The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's son is eligible for assistance from the Developmental Services Program.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background In this proceeding, Petitioner, Donald Hall, Sr., has appealed an eligibility decision of Respondent, Department of Children and Family Services (Department), which denied an application for mental retardation assistance for his son, Donald Hall, Jr. (Don), now almost 21 years of age, under the Developmental Services Program (Program). As a ground, the Department simply stated that the son was "not eligible for assistance." As clarified at hearing, Respondent takes the position that Don does not meet the statutory definition of a retarded person and therefore he does not qualify for assistance. The test for assistance The Program provides services to persons with specific developmental disabilities, such as mental retardation, cerebral palsy, spina bifida, and autism. In order to be eligible for mental retardation assistance, an individual must meet the definition of "retardation," as that term is defined in Section 393.063(44), Florida Statutes (1999). That provision defines the term as meaning "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the period from conception to age 18." As further defined by the same statute, the term "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning" means "performance which is two or more standard deviations from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test specified in the rules of the department." In this case, the mean score is 100, and the standard deviation is 15; thus, an individual must have general intellectual functioning of at least two deviations below 100, or a score of less than 70, in order to qualify under this part of the definition. To determine intellectual functioning, standardized testing is performed; one such test is the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (Wechsler), as revised from time to time, which was administered to Don. "Adaptive behavior" is defined as "the effectiveness or degree with which an individual meets the standards of personal independence and social responsibility expected of his or her age, cultural group, and community." In plainer terms, adaptive behavior means the individual's ability to function in everyday tasks in the world. This includes such things as providing personal care to oneself, expressing oneself, and finding one's way around. This behavior is measured by instruments such as the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scale (Vineland). Finally, both the subaverage general intellectual functioning and deficits in adaptive behavior must have manifested and been present before the individual reached the age of 18. In this case, the Department asserts that it is "eighty percent" sure that Don is not mentally retarded. It acknowledges, however, that he does have "significant difficulties in all areas of functioning." More specifically, the Department bases its denial on the fact that Don's 1995 tests indicated that his adaptive behavior was equivalent to other children of the same age, and that his intellectual functioning tests, principally the 1990 test and one score in 1995, revealed that he is in the borderline range between low average and mentally retarded. Don's background Don was born on November 5, 1979. Even while attending an educable mentally handicapped class at Parkwood Heights Elementary School, a public school in Duval County, Florida, Don experienced difficulty in coping with the curriculum. Indeed, after he had already repeated the first and third grades, and he was in danger of failing the fourth grade as well, public school officials transferred Don from the public school to Morning Star School (Morning Star), a private school for students with learning disabilities, including those who are mildly mentally handicapped. Later, when teachers at Morning Star expressed concern that Don had "gone as far as they could help him," and he was too old to retain eligibility, Don was referred by a child study team to Alden Road Exceptional Student Center (Alden Road), a public school (grades 6-12) for mentally handicapped students. Due to his present age (almost 21), he has only one year of eligibility left at Alden Road. At the school, Don receives limited academic instruction and has a supervised job. Don became eligible for Social Security death benefits when his natural mother died. Recently, his parents (father and stepmother) made application for those benefits to be converted to greater, more permanent Social Security benefits because of his condition. Their request was quickly approved, and Donald now receives lifetime monthly Social Security benefits. Don's test results for general intellectual functioning On April 24, 1990, when Don was 10 years old, he was given a psychological evaluation, which included the Wechsler test, to produce verbal, performance, and full scale intelligence quotients (IQs). The verbal IQ is a composite score of several subtests that make up the intelligence scale, including verbal reasoning, verbal memory, and verbal expressive skills. The performance score is based on a group of nonverbal tests, such as putting blocks and puzzles together, sequencing pictures, and marking coded symbols in a timed environment. Those results indicated a verbal IQ of 78, a performance IQ of 77, and a full scale IQ of 76. These scores placed him in the "borderline range" of intellectual functioning somewhere between low average and mentally retarded. The Wechsler test was revised in 1991 to provide a more valid estimate of intellectual functioning compared to the current day population. This resulted in students who retook the test scoring at least 5 points lower, and sometimes even lower, than they did on the earlier version of the test. Therefore, it is not surprising that Don attained lower scores on subsequent tests. The evidence establishes that a child will typically attain higher IQ scores at an earlier age, and that as he grows older, his scores will "tail off." This is because a child's intellectual skills reach a plateau, and the child is not learning new skills at a higher level as his age increases. Therefore, later tests scores are more indicative of Don's intellectual functioning. In 1993, when he was 13 years old, Don was again evaluated by the Duval County School Board and received a verbal IQ of 65, a performance IQ of 54, and a full scale IQ of 56 on the Wechsler test. More than likely for the two reasons given above, these scores were substantially lower than the scores achieved in 1990, and they indicated that Don was "in the range of mild mental retardatation" and therefore eligible for services. In 1995, when Don was 16 years old, he was again given the Wechsler test by a psychologist and was found to have a verbal IQ of 71, a performance IQ of 54, and a full scale IQ of Except for the verbal score, Don's IQ scores placed him in the range of mild mental retardation. On the 1995 verbal IQ score, which is made up of ten subtests, Don had one subtest with a score of 91, which raised his overall verbal IQ score to 71. Without that score, the verbal IQ would have been in the 60s, or in the mildly mentally retarded range. The evidence shows that it is quite common for children with mild to moderate deficiencies to score within the average range on some types of achievement measures. For example, some mildly retarded children will achieve a high level on academic tests, such as in the 80s or 90s, but they have little comprehension as to what those words mean. More than likely, Don fits within this category, and an overall verbal score of less than 70 is more reflective of his intellectual functioning. Based on the 1993 and 1995 tests, Don has general intellectual functioning of at least two deviations below 100, and therefore he qualifies for assistance under this part of the test. Adaptive behavior skills As noted above, this category measures Don's ability to deal with everyday tasks. To be eligible for services, an applicant must have deficits in his adaptive behavior which manifested before the age of 18. Presently, and for eight months out of the year, Don works from noon until 8:00 p.m. Monday through Friday at Jacksonville University "in the skullery room and [doing] tables." He relies on community transportation (from door to door) to get to and from work. When not working, he attends Alden Road where he receives limited academic instruction. According to a Vineland instrument prepared by an Alden Road teacher in December 1995, Don then had an overall adaptive behavior composite of 16 years old, or one roughly equivalent to other children of the same age. More specifically, in terms of communication, he was functioning at the age of 16; in terms of daily living skills, he was reporting at a greater level than the 18-year-old level; and in terms of socialization, he was slightly lower than a 16-year-old. The teacher who prepared the raw data on which the test score was derived was surprised to learn that her data produced a result which indicated that Don had adaptive skills equivalent to someone his own age. Based on her actual experience with him in the classroom, she found Don to be "functioning way below" her own son, who was the same age as Don. She further established that he can follow only the most "simple" instructions, and he will always need someone "looking out for him." This was corroborated by Don's parents and family friends. The Vineland test result also differs markedly from Don's real life experience. Don lives at home with his father and stepmother; he requires "constant supervision all day," even while working; and he is unable to live by himself. He is a "very trusting person," is easily subject to unscrupulous persons who could take advantage of him, and cannot manage his own money. Indeed, his psychologist described him as being "an easy target to be taken advantage of [by others]." Although Don is able to administer to some of his basic personal hygiene needs, he still requires constant reminders to do such things as wash his hair or brush his teeth. Finally, Don has minimal problem solving skills, and he is easily confused by instructions unless they are "very simple." In short, these are real deficits in adaptive behavior and are sufficient to make Don eligible for Program services.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order granting Petitioner's application for Program benefits for Donald Hall, Jr. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of July, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of July, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josefina M. Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Kathryn L. Sands, Esquire 1830 Atlantic Boulevard Jacksonville, Florida 32207-3404 Roger L. D. Williams, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 2417 Jacksonville, Florida 32231-0083
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Respondent, Tunisia Hairston, violated the provisions of section 1012.795(1)(d), (j), or (k), Florida Statutes (2010), and/or Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-10.081(3)(a) and (5)(a). If any violations of these provisions are found, then it must be determined what penalty may be appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses and other evidence presented at hearing, and upon the entire record of this proceeding, the following facts are found: Respondent, Tunisia Hairston, holds Florida Educator’s Certificate 886347, covering the areas of elementary education and English for speakers of other languages, which is valid through June 30, 2017. At all times relevant to the allegations in the Second Amended Administrative Complaint, Respondent was employed as a fifth-grade teacher at Greensboro Elementary School in the Gadsden County School District (District). In April of 2011, Respondent was teaching fifth grade. Her mother, Annette Jones Walker, taught fifth grade in the classroom adjacent to hers. Respondent is in her thirteenth year of teaching and currently teaches first grade at the same school. The Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test (FCAT) is a state-wide assessment administered pursuant to section 1008.22(3)(c), Florida Statutes (2010). For the 2010-2011 school year, the reading component was given to grades three through ten; math was given to grades three through eight; science was given to grades five and eight; and writing was given to grades four, eight, and ten. At issue in this case is the administration of the science portion of the FCAT to fifth graders in Ms. Hairston’s and Ms. Walker’s classrooms at Greensboro Elementary. Pearson, Inc., was the company with whom the State of Florida contracted to provide the 2011 FCAT. The evidence presented indicates that Pearson provided the test booklets to each county, which then distributed the test booklets to each school. The school’s test assessment coordinator would then distribute the tests to each teacher, matched with a list of the students each teacher was supposed to test. After the tests were completed, they were returned by the teacher to the assessment coordinator, who in turn returned the test booklets to the district. Pearson picked up each district’s test booklets and transported them to either Austin, Texas, or Cedar Rapids, Iowa, for scoring. There is no allegation or evidence presented to indicate that there was any irregularity with regard to the test booklets before they arrived at Greensboro Elementary or after the test was completed. Test booklets are “consumable,” meaning that there is no separate answer sheet. Multiple-choice answers are recorded in the test booklet itself. A subcontractor of Pearson’s, Caveon Data Forensics (Caveon), ran an analysis on the erasure marks on the answer portion of the test booklets for each grade, in order to set baseline data for similarities of answers in a particular test group code or school with respect to erasures. Generally, erasure analysis is performed to identify potential anomalies in the testing and to identify potential questions for review in terms of question validity. Standing alone, the erasure analysis provides nothing useful. It must be viewed in conjunction with other information. The erasure analysis performed by Caveon identified 21 Florida schools with scores that were above the threshold set for erasures. Gadsden County had three schools fitting within that category: Stewart Street Elementary School for third-grade reading, Greensboro Elementary School for fifth-grade science, and West Gadsden High School for tenth-grade reading retake. The science classes affected at Greensboro Elementary were those of Ms. Hairston and Ms. Walker. The Superintendent for each district with a high erasure index, including Superintendent Reginald James of Gadsden County, was notified by letter dated June 9, 2011, of the testing groups involved. The letter requested the Superintendent to conduct an internal investigation to examine the administration of the affected tests for any testing irregularities, including testing conditions and test security protocols at the schools. The Superintendent was notified that each school would initially receive an “I” for its 2010-2011 accountability outcomes until the erasure issue was resolved, or the Commissioner determined that sufficient data was available to accurately assign the schools a grade. Deputy Superintendent Rosalyn Smith conducted an internal investigation for Gadsden County, with the assistance of the District’s testing coordinator, Shaia Beckwith-James. According to Ms. Smith, the two of them collected documents and submitted them to the Department of Education, with Ms. Beckwith- James performing a lot of “legwork” on the investigation.3/ Both Ms. Hairston and Ms. Walker were interviewed and the interviews recorded. Ms. Smith testified that she did not find that either teacher had violated any testing protocols, but could not explain the high erasures. Both Ms. Walker and Ms. Hairston were removed as administrators from future administrations of the FCAT, a move that both teachers welcomed. No evidence was presented to indicate that the District considered, or that either teacher was notified, that removal as a test administrator was considered discipline. On June 16, 2011, Superintendent James forwarded to DOE information collected as part of the District’s internal investigation related to those schools with high erasure indexes. Superintendent James asked that the Department exclude the scores of any students with an erasure index of 1.3 or higher from the school’s letter grade calculation in order to assign the schools a letter grade as opposed to an “I” rating. On June 29, 2011, Deputy Commissioner Chris Ellington wrote back to Superintendent James regarding the schools in Gadsden County with high erasure indexes. With respect to Greensboro Elementary, he stated, While your investigation found no improprieties for Grade 5 Science at Greensboro Elementary School, there is sufficient statistical evidence that student test results may have been advantaged in some way. . . . Because this high percentage of three or more net wrong-to-right erasures is extremely unusual, the Department’s decision is to remove these test results from the 2010-2011 accountability outcomes for this school. Consequently, the “I” designation will be removed and the accountability outcomes will be calculated without these student test results. Greensboro Elementary subsequently received an A grade for the year. On March 6, 2012, then-Commissioner Gerard Robinson notified Superintendent James that he was requesting the Department’s Office of Inspector General to investigate whether there was any fraud with respect to the administration of the 2011 FCAT. The Inspector General’s Office then conducted an administrative investigation of four schools state-wide: Chaffee Trail Elementary; Charter School of Excellence; Greensboro Elementary; and Jefferson County Elementary. The Inspector General’s investigation was conducted by Bridget Royster and Anthony Jackson. They received the results from the District’s investigation, and requested testing booklets from the Division of Accountability and Research Management, who had the students’ test booklets for fifth-grade science shipped from Texas. Ms. Royster counted the number of erasures on each test booklet and created answer keys for each student. She also developed questions to ask each student to determine if the erasures were theirs. She and Mr. Jackson interviewed some, but not all, of the students from the two classes based upon their availability at the time, and interviewed Principal Stephen Pitts; Cedric Chandler, the school’s guidance counselor who served as the testing coordinator; and Tamika Battles and Valorie Sanders, who both served as proctors for the 2011 FCAT. They attempted to interview Ms. Walker and Ms. Hairston, who both declined to be interviewed,4/ preferring instead to seek counsel. Ms. Royster and Mr. Jackson recorded answers from the students on the questionnaire form they had developed. However, a review of the handwriting on the forms submitted into evidence reveals that they were filled out by Ms. Royster and Mr. Jackson, as opposed to being filled out by the students themselves. The statements made also refer to the students in the third person, supporting the belief that these are statements as understood by the investigators, as opposed to the actual statements of the students. Based on these interviews, the investigative report prepared by Ms. Royster and Mr. Jackson states in part: “although evidence does not support that fifth-grade teachers, Annette Walker and Tunisia Hairston, altered student answer tests, statements taken during the investigation reveal that they did coach or interfere with their students’ responses during the administration of the FCAT.” Ms. Royster acknowledged that erasures can be caused by students going over their answers a second time; by cheating; by a student’s confusion; by a student changing his or her mind about the answer; and by other unspecified reasons. She also acknowledged that they did not ask the students whether they cheated, as that was not the focus of the investigation. Respondent administered the 2011 Science Comprehensive Assessment Test (FCAT) for students in her classroom on April 19 and 20, 2011. The science portion of the FCAT was the last portion to be administered. It consisted of two sessions on successive days, with 29 questions on one day and 31 questions on the other. Both sessions were 55 minutes long. All 60 questions are in the same booklet. There may be one or two questions per page, depending on the question, so the test booklet is approximately 50-60 pages long. There are different forms of the test, but the core items are the same for each student. Teachers were trained regarding testing protocols and security measures by Cedric Chandler, Greensboro Elementary’s Guidance Counselor and Assessment Coordinator. Each teacher responsible for administering the FCAT was provided with a testing administration manual, including a copy of Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-10.042, which governs the administration of the test. There is also a form that is signed by educators when they attend the training that indicates that they understand and have read the rules. The FCAT/FCAT 2. Administration and Security Agreement signed by Respondent states in pertinent part: Florida State Board of Education Rule 6A- 10.042, F.A.C., was developed to meet the requirements of the Test Security Statutes, s. 1008.24, F.S., and applies to anyone involved in the administration of a statewide assessment. The Rule prohibits activities that may threaten the integrity of the test. . . . Examples of prohibited activities are listed below: Reading the passages or test items Revealing the passages or test items Copying the passages or test items Explaining or reading passages or test items for students Changing or otherwise interfering with student responses to test items Copying or reading student responses Causing achievement of schools to be inaccurately measured or reported * * * All personnel are prohibited from examining or copying the test items and/or the contents of student test books and answer documents. The security of all test materials must be maintained before, during, and after the test administration. Please remember that after ANY test administration, initial OR make-up, materials must be returned immediately to the school assessment coordinator and placed in locked storage. Secure materials should not remain in classrooms or be taken out of the building overnight. The use of untrained test administrators increases the risk of test invalidation due to test irregularities or breaches in test security. I, (insert name), have read the Florida Test Security Statute and State Board of Education Rule in Appendix B, and the information and instructions provided in all applicable sections of the 2011 Reading, Mathematics, and Science Test Administration Manual. I agree to administer the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test (FCAT/FCAT 2.0) according to these procedures. Further, I will not reveal or disclose any information about the test items or engage in any acts that would violate the security of the FCAT/FCAT 2.0 and cause student achievement to be inaccurately represented or reported. Respondent signed the Security Agreement on April 7, 2011. Teachers are also given a specific script to read for every grade and subject being tested. For the fifth-grade science test, the script is approximately five pages long. Teachers are instructed that they are to read the script and that their actions should comport with the directions in the script. Victoria Ash is the bureau chief for K-12 assessment at the Florida Department of Education. Her office is charged with the development, administration, assessment, scoring, and reporting of the FCAT. Ms. Ash indicated that there are no stakes attached to the science test at the state level. When asked about protocols to follow in the administration of the FCAT, Ms. Ash indicated that it is not permissible for teachers to assist students, as teacher interference would cause results not to be an accurate measure of the students’ ability. It is not permissible to walk up to a student, point to a question and answer and tell the student to take another look at that question. Such behavior is not permitted either verbally or by some other physical cue. When a student calls a teacher over during the FCAT to ask a question, the teacher is to avoid any specific response. However, it is acceptable, according to Ms. Ash, for a teacher to say things such as “just keep working hard,” “think about it more, you will eventually get it,” or “do your best.” To say something like “just remember the strategies we discussed” would be, in Ms. Ash’s view, “going right up to the edge” of permissible responses. As long as the response is not to a specific question, a teacher would not be violating the protocols to tell students to read over their answers again, and to make sure the students answered every question. The Second Amended Administrative Complaint alleges that Respondent provided inappropriate assistance to students in her fifth-grade class as they took the 2011 Science FCAT by pointing to incorrect test answers or telling students to look again at certain answers. Eight students from Ms. Hairston’s 2011 fifth-grade class testified at hearing. Of those 8 students, two testified that they had received assistance from Ms. Hairston during the test. T.W. was a male student in Ms. Hairston’s class. He testified that “in a certain period of time, she would point out answers for me.” He testified that she did not say anything to him, but “I just got the meaning that she was telling me to check it over again.” He also stated that she told the whole class to go over their tests again at the end of the test. L.T. was a female student in Ms. Hairston’s class. She referred to Mr. Pitts or Ms. Dixon being in the room. She testified that after Ms. Dixon or Mr. Pitts left the room, Ms. Hairston would walk around and “point out questions that maybe we would get wrong.” She testified that Mr. Pitts or Ms. Dixon came in 3-4 times. L.T. also stated that while Ms. Hairston told the class at the beginning of the test they could go back and recheck their answers when they were finished, she did not make a similar statement at the end of the test. On the other hand, students K.M., A.F., R.A., M.C., D.Y., and A.C. all testified that they did not remember Ms. Hairston giving any type of hints during the science FCAT, and that she did not point to answers on the tests. None of the students, including T.W. and L.T., had incredibly clear memories of the test, which is understandable given that they took the test over three years prior to the hearing. To the extent that these six students remembered Ms. Hairston saying anything, they remember her telling them to go back and read the questions over, in terms of the whole test. Tamika Battles was the proctor assigned to Ms. Hairston’s room. Although there was some dispute about how many days she was present during the science part of the FCAT, it is found that she was present for one of the two testing sessions.5/ Ms. Battles does not recall Ms. Hairston saying anything out of the ordinary, but rather simply walked around telling students to stay on task, and making general statements about test taking. She did not ever see her point to a particular student’s test. Ms. Battles had been trained in testing protocols, and believed that they were followed. Ms. Hairston also denied coaching any of the students or pointing out incorrect answers. She acknowledged pointing toward test booklets on occasion, not to point to a specific answer but to remind a student to focus or stay on task. Her testimony was credible. After careful review of the evidence, it is found that Ms. Hairston did not violate testing protocols by providing assistance to students during the 2011 science FCAT. She did not point to specific questions/answers or tell a student (or indicate without talking) that the student should change the answer to any particular question. T.W. was in Ms. Hairston’s class for the second time, having failed fifth grade the year before. He testified that Ms. Hairston did not say anything to him, but rather that he understood her to mean something that she never verbalized. While L.T. testified that Ms. Hairston would point to a question and say, “check your answers again,” she tied these actions to times when Ms. Dixon or Mr. Pitts came in the room. Neither Mr. Pitts nor Ms. Dixon signed the security log for Ms. Hairston’s class for either day of the science examination. Ms. Dixon signed in for one testing session on April 13, but not for either day of science testing, and Mr. Pitts is not signed in for any session at all. Credible testimony was also presented to indicate that while perhaps Ms. Dixon was present at some time during testing (and not necessarily science), Mr. Pitts was not. In addition, L.T.’s written statement focuses more on math questions than science questions. It is entirely possible, given the vague nature of her answers, that she was confusing the science FCAT with some other testing experience. In any event, T.W. and L.T.’s testimony, taken together or apart, does not rise to the level of credible, clear and convincing evidence of providing inappropriate assistance to students during the FCAT. Further, the type of coaching alleged in the Second Amended Administrative Complaint would be quite difficult to do, given the structure of the test and the testing environment. There is no answer key to the test, and according to Ms. Ash, there are different forms of the test. Some pages have one question while others have two. Students are given a set amount of time to complete the test, but worked at different speeds. Many finished early, while some may not have completed it. In order for Ms. Hairston to give the kind of assistance alleged, she would have to stand by the testing student, read the question on the page, see the answer given, recognize it as wrong, and point out the error to the student. Such a scenario is improbable at best, given that testimony is uniform that she walked around the room, not that she stopped for significant periods at any student’s desk. Ms. Hairston’s explanation that she commonly points in order to gain a child’s attention and get them to focus is reasonable. Several years of Respondent’s performance evaluations were submitted. Only those that were complete were considered. Those evaluations indicate that Ms. Hairston consistently has achieved effective, highly effective, or outstanding evaluations during her tenure at Greensboro Elementary School.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Education Practices Commission enter a Final Order dismissing the Second Amended Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of February, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 2015.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner, Robert D. Taylor, is eligible for the services offered by Respondent's Developmental Services Program.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Robert D. Taylor (Petitioner), filed an application with Respondent, the Department of Children and Family Services (Department), to receive services of the Department's Developmental Services Program. Based on information provided by Mrs. Tye, the suspected developmental disability/medical conditions which were the basis for Petitioner's potential eligibility were mild mental retardation and behavior problems. Following submittal of Petitioner's application, his eligibility for the Development Services Program was reviewed and determined by Dr. Bruce Crowell, a licensed psychologist employed by the Department. In order to determine Petitioner's eligibility, Dr. Crowell reviewed Petitioner's school psychological evaluations, all of which were completed prior to Petitioner's eighteenth birthday. According to Petitioner's school psychological evaluations, the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, Third Edition, was administered to Petitioner in January 1993. Petitioner obtained a verbal Intelligence Quotient (IQ) of 80, a performance IQ of 82, and a full scale IQ of 79. Petitioner was also evaluated by Dr. Ruth Nentwig, a licensed psychologist, in June 16, 1999. As part of her evaluation, Dr. Nentwig administered the WAIS-III, an instrument that measures an individual's overall intellectual functioning. On the WAIS-III, Petitioner obtained a verbal IQ of 86, a performance IQ of 80, and a full scale IQ of 82. This evaluation was completed prior to Petitioner's eighteenth birthday. Based upon the statutory criteria, Petitioner is not eligible for services provided by the Department's Developmental Services Program. The IQ scores obtained by Petitioner place him in the low average to borderline intellectual functioning level and are not indicative of significant cognitive or intellectual functioning impairment reflective of retardation. Petitioner would have to obtain a full scale IQ score of 69 or lower to be considered retarded and eligible for the Department's Developmental Services Program. Moreover, manifestation of such impairment would have to be documented prior to age 18 in order to demonstrate eligibility for the program.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Respondent, the Department of Children and Family Services, enter an order denying Petitioner's application for services through the Developmental Services Program. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of April, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of April, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert D. Taylor c/o Sarah Tye 1455 Winston Road Fort Myers, Florida 33917 Eugenie Rehak, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 60085 Fort Myers, Florida 33906-0085 Virginia Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John S. Slye, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Frank Giampietro (Petitioner) should be awarded additional credit for answers given on the chiropractic physical diagnosis practical licensure examination administered in November, 1989, and based thereon, whether he should be licensed to practice chiropractic in the State of Florida.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has been licensed to practice chiropractic in the State of Rhode Island since March, 1986. He took the diagnosis portion of the chiropractic practical examination administered by the Respondent on November 9, 1989, for purposes of being licensed in the State of Florida. Petitioner received a grade of 68.7% on this portion of the exam. The minimum passing grade on this practical exam was 75%. Thereafter, Petitioner timely requested a hearing to determine if he should be granted additional credit on this practical exam, and based thereon, whether he should have passed this examination. It was established that the physical diagnosis practical exam was properly administered, appropriate standardization procedures were followed, and each examiner independently graded Petitioner's exam and was qualified to serve as an examiner. At hearing, the Petitioner disputed the score he received in the areas of neurology, orthopedics, and differential diagnosis. A four point scoring system is used on the practical examination. A score of 4 means that the candidate demonstrated an exceptional knowledge and understanding of the subject area; a score of 3 represents an adequate understanding; a score of 2 indicates an inadequate knowledge of the subject area; and a score of 2 indicates that the candidate would be a danger to the public if allowed to practice in that particular subject area. If a grader feels that the candidate's answer demonstrates a degree of knowledge that is between two of these scores, a .5 credit can be given. This is a subjective, rather than an objective, scoring system that requires each examiner to use his own judgment in evaluating the completeness of a candidate's response; generally, there are no simple right or wrong answers to practical exam questions. In arriving at a candidate's overall percentage score, a score of 4 equals 100 points, a score of 3 equals 75 points, 2 equals 50 points, and 1 equals 25 points. A .5 score equals 12.5 points. For example, a score of 3.5 would equal 87.5 points. Each content area of the practical exam is weighted equally, and there were 4 content areas in the November, 1989 physical diagnosis practical exam. Two examiners are used to score each candidate's practical examination, and the scores given by each examiner are then averaged to give the candidate's overall grade. In this instance, one examiner gave Petitioner the grades of 2.5 in orthopedics and 3 in both neurology and differential diagnosis, while the other examiner gave him 2 in orthopedics, 2.5 in neurology and 3 in differential diagnosis. If Petitioner received two additional raw points on these three content areas which are under challenge, he would receive an overall passing score of 75%. Regarding the practical exam content area of orthopedics, the Petitioner improperly performed Apley's test, according to the expert testimony of Dr. Ordet, and incorrectly responded that the medial and lateral meniscus could not be differentiated using Apley's test. The Petitioner also improperly performed McMurray's test, as well as muscle testing of the hamstrings and quadriceps. The Petitioner's witness, Dr. Hoover, confirmed that he did not properly perform Apley's test, and did not make a determination as to the medial or lateral meniscus by rotating the patient's foot, as he could have. Regarding the neurology portion of the exam, Petitioner incorrectly identified the location of the upper motor neuron track, and according to Dr. Ordet, the Petitioner also incorrectly stated that pathologic reflexes which would actually be for a lower motor neuron lesion were the pathologic reflexes for an upper motor neuron lesion. This was a very significant error, according to Dr. Ordet, whose testimony is credited. Regarding the differential diagnosis portion of the exam, the Petitioner's response to the patient's bowel blockage was not precise or specific. Petitioner did not demonstrate that he had more than an adequate understanding of this subject area due to the nebulous answers he gave. Even the Petitioner's witness, Dr. Hoover, agreed with the grade of 3 which Petitioner received on this portion of the exam. Based on the evidence in the record, it is found that Petitioner was correctly graded on the orthopedics, neurology and differential diagnosis portions of the practical examination. It was not established that the grades given were contrary to fact or logic, and in fact, competent substantial evidence supports the grades which he received.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that Respondent enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's challenge to his grades on the orthopedics, neurology and differential diagnosis portions of the November, 1989, chiropractic examination. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of October, 1990 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of October, 1990. APPENDIX (D0AH CASE NO. 90-3399) The Petitioner did not file specific proposed findings of fact, but did file a letter dated September 28, 1990, on October 1, 1990, addressed to the undersigned. This letter does not evidence that a copy was provided to counsel for the Respondent, and therefore, it has not been considered. Rulings on the Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1. Adopted in Finding 1. 2-3. Rejected as unnecessary. 4. Adopted in Finding 2. 5-6. Adopted in Finding 7. 7-8. Adopted in Finding 8. 9-10. Adopted in Finding 9. COPIES FURNISHED: Frank Giampietro 1704 Adair Road Port St. Lucie, FL 34952 Vytas J. Urba, Esquire Northwood Centre, Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Kenneth D. Easley, Esquire Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Patricia Guilford Executive Director Board of Chiropractic 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner can prove Medicaid overpayments to Respondent and, if so, how much Petitioner is entitled to recoup.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a licensed physician with an office in Stuart. He is Board-certified in neurology and pain medicine. During the audit period and until recently, Respondent was an enrolled Medicaid provider. The audit in this case involved 237 claims on behalf of 30 recipients. Of these 237 claims, Petitioner determined that 59 were overpayments. After determining the total of these 59 overpayments, Petitioner referred the file to a statistician, who extended these 59 overpayments to the total overpayment shown in the Final Audit Report. The statistician based the extension on generally accepted statistical methods that he explained, at the hearing, to everyone's satisfaction, as evidenced by the fact that no one asked to hear more. During the statistician's testimony, the parties agreed that, if the overpayments in the Final Audit Report are altered in the Final Order, Petitioner will refer the new determinations to a statistician for another extension, based again, of course, on generally accepted statistical methods. Recipients will be identified by the numbers assigned them in Petitioner Exhibit 7. The only recipients addressed are those for whom Petitioner has determined overpayments. Nine billings are at issue with Recipient 1. On March 8, 2007, Respondent saw Recipient 1 and billed a CPT Code 99245 office consultation. Petitioner downcoded this to a CPT Code 99244 office consultation and generated an overpayment of $20.39. The CPT describes these office consultation codes as follows: 99244 Office consultation for a new or established patient, which requires these three key components: A comprehensive history; A comprehensive examination; Medical decision making of moderate complexity. * * * Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of moderate to high severity. Physicians typically spend 60 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. 99245 Office consultation for a new or established patient, which requires these three key components: A comprehensive history; A comprehensive examination; Medical decision making of high complexity. * * * Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of moderate to high severity. Physicians typically spend 80 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. Recipient 1 was the victim of a severe beating at the hands of her husband in July 2006. Petitioner's determinations concerning this case partly arose out of the failure of its consultant to find in Respondent's medical records a date of incident, but Respondent provided this information at the hearing. Recipient 1 suffered fractures of the skull and orbital bone from the spousal battery. Continuously since the incident, she had suffered headaches; vertigo, especially when blowing her nose; memory loss; and a complete inability to use her left hand. The initial office consultation was on March 8, 2007, and Respondent billed it correctly, given the complexity of the medical decisionmaking. She had five diagnoses, and Respondent gave her 11 recommendations. Considerable time and effort were required of Respondent to address her case at this initial office consultation, for which there is thus no overpayment. On March 20, 2007, Recipient 1 underwent an MRI of the brain, for which Respondent billed a CPT Code 70553, which is for brain MRIs with and without dye or contrast. Petitioner downcoded this to a CPT Code 70551, with a reduction of $76.59, because Respondent had ordered only an MRI of the brain without dye. Respondent produced at hearing a copy of the prescription, which cryptically states: "MRI Brain c /o contrast." The "c" and the "o" have dashes over them. The "c" with a dash is a traditional abbreviation of cum, so it means "with." The meaning of the dash over the "o" is unclear. Lacking a conjunctive symbol in the space between the letters, it appears that the combination means "without," rather than "with" and "without." The downcoding is appropriate, and the overpayment is $76.59. On the same date, Recipient 1 underwent an MRI of the neck and spine without dye. Petitioner denied this billing, which was for $233.47, for lack of medical necessity due to the absence of appropriate pain symptoms, especially radiating pain. At the hearing, Respondent explained that Recipient 1 suffered from moderate to severe stenosis, and he needed to rule out neck involvement in the patient's inability to use her left arm. The neck and spine MRI was medically necessary, so there is no overpayment for this test. On May 2, 2007, Recipient 1 underwent a muscle test, one limb--billed as CPT Code 95860; a sense nerve conduction test--billed as CPT Code 95904; and a motor nerve conduction test--billed as CPT 95903. On the next day, she underwent the identical tests--all billed under the identical codes. Petitioner denied all of these, and generated overpayments of $40.81, $73.05, $65.60, $40.81, $73.05, and $65.60, respectively. Petitioner denied these tests because Respondent had not ordered them. This does not seem to have been inadvertent on Respondent's part. None of these tests appeared to be part of Respondent's treatment plan for this patient. Petitioner thus determined correctly that these six sums are overpayments. Five billings are at issue with Recipient 3. The first is an office consultation on April 9, 2008. Petitioner has downcoded this from CPT Code 99245 to CPT Code 99244 due to a lack of complexity of decisionmaking. This generates an overpayment of $20.18. Respondent testified that Recipient 3 was a 63-year- old patient with "total body pain." Respondent testified that the patient complained of neck pain, low back pain, and chronic pain, all emanating from a bicycle accident five years earlier that had necessitated the placement of a titanium rod in the patient's leg. However, the eight diagnoses and 18 recommendations do not, on these facts, merit the complexity of decisionmaking claimed by Respondent in his billing. Petitioner has proved an overpayment of $20.18. Recipient 3 raises the issue of the reimbursability of an sNCT administered by Respondent. On April 21, Recipient 3 underwent two procedures billed as sense nerve conduction tests under CPT Code 95904 at $143.70 each. Two days later, Recipient 3 underwent two procedures billed under the same name and CPT Code at $141.70 and $143.70. Petitioner has disallowed all four of these billed amounts. CPT Codes 95900-95904 describe nerve conduction tests that measure the nerve's response to an electrical stimulation in terms of speed, size, and shape. CPT Code 95904 is "nerve conduction, amplitude and latency/velocity study, each nerve; sensory." A procedure meeting the definition of CPT Code 95904 must measure the nerve's response in terms of amplitude and latency/velocity. Amplitude is a measure of size. Latency is a measure of time of travel, so, provided travel distance is known, as it typically is, velocity, or speed, may be derived from latency. The device used by Respondent for all of the sense nerve conduction tests that he billed as CPT Code 95904 was an Axon II device. The inventor of the device testified at the hearing and explained how conventional sense nerve conduction tests, which were developed during World War II, are appropriate for the detection of gross injuries because they detect damage in the large nerve fibers. Fifty to 100 times smaller than these large fibers are the small nerve fibers, which transmit pain. Among these fibers are the fast-transmitting A-delta fibers and the slow-transmitting fibers are C-fibers. The Axon II focuses on the activity of the A-delta fibers. Originally, the witness produced a neurometer that relied on patient response to the application of increasing voltage to the point that the nerve produced a response in the form of a stimulus. Seven years later, in 2002, the witness added a potentiometer, or voltage meter, to allow what he terms a psychophysical assessment of a sensory nerve conduction test that applies electricity and records amplitude, but not latency or velocity. The witness claims that the A-delta fibers are too small for a useful test of latency or velocity. Among A-delta fibers, the only useful parameter for measurement is amplitude. He added that, similarly, the shape of the signal emanating from the nerve is also irrelevant when dealing with the smaller A- delta fibers. Whatever larger issues of medical necessity that may attach to the Axon II device, the issue in this case is whether it may be billed under Florida Medicaid law, which reimburses only those services designated in Chapter 2, Physician Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook. Pursuant to this requirement, Respondent billed the sNCTs that he performed with the Axon II device under CPT Code 95904. But, as noted above, this code requires at least a measure of latency and possibly measures of latency and velocity, and the sNCTs do not provide latency or velocity data. Respondent thus miscoded all of the sNCT procedures that he performed in this case. The sNCTs performed with the Axon II device are described by CPT Code 95999, which is assigned to unlisted neurological diagnostic procedures, and Code G0255, which is a unique code for sNCTs. If the sNCTs performed in this case were properly coded only under CPT Code 95999, another issue would emerge because the fee schedule for this code in the Physician Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook bears an "R" code. This means that the provider performing a procedure falling into the residual category of CPT Code 95999 may submit "either documentation of medical necessity for the procedure performed. . . or information . . . in order to review and price the procedure correctly." Physician Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook, p. 3-3. It is unnecessary to determine whether Respondent complied with the "by-report procedure" established for procedures classified within CPT Code 95999, or whether, consistent with the de novo nature of the proceeding, as discussed in the Conclusions of Law, Respondent could first present such evidence at hearing. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) created CPT Code G0255 for sNCTs because it determined that the devices producing this data were not medically necessary, and Medicare and Medicaid would not reimburse claims for these procedures. On March 19, 2004, CMS revised its National Coverage Determinations Manual regarding sNCTs. Noting that these procedures are different from the assessment of nerve conduction velocity, amplitude, and latency, section 160.23 of the manual states that providers may not use codes for tests eliciting nerve conduction velocity, latency, or amplitude for sNCTs. CMS has clearly expressed its intent that, although falling within the residual CPT Code 95999 procedures, sNCTs are ineligible for reimbursement, even by the "by-report procedure." Petitioner thus correctly disallowed the four procedures performed on April 21 and 23, 2008, because they were miscoded and are ineligible for Medicaid reimbursement. Recipient 3 raises another recurring issue. This one concerns an H-Reflex Test, CPT Code 95934. For Recipient 3, it was billed on May 8, 2008, for $27.49. Petitioner properly disallowed the billing because the procedure was not done. Respondent concedes that he never performed an H-Reflex Test on an upper extremity and explains that an inexperienced office worker misconstrued a handwritten mark indicative of a negative to mean that the test had in fact been ordered and conducted. The issue on the H-Reflex Test is not whether Respondent was initially entitled to reimbursement--it was not. The issues are 1) whether this overpayment may be extended to the larger total overpayment determined in this case and 2) whether Respondent has already reimbursed Petitioner for this overpayment of $27.49, if not considerably more. The answer to the first question is no, and the answer to the second question is probably not. The bottom line is that Petitioner may add $27.49 to the total overpayment, but may not include this sum in the extension calculations due to Respondent's timely correction of this billing error. Respondent discovered that his office had wrongly billed this procedure on 28 different occasions, but he (or his wife/office manager) informed Petitioner of this fact prior to the audit. Among the 30 patients randomly selected for the audit, four of them had these incorrect billings for an H-Reflex Test on an upper extremity. For obvious reasons, corrections after the start of an audit may not be allowed, but a timely correction remedies the overbilling, as though it had never taken place. Respondent contends that the situation is even more complicated. Respondent's wife testified that she voided the claims on Petitioner's automated electronic claims paying process, which is the proper procedure, but, for some reason, all other procedures performed on the same day as the procedure date reported for the H-Reflex Tests were also voided. If so, it would mean that Respondent has already reimbursed Petitioner for the $27.49 erroneous billing, and Petitioner must credit Respondent--and possibly extend the credit--for any other allowable procedures performed on the same date. For Recipient 3 on May 8, 2008, for instance, this would amount to a direct credit of $107.78 for the two other allowable procedures performed on the same day that the H-Reflex Test was reported as performed. Respondent's wife failed to detail these wrongfully aggregated voids, nor did anyone on Petitioner's side of the hearing room have any idea what she was talking about. On this record, it is impossible to credit the testimony so as to require Petitioner to restore the value of other procedures billed on the same date as the H-Reflex Test (here, $107.78), extend this value to a much higher credit, or even restore the value of the H-Reflex Test itself ($27.49). Three billings are at issue with Recipient 6. Two of them are sNCTs billed under CPT Code 95904 for two procedures done on February 27, 2008. They were billed at $141.70 and $143.70, respectively. For the reasons discussed above, these are miscoded and are ineligible for reimbursement, so they are overpayments. The third issue involves an office visit on April 3, 2008, which Respondent billed under CPT Code 99211. Respondent admitted at the hearing that he lacked documentation for this office visit, so Petitioner properly disallowed the $12.48 associated with it. One billing is at issue with Recipient 7. It is a brain MRI with and without dye, which is billed on May 23, 2007, under CPT Code 70553. Petitioner properly disallowed the entire $410.85 because it was obviously double-billed, and Petitioner allowed the "other" procedure. Three billings are at issue with Recipient 9. On November 2, 2007, Respondent billed a neck and spine MRI without dye as CPT Code 72141 and a lumbar spine MRI without dye as CPT Code 72148. On November 13, 2007, Respondent billed a head angiography without dye as CPT Code 70544. Citing a lack of medical necessity, Petitioner denied all of these items, which amount to $233.47, $236.65, and $300.09, respectively. At the time of the procedures in question, Respondent had been seeing this 37-year-old patient for only one month. Another physician had referred the patient, who, for three months, had been suffering from headaches in the right frontal temporal area. The pain was severe enough to cause the patient to go to the hospital emergency room three times. Finally, the emergency room physicians instructed the patient not to come to the emergency room, and they referred him to a neurologist--who had been dead for two years at the time of the referral. The emergency room physicians had prescribed Dilaudin, but the patient, who was also on a blood thinner, presented to Respondent with the need for a full neurological workup. He was a construction worker and needed to return to work. Respondent ordered the angiography to rule out vascular malformation, which could have caused the headaches and could be fatal. Respondent ordered the MRIs to assess significant anatomical problems and rule out metastatic disease. These three procedures were medically necessary, so there is no overpayment due in connection with them. One billing is at issue with Recipient 11. On January 10, 2007, Respondent billed an office consultation under CPT Code 99243. Petitioner allowed only an office visit, not an office consultation, resulting in an overpayment of $15.33. Respondent has not contested this adjustment, which appears to be correct. Four billings are at issue with Recipient 15. They are sNCTs billed under CPT Code 95904 for two procedures done on March 4, 2008, and two procedures done on March 24, 2008. Two of the procedures were billed at $141.70 and two were billed at $143.70. For the reasons discussed above, these are miscoded and are ineligible for reimbursement, so they are overpayments. Four billings are at issue with Recipient 16. They are sNCTs billed under CPT Code 95904 for two procedures done on January 22, 2008, and two procedures done on March 5, 2008. They are billed the same as those described in the preceding paragraph. They are miscoded and ineligible for reimbursement, so they are overpayments. Three billings are at issue with Recipient 17. They are sNCTs billed under CPT Code 95904 for one procedure done on March 17, 2008, and two procedures done on March 19, 2008. They are billed at $141.70 for two procedures and $143.70 for the third procedure. They are miscoded and ineligible for reimbursement, so they are overpayments. Four billings are at issue with Recipient 20. They are sNCTs billed under CPT Code 95904 for two procedures done one June 24, 2008, and two procedures done on June 30, 2008. They are each billed at $143.70. They are miscoded and ineligible for reimbursement, so they are overpayments. Six billings are at issue with Recipient 21. Four are sNCTs billed under CPT Code 95904 for two procedures done on February 20, 2008, and two procedures done on February 28, 2008. They are each billed at $143.70. They are miscoded and ineligible for reimbursement, so they are overpayments. The other two billings are for H-Reflex Tests of upper extremities--one on March 25, 2008, and one on April 2, 2008. As noted above, Respondent never performed these tests, but corrected the misbilling prior to the audit. The $27.49 billed for each of these tests may not be extended in determining the total overpayment, but Petitioner may add $54.98 to the total overpayment determination, and Petitioner is not required to credit Respondent for additional sums due to claimed problems in voiding these billings. Four billings are at issue with Recipient 25. They are sNCTs billed under CPT Code 95904 for two procedures done on June 5, 2008, and two procedures done on June 10, 2008. They are each billed at $143.70. They are miscoded and ineligible for reimbursement, so they are overpayments. One billing is at issue with Recipient 26. On February 15, 2007, Respondent billed an office visit under CPT Code 99205, which Petitioner reduced by $16.64 by downcoding it to CPT Code 99204. The CPT Manual describes these office visit codes as follows: 99204 Office or other outpatient visit of the evaluation and management of a new patient, which requires these three key components: A comprehensive history; A comprehensive examination; Medical decision making of moderate complexity. * * * Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of moderate to high severity. Physicians typically spend 45 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. 99205 Office or other outpatient visit of the evaluation and management of a new patient, which requires these three key components: A comprehensive history; A comprehensive examination; Medical decision making of high complexity. * * * Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of moderate to high severity. Physicians typically spend 60 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. Recipient 26 is a 43-year-old with migraines. She has suffered three headaches weekly since fourth grade. An MRI of her lower back in 2004 revealed a herniated disk, and she has pain in her right leg and foot numbness, if she drives too long. The medical decisionmaking was no more than moderately complex, so Petitioner properly downcoded this office visit, resulting in an overpayment of $16.64. Four billings are at issue with Recipient 27. On January 15, 2008, Respondent billed an office visit under CPT Code 99205, which Petitioner reduced by $18.64 by downcoding it to CPT Code 99204. Recipient 27 was referred by her obstetrician and saw Respondent two and one-half months post-partum. She was unable to lift her right arm. She had pain in her right outside shoulder. Her fingers were numb. Based on a physical examination, Respondent detected nerve damage in the axilla, and she reported cervical radiculopathy. The constellation of symptoms suggested three or four problems that obviously required immediate attention to facilitate her caring for her newborn. The medical decisionmaking was highly complex, so there is no overpayment for this office visit. Respondent billed two sNCTs under CPT Code 95904 for two procedures done on January 24, 2008, for $143.70 each. They are miscoded and ineligible for reimbursement, so they are overpayments. Respondent billed an H-Reflex Test under CPT Code 95934 on February 7, 2008, for $27.49. As noted above, Respondent never performed this test, but corrected the misbilling prior to the audit. The $27.49 may not be extended in determining the total overpayment, but Petitioner may add $27.49 to the total overpayment determination, and Petitioner is not required to credit Respondent for additional sums due to claimed problems in voiding these billings. Petitioner conceded error in its disallowance concerning Recipient 28, for whom Respondent billed $41.00 under CPT Code 95860 for a muscle test conducted on February 21, 2008. See Petitioner's proposed recommended order, paragraph 21. This is therefore not an overpayment. Three billings are at issue with Recipient 29. On February 7, 2007, Respondent billed an office consultation under CPT Code 99245, which Petitioner reduced by $46.24 by downcoding it to CPT Code 99205, which is for an office visit. This was an office visit, not an office consultation, as billed by Respondent, so the downcoding was correct, and there is an overpayment of $46.24. On February 16, 2007, Respondent billed for a neck and spine MRI without dye under CPT Code 72141 and a chest and spine MRI without dye under CPT Code 72146--twice each. Petitioner properly disallowed $357.60 and $305.18 for one pair of these procedures, which obviously were double-billed, so there are overpayments of these amounts. Two billings are at issue with Recipient 30. Respondent billed two sNCTs under CPT Code 95904 for two procedures done on April 14, 2008, for $141.70 and $143.70. They are miscoded and ineligible for reimbursement, so they are overpayments. The Final Audit Report claims that the audit cost $5658.09, but Petitioner failed to produce any evidence on these costs.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner submit the file to a statistician for an extension, using generally accepted statistical methods, of the redetermined overpayments, as set forth in the Findings of Fact, to a total overpayment determination. Petitioner issue a Final Order determining that Petitioner is entitled to recoup the total overpayment determined in the preceding paragraph, statutory interest on this sum from the date of the Final Order, and a $4,000 administrative fine for multiple violations of Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-9.070(7)(e). DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of May, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of May, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: George Kellen Brew, Esquire Law Office of George K. Brew 6817 Southpoint Parkway, Suite 1804 Jacksonville, Florida 32216 L. William Porter, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Monica Ryan, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Jeffries H. Duvall, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Elizabeth Dudek, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Justin Senior, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue The first issue to be determined is whether Respondent, Annette Jones Walker, violated the provisions of section 1012.795(1)(a), (d), (j), or (k), Florida Statutes (2010), and/or Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-10.081(3)(a), and (5)(a), (g), and (h). If any violations of these provisions are found, then it must be determined what penalty may be appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses and other evidence presented at hearing, and upon the entire record of this proceeding, the following facts are found: Respondent holds Florida Educator’s Certificate number 948631, covering the areas of elementary education and English for speakers of other languages, which is valid through June 30, 2019. At all times pertinent to the allegations in the Second Amended Administrative Complaint, Respondent was employed as a teacher at Greensboro Elementary School in the Gadsden County School District (District). In April of 2011, Respondent was teaching fifth grade. Her daughter, Tunisia Hairston, taught fifth grade in the classroom adjacent to hers. Respondent worked as a substitute teacher for approximately 14 years and as a full time teacher for 10 years. She currently teaches second grade in the same school. The Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test (FCAT) is a state-wide assessment administered pursuant to section 1008.22(3)(c), Florida Statutes (2010). For the 2010-2011 school year, the reading component was given to grades three through ten; math was given to grades three through eight; science was given to grades five and eight; and writing was given to grades four, eight, and ten. At issue in this case is the administration of the science portion of the FCAT to fifth graders in Ms. Hairston’s and Ms. Walker’s classrooms at Greensboro Elementary. Pearson, Inc., was the company with whom the State of Florida contracted to provide the 2011 FCAT. The evidence presented indicates that Pearson provided the test booklets to each county, which then distributed the test booklets to each school. The school’s test assessment coordinator would then distribute the tests to each teacher, matched with a list of the students each teacher was supposed to test. After the tests were completed, they were returned by the teacher to the assessment coordinator, who in turn returned the test booklets to the district. Pearson picked up each district’s test booklets and transported them to either Austin, Texas, or Cedar Rapids, Iowa, for scoring. There is no allegation or evidence presented to indicate that there was any irregularity with regard to the test booklets before they arrived at Greensboro Elementary or after the test was completed. Test booklets are “consumable,” meaning that there is no separate answer sheet. Multiple-choice answers are recorded in the test booklet itself. A subcontractor of Pearson’s, Caveon Data Forensics (Caveon), ran an analysis on the erasure marks on the answer portion of the test booklets for each grade, in order to set baseline data for similarities of answers in a particular test group code or school with respect to erasures. Generally, erasure analysis is performed to identify potential anomalies in the testing and to identify potential questions for review in terms of question validity. Standing alone, the erasure analysis provides nothing useful. It must be viewed in conjunction with other information. The erasure analysis performed by Caveon identified 21 Florida schools with scores that were above the threshold set for erasures. Gadsden County had three schools fitting within that category: Stewart Street Elementary School for third-grade reading, Greensboro Elementary School for fifth-grade science, and West Gadsden High School for tenth-grade reading retake. The science classes affected at Greensboro Elementary were those of Ms. Hairston and Ms. Walker. The Superintendent for each district with a high erasure index, including Superintendent Reginald James of Gadsden County, was notified by letter dated June 9, 2011, of the testing groups involved. The letter requested the Superintendent to conduct an internal investigation to examine the administration of the affected tests for any testing irregularities, including testing conditions and test security protocols at the schools. The Superintendent was notified that each school would initially receive an “I” for its 2010-2011 accountability outcomes until the erasure issue was resolved, or the Commissioner determined that sufficient data was available to accurately assign the schools a grade. Deputy Superintendent Rosalyn Smith conducted an internal investigation for Gadsden County, with the assistance of the District’s testing coordinator Shaia Beckwith-James. According to Ms. Smith, the two of them collected documents and submitted them to the Department of Education, with Ms. Beckwith- James performing a lot of “legwork” on the investigation.3/ Both Ms. Hairston and Ms. Walker were interviewed and the interviews recorded. Ms. Smith testified that she did not find that either teacher had violated any testing protocols, but could not explain the high erasures. Both Ms. Walker and Ms. Hairston were removed as administrators from future administrations of the FCAT, a move that both teachers welcomed. No evidence was presented to indicate that the District considered, or that either teacher was notified that, removal as a test administrator was considered discipline. On June 16, 2011, Superintendent James forwarded to DOE information collected as part of the District’s internal investigation related to those schools with high erasure indexes. Superintendent James asked that the Department exclude the scores of any students with an erasure index of 1.3 or higher from the school’s letter grade calculation in order to assign the schools a letter grade as opposed to an “I” rating. On June 29, 2011, Deputy Commissioner Chris Ellington wrote back to Superintendent James regarding the schools in his district with high erasure indexes. With respect to Greensboro Elementary, he stated, While your investigation found no improprieties for Grade 5 Science at Greensboro Elementary School, there is sufficient statistical evidence that student test results may have been advantaged in some way. . . . Because this high percentage of three or more net wrong-to-right erasures is extremely unusual, the Department’s decision is to remove these test results from the 2010-2011 accountability outcomes for this school. Consequently, the “I” designation will be removed and the accountability outcomes will be calculated without these student test results. Greensboro Elementary subsequently received an A grade for the year. On March 6, 2012, then-Commissioner Gerard Robinson notified Superintendent James that he was requesting the Department’s Office of Inspector General to investigate whether there was any fraud with respect to the administration of the 2011 FCAT. The Inspector General’s Office then conducted an administrative investigation of four schools: Chaffee Trail Elementary; Charter School of Excellence; Greensboro Elementary; and Jefferson County Elementary. The Inspector General’s investigation was conducted by Bridget Royster and Anthony Jackson. They received the results from the District’s investigation, and requested testing booklets from the Division of Accountability and Research Management, who had the students’ test booklets for fifth-grade science shipped from Texas. Ms. Royster counted the number of erasures on each test booklet and created answer keys for each student. She also developed questions to ask each student to determine if the erasures were theirs. She and Mr. Jackson interviewed some, but not all, of the students from the two classes based upon their availability at the time, and interviewed Principal Stephen Pitts; Cedric Chandler, the school’s guidance counselor who served as the testing coordinator; and Tamika Battles and Valorie Sanders, who both served as proctors for the 2011 FCAT. They attempted to interview Ms. Walker and Ms. Hairston, who both declined to be interviewed,4/ preferring instead to seek counsel. Ms. Royster and Mr. Jackson recorded answers from the students on the questionnaire form they had developed. However, a review of the handwriting on the forms submitted into evidence reveals that they were filled out by Ms. Royster and Mr. Jackson, as opposed to being filled out by the students themselves. The statements made also refer to the students in the third person, supporting the belief that these are statements as understood by the investigators, as opposed to the actual statements of the students. Based on these interviews, the investigative report prepared by Ms. Royster and Mr. Jackson states in part: “although evidence does not support that fifth-grade teachers, Annette Walker and Tunisia Hairston, altered student answer tests, statements taken during the investigation reveal that they did coach or interfere with their students’ responses during the administration of the FCAT.” Ms. Royster acknowledged that erasures can be caused by students going over their answers a second time; by cheating; by a student’s confusion; by a student changing his or her mind about the answer; and by other unspecified reasons. She also acknowledged that they did not ask the students whether they cheated, as that was not the focus of the investigation. Respondent administered the 2011 Science Comprehensive Assessment Test (FCAT) for students in her classroom on April 19 and 20, 2011. The science portion of the FCAT was the last portion to be administered. It consisted of two sessions on successive days, with 29 questions on one day and 31 questions on the other. Both sessions were 55 minutes long. All 60 questions are in the same booklet. There may be one or two questions per page, depending on the question, so the test booklet is approximately 50-60 pages long. There are different forms of the test, but the core items are the same for each student. Teachers were trained regarding testing protocols and security measures by Cedric Chandler, Greensboro Elementary’s Guidance Counselor and Assessment Coordinator. Each teacher responsible for administering the FCAT was provided with a testing administration manual, including a copy of Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-10.042, which governs the administration of the test. There is also a form that is signed by educators when they attend the training that indicates that they understand and have read the rules. The FCAT/FCAT 2. Administration and Security Agreement signed by Respondent states in pertinent part: Florida State Board of Education Rule 6A- 10.042, F.A.C., was developed to meet the requirements of the Test Security Statutes, s. 1008.24, F.S., and applies to anyone involved in the administration of a statewide assessment. The Rule prohibits activities that may threaten the integrity of the test. . . . Examples of prohibited activities are listed below: Reading the passages or test items Revealing the passages or test items Copying the passages or test items Explaining or reading passages or test items for students Changing or otherwise interfering with student responses to test items Copying or reading student responses Causing achievement of schools to be inaccurately measured or reported * * * All personnel are prohibited from examining or copying the test items and/or the contents of student test books and answer documents. The security of all test materials must be maintained before, during, and after the test administration. Please remember that after ANY test administration, initial OR make-up, materials must be returned immediately to the school assessment coordinator and placed in locked storage. Secure materials should not remain in classrooms or be taken out of the building overnight. The use of untrained test administrators increases the risk of test invalidation due to test irregularities or breaches in test security. I, (insert name), have read the Florida Test Security Statute and State Board of Education Rule in Appendix B, and the information and instructions provided in all applicable sections of the 2011 Reading, Mathematics, and Science Test Administration Manual. I agree to administer the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test (FCAT/FCAT 2.0) according to these procedures. Further, I will not reveal or disclose any information about the test items or engage in any acts that would violate the security of the FCAT/FCAT 2.0 and cause student achievement to be inaccurately represented or reported. Respondent signed the Security Agreement on April 7, 2011. Teachers are also given a specific script to read for every grade and subject being tested. For the fifth-grade science test, the script is approximately five pages long. Teachers are instructed that they are to read the script and that their actions should comport with the directions in the script. Victoria Ash is the bureau chief for K-12 assessment at the Florida Department of Education. Her office is charged with the development, administration, assessment, scoring, and reporting of the FCAT. Ms. Ash indicated that there are no stakes attached to the science test at the state level. When asked about protocols to follow in the administration of the FCAT, Ms. Ash indicated that it is not permissible for teachers to assist students, as teacher interference would cause results not to be an accurate measure of the students’ ability. It is not permissible to walk up to a student, point to a question and answer and tell the student to take another look at that question. Such behavior is not permitted either verbally or by some other physical cue. When a student calls a teacher over during the FCAT to ask a question, the teacher is to avoid any specific response. However, it is acceptable, according to Ms. Ash, for a teacher to say things such as “just keep working hard,” “think about it more, you will eventually get it,” or “do your best.” To say something like “just remember the strategies we discussed” would be, in Ms. Ash’s view, “going right up to the edge” of permissible responses. As long as the response is not to a specific question, a teacher would not be violating the protocols to tell students to read over their answers again, and to make sure the students answered every question. The Second Amended Administrative Complaint alleges that Respondent provided inappropriate assistance to students in her fifth-grade class as they took the 2011 Science FCAT by pointing to incorrect test answers or telling students to look again at certain answers. Five students from Ms. Walker’s class testified at hearing with respect to the 2011 science FCAT examination. Of those five, one student’s testimony could be construed as supporting the allegations in the Administrative Complaint. D.M. testified that Ms. Walker just walked around the classroom. She “wasn’t giving nobody answers. . . . She just tell you that maybe you should redo that one.” She testified that Ms. Walker told her to “relook” at a question, but also testified that she did not think Ms. Walker actually said anything, but rather pointed to the test booklet. D.M. admitted that her memory was not very clear, stating, “it was so long ago.” Students S.B., J.J., A.M., and E.S. also testified. S.B. said she “kind of” remembered the test, but that nothing about the test really stood out. She believed that in response to a question she had about the test, Ms. Walker may have given a general answer, such as, check over the page again. She did not remember Ms. Walker giving any hints to the class. S.B.’s testimony is vague and general at best, and does not support a finding of inappropriate assistance. J.J. testified that she was focused on the test, and was not paying attention to what others were doing. She stated that Ms. Walker did not go around the room giving hints to students during the test, and she did not recall Ms. Walker putting her finger on anyone’s test in a “hinting manner.” Similarly, A.M. testified that she did not remember Ms. Walker going around giving hints about how students should answer questions. Ms. Walker did not give any hints to A.M. and A.M. did not hear Ms. Walker give any hints to anyone else. A.M. stated that it was really quiet in the room, and while it is hard to remember that far back, if a teacher was giving hints on the FCAT, she would remember it. E.S. also testified that it was pretty quiet during the FCAT. She was not paying attention, but did not think that Ms. Walker went around the room giving hints about answers. She admitted that she did not remember much about the test, and could not separate out what happened in the science part of the test as opposed to the rest of the FCAT, but thinks it would have stood out if something inappropriate happened. She was focused on the test but aware of what was going on in the classroom, and Ms. Walker never pointed to anything on her test booklet, and thinks she would have heard something if Ms. Walker said anything inappropriate. Valorie Sanders was the proctor assigned to Ms. Walker’s class.5/ She does not recall exactly what Ms. Walker said during the test, but believed it was for the students to focus. She did not see Ms. Walker do anything that would violate testing protocols, for which she had received training; did not recall Ms. Walker giving hints to any students; did not recall any instance where Ms. Walker implied a student should change an answer from wrong to right; and did not see Ms. Walker point to an answer on a student’s test. Finally, Ms. Walker denied that she gave any inappropriate assistance to students during the test. She stated that she made statements such as “pay attention,” “focus,” “go back over your tests if you finish early,” and “make sure you have an answer for every question,” but did not make any comments about specific questions on the test. Ms. Walker testified that she remained seated during most of the testing because it is painful for her to walk. She did walk around once when she saw Mr. Chandler in Ms. Hairston’s class next to hers, and if she saw students staring off into space she would touch the student’s desk to get them back on task, but did not point to specific questions. Ms. Walker testified that she had been giving tests to students for 20 years and had never been accused of any impropriety. She, like her daughter, welcomed the decision not to proctor any more FCAT tests. After careful review of the evidence presented, it is found that Ms. Walker did not violate testing protocols by providing assistance to students during the 2011 science FCAT. She did not point to specific questions/answers or tell a student (or indicate without talking) that the student should change the answer to any particular question. The type of coaching alleged in the Second Amended Administrative Complaint would be quite difficult to do, given the structure of the test and the testing environment. There is no answer key to the test, and according to Ms. Ash, there are different forms of the test. Some pages have one question while others have two. Students are given a set amount of time to complete the test, but worked at different speeds. Many finished early, while some may not have completed it. In order for Ms. Walker to give the kind of assistance alleged, she would have to stand by the testing student, read the question on the page, see the answer given, recognize it as wrong, and point out the error to the student. Such a scenario is improbable at best, given that the testimony is undisputed that Ms. Walker had a difficult time walking6/ and only walked around the one time she saw Mr. Chandler. The explanation that she would point to the desk in order to gain a child’s attention and get them to focus is reasonable. It is not clear from the record at hearing when the Department of Education began or ended the investigation with respect to Respondent’s license. The Administrative Complaint was signed by the Commissioner on September 18, 2013. Ms. Walker testified that she did not remember receiving the Administrative Complaint, although she knew that there was an Administrative Complaint regarding the FCAT. She received a lot of paperwork during this time period, but did not read it all. She hired Mr. Caldwell to represent her during the investigative stage. On October 3, 2013, an Election of Rights form was filed on Ms. Walker’s behalf requesting time to negotiate a settlement with the Office of Professional Practices, and if an agreement was not reached during that time, electing a formal hearing. The Election of Rights form is signed by counsel, and not by Ms. Walker. On March 13, 2014, Ms. Walker completed an application for renewal form for renewal of her educator’s certificate. The form has a variety of questions, all of which Ms. Walker answered “no.” The questions listed included the following: Have you ever been convicted of a criminal offense? Have you ever been found guilty of a criminal offense? * * * Are there currently charges pending against you for any criminal offense? Have you ever had a professional license or certificate sanctioned or disciplined in this state or any other state? * * * Do you have any current disciplinary action pending in this state or any other state against a professional license or certificate or against an application for a professional license or certificate? Following the questions was a box that stated the following: Florida Law requires you to provide a YES or NO answer to the questions within the Legal Disclosure section of your application, even if previously submitted. If you answered YES to any question in the Legal Disclosure section on the application form, you must provide detailed complete information for each affirmative response within the corresponding section in this Legal Disclosure Supplement. * * * Having a criminal history or administrative sanction against a professional license does not automatically disqualify a person from receiving a Florida Educator’s Certificate, but such incidents will prompt a review by the Office of Professional Practices Services. For the section labeled “Professional License or Certificate Sanction(s),” the form required the applicant to identify the state, year, and issuing agency, as well as the license or certificate affected and the “Sanction and Reason.” Above the signature line, the form states: “I do hereby affirm by my signature that all information provided in this application is true, correct, and complete.” At the time Ms. Walker filled out the application, no discipline against her certificate had been imposed. There was, however, a proceeding in which Petitioner sought to impose discipline against her certificate. However, at that time, there would have been no year, sanction, or reason for her to list in the disclosure supplement. Applications for renewal are completed at the school district and forwarded to the Department of Education for processing. Ms. Walker testified that she went to the district office at the end of the day and was in a hurry when she filled out the application. At first she skipped the question about “current disciplinary action pending” because she did not understand the question. She bubbled it “no” because she was in a hurry. Veronica White of the Department of Education Bureau of Educator Certification explained the process for renewing educator certificates. She has been employed by the bureau since 1998. Ms. White was asked about the meaning of the term “pending disciplinary action” on the application form: Q. Ms. White, you referred to a question, referred to the application, the renew application of Ms. Walker. Let me ask you about a question on that application. When the Education Practices Commission, I will call it EPC. When EPC has ordered discipline, but it has not yet gone into effect; is that pending discipline? A. You are asking me questions that I can’t answer. I don’t work in Professional Practices Services. Q. Okay. A. I can only answer from the certification side. I am sorry. Q. Okay. Can I ask you about the meaning of pending discipline on the application form; is that something you feel you have expertise in, the meaning of pending discipline? A. No. Q. You can’t? Okay. All right. So you do not know the meaning of pending discipline on that application form? A. No, I really don’t. At the time Ms. Walker completed her renewal application, there was no final order imposing discipline against her license. There were disciplinary proceedings seeking to impose discipline that had not yet been resolved. It was not unreasonable, given the structure of the application, for her to answer “no” to the question as phrased, especially in light of the information sought in the legal disclosure supplement. She did not seek to obtain the renewal of her teaching certificate by fraudulent means. Some of Ms. Walker’s evaluations were admitted into evidence. A review of Respondent’s Exhibit 3 reveals that there are multiple copies of some of the evaluations, and the evaluation for 2010-2011 lacks a signature page. With respect to those evaluations that are complete, Ms. Walker was rated “outstanding” and “effective.”
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Education Practices Commission enter a Final Order dismissing the Second Amended Administrative Complaint in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of February, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 2015.
The Issue Is Petitioner entitled to receive supported living services from Respondent? See Section 393.066, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is 18 years old. He lives with his paternal grandmother and step-grandfather at 3109 Brandywine Drive, Tallahassee, Florida. On March 23, 1994, the Petitioner applied for developmental services. Petitioner's natural mother was institutionalized for retardation for an indeterminate length of time at a Sunland Center. Shortly after the Petitioner's birth, his mother left the Petitioner and his father. Petitioner has lived with his paternal grandmother since he was 13 weeks old. Petitioner's grandmother raised her own three children and has experience in child rearing and the development of children. She noticed that Petitioner's development was slow when Petitioner did not begin walking at age 17 months and did not begin to speak intelligible words until 30 months of age. Petitioner was taken to the Florida State University Psychology Clinic at age 4 years 3 months (4.3 years) in an effort to determine why his development was slow. This was the first time the Petitioner's Intelligence Quotient (IQ) was tested. He obtained a 77 on the Stanford-Binet L-M test, and an 87 on the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales. FSU advised the Petitioner's grandmother that Petitioner might have developmental problems and to observe him closely and retest him if he had problems in school. As a result, Petitioner's IQ was tested several times between ages 5 and 17. Testing dates and scores of these test are as follows: October 80 4.3 Stanford-Binet FSU Psy. Clinic IQ 77 Vineland Adaptive FSU Psy. Clinic 87 July 81 5.0 FSU Psy. Clinic Stanford-Binet IQ 84 May 84 7.10 WISC-R FSIQ 84-87 85 9.0 WISC-R FSIQ 80 April 86 9.9 WISC-R Psych. Assoc., Dr.Cook FSIQ 69 June 86 9.11 WISC-R Leon Cty. School, Barnes FSIQ 72 March 91 14.8 WISC-R Leon Cty. School, Popp FSIQ 69 April 92 15.9 Vineland Adapt. Psych. Assoc. Dr. Clark 62 July 93 17.0 WAIS-R, Psych. Assoc. Dr. Deitchman 70 Dr. Thomas Clark, who holds a doctorate in clinical psychology and is a board certified clinical psychologist, testified regarding intelligence testing and his examination of the Petitioner and the records of Petitioner's intelligence testing. The numbers in the far right column in Paragraph 5, above, all reflect the IQ of the Petitioner. IQ scores of 70 or lower placed a person two or more standard deviations below the mean on standardized intelligence tests. Individuals with mental retardation, who may exhibit higher IQ test scores when they are younger, may have their scores decrease as they get older. This is a recognized phenomenon in the mildly retarded. Scores on IQ tests may be inflated by a practice factor which occurs when the test is administered more than once within a six-month period. The record reflects that the Petitioner was tested two times in 1986, and his second score of 72 was higher because of the practice factor. The increase of Petitioner's score was within 2 to 3 points above his general performance on the first test in 1986 and his subsequent tests in 1991, 1992, and 1993, which is the predicted increase due to the practice factor. Since age 9.9, with the exception of the 72 due to the practice factor, the Petitioner has not scored above 70 on an IQ test. Based upon his examination and testing of the Petitioner and his review of the Petitioner's records, Dr. Clark's professional opinion was that the Petitioner was more than two standard deviations below the average in intellectual performance. Although the Petitioner suffers from Attention Deficit Disorder and has some emotional problems, Dr. Clark stated this did not alter his opinion regarding the Petitioner's IQ or his intellectual performance. Dr. Clark found that Petitioner's adaptive behavior was low for Petitioner's IQ. The parties stipulated that the measurement of Petitioner's general intellectual functioning existed concurrently with deficits in his adaptive behavior as manifested during the period from conception to age 18. Based upon its assessment, the Leon County Schools recommended that the Petitioner be placed in the community-based educational program which is designed for students who are mentally retarded within the educable range. The Petitioner has been awarded Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act upon a determination that he is mentally retarded. Since his completion of school, the Petitioner has been attending workshops conducted by Goodwill Industries to develop job skills and job coping skills. He has been unable to maintain employment, and has been discharged from all of the positions to which he has been referred. Petitioner was referred to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Developmental Services by officials of Vocational Rehabilitation (Composite Exhibit 1-C). Petitioner's grandparents take him shopping, assist the Petitioner in maintaining his daily life, live with Petitioner on a daily basis, and give him support and try to assist him in controlling his "excessive loud talking". Without the care of his grandparents, the Petitioner would not be able to maintain the activities of daily living. Petitioner's friends include neighborhood children whose ages range from 3 years to 12 years. Their parents have requested Petitioner no longer play with them due to his size, age and conduct. Petitioner's testimony and demeanor while testifying reveal a young adult who is mentally retarded and whose adaptive skills are consistent with his IQ. Petitioner's grandmother testified that even though he is 18 1/2 years old, the Petitioner acts like a boy between 9 and 10 years old. The Respondent's position was that Petitioner's earlier test scores indicated that he was not two deviations below average intellectual performance, and the Petitioner's later test scores were adversely impacted by his emotional and attention deficit problems; therefore, Petitioner was ineligible for developmental services. The testimony of Dr. Clark clearly refuted the assertion that the Petitioner's earlier high test scores indicated a higher IQ, and refuted the alleged negative impact upon IQ testing of Petitioner's attention deficit and emotional disorder. Petitioner presented competent evidence and expert testimony concerning Petitioner's intellectual function to establish that Petitioner's performance was two or more standard deviations from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test. Petitioner's showing was unrebutted by the Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is; RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered approving Petitioner's eligibility for developmental services. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of March, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of March, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Both parties submitted proposed findings which were read and considered. The following states which of those findings were adopted, and which were rejected and why: Petitioner's Recommended Order Findings Paragraph 1 Paragraph 1 Paragraph 2 Subsumed in Paragraph 14 Paragraph 3 Paragraph 15 Paragraph 4 Subsumed in Paragraph 14 Paragraph 5 Subsumed in Paragraph 16 Paragraph 6 Paragraph 17 Paragraph 7 Paragraph 2 Paragraph 8 Paragraph 3 Paragraph 9 Paragraph 4 Paragraph 10 Paragraph 5 Paragraph 11 Subsumed in Paragraph 9 Paragraph 12 Irrelevant Paragraphs 13,14 Subsumed in Paragraphs 16-19 Paragraphs 15-17 True, but made part of Statement of Case Paragraphs 18-21 Subsumed in Paragraph 20 Paragraphs 22-25 Subsumed in Paragraphs 6-10,21 Paragraph 26 Paragraph 11 Paragraph 27 Paragraph 22 Respondent's Recommended Order Findings Paragraph 1 Paragraph 1 Paragraph 2 Rejected as contrary to the more credible evidence summarized in Paragraph 20. Paragraph 3 Paragraph 5 in which the typographical error regarding the test of October 1980 is corrected. The facts set forth in the footnotes are rejected, particularly the assertion that Dr. Cook's reference to a "recent" administration of an IQ test did not fix the date of the test sufficiently to say whether the practice effect would impact its administration. Paragraph 5 Subsumed in Paragraphs 7 and 21 Paragraph 6 See comments for Paragraph 3. As stated in the findings, this premise was specifically rejected. Paragraph 8 Paragraph 1 Paragraph 9 Irrelevant Paragraph 10 Subsumed in various other findings. Paragraph 11 True; however, the Petitioner's application is based solely upon his allegation that he is mentally retarded. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel W. Dobbins, Esquire 433 North Magnolia Drive Tallahassee, FL 32308 John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 2639 North Monroe Street, Suite 252A Tallahassee, FL 32399-2949 Robert L. Powell, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Kim Tucker, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background By application dated March 29, 1989, petitioner, Stuart B. Novick, sought licensure by examination as a psychologist. The application was filed with respondent, Board of Psychological Examiners (Board), which has statutory authority to license and regulate the psychologist profession. In action taken act its August 1989 meeting, the Board voted to deny the application on the ground petitioner did not satisfy the educational and work experience requirements imposed by statute and rule. In addition, the Board concluded that Novick had not submitted proof of completion of an educational course concerning HIV and AIDS, as required by agency rule. This decision was conveyed to Novick in an order issued by the Board on September 15, 1989. This proceeding involves petitioner's challenge of that preliminary decision. The specific objections to licensure will be dealt with separately in the findings below. Educational Requirements The Board's preliminary decision made the following findings pertinent to petitioner's education: Your doctoral program was not completed at an institution of higher education fully accredited by a regional accrediting body recognized by the Council on Postsecondary Education or an institution which is publicly recognized as a member in good standing with the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada. In addition, your doctoral program was not approved by the American Psychological Association as required by Chapter 490.005(1)(b), Florida Statutes and Chapter 21U-11.006(1)(b)1., 9., and 10., Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner received a bachelor of arts in political science from the University of California - Los Angeles in December 1970. He then obtained a masters degree in educational psychology and guidance from California State University Northridge in January 1974. In the summer of 1977 he enrolled at California Graduate Institute (CGI), an institution of higher learning in Los Angeles. After attending CGI fulltime for approximately five years, Novick was awarded a doctorate in psychology in October 1982. At issue in this case is whether CGI and its psychology program meet the requirements of the law for licensure. According to applicable statutory requirements, petitioner was required to submit satisfactory proof that he had received a doctoral degree with a major in psychology from a program which at the time petitioner was enrolled and graduated was accredited by the American Psychological Association (APA). As to this requirement, Novick conceded that when he attended CGI from 1977 until 1982, that institution was not fully accredited by the APA. Therefore, petitioner did not meet that requirement. In lieu of satisfying the requirement described in the preceding paragraph, petitioner was authorized by law to submit satisfactory proof that he received a doctoral degree in psychology from a program which at the time petitioner was enrolled and graduated maintained a standard of training comparable to the standards of training of those programs accredited by the APA. In this regard, the more persuasive evidence, including the program analysis form submitted by petitioner with his application, shows that petitioner's doctoral program did not require each student to demonstrate knowledge and use of scientific and professional ethics and standards, research design and methodology, statistics, psychological measurements, and history and systems of psychology. The foregoing educational requirements are embodied in Rule 21U-11.006(1)(b)10., Florida Administrative Code, and must be satisfied in order to show comparability. In view of these deficiencies, it is found that petitioner failed to satisfy this part of the requirements for licensure. In addition to the foregoing comparability requirement, petitioner was obligated to show that his education and training in psychology wash received in an institution of higher education fully accredited by a regional accrediting body recognized by the Council on Postsecondary Accreditation. As to this requirement, petitioner conceded that CGI's psychology program was not accredited by a recognized regional accrediting body. That admission is corroborated by a letter dated May 15, 1989 from the chairperson of CGI's department of psychology to the Board. Therefore, this criterion was not met. Work Experience In its proposed agency action, the Board cited the following concerns with petitioner's work experience: You have not completed the two years or 4000 hours of supervised experience in the field of psychology as required by Chapter 490.005(1)(c), Florida Statutes, and Chapter 21U-11.006(1) (c), Florida Administrative Code and in compliance with Chapter 21U-17, Florida Administrative Code. The experience under Dr. Milana was experience as a marriage and family therapist, rather than as a psychological resident in compliance with Chapter 21U-17, Florida Administrative Code. As explained further at hearing by the Board's executive director, although petitioner's "supervising psychologist verification form" facially complied with the required work experience in the field of psychology, the Board was concerned with the fact that Novick has been licensed as a marriage and family therapist (MFT) since September 1986, was employed as a MFT when much of the work experience was obtained, and may have rendered services in that capacity rather than as a psychological resident. After graduation from CGI, petitioner was employed as an outpatient therapist by Northside Centers (the center), a mental health clinic in the Tampa area. During the course of that employment, petitioner obtained approval from Dr. Suzette Milana, a licensed psychologist, to train under her supervision as a psychological resident at the center. According to petitioner, as confirmed by Dr. Milana's testimony as well as documents in his application file, he worked, at least part of the time, under Dr. Milana's supervision from July 1984 until the application was filed. The supervising psychologist verification form completed by Dr. Milana reflects that Novick was supervised for 228 weeks, rendered approximately 2200 hours of psychological services to clients, and was employed by the center for a total of 4880 hours. According to Dr. Milana, petitioner is now competent to perform without supervision adult, adolescent and child treatment. Doctor Milana verified that, during his supervised period of employment, petitioner participated in the following activities: evaluation and assessment, intake activity, formulation of treatment plans, treatment intervention, case management and crisis intervention, all being activities normally engaged in by psycholgical residents. However, Novick did no psychological testing since the clinic already had an employee assigned to that job. Even so, there was no evidence to establish that psychological testing is a current required part of a resident's work experience. Doctor Milana described petitioner's supervision to be the same that she received when she was fulfilling her work experience requirement for licensure. By agency rule effective October 3, 1985, the Board imposed the requirement that, during one's training period, an applicant shall be known by the title "psychological resident". In addition, a requirement was added that all business cards, signs, stationery and the like naming the applicant must also bear the name and affiliation of the supervisor/associate. Finally, each resident is obliged to advise each client at the time services are initiated of his status as a resident, the requirements of a supervised status and of the name of his supervisor. The requirement concerning the disclosure of the supervisor's identity is necessary since the supervisor must ultimately take full responsibility for the resident's patients and their treatment. During the period after October 1985 and until the application was filed, petitioner continued to use business cards issued by the center which reflected his title as being a "marriage and family therapist" and did not disclose the name of his supervisor. According to petitioner, he never indicated on any reports or insurance forms that he was a psychological resident. Further, Dr. Milana did not co-sign any reports. Although petitioner told all of his patients that he was an outpatient therapist or a MFT, he told only "some" that he was working under the supervision of Dr. Milana. Except as to these departures from the rule, petitioner's training was in conformity with the Board rule. Course in HIV and AIDS The Board's order noted that Novick had not furnished "proof of completion of an educational course concerning HIV and AIDS in compliance with Chapter 21U-21, Florida Administrative Code". According to Rule 21U- 21.001, Florida Administrative Code (1989), each person applying for licensure subsequent to July 1, 1989 shall be required to complete an educational course approved by the Board and consisting of education on the transmission, control treatment and prevention of Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome with emphasis on appropriate behavior and attitude change. Novick did not submit proof of completion of such a course with his initial application. However, at hearing he stated he had completed a Board approved course at a local hospital in April 1989 and shortly thereafter forwarded a copy of his diploma to the Board. Although no documentary proof was submitted at hearing to support this claim, it was not contradicted by the Board, and it is accordingly found that Novick has satisfied this part of the licensure requirements.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of petitioner for licensure as a psychologist by examination be DENIED. DONE and ORDERED this 16 day of March, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1236 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16 day of March, 1990.
The Issue Whether Ketura Bouie suffers from “retardation”, as that term is defined by Section 393.063(43), Florida Statutes, and therefore qualifies for developmental services offered by the Respondent agency under Chapter 393, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Ketura Bouie is 15 years old. She currently resides in Tallahassee, Florida. She is enrolled in a new school after transferring from Chatahoochee. Ketura has had several “social” promotions from grade to grade over the years. Her application for developmental services has been denied by the Respondent agency. Wallace Kennedy, Ph.D., is a Board-certified and Florida-licensed clinical psychologist. He was accepted as an expert in clinical psychology and the testing of children. He conducted a psychological evaluation of Ketura on April 12, 1995, for which he has provided a written narrative dated April 13, 1995. His narrative was admitted in evidence. Ketura was 13 years old at the time of Dr. Kennedy’s evaluation. He administered three standardized tests which are recognized and accepted for determining applicants’ eligibility for developmental services. These tests were: a wide range achievement test, Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children— Revised (WISC-R), and Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scale. (Vineland) The wide range achievement test generally measures literacy. Ketura recognized only half of the upper-case letters of the alphabet and only a few three-letter kindergarten words. Her results indicated that she has the achievement level expected of a five and a half year old kindergarten student, even though she was then placed in the seventh grade. In Dr. Kennedy's view, there is "no chance Ketura will become functionally literate". The WISC-R measures intellectual functioning and academic aptitude without penalizing the child for handicaps. The mean score on this test is 100. To score two or more deviations from this mean, a subject must score 70 or below. All of Ketura’s WISC-R scores on the test administered by Dr. Kennedy in April 1995 were well below 70. They consisted of a verbal score of 46, a performance score of 46, and a full scale score of 40. Ketura’s full scale IQ of 40 is in the lowest tenth of the first percentile and represents a low moderate level of mental retardation. Ketura’s full scale score of 40 is the lowest result that WISC-R can measure. The Vineland measures communication, daily living skills, and socialization. Ketura’s composite score for Dr. Kennedy on the Vineland was 42. In conducting the Vineland test, Dr. Kennedy relied on information obtained through his own observation of Ketura and information obtained from Ketura’s mother. It is typical in the field of clinical psychology to rely on information supplied by parents and caregivers, provided they are determined to be reliable observers. Dr. Kennedy assessed Ketura’s mother to be a reliable observer. Dr. Kennedy’s Vineland test revealed that Ketura has a social maturity level of about six years of age. Her verbal and written communication skills are poor. Ketura has poor judgment regarding her personal safety. She cannot consistently remember to use a seatbelt and cannot safely use a knife. She has poor domestic skills. She has no concept of money or of dates. She does not help with the laundry or any other household task. She cannot use the phone. Ketura’s socialization skills are also poor. She does not have basic social manners. Her table manners and social interactive skills are poor. She has no friends, and at the time of Dr. Kennedy’s evaluation, she was unhappy due to classmates making fun of her for being unable to recite the alphabet. Dr. Kennedy rendered an ultimate diagnosis of moderate mental retardation and opined that Ketura's retardation is permanent. Although Dr. Kennedy observed that Ketura was experiencing low levels of depression and anxiety during his April 1995 tests and interview, he did not make a clinical psychological diagnosis to that effect. He attributed these emotional components to Ketura’s lack of confidence in being able to perform the tasks required during testing. In his opinion, Ketura did not have any behavioral or emotional problems which interfered with the reliability of the tests he administered. Also, there were no other conditions surrounding his evaluation which interfered with the validity or reliability of the test scores, his evaluation, or his determination that Ketura suffers from a degree of retardation which would qualify her for developmental services. In Dr. Kennedy’s expert opinion, even if all of Ketura's depression and anxiety were eliminated during testing, her WISC-R scores would not have placed her above the retarded range in April 1995. The retardation range for qualifying for developmental services is 68 or below. Ketura’s I.Q. was tested several times between 1990 and April 1995 with resulting full scale scores ranging from 40 to All or some of these tests and/or reports on the 1990 - 1995 tests were submitted to the agency with Ketura’s application for developmental services. Also included with Ketura’s application to the agency were mental health reports documenting depression, a recognized mental disorder. The most recent of these was one done as recently as May of 1996. However, none of these reports were offered or admitted in evidence at formal hearing. Respondent’s sole witness and agency representative, was Ms. JoAnne Braun. She is an agency Human Service Counselor III. Ms. Braun is not a Florida-licensed psychologist and she was not tendered as an expert witness in any field. As part of the application process, she visited with Ketura and her mother in their home. She also reviewed Petitioner’s application and mental health records described above. She reviewed the fluctuating psychological test scores beginning in 1990, one of which placed Ketura at 70 and another of which placed her at 74 on a scale of 100. Ms. Braun also reviewed a March 1995 psychological testing series that showed Ketura had a verbal 50, performance 60, and full scale 62 on the WISC-R test, one month before Dr. Kennedy’s April 1995 evaluation described above. However, none of these items which she reviewed was offered or admitted in evidence. The agency has guidelines for assessing eligibility for developmental services. The guidelines were not offered or admitted in evidence. Ms. Braun interpreted the agency's guidelines as requiring her to eliminate the mental health aspect if she felt it could depress Ketura's standard test scores. Because Ms. Braun "could not be sure that the mental health situation did not depress her scores," and because the fluctuation of Ketura’s test scores over the years caused Ms. Braun to think that Ketura’s retardation might not “reasonably be expected to continue indefinitely”, as required by the controlling statute, she opined that Ketura was not eligible for developmental services. Dr. Kennedy's assessment and expert psychological opinion was that if Ketura's scores were once higher and she now tests with lower scores, it might be the result of better testing today; it might be due to what had been required and observed of her during prior school testing situations; it might even be because she was in a particularly good mood on the one day she scored 70 or 74, but his current testing clearly shows she will never again do significantly better on standard tests than she did in April 1995. In his education, training, and experience, it is usual for test scores to deteriorate due to a retarded person's difficulties in learning as that person matures. I do not consider Ms. Braun’s opinion, though in evidence, as sufficient to rebut the expert opinion of Dr. Kennedy. This is particularly so since the items she relied upon are not in evidence and are not the sort of hearsay which may be relied upon for making findings of fact pursuant to Section 120.58(1)(a), Florida Statutes. See, Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Unemployment Appeals Commission and Robert Stack, 654 So.2d 292 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); and Tenbroeck v. Castor, 640 So.2d 164, (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). Particularly, there is no evidence that the "guidelines" (also not in evidence) she relied upon have any statutory or rule basis. Therefore, the only test scores and psychological evaluation upon which the undersigned can rely in this de novo proceeding are those of Dr. Kennedy. However, I do accept as binding on the agency Ms. Braun’s credible testimony that the agency does not find that the presence of a mental disorder in and of itself precludes an applicant, such as Ketura, from qualifying to receive developmental services; that Ketura is qualified to receive agency services under another program for alcohol, drug, and mental health problems which Ketura also may have; and that Ketura’s eligibility under that program and under the developmental services program, if she qualifies for both, are not mutually exclusive.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Families issue a Final Order awarding Ketura Bouie appropriate developmental services for so long as she qualifies under the statute.RECOMMENDED this 24th day of February, 1997, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax FILING (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of February, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Richard A. Doran General Counsel Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Marla Ruth Butler Qualified Representative Children's Advocacy Center Florida State University Tallahassee, FL 32302-0287 Marian Alves, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 100A Tallahassee, FL 32399-2949
The Issue The issues for determination in this case are: 1) whether the Respondent’s decision to award a contract to operate a juvenile work release halfway house program to the Henry and Rilla White Foundation was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious; and 2) whether the award of the contract is void as a matter of law because of procedural violations by the selection committee and the Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, JUVENILE SERVICES PROGRAM, INC. (JSP), is a Florida-based private not-for-profit corporation which was founded to serve troubled youths and their families. Respondent, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE (DJJ), is the agency of the State of Florida with the statutory authorization for planning, coordinating, and managing programs for the delivery of services within the juvenile justice consortium. Section 20.316, Florida Statutes. RFP #16P05 On September 27, 1996, Respondent DJJ advertised and released a Request For Proposal (RFP) #16P05 to provide a Work Release Halfway House for Delinquent Males in District IX, serving Palm Beach County, Florida. In response to the RFP, four bids were submitted to DJJ by the following parties: the Henry and Rilla White Foundation, Total Recovery, Inc., Psychotherapeutic Services Inc., and Petitioner JSP. The DJJ bid selection committee of evaluators for the RFP were Jack Ahern, Steve Brown, Jaque Layne, Patricia Thomas, and from the Office of Budget Finance, Fred Michael Mauterer. The contract manager for the RFP was Diane Rosenfelder. On October 28, 1996, each DJJ evaluator was sent a package consisting of a copy of the RFP, which included the evaluation sheet, a copy of each proposal submitted to DJJ, a conflict of interest questionnaire, a certificate of compliance, a description of the proposal selection process, and instructions. Each package sent to the evaluators had a different colored cover sheet which identified the specific evaluator. After completing the evaluations, each evaluator returned the signed conflict of interest forms, and certificates of compliance to Diane Rosenfelder. The evaluations were identified by the color of the cover sheets, as well as the signed conflict of interest forms and certificates of compliance. DJJ initially intended to provide each evaluator with an Award Preference Form which were to be used in the event the final evaluation scores were very close. The Award Preference Forms, however, were inadvertently omitted from the packages sent to the evaluators. The evaluation process resulted in the Henry and Rilla White Foundation receiving the highest average score of 391.50 points. Petitioner JSP received the second highest average score of 360.50 points. The award of points was determined by each evaluator which is indicated by the evaluator checking the box on Section 5 of the evaluation sheet, or by filling in the appropriate point score. The contract manager, Diane Rosenfelder, corrected addition errors on the scoring sheets. The budget part of the evaluation was completed by Fred Michael Mauterer, Senior Management Analyst Supervisor. In accordance with the evaluation scores, DJJ determined that the best response was submitted by the Henry and Rilla White Foundation which was awarded the contract. On November 8, 1996, Petitioner JSP filed a timely Notice of Protest of the award, which was supplemented on December 9, 1996 with the required posting of a $5000 bond. Alleged Errors and Discrepancies in the Evaluation Process Petitioner JSP alleges that several errors in the evaluation process require that the contract award to the Henry and Rilla White Foundation be set aside and that the RFP be reissued and rebid. Petitioner first alleges that the bid selection committee failed to follow the certain instructions during the evaluation process. The instructions were prepared by the contract manager Diane Rosenfelder. The instructions were not required by rule or policy of DJJ. The contract manager considered the instructions advisory in nature. The instructions stated that the members of the bid selection committee should not contact each other with respect to the proposals under evaluation. The evaluators, however, were permitted to contact the contract manager who would record all questions and answers. There were instances in which the contract manager did not record questions from the evaluators to the contract manager. There is no evidence that the evaluators contacted each other regarding the proposals during the evaluation process. The instructions asked the evaluators to explain high or low scores given to the proposals under consideration. None of the evaluators made specific explanations of high or low scores. The contract manager who prepared the instructions considered this instruction discretionary, and there is no evidence that any score given by an individual evaluator was without basis. The evaluators were instructed to provide page numbers from the proposals used to score each item. None of the evaluators complied with this instruction. As indicated above, however, there is no evidence that the actual scores give by the evaluators were without basis. As set forth above, none of the evaluators received the Award Preference Form. This form was to be used in the case of very close scoring of the proposals. The actual scores from the bid selection committee reflected a clear preference for the proposal submitted by the Henry and Rilla White Foundation. Accordingly, there was no demonstrated need for DJJ to rely upon the Award Preference Forms in making its decision to award the contract. The letter of introduction sent to the bid selection committee members from the contract manager stated that the proposal score sheets and the evaluators award preference and the best interest of the district would be considered in determining the award. The contract manager considered this statement advisory in nature. DJJ has not promulgated specific standards relating to the best interest of District IX; however, the proposal evaluation forms sent to the bid selection committee inherently include criteria setting out standards for the determination of the best proposal for the district. The evidence reflects that one of the evaluators, Patricia Thomas, erroneously checked the box on each proposal which gave each of the proposals fifty points as certified minority enterprises, and erroneously wrote “50” as a point count on one evaluation score sheet. None of the proposals included a copy of the certification for minority enterprise as required by Section 287.0945, Florida Statutes, and the contract manager recognized that the evaluator had made a mistake in this regard. In response to this error, the contract manager consulted her supervisors. Because each proposal was awarded the same points, DJJ did not consider the evaluator’s error as prejudicial to any proposal or to the bid selection process, and did reject the evaluator’s scoring of the proposals. There is no showing that Petitioner JPS was prejudiced by DJJ’s decision in this regard. The contract manager added signature lines to the last page of the evaluation sheets. Some of the sheets were returned unsigned from the evaluators. There is no DJJ requirement that the evaluation sheets specifically contain the signatures of the evaluators. The contract manager did not consider the signature page mandatory, and the evaluation proposal score sheets were clearly identified by both color coding and the certificates of conflict signed by the evaluators. There is no evidence that the procedural discrepancies affected the substance of the evaluator’s scoring of the proposals, nor did the procedural discrepancies prejudice the evaluators’ consideration of Petitioner’s proposal.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Respondent enter a final order upholding the proposed agency action to award the contract to the Henry and Rilla White Foundation, and dismissing the Petition filed in this case. DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of April, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. RICHARD HIXSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of April, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Dominic E. Amadio, Esquire Republic Bank Building, Suite 305 100 34th Street North St. Petersburg, Florida 33713 Scott C. Wright, Assistant General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Calvin Ross, Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Janet Ferris, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100
