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FELIDO MARTINEZ vs ORANGE COUNTY FLEET MANAGER, 97-000559 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Altamonte Springs, Florida Feb. 03, 1997 Number: 97-000559 Latest Update: Jun. 30, 2004

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is male and Cuban. He is a member of a protected group and a qualified individual. Petitioner was employed by the Fleet Manager for Orange County, Florida in February, 1981, as a Mechanic I. He was later reclassified as a Mechanic II as part of an internal reorganization. Petitioner's duties require him to drive County vehicles to various locations to repair other County vehicles. The parties stipulated that Petitioner is a good mechanic and has always performed mechanical repairs competently. Orange County is a subdivision of the state. It employs a substantial number of people. The Fleet Manager maintains Orange County vehicles, operates and maintains the County's refueling system, and operates and manages emergency rescue vehicles and emergency generators for the County. The Fleet Manager is responsible for all personnel matters for County employees assigned to the fleet system. Mr. James Brock is the Fleet Manager who took the employment actions on behalf of Orange County that are the subject of this proceeding. Orange County employed Mr. Brock as a traffic engineer in 1987 and promoted him to Assistant Fleet Manager and Fleet Manager, respectively, in 1989 and 1992. Orange County and the Fleet Manager are referred to hereinafter as "Respondent." Respondent maintains a progressive discipline policy. Discipline progresses from counseling or verbal reprimand, to written reprimand, suspension, and then termination. The purpose of the progressive discipline policy is to make individual employees productive workers by modifying their behavior from inappropriate to appropriate behavior. The purpose of the progressive discipline policy is not to punish employees. Respondent prohibits discrimination, including that based on national origin. Respondent prohibits the implementation of its progressive discipline policy in a manner that discriminates against employees. Petitioner has a long history of discipline that began in his first year of employment. In November, 1981, Petitioner wrecked at least three vehicles. He received a written reprimand. In 1982, Petitioner ran over a battery charger. In 1985, after repeated warnings and notices, Petitioner was suspended for approximately three days for refusing to follow County policies. In 1991, Petitioner wrecked a County vehicle in an automobile accident with another vehicle driven by a member of the public. The truck driven by Petitioner was totally destroyed. The employment actions at issue in this proceeding began in April 1993. Respondent received information that Petitioner kept his County vehicle at his house on work days and used it for personal purposes, including hauling bricks to build a fence. Respondent convened a meeting with Petitioner, Petitioner's foreman, and an interpreter. Respondent and the foreman advised Petitioner that it was a violation of County policy to take a County vehicle home, to take the vehicle outside of the County where Petitioner resides, and to falsify work records. In September 1993, Respondent issued a written reprimand to Petitioner for threatening a co worker with Petitioner's vehicle. Respondent concluded that Petitioner drove his vehicle toward a co worker at a rapid speed and stopped just before impact. In October 1993, Respondent received repeated telephone calls from a third party that Petitioner was home during work days with his County vehicle. Respondent verified the reports with its own investigation and charged Petitioner with insubordination, taking a County vehicle home, and falsifying work records. Respondent conducted a predetermination hearing in accordance with due process requirements. Respondent notified Petitioner of his right to have a representative, attorney, or union steward present and to appeal any adverse determination. Petitioner attended the predetermination hearing. Both Petitioner and Respondent presented evidence including the testimony of witnesses under oath. The hearing was recorded. Respondent suspended Petitioner for four days without pay. In February 1994, Petitioner wrecked another County vehicle. He backed over a County lawn mower while backing his own vehicle out of the heavy equipment shop. Respondent counseled Petitioner after the incident. Petitioner does not have a good driving record. He has numerous speeding tickets. In August 1994, Respondent required Petitioner to attend a cultural awareness course. The course teaches cooperation among individuals from diverse cultural or ethnic backgrounds. Respondent requires all employees to attend the course. Petitioner argued with the instructors and refused to stay in the course. In September 1994, Respondent issued a letter of direction requiring Petitioner to attend the course. In September 1994, Petitioner took his County vehicle home again. Respondent counseled Petitioner for the violation and conducted an investigation that was still pending in October 1994. On October 14, 1994, Petitioner responded to a request for emergency repair of another County vehicle. Respondent drove his County vehicle recklessly and made an obscene gesture to another motorist. Petitioner followed the motorist up an access ramp on the East West Expressway at a speed of 35 40 mph, made an obscene gesture, and passed the motorist improperly. Petitioner followed the motorist at a distance of less than one foot. Petitioner then turned on the yellow warning lights on his County vehicle. When the motorist did not pull over and allow Petitioner to pass, Petitioner made an obscene gesture and passed the motorist while on the access ramp. The motorist pulled up beside Petitioner and wrote down the number of the vehicle. The motorist reported the incident to Respondent on the same day. Respondent investigated the incident and conducted a predetermination hearing on November 2, 1994. Petitioner participated in the predetermination hearing. Respondent terminated Petitioner on November 11, 1994. While Petitioner was employed by Respondent, Petitioner applied for promotion to Mechanic III approximately three times. Respondent never promoted Petitioner. Promotions are determined by a board composed of four mechanics who sit for a prescribed period and then are replaced by other mechanics. The mechanics are appointed to the board by management. The board is racially diverse. It typically includes Hispanics. The board conducts a separate interview of each candidate for promotion. The board members ask each candidate identical questions and score the responses from each candidate. The board then recommends the candidate with the highest score. The board never recommended Petitioner for promotion. Respondent has never deviated from the recommendation of the board. The candidates recommended by the board are racially diverse. They include Hispanics. Respondent has never taken any employment action against Petitioner on the basis of Petitioner's national origin. Respondent has never taken any employment action against Petitioner for a discriminatory reason.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a Final Order finding Respondent not guilty of discriminating against Petitioner on the basis of his national origin. RECOMMENDED this 9th day of June, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of June, 1997 COPIES FURNISHED: Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission On Human Relations Building F. Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399 0700 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission On Human Relations Building F. Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399 0700 Peter T. Hickey, Esquire Post Office Box 1323 Orlando, Florida 32802 Jeffrey J. Newton, Esquire Orange County Attorney's Office Orange County Administration Center Post Office Box 1393 Orlando, Florida 32802 1393

USC (1) 42 U. S. C. 2000e Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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CUSLYN STEPHENSON vs BREVARD COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 93-002650 (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Melbourne, Florida May 13, 1993 Number: 93-002650 Latest Update: Jun. 09, 1994

The Issue Whether Petitioner, a member of a protected class, was denied promotion to the position of Secretary III with the Respondent in the Environmental Services Department on or about June 10, 1992, on the basis of her race (African- American), in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1991).

Findings Of Fact The Respondent is a constitutionally created school district charged with the duty to operate, control, and supervise all free public schools in Brevard County, Florida, and is an employer under the Florida Human Relations Act of 1977, as amended. Petitioner was employed by the Brevard County School District as a Clerk-Typist in the Environmental Services Department during the relevant period of time including April 1992. Petitioner is an African-American, and a member of a protected class. She is the only African-American who is assigned to work in the Environmental Services Department. During April of 1992, Petitioner worked as a Clerk Typist in the Environmental Services Department, and the Secretary III position was held by Sylvana Wall. Subsequent to April of 1992, Sylvana Wall resigned, creating a vacancy in the Secretary III position in the Department. In the interim period from the time Sylvana Wall resigned, and the date the position was filled in July of 1992, Petitioner undertook to perform the duties of the Secretary III position, and in accordance with the applicable collective bargaining agreement, was paid for said period of time in the higher classification. Following creation of the vacancy, a job vacancy announcement was posted and advertised. Applications were received and reviewed by a selection committee composed of Irma Reinpoldt, Department Director, and Michael Rogers, Environmental Engineer. Petitioner submitted application for the vacant position. Subsequently, applicants except Petitioner, were interviewed by the committee, and a decision was made to employ applicant Rhonda Steward, a white female, for the Secretary III position in the Environmental Services Department. Petitioner was not personally interviewed for the Secretary III position by the committee. They based their decision on the fact that Petitioner had been working for the department as a clerk typist for a number of months, and she had also filled in as the Secretary III for several months when the vacancy was created until the position was filled. Both members of the committee knew the Petitioner, her capabilities and qualifications, and considered it "redundant" to interview her. There was no School Board policy, custom, or practice that required the employer to personally interview all applicants for vacancies. The candidate selected, Rhonda Stewart, was fully qualified to fill the Secretary III position. The evidence showed that during the relevant period there were certain conflicts in the Department, not related to race. There was evidence of personality disputes, such as name calling, and unwillingness by Petitioner to do secretarial functions for certain members of the Environmental Services Department, particularly an Environmental Specialist who was dyslexic. In addition, certain co-employees did not get along with the Petitioner and vice versa. However, there was no indication from the sworn testimony that race played a part in the decision made by the Respondent to hire someone else for the position. It was the practice of Respondent that the immediate supervisor and department head determine who was the best qualified for a job vacancy, subject to any review by the Personnel Division. The Petitioner presented no testimony including her own, that she did not get promoted to the Secretary III position because of her race, or that there was disparate treatment of African-Americans by the Respondent in the hiring or promotion of minorities.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order which DENIES the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of October, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of October, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-2650 The following constitute my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner did not submit proposed findings of fact. Proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent: Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8(in part), 9, 10(in part), 11 Rejected as irrelevant, immaterial or as comment on the evidence: paragraphs 8(in part), 10(in part) COPIES FURNISHED: Cislyn Stephenson Emil Stephenson Qualified Representative 2298 September Street Melbourne, Florida 32935 Bill Walker, Esquire School Board of Brevard County 2700 St. Johns Street Melbourne, Florida 32940 Dana Baird General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Honorable Betty Castor Commissioner of Education Department of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Sydney H. McKenzie General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, PL-08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400

USC (1) 42 USC 2000e Florida Laws (2) 120.57760.10
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FREDDIE J. SEXTON vs ST. AUGUSTINE TRANSFER/GAMSEY CARRIAGE COMPANY, 08-004559 (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Augustine, Florida Sep. 17, 2008 Number: 08-004559 Latest Update: Apr. 13, 2009

The Issue The issue to be determined in this case is whether Respondent has committed an unlawful employment practice in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and if so, what remedy should be ordered.

Findings Of Fact Petitioners Diana Sexton and Freddie Sexton were carriage drivers for Gam-San, Inc., which was known by the fictitious name of St. Augustine Transfer Company. They conducted ghost tours and history tours in the historic district of St. Augustine. No evidence was presented regarding Mr. Sexton's race or either Petitioners' age. At the time of the incident giving rise to this proceeding, Diana Sexton had worked for Respondent for approximately one and a half years. Freddie Sexton has worked for the company in the same type of position for a shorter period of time. Petitioners are married to each other. Petitioners drove carriages pulled by horses, and gave tours to the public. They sometimes stayed overnight at the barn owned by Respondent in order to water the horses. They did not have permission to stay at the barn, but Ms. Sexton considered it to be a benefit in exchange for watering the horses at night. Diana Sexton acknowledged that Petitioners had been informed that they were expected to find another place to stay before the end of the "Nights of Lights" (although no explanation was provided regarding what time frame this entailed), but denied that Petitioners were ever told to leave or not to stay at the barn. Employees hired by St. Augustine Transfer were usually hired as carriage drivers, stall people, or barn managers. Both stall people and barn managers were paid minimum wage. Carriage drivers, like waitresses, receive tips from customers as part of their pay. Generally, with tips, drivers are the highest paid employees of the business. It would not be considered a promotion to go from a position as driver to either stall person or barn manager. Petitioners did not work on December 25, 2007. They apparently spent the night at the barn the night before and left the work premises in the morning. At some time in the evening, Petitioners returned to the business premises, ostensibly to retrieve some of their belongings that were in the barn. While they were present on the property, the police came, indicating that they had received a call complaining of a disturbance. Petitioners were believed to be the cause of the disturbance and were asked to leave. Petitioners refused to leave without speaking to Stuart Gamsey, and denied creating any type of disturbance. Eventually they left the premises at the insistence of the police. They claim they were not allowed to return to retrieve their belongings for several days, and were discharged from their jobs. The evidence is in conflict over what, if anything, was occurring on the premises of the business the evening of December 25, 2007. However, the more credible admissible evidence indicates that at least two calls were made to Stuart Gamsey, the then owner of St. Augustine Transfer Co. The calls involved complaints about Petitioners' drinking, yelling, and generally creating a disturbance on the property. One call was made by police officers on the scene. Mr. Gamsey had not given Petitioners, or any other employees, permission to stay on the premises when not working. He could not say whether there was actually a disturbance on the premises, but confirmed that in response to the calls he received, he asked the police to do "whatever it took" to get Petitioners to leave the property. His goal was simply to end whatever disturbance might be occurring. Petitioners' employment was terminated by St. Augustine Transfer. It is not entirely clear from the evidence presented whether the December 25, 2007, incident formed the basis for the termination or whether other factors were involved. It is clear, however, that Petitioners resisted leaving the premises at a time when they did not have permission to be there. Stuart Gamsey sold the business in the summer of 2008. He currently has no responsibility for the hiring practices of St. Augustine Transfer Co. or its successor. No competent, credible evidence was presented indicating that any other employee was allowed to stay on the premises outside of work hours. Petitioners also claim that Mr. Sexton was discriminated against based upon his marital status because someone, presumably another employee, left K-Y jelly in his carriage, and on one occasion, a patron tipped another employee to make sure she could ride in his carriage and engage in inappropriate behavior designed to seduce him. However, no competent, credible evidence was presented to show who placed the K-Y jelly in Mr. Sexton's carriage or for what purpose, if any, it was left. Likewise, no competent, credible evidence was presented to support the allegation that placing the patron in Mr. Sexton's carriage was for any discriminatory purpose. No evidence was presented regarding any other proceedings of any type involving Petitioners and Respondent.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing Petitioners' Petitions for Relief and denying Respondent's Motion for Attorney's Fees. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of January, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of January, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Freddie J. Sexton Diana J. Sexton Post Office Box 105 St. Augustine, Florida 32084 Regina Sargeant, Esquire 2820 US 1 South, Suite F St. Augustine, Florida 32086 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57120.595760.02760.10
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DAVE HARVEY vs MEAL ON WHEELS ETC., INC., 15-003941 (2015)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Jul. 15, 2015 Number: 15-003941 Latest Update: Feb. 17, 2016

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner was subject to an unlawful employment practice by Respondent, Meals on Wheels, Etc., Inc., on account of his race and disability, as a result of Respondent's maintenance of a hostile work environment, or as retaliation to his opposition to an unlawful employment practice, in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact As its name implies, Respondent is a non-profit charitable organization engaged in the business of providing free meals, transportation services, and related assistance to senior citizens in the Sanford, Florida, area. Petitioner is a 64-year-old black male of Jamaican origin. He worked as a driver for Respondent from August 13, 2012, until October 23, 2014, when he was discharged for violating a company policy. As a condition of employment as a driver, Petitioner was required to submit a medical fitness form regarding his current medical condition. In the form filed on July 30, 2012, he denied having any medical issues except non-insulin dependent diabetes, which is controlled by diet. See Ex. 21. An updated form was submitted on August 25, 2014, reflecting no change in his medical condition. Id. No other medical records were submitted to substantiate any other medical condition. When he interviewed for the position, Petitioner did not tell Respondent that he needed an accommodation for his diabetes or that he had any work restrictions. As such, management never considered Petitioner to have a disability. Petitioner also provided a post-employment medical questionnaire on August 8, 2012, which stated that he had diabetes but that it was controlled by diet. Id. No other injuries, illnesses, or health abnormalities were reported. As a driver, Petitioner was expected to adhere to Respondent's safety rules. To ensure compliance with the rules, shortly after being hired, Petitioner was required to read, and then sign a statement acknowledging that he understood, the organization's General Policies. See Ex. 1, p. 4. He was also required to acknowledge receipt of its Employee Handbook containing the Safety Policies and Procedures. See Ex. 3. In addition, Respondent's Transportation Coordinator, Mark Taylor, conducted periodic refresher training sessions with all drivers, including Respondent. One of Respondent's most significant safety rules, if not the most significant, is a rule that requires drivers to provide door-to-door service. It provides in relevant part that "[u]pon arrival at a client's home, [a driver must] go to [the] door and knock. If the client needs help, you will be right there to assist." Ex. 1, p. 1, ¶ 6. This rule is intended to promote client safety and to ensure, to the extent possible, that Respondent will not face legal exposure because, for example, a client falls down while walking unassisted to or from the vehicle. To comply with the above rule, drivers are required to get out of the van, go to the front door, knock, and then assist the client walking to the van. This is because the clients are elderly, some use walkers, and they need assistance from the driver while getting to and from the van. On August 21, 2014, Petitioner signed another statement acknowledging that he understood the policy, he agreed to follow it at all times, and he understood that "[t]ermination will result in not following this important safety rule." Ex. 7. As a corollary to the above safety rule, drivers are instructed that they should never honk the vehicle's horn when they arrive at a client's home. Instead, they should get out of the vehicle and go to the front door of the residence. Petitioner was specifically told about the no-honking rule at two safety meetings. The incident underlying Petitioner's discharge occurred on the morning of October 23, 2014. Petitioner was told to pick up Angelo Rosario and transport him to an appointment. The client is in his 80s, suffers from Alzheimer's disease, and uses a walker. He resides in a mobile home-type community with his daughter; and the driveway in front of the mobile home is unpaved with exposed roots making it easy to trip or fall. Although Mr. Rosario was not one of his regular clients, Petitioner had picked him up at least 12 times in the previous 30 days and was familiar with his condition and the area in which he lived. The testimony describing the incident is conflicting. However, the accepted testimony shows that Petitioner arrived at the Rosario residence while Petitioner was on a personal cell phone call to his sister. When he finished the call, Petitioner blew the horn to alert the client that he was there. The honking was loud enough to annoy Rosario's neighbor who approached Petitioner's vehicle complaining about the noise. Suspecting that the neighbor's concern might cause a problem, Petitioner immediately telephoned Mr. Taylor and told him that he had blown the horn and anticipated that someone might be calling him with a complaint. Mr. Taylor told Petitioner that honking the horn was inappropriate, it violated an important safety rule, and he could not just sit in the van waiting for the client. Petitioner admits that during the telephone call, he shouted at Mr. Taylor and claimed he was unaware of the rule. After Mr. Taylor instructed Petitioner to go to the front door to pick up the client, Petitioner exited the vehicle and escorted the client to the van. After speaking with Petitioner, Mr. Taylor immediately telephoned the client's daughter to get her version of events. Mr. Taylor learned that honking had recently occurred rather frequently at the client's home, and he believed that Petitioner was the responsible driver, as Petitioner had transported the client at least 12 times during the previous 30 days. Mr. Taylor immediately reported the incident to the Executive Director, Sherry Fincher, who evaluated the matter, and then decided to terminate Petitioner for violating the organization's most important safety rule. Notwithstanding Petitioner's claim to the contrary, it is the Executive Director alone, and not Mr. Taylor, who makes the decision to terminate an employee. A memorandum was prepared by Ms. Fincher that day indicating that Petitioner was being terminated "due to not following agency policies regarding door-to-door pick up of clients[,] . . . one of the most important policies to ensure the safety of all clients." Ex. 20. This was consistent with Respondent's policy, and one that Petitioner clearly understood. Petitioner's race and diabetic condition played no role in the decision. Petitioner's Employment Charge of Discrimination was filed one month later. Prior to that time, there is no competent evidence that Petitioner had ever complained to Taylor or Fincher about any discriminatory practices by the organization. Since the inception of this case, Petitioner has contended that he has a disability within the meaning of the law. At hearing, however, he acknowledged that his diabetic condition does not affect any major life activity. To support his disability discrimination claim, he testified that on an undisclosed date in 2014, he asked Mr. Taylor if he could eat meals or snacks at designated times because of his diabetic condition but was told he could not. The accepted testimony shows, however, that Mr. Taylor advised him that he could eat whenever necessary, as lunch and break hours are not set in stone. To avoid a drop in his blood sugar, Petitioner was told that he was free to eat or drink something at any time, or even bring a bag lunch with him while driving his routes. Even assuming arguendo that Petitioner had a disability, which he does not, the contention that a disability formed the basis for an unlawful employment practice must fail. Petitioner also contended that Belinda Stum, a white female lead driver, was treated differently than he and was given more "leeway" when she violated a rule. However, the only evidence concerning a rule violation by Ms. Stum involved a different rule. After a client accidentally slipped while being assisted out of the van, Ms. Stum immediately reported the incident to Mr. Taylor and then filed a completed incident report. Other than Ms. Stum, Petitioner was unable to specifically identify any other similarly-situated employees outside his protected class (or even ones within his own class) who were allegedly treated differently than he. Although a client testified at hearing that on several occasions she had observed Ms. Stum sitting in her van when picking up clients, even if this is true, the client admitted that she never reported this to anyone at Respondent's organization so that the alleged violation could be investigated and disciplinary action taken, if appropriate. Petitioner also contends he was subjected to a hostile working environment due to his race and disability. He claimed that Mr. Taylor, a white male, called him "boy," required him to answer "yes sir," and would gesture a "cut throat" sign towards him, threatening him to keep his mouth shut. This assertion was not corroborated by any other evidence, and Mr. Taylor denied the charge. The testimony of Mr. Taylor is accepted as being more credible on this issue. Assuming arguendo that he had a disability, there is no evidence whatsoever that Petitioner was subjected to a hostile working environment due to his diabetic condition. Finally, there is no evidence regarding the charge that Petitioner was terminated in retaliation for engaging in a protected activity. Indeed, Petitioner submitted no credible proof that he complained to management regarding any discriminatory practices that precipitated the alleged retaliation, other than "standing up for his rights" on the day he was terminated, and Taylor and Fincher credibly testified that they were unaware of any such complaints. Complaints made at hearing that he is still owed money and was never paid for training are not germane to this dispute. Petitioner is now working part-time as a driver for a retirement center in the Sanford area. He says he is also employed as a substitute teacher for the Seminole County School Board. Both jobs equate to full-time employment. According to evaluations and testimony at hearing, Petitioner was considered a "good worker," "likeable," and someone who "did a pretty good job." While his evaluations showed he met expectations, his last evaluation noted that he needed improvement in following orders. Except for being "written up" one time for being late to work, Petitioner had no other disciplinary action.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief, with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of November, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of November, 2015.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57120.68760.10760.11
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CHARLES H. MILLER vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 03-000976 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Gainesville, Florida Mar. 24, 2003 Number: 03-000976 Latest Update: Apr. 22, 2004

The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Respondent discriminated against the Petitioner because of his alleged disability.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Charles H. Miller, was employed by the Respondent, Department of Transportation, for approximately 15 years. In October 1999, Mr. Miller injured his ankle in a work-related accident. He experienced chronic pain and mobility limitations as a result of the accident and continually received medication and psychological and/or physical therapy to help relieve the symptoms of his condition. Mr. Miller wore a brace on his injured foot and took various narcotic pain relievers. On May 2, 2001, Petitioner began seeing Lewis Fabrick, Ph.D., a licensed clinical social worker. Dr. Fabrick determined that Mr. Miller was suffering from depression, anxiety and stress that resulted partly from the pain from the physical injury and partly from the side effects of the medication. However, the Department was not aware of the nature or extent of Mr. Miller's mental or emotional issues. Prior to December 2000, Mr. Miller reported directly to Thomas Malerk, the State Materials Engineer. At that time, Mr. Miller was acting as the data center manager and supervised several other employees. Around November 2000, Mr. Malerk assigned another employee to supervise Mr. Miller and eliminated Mr. Miller's supervisory responsibilities. Mr. Miller's pay and benefits were not affected by this change. Mr. Malerk took this action to correct problems with the data center that had resulted in complaints about Mr. Miller and the data center. Mr. Miller's physical condition was not a factor in Mr. Malerk's decision to change Mr. Miller's job. In December 2000, Mr. Miller complained to the Department's ombudsman that coworkers were making fun of his ankle brace and physical limitation. Mr. Miller alleged that Mr. Malerk had joked about Mr. Miller needing a boot on the other foot to match and that the personnel officer, John Cooper, would pretend to "draw like a cowboy" in a manner that ridiculed Mr. Miller's condition. Mr. Miller also alleged that another co-worker, Gale Page, was harassing him by making fun of his physical limitations. Neither Mr. Cooper or Mr. Page had any supervisory responsibility over Mr. Miller. After receiving Mr. Miller's complaint, the ombudsman contacted Mr. Cooper and Mr. Malerk to inform them of Mr. Miller's concern. At approximately the same time, Mr. Miller also told Mr. Cooper that he was being harassed by Mr. Page, Mr. Malerk, and Mr. Cooper. When Mr. Cooper asked Mr. Miller to specifically identify the harassment that had occurred, Mr. Miller only specifically reported that Mr. Page had made fun of his walk or his leg. Mr. Cooper then informed Mr. Malerk of Mr. Miller's complaint and approached Mr. Page. Mr. Cooper told Mr. Page that he should refrain from making comments about Mr. Miller's condition. When Mr. Malerk learned of Mr. Page's remark to Mr. Miller, he reprimanded Mr. Page and requested that he apologize or otherwise clear the matter. Mr. Malerk also discussed the matter with Mr. Miller. Mr. Malerk apologized to Mr. Miller for anything he might have said that was insensitive and asked Mr. Miller if he had made any inappropriate remarks. Mr. Miller told Mr. Malerk that they did not have a problem and that he considered the matter with Mr. Page closed. Other than the incident with Mr. Page, and the accompanying accusations involving Mr. Malerk and Mr. Cooper, neither Mr. Cooper or Mr. Malerk had any reason to believe that any Department employee might be harassing Mr. Miller or making jokes about his injury or condition. Contrary to Mr. Miller's claim, the evidence does not indicate that either Mr. Malerk or Mr. Cooper even made fun of Mr. Miller's condition. Mr. Miller and Mr. Malerk have known each other since 1997 and were friendly with each other. On May 22, 2001, the Department dismissed Mr. Miller. The decision to dismiss Mr. Miller was based upon a number of violations of the Department's conduct standards, including Mr. Miller's insubordination, absence without authorized leave, display of an uncooperative or antagonistic attitude, and a violent outburst by Mr. Miller on May 21, 2001, when he was advised of the Department's intention to dismiss him. The issues relating to Mr. Miller's dismissal were fully litigated in a proceeding before the Public Employees Relations Commission, which culminated in a Recommended Order and Final Order upholding the Department's decision to dismiss Mr. Miller for violation of the Department's conduct standards. Mr. Malerk was responsible for requesting Mr. Miller's dismissal. Mr. Malerk requested Mr. Miller's dismissal for the violations of the Department's conduct standards that were included in the dismissal letter and was not motivated to request his dismissal in any part by Mr. Miller's physical problems.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore,

USC (1) 29 U.S.C 794 Florida Laws (6) 110.227120.569120.57447.207760.01760.11
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LATASHA MCCLEARY vs COLE, SCOTT, KISSANE, P.A., 19-003974 (2019)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Jul. 25, 2019 Number: 19-003974 Latest Update: Jan. 07, 2020

The Issue The issues in this case are whether, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act, Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment on the basis of her race, or retaliated against her for engaging in protected activity; and whether Respondent subjected Petitioner to a hostile work environment.

Findings Of Fact Respondent Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A. ("CSK"), is a law firm having offices throughout the state of Florida. Petitioner Latasha McCleary ("McCleary"), an African-American woman, worked for CSK in its Orlando office as a legal assistant from August 7, 2017, through July 31, 2018. However, because McCleary began taking medical leave on June 6, 2018, and never returned to work, her last day in the office was June 5, 2018. Thus, the period of time in which McCleary actually functioned as a regular CSK employee was ten months. During her tenure with the firm, McCleary provided secretarial and administrative support to several attorneys, including partner Bartley Vickers and associates Jeremy Beasley and Shawn Gibbons. McCleary's direct supervisor was the then office manager, Lilliam Hernandez. CSK regarded McCleary as a valued and high-performing employee. Although, as will be discussed, McCleary complains that she was subjected to unfair criticism during the last weeks of her time in CSK's Orlando office, she was never reprimanded, disciplined, or subjected to an adverse employment action. For the first nine months of her employment, McCleary got along well with the attorneys for whom she worked, including Mr. Vickers, and she has no complaints about their treatment of her during this period. The only noteworthy incident or incidents of relevance to have occurred in this time frame are a secretary's use, on one or perhaps more occasions, of the "n- word" in McCleary's presence. An employee's use of this racial epithet in the workplace is, of course, extremely offensive and inflammatory, to say the least, and, if unchecked, could create a hostile work environment. That did not happen here, however. The legal assistant who made the offensive remark (apparently in the presence of peers only, not supervisors or managers) apologized to McCleary when the latter expressed her discomfort. McCleary never reported the incident(s) in writing to the firm's management, as the Employee Handbook required——a fact from which the undersigned infers that she accepted her co-worker's apology——and the bad behavior stopped. The upshot is that this upsetting incident was resolved informally among the affected employees without initiating an investigation by the firm, and a nascent problem was nipped in the bud. The watershed moment in this case occurred on May 7, 2018, at the beginning of McCleary's tenth month with CSK. An expert witness retained by CSK was scheduled to conduct an on- site inspection that day but failed to appear, forcing a last- minute cancelation which caused opposing counsel to incur travel expenses that CSK had to reimburse. McCleary mistakenly had failed, on the previous business day, to confirm the expert's availability, as the firm's routine required, and thus, she bore some responsibility for the unwanted results. That said, there is no evidence that this situation was other than a relatively minor inconvenience that could be fixed, learned from, and forgotten. When the problem came to light on May 7, 2018, Ms. Hernandez, the office manager, sent an email to McCleary reminding her that the inspection "should have been confirmed" beforehand to avoid a "waste[] [of] time and money." McCleary apologized for making a "human error" and promised it would not happen again. On May 9, 2018, Mr. Vickers, the partner, sent an email to McCleary and Mr. Gibbons, the associate, telling them that "some form of confirmation is needed" "for confirming inspection dates." He added: "This is a mistake that I imagine will not happen again, and I am glad we can move past it and look to the future without these types of issues again." The only thing remarkable about these emails is how unremarkable they are. Two points of interest will be mentioned. First, as just suggested, the tone of each message was neither derogatory nor personal, but measured and professional. There was a touch of criticism, to be sure, as would be expected, but the criticism was constructive in nature, not harsh or angry in tone. Second, McCleary was not the only one called to account. Mr. Vickers's email was directed as much to the associate attorney as to McCleary. The next day, Thursday, May 10, 2018, Mr. Vickers conducted a training meeting for the legal assistants in his group, which McCleary attended. There were a number of topics on the agenda, covering a range of administrative tasks that CSK expected its litigation support staff to carry out. Although Mr. Vickers brought up that week's scheduling snafu as an example of miscommunication-driven consequences, no evidence suggests that McCleary's mistake had prompted the meeting. Further, McCleary was not identified in the meeting as having been at fault or involved in the incident. McCleary, however, complains that she was "singled out" during the meeting, "80% [of which, she maintains,] covered what happened with [her] in regards to the May 7th re-inspection." The greater weight of the evidence does not support her characterization of the training session. According to McCleary, Mr. Vickers, who had been a good boss for the previous nine months, suddenly turned into a tyrant around May 10, 2018. McCleary alleged in an email written a few weeks later, on June 1, 2018, that soon after the canceled inspection, Mr. Vickers had begun asking her "idiotic questions to be sure [she knew] her job," and been constantly micromanaging [her] with multiple emails" accusing her of making numerous mistakes. Yet, although this entire period spans just 18 business days, McCleary produced none of Mr. Vickers's alleged, accusatory emails. The greater weight of the evidence does not support McCleary's allegations concerning Mr. Vickers's treatment of her during the month of May 2018. Sometime near the end of May, McCleary sent out notices of taking deposition duces tecum that did not have the document requests attached. McCleary was not solely to blame for this oversight; the attorney handling the case should have reviewed the papers to make sure that everything was in order before service. Still, as the legal assistant, McCleary should have spotted the omission and brought it to the attorney's attention. On the morning of May 31, 2018, after the problem had been discovered, Mr. Vickers sent an email to McCleary and Mr. Beasley, the associate, admonishing them to "stay focused" when preparing deposition notices for service. Similar to the canceled inspection earlier in the month, the incomplete deposition notices were a problem that CSK obviously would rather have avoided; inattention to detail, moreover, is something any reasonable employer should want to correct. There is no evidence, however, that CSK generally, or Mr. Vickers in particular, made a big deal about this incident. Mr. Vickers told McCleary and the associate that he hoped "it would not happen again"——and that, it seems, would be that. Except it wasn't. Later that day, May 31, 2018, McCleary spoke to the office administrator, Johnson Thomas. During this conversation, McCleary complained about working for Mr. Vickers and asked to be transferred to a different group of attorneys. On Friday, June 1, 2018, McCleary again contacted Mr. Thomas, sending him the email mentioned above. This email was the first written notice that CSK received from McCleary concerning her complaints about Mr. Vickers. In the email, McCleary did not allege racial discrimination, per se, but she did include some language which clearly indicated that such a charge might be forthcoming: "I refuse to subject myself to further retaliation, oppression and disrespect from Mr. Vickers. He is creating a hostile working relationship between us. I cannot concentrate on work and am in need of immediate transfer." (emphasis added). The following Tuesday, June 5, 2018, CSK approved McCleary's request to be transferred, assigning her to the work group headed by partner Melissa Crowley. When the announcement was made, Ms. Crowley sent an email to McCleary stating, "Welcome Latasha! I look forward to working with you." McCleary never reported for duty under Ms. Crowley. Instead, she took a sick day on June 6, 2018, and applied for unpaid medical leave. Despite McCleary's having presented somewhat nonspecific reasons, such as heart palpitations and anxiety, the firm granted McCleary's application and placed her on medical leave through July 11, 2018. In mid-July, McCleary provided CSK with a note from her mental health counselor in support of a request to extend the unpaid medical leave until September 5, 2018. On July 12, 2018, the firm informed McCleary that it would not be able to keep her position open that long without hiring a replacement, but agreed to let her remain on leave until July 31, 2018. CSK made it clear to McCleary that she needed to return to work on August 1, 2018, or face dismissal on grounds of abandonment. McCleary did not return to work on August 1, 2018, and the firm terminated her employment. Ultimate Factual Determinations There is no persuasive evidence that CSK took any actions against McCleary motivated by discriminatory animus, or created (or acquiesced to the creation of) a hostile work environment. Indeed, there is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of unlawful racial discrimination could be made. There is no persuasive evidence that CSK took any retaliatory action against McCleary for having opposed or sought redress for an unlawful employment practice. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that CSK did not discriminate unlawfully against McCleary on any basis.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding CSK not liable for race discrimination, retaliation, or creating a hostile work environment. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of December, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of December, 2019. COPIES FURNISHED: Reshad Favors, Esquire Mosaic Law Firm Tenth Floor 1875 Connecticut Avenue Northwest Washington, DC 20009 (eServed) Robert Alden Swift, Esquire Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A. Tower Place, Suite 750 1900 Summit Tower Boulevard Orlando, Florida 32810 (eServed) Barry A. Postman, Esquire Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A. Second Floor 1645 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 (eServed) Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Cheyanne M. Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)

USC (1) 29 U.S.C 623 Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57120.68760.10 DOAH Case (1) 19-3974
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JACQUES PIERRE vs SECURITY SERVICES OF AMERICA, 08-003937 (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Aug. 14, 2008 Number: 08-003937 Latest Update: Mar. 18, 2011

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice by retaliating against Petitioner for filing a charge of discrimination.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Jacques Pierre (Petitioner or Mr. Pierre) is black and his national origin is Haitian. He has worked in the United States for 24 years. On or about January 25, 2006, Mr. Pierre filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) a charge of discrimination against his employer, Respondent, SSA Security, Inc., a/k/a Security Services of America, a California Corporation (Respondent or SSA). SSA, under a subcontract with a federal government contractor, Alutiiq-Mele, provided security services for a federal building in Miami. SSA continued to employ Petitioner as a security guard when it took over the contract from his previous employer, Superior Protection. Contractors and managers changed, in the past, but the security guards stayed the same. On August 10, 2006, and August 15, 2006, first Mr. Pierre, then a representative for SSA signed an agreement to settle the EEOC complaint. With a letter dated August 23, 2006, Mr. Pierre received a settlement check in the amount of $1,257.04, and he was advised to report any future unlawful harassment or discrimination charges by use of a "Harassment Hotline and [to] speak with your local area manager, Barry Hirsch [sic]." Captain Barry Hersch was Mr. Pierre's immediate supervisor. The agreement was approved, in principle, by Kent Jurney, Sr., an SSA corporate officer. The language of the agreement is, in relevant part, as follows: Removal of all Disciplinary Notices in File. Company agrees to remove all writings related to disciplinary actions taken against Employee from Employee's personnel file maintained by the Company. Employee understands that the removal of said documents does not prevent the Company from issuing disciplinary notices and/or taking disciplinary action against Employee as necessary in the future should Employee violate the Company's rules of [sic] policies. * * * 4. Confidentiality Clause. The Employee and the Company agree to the following confidentiality and non-disclosure agreement: (a) The parties represent and agree that they will keep the terms and amount of this agreement completely confidential. The parties will not hereafter disclose any information concerning this agreement to anyone, including but not limited to, any past, present or prospective employee of the Company or any prospective employer of the Employee. On August 25, 2006, the federal government changed the requirements in the contract. No longer would security guards be allowed to take breaks at the start or end of their shifts, but only during the middle. Mr. Pierre was made aware of the change. In violation of the requirement, on September 1, 2006, Mr. Pierre took his break at the end of his shift. The federal government contract also prohibited security guards from being on the work premises more than 30 minutes before or after their shifts. On August 28, 2006, Mr. Pierre returned to his work site and entered the building more than 30 minutes after his shift to retrieve keys and a telephone charger. Mr. Pierre also got into a loud and profane argument with another worker during his unauthorized return to the building. Mr. Pierre admitted he had an incident where he got into an argument with and "fired back" at a supervisor in 1995 or 1996. Beginning on or about July 10, 2006, Petitioner began to request, but initially was denied, leave. Mr. Pierre was feeling threatened and harassed by his supervisors and was suffering physically as a result. On a form dated August 25, 2006, Mr. Pierre said he was requesting leave from September 11 to September 25, with a return date of September 27, 2006. Spaces on the form to indicate whether it was approved or disapproved, and by whom are blank. As the reason for the request, Mr. Pierre indicated "stress related: as a result of retaliation.” This time, Captain Hersch, approved the request and Mr. Pierre went on vacation in September 2006. On September 5, 2006, as instructed by Mr. Jurney, another Miami supervisor, Bill Graham, issued a memorandum to Mr. Pierre requiring him to attend a mandatory meeting "about several important issues and notifying him of his "temporary removal from the schedule until this meeting has taken place." Copies of the memorandum were sent to Mr. Jurney and Captain Hersch. The evidence is insufficient to determine if other security guards who violated the same rules were subjected to the same consequences, or if discipline was uniformly applied. Mr. Pierre requested, either through his supervisor, Captain Hersch, or directly to Mr. Graham, that the attorney who handled his EEOC complaint and settlement agreement be allowed to attend the meeting with him. Mr. Jurney denied the request. Because he never attended a meeting, Mr. Pierre remained "off the schedule." For the remainder of 2006 and in early 2007, he was working part-time only at his second job with the State Department of Corrections. Mr. Pierre's income was reduced from $15 an hour ($17 minus $2 for insurance) for 40-hour weeks with SSA, plus $1,000 every two weeks from Corrections to only his Corrections pay. The evidence is insufficient to determine how long Mr. Pierre was, or if he still has, a lower income and what, if any, efforts he has taken to secure alternate employment to mitigate damages. SSA supposedly notified Mr. Pierre, in a memorandum dated September 22, 2006, that he was suspended without pay for two weeks for his rule violations and his failure to attend the mandatory meeting. The authenticity of the memorandum was questioned, and no witnesses testified to sponsor it or to explain why it was necessary, given the fact that Mr. Pierre was already "off the schedule." On October 3, 2006, Mr. Pierre filed a charge of retaliation with the Florida Commission on Human Relations which, on July 2, 2008, found that reasonable cause existed to believe that an unlawful employment practice had occurred. In the fall of 2006, Mr. Pierre applied for a job with the Miami-Dade Corrections and Rehabilitation Department (Miami- Dade). It was his understanding that his background investigation had been successfully completed, but that SSA had not responded to a reference form. Mr. Pierre took the form to SSA. The form, dated October 4, 2006, was completed by Captain Hersch, who responded, in relevant part, as follows: Reason for termination (voluntary/fired)? NON APPLICABLE Describe the applicant's work performance. GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE Describe the applicant's attendance record. GOOD OVERALL Was the applicant ever disciplined for any reason? If YES, please explain. YES CONFIDENTIAL." Is applicant able to work well with others? YES Is applicant trustworthy? YES Describe applicant's work habits? KNOWS HIS JOB, AND DOES IT Is applicant eligible for re-employment? If NO, please explain why. STILL EMPLOYED There is no explanation why Captain Hersch mentioned the confidential agreement, but not the subsequent disciplinary actions that were the focus of concern to Mr. Jurney and Mr. Graham, which could have been disclosed without violating the agreement. Based on the earlier assurances from Miami-Dade, Mr. Pierre, having put "no" when asked about discipline of his job application, believes the contradictory response from SSA caused him not to get the job. He received a letter informing him, but without giving specific reasons, that he was not hired by Miami-Dade. He failed to prove the correctness of his belief. Mr. Pierre testified, but presented no supporting evidence, that he could have earned up to $120,000 a year with Miami-Dade. SSA received notice on the second anniversary of its contract, in October 2006, that the federal government contract would not be renewed. Some time in 2007, most likely in February, at Mr. Pierre's request, he met with Mr. Jurney. It was not until that meeting, Mr. Pierre remembered, that Mr. Jurney had someone remove pre-settlement discipline records from his personnel file. By that time, SSA no longer had a contract with the federal government and was transferring its personnel over to work for the next contractor, Alutiiq. Mr. Pierre asked to be transferred and Mr. Jurney testified that he contacted someone at Alutiiq and asked for Mr. Pierre to be interviewed, but the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that SSA attempted to transfer Mr. Pierre to Alutiiq, or what the routine procedures were for transferring security guards. When Mr. Pierre found out that the necessary paperwork was never sent from SSA to Alutiiq, he tried unsuccessfully for two or three weeks to contact SSA. It is reasonable to believe that SSA, while not allowing Mr. Pierre to work, would not help him transfer over to the next contractor. Mr. Pierre was not transferred and was not employed by Alutiiq. Mr. Jurney testified unconvincingly that he made non-federal contract job offers to Mr. Pierre and Mr. Pierre found the offers acceptable, “but he didn’t accept them.” It is inconceivable that Mr. Pierre, who has three children to support and a wife who works part-time, would have rejected any legitimate job offer at that time. Mr. Pierre and Mr. Jurney, a former highway patrol trooper and member of an advisory board for the Florida Highway Patrol, discussed Mr. Pierre’s desire to be a trooper. Mr. Jurney offered to assist him but that employment never materialized. As a corporate officer, Mr. Jurney was responsible for overseeing hundreds of contracts involving 1,500 employees. He was senior to Mr. Graham and Captain Hersch. Yet, once he authorized the EEOC settlement, he became directly involved in the decision-making concerning discipline and consequences for Mr. Pierre. There is no evidence that Mr. Pierre had ever come to his attention before he approved the settlement.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order directing that Respondent cease the discriminatory employment practice evidenced in this case and awarding Petitioner back pay at the rate of $15.00 an hour for each normal 40-hour work week between September 5, 2006, and the date of the final order, offset by earnings from substitute employment, if any. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of January, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ronald G. Polly, Esquire Hawkins & Parnell, LLP 4000 SunTrust Plaza 303 Peachtree Street, Northeast Atlanta, Georgia 30308-3243 Jacques Pierre 19601 Northwest 12th Court Miami, Florida 33169 Erwin Rosenberg, Esquire Post Office Box 416433 Miami Beach, Florida 33141

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000 Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57257.04760.01760.10760.11 Florida Administrative Code (1) 28-106.204
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VIRGINIA HOWELL vs COLLEGE OF CENTRAL FLORIDA, 19-000029 (2019)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Ocala, Florida Jan. 03, 2019 Number: 19-000029 Latest Update: Sep. 12, 2019

The Issue The issues for determination are: (1) did the College of Central Florida (“CCF”) commit an unlawful employment practice by discriminating against Petitioner on the basis of age and/or sex; and (2) did CCF unlawfully retaliate against Petitioner by firing her.

Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: Ms. Howell began working in CCF’s lawn maintenance department on August 17, 2015. She worked 25 hours a week performing activities such as removing weeds, picking up debris, and maintaining the flower beds around CCF’s campus. CCF’s lawn maintenance department consisted of approximately 20 people, but Ms. Howell was the only female. At the time of the final hearing, Ms. Howell was 67 years old. Tommy Morelock, CCF’s director of facilities, made the decision to hire Ms. Howell. Ms. Howell claims that her co-workers mistreated her. For example, she asserts that there were at least three occasions when co-workers intentionally drove a four-wheel drive vehicle or a pickup truck into a golf cart driven by her. Another alleged incident involved a co-worker running a finger down her neck. In addition, Thomas Smith supposedly “flipped her off” on numerous occasions throughout her tenure at CCF and referred to her as a “f***ing c*nt.” In approximately August of 2016, after a co-worker allegedly used a vehicle to strike a golf cart driven by Ms. Howell, her fiancée, Newell Melton, called CCF in order to lodge a complaint with Mr. Morelock. Mr. Melton ultimately spoke with Katherine Hunt, one of Mr. Morelock’s subordinates and CCF’s manager of facility operations and construction projects. Ms. Hunt met with Ms. Howell soon afterward about these alleged incidents. Ms. Howell also described how her male co- workers would grab themselves between the legs. However, Ms. Howell did not indicate that those actions were directed toward her. Ms. Howell did not mention any improper conduct by Thomas Smith during her meeting with Ms. Hunt. In late 2016 or early 2017, Ms. Howell also met with Mark Sakowski, another of Mr. Morelock’s subordinates and CCF’s manager of plant safety and facility operations, about one of the vehicle incidents. Mr. Sakowski told Ms. Howell that he would talk to the co-worker in question and asked her to bring any future issues to his attention. Ms. Howell did not mention anything to Mr. Sakowski about Thomas Smith directing obscene gestures toward her. After the meeting, Mr. Sakowski spoke to employees within the lawn maintenance department about professionalism, safety, and having respect for others. Ms. Howell never filed a formal complaint with CCF about her co-workers’ alleged misconduct. At Mr. Morelock’s request, Ms. Howell met with him and Caroline Smith, CCF’s equity officer, on June 7, 2017, to discuss her complaints. During this meeting, Ms. Howell described: (a) how her co-workers would drive vehicles into golf carts she was occupying; (b) the incident in which a co-worker ran a finger down her neck; and (c) a rumor among her co-workers that she was planning to file a sexual harassment complaint. As CCF’s equity officer, Ms. Smith is responsible for investigating student and employee claims of discrimination or harassment. After hearing Ms. Smith’s description of the alleged incidents, she concluded that the allegations involved inappropriate “horseplay” rather than age and/or gender-based discrimination. She then explained CCF’s employee complaint procedure to Ms. Howell, but Ms. Howell declined to initiate a formal complaint. Ms. Howell did not mention Mr. Smith’s alleged misconduct during her meeting with Mr. Morelock and Ms. Smith. In a memorandum dated June 7, 2017, and addressed to Ms. Howell, Mr. Morelock wrote the following: As discussed in our 11:00 AM meeting today with the College Equity Officer, Mrs. Smith, to address your complaints regarding horseplay in the workplace, rumors, and possible harassment, I have met with the 3 employees in your complaint and have addressed these issues. Please let me know immediately if there are any further incidents or if you have any additional concerns. Mr. Morelock noted in the memorandum that Ms. Hunt, Mr. Sakowski, and Ms. Smith received copies. Ms. Howell received a copy of Mr. Morelock’s memorandum shortly after their meeting. At approximately 12:30 p.m. on July 19, 2017, Ms. Howell was nearing the end of her workday and driving a golf cart. She crossed paths with a vehicle driven by Mr. Smith and noticed in her rearview mirror that Mr. Smith was directing an obscene gesture toward her.2/ Ms. Howell proceeded on her way to leaving the CCF campus. However, she reversed course and, with the assistance of another co-worker, spent approximately ten minutes driving around the CCF campus looking for Mr. Smith. Upon finding Mr. Smith at the back of the CCF campus planting junipers, Ms. Howell exited the golf cart and angrily told Mr. Smith to stop directing obscene gestures toward her. According to Mr. Smith, Ms. Howell went into a “tirade.” After confronting Mr. Smith, Ms. Howell left the campus without reporting this new incident to any supervisors. As far as she knew, none of the pertinent supervisors were available. Mr. Smith felt threatened and immediately sought out Mr. Sakowski. Mr. Smith reported that Ms. Howell demanded that he stop spreading rumors about her, and Ms. Howell supposedly stated that CCF, Mr. Smith, and Mr. Smith’s wife “would be sorry.”3/ Rather than obtaining Ms. Howell’s version of the confrontation, Mr. Sakowski and Ms. Hunt spoke to Mr. Morelock, who was on vacation at the time. Mr. Morelock recommended that they confer with CCF’s director of Human Resources and authorized them to resolve the matter as they saw fit. Mr. Sakowski and Ms. Smith called Ms. Howell on July 21, 2017, and notified her that she had been fired. The only explanation given to Ms. Howell was that she did not work well with supervisors and co-workers. Mr. Sakowski explained that he was concerned about his staff’s safety and that of CCF’s students: We take safety very seriously on the campus. And in this day and age with mass-casualty and active-shooter scenarios, we practice these drills on campus on an annual basis. And it did scare me that -- I did not want it [to] make national news. Mr. Sakowski was also concerned by the fact that Ms. Howell confronted Mr. Smith rather than reporting his obscene gesture to a supervisor: Instead of coming back onto campus after leaving her shift, she should have come into the building and either got myself or Ms. Hunt at that time and explained what had just happened instead of taking matters into her own hands. Because Mr. Morelock’s memorandum to Ms. Howell directed her to “[p]lease let me know immediately if there are any further incidents or if you have any additional concerns,” Ms. Hunt considered Ms. Howell to be insubordinate when she confronted Mr. Smith on July 19, 2017.4/ This was the first disciplinary action that CCF had taken against Ms. Howell. Since being fired by CCF, Ms. Howell has unsuccessfully applied for two positions, a greeter at a hospital and a landscaping technician at a local cemetery. While she considers herself to be retired, Ms. Howell is still looking for employment. Ultimate Findings Ms. Howell persuasively testified that Mr. Smith directed an obscene gesture toward her on July 19, 2017. However, the preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that CCF did not know nor should have known that Mr. Smith directed obscene gestures and/or language toward Ms. Howell. While Ms. Howell consistently testified that she did not discuss Mr. Smith’s conduct with Mr. Sakowski or Ms. Hunt, she gave conflicting testimony as to whether she reported Mr. Smith’s conduct to Mr. Morelock during their meeting on June 7, 2017. In contrast, Carol Smith, CCF’s equity officer, persuasively testified that Mr. Smith’s conduct was not discussed during that meeting.5/

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of June, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of June, 2019.

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000e Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57120.68509.092760.01760.10760.11 Florida Administrative Code (1) 60Y-4.016 DOAH Case (1) 19-0029
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DIANA J. SEXTON vs ST. AUGUSTINE TRANSFER/GAMSEY CARRIAGE COMPANY, 08-004560 (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Augustine, Florida Sep. 17, 2008 Number: 08-004560 Latest Update: Apr. 13, 2009

The Issue The issue to be determined in this case is whether Respondent has committed an unlawful employment practice in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and if so, what remedy should be ordered.

Findings Of Fact Petitioners Diana Sexton and Freddie Sexton were carriage drivers for Gam-San, Inc., which was known by the fictitious name of St. Augustine Transfer Company. They conducted ghost tours and history tours in the historic district of St. Augustine. No evidence was presented regarding Mr. Sexton's race or either Petitioners' age. At the time of the incident giving rise to this proceeding, Diana Sexton had worked for Respondent for approximately one and a half years. Freddie Sexton has worked for the company in the same type of position for a shorter period of time. Petitioners are married to each other. Petitioners drove carriages pulled by horses, and gave tours to the public. They sometimes stayed overnight at the barn owned by Respondent in order to water the horses. They did not have permission to stay at the barn, but Ms. Sexton considered it to be a benefit in exchange for watering the horses at night. Diana Sexton acknowledged that Petitioners had been informed that they were expected to find another place to stay before the end of the "Nights of Lights" (although no explanation was provided regarding what time frame this entailed), but denied that Petitioners were ever told to leave or not to stay at the barn. Employees hired by St. Augustine Transfer were usually hired as carriage drivers, stall people, or barn managers. Both stall people and barn managers were paid minimum wage. Carriage drivers, like waitresses, receive tips from customers as part of their pay. Generally, with tips, drivers are the highest paid employees of the business. It would not be considered a promotion to go from a position as driver to either stall person or barn manager. Petitioners did not work on December 25, 2007. They apparently spent the night at the barn the night before and left the work premises in the morning. At some time in the evening, Petitioners returned to the business premises, ostensibly to retrieve some of their belongings that were in the barn. While they were present on the property, the police came, indicating that they had received a call complaining of a disturbance. Petitioners were believed to be the cause of the disturbance and were asked to leave. Petitioners refused to leave without speaking to Stuart Gamsey, and denied creating any type of disturbance. Eventually they left the premises at the insistence of the police. They claim they were not allowed to return to retrieve their belongings for several days, and were discharged from their jobs. The evidence is in conflict over what, if anything, was occurring on the premises of the business the evening of December 25, 2007. However, the more credible admissible evidence indicates that at least two calls were made to Stuart Gamsey, the then owner of St. Augustine Transfer Co. The calls involved complaints about Petitioners' drinking, yelling, and generally creating a disturbance on the property. One call was made by police officers on the scene. Mr. Gamsey had not given Petitioners, or any other employees, permission to stay on the premises when not working. He could not say whether there was actually a disturbance on the premises, but confirmed that in response to the calls he received, he asked the police to do "whatever it took" to get Petitioners to leave the property. His goal was simply to end whatever disturbance might be occurring. Petitioners' employment was terminated by St. Augustine Transfer. It is not entirely clear from the evidence presented whether the December 25, 2007, incident formed the basis for the termination or whether other factors were involved. It is clear, however, that Petitioners resisted leaving the premises at a time when they did not have permission to be there. Stuart Gamsey sold the business in the summer of 2008. He currently has no responsibility for the hiring practices of St. Augustine Transfer Co. or its successor. No competent, credible evidence was presented indicating that any other employee was allowed to stay on the premises outside of work hours. Petitioners also claim that Mr. Sexton was discriminated against based upon his marital status because someone, presumably another employee, left K-Y jelly in his carriage, and on one occasion, a patron tipped another employee to make sure she could ride in his carriage and engage in inappropriate behavior designed to seduce him. However, no competent, credible evidence was presented to show who placed the K-Y jelly in Mr. Sexton's carriage or for what purpose, if any, it was left. Likewise, no competent, credible evidence was presented to support the allegation that placing the patron in Mr. Sexton's carriage was for any discriminatory purpose. No evidence was presented regarding any other proceedings of any type involving Petitioners and Respondent.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing Petitioners' Petitions for Relief and denying Respondent's Motion for Attorney's Fees. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of January, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of January, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Freddie J. Sexton Diana J. Sexton Post Office Box 105 St. Augustine, Florida 32084 Regina Sargeant, Esquire 2820 US 1 South, Suite F St. Augustine, Florida 32086 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57120.595760.02760.10
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JENNIFER HATFIELD vs SOUTHEAST COMPOUNDING PHARMACY, 14-004046 (2014)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Aug. 27, 2014 Number: 14-004046 Latest Update: Mar. 26, 2015

The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against the Petitioner.

Findings Of Fact At some time prior to August of 2013, the Petitioner and Respondent discussed the Petitioner’s potential employment as a “Pharmacy Sales Representative” for the Respondent. The Respondent eventually offered such employment to the Petitioner, the terms of which were set forth in a letter (hereinafter “agreement”) from the Respondent (identified therein as “SCP, LLC” or “company”) to the Petitioner. The agreement stated as follows: Your job title will be Pharmacy Sales Representative and your duties include all aspects of sales and marketing to physicians and patients SCP, LLC can provide for. You will be responsible for producing leads and establishing new pharmacy sales as well as maintaining all existing accounts. You will report to members of SCP, LLC. You may be assigned other duties as needed and your duties may also change on reasonable notice, based on the needs of the company and your skills, as determined by the company. The agreement provided that the Petitioner would be paid an annual base salary of $45,000, and a commission “based on the total sales of compounded products sold to all accounts you are managing.” The salary was to be paid bi-weekly. The commission was to be paid quarterly. The agreement stated that the Petitioner would receive an additional $250 per month for the purposes of obtaining private health insurance, and that the additional payment would cease if a company health insurance plan became available to employees. The agreement stated that the Petitioner would also have access to an expense account, including a company credit card, and receive either a car or a paid car allowance from the Respondent. The agreement specifically provided as follows: YOUR EMPLOYMENT WITH THE COMPANY IS AT-WILL. IN OTHER WORDS, EITHER YOU OR THE COMPANY CAN TERMINATE YOUR EMPLOYMENT AT ANY TIME FOR ANY REASON, WITH OR WITHOUT CAUSE AND WITH OR WITHOUT NOTICE. According to the agreement, the Petitioner’s employment was to commence on September 3, 2013. Although the Petitioner was dissatisfied with the salary structure offered by the Respondent and believed that the offer was below her market value, the Petitioner signed the agreement on August 1, 2013, and accepted the employment terms set forth therein. The Petitioner’s dissatisfaction with her income was a continuing issue during her employment. The Petitioner repeatedly requested that her base salary be increased, but the Respondent was unprofitable and was unwilling to agree to the Petitioner’s request. Although the Petitioner initially developed some marketing materials for the Respondent, the Respondent was not satisfied with the Petitioner’s overall job performance. Additionally, there appears to have been disagreement between the Petitioner and the Respondent as to the responsibilities of her employment, including continuing friction between the Petitioner and her supervisor. On several occasions, the supervisor requested that the Petitioner come into the office during working hours to meet with him. The Petitioner apparently believed that her time was better utilized meeting with prospective clients; however, some of the prospective clients sought products that, for a variety of reasons, the Respondent could not supply. In any event, rather than come into the office as requested by her supervisor, the Petitioner chose to communicate with him by “after hours” email or by telephone. The supervisor was dissatisfied by the Petitioner’s failure to comply with his request. At some point in December of 2013, the Respondent determined that the Petitioner’s performance was not satisfactory and that a change needed to occur. The Petitioner was advised of the Respondent’s dissatisfaction in a meeting on December 5, 2013, between the Petitioner and a representative of the Respondent. After being advised that some type of change was going to occur, the Petitioner raised a number of complaints about her supervisor. The Petitioner complained that the supervisor used profanity, that he had hung up on her during a telephone call, and that, on one occasion, he had patted her on the head in an apparently demeaning manner. The Respondent had a written “zero tolerance” policy prohibiting all forms of harassment, including sexual harassment. The policy prohibited any form of retaliation against an employee who complained that he or she was a target of harassment. The Respondent also had a written “open door” policy that provided a specific procedure for resolving employment-related disputes. The Petitioner was specifically advised of such policies during an orientation process that occurred at the commencement of her employment with the Respondent. Additionally, the Petitioner received written copies of all relevant policies from the Respondent’s human resource director. There is no evidence that, prior to learning on December 5, 2013, that her employment was in jeopardy, the Petitioner advised any representative or employee of the Respondent that she objected to the supervisor’s alleged behavior. After the meeting on December 5, the Petitioner wrote an email to company officials dated December 17, 2013, wherein she asserted that she had “closed” a number of accounts on behalf of the Respondent, and suggested that her contribution to the company was being undervalued. She also requested reevaluation of her compensation because she believed the commission structure was inadequate. The Respondent apparently disagreed with the Petitioner because few actual sales resulted from the Petitioner’s “closed” accounts. Accordingly, during a meeting with Respondent’s representatives on December 20, 2013, the Petitioner was advised that her employment was officially being terminated. Central to the Respondent’s decision was the lack of revenue generated by the Petitioner’s sales and the unprofitability of the company. The Petitioner’s failure to comply with the requests of her supervisor also provided a basis for her termination from employment. During the meeting on December 20, the Petitioner restated the complaints she had first addressed during the meeting on December 5, and raised a number of additional complaints, including allegations of harassment or sexual harassment by her supervisor or another employee. There is no evidence that, prior to learning on December 20, 2013, that her employment was being terminated, the Petitioner had advised any representative or employee of the Respondent that she had been harassed in any manner by her supervisor or by any other employee of the Respondent. The alleged perpetrators of the harassment dispute the Petitioner’s assertions. The evidence fails to establish that any of the alleged acts of harassment or sexual harassment actually occurred. In a memorandum to the Petitioner dated December 20, 2013, the Respondent advised the Petitioner that her termination package would include salary payments for three weeks (one week of “final” pay and two weeks of severance pay), additional payment for 27 hours of accrued paid time off and unused comp time, and a total commission payment of $31.97. By letter to the Respondent dated December 27, 2013, the Petitioner restated the alleged harassment referenced herein and requested that she receive an additional two weeks of severance pay. The Respondent ultimately paid the Petitioner a total of four weeks of severance pay. The evidence fails to establish that the termination of the Petitioner’s employment by the Respondent was related to any complaint of harassment or sexual harassment, or was retaliatory in any manner.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner's complaint against the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of January, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of January, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Cheyanne Michelle Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Christina Harris Schwinn, Esquire Pavese Law Firm 1833 Hendry Street Post Office Drawer 1507 Fort Myers, Florida 33901 (eServed) Antonios Poulos, Esquire Poulos Law Firm 1502 West Busch Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33612 (eServed)

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57120.68760.02760.10760.11
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