced because he had used the funds for his business operating account since the business was doing bad financially. Insurance Resources had not yet repaid AAPCO their monies owed for the three checks. AAPCO has suffered a financial loss due to nonpayment. After nonpayment, AAPCO turned the matter over to AAPCO's legal department. After an investigation, Petitioner charged Respondents with numerous violations by separate Administrative Complaints dated April 21, 2010. The Charges: In Count I of the Administrative complaint filed against Mendez, Petitioner charges Mendez with violations of sections 626.561(1), 626.611(7), (9), (10), and 626.621(4), Florida Statutes, for failing to remit all premiums due to Bass. In Count II, Petitioner charges Mendez with violations of sections 626.561(1),626.611(7), 626.611(9) and (10), and 626.621(4) for submitting the three checks to AAPCO in payment of the policy down payment premiums that were returned for insufficient funds and not repaid after demand. In Count I of the Administrative complaint filed against Insurance Resources, Petitioner charges Insurance Resources with violation of sections 626.561(1),626.6251(5)(a),(d),(f),(j), and (k) for failing to remit all premiums due to Bass.2 In Count II Petitioner charges Insurance Resources with violations of sections 626.561(1), and 626.6251(5)(a),(d), (f),(j), and (k) for remitting three checks to AAPCO in payment of the policy down payment premiums that were returned for insufficient funds and not repaid after demand.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order that: (a) finds Respondents not guilty as charged in Count I, of the Administrative Complaints; (b) finds Respondents guilty in Count II; (c) suspends Respondent Mendez's license for 12 months with reinstatement conditioned upon repayment to AAPCO; and (d) suspends Respondent Insurance Resources' license for three months with reinstatement conditioned upon repayment to AAPCO. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of February, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. MCKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February, 2011.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to receive a passing grade on her optometry examination.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner took the optometry licensure examination on September 22-24, 1991. Following review of her initial scores, Respondent informed her by notice dated February 22, 1991, that she earned 100 points on Florida law and rules, which was a passing grade; 52.5 points on pharmacology and ocular diseases, which was below the minimum passing grade of 70; and 77 points on clinical, which was below the minimum passing grade of 80. Petitioner challenged her grades on the pharmacology and ocular diseases and clinical portions of the examination. However, at the beginning of the hearing, shedropped her challenge to the pharmacology and ocular diseases portion of the examination. The clinical portion of the examination is divided into two sections. In the first section, the applicant sees a "patient." Two examiners watch and listen as the applicant examines the "patient," who is unknown to the applicant and has been prepared with certain information. The applicant is graded under various areas within the broad categories of case history, visual acuity, pupillary exam, confrontation visual fields, and extra-ocular muscle balance assessment. In the second section, the applicant brings with him to the test site his own "patient." Two examiners, who are different from the examiners for section one, evaluate the applicant's ability to use various types of clinical equipment on his "patient." In the first section, Petitioner challenged the grades that she received for Questions 6, 8-10, and 11, which are all worth two points except for Question 10. Question 10 is worth four points. In the second section, Petitioner challenged the grades that she received for Questions 1-4, which are all worth five points, except for Question 4. Question 4 is worth four points. Any combination of additional points adding up to two or more would give Petitioner a passing grade on the pharmacology and ocular disease portion of the examination. As noted below, Petitioner received partial credit for certainanswers. Each of the four examiners completed a scoresheet while grading Petitioner. When no or partial credit was awarded, the examiner would write comments explaining what the problem was. Testifying for Respondent at the hearing, a licensed optometrist, who was one of the examiners of Petitioner for section two, explained adequately each of the scores awarded Petitioner for each of the challenged questions. He established that the equipment was carefully calibrated prior to each test session and for each individual applicant. A psychometrician employed by Respondent also testified that she had analyzed the variance of the scores among the examiners, in terms of overall scores for all applicants, and found no variances tending to discredit the grades. The challenged questions and clinical procedures provided a reliable measure of an applicant's relevant ability, knowledge, and skill. Petitioner's grades were a fair evaluation of her performance on the challenged questions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby recommended that the Board of Optometry enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's challenge to her scores in pharmacology and ocular diseases and clinical portions of the September, 1990, optometry licensure examination. RECOMMENDED this 19th day of June, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of June, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack McCray, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Patricia Guilford, Executive Director Board of Optometry 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Chidiebere Ekenna-Kalu P.O. Box 621507 Orlando, FL 32862-1507 Vytas J. Urba Assistant General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 N. Monroe St. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
The Issue Validity of Respondent's policy that applicants to retake the examination administered for licensure as an optometrist must have passed all portions of the national board examination within five years prior to the filing of the application. This rule challenge arises under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. It was consolidated for purposes of hearing with another case involving the same parties, DOAH Case No. 84-2647, wherein Petitioner is seeking to have his application to retake part of the state examination for optometrists approved. In that case, the Petitioner has provisionally denied his request based on the policy being challenged as a rule in this proceeding. At the hearing, Petitioner testified in his own behalf and called Mildred Gardner, Executive Director of the Board of Optometry, as a witness. Petitioner submitted 12 exhibits in evidence and the Respondent submitted one exhibit. The parties have submitted posthearing findings of fact pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(b)4, Florida Statutes. A ruling on each proposed finding of fact has been made either directly or indirectly in this Recommended Order, except where such proposed findings of fact have been rejected as subordinate, cumulative, immaterial, or unnecessary.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Samuel Scardino is an optometrist who is currently licensed as such in the states of California, Illinois, Kentucky, and Michigan. He graduated from the Illinois College of Optometry in 1978, and successfully passed all parts of the National Board of Optometry examination in the same year. He has been a practicing optometrist in Battle Creek, Michigan, since 1978. (Testimony of Petitioner, Petitioner's Exhibit 4) By application dated May 10, 1983, Petitioner applied to take the Florida optometry examination. His application was received by Respondent on May 13, 1983. Petitioner's application was approved pursuant to Respondent's Rule 21QER83-1 which amended Rule 21Q-4.01, Florida Administrative Code, on May 19, 1983, to provide that an applicant must have obtained a qualifying score on the national examination within five years prior or two years subsequent to the date of passage of the state examination. It also provided that a passing score of 75 must be obtained on the pharmacology section of the national examination in 1983, or subsequent thereto, within five years prior or two years subsequent to passage of the state examination. By letter of May 18, 1983, Respondent acknowledged receipt of Petitioner's application and $250.00 fee, but indicated that the application was incomplete in that a final transcript must be sent by his school, and also that the National Board report of passing grades within the past five years and the pharmacology section in 1983 with a score of 75 or above were required. Petitioner complied with these requirements and received an admission card for the optometry examination to be held in July of 1983. Petitioner took the examination at that time and received notice in September 1983 that he had failed the pharmacology/pathology portion of Part II of the examination with a grade of 61. A review of Petitioner's objections to the grade resulted in a further letter from Respondent, dated December 23, 1983, which advised Petitioner that the Board of Optometry review committee had reviewed the matter and changed his final grade for the pharmacology/pathology portion of the examination from 61 to 65, but that a final grade of 70 percent or better was required to achieve a passing status. He was thereupon advised of his right to a hearing under Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. (Testimony of Petitioner, Petitioner's Exhibit 1, 5-8, Respondent's Exhibit 1) On March 19, 1984, Petitioner filed an application for optometry reexamination with the Respondent, together with the $250.00 reexamination fee. The state application form for reexamination did not ask for any information concerning the National Board of Optometry examination, as did the original application form. Respondent's Rule 21Q-4.02, Florida Administrative Code, pertaining to reexamination, provided pertinently as follows: 21A-4.02 Reexamination.-- An applicant who fails either Part I or Part II of the state examination for licensure shall be required to retake only that part of the examination on which he failed to achieve a passing grade, provided that the applicant shall be limited to two retakes within a two year period from the date of original failure. If the applicant fails to achieve a passing grade as provided above, he shall be required to take the complete state examination for licensure in order to be entitled to be licensed as an optometrist. Reexamination shall be conditioned on payment of the reexamination fee. Respondent advised Petitioner by an undated letter which he received on April 7, 1984, that his National Board scores were no longer valid to take the Florida examination since they had been obtained more than five years prior to his application to take the 1984 examination. The letter further stated that 1983 was his last year of eligibility for examination under his 1978 National Board scores and that he had not been successful in his 1983 Florida examination. The letter enclosed an application for refund of his $250.00 fee for the 1984 examination. Petitioner thereafter spoke with the Executive Director of the Board of Optometry who indicated that the card would be evaluating his and other questions of candidates at their May 4, 1984 meeting. (Testimony of Petitioner, Gardner, Petitioner's Exhibits 2, 9, 11) The minutes of a meeting of the Board of Optometry on May 3, 1984, contains the following item: Examination 1984 - After discussion with Board Counsel, the Board reiterated that Examination candidates must have passed all parts of the National Board within 5 years prior to application to take the Florida examination in order that all candidates who pass the Florida examination are immediately eligible to apply for licen sure. Any candidate who applies to retake the Florida examination must also meet the requirements of passing the National Board within 5 years of applying to retake the Florida examination. All requirements of 21Q-4.01 apply to all candidates and no waiver of requirements shall be granted. Motion by Dr. Walker, seconded by Mrs. Chambers. Passed unanimously. The Board's Executive Director advised Petitioner of the action taken by the Board in a letter of May 14, 1984. He was also informed by this letter that if he completed the National Board requirements prior to the 1985 examination and applied for such examination, he would be required only to take the practical portion of Part II of the Florida examination, but that if he were not licensed in 1985, he would be required to take the entire Florida examination. After receiving the letter, Petitioner submitted his application for refund of the $250.00 reexamination fee which was approved on April 4, 1984 and thereafter paid to Petitioner. By Petition dated June 19, 1984, Petitioner requested an administrative hearing to contest the Respondent's denial of his application to retake the Florida optometry examination which was scheduled for August 1984. The instant rule challenge was subsequently filed in September 1984. (Testimony of Petitioner, Gardner, Petitioner's Exhibit 10) The policy statement announced by the Board at its May 3, 1984, meeting that applicants for reexamination must have passed the National Board examination within a period of five years prior to such application was first applied in 1984 and was uniformly applied to all applicants for reexamination who had not taken the National Board examination within the requisite period prior to application. (Testimony of Gardner)
The Issue At issue is whether Respondent materially failed to follow applicable ruling making procedures required by Section 120.54(2)(a), Florida Statutes, with regard to promulgation of proposed Rule 21P-16.002, Florida Administrative Code, relating toqualifications of sponsors for apprentice opticians; whether the proposed rule is an invalid exercise of delegated authority by Respondent; and whether Petitioners are parties substantially affected by the proposed rule.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for regulation of an apprenticeship program for candidates desiring licensure as opticians in the State of Florida. The apprenticeship program provides an alternate route to qualification to take the examination for licensure as an optician. Candidates may also qualify for examination by receipt of an associate degree in opticianry from an accredited educational institution or previous practice and licensure in other jurisdictions. Candidates electing to pursue licensure examination through the apprenticeship program as currently established must comply with provisions of Rule 21P-16.002, Florida Administrative Code. The current version of Rule 21P-16.002, Florida Administrative Code, states: 21P-16.002 Qualifications for Apprentices and Sponsors. Apprentices and sponsors for apprenticeship programs must meet the following qualifications: An apprentice must be at least 17 years old at the date of application; must submit a complete application for apprenticeship along with proof of having obtained a qualified sponsor; and must submit the registration fee required in Rule 21P-11.013. A sponsor must be an optician, a physician or an optometrist licensed in this state, whose license is not subject to any current disciplinary action; must be actively engaged in the practice of the qualifying profession; and must provide the equipment set forth in Rule 21P-10.007 on the premises of any establishment in which apprentices are trained. Proposed Rule 21P-16.002, makes no changes to the existing sponsorship requirements found in paragraphs (1) and (2) of the present rule, but adds a new paragraph (3) which specifies the following: (3) No optician, physician or optometrist may serve as a sponsor unless he actually dispenses eyewear and maintains the required equipment on the same premises where the apprentice works. For example, an optician, physician or optometrist whose premises and equipment are distinct from the intended apprentice's work area cannot serve as a sponsor, even though the optician's, physician's or optometrist's premises are within the same office area or building. The proposed rule seeks to implement Section 484.007(1)(d)4., Florida Statutes, which provides an applicant may qualify to take the state opticianry licensure examination following completion of a three year apprenticeship "under the supervision of an optician, a physician, or an optometrist licensed under the laws of this state." Through promulgation of the new rule, Respondent seeks to correct a perceived deficiency in the degree of supervision provided by some sponsors to their apprentice opticians. The new proposed rule seeks to correct such deficiency through the prohibition of separate or "distinct" work areas for sponsor and apprentice; the requirement that the sponsor "dispense eyewear"; and the requirement for the sponsor to "maintain the equipment" used by the apprentice on the premises where both apprentice and sponsor work. Petitioners are corporate entities licensed to do business in the State of Florida. Petitioners operate various retail optical establishments engaged in providing opticianry services. While not licensed to perform opticianry services, Petitioners employ opticians and apprentice opticians for that purpose. Petitioners also have contractual relationships with licensed optometrists for the provision of optometric services at Petitioners' retail establishments. The employed opticians and contracted optometrists often act as sponsors for apprentice opticians employed in Petitioners' retail establishments. Generally, Petitioners' retail establishments haveseparated areas for optometry services, dispensing of eye wear and a laboratory for the preparation of lenses. In the various establishments, these areas are separated from each other by a permanent wall constructed of either glass or other solid, opaque substance. Two to four licensed opticians are employed in each of Petitioners' retail establishments. Each of these individual opticians, or a licensed optometrist under contract, may sponsor an apprentice optician employed by Petitioners. Often the sponsoring professional is otherwise occupied in these establishments and the apprentice, who is also generally an employee, may be required to perform certain functions without direct supervision by the sponsor. The proposed rule's requirement that a sponsor actually "dispense eyewear" results from Respondent's position that a sponsor should actually be performing that task in order to properly train an apprentice in the performance of that procedure. The proposed rule's requirement that a sponsor "maintains the required equipment on the same premises where the apprentice works" dictates that a sponsor must own the equipment used by the apprentice or otherwise be responsible for the provision of that equipment. Such a requirement may effectively prohibit opticians and optometrists employed by Petitioner from serving as sponsors where those employees do not own and are not otherwise responsible for providing, generally, the "required equipment" on the premises of Petitioners' various establishments. Petitioners argue that such de facto denial of sponsorship opportunities to opticians, optomertrists and physicians employed by them contravenes the statutory provision of Section 484.007(1)(d)4, Florida Statutes, that an apprenticeship be completed under the supervision of "an optician, a physician, or optomertrist licensed under the laws of this state." Such an argument is not credited in the absence of expressed legislative intent to grant sponsorship status to any of the licensed professionals denominated in the statute. Specifically, it is found that the referenced statutory provision sets a minimum requirement for sponsorship, as opposed to a limitation to establishment of further qualifications. Respondent's economic impact statement was prepared by counsel. Respondent's position, as expressed through testimony of its executive director, is that the proposed rule has no discernible direct adverse economic impact, although testimony presented by Petitioners supports the finding that the proposed rule change shall require at least some alteration of the physical arrangement at some of Petitioners' retail establishments in the event that Petitioners desire to continue present apprentice programs in their businesses.
