The Issue Whether Respondent committed the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, and the entire record of this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: Mr. Arthur is the owner of Mustang Speed and Restoration (MS&R), a motor vehicle repair shop. MS&R’s physical address is 12545 44th Street North, Suite D, Clearwater, Florida. 4 Exhibit 9 is a composite exhibit of seven black and white photocopied photographs. Three of the photographs were identified as sand in the back seat of the Jeep; two photographs were of the Jeep parked; one photograph identified a pair of “pink” panties; and one photograph contained two “ZAFUL FOREVER YOUNG” tags. Only the photographs of the parked Jeep and the tags were clear. Mr. Arthur filed a motor vehicle repair registration application to renew MS&R’s license in March 2019. The application contained MS&R’s registration number as MV87835. Additionally, the application contained the following “Application Certification:” I certify that this applicant is aware of and complies with all of the requirements of ss. 559.901-559.9221, F.S., including the repair estimate and disclosure statement required to be given to customers, and I am empowered to execute this application on behalf of the above named [sic] entity or individual. Mr. Arthur’s name was printed below this statement along with his signature (which Mr. Arthur acknowledged during his testimony), his title as “owner,” his phone number, and the date: March 10, 2019. At all times relevant to this case, MS&R held a valid motor vehicle repair shop license. Sometime in 2019, Victor Oddo bought a 2002 Jeep Liberty (Jeep) from M and K Auto. Mr. Oddo secured his vehicle license plate, numbered FL- NBMD06, on the Jeep. Shortly after the purchase, the Jeep was not running smoothly. Mr. Oddo contacted M and K Auto, explained the problem, and he was directed to Respondent. Testimony at hearing did not adequately address the extent of the problem, other than the check engine light was coming on. During another appointment, Mr. Oddo paid Respondent $100 for a valve gasket repair. When shown a copy of the MS&R invoice for the valve gasket repair, Mr. Arthur confirmed it was an MS&R invoice but, testified he had “never seen that invoice, no. I don’t know anything about a valve gasket repair.” In January 2020, the Jeep’s check engine light kept coming on. Mr. Oddo brought the Jeep to Respondent. Mr. Arthur sent Mr. Oddo to a different repair shop, Carl and Sons Repair Shop (C&S). Based on information provided, Mr. Oddo believed the repair would cost $1,000 if done by C&S. On Wednesday, January 15, 2020, Mr. Oddo returned his Jeep to MS&R after Mr. Arthur stated he could do the repair for $380. The Jeep remained in Respondent’s possession until February 6, 2020, a period of 22 days. Mr. Oddo communicated with Mr. Arthur via telephone and text messages. Over the course of the 22 days the Jeep was at MS&R, Mr. Oddo sought information about the status of the Jeep’s repairs and when it would be returned to him. Respondent did not provide Mr. Oddo a written estimate for any work to be completed on the Jeep. At no time did Mr. Oddo waive the preparation of a written estimate. Mr. Arthur repeatedly claimed that the repair would be paid for by M and K Auto, as “the repairs were not done for the - - Mr. Oddo, they were done for the lot.” Mr. Oddo did not authorize Respondent or any of its employees to use his Jeep for personal use. Between January 15, 2020, and February 6, 2020, Mr. Oddo never took physical possession of his Jeep. On Thursday, January 23, 2020, at approximately 1:10 p.m., Mr. Oddo took two photographs of his Jeep parked in front of a Speedway store. The Jeep’s license plate confirmed it was Mr. Oddo’s vehicle. (Pet. Ex.9, pp 31 & 32.) This Speedway store is a block or more away from MS&R. On February 6, 2020, Mr. Oddo picked up the Jeep from MS&R. Respondent did not provide Mr. Oddo an invoice or billing statement for any work that was completed on the Jeep. After picking up the Jeep on February 6, 2020, Mr. Oddo received a parking ticket (Ticket One) in the mail. Ticket One was issued by the City of Tampa for a parking infraction at Ben T. Davis beach.5 The parking 5 A round-trip trek from MS&R’s location to Ben T. Davis beach could not be more than 40 miles. infraction occurred on Saturday, January 18, 2020, at approximately 1:00 a.m., while the Jeep was in Respondent’s possession. The Jeep’s license number on Ticket One confirmed it was Mr. Oddo’s vehicle. Mr. Oddo communicated with Mr. Arthur about Ticket One, and believed Mr. Arthur would pay the $46.00 fine. Later, Mr. Oddo received another parking ticket (Ticket Two) in the mail. Ticket Two was issued by the City of Clearwater for an expired parking meter at a Clearwater beach.6 The parking ticket was issued on January 18, 2020, at 5:11 p.m., while the Jeep was in Respondent’s possession. The Jeep’s license number on Ticket Two confirmed it was Mr. Oddo’s vehicle. Mr. Oddo did not communicate with Mr. Arthur about Ticket Two as by that time, Mr. Oddo had filed a complaint with Petitioner. Petitioner’s Exhibit 9, pages 27 through 29, purports to show sand on the back seat of Mr. Oddo’s Jeep. While it is logical to assume that a vehicle may have sand in it after a trip (or two) to the beach, or for that matter while in Florida as a whole, the black and white photographs are not clear or concise, but are unnecessary. That the Jeep was at each beach is established by the two tickets. After receiving the second ticket, Mr. Oddo checked his Florida Sunpass transponder7 account and discovered two charges while the Jeep was at MS&R for repair. On Thursday, January 23, 2020, at approximately 11 a.m., Mr. Oddo’s transponder account was charged $1.07 for his Jeep traveling southbound on the Bob Graham Sunshine Skyway bridge (Skyway). Later, at 12:25 p.m., Mr. Oddo’s transponder account was again charged $1.07 for the Jeep returning northbound on the Skyway. Mr. Arthur testified that Mr. Oddo’s Jeep was taken for a round-trip test drive to Sarasota, Florida, on January 23, 2020. The round-trip test drive 6 A round-trip trek from MS&R’s location to a Clearwater beach could not be more than 40 miles. 7 Mr. Oddo referred to this as his “Sunshine Skyway pass.” was approximately 82 miles in distance. Mr. Arthur attached a scanner to the Jeep to determine “what the repair needed to be done.” The test drive was also to pick up “a check for a different repair for a car dealer.” Respondent described this test drive using the phrase it “killed two birds with one stone.” Approximately 45 minutes after the Jeep returned from the Sarasota test drive, the Jeep was photographed at the Speedway store front. Mr. Arthur claimed the Jeep was on empty and had to be filled with gas. As provided in paragraph 11 above, Petitioner’s Exhibit 9, pages 31 and 32, are pictures of the Jeep parked in front of the Speedway store, not at a gas pump. Prior to reclaiming his car, Mr. Oddo was led to believe from Mr. Arthur that the Jeep’s timing chain and the check engine light had been repaired. However, that was not the case. Although the timing chain may have been repaired or replaced, the check engine light stayed on. When Mr. Oddo reclaimed his Jeep on February 6, 2020, he claimed there were “approximately a thousand miles added to my odometer.” He failed to substantiate this claim with evidence of the odometer reading on the Jeep when he dropped it at MS&R, compared to the odometer reading when he reclaimed the Jeep. Further, Mr. Oddo confused the issue when he testified: My trip odometer only had 16 miles on it, and I always reset my trip odometer when I fill up my gas tank. My gas tank was empty with 16 miles, so I - - I don’t understand why the trip odometer has to be reset for a test drive at all. Mr. Arthur admitted he never filled out or provided an estimate or invoice for the repair work to Mr. Oddo’s Jeep. Mr. Arthur testified instead that he was under the impression the repair work would be paid for by the car dealer from whom Mr. Oddo bought the Jeep. Mr. Arthur testified: We have an open contract, we are - - no shop under any of the motor vehicle repair under Mr. Williamson,[8] or anybody else, requires the car dealer to come out here and sign the invoice on every job. * * * And no shop that does car dealer wholesale work, auto work, auction work, has the customer - - the car dealer come down out of his office and sign a repair order; it’s a blanket contract, verbal contract. We repair them, they pay their bills, and everybody’s happy. * * * Just in rebuttal, there’s not one car dealership, one repair shop in the world that gets the car dealer or the auction to sign an invoice on every single job. It’s not possible. They’re not going to come down out of their car lot to come down here and sign every - - it’s a blanket contract, verbal contract valid under the State of Florida. Petitioner did not present any disciplinary history regarding Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order that: Finds Respondent guilty of violating section 559.920(3), (12), (13), and (17), as alleged in the AC; Imposes an administrative fine of $4,000; and Directs Respondent to cease using consumers’ vehicles for unauthorized business. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of February, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of February, 2021. Robert J. Arthur Robert J. Arthur, d/b/a Mustang Speed & Restoration 12545 44th Street North, Suite D Clearwater, Florida 33762 Steven Hall, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 407 South Calhoun Street, Suite 520 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Genevieve Hall, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 407 Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Honorable Nicole “Nikki” Fried Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
Findings Of Fact Patricia Pyle is the sole owner and proprietor of Automenders, located at 5655 Beaver Street in Jacksonville, Florida. A paint and body shop, Automenders was opened in 1991 by Petitioner. In addition to paint work, Automenders repairs car frames, does rust repair to car bodies, repairs dents in automobiles, and installs headliners and vinyl tops. George Pyle, Petitioner's husband, has 30 years of experience in the automobile repair industry. He owns 50 percent of the land on which the business is located. He receives no rent from the business for use of his interest in the property. Mr. Pyle also does 50 percent of the estimates for work to be done in the shop, and works there approximately 30 to 50 hours per week. He is not paid for any of his efforts by Automenders since he presently draws social security. He does, however, share in the profits of the business. Petitioner and her husband previously operated a paint and body shop business at the same location from 1970 until 1986 when the couple decided to sell the business and retire. In that business, Petitioner was in charge of hiring, firing, keeping the books, doing the payroll and other administrative aspects of the business. The sale of the business in 1986 included the property, the paint and body shop, and an adjacent car lot. The purchasers of the business were unsuccessful in their business endeavors and, in 1991, Petitioner regained control of the property after the purchasers defaulted on their payments. Petitioner provided the start up costs and reopened the present business. There is little difference between Petitioner's present duties and her duties with the business which she and her husband sold. Petitioner is still in charge of administrative aspects of the enterprise. Listed on Automenders' bank account signature card are the names of Petitioner, her husband, and their daughter. Only one signature is required to transact business on the account. Additionally, Petitioner's husband is listed on Automenders' checks, along with Petitioner. Petitioner does not do actual body repair and painting of vehicles herself. While she did occasionally perform some technical tasks in the previous business such as taping and paint mixing, she has no other technical experience and has never received technical training in automobile body repair or painting. Even though she does not know how to run a frame straightening machine or paint cars, Petitioner maintains that she hires qualified employees and relies upon them for the technical aspects of her business. Petitioner's employees, Robert Yonnetti and Jason Sikes, are experienced. Yonnetti has 20 years of experience in the automobile body repair industry and has received training in repair as well as use of frame machines. Sikes has over nine years experience in automobile painting and has received training in automobile painting. Petitioner graduated from high school and attended Montgomery College where she took courses in bookkeeping, accounting and management. Petitioner has failed to provide documentation of training or possession of an expertise in automobile body repair work and painting. Consequently, Petitioner has not demonstrated the technical knowledge and capability necessary to maintain control of the technical aspects of the enterprise.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered denying Automenders application for certification as an MBE. DONE and ENTERED in Tallahassee, Florida, this 22nd day of March, 1995. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 1995. APPENDIX In accordance with provisions of Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, the following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings Petitioner submitted a four page letter containing 10 unnumbered paragraphs. The letter has been reviewed and to the extent possible addressed by the foregoing findings of fact. Respondent's Proposed Findings 1.-20. Accepted, but not verbatim. COPIES FURNISHED: Patricia Pyle 5655 West Beaver Street Jacksonville, FL 32254 Ana Cristina Martinez Assistant Attorney General The Capitol - Suite PL - 01 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050 Crandall Jones Executive Administrator Knight Building 2727 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-0950
The Issue Did the Department of Transportation (Department) improperly deny a refund to Petitioner of a penalty assessed pursuant to Chapter 316, Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The Department is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility of enforcing the provisions of Chapter 316, Florida Statutes. On June 7, 1999, the Department's Inspector Clemente Igracio stopped Petitioner's truck for an inspection. After inspecting Petitioner's truck, Inspector Igracio issued a Safety Report Citation numbered 0862152 wherein Petitioner was cited for the alleged violations of Sections 316.515(1) and (3) and 316.550, Florida Statutes. The total fine imposed was $1,600.00 which included a fine of $1,250.00 for the alleged violation of Section 316.515(3), Florida Statutes. However, since the maximum fine imposed for a Section 316.515(3), Florida Statutes, violation is $1,000.00, the total fine imposed was $1,350.00, which Petitioner paid. Subsequently, due to mitigating circumstances, the Department refunded Petitioner the $100.00 that it had paid for the alleged violation of Section 316.550, Florida Statutes. Petitioner does not protest the Section 316.515(1), Florida Statutes violation nor does it protest the Section 316.550, Florida Statutes violation. Petitioner stipulated that the combined length of the truck and trailer was 65 feet, 9 inches. Petitioner also stipulated that the length of the trailer was 42 feet, 10 inches. Inspector Igracio categorized the truck as a "straight- truck" because it had two axles and load-carrying capacity on the power unit. The vehicle in question is a two-axle vehicle with the cargo unit and motive power unit located on the same frame so as to form a single, rigid unit. The subject vehicle and trailer combination was 65 feet, 9 inches in overall length. The subject trailer was 42 feet, 10 inches in length. Petitioner did not have a permit to be over the legal length.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department enter a final order denying the refund sought by Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th of June, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Peter Byra West Coast Towing 124 South Berkley Road Auburndale, Florida 32823 Kelly A. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 James C. Myers, Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue Whether Respondent is operating a motor vehicle repair shop without being registered with Petitioner, in violation of Section 559.904, Florida Statutes, and is subject to an administrative fine.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the state agency charged with the enforcement and regulation of Sections 559.901-559.9221, Florida Statutes, cited as the "Florida Motor Vehicle Repair Act". On October 13, 1995, an Investigation Specialist with the Bureau of Motor Vehicles, went to 1604 C Waverly Place, Melbourne, Florida. At that location is a building that has signs on it which read "All Auto Repair, Acura and Honda Factory Trained". All Auto Repair occupied approximately two-thirds of the building. There were two bays and two vehicle lifts. In the building were located snap-on tools; and while inside, the Investigation Specialist observed two persons who appeared to be mechanics. One of the two was working on a vehicle in one of the two bays. Besides the vehicle being worked on, other vehicles were on the property. The person who was not working on a vehicle introduced himself as Rudy Garcia, Manager of the business. While conversing with Mr. Garcia, a telephone call was received at the business. A female voice on the telephone identified herself as Elizabeth Whitehead, owner of All Auto Repair. She was informed about the registration and why the inspector was there. Mr. Garcia would not sign for the registration package which the inspector had with him. The registration package was left at the place of business. The registration package had an application, a copy of the Florida Motor Vehicle Act, and an envelope to send the application in to the Department. On or about October 19, 1995, Respondent sent a letter to the inspector addressed to Petitioner in Tallahassee concerning his visit to her ". . . private place of labor". On October 25, 1995, the Petitioner sent to Respondent a Notice of Intent to Impose Administrative Fine for failure to register or file an affidavit of exemption. Respondent received the Notice. The response from Respondent was a letter dated November 17, 1995, which the Petitioner construed as a demand for a hearing. After the Notice of Intent was sent, an analyst with the Bureau of Motor Vehicle Repair called the telephone number for All Auto Repair to confirm that it was open and doing motor vehicle repair. It was open and doing motor vehicle repair. Subsequent to his visit on October 13, 1995, the inspector drove by All Auto Repair during November and December and observed that the repair shop was open for business. On January 30, 1995, 12 to 15 vehicles were observed behind a chain- link fence, which surrounded the grounds of All Auto Repair. In the northernmost bay, a Ford LTD was being worked on by a technician. Among the cars on the property were some Hondas, a Toyota, a Suzuki, and a Lincoln Town Car. Prior to the hearing on February 27, 1996, an inspector went by All Auto Repair and observed a technician working on a red Honda in one of the bays. He observed two Hondas and an Acura on the grounds. At some point in time, Rudy Garcia was seen on the grounds. Respondent has not registered with the Petitioner as a motor vehicle repair shop and has not submitted an affidavit of exemption to the Petitioner. Respondent is operating a motor vehicle repair shop.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent be found guilty of unlawfully engaging in repair work for compensation without first being registered with the Petitioner, in violation of Section 559.920(1), Florida Statutes; and pursuant to Section 559.921(4), Florida Statutes, the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a Final Order imposing an administrative fine against Respondent in the amount of $1,000.00, and it is further RECOMMENDED that Petitioner seek a temporary or permanent injunction in circuit court compelling Respondent to cease and desist in her violation of the law. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of March, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of March, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 96-0015 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1-17. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Respondent did not submit proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Lawrence J. Davis, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Room 515, Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Ms. Elizabeth Whitehead 1604 C Waverly Place Melbourne, Florida 32901 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue Whether there is probable cause for petitioner to bring an action against respondents, or any of them, for violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act?
Findings Of Fact Mark Sherwood Turner started working for Gulf Coast Motors in 1982. At the time, Charles E. Pace owned all of the inventory and other assets of the business, a used car lot at 301 Beverly Parkway in Pensacola, Florida. When Mark Turner's name was added to the fictitious name papers, it was not because he had acquired an ownership interest in the business; it was done in order to effectuate an agreement between him and Mr. Pace: They had agreed that Turner could use the lot to display his own cars and otherwise to operate his own, independent used car sales business, without incurring the expense of obtaining his own motor vehicle dealer's license. In exchange, Turner was to run Pace's business in Pace's absence. They kept separate books, and neither Turner had an ownership interest in the cars sold to Messrs. Hayes, Allen and Crutchfield, or Ms. Youmans. Later Pace sold one Richardson the accounts receivable generated by Gulf Coast Motors. Richardson subsequently assigned to Mark Turner everything he had acquired from Pace. On March 11, 1983, the corporate respondent was organized and Mark Turner acquired an interest in Gulf Coast Motors, Inc. Mark's brother David Jerry Turner began working at the used car lot a year or two before the final hearing. He came in three days a week, worked in the office and occasionally acted as a salesman. On June 25, 1984, he also acquired an interest in Gulf Coast Motors, Inc. Crutchfield On March 15, 1984, Joel Harold Crutchfield bought a Dodge Monaco for $1531 after Joe Smith told him it was in good mechanical condition. He signed a form contract that had "GULF COAST MOTORS" at the top with "Charlie Pace" and "Mark Turner," printed underneath. Respondent's Exhibit No. 1. Nobody else signed this undated form contract, which provided, among other things: Any payment late will include a late charge of $5.00 for every three days late . . . GULF COAST MOTORS has full rights to repossess any vehicle with a payment three days late. If any vehicle is repossessed the buyer has up to 10 days in which to pay the vehicle off in full and a $100.00 repossession charge to redeem the vehicle. Mr. Crutchfield also signed a form warranty disclaimer, stating "THIS USED MOTOR VEHICLE IS SOLD AS IS WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY . . .". Respondent's Exhibit No. 2. Mark Turner and Glen Padgett witnessed his signature on the warranty disclaimer. Mr. Crutchfield understood that he was buying the car "as is." Under the agreement, Mr. Crutchfield made a downpayment of $250 and undertook bi-weekly payments of $60 to retire a balance of $1281. Joe Smith signed an undated receipt for $250 on which "GULF COAST MOTORS" was stamped. David J. Turner signed a similarly stamped receipt for $60 on March 31, 1984. Mark Turner's and David Turner's names were on front of the office building at the car lot. The night following the purchase, Mr. Crutchfield had to buy a new starter for the car. When he drove the car home, he discovered that the brakes, the brake lights and the horn did not work. Only three lug nuts held each tire to its wheel. About a month after he had the car, the front end dropped and the car was "so low it looked like it would hit the road"; the frame was broken. Eventually Mr. and Mrs. Crutchfield decided to give the car back because Joe Smith and Charlie Pace refused to fix the frame. They made their last payment on or about September 17, 1984. Mrs. Crutchfield left the car on the lot and walked off ignoring calls to come back. A couple of days later the car was gone. The Crutchfields never received any correspondence in connection with the car thereafter. Youmans Frances Gayle Youmans also purchased a car on March 15, 1984, and also made a down payment of $250.00. She also dealt with Joe Smith. For a sales price of $1495.00, which with the dealer handling charge of $25.00, tag and title transfer fees, came to $1636.00, Ms. Youmans acquired a 1974 Buick that had been driven 78,482 miles. She agreed to pay the balance of $1380.00 in $25.00 weekly installments. On the vehicle registration certificate "GULF OOAST MOTORS" is shown as the "SELLER, FLORIDA DEALER, OR OTHER PREVIOUS OWNER," and as the first lienholder. Joe Smith, C. E. Pace, David J. Turner, Mark Turner and Lisa Russo signed receipts for various weekly payments she made. The day she bought the car it backfired on a test drive. Mr. Smith told her that it was the carburetor and that he would get a mechanic to fix it. Ms. Youmans is not an automobile mechanic; she works as a maid. She signed an "as is" disclaimer, which she did not understand. On March 16, 1984, she spoke to Joe Smith about fixing the car. He promised her repeatedly that he would arrange for a mechanic to fix it and told her not to take it to anybody else. She left the car parked at her home for more than two months, making weekly payments the while, on the strength of these assurances. On March 16, 1984 Ms. Youmans made application for a temporary license tag. A form application for vehicle registration was partially completed on April 19, 1984. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. Ms. Youmans asked Joe Smith to arrange for the car to be picked up and taken to the car lot, because she was afraid to drive it. After she had made the last in an unbroken series of weekly payments, on June 15, 1984, the car was towed. The next day Joe Smith told her to continue the weekly payments so that she could have the car back when she paid the mechanic's bill. About a week later the car "ran," and about a week after that she appeared with $155.00, enough to pay for the mechanic, for towing ($50.00) and to bring payments (with late charges) current. Mark Turner refused the money, pounded his fist on a table, and told her to leave. Still later she noticed that the car was no longer on the lot. Allen On March 24, 1984, Donald Gene Allen purchased a 1973 Volkswagen from a salesman named Smith, making a down payment of $300.00 and agreeing to weekly payments of $35.00 to retire a balance of $2180.00. He signed a form contract that had "GULF COAST MOTORS" at the top with "Charlie Pace" and "Mark Turner" printed underneath. Respondent's Exhibit No. 4. Nobody else signed the form contract, which provided, among other things: Any payment late will include a late charge of $5.00 for every three days late . . . . GULF OOAST MOTORS has full rights to repossess any vehicle with a payment three days late. If any vehicle is repossessed the buyer has up to 10 days to pay the vehicle off in full and a $100.00 repossession charge to redeem the vehicle. Respondent's Exhibit No. 4. Mark Turner and C. E. Pace witnessed Mr. Allen's signature on a form warranty disclaimer, which stated, "THIS USED MOTOR VEHICLE IS SOLD AS IS WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY . . ." Respondent's Exhibit No. 3. A week and a half after he had acquired the Volkswagen, the transmission failed and Mr. Allen called for the car to be towed back to the used car lot. He asked that the car be repaired and the car was taken to a Volkswagen mechanic's shop. This shop refused to release the car to Mr. Allen without payment of the repair bill. He was refused, when he asked that his down payment be returned. Mr. Allen dealt only with Charlie Pace and Joe Smith and never spoke to the Turners. Hayes Willie Hayes, Jr. bought a car from Gulf Coast Motors in 1982 or 1983 for about $1200.00. He fell behind in his bi- weekly payments once in a while, but always let somebody know when he would be unable to make a payment. In May of 1984, when he was $60.00 or $70.00 behind, he told Mr. Pace that he would bring payments current in a week's time. He showed up at the used car lot with all but $20.00 of what he had intended to bring, but was told that he had to pay everything he still owed on the car, a balance of $420.00. Mark Turner asked him for the key to the car when it became clear that he could not pay. Mr. Hayes refused, got into his car and started to leave. Mark Turner got into another car and blocked his egress while another driver pulled another car in front of Mr. Hayes, penning his car. Eventually a Highway Patrolman arrived, wrote Mr. Hayes a ticket for having backed into the car Mr. Turner had placed in his way, determined that Mr. Turner had no judicial process authorizing repossession, and sent Mr. Hayes on his way. Motley Burtis O. Motley bought a 1980 Ford Granada from Gulf Coast Motors on October 11, 1984. He dealt with a Jerry Murph who signed an odometer mileage statement reciting that the odometer "now reads 131,527 miles . . . [and that] the odometer reading . . . reflects the actual mileage." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6. In fact, however, the odometer read 131,528, understating the mileage by 99,999 miles, a point on which Mr. Motley, a retired carpenter, was confused. During negotiations he commented to the salesman, "I see the low mileage." Cataracts impair Mr. Motley's vision. He did not read the odometer mileage statement or the other documents he signed when he paid $500.00 down, traded in his old car, and undertook to retire a balance of $3206.75 with monthly payments of $70.00. He realized he was buying the car "as is," however, and signed a disclaimer to that effect. Two or three days after the purchase, Mr. Motley began having repairs done, first on the brakes: the front brakes pulled to the left and the back brakes "went haywire." Grease seals were replaced at K-Mart. New shock absorbers were needed. Mr. Motley decided that he had had enough. On the telephone he told one of the Messrs. Turner that he was going to stop making payments and that he would "turn the car in." On November 24, 1984, somebody took the car. Mr. Motley later saw it on the Gulf Coast Motors lot, but there was never any communication as to its disposition after November 24, 1984. Pugh On July 7, 1984, a Saturday, Marshall Everett Pugh bought a 1972 Toyota from David Turner purporting to act as a salesman for Gulf Coast Motors. Most of the paperwork he signed in blank but he was aware of the import of the form warranty disclaimer he signed, and acknowledged at hearing that he purchased the car "as is," after David told him that the car "ran good." At the time of the purchase he was aware that the driver's door did not open and that the ignition key was prone to stick in a way that kept the starter operating even after the engine was running. On the 9th or 10th of July, after he had taken the car to mechanics to be looked at, Mr. Pugh learned that only one cylinder was functioning properly. On July 10, 1984, he took the car back to the used car lot and asked Mark Turner where David was. Mark pointed out that Pugh had bought the car "as is," ending his remarks on an obscene note that precipitated a tussle. The fight ended with David pulling Pugh off Mark by the hair. Pugh left without the car and never heard further from the Turners or Gulf Coast Motors about the car. He had given them an erroneous address at the time of purchase and left town shortly afterward. Castello Under her then (married) name of Graves, Cathy Sheree Castello bought a 1979 Cougar from a salesman named Bill on the Gulf Coast Motors lot. He told her it was a good car. She had effected a few repairs when, two weeks after the purchase, she was told that the car needed a new engine, because the one it had was "totally blown." The car would only go about 30 miles per hour. She, too, had signed an "as is" warranty disclaimer. Ms. Castello returned the car to the lot where it was offered for sale while she and the used car lot personnel tried to reach a settlement. Without notice to her, the car was sold and somebody forged her stepfather's signature in transferring title to the new buyer. Before the final hearing in this case, she had settled her claim against respondents amicably.
The Issue Whether General Motors' decision not to renew its franchise agreement with Gallman Pontiac was "unfair" as the term is defined by Section 320.641(3), Florida statutes.
Findings Of Fact Background On or about October 28, 1988, (general Motors Corporation, Pontiac Division (General Motors) notified it franchisee, Bill Gallman Pontiac, GMC Truck, Inc. (Gallman Pontiac), a licensed motor vehicle dealer in the State of Florida, of its election not to renew the franchise agreement, effective ninety days from the date of the delivery of the notice of its decision. Because the franchise agreement was scheduled to expire on November 20, 1988, Bill Gallman would have the option to void the nonrenewal due to General Motor's failure to notify the motor vehicle dealer ninety days in advance of the proposed nonrenewal. To avoid this result and to comply with the franchise agreement, General Motors informed the dealer in the same notification that the current agreement was being extended for the same ninety day period in which the dealer had been given notice of the proposed nonrenewal. General Motors' extension of the term of the franchise agreement was a unilateral proposed novation that was accepted by Gallman Pontiac when he relied upon the modification and continued to do business under the novation. Gallman Pontiac's acceptance of the novation is clearly demonstrated by the timing of the verified complaint in this proceeding, which was filed on January 12, 1989. The specific reason stated by General Motors for its decision not to renew its franchise agreement beyond the ninety-day period was that Gallman Pontiac failed to fulfill its minimum sales performance responsibilities pursuant to its contractual obligations as set forth in the Dealer Sales and Service Agreement. Gallman Pontiac subsequently filed a verified complaint, pursuant to Section 320.641, Florida Statutes, to contest the proposed nonrenewal of the franchise agreement. The complaint alleges that the proposed nonrenewal is unfair and that the grounds asserted for the nonrenewal were factually untrue and/or legally insufficient for the intended purpose. The Mathematical Formula for Sales Effectiveness The manufacturer's primary purpose for entering into a franchise agreement with a dealer is to have its automobiles sold. To determine whether a dealer is meeting its responsibilities in this regard, the franchise agreement contains a mathematical formula which is used to evaluate the sales performance of all dealers who sell Pontiacs. Pursuant to the formula, which is expressed in the agreement and tide annual sales performance evaluation form, a dealer's sales ratio and registration ratio must be calculated. A dealer's sales ratio is determined by dividing the dealer's actual unit sales of new motor vehicles, wherever registered, by industry new unit registrations in the Dealer's Area of Prime Responsibility. A dealer's registration ratio is determined by dividing new motor vehicle unit registrations by industry new unit registrations in the Dealer's Area of Prime Responsibility. After these ratios are recorded, the dealer's sales and registration ratios are compared to zone and national registration ratio levels to determine sales and registration effectiveness. If the individual dealer's sales and registration performances reach a comparative level of 85 percent effectiveness to the zone and national levels, the dealer's performance is considered effective by General Motors. When the comparisons were made in this case, the dealer's sales effectiveness was 53.6 percent in 1987 and 68.5 percent in 1988. Registration effectiveness was 56.5 percent in 1987 and 74.1 percent in 1988. These levels of performance do not meet the minimum levels required by the franchise agreement. Other Considerations Under the Agreement In addition to the mathematical formula, the franchise agreement states that General Motors will consider other relevant factors in its sales evaluation, including the following factors: the trend over a reasonable period of time of dealer's sales performance; the manner in which dealer has conducted the sales operations, including advertising, sales promotion and treatment of customers; sales to fleet customers if they have affected registrations; the manner in which dealer has submitted orders for new motor vehicles to the Pontiac Division; the availability of new motor vehicles to dealer; and significant local conditions that may have directly affected dealer's performance. If the mathematical formulas regarding sales and registration effectiveness set forth in the franchise agreement were the sole measure used to determine Gallman Pontiac's sales performance through January 1989, it is clear that the dealer was not meeting its contractual obligations to General Motors in this area of responsibility. However, under the terms of the agreement, General Motors must look to other relevant factors that may have directly affected dealer's performance before a final determination can be made regarding an individual dealer's sales effectiveness. Contrary to the terms of the agreement, the annual evaluation forms show that Gallman Pontiac's performance was evaluated on retail sales only. The other relevant factors in the franchise agreement were not reviewed before the decision not to renew the franchise agreement was made. Other Relative Factors in the Agreement Which Should Have Been Considered in the Dealers Evaluation When the trend of the Gallman Pontiac's sales performance is reviewed, the evidence shows that Gallman Pontiac's sales performance over the life of the franchise agreement has improved relative to market growth by a small percentage (7.51%). This slight upward trend does not demonstrate an effective performance as the sales were below an acceptable standard before the increase in sales, and the improvement barely exceeded the local market growth. The time period over which the trend evaluation occurred is reasonable in this case because both parties agreed to a two-year term in the franchise agreement, which was subject to an overall evaluation prior to a renewal of the agreement. Although there was opinion testimony from a former sales manager from the dealership that Gaillman Pontiac did not order sufficient quantities and mix of vehicles, and imprudently focused the advertising towards the limited, younger group of buyers in Naples, this testimony was not found to be credible by the Hearing Officer. All of the other evidence presented by both sides regarding the manner in which the dealer conducted sales operations demonstrates that Gallman Pontiac met or exceeded his contractual obligations in this area of responsibility. Sales to fleet customers did not affect registrations in 1988. The dealer chose not to compete in the fleet market because the later resale of these vehicles interferes with the sale of new vehicles at this dealership. The manner in which the dealer submitted orders to the Pontiac Division was not criticized by General Motors. The dealer's procedures were continuously reviewed and evaluated through the Dealer Assistance Program. There was no showing that the dealer's ordering procedures directly affected its sales performance. The allocation procedures were applied to Gallman Pontiac in the same manner they were applied to other dealers. The evidence did not show that imprudent selections were made by the dealer in the ordering process, nor was it sufficiently established that manufacturer delays or the unavailability of certain products interfered with the dealer's sales in Naples. A significant local condition that may have directly affected the dealer's sales performance was the lack of receptivity in the Naples market area for linemakes in the class of automobiles offered by Pontiac. Actual sales performance data for all new car registrations in the area show that the Naples market prefers to purchase automobiles from the high group of automobiles such as Cadillac, Lincoln, BMW, Mercedes Benz, and Porsche. Pontiac does not have a linemake designed to compete in this market segment. Application of the Other Relevant Factors To The Decision Not To Renew Because the franchise agreement and the annual sales evaluation form have not made provisions for any adjustments to the original statistical formula based upon the additional considerations mentioned in paragraphs 9-13, these factors are to be considered independently from the initial mathematical calculation. The purpose of the review of these factors is to determine if the statistical analysis is a reliable indicator of the sales performance of the dealer who is being evaluated before General Motors makes its final decision regarding termination. There has been no showing that General Motors ever used the additional considerations for any other purpose in its course of dealings with other dealers in the past or that any other interpretation has been given to these factors. In this case, when the additional relevant factors are reviewed in addition to the ineffective sales and registration performance statistics, the mathematical formula continues to be a reliable indicator that the sales performance at the Gallman Pontiac dealership does not meet required standards. The additional considerations set forth in the franchise agreement which are relevant to this case, do not seriously undermine the fairness of the application of the initial mathematical calculation to the sales performance of Gallman Pontiac. While the local market's lack of receptivity directly affects Gallman Pontiac's performance, the statistical formula takes this into account to a large degree when a dealer is required to meet eighty-five percent of the zone or national average to demonstrate minimum performance. If yet another mathematical formula was created to give additional weight to this local condition beyond the provision in the minimum standards formula, the manufacturer could be harmed by a individual dealer's lack of market penetration efforts. Because it is difficult to determine the primary cause and effect of poor market penetration in a specific area, the statistical formula is generally fair to both sides in most situations. It does not unfairly accuse either the dealer or the manufacturer as being responsible for the lack of sales. One indicator of the fairness involved in the application of the formula as designed can be found in Mr. Anderson's comparative analysis of the Naples automobile market and the Sarasota market. Mr. Anderson is the expert in automobile marketing analysis presented by General Motors. This analysis refutes the opinion of Dr. Ostlund, the expert presented by Gallman Pontiac during the hearing regarding automobile marketing analysis. It is Dr. Ostlund's opinion that Naples is a unique market in which the usual statistical formula becomes unfair if it is applied to all registrations in the Dealer's Area of Responsibility. Based upon this analysis, Dr. Ostlund suggests that a weighted average be applied in the standard formula to all of the sales made by Gallman Pontiac during the franchise period. However, even if this were done, Gallman Pontiac's performance would have been 84.7 percent, which is still below the required standard of 85 percent. Contrary to Dr. Ostlund's analysis, the Naples-Sarasota comparison conducted by Mr. Anderson demonstrates that Pontiac can compete in a high income area with similar demographics to Naples within the same zone along the same Florida coast. Therefore, the usual statistical formula remains a reliable indicator of the sales effectiveness of a Pontiac dealer in Naples, Florida, and should be applied without any further weighting of averages in the statistical analysis required by the franchise agreement. Application of Additional Factors Relevant to the Decision Not to Renew Pursuant to Statute A nonrenewal of the franchise agreement is clearly permitted by the franchise agreement. The nonrenewal has been undertaken in good faith and good cause. The manufacturer has continuously encouraged the dealer to meet sales performance standards and has worked with Gallman Pontiac in an effort to achieve this goal within the time frame agreed to by the parties. Because franchise dealers are the major outlet the manufacturer has for the sale of new automobiles, it is essential that minimum levels of sales performance are achieved on a regular basis. Failure to meet the minimum sales performance over the term of this agreement by Gallman Pontiac is a material and substantial breach of the contract.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles enter a Final Order dismissing Gallman Pontiac's complaint with prejudice. DONE and ENTERED this 28 day of June, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28 day of June, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-0505 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #1. Accepted. See HO #3. Reject all but last sentence. Conclusions of Law. Accept the last sentence. Rejected. Conclusion of Law. Accepted. Reject that the dealer code problem can be attri- buted to the conduct of the manufacturer. Insufficient proof. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Reject the weighted average basis. See HO #14 and #15.. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #4. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Speculative. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #15. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #15. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #15. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #17. Rejected. Irrelevant. Attempt to shift evidentiary burden. Rejected. See HO #15. Accepted. See HO #13. Rejected. See HO #15. Rejected. See HO #15. Accepted. See HO #13. Accepted. See HO #13. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #8. Accepted. Rejected. See HO #15. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Rejected. See HO #15. Accepted. Rejected. See HO #14. Accepted. Accepted. Accept that additional factor's need to be considered. Rejected Dr. Ostlund's interpretation. See HO #9 through #15. Rejected. Improper summary. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. Accepted, except for the last sentence which is an opinion or closing argument as opposed to a finding of fact. Accepted. Rejected. See HO #14. Accepted. Accepted, except for Nissan. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. See HO Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Closing argument as opposed to finding of fact. Rejected. Irrelevant and contrary to fact. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Contrary to fact. Rejected. Conclusionary. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. See HO #10. Rejected. See HO #17. Rejected. See HO #15 and #17. Rejected. See HO #17. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #17. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. See HO #8. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO 415. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #15. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #15. Accepted. See HO #13. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #15. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #11. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #15. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Redundant. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #14. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #9. Rejected. Unreliable conclusion. Accepted. See HO #17. Rejected. Irrelevant. Outside the reasons given for nonrenewal. See HO #8. Rejected. Same reason as given in above. Rejected. Same reason as 49 and 50. Also contrary to fact. Rejected. Irrelevant to this hearing. Rejected. Irrelevant to this hearing. Accepted. See HO #17. Accepted. See HO #15. Rejected. Redundant and argumentative. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Improper argument. Rejected. The use of "sales reported" was allowed by the Hearing Officer at hearing. Rejected. Irrelevant in these proceedings. Rejected. Irrelevant and unreliable speculation. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Dr. Ostlund was very credible. Mr. Anderson's analysis, based upon y~he Sarasota- Naples comparison, which tended to refute the testimony of Dr. Ostlund, was given greater weight by the Hearing Officer. COPIES FURNISHED: James D. Adams, Esquire Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Feaman, Adams, Harris, Department of Highway Fernandez & Deutch, P.A. Safety And Motor Vehicles Corporate Plaza, Fourth Floor Neil Kirkman Building 4700 N.W. Second Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Boca Raton, Florida 33431 S. William Fuller, Jr., Esq. Vasilis C. Katsafanas, Esquire Fuller Johnson & Farrell Rumberger, Kirk, Caldwell, Post Office Box 1739 Cabaniss, Burke & Wechsler Tallahassee, Florida 32302 11 East Pine Street Orlando, Florida 32802 Charles J. Brantley, Director Division of Motors Vehicles William J. Whalen, Esquire Department of Highway Office of General Counsel Safety and Motor Vehicles General Motors Corporation B439 Neil Kirkman Building New Center One Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 3031 West Grand Boulevard Detroit, Michigan 48232 Enoch J. Whitney, Esquire General Counsel S. Thomas Wienner, Esquire Departments of Highway Dykema Gossett Safety and Motor Vehicles 35th Floor Neil Kirklan Building 400 Renaissance Center Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Detroit, Michigan 48243
The Issue The issue for determination in this proceeding is whether Proposed Rules 15C-7.004(4)(a), (4)(b), and (7)(d) and Florida Administrative Code Rule 15C- 1.008 each constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact The Parties The Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (the "Department") is the agency responsible for promulgating and administering the rules challenged in this proceeding. The Department administers Chapter 320, Florida Statutes, 2/ which governs the operation of motor vehicle dealers and manufacturers in Florida. General Motors Corporation ("GM") is a corporation incorporated in Delaware and registered to do business in Florida. GM's corporate address and principal place of business is 3044 West Grand Boulevard, Detroit, Michigan 48202. GM is licensed by the Department, pursuant to Section 320.60, Florida Statutes, as a manufacturer of motor vehicles. GM has entered into and will enter into dealer sales and service agreements to authorize motor vehicle dealers to sell GM vehicles at locations in Florida. The Florida Automobile Dealers Association (??FADA??) and the South Florida Auto Truck Dealers Association ("SFATDA") are trade associations composed of both domestic and foreign line-make franchised motor vehicle dealers. FADA is composed of more than 800 franchised motor vehicle dealers licensed in the state. SFATDA is composed of virtually all franchised motor vehicle dealers in Palm Beach, Broward, Dade, and Monroe Counties. The Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc. ("MVMA") is a trade association whose member companies manufacture motor vehicles produced in the United States. MVMA members include Chrysler Corporation, Ford Motor Company, GM, Honda of America MFG., Inc., Navistar International Transportation Corporation, PACCAR Inc., and Volvo North America Corporation. The principal place of business for MVMA is 7430 Second Avenue, Suite 300, Detroit, Michigan 48202. All of the members of MVVA, including Ford Motor Company ("Ford"), are licensed pursuant to Section 320.61, Florida Statutes. The Association of International Automobile Manufacturers, Inc. ("AIAM") is a trade association of manufacturers and manufacturer-authorized importers which import motor vehicles for sale in the United States. AIAM members and associates affected by the challenged rules include: American Honda Motor Company, Inc.; America Suzuki Motor Corporation; BMW of North America, Inc.; Daihatsu America, Inc.; Fiat Auto U.S.A., Inc.; Hyundai Motor America; Isuzu Motors America, Inc.; Jaguar Cars, Inc.; Mazda Motor of America, Inc., Mitsubishi Motor Sales of America, Inc.; Nissan North America, Inc.; Peugeot Motors of America, Inc.; Porsche Cars North America, Inc., Rolls-Royce Motor Cars, Inc.; Rover Group USA, Inc.; Saab Cars, USA, Inc.; Subaru of America, Inc.; Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.; Volkswagen of America, Inc., Volvo North America Corporation; and Yugo America, Inc. The principal place of business for AIAM is 1001 19th Street North, Suite 1002, Arlington, Virginia 22209. Each member of AIAM is either licensed as an importer, pursuant to Section 320.61, Florida Statutes, or maintains a contractual relationship with a distributor which is licensed pursuant to Section 320.61. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. ("Toyota"), for example, is not licensed in the state as an importer. Toyota, however, maintains a contractual relationship with Southeast Toyota, Inc., which is licensed as a distributor for the purpose of marketing motor vehicles in Florida. Hyundai Motor America ("Hyundai") is an importer of motor vehicles. Hyundai's principal place of business is 10550 Talbert Avenue, Fountain Valley, California 92728. Members of MVMA and AIAM, as well as Ford and Hyundai, have entered into and will continue to enter into dealer sales and service agreements to authorize motor vehicle dealers to sell GM vehicles at locations in Florida. Ed Morse Chevrolet of Seminole, Inc. ("Morse") is an applicant for a license as a franchised motor vehicle dealer. The application of Morse was approved after a hearing pursuant to Section 320.642, Florida Statues. Morse's facility, however, is not yet completed and it would be adversely affected by the enforcement of Proposed Rules 15C-7.004(7)(d) and Rule 15C-1.008. The portions of the proposed and existing rules challenged in this proceeding will affect the substantial interests of the parties to this proceeding. The Challenged Rules Proposed Rule 15C-7.004 was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Vol. 17, NO. 16, at page 1721, on April 19, 1991 (the "Proposed Rule"). The particular portions of the Proposed Rule challenged in this proceeding are hereinafter identified by the underlining in the quoted portion of the Proposed Rule. Proposed Rule 15C-7.004(4)(a) provides: Application for Reopening or Successor Dealership, or for Relocation of Existing Dealership. If the license of an existing franchised motor vehicle dealer is revoked for any reason, or surrendered, an application for a license to permit the reopening of the same dealer or a successor dealer within twelve months of the license revocation or surrender shall not be considered the establishment of an additional dealership if one of the conditions set forth in Section 320.642(5) is met by the proposed dealer. (emphasis added) Proposed Rule 15C-7.004(4)(b) provides: Application for Reopening or Successor Dealership, or for Relocation of Existing Dealership. An application for change of address by an existing dealer under this section shall be filed on form HSMV 84712, Application For Change of Location (Address) Of Dealer In Motor Vehicles, Mobile Homes or Recreational Vehicles, which is hereby adopted by reference, provided by the Department. The dealer shall indicate which provision of Section 320.642(5) Florida Statutes, if any, it contends exempts the proposed location from consideration as an additional dealership. (emphasis added) Proposed Rule 15C-7.004(7)(d) provides: (7) Hearing and Post-Hearing Procedures. (d) If the proposed additional or relocated dealership is approved construction on the dealership shall begin within 12 months of the date of the final order. The applicant must complete construction and finalize its preliminary application for license within twenty-four months of the date of the final order. This period may be extended by the Department for good cause. (emphasis added) Florida Administrative Code Rule 15C-1.008 provides: Any person who contemplates the establishment of a motor vehicle business for the purpose of selling new motor vehicles, for which a franchise from the manufacturer, distributor or importer thereof is required, shall, in advance of acquiring building and facilities necessary for such an establishment, notify the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles of his intention to establish such motor vehicle business. Such notice shall be in the form of a preliminary filing of his application for license and shall be accompanied by a copy of any proposed franchise agreement with, or letter of intent to grant a franchise from, the manufacturer, distributor or importer, showing the make of vehicle or vehicles included in the franchise; location of the proposed business; the name or names of any other dealer or dealers in the surrounding trade areas, community or territory who are presently franchised to sell the same make or makes of motor vehicles. Upon receipt of such notice the Director shall be authorized to proceed with making the determination required by Section 320.642, Florida Statutes, and shall cause a notice to be sent to the presently licensed franchised dealers for the same make or makes of vehicles in the territory or community in which the new dealership proposes to locate, advising such dealers of the provisions of Section 320.642, Florida Statutes, and giving them and all real parties in interest an opportunity to be heard on the matters specified in that Section. Such notice need not be given to any presently licensed notice dealer who has stated in writing that he will not protest the establishment of a new dealership which will deal in the make or makes of vehicles to be included in the proposed franchise in the territory or community in which the new dealership proposes to locate. Any such statements or letters of no protest shall have been issued not more than three months before the date of filing of the preliminary application. The Director may make such further investigation and hold such hearing as he deems necessary to determine the questions specified under Section 320.642. A determination so made by the Director shall be effective as to such license for a period of twelve (12) months from the date of the Director's Order, or date of final judicial determination in the event of an appeal, unless for good cause a different period is set by the Director in his order of determination. (emphasis added) Rulemaking authority for Proposed Rule 15C-7.004 is found in Sections 320.011 and 320.27(3), Florida Statues. The law implemented by the proposed rule is found in Sections 320.27 and 320.60-320.70. Rulemaking authority for Florida Administrative Code Rule 15C-1.008 is found in Sections 320.011, 320.27(3), and 320.69. The law implemented by the existing rule is found in Sections 320.27 and 320.642.
