The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether Rule 61F8- 3.015, Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, as defined in Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes, and whether the Petitioners have standing to challenge that rule.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner POF is a non-profit Florida corporation organized under the laws of Florida for the purpose of representing its members who are licensed opticians. Petitioner Riddlebaugh is a board-certified, licensed optician pursuant to the laws of Florida and has been so licensed since 1987. After first becoming licensed in Florida, Petitioner Riddlebaugh worked in his family's optical business in Ormond Beach, Florida. He later worked for Burdine's Optical and Omni Optical. From April 1990 to February 1994, he owned and operated an independent opticianry business in Florida and was the sole employee of that business during the entire time of its operation. The Respondent is a state agency authorized to promulgate rules and regulations concerning the practice of optometry and licensure of optometrists, by authority of Chapter 463, Florida Statutes. The Intervenor is a non-profit Florida corporation whose membership is comprised of optometrists licensed under Chapter 463, Florida Statutes, and who are authorized to practice optometry in Florida. Petitioner POF's organizational purposes are to promote, protect, and improve the professional status of persons engaged in the practice of opticianry and to encourage, establish, and maintain standards of competence, knowledge, and performance through the provision of educational programs, training, and uniform licensing of optical dispensers. Petitioner POF has seven classes of membership entitled Professional Member Class I, Professional Member Class II, Professional Non-Licensed Member, Associate Member, Affiliate Member, Student Member, and Honorary Member. Only Professional Member Class I has Florida licensed opticians as members. Any member of Petitioner POF may terminate membership upon 60 days written notice to the executive director. Members of POF who fail to pay dues and other obligations within 60 days are removed from the membership rolls. It is impossible to determine the number of members of Petitioner POF, since the membership roster can change daily, based upon resignations and terminations. Petitioner POF did not introduce its most current or any membership roll designating the members by their appropriate membership class. The 1993-94 directory and desk guide of Petitioner POF lists the members of Petitioner POF followed by a number designation in parentheses. The number designation (1), which does not indicate only Professional Member Class I membership, as defined by the Bylaws of the association, represents members who are not licensed in Florida as opticians, as well as some members who are licensed in Florida as opticians. It is impossible to determine how many members besides Riddlebaugh and Richard W. Williams are licensed in Florida as opticians, although a substantial number of the total membership are Florida licensed opticians. No preponderant evidence was offered to show that the membership of Petitioner POF was substantially affected by the challenged rule. During the six years the rule has been in effect, Petitioner POF did not gather any information to show how or if the challenged rule affected its membership even though it had challenged the rule when first promulgated, later withdrawing the challenge. The number of licensed Florida opticians has increased during the entire six-year period the challenged rule has been in effect. Petitioner Riddlebaugh is a Florida licensed optician who was licensed in 1987. He closed his optical business "Spectacles" in February 1994. He closed that business because of generally declining economic conditions in Volusia County, Florida, where he practiced, due in large part to the competitive effects on his business in that vicinity posed by physicians (ophthalmologists), who, in addition to practicing as ophthalmologists, can also practice opticianry. Additional competition was posed by optometrists, other opticians, and large optical purveying firms, such as Opti-World, Pearle Vision Express, J.C. Penney Company, Inc., Lens Crafters, Inc., and Sears Optical. Petitioner Riddlebaugh was able to obtain employment at Omni Optical from February 1989 to February 1990 during the time the challenged rule was in effect, it having taken effect in 1988. He was able to open his business in April 1990 and operate it for four years during the time the rule was in effect. Ophthalmologists and optometrists are allowed under their practice acts to employ non-licensed personnel, who can perform optician-type functions and duties under appropriate supervision, delineated in those practice acts. This poses competition to opticians situated such as Petitioner Riddlebaugh, wholly apart from perceived and purported competitive effects posed by the subject rule under challenge. Petitioners POF and Riddlebaugh simply failed to demonstrate that any deleterious competitive effects imposed on Petitioner Riddlebaugh's business, or the business of any members of Petitioner POF, were occasioned by the operative effects of the rule under challenge. Although Petitioner Riddlebaugh testified that one of the primary factors for closing his business was the competition posed by the effect of the rule, that testimony is not deemed preponderant nor credible as evidence, since Petitioner Riddlebaugh had previously given testimony by deposition that another set of rules promulgated by the Board, unrelated to the challenged rule, was the only reason for closing his business. It appears, however, that the real reason for the closing of his business was due to the combined effects of competition from various optical establishments and other optometric and ophthalmologic professionals, as well as a general economic decline in Volusia County, Florida, in the early 1990's when he was attempting to operate his business and ultimately closed it. Unlicensed persons may work for opticians doing all functions within the definition of opticianry, under appropriate supervision, as delineated in the pertinent provisions of Chapter 484, Florida Statutes, and the opticianry practice rules promulgated thereunder. Unlicensed persons working for opticians can perform such functions as selection of frames and transfer of optical devices without the optician being on the premises. Unlicensed persons can also work for ophthalmologists, performing opticianry duties. In October 1986, the Respondent, with a view toward promulgating this rule, requested that the Board of Opticianry define "fitting, adjusting, and dispensing". This was an effort by the Respondent to avoid conflicting with the legally-defined practice requirements for opticianry. The Board of Opticianry was aware of the rule promulgation effort by the Respondent, however, it never responded to the request. Because it never obtained any definitional information from the Board of Opticianry, the Respondent elected to delete the terms "dispensing" and "measuring" from its proposed rule at that time. The words "delivery of eyeglasses" were inserted. Optician, Richard E. Williams, who testified at the hearing, defined "dispensing" as being the adjustments necessary to make certain that eyeglasses properly fit a patient. Mr. Williams defined "fitting" as determining whether the glasses were set properly on an individual's face. He also defined "fitting" as making certain that pupillary distance was accurate and defined "dispensing" as fitting and adjusting. Petitioner Riddlebaugh defined "fitting" as making certain that the frames of eyeglasses were properly adjusted to the patient. According to the preponderant evidence of record, the "adjustment of frames" is not the practice of opticianry. The purpose of adjusting frames is simply to get them to set comfortably and properly on a patient's face. Adjusting may also be used to align lenses properly within the frame. The "delivery of eyeglasses" is not the practice of opticianry either, nor is the "selection of frames". Unlicensed persons can also work for ophthalmologists, performing opticianry. Petitioner Riddlebaugh testified that the challenged rule affects the integrity of his opticianry license and the viability of his practice because it allows unlicensed persons to perform opticianry functions when working for an optometrist or an ophthalmologist. His testimony is not preponderant or credible, however, since there is no limit to the number of unlicensed persons that opticians themselves can employ to perform opticianry functions under appropriate supervision, just as optometrists and ophthalmologists may employ such unlicensed personnel to perform opticianry under the appropriate supervision, as delineated in their practice act and rules. There is no meaningful distinction between the competitive effects of unlicensed persons working for an optician and those working for ophthalmologists and optometrists. Richard E. Williams, a licensed optician, testified that he had to close his office in Panama City Beach, Florida, because a "group of doctors" opened an office in competition with him. On some days, their office was only staffed by unlicensed persons. He did not indicate in his testimony whether the "group of doctors" were ophthalmologists or optometrists. His testimony also described his practice on Panama City Beach dwindling because of the effects of ophthalmologists, regulated by Chapter 458, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated thereunder, who were in practice in the Panama City area. The Petitioners adduced evidence of preparation and dispensing of eyeglasses by unlicensed personnel in an optometry practice and establishment, done under general, rather than direct, supervision, which were more than merely ministerial in nature. Tasks which were performed under purported authority of the challenged rule, that were more than ministerial in nature, and constituted the practice of opticianry by an unlicensed person, were shown by the testimony of Deborah L. Metz-Andrews. Ms. Andrews is not licensed in either opticianry, optometry, or ophthalmology. She was employed by the Newberry Eye Clinic in Chipley, Florida, from January 1991 to August 1992. That establishment is an optometric practice owned and operated by an optometrist and which has an optical department. It has satellite offices in Chipley, Port St. Joe, Panama City Beach, and Panama City, Florida. While employed at Newberry, Ms. Andrews was referred to as "the optician" by the optometrist, but her job title was really "optical technician". During her employment with Newberry, she neutralized glasses with the use of a lensometer, to determine the prescription on the existing glasses worn by a patient. She took prescriptions and determined what the prescription was, what kind of frame would facilitate that prescription, and performed pupillary distance measurements. She determined if a patient needed trifocals or bifocals and did all of the required measurements. She also was responsible for ordering the eyeglasses from the laboratory in Panama City. Once the glasses were made and returned to Chipley, she would place them in the lensometer to check them, and the patient would be notified that the glasses were ready to be picked up. When the patient came in to pick up the glasses, she typically performed the following duties: She fit the glasses on the patient, double- checking the segment height, if they were bifocals; fit the eyeglasses to the nose; adjusted the frame; and made sure that the pantoscopic tilt was correct. She would inquire of the patient's ability to see and if satisfied, the patient would take the eyeglass case, go to a window, pay the bill, and leave. She performed these duties, some of which fall within the practice of opticianry, without the optometrist being on the premises in direct supervision. She stated that she did not feel confident doing some of the types of duties and tasks she was performing and received no guidance from the optometrist. Mr. Williams was accepted as an expert in the practice of opticianry (excluding the field of contact lenses). He opined that the duties being performed by Ms. Andrews, purportedly pursuant to the challenged rule, constitute the practice of opticianry. Dr. John McClane is a licensed Florida optometrist. Dr. McClane's Florida office employs 10 or 11 employees, only one of whom is a licensed optician. The unlicensed personnel in his office adjust frames and perform neutralization of lenses without the lenses having been checked by a licensed optometrist before final delivery to the patient. In operating a lensometer in the neutralization process, unlicensed personnel in Dr. McClane's office also read prisms and transpose prescriptions. The glasses are not always checked by either the licensed optician or the licensed optometrist prior to final delivery to the patient by the unlicensed personnel. According to Dr. McClane's understanding of the term "ministerial", as used in the rule, an unlicensed person can perform any tasks that an optometrist orders and determines, if it is appropriate for patient care. Any delegated task, by his understanding, may be performed under general, rather than direct, supervision. He believes that "direct supervision" is a situation where the optometrist is on the premises directly supervising the work of the unlicensed person. Even if the duties, or some of them, performed by unlicensed personnel at the Newberry and McClane establishments constitute the practice of opticianry by unlicensed personnel, under the general, rather than direct, supervision of optometrists, the testimony of Ms. Andrews and Dr. McClane does not definitively indicate which of the purported opticianry duties Ms. Andrews and other unlicensed personnel performed were actually done with the optometrist away from the premises and not in direct supervision. Further, even if such unlicensed personnel were doing some task which constituted the practice of opticianry, without the direct supervision of an optometrist, there was no competent, credible evidence to show that such practices, under the aegis of the challenged rule, are so widespread or common in practice as to indicate that the language and terminology embodied in the rule is fraught with vagueness so as to cause frequent, recurring misunderstandings by optometrists in conducting their practices with the use of unlicensed personnel. Rather, these two examples offered by the Petitioners may raise simply an issue of the application of the subject rule and a question as to uniformity of its enforcement. In 1986, the legislature enacted a substantial amendment to Section 463.009, Florida Statutes, regarding supportive personnel, by allowing such unlicensed personnel to perform functions for an optometrist under either general or direct supervision. The definition of direct supervision was changed and a definition of general supervision was added in Section 463.002(6)&(7), Florida Statutes. See Chapter 86-288, Laws of Florida. Pursuant to the 1986 amendments, the Respondent began rule-making at its August 21, 1986 annual meeting and rule workshop. The resulting Rule 21Q-3.015, Florida Administrative Code, at paragraph (3), listed the tasks which unlicensed personnel could perform under general supervision as dispensing, selection of frames, measuring and adjusting eyeglasses, and instruction in the insertion, removal and care of contact lenses. On October 3, 1986, Petitioner POF filed a rule challenge to the proposed rule alleging, inter alia, that the rule allowed unlicensed persons to practice opticianry under general supervision, thus, purportedly constituting a departure from the authorizing statute. After the filing of the rule challenge, at a public hearing on October 15, 1986, the Respondent withdrew the proposed rule. During that October public hearing, a member of the Respondent was requested by the Board Chairman to attend the Opticianry Board's rules committee meeting the following day, on October 16, 1986, and to request the opticianry rule committee to develop a rule to provide a definition of "fit, adapt, adjust, and dispense". During the October 16, 1986 meeting of the rules committee of the Board of Opticianry, a member of the Board, Ms. Card, reported that the Respondent was waiting for the Board of Opticianry to define "fitting and adjusting" before the Respondent continued with its rule-making regarding support personnel. She also stated that the Respondent had a meeting scheduled for December 19, 1986. The Board of Opticianry met on November 20, 1986 and approved the minutes of the rules committee meeting of October 16, 1986, but took no action regarding promulgating rules defining the terms which the Respondent requested it to define, even though the Board of Opticianry took extensive action on rule-making on other subjects. Thereafter, at the January 22, 1987 meeting of the Respondent, after receiving no information from the Board of Opticianry regarding the definitions requested, the Respondent approved an amended version of Rule 21Q-3.015, Florida Administrative Code, changing the list of tasks in paragraph (3) to "delivery of eyeglasses, selection of frames, adjustment of frames, and instruction in insertion and removal and care of contact lenses". The tasks of "dispensing and measuring and adjusting eyeglasses", contained in the prior version of the rule, were deleted. A meeting and public hearing was again held on April 10, 1987, during which the proposed rule was addressed; and it was reported that Petitioner POF had again filed a rule challenge to Rule 21Q-3.015, Florida Administrative Code. The proposed rule was then again withdrawn. Workshops by the Respondent were thereafter held in November 1987 and on February 12, 1988 concerning Rule 21Q-3.015, Florida Administrative Code, and the rule was noticed for promulgation on April 29, 1988. Rule challenges were thereafter filed by Petitioner POF and Jack Eckerd Corporation. The Respondent then met on August 5, 1988 and changed the word "employee" to "nonlicensed, supportive personnel" in paragraph (4) of the proposed rule. The two rule challenges were then voluntarily dismissed by those petitioners, and the rule was adopted and became effective on October 23, 1988 and has been in effect since. The Board of Opticianry was well aware of the Respondent's efforts to promulgate the rule on support personnel. The Board of Opticianry never promulgated rules defining "fitting, adjusting, and dispensing" of optical devices, despite the Respondent's request. During the time period that the Respondent was considering the rule in its present form, the members of the Board of Opticianry never agreed on a definition of "dispensing".
The Issue Whether the Department acted arbitrarily and capriciously in giving notice of its intended award of a contract for the purchase of optical character reading equipment to Scan Optics?
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with the administration of Florida's unemployment compensation insurance program. The Department's Bureau of Claims and Benefits (hereinafter referred to as the "Bureau") is responsible for receiving claims for unemployment insurance benefits and for the disbursement of unemployment insurance payments. In processing and paying claims for unemployment insurance benefits, the Bureau must work with the Comptroller, who issues the payment checks. The Comptroller's office has been issuing checks on IBM punch cards. The Bureau has also been using IBM punch cards in processing unemployment insurance claims so that the punch cards could be collated with the IBM punch card checks issued by the Comptroller. In early 1984, the Bureau was informed that IBM card stock would no longer be printed. In early 1985, the Bureau was informed by the Comptroller's office that the Comptroller was going to begin to use paper warrants for the payment of benefits instead of IBM cards. As a result of this change, the Department is no longer able to use checks issued by the Comptroller to collate with its IBM punch cards. Because of the switch to paper warrants by the Comptroller, the Department began in 1985 to look at other technologies capable of efficiently working with paper warrants. The Bureau formed a committee to explore alternatives. That committee researched alternatives and visited other states to determine how other states were processing claims. The Department decided to purchase an optical character reader (hereinafter referred to as an OCR), for use in processing unemployment compensation claims. An OCR is a device which reads printed or handwritten characters. It scans a document, reads characters by comparing them to a mask or template and reads and records the data. The Department plans to use the OCR to read and record data from certifications for unemployment compensation insurance benefits. The data recorded will be transferred to the Department's mainframe IBM computer for use in processing by an automated benefits system. The Petitioner and Scan Optics are manufacturers of OCR equipment. Scan Optics has been manufacturing OCR equipment for 20 years. The Department requested a list of vendors from the Division of Purchasing and received a list of 167 potential vendors. On July 14, 1986, the Department issued a Request for Proposals (hereinafter referred to as the "RFP"), seeking competitive bids for the purchase by the Department of an OCR. All 167 potential vendors were notified of the RFP by the Department. Approximately 25 of the potential vendors requested a copy of the RFP. Only the Petitioner and Scan Optics submitted proposals in response to the RFP. A 6 member committee appointed by the Department prepared the RFP. Three members of the committee were employees of the Bureau and three members were employees of the Department's Bureau of Computer Data Systems. A request for proposal is a solicitation by an agency of offers from potential vendors to provide a needed commodity or service. It is different from a bid where the agency simply identifies the product it wishes to purchase and chooses the vendor offering the product at the lowest cost. The RFP set forth the Department's functional requirements and asked vendors to respond in any manner which they believed would meet those requirements. In the RFP, the Department stated the requirements which vendors were required to meet, evaluation criteria and the weight to be given to those criteria. It was also provided that responses would be verified by documentation and demonstration in a benchmark test. In the RFP, vendors were informed that if they disputed the reasonableness, necessity, or competitiveness of the RFP they must file a protest in accordance with Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes. Paragraph 8 of the General Conditions. Vendors were also informed that any questions concerning the conditions and specifications of the RFP had to be submitted in writing to the Department no later than 10 days prior to the proposal opening and that "[n]o interpretation shall be considered binding unless provided in writing by the State of Florida in response to request in full compliance with this provision." Paragraph 5 of the General Conditions. Section 1.07 of the RFP instructed vendors to examine the RFP to determine if the requirements were clearly stated. Section 1.10 of the RFP provided that only written and signed vendor communications would be considered and that only written communications from the purchasing off ice would be considered authoritative. The Petitioner did not file a protest of the terms of the RFP pursuant to Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes. Section 1.03 of the RFP provided for a vendors conference at which the contents of the RFP and any written inquiries from the vendors could be discussed. The Petitioner and Scan Optics submitted written questions to the Department. The vendors' conference was scheduled and conducted on July 30, 1986. Representatives of the Petitioner and Scan Optics attended the vendors' conference. The questions submitted by the Petitioner and Scan Optics were discussed. At the commencement of the vendors' conference, the Department's representative cautioned all present that statements made during the conference would not modify the RFP. This representation was heard and understood by the Petitioner's representative at the vendors' conference. Subsequent to the vendors' conference, the Department issued amendments to the RFP. The cover letter dated August 7, 1986, conveying the amendments to the Petitioner stated that any questions about the amendments had to be received in writing in the Office of Purchasing no later than 5:00 p.m., August 12, 1986. Draft samples of claims' certification forms and paper stock described in Section 3.01.18 of the RFP were also sent to the Petitioner and Scan Optics. The Petitioner did not submit any additional questions about the RFP or the amendments before 5:00 p.m., August 12, 1986. The Department proposed to accept Scan Optics' proposal and purchase the OCR from Scan Optics. The Petitioner brought this administrative action challenging the Department's proposed action. Chapter I of the RFP contains administrative and general information. Chapter II of the RFP contains a description of the Department's current system, a list of proposed OCR applications and the objective of the Department. Chapter III of the RFP sets out the technical requirements. Mandatory requirements and desirable requirements are provided. The terms "mandatory requirement" are defined in Section 1.17.ao of the RFP as follows: "Mandatory Requirement" shall be defined as a requirement the vendor must meet for the proposal to be considered responsive, failure to meet a mandatory requirement will cause the proposal to be rejected. The terms desirable requirement" are defined in Section 1.17.ak of the RFP as follows: "Desirable Requirement" shall be defined as a function, feature, or service the State considers necessary for optimal application flexibility, ease of system operation, or system reliability. Failure to meet a desirable requirement will result in a lower technical evaluation. The technical requirements set out the specifications which the Department had determined must (mandatory) or should (desirable) be met in order for an OCR to fulfill the Department's objectives. Chapter IV of the RFP provides the evaluation process the Department was to follow in determining which proposal to accept. The evaluation process was to include the awarding of points for compliance with the technical requirements. The RFP also included provisions designed to ensure that the representations of a vendor in a proposal would be fulfilled, including a benchmark test to verify certain representations of a vendor and acceptance testing after the equipment was purchased and installed. The general objective of the Department was provided in Section 2.04 of the RFP: The State wishes to procure an Optical Character Reading System with related soft- ware capable of meeting the requirements for the reading of UI benefit certifications and other UI applications that are feasible. The Optical Character Reading System will consist of a [sic] Optical Character Reader (OCR) and Correction System. The complete System will be bought from a single vendor. Section 1.17.ap of the RFP defines "objective" as: A statement describing generally the system to be procured. Any proposed system not meeting the objective will be rejected. Although Section 2.03.3 of the RFP provides that processing of quarterly wage reports is a major application, the RFP does not require that the proposed OCR equipment must be capable of this application. The only requirement is that the objective" be met. The reference to "other UI applications that are feasible" in the objective was intended to refer to future applications of the OCR which the Department only wanted to be aware of. There was no requirement that proposed OCR's be capable of other applications. The RFP made it clear that proposals would be based on the technical requirements of Chapter III of the RFP and would be evaluated pursuant to Chapter IV of the RFP. When these chapters and the "objective" are considered it is clear that the Department was proposing to purchase an OCR to perform the task of reading unemployment insurance claims forms and not wage reports. The responses to the RFP submitted by the Petitioner and Scan Optics were evaluated by the committee established by the Department to prepare the RFP. The committee determined whether the vendors met the mandatory requirements of the RFP and allocated points for mandatory and desirable requirements based upon the vendors' responses. The committee's evaluation consisted of 3 stages as required by the RFP. First, the committee evaluated and scored the vendors' technical responses. Each vendor was awarded points for their responses to the mandatory and desirable requirements as provided in the RFP. The committee fairly and reasonably applied the scoring system. Secondly, the committee evaluated and scored the vendors' cost responses as provided in the RFP. Finally, each vendor's scores were added. The vendor with the highest score was then given an opportunity to subject its proposed system to a benchmark test. The RFP provided that only the vendor with the highest points from the first 2 stages of the evaluation would be subjected to the benchmark test. The benchmark test was used by the Department to verify some of the statements in the highest scoring vendor's response, including some responses which the committee had some questions about during the evaluation. Based upon the committee's evaluation, Scan Optics was selected as the highest scoring vendor and its proposed system was subjected to the benchmark test. The benchmark test is provided for in Chapter X of the RFP. If Scan Optics' system had failed the benchmark test with regard to a mandatory requirement, its proposal would have been rejected. If it had failed to fulfill a desirable requirement, its response would have been rescored. The benchmark test was designed to give some assurances that a vendor's claims were correct. The test gave the committee confidence that the vendor was providing accurate information. Scan Optics' system successfully completed the benchmark test. During the first two stages of the evaluation, the committee looked at each vendor's total response, read all of the documentation submitted by the vendors and did all the research it could without actually having the system itself to evaluate. Not every response of the vendor was verified with absolute certainty. It was necessary for the Department to exercise judgment and discretion in determining whether responses were responsive to the RFP. Each response was evaluated as a whole and relevant information contained in one response was considered in evaluating other responses. Both vendors' responses were reviewed carefully. Both vendors provided responses which were not as thorough as the committee desired. The committee exercised its discretion in those instances and reviewed all documentation and the complete response to determine if sufficient information had been provided to conclude that a response was acceptable. Clarification or explanation of some responses was requested by the committee from both vendors. The manner in which mandatory responses were to be evaluated is provided in Section 1.06 of the RFP: The State has established certain requirements with respect to Request for Proposals to be submitted by vendors. The use of "shall", must" or "will" (except to indicate simple futurity) in this Request indicates a require- ment or condition from which a material deviation may not be waived by the State. A deviation is material if the deficient response is not in substantial accord with this Request for Proposal requirements [sic] provides an advantage to one vendor over other vendors, has a potentially significant effect on the quantity or quality or items proposed, or on the cost to the State. Material deviations cannot be waived. Determining whether a deviation was material required the Department to use discretion. The RFP does not require rejection of a proposal if a desirable requirement was not met. Section 1.06 of the RFP provides the following with regard to desirable requirements: The words "should" or "may" in this Request for Proposal indicate desirable attributes or conditions, but are permissive in nature. Deviation from, or omission of, such a desirable feature, will not in itself cause rejection of a proposal. In determining whether a mandatory requirement was met, the committee determined if a vendor's response indicated that the requirement could be met. If there was any question about the vendor's response, the committee then evaluated the response to determine if the response was sufficient to justify rejecting the entire proposal. This is a reasonable approach. The Department, through its committee, exercised its discretion fairly and equitably in reviewing each vendor's response. Scan Optics proposed a 442 system in response to the RFP. A 4542 system consists of two primary hardware component: a 4500 editing system and a 542 optical scanner. Section 3.01.1 of the RFP provides the following mandatory requirement The Vendor must supply documentation indicating the proposed System's capabilities to meet each mandatory and desirable item listed in this RFP. The documentation must refer to the section and item number it applies to in this RFP. There is no requirement in the RFP that the documentation provided by a vendor be listed. Scan Optics provided a great deal of documentation with its response. The Department reasonably concluded that the documentation provided met the requirement of Section 3.01.1 of the RFP. A list of most of Scan Optics' documentation was provided with its response. In addition to the documentation listed, Scan Optics provided a Model 542 Product Guide and a Model 533/542 Operator's Manual. Scan Optics' Models 530 and 540 optical scanners are very similar to their Model 542. The designation 540 refers to a family of optical scanners which includes the Model 542. Most of the information concerning the operation and capacity of the 540 also applies to the 542. Differences are due to greater capacity and speed of the 542 and internal differences. All of the documentation supplied by Scan Optics was considered by the committee in its evaluation and was determined to satisfy the requirement of Section 3.01.1 of the RFP. The committee talked with representatives of Scan Optics to determine whether documents pertaining to Model 530/540 supplied to the Department were relevant. The Department was informed that the Model 542 was a member of the same family of models and the information provided in the Model 530/540 documents was also applicable to the Model 542. Manufacturers of computer equipment have constantly evolving families of models with a number of similarities. The use of manuals and guides which apply to a family line is a common practice. The committee reasonably accepted the Model 530/540 documents as documentation supporting the Model 542 proposed. Section 3.01.10.f of the RFP initially required that vendors show how the Initial System could be upgraded to meet a number of requirements, including the " [a]bility to read 700 different fonts including handprint in a multifont mode." The Petitioner submitted a written question which was discussed at the vendors' conference concerning the use of the term "fonts." There are not 700 fonts in the English language. An OCR is capable of scanning written documents and reading and recording the data contained thereon. Each particular design or style of a1phabetic (A to Z, in upper and lower case) and numeric (0 to 9) characters typed or written is called a font. Each style, or font, is unique and different from other styles. Characters are recognized and read by an OCR by templates or masks. Templates or masks determine an OCR's ability to read a particular character of different fonts. To read all the characters of one font, 36 masks or templates are needed. A single mask or template can read the same character, such as the letter "A" in more than one font. The question raised by the Petitioner was discussed at the vendors' conference and resulted in a written amendment to the mandatory requirement of Section 3.01.10.f. Section 3. 01.l0.f of the RFP, as amended, required that the Initial System be upgradeable to include the " [a]bility to read 700 different fonts/masks/templates, plus alpha numeric hand print." The Department and the vendors realized that Section 3. 01.10.f of the RFP, as amended, required that the ability to read 700 templates or masks, and not 700 fonts, was what was required. The Petitioner did not submit any questions concerning the amendment to Section 3.01.10.f of the RFP. The Petitioner's representative at the vendors' conference indicated that he understood the amendment and that the amendment eliminated the confusion created by the original requirement concerning "700 fonts." No statements were made by representatives of the Department during the vendors' conference concerning the requirement of Section 3.O1.10.f of the RFP, as amended. A statement concerning proposing a "maximum capability machine" was directed only to the Petitioner. The Department was aware that the Petitioner's maximum capability machine with regard to templates or masks was a machine with 720 templates. Therefore, the Petitioner was told that if it bid its maximum capability machine it would meet the requirement of Section 3.01.10.f of the RFP, as amended. This discussion was directed only at the Petitioner and was in response to the Petitioner's question, submitted in writing, about the requirement of Section 3.01.10.f of the RFP before it was amended. Section 3.01.10 of the RFP contains 7 subparagraphs labeled "a" through "g". Scan Optics' response to Section 3.01.10 of the RFP contained only 5 subparagraphs labeled "a" through "e". The responses of Scan Optics did not correspond to the subparagraphs of Section 3.01.10 of the RFP. There was no requirement that they do so. One of the subparagraphs for which there was no labeled response from Scan Optics, Section 3.01.10.f of the RFP, pertains to upgrading the Initial System to read 700 templates. Scan Optics proposed a system which already contained 768 templates. There was therefore no requirement to explain how the system could be upgraded. The other subparagraph for which there was no labeled response from Scan Optics, Section 3.01.10.g of the RFP, pertains to upgrading the Initial System to include "necessary system CPU's and controllers." Scan Optics' response to Section 3.01.10 of the RFP, when considered with other responses and the documentation provided, indicated that the Initial System would meet this provision. The Department reasonably determined that the response of Scan Optics to Section 3.01.10 of the RFP adequately explained how its system could be upgraded. Section 3.01.13 of the RFP contains the following mandatory requirement: The OCR must capture and store data on a 9-Track, 1600 and/or 6250 BPI EBCDIC Tape compatible with the equipment in use at the Caldwell Data Center at the State's Central Office in Tallahassee. Each tape drive in the proposed system must be usable for both output and input operations. The requirement of Section 3.01.13 of the RFP was amended to add the following sentence: The drives in use in the Data Caldwell Center [sic] are IBM 3420 Dual Density (1600 6250 BPI) with odd parity. In its response Scan Optics quoted the requirement without the amendment and then provided the following answer: The Scan-Optics Tape Drive provided is an operator selectable 1600 or 6250 BPI EBCDIC drive compatible with IBM equipment including the equipment in use at the Caldwell Data Center, and is capable of output or input. Although Scan Optics did not quote the requirement with the amendment, the amendment was included elsewhere in its response and Scan Optics' representatives were aware of the amendment. Even though Scan Optics did not correctly quote the requirement as amended, its response indicates that Scan Optics' proposal meets the amended requirement. Scan Optics indicated that its system is compatible with the Caldwell Data Center's equipment and identified the drives which it uses. The failure to quote the amended requirement was merely an oversight on the part of Scan Optics. There is no requirement that the requirements of the RFP be properly quoted or quoted at all in a response. Section 3.01.15 of the RFP, as amended, provides the following mandatory requirement: The OCR Microfilm camera must provide an image reduction ratio within the range of 40:1 to 50:1, image reduction in duplex mode and provide at least two (2) blip sizes based on Kodak IMT specifications which can be selected under program control. The system must be capable of filming any blip sizes based on predefined conditions on a document by document basis. In its response Scan Optics identified the range of its image reduction ratios and indicated that it would provide the blip sizes required. Although Scan Optics' response can be interpreted to indicate something which Scan Optics will be able to do in the future, the Department reasonably accepted Scan Optics' response. The committee knew that technology for meeting the microfilm requirement existed and was in use in the industry. Based upon documentation provided by Scan Optics, the committee also knew that the reduction ratios could be provided by Scan Optics because its camera was under program control and was therefore adjustable. Because the camera was under program control, the committee knew that it could be adjusted to provide two blip sizes. The committee also knew that if Scan Optics was selected as the high scorer as a result of the first two phases of the evaluation its camera would be subjected to the benchmark test. In fact, Scan Optics' camera was subjected to the benchmark test and demonstrated that the requirements of Section 3.01.15 of the RFP could be met. Scan Optics properly responded Section 3.01.15 of the RFP and the Department reasonably accepted its response. Section 3.01.18 of the RFP provides the following mandatory requirement: The OCR must be capable of processing documents with a paper weight range from 20 lbs. to 110 lbs. A paper thickness of .0075 inch capability is required. Scan Optics' response to Section 3.01.18 of the RFP was as follows: Standard Scan-Optics specification of paper weight is from 20 lbs. to 100 lbs. However, Scan-Optics personnel will modify the transport vacuum pumps and perform the necessary pre- ventative maintenance routines to accomplish the additional 10 percent requirement at the higher paper range, as we have done in numerous other installations. Scan Optics' total response indicates that it can meet the requirement of Section 3.01.18 of the RFP. The Department reasonably accepted the response. The Department-knew that similar equipment was frequently modified to fit specific jobs, that Scan Optics had indicated that it had modified its equipment in "numerous other installations" and that Scan Optics had indicated that it would modify its transport system. The Department also knew that the ability to process 110 lb. paper would be benchmark tested. The vendors were provided with sample forms which were .0075 inch thick and 110 lb. weight. This was the actual paper used by the Comptroller. Scan Optics' ability to meet the requirement of Section 3.01.18 of the RFP was tested and demonstrated in the benchmark test. Section 3.01.43 of the RFP provides the following mandatory requirement: "The Vendor must propose to provide four (4) manuals for application and program development." Section 3.01.44 of the RFP provides the following mandatory requirement: "The Vendor must propose to provide three (3) sets of manuals for support of system operations. Scan Optics indicated that it would provide the manuals at the time the contract was awarded. There was no requirement that a vendor provide the manuals at the time a response was filed. Section 3.01.43 and Section 3.01.44 of the RFP only sought assurances that the manuals would be provided. Scan Optics' response to Section 3.01.43 and Section 3.01.44 of the RFP and the Department's acceptance of the response was reasonable. Prior to amendment, Section 3.03.2 of the RFP provided the following desirable requirement: The Vendor should be able to upgrade the OCR font recognition as the Vendor makes improve- ments in font recognition to improve OCR read rates. This upgrade should be installable by the State. Section 3.03.2 of the RF was renumbered as Section 3.02.2 and the last sentence was amended to provide: "This upgrade should be installable by the State or, if installed by the Vendor, at no additional cost to the State." Scan Optics' response quoted the requirement before the amendment. The response, however, indicated that the requirement, as amended, could be met and the amendment was included in another portion of the Scan Optics' response. The Department reasonably accepted the response of Scan Optics to Section 3.02.2 of the RFP. Section 3.02.3 of the RFP (originally numbered 3.03.3) includes a desirable requirement that vendors specify the projected number of desk weekly unemployment insurance claim certification documents a vendor's proposed system could process in one hour with no more than three operators -- one to operate the OCR and two to correct unrecognized characters. Section 3.02.3 of the RFP provides that the document to be processed and the rules for processing are described in Chapter x, Section 10.2 of the RFP. The vendor with the highest score was to be benchmark-tested pursuant to these rules to determine if the vendor's response was accurate. Chapter x, Section 10.2 of the RFP describes the data that would be included in the claim form, how the form would be completed, the weight of the paper and the styles or fonts which would be used. Section 3.02.3 of the RFP only requires that the number of documents processed be provided. Scan Optics' response to Section 3.02.3 of the RFP provided that "Scan-Optics throughput based upon your requirements above will be: 3,500 desk weekly UI claim certification forms in one hours [sic]." Scan Optics' response went on to repeat the criteria set out in the RFP and provided: "Therefore, because of the above variables, Scan-Optics throughput has been calculated using the following assumptions:" The response goes on to provide certain assumptions made by Scan Optics in calculating the number of documents it projected could be processed. The assumptions set out in Scan Optics' response do not expressly limit or condition its estimate of 3,500 documents per hour. The response was given with knowledge that the estimate would have to be proved to be accurate in the benchmark test. Scan Optics' response was based upon the use of a standard formula and was reduced from 4,800 to 3,500 in order to give a projection which could be met and accounted for loss of productivity due to jams, operator absence and other problems. The projection was tested by Scan Optics before the proposal was submitted to the Department. The Department accepted the projection of Scan Optics and awarded Scan Optics the maximum points available for the desirable requirement of Section 3.02.3 of the RFP, 280 points. The Department did not take into account the assumptions expressed by Scan Optics in its response. The evidence did not prove if the assumptions expressed by Scan Optics are inconsistent with the rules for processing which would be followed in the benchmark test. Scan Optics successfully demonstrated its ability to process 3,500 forms per hour in the benchmark test. The benchmark test did not incorporate the assumptions made by Scan Optics. The forms used in the test were completed by individuals who received less instructions than claimants and State employees who will actually complete the forms. Even the instructions given were not completely followed. The benchmark test provided an accurate test of Scan Optics' ability to process claims. The Department reasonably accepted Scan Optics response to Section 3.02.3 of the RFP. Section 1.14 of the RFP required vendors to provide five references where "similar or exact proposed equipment and Licensed Software is installed and operational." Section 4.05 of the RFP provided for the manner in which references were to be evaluated. Up to 10 points per reference could be awarded, up to a maximum of 50 points. Section 4.05.6 of the RFP defined "similar equipment and software" to mean equipment consisting of "an OCR with microfilm option that reads either numeric handprint or multifont." [Emphasis added]. The Petitioner and Scan Optics provided more than five references. All references were contacted. Five of the references provided by both vendors had similar equipment and software as defined by Section 4.05.6 of the RFP. Scan Optics' five satisfactory references were Newport News Ship Building, IRS Atlanta, Barnett Bank of Florida, State of Ohio Department of Taxation and State of Tennessee Department of Revenue. The Department reasonably concluded that the references provided by Scan Optics satisfied the requirement of Section 1.14 of the RFP. The Department did not evaluate Scan Optics' response in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Formal Written Protest and Petition for Formal Administrative Proceeding filed by the Petitioner, Recognition Equipment, Inc., be dismissed. DONE AND ORDERED this 26th day of February, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-4570 BID The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they were accepted. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reasons for their rejection have also been noted. Paragraph numbers in the Recommended Order are referred to as "RO ." THE PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT: Proposed Finding RO Number of Acceptance or of Fact Number Reason for Rejection 1 RO 13. 2 RO 9 and 75-76. 3 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 4 RO 25, 27 and 29. 5 Although this statement was made, see RO 81. 6 RO 34-35 and 60. 7 RO 45. 8 RO 34, 36 and 47. 9 RO 48. 10 Irrelevant. 11 RO 124 and 126. Although the first sentence is true, it is irrelevant. The second sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first sentence is accepted in RO 83. The rest of the proposed finding of fact is irrelevant. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first sentence is argument. The second sentence is irrelevant. If the Petitioner relied on oral state- ments such reliance was not reasonable. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Although Mr. Stallworth did make the quoted statement, it does not expand the requirements specifically included in the RFP. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first two sentences are accepted in RO 49. The third and fourth sentences are not supported by the weight of the evidence. 21 RO 57. 22 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. THE DEPARTMENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT: 1 RO 1, 3 and 5. 2 RO 5-6 and 8. 3 RO 13 and 38. 4 RO 12 and 14-16. 5 RO 22-23. 6 RO 25. 7 RO 26-27. 8 RO 29. 9 RO 29-30. 10 RO 73-74. 11 RO 77-78. 12 RO 80. 13-15 RO 81. 16 RO 40-44. 17 RO 44. 18 RO 67-68. 19 RO 70. 20 RO 82-84. 21 RO 84. 22 RO 87-88 and 90. 23 RO 91. 24 RO 93-97. 25 RO 96. 26 RO 99-100. 27 RO 100 and 102. 28 RO 112-113. 29 RO 115-116. 30 RO 122. 31 RO 57. 32 RO 47-49. 33 RO 53. 34 RO 54-55. 35 Irrelevant. 36 RO 54. 37 RO 124 and 127. 38 RO 125. 39 RO 126. 40 RO 127. 41 RO 128. SCAN OPTICS' PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT: 1 RO 1. RO 8. RO 9. 4 RO 75-76. 5 RO 76. 6 Irrelevant. 7 RO 10. 8 RO 11 and 26. 9 RO 11. 10 RO 1-2. 11 Irrelevant. 12 RO 3. 13 Hereby accepted. 14 RO 4. 15 RO 5. 16 RO 6. 17 RO 7. 18 RO 8. 19 RO 13. 20 RO 17. 21 RO 18 and 57. 22 RO 19. 23 RO 20. 24 RO 14-16. 25 RO 21. 26 RO 26. 27 RO 27. 28-29 RO 28. 30 Hereby accepted. 31 RO 29. 32 RO 30. 33 RO 32. 34 RO 33. 35 RO 34 and 37. 36 RO 37. 37 RO 38. 38 RO 39. 39 RO 39. The second and third sentences are irrelevant. 40 RO 40. 41 RO 43. 42 RO 44. 43 RO 42 and 44. 44 The first sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. The second sentence is hereby accepted. 45 RO 45. 46 RO 56. 47 RO 57. 48 RO 58. 49 RO 59. 50 RO 60. 51 RO 61. 52 RO 62. 53 RO 52. 54 RO 53. 55 RO 54. 56 RO 63. Irrelevant. Hereby accepted. 59 RO 64. 60-64 Irrelevant. 65 RO 38, 47 and 49. 66 RO 47-49. 67 RO 49-51 and 55. 68 RO 65. 69 Hereby accepted. 70 RO 78. 71 RO 66-68 and 70. 72 Hereby accepted. 73 RO 69. 74 RO 70. 75 RO 71. 76 RO 72. 77 RO 78. 78 The first and last sentences are accepted in RO 78-79. The second sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 79 RO 75. 80 RO 82-84. 81 RO 84. 82 RO 85. 83 RO 92. 84 RO 93. 85 RO 95. 86 RO 96. 87 RO 97. 88 RO 98. 89 RO 99-100. 90 RO 101. 91 RO 100. 92 RO 102. 93 RO 86. 94 RO 87. 95 RO 88-90. 96 RO 103. 97 RO 106. 98 RO 105. 99 RO 106. 100 RO 107. 101 RO 104. 102 RO 105. 103 RO 107. 104 RO 108-109. 105 RO 110. 106 RO 111. 107 RO 112-113. 108 RO 114. 109 RO 113. 110 RO 115. 111 RO 116-117. 112 RO 119. The last sentence is irrelevant. 113 RO 118. 114 RO 121-122 Cumulative. Hereby accepted. 117 RO 123. 118 RO 124. 119 RO 125. 120 RO 126. 121 RO 127. 122 RO 128. 123 RO 129. 124 RO 130. 125 Not a finding of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Edwin F. Blanton, Esquire Post Office Box 12808 Tallahassee, Florida 32317 Hugo Menendez Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security 206 Berkeley Building 2590 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Kenneth H. Hart, Jr., Esquire General Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security Suite 131, Montgomery Building 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0657 Leonard A. Carson, Esquire John D. C. Newton, II, Esquire Mahan Station 1711-D Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas J. McHale, Esquire Gager, Henry & Narkis One Exchange Place Post Office Box 2480 Waterbury, Connecticut 06722
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether alleged statements attributed to the Board of Optometry were made by the Board, and if so, whether the statements constitute unpromulgated rules prohibited by Section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes, (Supp. 1996).
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated as a matter of fact that: The FOA is a not-for-profit Florida corporation whose membership is comprised of optometrists licensed under Chapter 463, Florida Statutes, to practice optometry in Florida. All FOA members are subject to and regulated by the Board of Optometry and its rules. The FOA has approximately 1,022 members. The Board of Optometry is the agency responsible for regulating the optometric practice of all FOA members. Board rules and agency statements of general applicability regulate the optometric practice of all FOA members. Individual members of the FOA, being subject to and regulated by the rules and policy of the Board of optometry, are persons whose substantial interests will be affected by the alleged agency statements and are thus substantially affected persons within the meaning of Section 120.56(1)(e), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1966). As all members of the FOA are subject to and regulated by Board rules and statements of general applicability, a substantial number of the FOA’s members would be substantially affected by the alleged statements. The objective of the FOA is to promote and protect the interests of the general public and licensed optometrists in ensuring the availability of high quality eye care at an affordable price. The FOA represents its members through the provision of education and training, and by participation in administrative proceedings, legislative activities, and court litigation. Petitioner, Brian Lloyd Weber, O.D., is an optometrist licensed and practicing in Florida. Petitioner, 29/49 Optical Inc., (29/49), is a corporation which operates optical establishments in Florida. The Board of Optometry is the state agency in Florida which licenses optometrists and regulates the practice of optometry in this state. On January 29, 1992, the Probable Cause Panel of the Board of Optometry determined there was probable cause to discipline the license of Dr. Weber because of an alleged violation of Section 463.014(1)(b), Florida Statutes, involving the corporate practice of optometry. Thereafter, on February 2, 1992, an Administrative Complaint was filed with the Board which alleged that Dr. Weber had violated the cited statute by engaging in the practice of optometry with a corporation not composed of other health care providers; by entering into a corporate arrangement which permitted an unlicensed person to practice optometry through Dr. Weber, in violation of Rule 21Q-3.008, (now Rule 59V-3.008, Florida Administrative Code); and by holding himself out to the public as available to render professional services in a manner which implies he is professionally associated with an entity which is not a licensed practitioner, also in violation of the Rule. The investigation conducted by the then Department of Professional Regulation, which led up to the action of the panel and the filing of the Administrative Complaint indicated that Dr. Weber owned 250 shares of stock in 29/49, along with an optician, Anthony Record, not licensed to provide optometry services, who also owns stock in the corporation. Allegedly, the corporation operated at five different locations, at one or more of which eye examinations were performed. It was also alleged that 29/49 had publicly advertised itself as an entity which provided complete eye examinations, and that Dr. Weber performed the eye examinations described in the advertisements. In fact, Dr. Weber is a director and officer of 29/49. He holds a 75% ownership share in the corporation. Both Dr. Weber and Mr. Record control the corporation and share the duties and profits of the operation. The firm provides optitianry services, as defined in Sections 484.002(3) and (7), Florida Statutes. Dr. Weber asserts that the operations of 29/49 are separate from the operations of his optometric practice, and claims that the Board’s direction to him to change the corporate structure of 29/49 so as to dissolve his partnership with a lay person is a continuation of what he claims is a long-standing policy of prohibiting the joint ownership of an optitianry between and optometrist and a lay person. Before a hearing was held on the Administrative Complaint, Dr. Weber and counsel for the Board entered into a stipulation which, if accepted by the Board, would have resolved the pending disciplinary action. The stipulation was presented to the Board at its July 8, 1993 meeting, at which time the Board voted to reject it and to propose a counter-stipulation. At that meeting, the Board did not enunciate any of the alleged agency statements at issue here nor did it take a position as to what Dr. Weber must do to rectify the practice situation to its satisfaction. Nonetheless, by Order dated September 9, 1993, the Board formally rejected the proposed stipulation and proposed its own stipulation. On September 12, 1996, Dr. Weber and the Agency’s counsel presented a second stipulation to the Board for settlement of the disciplinary matter, but again the Board voted to reject the stipulation and to offer its own second counter- stipulation. This counter-proposal called for Dr. Weber to change his corporate structure so that he no longer violated the statutory prohibition against practicing optometry with non- licensed individuals, and that he no longer practice with a lay person. This second counter-proposal by the Board did not enunciate any of the alleged agency statements at issue herein. This second counter-proposal was promulgated in an Order of the Board issued on October 15, 1996. Sections 463.014(1)(a)&(b), Florida Statutes, provide: No corporation, lay body, organization, or individual other than a licensed practitioner shall engage in the practice of optometry through the means of engaging the services, upon a salary, commission, or other means or inducement, of any person licensed to practice optometry in this state. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prohibit the association of a licensed practitioner with a multidisciplinary group of licensed health care professionals, the primary objective of which is the diagnosis and treatment of the human body. No licensed practitioner shall engage in the practice of optometry with any corporation, organization, group or lay individual. This provision shall not prohibit licensed practitioners from employing, or from forming partnership or professional associations with, licensed practitioners licensed in this state or with other licensed health care professionals, the primary objective of whom is the diagnosis and treatment of the human body. Consistent therewith, the Board of Optometry has promulgated Rule 59V-3.008, Florida Administrative Code, which implements the provisions of the statute. Rule 59V-3.008, Florida Administrative Code, restates the intent of the legislature regarding the need for licensure of practitioners of optometry, defines a “licensed practitioner”, and thereafter outlines with particularity those actions which may and those which may not be carried on by licensed optometrists in Florida. The rule is quite clear in its definitions and leaves little room for misunderstanding regarding what constitutes the practice of optometry and optometric services; those individuals who must be licensed; what professional activities a licensed practitioner may perform and what activities constitute a violation of Section 463.014,Florida Statutes. Of specific relevance to the issues herein are: (15)(b) Entering into any agreement (whether written or oral) which allows, permits or facilitates an entity which itself is not a licensed practitioner to practice optometry, to offer optometric services to the public, or to control through any means whatever any aspect of the practice of optometry. Allowing, permitting, encouraging, forbearing, or condoning any advertisement including those placed in a newspaper, magazine, brochure, flier, telephone directory, or on television or radio, which implies or suggests that the licensed practitioner is professionally associated or affiliated with an entity which itself is not a licensed practitioner. Occupying or otherwise using professional office space in any manner which does not clearly and sufficiently indicate to the public that his/her practice of optometry is independent of and not associated with an entity which itself is not a licensed practitioner. , (I), and(j), [which all refer with specificity to some action which relates to the practice of optometry by a licensed practitioner with an entity which itself is not a licensed licensed practitioner.] This rule has been challenged in the courts and determined to be a valid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Petitioner claims that pronouncements by the Board of Optometry since the passage of the relevant statute and the promulgation of the relevant rule, including a Declaratory Statement by the Board in response to a Petition therefore by Phillip R. Sidran, O.D. in 1991, found at 13 FALR 4804; and in discussion of members at various meetings of the Board’s Probable Cause Panel; all indicate that the Board has formulated a policy regarding the instant issue which is neither a statute nor a properly promulgated rule. In 1991, Dr. Sidran, a licensed optometrist, sought a declaratory statement from the Board regarding the propriety of having a licensed optician share the revenues and responsibilities deriving from the optical portion of his practice. In its Declaratory Statement, issued on October 9, 1991, the Board specifically referred to and quoted the controlling portions of the statute and the rule which it then interpreted as indicating such an arrangement was prohibited. At no time did the Board promulgate new guidelines or expand the strictures imposed by the existing statute and rule. It applied an existing statute and rule to the factual situation posed by Dr. Sidran and concluded that under the facts of that case, the existing statute and rule prohibited the proposed relationship. The subsequent discussion of that opinion at the meeting of the Board’s Probable Cause Panel, convened on January 29, 1992, to consider proposed disciplinary action against Dr. Weber for the situation described here with 20/49, again interpreted existing statute and rule but did not formulate policy. Petitioner further refers to two additional meetings of the Board of Optometry at its meetings on July 8, 1993 and September 12, 1996, at both of which the members present discussed the situation regarding Dr. Weber’s business relationship in 29/49. He claims that in both situations, the Board members made policy statements which should have been formalized through the promulgation of a rule amendment or supplement. Review of the transcripts of those meeting does not support Dr. Weber’s position, however. It is clear that in each case the Board members examined the facts presented to them, applied the existing statutory and rule provisions to those facts, and concluded that the Petitioner’s actions constituted a violation of existing law. The Board’s position vis a vis Dr. Weber’s business arrangement was made a part of the Board’s counter-proposal to the stipulation of settlement initially agreed to by Dr. Weber and the Department’s counsel. In it’s counter-stipulation, which came out of the September 12, 1996 Board meeting, the Board required Dr. Weber to “... change his corporate structure so he is no longer in violation of Section 463.014(1)(b), Florida Statues, and that [his] practice be changed so that he is no longer practicing with a lay person.”
The Issue The issues are (1) Whether the response of TRAK Engineering, Inc., (TRAK) to the Request for Proposal (RFP) No. SP1587T1 is responsive; and (2) Whether TRAK should be awarded the contract for RFP No. SP1587T1; and (3) If not TRAK, then which vendor should be awarded the contract. Petitioner, Howden Coloney, Inc., (HCI) requested a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, in order to challenge the Department of Transportation's (DOT) decision to award the contract for RFP No. SP1587T1, for procurement and installation of an Automated Fuel Dispensing System (AFDS), to TRAK. HCI presented the testimony of Douglas Coleman, Terry Cappellini, and William Douglas. Petitioner's Exhibits 1-7 and 9-13 were admitted in evidence. TRAK presented the testimony Larry Weinstein, who was accepted as an expert in designing and programming of fuel management systems, which use electrical cable as well as fiber optics. TRAK had Intervenor's Exhibits 1 and 2 admitted in evidence. DOT presented the testimony of Mark Sawicki and William Douglas, together with DOT's Exhibit 1 which was admitted in evidence. The transcript of the proceedings was filed on November 12, 1987. The parties each filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on November 23, 1987. All proposed findings of fact have been considered and a specific ruling on each proposed finding of fact is made in the Appendix attached hereto and made a part of this Recommended Order.
Findings Of Fact The address of Respondent, DOT, is 605 Suwannee Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-32301. The address for the Petitioner, Howden Coloney, Inc., is Post Office Box 5258, Tallahassee, Florida 32314. The address for the Intervenor, TRAM Engineering, Inc., is Post Office Box 20325, Tallahassee, Florida 32316. RFP No. SP1587T1 comprises the subject of the protest filed by the Petitioner. This RFP is entitled "Automated Fuel Dispensing System" and it involves a contract for commodities for the installation of an Automated Fuel Dispensing System at 73 DOT maintenance facilities throughout the State of Florida as well as for the procurement by DOT of 20 mobile AFDS units to be used by DOT in the field at job sites. On July 31, 1987, DOT issued a RFP for an AFDS which stated that submissions in response to the RFP would be opened by DOT on September 15, 1987, at 2:30 p.m. Special conditions of the RFP explained the format that the responses to the RFP should take. The responses were to be divided into a "Technical Proposal" and a "Cost Proposal." The technical proposal by the vendor would consist of three parts: Detailed information of the proposed equipment and software; a work plan for installing and implementing the system; vendor qualifications and experience references. Cost data was not to be supplied in the technical proposal. The cost proposal would be divided into three parts: A bid sheet, showing the cost of each item and the total cost of the system; a vendor's warranty statement; the vendor's proposed service contract which would include a cost quotation for one year covering all parts and labor. The RFP apprised all vendors of how their proposals were to be evaluated. Technical proposals were to be evaluated) by a committee established by DOT. The technical proposals were to be evaluated based upon three categories: Completeness and quality of proposed system hardware and software (50 points); Understanding of the project as demonstrated by the narrative work plan and schedule (25 points); Experience of vendor in installing similar automated fuel systems (15 points). Only technical proposals receiving an overall score of 75 points or higher were to be considered. The highest possible score for the technical proposal could be 100 points. In evaluating the cost proposal, the "net low bid" would receive a score of 100 points. All other cost proposals would receive a score of less than 100 points based on their relationship to the low bid. Cost proposals would be returned unopened to the vendor if the technical proposal score was below 75. The award would be made "...to the responsive and responsible vendor whose proposal received the highest overall score" when the score for the technical proposal and the cost proposal were combined. A tabulation of the submitted proposals for the recommended award was to be posted in the Bureau of Purchasing on September 25, 1987. Five vendors submitted responses to the RFP, including HCI and TRAK. The technical proposals were split into three sections: Section I- Technical; Section II-Work Plan; and Section III-Company Experience. These categories were further subdivided. The "Technical" section of the technical proposal was further subdivided into four parts: Part I- Equipment; Part 2 - System Capabilities; Part 3 - System Features; and Part 4 - Reports and Software. These Parts were comprised of numerous individual items of evaluation, e.q. Central Controller, Pump Island Controller, Encoders, Oil Dispenser, Mobile Controller, etc. Under Section I, Technical, which was divided into four parts, there were 33 individual items of evaluation. DOT's Technical Review Committee ranked these items from 1 to 5, with a 1 being the poorest grade and the 5 being the best grade, unless the Committee could not grade the item at all, in which case it was given a question mark and scored as a O. The scores were tallied for each of the items graded. A perfect score on each item in every category would result in 165 raw points." The actual points received by the vendor in the Technical Section would then be divided by the total number of raw points (165) and multiplied by 50 (the total technical points possible) in order to compute the vendor's grade. For instance, TRAK, which received the highest score in the Technical Section, had 148 raw points. The 148 raw points divided by 165 raw points, multiplied by the 50 maximum possible points resulted in TRAK's score of 45 points. One of the 33 items in the Technical Section of the Technical Proposal was "wiring." For this item, the RFP specification provided: (b) Wiring-the Department shall supply the main source of power for the system. The vendor shall provide all wiring and conduit from the main power source to the system. All data communication lines between the pump island controllers to the or modems [sic] will be supplied by the vendor. Attachment B shows conduit specifications. All wire and cable to be installed underground in conduit. Attachment B to the bid specification shows (by drawings) that the conduit in which "wires and cables" were to be enclosed was to be PVC (plastic) conduit except where conduit was to run under railroad tracks. TRAK provided in its technical proposal the following: XI.b. Trak will provide all wiring and conduit for the routing of power to the pump controllers. Trak will provide all communication cables. Some non-electrical cables (Fiber Optic) may be direct buried. All wiring will be done in accordance with the National Electric Code. HCI provided in its technical proposal that the installation crew will "pull all necessary power conductors and communication cables..." through conduit. Of the five vendors who submitted proposals to the RFP, TRAK received the highest score on the technical proposal. TRAK received 93 out of 100 possible points on their technical response to the RFP and HCI received 85 points on their technical response to the RFP (the lowest of the vendors who met the minimum required score of 75 points in order to be considered as a possible successful bidder). On Section I-Technical of the technical proposal to the RFP, TRAK received 45 out of 50 points which was the highest score received by any vendor. Under the category of "Wiring" in Section I, TRAK received a 5 (the highest possible score for that individual category) and HCI received a 3 (the lowest score given in that category, which all vendors other than TRAK received). Mark Sawicki, Professional Engineer with DOT, was involved in the development of the AFDS specifications and was part of the technical committee which evaluated the vendors' responses to the technical proposals of the RFP. Sawicki believed that this last sub-part of the wiring specification ("All wire and cable to be installed underground in conduit") was a relatively minor point. According to Sawicki, this is "especially" a "relatively minor point" on the pump islands. On April 20, 1987, before this RFP was issued, Douglas Coleman, Program Manager of HCI, wrote Sawicki and among other questions asked the following questions: 8. Do all power communication conductors have to be enclosed in conduits? Does this include fiber optic conductors? How deep should conduits be? The RPF bid specifications provide, in pertinent part the following: No negotiations, decisions, or actions shall be initiated or executed by a vendor as a result of any discussions with any Department employee. Only those communications which are in writing from the Department may be considered as a duly authorized expression on behalf of the Department. Sawicki does not recall seeing the HCI letter of April 20, 1987, nor does he recall whether the RFP specifications regarding conduit were drafted before or after the letter. William E. Douglas, Professional Engineer and Engineer of Central Support Operations for DOT, was involved in the evaluation of the technical proposal on the RFP involved in this case. Before this bid protest, if someone had asked Mr. Douglas about wire and cable, he would not have thought of fiber optics. TRAK was the only company which submitted a proposal which involved the use of fiber optics. Fiber optics is solid plastic or glass encased plastic with the property of total internal reflection, which means that light passes through it even if it is bent or twisted around. In TRAK's system, fiber optics is used to run control and communication lines on fuel islands and connect various aspects of the system. TRAK uses fiber optics because it is safe to use on a fuel pump island and avoids electrical damage and electrical noise. Its advantages over electrical wire or electrical cable are that it is not subject to receiving radiation which would disrupt electrical wire and that it can be run on a fuel pump island safely. Mark Sawicki was aware of the advantages of fiber optics and rated fiber optics more favorably because of its technical advantage over the traditional electrical wiring systems. According to DOT Engineer William E. Douglas, DOT specifically chose to issue a Request for Proposal as opposed to an Invitation to Bid. The AFDS that DOT sought was "highly technical" and the Department: ...felt that it was better to take advantage of the state of the art by asking for Requests for Proposals where we could evaluate the various vendors and their ability to give us a workable system, and thereby hopefully pick the best system for the least price. Because of the issuance of the RFP, the rating or scoring criteria discussed previously was developed. TRAK's bid was $891,061, without the service contract. With the service contract, TRAK's bid was $959,141. On the cost proposal ranking, TRAK received the highest possible score of 100 points due to its being the lowest bid amount. When combined with the Technical Proposal rating of 93 points, TRAK's total score was 193 points. HCI's bid was $947,696, without the service contract. With the service contract, its bid was $1,048,421. On the cost proposal, HCI received 94 points. HCI received a total of 179 points on the bid tabulation, which represented 94 points on its cost proposal and 85 points on its Technical Proposal. Engineering Systems, Inc., received a total point score of 179, which included 90 points for its cost proposal and 89 points for its Technical Proposal. Tech 21 Inc., received 67 points on its Technical Proposal. Pursuant to the rules of the RFP, its cost proposal was not opened because it received less than 75 points on its Technical Proposal. The Technical Proposals were opened on September 15, 1987. The bid tabulation with the cost proposals were posted on September 25, 1987. On September 30, 1987, HCI transmitted to DOT a formal protest letter. DOT employee Terry Cappellini called representatives of TRAK to tell them that DOT had received a protest from HCI, explained the nature of the protest, and suggested that TRAK send DOT "something in writing to assure [DOT] that [TRAK] would put all cable in conduit...." This action was taken by Mr. Cappellini after conferring with Mr. Douglas. Mr. Douglas interpreted TRAK's response to the wiring category to be the amount of conduit under the pump islands. Hence, DOT interpreted this to be "a very minor amount of conduit." TRAK responded with a letter dated October 2, 1987, which indicated that TRAK would include under the heading of "Wire and cable to be installed underground in conduit," fiber optic lines referenced in its response to the RFP. At the formal hearing on October 26, 1987, Douglas Coleman was HCI's chief witness, but was not qualified as an expert in any area or field of expertise. Mr. Coleman testified that he only "gathered" or "coordinated" figures and data, but that he did not originate them. All of the figures testified to by Mr. Coleman were based on the cost or price of metal conduit, not PVC (plastic conduit) as Attachment B requires. HCI does not direct bury wire. Coleman also stated that in some instances (where telephone lines were available) HCI "reserved the option" to not "lay conduit in those particular situations." HCI's experience is limited to the installation of one electric cable fuel management system for the United States Air Force in and around 1981. HCI did not bid a fiber optic system and has no "current" system using fiber optics. In testifying to the figures that Mr. Coleman "gathered," such figures included HCI's overhead. No expert witnesses testified at the hearing on behalf of HCI as to the costs of laying conduit or cable. According to Mr. Coleman's testimony, $40,000 in special equipment was included in the figures he testified to as HCI's costs of placing electrical cable in underground conduit. The RFP did not call for the purchase of equipment by a vendor in order to respond to the RFP. Mr. Coleman, testifying on behalf of HCI, did not provide dollar figures for the costs of fiber optic line. Mr. Coleman's figures for the installation of fiber optic cables were based on estimated costs for HCI to place fiber optics in metal conduit, albeit HCI has no experience with fiber optics. According to Mr. Coleman, neither he nor technicians at HCI inspected TRAK project sites to determine TRAK's method of installing fiber optics. However, Mr. Coleman "guessed" that it would cost HCI approximately $80,000 to direct bury fiber optics as compared to $236,000 to place its electrical cable in metal conduit underground. According to Mr. Douglas, even if wire were direct buried, the labor costs associated with such direct burial would be "fairly close to the same" costs that would be incurred in burying conduit because it would still be necessary to dig down to approximately the same depth and engage in the same labor. TRAK's Vice President, Larry Weinstein, was qualified as an expert in the design and programming of Fuel Management Systems which use electrical cable as well as fiber optics. Mr. Weinstein prepared TRAK's response to the DOT RFP. Article 770 of the National Electric Code allows fiber optic cables or lines to be run in the same conduits as power or electrical cables. In responding to the RFP specifications regarding wiring, Mr. Weinstein had to interpret the language relating to the wiring requirement. In TRAK's situation, because TRAK was the only company using fiber optics, Mr. Weinstein had to interpret whether the statement related to fiber optics since there was no reference therein to fiber optics. Mr. Weinstein testified that in TRAK's Technical Proposal, in response to DOT's RFP and Bid Specification regarding wiring, he "literally wanted to avoid indicating that TRAK wasn't going to meet the specifications." TRAK's cost proposal included the costs of placing all wiring, i.e., fiber optics and electrical, in conduit pursuant to DOT's statement regarding wiring. Mr. Weinstein testified that TRAK calculated its price based on the assumption that [TRAK] would have to run everything, including the on-the- island work, in conduit. [TRAK] hoped to avoid it. It did not make a large cost difference, but [TRAK] assumed that [it] would, and it is part of [TRAK's] standard installation. TRAK's cost proposal included its full installation price. Mr. Weinstein testified that the difference in placing all the fiber optics lines in conduit and placing "some" fiber optics lines that "may" be direct buried would be approximately $10,000. In arriving at its unit installation price, TRAK, based upon its experience, has arrived at an installation charge which it applies universally. Because of TRAK's experience and the manner in which they determine the costs of their installations, there was no need to visit the individual job sites, particularly since DOT supplied a layout of each fuel pump island. TRAK did not have to purchase any equipment in order to perform the installations required for this RFP.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order denying the protest of Howden Coloney, Inc., and awarding the contract for RFP No. SP1587T1 to TRAK Engineering, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of December, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of December, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-4423BID The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, Howden Coloney, Inc. Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 3(5); 4(4); 5(22); 7(16); 9(18); 10(28 & 29); 12(28 & 29); 18(44); and 27(33). Proposed findings of fact 1, 2, 8, 14-17, 19-24, and 26 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. Proposed findings of fact 6 and 13 are rejected as being unsupported by the competent, substantial evidence. Proposed findings of fact 11 and 25 are rejected as being unnecessary and/or irrelevant. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent, Department of Transportation 1. Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1-5 (1-4); 6- 23(5-22); 24-33(24-33); 34-39(35-40); 40(41-43); 41(44); and 42(45). Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Intervenor, TRAK Engineering, Inc. Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1-3 (5); 4(6); 5(7); 6 & 7 (8); 8 & 9 (9); 10-12(10); 13 & 14(11); 15 (12); 16 18(13); 19(14); 20 & 21(15); 22 & 23 (16); 24(17); 25(18); 26(19); 27(36); 29(36); 30(16); 31-35(20); 36 (21); 37 (16); 38 & 39 (21); 40 & 41(22); 42 & 43 (23); 45-47(24); 48-52(25); 53 & 54(26); 55(27); 56-58(28); 59-61(29); 62(30); 63(31); 64(32); 65-67(33); 68(36); 70(35); 71-78(36); 79(37); 80 & 81(38); 82(39); 86(36); 87 & 88 (39); 89(40); 90-92(41); 93-94(42); 97-99(43); 100 & 101 (44); 102(45); and 103 & 104(44). Proposed findings of fact 28, 44, 69, 83-85, and 95 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. Proposed findings of fact 96 and 105 are rejected as being unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas J. Cassidy, III Senior Litigation Attorney Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 William E. Williams, Esquire 111 North Calhoun St. Tallahassee, Florida 32302 David P. Gauldin, Esquire Post Box 142 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Kaye North Henderson, Secretary Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue At issue is whether petitioner's application to take the examination required for licensure as an optician should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Silverstone seeks licensure through the apprenticeship program. His organized sponsor indicated he only supplied initial sponsorship forms. The vast majority of the hours Mr. Silverstone claims were not certified by his sponsor whose signature was forged.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be rendered approving petitioner's application to take the examination required for licensure as an optician, and imposing an administrative fine of $1,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of June, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of June, 1997.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence produced at hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was licensed to practice optometry by the State of Florida, Board of Optometry. On or about May 8, 1980, Respondent entered into a lease agreement with Cole National Corporation to lease 154 square feet of space as an optometric office in the location of the retail store of Sears, Roebuck and Co. at 1420 Northwest 23rd Boulevard, Gainesville, Florida. Respondent practiced in that location approximately two days per week until on or about October 1, 1982. Respondent's optometric office was located in a Sears, Roebuck retail store next door to the "Sears Optical Department," in which eyeglasses and contact lenses and other optical merchandise could be purchased. Respondent's office was identified by a large sign overhead reading "Optometrist," in the same print as the sign above the Sears Optical Department. In addition, a small plaque on the door leading into Respondent's examination room read "Dr. L. A. Schwartz, Optometrist." During the time he practiced at the 1420 Northwest 23rd Boulevard location of Sears, appointments could be made with Respondent by calling the Sears Optical Department telephone number. The phone was answered "Sears Contact and Lenses Center" by employees of Cole National Corporation, which controlled and owned the Sears Optical Department. The Cole employees were not paid for this service by Respondent. Respondent had no telephone listing in either the yellow or white pages of the Gainesville, Florida, telephone directory between May, 1980, and July 12, 1982, the date of the Administrative Complaint. The Cole National Corporation employees maintained Respondent's scheduling book and made tentative appointments for his prospective patients, although Respondent customarily would call the patient back to confirm the date and time of the appointment prior to the time of the scheduled visit. Respondent's hours of service and fee information were also given to prospective optometric patients by Cole National personnel. Respondent accepted the Sears, Roebuck and Co. credit card as payment for optometric services. Sears then billed the patients directly and Respondent received monies billed to the patients in full through Sears on a monthly basis, regardless of whether the patient paid the bill fully monthly or carried the debt over to succeeding months. Respondent, pursuant to his lease with Cole National Corporation, was precluded from selling optometric supplies to his patients. Rather, Respondent would in all cases issue prescriptions for optometric goods and supplies, such as glasses and contact lenses, which in most cases were placed on a prescription blank bearing his name. At times, however, when Respondent did not have prescription forms available bearing his own name, he would use such a form from the Sears Optical Department, crossing out all references to Sears and inserting his name and address in place of that of Sears Optical Department. On or about February 22, 1982, the Sears Optical Department mailed letters to various consumers in the Gainesville area. These letters, in part, advised that Respondent, an independent doctor of optometry, was available for eye examinations in his private office in the Sears building and that he could be reached for appointments at a telephone number which was listed in the telephone directory for Sears Optical Department. The evidence in this cause establishes that Respondent's office location at all times material hereto was maintained separately from both Sears, Roebuck and Co. and the Sears Optical Department. In addition, the record in this cause fails to in any way establish that Respondent ever held himself out as an employee or representative of either Sears, Roebuck and Co. or the Sears Optical Department. In fact, the record clearly establishes that both Respondent and employees of the Sears Optical Department always indicated to the consuming public that Respondent was an independent optometric practitioner.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a membership organization that charges membership dues. Petitioner applied for sales tax exemption as an "educational institution." Petitioner's witness conceded that the organization does not "exactly fit" the statutory criteria for an educational institution exemption. During the review process with respect to each application for exemption, the Department of Revenue looks not only at the category marked on the application, which in this case was "educational institution," but also reviews the facts of the applicant's case to see if any other exemption category applies. In this case, the Department found no tax-exempt category for which Petitioner would qualify. Petitioner is not a religious organization. Petitioner is not a scientific organization. Petitioner performs its educational function by encouraging rational examination of various issues through sponsored monthly luncheon forums and other discussion groups. Petitioner provides "scholarships" to high school students and their teachers to attend Petitioner's monthly luncheon forums. Petitioner's forums are broadcast on radio and cable television. However, Petitioner is not an educational television or radio network or system, nor is it a nonprofit educational cable consortium. Petitioner does not hold any formal classes. Petitioner does not provide any of the following: medical aid; physical necessities; services for the prevention of, or rehabilitation of persons from, alcoholism or drug abuse, or for the prevention of suicide, or for the alleviation of mental, physical or sensory health problems; social welfare services; medical research; or food, shelter, and medical care for animals, or adoption services for animals. Petitioner does provide educational programs concerning animals about once every other year. Petitioner is not a State tax-supported school, a church school, or parochial school. Petitioner also is not either a nonprofit private school, or a college, or a university. Petitioner is not a nonprofit private school which conducts regular classes and courses of study which are accepted for continuing education credit by an accrediting authority. Petitioner is not a nonprofit library, art gallery or museum open to the public. Petitioner is not a nonprofit newspaper circulated primarily on federally-exempt university or college campuses. Petitioner is not a private nonprofit corporation that raises funds for grade schools, high schools, colleges or universities. Petitioner is not a state, district, or other governing or administrative office existing to assist or regulate the customary activities of educational organizations. Petitioner is not a veterans' organization.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a Final Order ratifying its initial denial of a consumer's certificate of exemption to Petitioner. RECOMMENDED this 18th day of November, 1996, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of November, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Florida Free Speech Forum, Inc. c/o ALICE PRIMACK 3657 NW 40th Place Gainesville, Florida 32605 Kent Weissinger, Esquire, and Ruth Ann Smith, Esquire Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Linda Lettera, Esquire Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue At issue is whether Respondent materially failed to follow applicable ruling making procedures required by Section 120.54(2)(a), Florida Statutes, with regard to promulgation of proposed Rule 21P-16.002, Florida Administrative Code, relating toqualifications of sponsors for apprentice opticians; whether the proposed rule is an invalid exercise of delegated authority by Respondent; and whether Petitioners are parties substantially affected by the proposed rule.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for regulation of an apprenticeship program for candidates desiring licensure as opticians in the State of Florida. The apprenticeship program provides an alternate route to qualification to take the examination for licensure as an optician. Candidates may also qualify for examination by receipt of an associate degree in opticianry from an accredited educational institution or previous practice and licensure in other jurisdictions. Candidates electing to pursue licensure examination through the apprenticeship program as currently established must comply with provisions of Rule 21P-16.002, Florida Administrative Code. The current version of Rule 21P-16.002, Florida Administrative Code, states: 21P-16.002 Qualifications for Apprentices and Sponsors. Apprentices and sponsors for apprenticeship programs must meet the following qualifications: An apprentice must be at least 17 years old at the date of application; must submit a complete application for apprenticeship along with proof of having obtained a qualified sponsor; and must submit the registration fee required in Rule 21P-11.013. A sponsor must be an optician, a physician or an optometrist licensed in this state, whose license is not subject to any current disciplinary action; must be actively engaged in the practice of the qualifying profession; and must provide the equipment set forth in Rule 21P-10.007 on the premises of any establishment in which apprentices are trained. Proposed Rule 21P-16.002, makes no changes to the existing sponsorship requirements found in paragraphs (1) and (2) of the present rule, but adds a new paragraph (3) which specifies the following: (3) No optician, physician or optometrist may serve as a sponsor unless he actually dispenses eyewear and maintains the required equipment on the same premises where the apprentice works. For example, an optician, physician or optometrist whose premises and equipment are distinct from the intended apprentice's work area cannot serve as a sponsor, even though the optician's, physician's or optometrist's premises are within the same office area or building. The proposed rule seeks to implement Section 484.007(1)(d)4., Florida Statutes, which provides an applicant may qualify to take the state opticianry licensure examination following completion of a three year apprenticeship "under the supervision of an optician, a physician, or an optometrist licensed under the laws of this state." Through promulgation of the new rule, Respondent seeks to correct a perceived deficiency in the degree of supervision provided by some sponsors to their apprentice opticians. The new proposed rule seeks to correct such deficiency through the prohibition of separate or "distinct" work areas for sponsor and apprentice; the requirement that the sponsor "dispense eyewear"; and the requirement for the sponsor to "maintain the equipment" used by the apprentice on the premises where both apprentice and sponsor work. Petitioners are corporate entities licensed to do business in the State of Florida. Petitioners operate various retail optical establishments engaged in providing opticianry services. While not licensed to perform opticianry services, Petitioners employ opticians and apprentice opticians for that purpose. Petitioners also have contractual relationships with licensed optometrists for the provision of optometric services at Petitioners' retail establishments. The employed opticians and contracted optometrists often act as sponsors for apprentice opticians employed in Petitioners' retail establishments. Generally, Petitioners' retail establishments haveseparated areas for optometry services, dispensing of eye wear and a laboratory for the preparation of lenses. In the various establishments, these areas are separated from each other by a permanent wall constructed of either glass or other solid, opaque substance. Two to four licensed opticians are employed in each of Petitioners' retail establishments. Each of these individual opticians, or a licensed optometrist under contract, may sponsor an apprentice optician employed by Petitioners. Often the sponsoring professional is otherwise occupied in these establishments and the apprentice, who is also generally an employee, may be required to perform certain functions without direct supervision by the sponsor. The proposed rule's requirement that a sponsor actually "dispense eyewear" results from Respondent's position that a sponsor should actually be performing that task in order to properly train an apprentice in the performance of that procedure. The proposed rule's requirement that a sponsor "maintains the required equipment on the same premises where the apprentice works" dictates that a sponsor must own the equipment used by the apprentice or otherwise be responsible for the provision of that equipment. Such a requirement may effectively prohibit opticians and optometrists employed by Petitioner from serving as sponsors where those employees do not own and are not otherwise responsible for providing, generally, the "required equipment" on the premises of Petitioners' various establishments. Petitioners argue that such de facto denial of sponsorship opportunities to opticians, optomertrists and physicians employed by them contravenes the statutory provision of Section 484.007(1)(d)4, Florida Statutes, that an apprenticeship be completed under the supervision of "an optician, a physician, or optomertrist licensed under the laws of this state." Such an argument is not credited in the absence of expressed legislative intent to grant sponsorship status to any of the licensed professionals denominated in the statute. Specifically, it is found that the referenced statutory provision sets a minimum requirement for sponsorship, as opposed to a limitation to establishment of further qualifications. Respondent's economic impact statement was prepared by counsel. Respondent's position, as expressed through testimony of its executive director, is that the proposed rule has no discernible direct adverse economic impact, although testimony presented by Petitioners supports the finding that the proposed rule change shall require at least some alteration of the physical arrangement at some of Petitioners' retail establishments in the event that Petitioners desire to continue present apprentice programs in their businesses.
Findings Of Fact David R. Ness, Petitioner, attended Southern College of Optometry in Memphis, Tennessee, and graduated in May 1990. Part of his training included a three-month externship with James C. Lanier, O.D., an optometrist practicing in Jacksonville, Florida. Dr. Lanier found him a very competent student, thorough in his fact finding and case histories; and satisfactory, if not above average, in his examination of the patients. Dr. Lanier did not participate in the grading of the examination in issue and has no personal knowledge of Petitioner's performance on the examination. Petitioner sat for the September 1990 Optometry licensure examination. He passed the certification portion of the examination and the laws and rules section; he failed the pharm./ocular portion and the clinical portion. After several challenges to the examination, the Board adjusted some scores, but Petitioner's scores in the pharm./ocular section and the clinical sections were still below passing. Written Examination The pharmacology/ocular written portion of the examination consists of a series of case histories, with five questions directed to each. Petitioner explained that he challenged his score on the following specific questions: History #1, question #4; History #5; question #23; History #7, questions #32-35; and History #10, question #48. Case history #1 describes a 19-year old female soft contact lens wearer with symptoms correctly identified by Petitioner as Giant Papillary Conjunctivitis. The patient relies on her contact lenses because she is an actress. The severity of her condition is 3+ on a scale of 1-4, with four being the most severe. Question #4 requires selection from six choices of the initial management course of choice. Petitioner chose "c", Pred Forte suspension, every two hours. Pred Forte is the strongest commercially available steroid and its application every two hours is reserved for very severe cases. While the condition described is moderate to severe, the better answer is "f", "switch to preservative free system, enzyme cleaning 1 time a week". The patient's cleaning solution, described in the case history, is an old solution with a preservative which is known to cause conjunctivitis. While the safest course would be to discontinue contact lens wear, this is a radical option for a patient who must wear the lenses for her work. The preferred course then is to change the solution to see if the condition improves before moving to a less conservative treatment such as Pred Forte. Case history #5 describes symptoms and includes a color photograph of the eye in issue. Petitioner correctly identified the differential diagnosis as "Essential Iris Atrophy" and "Reiger's Anomaly". The next question, #23, states that the fellow eye shows similar findings in a slit lamp examination, and asks which of the differential diagnoses is the final diagnosis. Petitioner selected "Essential Iris Atrophy". The correct answer is "Reiger's anomaly". Essential Iris Atrophy is almost always unilateral and Reiger's is bilateral. The question required the examinee to know this distinction. Case history #7, describes a 37-year old patient with alleged recent vision field loss which occurred after thoracic surgery. The history describes an examination in which the patient remarks that he "isn't going to sue the physician" and where, with coaxing, his vision is much better than he admits. The patient also presented summary results of carotid artery testing and CT studies, which were normal. In his answers to questions 32-35, Petitioner chose diagnoses and treatment based on his conviction that he should try to help anyone who would come to him. He missed the fact that the patient described in the case history is a malingerer who likely is trying to sue his surgeon, and who requires no treatment. Case history #10 describes a 68-year old patient who is being examined for fitting of an extended wear contact lens. The best corrected vision is 20/50 OD, with or without a contact lens. The examination question includes two photographs, one of the fundus examination, the other of a fluorescein angiogram. An angiogram is obtained by injecting dye in the forearm and taking pictures with a special filter as the dye circulates through the blood vessels within the eye. This process is able to reveal abnormalities in the eye. Petitioner missed the question relating to the final diagnosis, which should have been "age-related macular degeneration with secondary choroidal neovascular membrane". Final diagnosis relied, in part, on the fluorescein angiogram. While Petitioner is not arguing that his answer is correct, he contends that the question itself is invalid, because it depends on a process which optometrists are not licensed to perform and it was too technical for recent graduates. People coming out of school have been exposed to live patients and have seen fluorescein angiograms performed and have seen their photographs. Moreover, in Florida, the number of elderly patients makes it necessary that optometrists be proficient in diagnosing age-related macular degeneration. The Practical/Clinical Examination Section 1 of the clinical portion of the practical examination involves the two examiners' review of the examinee's performance of an actual eye examination of a live patient. The two examiners are briefed extensively prior to the examination as to what to look for, but they do not confer during the examination when scoring various functions. For this reason, there may be disagreement between the two examiners. The scores are averaged. On section 1, item #6, with regard to the patient's case history, "follow-up information", the point spread is 0-7, with points being subtracted for failure to follow up on certain information. One examiner gave Petitioner the maximum number of points for the entire case history section. The other examiner gave Petitioner a "no" (0 points) under "personal ocular history", and commented on the examination score sheet that the examinee did not ask ocular history. The same examiner took off 2 points on item #6, "follow-up information" and commented, "did not ask ocular history". At some point during Petitioner's initial challenge, he was given credit for item #3, because it was determined that he did obtain an ocular history. The additional points were not restored to item #6, but should have been; as the failure to obtain that history is the basis for the reduced score. The examiner was not present at hearing to explain any other basis. Section 2 of the clinical portion of the practical examination requires the examinee to perform a series of functions under the scrutiny of two examiners (not the same two as in section 1). Again, the scores are awarded without consultation and there are discrepancies. In each area the examiner marks "yes" or "no" as to whether the procedure is properly performed. A "no" must be supported with the examiner's comment. Two yes marks entitle the examinee to 2 points; a yes/no is worth one point; and two no's are scored zero. For each function, the examinee must demonstrate twice. That is, he says "ready", and the first examinee views the result, then he prepares again and signals, "ready", for the second examiner. For section 2, the candidate is performing techniques or functions on his own patient, a patient whom he brings to the examination and with whom he is familiar. Petitioner is challenging the grading method for Section 2. In 6 out of 16 techniques or functions, the two examinees disagreed; that is, one gave a "yes", and the other, a "no". Petitioner contends that he should get full credit anytime he got one "yes", since that indicates that two people, the examinee and one examiner, agree. There are several reasons why two examiners may disagree on whether the examinee performed a function or technique properly. In some instances one examiner may give the individual the benefit of the doubt; in other cases the patient might move or blink or the examinee might lose his focus. The fact that two examiners independently assess the results gives the examinee two chances to demonstrate his skill. The third section of the clinical examination requires an examination of a live patient where the refractive error of the patient's vision is determined, and a prescription is made. Before being presented to the examinee, the patient is examined independently by three licensed optometrists serving as "monitors". Their examinations give the refraction results against which the examinee's results are compared. Their examinations also determine whether the patient is suitable; that is, the eye must be refracted correctable to 20/20 and the other eye correctable to 20/50. A fourth monitor reviews the results before the patient is presented to the examinee. In this case the patient was examined by the monitors and was found acceptable. Petitioner had problems with the patient; the best he could read was the 20/25 line. Petitioner felt that the patient should have been disqualified and commented in writing on that at the end of his examination, as was appropriate. The comments were reviewed by Dr. Attaway, who considered that the patient had met the criteria when examined by the monitors. Petitioner's refractions varied significantly from the monitors' refractions, which also varied somewhat from each other. Petitioner received a score of 3, out of possible 20, on this portion of the examination. Dr. Attaway did not, himself, examine the patient and the monitors who performed the examinations were not present to testify. The only evidence to rebut Petitioner's findings was the written report of the monitors. Pass Rate for the Examination Out of 130 candidates, approximately 34 percent passed all parts of the September optometry examination. In 1986, 51 percent passed; in 1987, 33.5 percent passed; in 1988, 59.6 percent passed; and in 1989, 52 percent passed. These figures do not, alone, establish that the test is too technical or unfair, nor does the fact that very good students failed. When the examinations are evaluated, when the examinee's performance is rated, there is no established pass rate; the monitors have no idea how close the individual examinee is to passing, either originally or when a challenge is being addressed. Petitioner was a very articulate and candid witness. His two experts were clearly knowledgeable and were sincerely concerned that he should be licensed. None had the experience of Respondent's witnesses, also well-qualified licensed optometrists, in working with the examination. With the exception of the inconsistent score on Section 1, item #6, Petitioner failed to prove that he is entitled to a higher score on any portion of the examination, or that the examination itself was invalid or unfair.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, recommended that Petitioner's final score on Section 1 of the clinical examination be adjusted to reflect full credit for Item #6; that he be permitted to retake Section 3 of the clinical examination; and that his remaining challenges to the examination be denied. RECOMMENDED this 29th day of May, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of May, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 91-0700 The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties: Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1.-2. Adopted in paragraph 2. 3. Adopted in substance in paragraph 20. 4.-6. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in summary in paragraph 2. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. Finding of Fact #15 reflects the grades after adjustment. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 1. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as irrelevant. This fact does not make the examination invalid so long as it fairly evaluates the qualification of the applicant. 13.-14. Rejected as statements of statutory language rather than findings of fact. Respondent's Proposed Findings The Hearing Officer is unable to find where in the record the exact final score of Petitioner is reflected. Adopted in paragraph 1. Rejected as restatement of testimony rather than findings of fact. 4.-5. Rejected as unnecessary. 6.-15. Rejected as restatement of testimony; summary statements, or argument, rather than findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: David R. Ness 611 Poinsettia Avenue Titusville, FL 32780 Vytas J. Urba, Esquire Dept. of Professional Regulation 1940 N. Monroe St., Ste. 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Patricia Guilford, Exec. Director Dept. of Professional Regulation Board of Optometry 1940 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Jack McRay, General Counsel Dept. of Professional Regulation 1940 N. Monroe St., Ste. 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
The Issue Prior to hearing, Respondent moved to dismiss the administrative complaint. This motion was granted in part and denied in part for the reasons stated in the order dated June 22, 1982. Those portions of the amended complaint asserting violation of Sections 484.03 and 484.09, Florida Statutes, were stricken by an order dated June 22, 1982, leaving only the allegation that the Respondent misrepresented material information on his application contrary to Section 484.014(1)(a), Florida Statutes. This was the only issue remaining for resolution at the hearing. Specifically, the factual dispute surrounded the representation by Respondent on his application that he had done his apprenticeship at House of Vision in South Hadley, Massachusetts, between 1973 and 1976. The Board of Opticianry asserted that the Respondent had not done his apprenticeship as he had represented. The parties submitted proposed findings of fact, memoranda of law and proposed recommended orders. To the extent the proposed findings of fact have not been included in the factual findings in this order, they are specifically rejected as being irrelevant, not being based upon the most credible evidence, or not being a finding of fact.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Gilbert Rosenbrier, is a licensed optician under the laws of the State of Florida, holding License #DO 0001378 issued by the Board of Opticianry. On or about December 2, 1977, Respondent filed an application for admission to the licensure examination in ophthalmic dispensing with the Florida State Board of Dispensing Opticians (now Board of Opticianry). A copy of said application was received as Petitioner's Exhibit #2. Respondent's application contains a form for reporting experience in ophthalmic dispensing under a licensed optician, optometrist or physician. The Respondent completed such a form as follows: Print full name: Gilbert Rosenbrier Street Address: 7825 Red Road Miami FL Title of position held: Optician Employed in position from: Nov 1973 to August 1976 Print full name of employer: House of Vision Full address of employer: Mountain Farms Mall, So Hadley Mass Print full name of supervisor: Harry Marsh Full address of supervisor (if different from employer): Presently: 7825 Red Road, Miami Fl. 33143 Check the type of establishment or office: (applicant indicated) Ophthalmic dispensers Check the specific duties of applicant and give approximate time (in hours) engaged in each during a normal work week of approximately 40 hours: (Applicant indicated) Fitting and adjusting spectacles to human faces 15 hours; Interpreting prescriptions and verifying optical calculations 10 hours; Optical laboratory work (Manufacturing) 15 hours House of Vision was owned by Harry Marsh. Marsh sold it to Kent Whalen. Whalen worked for Marsh and House of Vision of Mountain Farms Mall in South Hadley, Massachusetts, from May of 1974, until Whalen purchased the business in late 1976. Whalen knew the Respondent as a neighbor of Marsh's but only saw the Respondent in the store on two occasions, late in 1976. Whalen stated that to the best of his knowledge Respondent was never an employee of House of Vision. The Respondent testified in his own behalf. He had become interested in opticianry in 1973 by virtue of his association with his neighbor, Marsh. At that time, Respondent had started working at House of Vision with Marsh at a time when the Respondent was supervisor of an educational consulting firm and could set his own hours. Marsh's store had to be open during the hours the mall was open, and Marsh needed the Respondent's help. In the spring of 1974, Respondent needed to spend more time with his business but still wanted to learn about opticianry. Marsh agreed to provide Respondent with optical equipment of the type used at the store, which Respondent placed in his basement, in exchange for Respondent's promise that the would invest money in a venture with Marsh at a later date. This equipment was used by Respondent to perform the shaping of lenses, assembly of frames, tinting of lenses, etc., under Marsh's supervision in the afternoons, on weekends, and during Respondent's other free time. In addition, Respondent would go to the store on weekends and help Marsh when Whalen was off. Marsh sold the store in November of 1976, and he and Respondent came to Florida, where Respondent did invest money in a joint venture with Marsh in the opticianry business. Witnesses who had known Respondent and had visited his home between 1973 and 1976, corroborated the fact that the Respondent had optical laboratory equipment in his basement during that time, had spent his spare time working with this equipment, and had made one of the witnesses a pair of glasses using frames picked out at House of Vision. Respondent did not spend his time doing a specific task while he was learning opticianry, but started with simple procedures such as tinting and assembling frames and progressed to making patterns for grinding lenses, shaping, and grinding lenses in his basement lab. He obtained his experience in fitting glasses and selling at the store prior to the spring of 1974, and after that date when he worked with Marsh on weekends. Respondent did not mention drawing a salary from Marsh but gave the impression that this time was traded to Marsh for Marsh's expertise in teaching him. The Respondent has a doctorate degree in an academic area and was engaged in academic work and consultant work for years prior to 1973.
Recommendation Having found that the statute under which the Board of Opticianry seeks to discipline the Respondent, Gilbert Rosenbrier, was passed after the alleged acts occurred upon which the complaint is based, it is recommended that the Board dismiss the amended administrative complaint and take no action. DONE and ORDERED this 3rd day of September, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of September, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Tina Hipple, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Lionel Barnet, Esquire Miller Square 13842 Southwest 56 Street Miami, Florida 33183 H. Fred Varn, Executive Director Board of Opticianry 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Samuel R. Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER =================================================================
