Findings Of Fact In 1991, Petitioner owned a new 1991 Ford conversion van which he felt was a lemon as that term is defined in the Florida Lemon Law. In pursuit of his legal rights under the Lemon Law, Petitioner made a request for arbitration of his automotive problem. Petitioner first applied for arbitration pursuant to the Lemon Law on December 31, 1991. Petitioner's application was incomplete because it failed to show that Petitioner had properly addressed and mailed Ford Motor Company a Motor Vehicle Defect Notification. The Department returned the arbitration request to Petitioner on January 14, 1992. The accompanying letter informed Petitioner that he was required to submit, by certified mail, a Motor Vehicle Defect Notification form to the "Ford Motor Company, Attention: Customer Relations, Post Office Box 945500, Maitland, Florida 32794 Petitioner was instructed to supply the Department with evidence of his compliance with the Notice requirement providing a proper receipt along with his application within 30 days of Petitioner's receipt of the January 14, 1992, letter. Petitioner failed to respond or return his application within the 30 days. No evidence was ever submitted to the Division to show that Mr. Thomas mailed the Motor Vehicle Defect Notification Form to the Ford Motor Company as instructed by the January 14, 1992, letter from Respondent and as required by statute. Similarly, no evidence was presented at the hearing that the form was ever mailed to the appropriate entity. After 30 days had lapsed from the January 14, 1992 letter, the Department could have "rejected" Petitioner's request for arbitration by sending him a notice of rejection as required by Rule 2-32.009(c)(2), Florida Administrative Code. However, the Division did not send a rejection notice to Petitioner at that time. Instead, Petitioner's file was closed on March 13, 1992, with no further action taken. Therefore, the time period for amending Petitioner's first application did not expire and remained open at least through January, 1993. At the hearing, Petitioner claimed that he did not respond to the Division's request for more information because he was mentally disabled and was hospitalized for 45 days between December 1991, and October 1992, and that the American's with Disabilities Act requires that an exception to compliance with the Rules and Statutes be given to him. However, the evidence did not demonstrate that Petitioner was disabled during the entire period of time after the Division's request for information. Additionally, Petitioner did not request an extension of his response time as is required by the Florida Administrative Code. Moreover, since neither the rules nor the statutes provide for such an ADA exception, the Division cannot unilaterally fashion such an exception without engaging in rulemaking under Chapter 120. Such an exception must be addressed by the Florida Legislature or in rulemaking. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to any exception to the Lemon Law requirements because of his disability or hospitalizations. Ten months later, On October 5, 1992, Petitioner again applied for Lemon Law arbitration. Petitioner's application was again incomplete and the Department requested more information. However, because the Division did not send Petitioner a formal rejection letter, the October 5, 1992, application related back to the first application filed December 31, 1991. Petitioner supplemented the second application with information showing that his vehicle had reached 24,000 miles in September of 1991. On November 13, 1992, Respondent notified Petitioner that his request for arbitration was untimely because his request did not fall within the statutory period allowed once his vehicle reached 24,000 miles. A rejection notice was contained in the Department's letter of November 13, 1992, thereby beginning the 30 day time period for any amendments to either of Petitioner's applications. As indicated earlier, the 30 day time period expired without Petitioner submitting any evidence that he had mailed Ford Motor Co. a Vehicle Defect Notification form. Therefore, Petitioner's application remained incomplete at the time any request for arbitration could have been made expired. Petitioner is therefore not entitled to arbitration under the Florida Lemon Law. Finally, after Petitioner had requested arbitration, Petitioner sold and replaced the conversion van prior to the hearing. Therefore, Petitioner can not present the van to Ford Motor Co. for one last opportunity to repair. Such presentation is a condition precedent to arbitration which Petitioner cannot meet. Additionally, by selling his vehicle, Mr. Thomas has abandoned his Lemon Law Claim, in that he no longer has an ongoing dispute with Ford Motor Company that requires arbitration and his request for such is moot.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services denying Mr. Andrew Thomas' request for Lemon Law arbitration. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of September, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANNE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of September, 1994.
The Issue This issue on this case is whether the Petitioner filed a timely Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board.
Findings Of Fact On December 30, 1993, William Coyle took delivery of a new 1994 Pontiac Bonneville. At the time the car was delivered to Mr. Coyle, the odometer indicated that the vehicle had been driven five miles. Soon after taking delivery of the vehicle, Mr. Coyle began experiencing problems with the car, including failure of the car ignition on several occasions, and a malfunctioning oil pressure indicator. On repeated occasions, Mr. Coyle returned the car to the dealer for repair. According to Mr. Coyle, the dealer was unable to fix the problems with the car. On or about July 7, 1995, Mr. Coyle filed a Motor Vehicle Defect Notification form. Although Mr. Coyle mistakenly dated the form as "7/7/94," the evidence establishes that the form was actually filed in 1995. Filing a Motor Vehicle Defect Notification form triggers a final opportunity for a vehicle manufacturer to correct the alleged defect. One copy of the notification form goes to the manufacturer. A second copy of the form goes to the Office of the Florida Attorney General. After the Motor Vehicle Defect Notification form was filed, the vehicle apparently was not repaired to Mr. Coyle's satisfaction. As set forth in Chapter 681, Florida Statutes, a consumer's rights under the Lemon Law extend for 18 months or 24,000 miles, whichever occurs first, and may possibly be extended an additional 6 months for those problems which have not been corrected in the initial period. Based on the repair records, Mr. Coyle's vehicle had been driven in excess of 24,000 miles by October 7, 1994. Assuming that Mr. Coyle was entitled to a six month deadline extension as provided by law, Mr. Coyle's Lemon Law rights expired on April 7, 1995. The applicable statute provides a period of six months following the expiration of the Lemon Law rights period by which a consumer must file a Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board. Mr. Coyle's Request for Arbitration was required to be filed not later than October 7, 1995. Mr. Coyle filed a Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board on December 12, 1995. By letter dated December 28, 1995, Mr. Coyle was notified by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, that his request for arbitration was being rejected. As grounds for the rejection, the letter states: The lemon law rights period, as defined by Chapter 681, F.S., is 18 months or 24,000 miles, whichever occurs first, and may possibly be extended an additional 6 months for those problems which have not been corrected in the initial rights period. The Request for Arbit- ration should be received by this office with- in 6 months of the conclusion of the lemon law rights period or any extended time allowances. The attached Invoice number 6946, dated 10-07- 94, reflects that the mileage at the time of that repair to be 27,494. Since 24,000 miles apparently were exceeded prior to 10-07-94, your initial rights period ended at some point before that date. If a 6 month extension was allowed following the end of your rights period, the expiration of that extension would have occurred prior to 04-07-95. This would require that your Request for Arbitration be received by this office prior to October 07, 1995. Your application was signed December 05, 1995, post- marked 12-07-95, and received by this office 12-12-95. Reviewing all these dates, it is concluded that your application was not sub- mitted in a timely manner and must be rejected.... The evidence establishes that Mr. Coyle's Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board was not filed by the proper deadline and must be rejected. Mr. Coyle asserts that he filed a Motor Vehicle Defect Notification on or about July 7, 1995, and that such notice is sufficient to qualify as a Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board. A Motor Vehicle Defect Notification is a separate document from a Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board. The forms are filed with different agencies. The filing of a Motor Vehicle Defect Notification does not constitute a Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's request for arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of May, 1996 in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of May 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 96-0744 The Petitioner did not file proposed findings of fact. To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, the following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the Respondent. The Respondent's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 1, 10. Rejected, unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 William Coyle, pro se 2403 Vandervort Road Lutz, Florida 33549 Rhonda Long Bass, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 515 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: On or about October 1, 1994, Petitioner purchased from Triangle Auto Center Inc., d/b/a Toyota of Hollywood (hereinafter referred to as the "Dealer"), a Broward County, Florida automobile dealer, a used 1994 Chevrolet Cavalier, which had been driven 7,726 miles. Petitioner had been told by the Dealer, before the purchase, that the vehicle had been used by its previous owner "to drive documents to the airport." At the time Petitioner purchased the vehicle, it was still under factory warranty. Thereafter, various problems developed with the vehicle, the worst and most persistent of which involved the vehicle's tires and brakes. These problems have yet to be completely remedied. Petitioner reported the problems she was experiencing with her vehicle to the Dealer. The Dealer told Petitioner that it was unable to help her. At the Dealer's suggestion, Petitioner telephoned and wrote letters of complaint to the manufacturer of the vehicle. The manufacturer advised Petitioner to file a complaint/arbitration request with the Better Business Bureau's Auto Line program (hereinafter referred to as the "BBB program"), an arbitration program in which the manufacturer participates. Petitioner followed the advice she was given and filed a complaint/arbitration request with the BBB program. On September 29, 1995, the BBB program sent Petitioner a letter notifying her that the arbitrator who had heard her case had determined that she was not entitled to any relief from the manufacturer. The letter further advised Petitioner of the following: The enclosed decision is not binding on the consumer. The consumer may reject this decision and, if eligible, may pursue arbitration with the Florida New Vehicle Arbitration Board administered by the Office of the Attorney General. To obtain information about eligibility for the state run program, the consumer should contact the Division of Consumer Services' Lemon Law hotline at 1-800-321-5366. Please be advised that Section 681.109(4), F.S., provides that the consumer must file the request for arbitration within 6 months after the expiration of the Lemon Law rights period, or within 30 days after the final action of a certified dispute-settlement procedure, whichever occurs later. Petitioner rejected the arbitrator's decision. On October 23, 1995, Petitioner filed with the Department a Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board. By letter dated November 9, 1995, the Department advised Petitioner that "a determination ha[d] been made in accordance with Section 681.109 Florida Statutes to reject [her request because her] vehicle was not purchased new in Florida."
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for arbitration. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 3rd day of April, 1996. STUART M. LERNER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of April, 1996.
The Issue Whether Petitioner qualified for arbitration before the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board (hereinafter the "Board") pursuant to Chapter 681, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner, Michael Boudreau, was a resident of the State of Florida. Pursuant to Section 681, Florida Statutes, the Respondent's Division of Consumer Services is the state agency in Florida charged with the responsibility to receive, screen, and evaluate requests for arbitration before the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board and to determine eligibility for arbitration. Respondent has the authority to reject a dispute that the Respondent determines to be outside the scope of the Board's authority. On May 17, 1996, Petitioner purchased and took possession of a new 1996 Dodge Ram 3500 Truck from Dodge Country in Duluth, Georgia. Dodge is a division of the Chrysler Corporation, a Michigan corporation. The consideration for the motor vehicle was paid to Dodge Country in Duluth, Georgia. The truck was driven to Florida. It was titled in Florida, and the sales and use tax, registration fee, and title fees paid to the State of Florida. Petitioner made numerous reports of problems with the vehicle. The manufacturer's authorized service agent in Florida was given more than three attempts to correct the same problem without success. On May 8, 1997, Petitioner filed his Request for arbitration by the Florida New Vehicle arbitration Board. By letter dated May 9, 1997, the Respondent rejected Petitioner's Request for Arbitration because the vehicle was purchased in Duluth, Georgia, and not sold in the State of Florida. Petitioner testified that he attempted to purchase the vehicle in Florida. However, the make and model of his choice was not available from any dealer in Florida. He was forced to purchase the vehicle out-of-state, but he drove it immediately thereafter to Florida and titled it in this state.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a Final Order denying the Petitioner's Request for Arbitration before the Board. RECOMMENDED this 8th day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Boudreau, pro se 1209 Alton Drive Apopka, Florida 32703 DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of December, 1997. Rhonda Long Bass, Senior Attorney Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 515 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
Findings Of Fact Background Petitioner, Chrysler Corporation (Chrysler), is a "manufacturer" of motor vehicles as that term is defined by Section 681.102(10), Florida Statutes (1992 Supp.), 1/ and, as such, is subject to the provisions of Chapter 681, Florida Statutes, the "Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act." Consequently, Chrysler is substantially affected by the rules promulgated by respondent, Department of Legal Affairs (Department) to implement Chapter 681, and the parties have stipulated that it has standing to maintain this rule challenge proceeding. The Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act (the "Lemon Law") imposes upon manufacturers, as defined by Section 681.102(10), a duty to repair nonconformities which are first reported by consumers during the "Lemon Law rights period," and liability for the refund of the purchase price or replacement of those motor vehicles if their nonconformities are not corrected within a reasonable number of repair attempts. A consumer's right to exercise the remedies provided by the Lemon Law accrue from the date the consumer takes delivery of the motor vehicle. The "Lemon Law rights period" is defined by Section 681.102(9), Florida Statutes, as follows: "Lemon Law rights period" means the period ending 18 months after the date of the original delivery of a motor vehicle to a consumer or the first 24,000 miles of operation, whichever occurs first. On October 9, 1992, the Department published notice, inter alia, of proposed rule 2-30.001(3)(e), in volume 18, number 41, of the Florida Administrative Weekly. Such rule would define "24,000 miles of operation," for purposes of calculating the running of the Lemon Law rights period established by Section 681.102(9), Florida Statutes, as "miles of operation by the consumer." By petition filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on October 30, 1992, Chrysler timely challenged the validity of such proposed rule as an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. The predicate for Chrysler's challenge was its contention that the proposed rule enlarges, modifies or contravenes Section 618.102(9), Florida Statutes, the provision of law sought to be implemented. 2/ The proposed rule Proposed rule 2-30.001(3)(e) provides: When calculating the running of the Lemon Law rights period as defined by s. 681.102(9), FS., "24,000 miles of operation" means miles of operation by the consumer. If the consumer is a subsequent transferee as defined in s. 681.102(4), FS., "24,000 miles of operation" means miles of operation by both the original consumer and the subsequent transferee. The gravamen of the dispute between the parties concerning the propriety of the proposed rule is a disagreement regarding the interpretation to be accorded Section 681.102(9), Florida Statutes, which defines the "Lemon Law rights period" as: . . . the period ending 18 months after the date of the original delivery of a motor vehicle to a consumer or the first 24,000 miles of operation, whichever occurs first. Chrysler contends that the "Lemon Law rights period," as defined by Section 681.102(9), is clear and unambiguous, and that the "first 24,000 miles of operation" refers to the actual mileage shown on the odometer of the motor vehicle, without regard to when or by whom the mileage was accrued. So read, proposed rule 2-30.001(3)(e) conflicts with the law sought to be implemented. The position advanced by Chrysler is of import to it since Chrysler impresses new motor vehicles into use as company cars and permits its dealers to purchase and use new vehicles for demonstration purposes for customers or personal use, prior to their retail sale. During this period, the motor vehicle accumulates mileage on its odometer as a result of such "demonstrator" use. Excluding the mileage so accrued from the running of the "Lemon Law rights period," as contemplated by the proposed rule, could extend Chrysler's liability under the Lemon Law beyond the first 24,000 miles of operation registered on the vehicle, if it issued a warranty as a condition of sale to the consumer. See Section 681.102(14), definition of "motor vehicle," discussed infra. Contrasted with Chrysler's position, the Department interprets the "first 24,000 miles of operation" provision of Section 681.102(9), to relate to operation by a consumer, and would exclude any mileage accrued on the vehicle prior to its delivery to the consumer when calculating the "Lemon Law rights period." So interpreted, the proposed rule is consistent with the law sought to be implemented. The Department's interpretation is premised on its reading of Section 681.102(9) in pari materia with Section 681.102(14) which defines a "motor vehicle" as: . . . a new vehicle, . . . and includes a vehicle used as a demonstrator or leased vehicle if a manufacturer's warranty was issued as a condition of sale, or the lessee is responsible for repairs. . . . So read, a demonstrator is considered a new vehicle, and no distinction is made in applying the Lemon Law rights period between consumers who purchase a motor vehicle with no or minimal mileage on its odometer at delivery and those who purchase a demonstrator. The proposed rule's predecessor Pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 88-95, Laws of Florida, Chapter 681, Florida Statutes, was amended effective January 1, 1989, to establish what has been referred to as the Lemon Law. At that time, the "Lemon Law rights period" was defined as: . . . the period ending 1 year after the date of the original delivery of a motor vehicle to a consumer or the first 12,000 miles of operation, whichever occurs first. Section 681.102(7), Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.). To implement the provisions of the Lemon Law, the Department adopted Rule 2-30.001, Florida Administrative Code, in or about January 1989. At that time, the rule included the following definition of the "Lemon Law rights period": The "Lemon Law Rights period" is the period ending one year after the date of the original delivery of the motor vehicle to the consumer, or the first 12,000 miles of operation, whichever occurs first. This period may be extended if a substantial defect or condition is reported to the manufacturer or its authorized dealer during the Lemon Law Rights period, but has not been cured by the expiration of the period. If you put 12,000 miles on your vehicle (miles driven minus miles on the vehicle on the date of delivery) before the end of the first year of operation, you should note that date in your personal records. If a warranty problem is examined or repaired during the Lemon Law Rights period, be sure you get and keep a copy of the work order which contains the date, odometer reading, and a description of that problem. Your work order copy provides the best proof as to when the problem was first reported. [Respondent's exhibits 3 and 15]. Consistent with the foregoing rule, the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board, which is charged with the responsibility of arbitrating disputes under the Lemon Law, has consistently construed the provisions of the "Lemon Law rights period" concerning "miles of operation" to relate to operation by the consumer, and has excluded any mileage accrued on the vehicle prior to its delivery to the consumer when calculating the "Lemon Law rights period." [See e.g., Respondent's exhibits 5, 8 and 9]. Since the Lemon Law was enacted, there has been no change in the definition of "Lemon Law rights period," or the Department's rule, until the passage of Chapter 92-88, Laws of Florida, effective July 1, 1992. Under such law, the "Lemon Law rights period" was amended to read as follows: (9)(7) "Lemon Law rights period" means the period ending 18 months 1 year after the date of the original delivery of a motor vehicle to a consumer or the first 24,000 12,000 miles of operation, whichever occurs first. Section 681.102(9), Florida Statutes. Here, the proposed rule is designed to reflect the change in the "Lemon Law rights period" from one year or 12,000 miles to 18 months or 24,000 miles, occasioned by the aforesaid amendment to Chapter 681. The Department's interpretation of the "Lemon Law rights period" concerning "miles of operation" to relate to operation by the consumer remains, however, consistent with its prior rule and interpretation.
