The Issue The issue is whether South Broward Hospital District's (District) application for a certificate of need to build and operate a satellite facility in southwest Broward County by transferring 100 beds and retiring 25 medical/surgical beds from its existing facility should be granted. STIPULATION CONCERNING APPLICABLE STATUTES A prehearing stipulation was filed in which the parties agree that criteria found in Sections 381.494(6)(c), Florida Statutes (1985), apply in determining whether the satellite facility should be built. Not all of these criteria are in dispute, however. By stipulation the criteria found in Section 381.494(6)(c)3., 6., 7., 11. and 13. 381.494(6)(d)3. and 5., Florida Statutes (1985), are inapplicable or are not in dispute. Section 381.494(6)(c)8., Florida Statutes (1985), is not in dispute as it relates to the availability of resources and capital or operating funds. The criteria set out in Section 381.494(6)(c)1., 2., 4., 5., 9., 10. and 12. apply and Humana contends the application of South Broward Hospital District does not meet them. Humana maintains that the application does not meet the criteria of Section 381.494(6)(d)1. 2. and 4., while the District maintains those are inapplicable because the District proposes no new services. STIPULATED FACTS The parties have also stipulated to the following facts: The District's application was timely filed; The petition for a formal hearing on the agency's intent to deny the certificate of need was timely filed; The donated services expense, operating expenses and Hospital Cost Containment Board assessment found in the financial statements are reasonable; The site preparation costs contained in Table 25 of District Exhibit H are reasonable, even in the event of any cost increase due to delays in commencement of the project; The findings, opinion and data contained in District Exhibit 1 are reasonable; The construction costs reflected in Table 25 of Exhibit H are reasonable, provided any increase in costs from delaying the opening of the satellite 17 months would not exceed 5 percent of the total construction cost; the construction figures include a contingency factor of 5 percent.
Findings Of Fact General Procedural Background Following the Department's expression of its intention to deny the application of the District to construct a new satellite hospital in southwest Broward County, the District requested a formal administrative hearing which became Case No. 84-0235. On February 8, 1984, Humana Hospital Bennett moved to consolidate the District's case (DOAH Case No. 84-0235) with Cases No 84-0265 and 84-0266 (certificate of need applications to transfer beds from Humana South Broward to Humana Bennett) and Case No. 83-3944 (a certificate of need application to transfer beds from Humana South Broward to southwest Broward County). These three "Humana" cases were consolidated with South Broward Hospital District's application on February 23, 1984. On February 24, 1984, Pembroke Pines General Hospital (Pembroke Pines) moved to intervene in Case No. 84-0235, the South Broward Hospital District application. The motion was granted on March 15, 1984, and final hearing was scheduled for June 20, 1984. On April 11, 1984, Pembroke Pines moved for a continuance based, in part, on the need to consolidate Case Nos. 84-0235, 84-0265, 84-0266 and 83- 3944. The motion was granted on May 29, 1984. On April 20, 1984, Humana South Broward moved to intervene in DOAH case No. 84-0235 (the South Broward Hospital District application) and the motion was granted. The final hearing was set for August 1, 1984, but was subsequently continued to October 15, 1984, and then to February 25, 1985. Ultimately, the cases mentioned in the preceeding paragraphs were consolidated with an application for a certificate of need filed by Pembroke Pines to offer obstetrical services, which was Case No. 84-0610. On July 23, 1986, Humana South Broward announced that it would not pursue the applications involved in Case No. 83-3944, its application to transfer beds from Humana South Broward to a southwest Broward County location. In 1985, the South Broward Hospital District filed its application for a certificate of need to develop and operate a 100-bed satellite hospital in southwest Broward County by transferring 100 beds from the facility it operates in eastern Broward. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Indicated its intent to deny that application. The district requested a hearing, and the case was assigned DOAH Case No. 85- 3940. On April 11, 1986, South Broward Hospital District updated its two applications to permit the transfer of 100 beds from an existing facility to a satellite facility which would be composed of 92 medical/surgical beds and 8 intensive care beds. Subsequently, South Broward Hospital District agreed to retirement off an additional 25 medical/surgical beds upon the opening of a satellite facility, which would remove those 25 licensed beds from its present facility in eastern Broward County and reduce the county's overall inventory of acute care beds. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services agreed to support this application at the final hearing. On September 9, 1986, after the hearing had begun, Pembroke Pines, South Broward Hospital District, and the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services entered into a written agreement, part of which was that Pembroke Pines would withdraw its opposition to the District's application for approval of the satellite hospital. Humana South Broward and Humana Hospital Bennett were, thus, the only parties objecting to the application at final hearing. The Parties South Broward Hospital District (the District) was created in 1947 by the Florida Legislature in Chapter 24415, Laws of Florida, Special Acts of 1947, as an independent taxing authority. It assures access to health care services by the residents in its geographical area by constructing and operating health facilities serving the need for all types of health care within the District. It provides services without regard to the ability of District residents to pay for them. The District's geographic boundaries generally cover the southern 1/3 of Broward County and includes about 1/3 of the county population. The remaining portion of the county is served by a separate public entity, the North Broward Hospital District. The District established Memorial Hospital of Hollywood (Memorial) in 1952 as a 100-bed hospital facility. Memorial has been expanded in 1957, 1962, 1967 and 1974. Memorial is now a 737 bed full-service hospital accredited by the Joint Committee on Accreditation of Hospitals. It is the only provider in south Broward County of the following services: cardiac surgery; cardiac catheterization; physical rehabilitation within a distinct comprehensive unit; psychiatric services; pediatric surgical programs; pediatric intensive care; full-service neonatology; newborn intensive care/progressive care; high risk obstetric maternity care; residential substance abuse programs. Some of these services are operated at a loss. Uncompensated care is 18.7 percent of the District's total operating budget. $14.8 million will be spent in the current year on services to indigents who use 6.7 percent of Memorial's patient days. Medicaid patients account for 6.3 percent of Memorial's patient days. Operating revenues and the District's power to levy and collect property taxes pay for the service to indigents. It is the most important provider of services to the indigent and medically underserved in South Broward County. Memorial Hospital is located east of State Road 441 in a fully developed and matured area of Broward County. Since 1976 the District has operated a 24-hour walk-in center in Pembroke Pines, in southwest Broward County, approximately 8 miles west of Memorial Hospital. It treats emergencies and provides routine unscheduled care. In 1985, that center experienced over 24,000 patient visits. Of the twenty hospitals in Broward County, only three had more patient visits than the District's walk-in center. The center also has a residential substance abuse treatment center of 14 beds, 12 of which are occupied on any given day. In 1982, HRS granted the District a certificate of need far $1,000,000 authorizing the District to purchase the land upon which the proposed satellite hospital would be built, on Flamingo Road, between Johnson Street and Pines Boulevard. Humana South Broward is a 282-bed acute care hospital located at 5100 West Hallandale Boulevard, Hollywood, Florida. It serves the southern portion of Broward County and is a wholly owned subsidiary of Humana. Humana Hospital Bennett is a 204-bed acute care hospital located in West Broward County. It is a wholly owned subsidiary of Humana. Factual Findings Concerning The Criteria Against which The Application Must Be Evaluated General Applicability of Chapter 10-5, Florida Administrative Code Under Rule 10-5.003, Florida Administrative Code, certificate of need applications are processed and reviewed under the provisions of Chapter 10-5. These rules implement the statutory criteria enacted a Section 381.494(6)(c) and (d), Florida Statutes (1985). The project at issue involves the relocation reduction of licensed acute care beds The methodology for determining the need for new beds found in Rule 19-5.011(1)(m)6., Florida Administrative Code, is inapplicable, because no additional beds will be added to the inventory of the HRS service district. Central Florida Regional Hospital v. Daytona Beach General Hospital, 475 So.2d 974 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). Similarly, the other standards found in the rule besides the need methodology also do not apply. Because no batching cycle is involved, no planning horizon is set involved. The Department's Non-Rule Policy On Bed Transfer And Relocation. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services has promulgated no rule governing the circumstances in which applications to transfer or relocate beds within a service district will be approved. The Department's policy on the approval of such transfers and relocations has evolved over time. An early, large hospital relocation decision by the Department involved the application of St. Luke's Hospital in Jacksonville, Certificate of Need #1487, which was granted in 1981. The Rule methodology for computing need for new beds had not been adopted then. The Department approved that ultimately unopposed application in order to improve geographic access to care for residents in a fast growing area, and due to life safety problems in the old facility. Later, in 1982, Orlando Regional Medical Center applied for Certificate of Need #2868 to build a satellite facility by relocating 150 beds to a fast growing area in southeast Orange County. This application also pre- dated the need methodology. The project was unopposed and was approved due to increased accessibility of medical services to a fast growing area and the hospital's plan to more efficiently use the vacated space at the existing facility. Lee Memorial Hospital in Lee County received Certificate of Need #2851 in 1984, permitting the construction of a satellite facility and the renovation of an existing facility. That project was approved because: The hospital needed to demolish obsolete buildings constructed in 1939. The construction of a satellite facility, which would be made up of 81 beds from the demolished main campus and 19 new beds, would have been no more costly than construction of a new facility on the current location. Projected growth in the 65 and older population justified the additional beds according to the need methodology which had been adopted by rule. Moving the existing and new beds to the satellite would decentralize the service district's concentration of beds in the City of Fort Myers. The Department granted Beaches Hospital in Duval County Certificate of Need #352-6 in 1985 to transfer its 82 bed facility to a new location. That small public hospital provided vital medical services to Medicare and indigent patients. It would be forced to close in about 10 years if it did not relocate, due to deteriorating physical plant and inefficiencies in its physical layout. Beaches Hospital had been located in a decaying area. Physicians were locating away from the hospital's immediate area. Relocation was necessary for that public facility to remain financially viable. In reviewing various State Agency Action Reports and Final Orders of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services concerning applications analogous to the one at issue here, the Department has looked at five factors in determining whether to approve applications for the relocation of beds: whether the relocation is predicated upon the need for additional beds based on the need methodology of Rule 10-S.011(1)(m)., Florida Administrative Code, or the reduction of excess capacity within a district (or a subdistrict, if one has been established); whether the proposed project improves geographic access to a sufficiently large segment of the population which is expected to experience serious problems in obtaining in-patient care; whether the project improves availability of in-patient care to all residents of the community, especially Medicaid and indigent patients; whether the relocation corrects life safety deficiencies that could not otherwise be resolved through less costly facility renovations, or replaces obsolete or deteriorating and inefficient public hospital facilities; and whether the project will result in an increase in hospital costs and charges at a rate above the state average for hospitals of similar size, offering similar services. The Department has formulated a draft policy with respect to standards for evaluating applications to transfer beds or convert facilities. This policy was first written on August 7, 1986, and is based on the agency's prior experience in health planning. The Department's general policy for transfers and conversions is to try to "work off" any overbedding in a service district when approving transfers by requiring bed retirement as a condition to the approval of transfers. This strategy is the Department's attempt to reduce the excess of licensed and approved medical/surgical beds. The Department does not believe it possesses statutory authority to de-license acute care beds or to retire acute care beds. Voluntary reduction of surplus beds in conjunction with applications to transfer beds or convert facilities provides one means for reduction of the number of beds in a service district. When the Department reviews applications for transfers or conversions of beds, it seeks to assure there will be no adverse effect on a public facility which has traditionally provided services to indigents, providing access to medical services without regards to a patient's ability to pay. This insures low income groups access to health care facilities. Another element of the Department's incipient policy is a review of the efficiency of the facility proposing the transfer, and examination of the applicant's historic cost per discharge, gross revenue per adjusted admission, and the general cost effect of the proposal, to assess whether the transfer or conversion would lead to higher patient charges. The incipient policy is designed to promote price and non-price (service) competition among providers. Changing bed complements at facilities by transfer allows providers to compete for larger market shares, which fulfills the Department's statutory duty to promote competition among providers. The Project's Consistency With The Department's Non-Rule Policy On Bed Transfer and Reallocation The District's project will reduce the number of medical/surgical beds located in the service district (District X) by 25 beds. In the service district there are 5,770 medical/surgical beds, an excess of approximately 80 medical surgical beds as of the last calculation done by the Department. In the letter of denial attached in the State Agency Action Report, Humana exhibit N, there were 447 unused acute care beds available to the southwest Broward County population within reasonable access on a daily basis in 1984. The delicensure of 25 beds will only minimally advance the goal of reduction of excess capacity. The proposed project does not improve geographic access to a sufficiently large segment of the population expected to experience serious problems in obtaining in-patient care. There is no persuasive evidence that any significant segment of the population in Broward County now has a serious problem in obtaining in-patient care. To the extent that a satellite facility in southwestern Broward County would bring an acute care hospital to that area, those living in that area would have enhanced or more convenient access, but that is a far cry from demonstrating that a population has a serious access problem. This project would not significantly improve the availability of in- patient care to Medicaid and indigent patients who are now served at the District facility (Memorial Hospital) in east Broward. This situation might be different if there were subdistricting in Broward County, but none now exists. In fact, subdistricting has been considered by the Local Health Council, but rejected for lack of adequate data. Ad hoc subdistricting is inappropriate here. There is no evidence of deterioration of the facilities of the District or the necessity to correct life safety deficiencies by building the satellite facility. This case is not like the Lee Memorial Hospital situation. Here, the District is in the process of a significant $50 million renovation of Memorial Hospital, including construction of an eight floor patient tower. With respect to the effect on patient charges, the District has sufficient cash on hand to build the satellite. If the project is approved, it would have no effect on the charges to patients at the District's current hospital. It would, however, allow improvements in the use of space at the current hospital by relocating and retiring 125 beds from Memorial Hospital. Approximately 15,000 square feet of space will become available at the current facility. Data processing, management systems, engineering, billing and collection clerks are presently housed away from Memorial in 20,000 square feet of rented space. Consolidating these operations at the main campus would allow the District to save approximately $100,00 per year in lease payments. Statutory Criteria For Evaluating The Application Under Section 381.494(6)(c), Florida Statutes A. Consistency With The State Health Plan And the Local Health Plan Related To Occupancy Levels. Section 381.494(1)(6)1., Florida Statutes. The Florida State Health Plan and the Local Health Plan set as goals occupancy levels for surgical and acute care beds of 80 percent. State Plan, Goal 8, Objective 8.1; Local Plan, Goal 3, Objective 3.1. The Local Health Plan recommends that there should be no new hospital construction until there is an average annual occupancy in the District equal to 80 percent. Local Plan, page 227. Pembroke Pines General Hospital is the closest hospital to the proposed satellite, and now serves most of the area the satellite would serve. Pembroke Pines operates at below 50 percent occupancy for its medical/surgical beds. Excess or underutilized bed capacity contributes to higher health care costs. According to the Institute of Medicine, the cost of an empty bed is 50 percent of the cost of an occupied bed, made up largely of the overhead assigned to that empty bed. State Plan, page 70. There had been a great growth in the number of acute care beds in Florida before the need methodology of the certificate of need program was developed. According to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, there were 4,800 excess acute care beds in Florida as of July, 1986. The State Health Plan sets the appropriate ratio of medical/surgical beds to the population as a ratio of 4.11 to 1,000. State Plan, Goal 6, Objective 6.1. The overall medical/surgical bed ratio to population in District X is approximately 5.1 to 1,000, in excess of the State Health Plan goals. The Local Health Plan encourages the reduction of licensed beds to achieve a ratio of 4.5 medical/surgical beds to 1,000 population by 1988 and seeks to achieve an 85 percent occupancy rate by that time. Local Plan, Page 226. District X (Broward County) is significantly overbedded. The proposal from the District would reduce the total inventory of acute care beds by 25 beds. In return, it would cost the health care system in the District approximately $15,965,500 to build the satellite. Such a cost for a rather modest reduction of 25 beds is unwarranted. Availability, Utilization, Geographic Accessibility And Economic Accessibility of Facilities in the District Section 381.494(6)(c)2., Florida Statutes The area that the District proposes to serve in the satellite facility includes census tracts 702-706, 1102, and 1103. These have a younger population and age distribution than Broward County as a whole. This younger population has a lesser need for hospital services than older populations. District's exhibit, 1 table 2, shows that the elderly population in the satellite service area will decrease over time, so that by 1990 the elderly will comprise about 7 percent of that population. The elderly will be 23.7 percent of the total Broward County population in 1990. The satellite facility does not propose pediatric services. The age group from 0-14 will achieve second highest population of growth in the service area, but the pediatric population will not benefit particularly from the proposed satellite, because licensed pediatric beds, pediatric and pediatric surgery will remain at the current facility. The age cohort with the highest growth is that of ages 30-44. This group demands in-patient services at a smaller rate than the elderly and tend to use such services as obstetrics, nursery services, psychiatric services, substance abuse services, cardiac catheterization and cardiac surgery which will not be available in-house at the satellite. The District does not propose to offer any service at the satellite not now available at existing hospitals in its service area. Other hospitals now serving the area which the satellite proposes to serve have additional capacity to serve population growth in western Broward. Pembroke Pines is the closest hospital to the proposed satellite, and now operates at below 50 percent occupancy for medical/surgical beds. There is sufficient unused capacity to accommodate projected demands in the HRS service District X. The majority of the population growth will be experienced in the area between Humana Bennett and Pembroke Pines Hospital. These facilities and other hospitals can meet projected demand from that population growth. There is no geographic access problem for residents of the satellite service area in receiving in-patient hospital services at existing hospitals. There is no significant indigent or medicaid populations in the west and southwestern areas of Broward County, which has a younger population and is a more recently developed part of the county. Typically older sections of the county have more medically indigent persons. The current establishment of the satellite facility is not necessary to ensure the financial viability of South Broward Hospital District or to maintain its indigent care commitment. In the fiscal year 1985, the District made $19.2 million from hospital operations at Memorial and was the most profitable hospital in the State of Florida. In the fiscal year 1986, the District made $13 million from the operation of Memorial. The District is not in any financially dangerous situation and has unused additional taxing authority available to it. There is no evidence that the District will not remain financially viable through 1990. Other Facilities and Services which may serve as Alternatives to the Facilities and Services Proposed. Section 381.494(6)(c)4., Florida Statutes. The residents of the District requiring in-patient services will continue to do so. There are no less expensive alternatives to in-patient care which the District has failed to consider. Probable Economies from Joint, Cooperative or Shared Services or Facilities. Section 381.494(6)(c)5., Florida Statutes. The uncompensated case load of the District is such that it is unlikely other hospitals would jointly operate a service or facility with the District. No such alternative has been proposed by Humana. If the satellite is built, the District will be able to use space vacated at the main campus for administrative operations now housed away from the Hospital in rented space. The District would be able to handle many administrative matters, e.g. accounting, purchasing, risk management centrally if the satellite is built. The District would experience improved physical efficiency and save approximately $100,000 per year in rental payments. Availability of Resources Including Health Manpower. Section 386.494(6)(c)8., Florida Statutes. The District has the financial and human resources to operate the satellite. There is no evidence that approval of the project will have an adverse effect on training programs or divert human or financial resources from other needed health care. The satellite would be economically accessible to residents of the District, due to the statutory mandate that care be provided without regard to ability to pay. Financial Feasibility. Section 381.494(6)(c)9., Florida Statutes. The project is financially feasible in the short and long terms. The District has the ability to fund the project in the short-term without borrowing. The total projected cost for the project is $15,965,50. This total cost is also reasonable. For the first two years of projected operations, fiscal years 1990 and 1991, the facility would have an excess of revenue over expenses of $1,154,800 and $2,147,900, respectively. In the long-term, based on historical patient origin and marketshare data that is available, the project is financially feasible. The breakeven point from a financial basis is achieved at a 44 percent occupancy rate, and on a cash flow basis, at a 35 percent occupancy rate. Even if the District only achieved a 16 percent share of the southwest Broward market by 1992, the facility would still be financially feasible. By servicing existing patients alone, the satellite would have an immediate 20-30 percent occupancy rate. Needs of Health Maintenance Organizations. Section 381.494(6)(c)10., Florida Statutes. The District is an efficient provider of health services and has attracted health maintenance organizations to contract with it due to its low costs. There is no evidence, however, that unless the satellite is approved, health maintenance organizations will not be able to obtain adequate services for their members at a reasonable price. Probable Impact of the Proposed Satellite on the Cost of Health Services Proposed by the District. Section 381.494(6)(c)12., Florida Statutes. Because the project can be built with cash on hand, it will have no adverse effect on patient charges at Memorial Hospital. Construction of the satellite would, however, draw patients from Humana Bennett and Humana South Broward, which now draw patients frown the area the satellite would service. The net financial loss to Humana Bennett in the first two years of satellite operation would be $1 million, and to Humana South Broward $1/2 million.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the application of the South Broward Hospital District to build a satellite facility in southwest Broward County be denied DONE AND ORDERED this 4th day of August, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of August, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: 1. Covered in Finding of Fact 1. 2. Covered in Finding of Fact 8. 3. Covered in Finding of Fact 9. 4. Covered in Finding of Fact 10. 5. Covered in Finding of Fact 12. 6. Covered in Finding of Fact 12. 7. Covered in Finding of Fact 12. 8. Covered in Finding of Fact 13. 9. Covered in Finding of Fact 14. Covered in Finding of Fact 15. Rejected as cumulative. Covered in Finding of Fact 15. Covered in Finding of Fact 15. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in Finding of Fact 15. Covered in Finding of Fact 15. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Covered in Finding of Fact 62. Covered in Finding of Fact 16. The evidence is not persuasive that western migration is leaving a concentration of patients without the ability to pay for medical services in the eastern portion of Broward. Indeed, there is no satisfactory north-south dividing line to make an east-west Broward comparison. Covered in Finding of Fact 17. Covered in Finding of Fact 18. Covered in Finding of Fact 14. Covered in Finding of Fact 20. Covered in Finding of Fact 21. Covered in Finding of Fact 22. Covered in Finding of Fact 23 Covered in Finding of Fact 24. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative to findings of fact 12 and 15. Covered in Finding of Fact 45. Rejected as inapplicable to Broward County since beds are accessible to the entire population of the county. Covered in Finding of Fact 46. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. To the extent necessary covered in finding of fact 42. Rejected for the reasons stated in 37 above. Covered in Finding of Fact 44. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in Finding of Fact 38. Covered in Finding of Fact 47. Rejected as an improper attempt to use U.S. 441 for ad hoc subdistricting. See Finding of Fact 47. See Finding of Fact 47. Rejected because the cited portion of the Local Health Plan only states that a study may indicate that special consideration should be given to the western portion of the county. Covered in Finding of Fact 47. Covered in Finding of Fact 25. Covered in Finding of Fact 26. Covered in Finding of Fact 27. Covered in Finding of Fact 28. Rejected because the portion of Exhibit F related to Saxon General Hospital did not appear to support the findings proposed. See also the Final Order in Halifax Hospital Medical Center vs. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 8 FALR 2038 (1986). Covered in Finding of Fact 29. Covered in Finding of Fact 30. Covered in Finding of Fact 31. Covered in Finding of Fact 32. Rejected because there is no "maldistribution problem" in this case. Because Broward has no subdistricts. Covered in Finding of Fact 33. Covered in Finding of Fact 33. Rejected as an unnecessary characterization. Covered in Finding of Fact 34. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in Finding of Fact 35. Covered in Finding of Fact 36. Covered in Finding of Fact 37. Rejected because there is no need in west Broward for an additional facility. 72-75. Rejected as list persuasive and the evidence adopted in Findings of Fact 48-56. Covered in Finding of Fact 49. Rejected because there is no division point from which to compute a maldistribution; to attempt to do so is to engage in ad hoc subdistricting. Covered in Finding of Fact 16 concerning location. The second sentence is rejected as unsupported insofar as it implies that those living in areas other than southwest Broward lack the ability to pay for medical services. Rejected because there is no method by which to determine lessor or greater need in a district which is not subdistricted. Rejected because the assumptions regarding payor mix are speculative Rejected as speculative. Covered in Finding of Fact 15. Rejected as speculative. Rejected because there is no need to follow the private pay patient population in the absence of a need for additional beds or expenditures to move existing beds. Rejected for the reasons stated in Conclusions of Law Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Sentence one is covered in Finding of Fact 52 to the extent appropriate. Sentence two is rejected as unpersuasive. Rejected because the evidence in support of the findings is not persuasive. Rejected because, although true, the implicit inference that the contrary is true is not sustained by the evidence. Covered in Finding of Fact 57. 97-98. Covered in Finding of Fact 57. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. 101-102. Rejected because no true efficiency is increased the increase in occupancy rate and efficiency is merely a paper gain. 104. Rejected as unnecessary because tertiary services will continue to be provided at the current facility. 105-111. Rejected as unnecessary, that Memorial is an efficient, low cost provider is true. 112-114. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected because it is not shown that the ongoing renovations at Pembroke Pines account for its occupancy rate being as low as 50 percent. Rejected as unnecessary. 118-122. Rejected because notwithstanding those factors, Humana Bennett still has additional functional capacity. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. 125-126. While these factors may affect the occupancy rates at Humana South Broward they do not justify ignoring the occupancy goals set in the Local Health Plan that no new construction will take place until there is an average annual occupancy equal to 80 percent in the District. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in Finding of Fact 57. Rejected as unnecessary. 131-132. Covered in Finding of Fact 58. 133-134. Rejected as cumulative. 135-136. Covered in Finding of Fact 59. 137. Covered in Finding of Fact 60. 138-150. Rejected as cumulative to the finding that the project is financially feasible. Covered in Finding of Fact 61. Covered in Finding of Fact 61. Covered in Finding of Fact 61. 154-158. Rejected as cumulative to the finding that the project is financially feasible. Covered in Finding of Fact 61. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. 162-165. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in Finding of Fact 63. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected because the impact on Humana South Broward will be approximately $1/2 million in the first two years of operation. See Finding of Fact 63. 169-172. Rejected as unpersuasive. Rejected for the reasons stated in Finding of Fact 63. Rejected as argument rather than a Finding of Fact. 175-181. Rejected as unnecessary. 182. Rejected because the construction of an entiresatellite hospital does appear to constitute "newhealth services to in-patients." The Final Order in Halifax Hospital Medical Center vs. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services notwithstanding. Humana's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Covered in Finding of Fact 15. Covered in Finding of Fact 40. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in Finding of Fact 8. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in Findings of Fact 9 and 10. Covered in Finding of Fact 52. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in Finding of Fact 48. Covered in Finding of Fact 49. Covered in Finding of Fact 49. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in Finding of Fact 49. Covered in Finding of Fact 49. Covered in Finding of Fact 50. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in Finding of Fact 51. Covered in Finding of Fact 51. Covered in Finding of Fact 52. Rejected as cumulative to Finding of Fact 52. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in Finding of Fact 52. Covered in Finding of Fact 52. Covered in Finding of Fact 52. Covered in Finding of Fact 53. Rejected as cumulative to Finding of Fact 53. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected because quality of care is not an issue by stipulation of the parties. Covered in Finding of Fact 54. Covered in Finding of Fact 54 Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in Finding of Fact 55. Covered in Finding of Fact 55 Covered in Finding off Fact 55. Covered in Finding of Fact 55. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. 49-85. Rejected because the criticism of the District's financial projections provided by Mr. Baehr was not persuasive, and the proof of the District on financial feasibility was persuasive. See Findings of Fact 59. 86-92. Rejected because the project can be built with cash and have no adverse impact on patient charges at Memorial Hospital or at the satellite. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. 96-103. Rejected as cumulative to the finding made in Finding of Fact 63. Covered in Finding of Fact 63. Rejected because the characterization of the impact of the loss of $1/2 million on Humana South Broward as "tremendous" is not persuasive. Covered in Finding of Fact 42. Rejected as irrelevant because it would not be expected that a new satellite hospital would begin with an occupancy rate equal to 80 percent. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in Finding of Fact 43. 110-111. Covered in Finding of Fact 62. COPIES FURNISHED: F. Phillip Blank, Esquire 241 East Virginia Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ursala Mancusi-Ungaro, Esquire AmeriFirst Building One S.E. Third Avenue Miami, Florida 33031 Douglas L. Mannheimer, Esquire Post Office Drawer 11300 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 John H. French, Jr., Esquire James C. Hauser, Esquire Post Office Box 1876 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1876 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller, Acting General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 =================================================================
The Issue The issue presented herein is whether or not a CON to construct a 60-bed short-term psychiatric hospital in District XI should be issued to Florida Medical Center (FMC).
Findings Of Fact FMC seeks a CON for a 60-bed free-standing psychiatric facility to be located in the Key Largo area of Monroe County in HRS District XI. FMC intends to provide 6.25 percent of its patient days at no charge to indigent patients. It further intends to provide another 6.25 percent of its patient days to HRS' clients and Baker Act patients at 50 percent of its projected charge, or $200 per day. (FMC Exhibit 2, Table 7). FMC proposes to build this facility at a cost of $6,060,000. Dr. Richard Matthews, Ph.D., has been executive director of the Guidance Clinic of the Upper Keys since 1973 and is a clinical psychologist. He is responsible for the overall administration and supervision of mental health, alcohol, drug abuse and out-patient services provided under contract with HRS. Dr. Matthews was qualified as an expert in clinical psychology and the mental health delivery health system in Monroe County. (FMC Exhibit 13). There are three guidance clinics in Monroe County, one each for the upper, lower and middle Keys. HRS contracts through each of these clinics to provide mental health care for its clients. There are no community mental health centers in Monroe County and the clinics are the sole means of delivering mental health care on behalf of HRS' clients within the county. Currently, the guidance clinic of the upper Keys places its in- patients in Harbor View Hospital in Dade County at a cost of $236 per day. Neither Harbor View nor any other hospital provides free days to any of the guidance clinics for in-patient psychiatric care. (FMC Exhibit 13, P. 9) Jackson Memorial Hospital does not accept indigent or charity psychiatric patients from Monroe County. There have been occasions where patients without resources have been unable to be hospitalized although hospitalization was indicated. The middle Keys has a crisis hospitalization unit with a limited number of beds. Patients needing hospitalization longer than three days must be transferred to Harbor View or some other facility in the District. The 15 beds at Depoo Hospital in Key West are not readily accessible to residents of the upper Keys. Residents needing psychiatric services usually go to hospitals in Dade County. Coral Reef Hospital, the nearest psychiatric facility to Petitioner's proposed facility, has in the past refused to negotiate a discounted rate with the guidance clinic. Dr. Matthews, on one occasion, sent a patient to Coral Reef who was refused treatment. Currently, no psychiatrist practices in Key Largo because there are no psychiatric beds to which a psychiatrist could admit patients. The discounted rate of $200 per day quoted by FMC is some $36 per day less than the guidance clinic currently pays to providers for referrals of its patients for psychiatric care. Additionally, the 6.25 percent of free care that Petitioner proposes is greater than the free care which the guidance clinic currently receives from any facility since no facility presently gives any free care to the clinic. The guidance clinic supports Petitioner's CON application and will contract with Petitioner who provides services for in-patients. Grant Center is a long-term 140-bed psychiatric hospital specializing in the treatment of children and adolescents. It is the nearest facility to Petitioner's proposed facility. Grant Center has agreed to refer adult patients to Petitioner. Grant Center treats 2-3 adults a month who need psychiatric care. (FMC Exhibit 14). There is one hospital providing psychiatric care in Dade County which was surveyed by the Health Care Finance Administration (HCFA) in March, 1988. Currently, a third party insurance carrier no longer utilizes Grant Center because of price. If a facility has prices which carriers consider too expensive, utilization will go down. (FMC Exhibit 14, P. 7). Grant Center currently contracts with HRS to provide its clients care at a rate of approximately $350 per day, a rate one half of Grant Center's normal rate. Jackson Memorial is the only Dade County hospital which will treat an indigent psychiatric patient. Grant Center intends to assist Petitioner with staffing or programmatic needs. It has 80-100 professional staff, most of whom live in close proximity to Key Largo. Robert L. Newman, C.P.A., is the chief financial officer at FMC. He testified, by deposition, as an expert in hospital accounting and finance. Newman analyzed the Hospital Cost Containment Board (HCCB) reports for each hospital in District XI which provides psychiatric care. There is no free standing psychiatric hospital in the District which reports any indigent or uncompensated care. Among area acute care hospitals which have psychiatric units, Miami Jackson rendered 38.89 percent indigent care, Miami Children's rendered 6.5 percent indigent care, and no other facility reported that it rendered more than 1.75 percent indigent care. (FMC see Exhibit 11, disposition exhibit 1). Jackson provides no free care to Monroe County residents and Miami Children's care is limited to treating children while Petitioner is seeking adult beds. Jayne Coraggio testified (by deposition) as an expert in psychiatric staffing and hiring. She is currently Petitioner's director of behavioral sciences. The ideal patient to staff ratio is 4 to 5 patients per day per professional staff member. During the evening shift, the ideal patient ratio per professional staff member is 7 to 8 patients. (FMC Exhibit 12, PP. 6-7). Petitioner's facility is adequately staffed based on the above ratios. FMC is considered overstaffed in the psychiatric unit by some of the other area hospitals since they do not staff as heavily as does Petitioner. Lower staffing ratios can affect quality of care since patients and their families would not receive as much therapy. Family therapy is important because the family needs to know about changes in the patient in order to make corrective adjustments. The family that is required to travel in excess of 45 minutes or more one way is less likely to be involved in family therapy. Islara Souto was the HRS primary reviewer who prepared the state agency action report (SAAR) for Petitioner's CON application. (FMC Exhibit 15). District 11 has subdivided into five subdistricts for psychiatric beds. Florida is deinstitutionalizing patients from its mental hospitals. To the extent that private psychiatric hospitals do not accept nonpaying patients, their existence will not solve the problem of caring for such patients. Souto acknowledged that the local health councils conversion policy discriminates against subdistrict 5 because there are so few acute care beds in the subdistrict. In fact, the conversion policy actually exacerbates the maldistribution of beds in the district. (FMC 15, page 26). The psychiatric facility nearest the proposed site (Coral Reef), had an occupancy of 90.3 percent. Souto utilized a document entitled Florida Primary Health Care Need Indicators, February 1, 1986, and determined that Monroe County has not been designated as a health manpower shortage area, nor a medically underserved area. This information is relied upon by health planners to determine the availability of health manpower in an area. This report refers both to physicians and R.N.'s. The average adult per diem for free-standing hospitals in District 11 range from $430 at Charter to just over $500 at Harbor View. Although districts have established subdistricts for psychiatric beds, no psychiatric bed subdistrict in any district has been promulgated by HRS as a rule. The access standard that is relevant to this proceeding is a 45-minute travel standard contained in Rule 10-5.011(1)(o)5.G. That standard states: G. Access Standard. Short-term inpatient hospital psychiatric services should be available within a maximum travel time of 45 minutes under average travel conditions for at least 90 percent of this service area's population. Here, the standard refers to the service area which is determined to be an area different than a service district. Applying the travel time standard on a service area basis makes the most sense since the subdistrict is established by the local health council and not the applicant. Analyzing this access standard on a sub-district level, 90% of the sub-districts population is not within 45 minutes of any facility anywhere in sub-district V since the sub-district is more than two hours long by ordinary travel and the population is split two-thirds in lower Dade County and one-third in Monroe County, the bulk of which is in Key West. (FMC Exhibit 17). Therefore, a facility located on either end of this sub-district is not readily accessible by the applicable travel standards to citizens at the other end of the sub-district. This access standard must however be measured and considered with the needs for psychiatric services of the kind Petitioner is proposing to provide. Petitioner has not presented any access surveys or assessments of the caliber relied upon by the Department in the past. Petitioner's facility which would be located in the Key Largo area will no doubt provide better geographic accessibility to residents of District XI who live in the Key Largo area. HRS has in the past used a sub-district analysis to determine geographic accessibility for psychiatric beds even though it has not promulgated a rule for sub-districts for psychiatric beds. See, for example, Psychiatric Hospital of Florida vs. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and Pasco Psychiatric Center, DOAH Case No. 85-0780. Likewise, the Department has approved the conversion of acute-care beds to psychiatric beds even though it found that there was a surplus of psychiatric beds in the district. (Petitioner's Exhibit 7). The Department has in the past used a geographic access analysis to approve psychiatric beds in District XI and has used the sub- district analysis or a time travel analysis in its review of Cedars, Coral Reef, Depoo (for psychiatric beds) and the Glenbiegh case (for long term substance abuse). The bed need calculations for the January, 1992 planning horizon shows a surplus of 180 short-term in-patient psychiatric beds. (HRS Exhibit 2). The occupancy level for short-term psychiatric beds in the district is below 70%. (HRS Exhibit 2, pages 11-12). Additionally, the occupancy standards of the local and state health plan, of which the department is required to review CON applications, have not been met in this instance. (HRS Exhibit 2, Pages 6-7). Petitioner has not submitted any documentation to HRS regarding special circumstances need. Petitioner's proposal at final hearing for a staff referral agreement with another local hospital was not contained in the CON application filed with HRS. (FMC Exhibit 14, pages 11-12). Although Petitioner has alluded to some unspecified access problem for residents in the Florida Keys, Petitioner has not documented a real access problem and certainly not a demonstration of inaccessibility under the rule access standard. (Florida Administrative Code Rule 10-5.011(1)(o)5.g.)(HRS Exhibit 2, pages 14-15). Although the proposed project would increase availability and access for underserved groups in the district, the percentage of total patient days for "indigents" is not substantial and certainly not to the point to warrant deviation from the usual access criteria. 2/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT: Petitioner's application for a Certificate of Need to build a 60-bed free- standing psychiatric hospital in District XI be DENIED. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of February, 1989 in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of January, 1989.
The Issue Whether CON 8241, Palm Beach Regional's application to convert its 200 bed acute care hospital to a 60 bed long-term care hospital should be granted or denied?
Findings Of Fact The Parties The applicant in this case is The Hospital Corporation of Lake Worth d/b/a Palm Beach Regional Hospital. A subsidiary of Columbia Hospital Corporation, ("Columbia,") Palm Beach Regional is a licensed general acute care hospital with 200 beds located in Palm Beach County, AHCA District 9. Palm Beach Regional's license is issued pursuant to Chapter 395, Florida Statutes, the chapter of the Florida Statutes entitled, "Hospital Licensing and Regulation." The agency is "designated as the single state agency to issue ... or deny certificates of need ... in accordance with the district plans, the statewide health plan, and present and future federal and state statutes." Section 408.034(1), F. S. Integrated is a licensed 120-bed skilled nursing facility, also known as a long-term care facility, located in Palm Beach County, AHCA District 9. Its license is issued pursuant to Chapter 400, Florida Statutes, the statute entitled "Nursing Homes and Related Health Care Facilities." Columbia Hospital Corporation The parent company of petitioner, Columbia has a stock market capitalization of between $15 and $20 billion and enjoys a profitability of over $1 billion per year. It owns approximately 340 hospitals, well over 100 ambulatory surgical centers, and an extensive number of home health agencies. As to be expected of a Fortune 500 company, Columbia generates substantial annual revenues. In 1994, for example, the annual revenues generated by Columbia exceeded $17 billion. Columbia also lays claim to being the largest hospital system in the state. It has five divisions with approximately 60 hospitals in its "Florida Group," the organizational title for its Florida operations. The net revenues of the Columbia Florida Group is approximately $4.5 billion. One of five divisions of Columbia's Florida Group, the South Florida Division is a $1.2 billion operation. The division encompasses Dade, Broward and Palm Beach Counties and consists of 15 hospitals, six surgery centers, and one dozen home health agencies. The South Florida Division, of course, includes Palm Beach Regional. Background to the Application Palm Beach Regional was purchased by Columbia shortly after Columbia had purchased JFK Hospital, a 300-bed tertiary hospital approximately three miles from Palm Beach Regional. In August of 1995, as a business decision, Columbia consolidated the operations of the two facilities. The consolidation resulted in a patient census drop at Palm Beach Regional. Shortly thereafter, with the permission of the agency, Palm Beach Regional ceased operations at its emergency room. The result of the consolidation and limitation of the services offered was that it cost only about $100,000 a month to keep Palm Beach Regional running with its small census. Even with the small census, and the relatively low monthly operational expense, the operational expense was more than $1 million per year. In June of 1996, Palm Beach Regional and the agency entered a stipulation which authorized the hospital to suspend the acute care operations in contemplation of this proceeding. Palm Beach Regional's hospital-based skilled nursing unit has since been transferred. Palm Beach Regional is now closed and empty. The reason Palm Beach Regional had been kept operating at all after the consolidation with JFK was to preserve the opportunity to convert the license as proposed in the application. The Application Certified for accuracy on September 18, 1995, under the signature of its authorized representative, Robert L. Newman, CEO of Columbia/HCA, South Florida Division, the application was submitted to the agency bearing a date of September 20, 1995. The application describes what it seeks in the section titled "Project Summary" as follows: Hospital Corporation of Lake Worth (Palm Beach Regional) proposes in this Certificate of Need Application to convert 60 acute care hospital beds to 60 long-term acute care hospital beds and to delicense 128 existing acute care beds. (At a later date the existing 12 skilled nursing beds will be located to another Columbia/HCA hospital in District IX.) Palm Beach Regional Exhibit No. 1, AHCA Form 1455A, Oct 92, AHCA 4600-0005 Aug 93. The transfer of the 12 skilled nursing beds has already occurred and therefore is not at issue in this proceeding. Nor is the delicensure of the 128 beds really at the heart of the agency's denial and Integrated's opposition. In contrast, what is contested is the conversion of the 60 acute care hospital beds to 60 long- term acute care hospital beds. Such a conversion would make Palm Beach Regional a long-term acute care hospital. Long-term Acute Care Hospitals Referring to a hospital as both "long-term" and "acute," is confusing. The two terms have divergent meanings both in terms of average length of stay and the traits of the illness suffered by the acute and the long-term patient. In the context of hospitals, "long-term" refers to a patient with an average length of stay of greater than 25 days. By comparison, the acute patient's stay is typically much less than 25 days, with the average length of stay being between 5 and 6 days. As is the patient in need of acute care, the typical long-term hospital patient is very ill. The difference in the type of illness suffered by the acute care patient as opposed to the long-term patient, however, lies in other characteristics. Unlike the acute care patient, the long-term patient is not in the urgent, emergent or desperately critical state of patients in the acute care setting. The two terms, "long-term" and "acute" have been used together with reference to the type of hospital to which Palm Beach Regional proposes to convert because of the history of the long- term care hospital’s development. Originally in Florida, long-term hospitals were licensed as acute care hospitals and were referred to, therefore, as "long-term acute," hence the combination of terms with disparate meanings. In the context of a study conducted by the Hospital Cost Containment Board, however, the agency examined the issue of whether long-term hospitals should be subject to CON review as long-term hospitals apart from other acute hospitals. As a result, long-term hospitals came to be reviewed in their own separate category under certificate of need review, subject to the same licensure requirements as a specialty acute care hospital. Because they had been licensed earlier as acute care hospitals, the term "acute" was carried over into the new category. At present, there is a recommendation to refer to long-term acute care hospitals simply as "long-term hospitals" to clear up any confusion caused by the terminology. This recommendation will be followed for the most part in the remainder of this order when reference is made to acute and long-term facilities and acute and long-term care. Long-term Care Hospital-based long-term care is a distinction established in federal Medicare regulations that describes a hospital with patients having an average length of stay of greater than 25 days. The distinction allows an exclusion from the Medicare prospective payment system so that reimbursement is received by the long-term hospital on the basis of cost. The distinction is of great import financially because of the distinction between "cost-based" Medicaid and Medicare reimbursement systems and another payment system used by Medicaid and Medicare: the prospective payment system. Before the prospective payment system was instituted, hospitals generally were well utilized, in fact, “filled to the brim.” The high utilization was due to the "cost-based" reimbursement system which contained a financial incentive for the hospital to keep patients in the hospital. Under the cost-based system, the more a hospital spent, the more reimbursement it would receive from Medicare and Medicaid. The prospective payment system was instituted to save taxpayers the high cost of the cost-based reimbursement system. Under the prospective payment system, the hospital receives a flat fee for Medicare and Medicaid patients depending on the diagnostic category, or diagnostic-related group, ("DRG,") into which falls the illness treated. The flat fee is figured on the basis of average length of stay for that diagnostic category. Under this system, unlike the cost-reimbursed system, the hospital receives the same reimbursement for Medicare and Medicaid patients who stay for less than the average length of stay assigned to the patient's DRG as for those who stay longer. With regard to a patient who stays in the hospital longer than the average length of stay for the patient's DRG, the hospital, in many cases, not only profits less the longer the patient stays but begins to lose money at some point in the stay. If the average length of stay for an appendicitis patient is four days, for example, then the hospital profits more in the case of an appendicitis patient who stays only two days because it has incurred only two days of costs instead of the expected four days of costs. In the case of another appendicitis patient, who stays longer than the average length of stay, the hospital makes less money and reaches the point eventually in some cases where the hospital actually loses money for treating the patient if the patient stays long enough. Medicare provides additional payments for both "day-outliers" and "cost-outliers," but not enough to prevent financial pressure on hospitals to discharge acute patients as soon as possible. The prospective payment system has succeeded in forcing hospitals to operate more efficiently; the average utilization of hospitals has declined dramatically. Today, about half of the hospital beds in Florida on any given day go unused. The system does not have the same effect on long-term hospitals; they are exempt from the prospective payment system. Instead, long-term care hospitals are reimbursed under a cost-based system. A long-term hospital well located geographically is particularly attractive to a large hospital system, such as Columbia. Not only will it likely be a financial success in its own right but it will assist Columbia’s sister acute care hospitals in relieving them of patients too sick to be discharged to a subacute setting yet finished with the acute episode which required the acute care hospital’s service in the first place. Development of Long-term Care Hospitals in Florida The first long-term care hospital was instituted in Florida in the 1980's. Fairly soon thereafter there were three long-term care hospitals in Florida, but then there was a lull in the attempt to establish long-term care hospitals. With the advent of the prospective payment system, however, there eventually came the closing of a number of small hospitals in Florida because of their inability to continue to operate in sound financial condition. At the same time, four or five applications for the conversion of small hospitals to long- term care hospitals were filed with the agency. In the early part of the present decade the agency conducted a study of long-term hospital care. The study took place within a larger study by the Hospital Cost Containment Board. Ultimately, it was recommended that long-term care hospitals be regulated separately from acute care hospitals and that they be subject to separate certificate of need review. The recommendation was made for a number of reasons. First, long-term hospitals were viewed by the agency as very different from acute care hospitals because of the patients' average lengths of stay. Second, long-term care hospitals were found to be expensive for the type of care given in them which was of great concern to the state since cost control is an objective of the certificate of need program. Third, long-term hospitals were found to experience high mortality rates. As the result of the study and recommendation, the agency made the creation or conversion of hospitals into long-term hospitals subject to certificate of need review. Admission Criteria In the study, the agency also found that there are no clear admission criteria for long-term hospitals. To date, neither the Health Care Finance Administration (“HCFA”), nor the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospital Organizations ("JCAHO,") or any of its sub-organizations have developed any criteria to define a long-term care hospital. It is not clear, therefore, exactly what type of patients are suitable for care in a long-term hospital. Sub-acute Care The parties are in agreement that sub-acute care is a level of care that is below acute care. Palm Beach Regional claims, however, that the care provided by long-term care hospitals is not subacute but rather falls into a category of care between acute and sub-acute. An understanding of this claim requires some discussion. Unlike other classes of hospitals which are exempt from the prospective payment system, like cancer, children's or psychiatric hospitals, patients in long-term care hospitals do not have a specific type of illness nor are they limited to serving a specific age group. Generally, however, they are patients who have had an acute episode, whose program of care has been identified and who need a longer term of care to recover or to be rehabilitated because of an acute illness or surgical procedure. And, although they are not limited to a specific age group, the experience of long-term care hospitals is that a major part of their patient population is elderly, virtually all of whom are covered by Medicare. In these respects, long-term care hospital patients are not much different from patients in other "subacute" settings: comprehensive rehabilitation hospitals, acute care hospital skilled nursing units, skilled nursing facilities in free-standing nursing homes, and, even, in some cases, home health care, assisted living and outpatient services for the elderly. If there is a difference between the long-term hospital patient and patients in other subacute settings, it is that the long-term hospital patient has more at-risk types of physical problems, is more likely to be medically unstable or is, in fact, medically unstable. But this difference is not strictly observed because of the financial pressure on hospitals to discharge patients from the acute setting into a subacute setting. Medically unstable patients, therefore, are found in subacute settings such as skilled nursing facilities whether hospital-based or in free- standing nursing homes. In contrast to what has become commonplace practice, Dr. Kathleen Griffin, an expert in health care planning with a specialty in long-term acute care and subacute care, testified that it would not be appropriate for a medically unstable patient to be transferred to a skilled nursing bed. In her opinion it would be best for a medically unstable patient about to be discharged from acute care to be admitted instead to a long-term care hospital. Despite the reality that there are no admission criteria for long-term care hospitals, Dr. Griffin maintains that if a hospital discharge planner believes through information gathered from the medical and nursing staffs that the patient "is highly acute and at risk, and there is a long-term care acute hospital available, then that would be the placement of choice." (Tr. 523.) If a long-term care hospital is not available, however, the alternative is to keep the at-risk, medically unstable patient in the acute care hospital rather than discharge the patient into a nursing facility. Dr. Griffin's opinion is shared by the physician practicing in long-term hospitals. Representative of such a physician is Dr. Wendell Williams, presently the Medical Director of a long-term care hospital, Specialty Hospital of Jacksonville. Dr. Williams sees a distinction between long-term acute care and subacute care. Long-term hospital care is acute care without the need for "highly technical diagnostic capabilities," and "high surgical capabilities," but still care in the "medically complex case that requires frequent physician direction [and] high skill level of caregivers." (Petitioner's Ex. No. 16, pg. 13.) In Dr. Williams view, long-term hospital care occupies a level of care between acute and subacute care. The views of Dr. Griffin and Dr. Williams find support in analyses of nursing hours per patient. In a typical nursing home, the number of hours per patient is about 4.5 hours per day, while in a long-term care hospital, the number is around 6.5 hours per patient day. At Specialty Hospital of Jacksonville, the nursing hours per patient day for non-ventilator patients is 6.75 hours, and for ventilator patients is 10 hours. In contrast, Integrated, a nursing home, provided nursing hours per patient day in its "med-surg unit" at 4.34 hours in March of 1996, 4.60 hours in April and 4.52 hours in May although at times Integrated's nursing hours per patient day have reached as high as 6 hours. The opinions of Dr. Griffin and Dr. Williams have not yet been generally accepted. Following the agency's study in the earlier part of the 1990's, the federal government, under the auspices of HCFA, launched a major study that addresses what AHCA viewed as the "whole gamut of what is marketed as subacute care," (Tr. 272). The study included long-term care hospitals, as well as those settings which the parties all agree are clearly in the category of "subacute": hospital-based skilled nursing facilities, free-standing nursing homes, comprehensive rehab hospitals and home health care. The report was issued in November of 1995. It confirmed that there was a great deal of overlap among the settings studied including between the long-term care hospital and other settings unquestionably subacute. Moreover, it confirmed that many of the services are "primarily driven by reimbursement," (Tr. 275), and not by which provides the best or most cost-effective health care for the very ill, elderly patient no longer in need of acute care. In other words, the financial pressure on hospitals to discharge patients from the acute care setting was what accounted for the tremendous growth of subacute services and the move toward more long-term care hospitals rather than what is actually best for the patient or the health care system. The study concluded that there is insufficient data to determine the cost effectiveness of subacute care as defined in the study. As for overlap in the various settings, the extent of overlap was not precisely determined. But just as long-term care hospitals provide ventilator treatment, skilled nursing units specialize in ventilator patients. Nursing home subacute units specialize in wound care, infectious disease programs and IV antibiotic therapy programs, as well, just as would Palm Beach Regional if approved. The HCFA study also confirmed that the cost of care and mortality rates at long-term care hospitals are high, $2,000 per day and 40 percent, respectively. The average cost per discharge at a long-term care facility was between $150,000 and $250,000. Despite the long-term hospital's recognition by the federal government, the presence in Florida for more than eight years, and separate CON regulation for the last several years, it remain unsettled which patients should be treated and cared for in long-term hospitals. While for some, such as Dr. Griffin and Dr. Williams, the question is one which discharge planners, after consultation with nursing and medical staff, ably make, it is not generally accepted that it is clear which patients should be cared for in long-term care hospitals. It is not generally accepted as evidenced by the wont of admission criteria for long-term hospitals. Furthermore, it is not clear whether long-term hospitals represent the best means or the most cost-effective way of treating patients ready for discharge from an acute care setting. Specialty Hospital of Jacksonville: the Model The Palm Beach Regional proposal to convert to a long- term care hospital is modeled after another Columbia long-term care hospital, Specialty Hospital of Jacksonville, the hospital of which Dr. Williams is the medical director. Opened in 1992, Specialty offers four major program areas: ventilator and other respiratory complications, infectious diseases, wound management and complex medical and rehabilitative services. The typical ventilator patient is quite ill; often with other attendant system breakdown such as cardiac or renal failure. The goal is to free the patient from ventilator dependence. If the patient is judged to be a lifetime custodial ventilator patient, the patient would not be appropriate for Specialty. A variety of infections are treated in the infectious disease program. Often the primary antibiotic treatment has failed and there may be other conditions attendant. The typical wound care patient admitted to Specialty has severe wounds that may derive from circulatory problems. Often admission is from a hospital or nursing home. The patient may be diabetic, paraplegic or quadriplegic. The patient may have experienced a surgical intervention which has not healed. Or the patient may have a distressed digestive system which inhibits the body's ability to absorb the proper nutrients to support the healing process. The typical complex medical and rehab patient includes the spinal cord injured patient and the multiple system failure patient. The patients at Specialty are under the management of an attending physician but typically four or five different specialties are involved in each patient's care. Specialty Hospital has experienced approximately five percent Medicaid and one percent charity care. A representative patient at Specialty Hospital has an average length of stay of 23 days. The representative patient in the infectious diseases program would experience an average length of 18, 20 days in the pulmonary program, 29 days in the ventilator program, 36 days in the wound program, 18 days in the physical medicine and rehabilitation program and 26 days in the medicine program. These lengths of stay resemble acute or Medicare certified skilled nursing bed lengths of stay more than the historical 90 day lengths of stay experienced in Florida at long- term care hospitals. A representative patient at Specialty Hospital will experience an average daily charge of $1,122 and an average charge per case of $25,810, the highest averages incurred by the ventilator program at $1,848 per day and $52,781 per case. From a medical standpoint, all of the patients treated at Specialty Hospital could be treated in an acute care hospital. There is one difference between Specialty's patient profile and the one expected at Palm Beach Regional. The approach proposed by the applicant will include patients with greater levels of instability. Whereas Specialty has taken the approach that patients at the intensive care level should be in a general acute care hospital, Palm Beach Regional expects to treat patients in need of services from an intensive care unit. Palm Beach Regional, therefore, has planned for an intensive care unit at the facility should its CON application be approved. Integrated's Existing Programs Sixty of Integrated 120 beds are dedicated to meet the needs of patients requiring subacute care. Although they may differ slightly in intensity of application because of slightly lower acuity levels of the patients, the programs offered in this sixty-bed skilled nursing unit encompass the four programs proposed for Palm Beach Regional's long-term care hospital: ventilator and respiratory complications; infectious disease; wound management; and complex medical and rehabilitation service program. Integrated uses its own method to measure the acuity of its patients. Within this method, two of the levels require active treatment of co-morbidities, multiple diseases which complicate the primary diagnoses. By whatever means acuity is measured, it is reasonable to expect that the average level of acuity would be somewhat higher among patients treated at a Palm Beach Regional long-term care facility. (Although without criteria to measure acuity for admission or to know for sure what patients are actually being treated at long-term hospitals, this is not certain.) Nonetheless, considering both diagnosis and treatment, Integrated's patients at Integrated's two highest levels of acuity, even if not at quite as high an acuity level on average, would be similar to the patients Palm Beach Regional might serve if its application were granted. Patients at a Palm Beach Regional's long-term care facility who would exceed the highest level of acuity of those patients at Integrated are patients appropriate for treatment in an acute care hospital. Ventilator Care at Integrated Ventilator patients are treated in skilled nursing facilities both in hospitals and in free-standing nursing homes like Integrated. Some skilled nursing units even specialize in ventilator care. There is clearly overlap between ventilator services in skilled nursing facilities and long-term care hospitals. The precise extent of the overlap is not clear. While the overlap may not be 100%, it is certainly significant. Twenty of Integrated's 60 subacute beds are capable of assisting ventilator patients. Within this 20 bed unit, Integrated provides oxygen, air, and wall suctioning just like in a hospital setting. Additionally, Integrated can provide respiratory services outside of its specific unit by using portable suction machines and oxygen concentrators. The ventilator patients treated at Integrated are similar to the ventilator patient treated in intensive care units in hospitals. Some of Integrated ventilator patients are in need of acute care. All are hemodynamically stable but some are medically unstable. Nonetheless, there are patients who would be too unstable to allow them to be suitable for admission into Integrated's respiratory unit. Patients who would need to remain in acute care in the hospital would be patients who, for example, were bleeding or having trouble with a post-surgical trach placement. The medical director at Integrated is a pulmonologist. Integrated has a 24-hour respiratory staff. The ventilator program at Integrated meets the description in the application of the proposed ventilator program at Palm Beach Regional. Comparison of the respiratory services offered at Integrated to the services proposed to be offered in Palm Beach Regional's ventilator program reveals significant overlap between the two. Integrated primarily uses a Bear 3 Ventilator. Other equipment used by Integrated includes pulse oximeters and pneumatic blood pressure cuffs to provide hemodynamic monitoring. The respiratory unit is able to obtain an assessment of the patient's arterial blood gases within two hours through an arrangement with a courier service and nearby JFK Hospital. On average the blood work results are received within an hour of the blood being drawn from the patient. An interdisciplinary team of therapists, including respiratory therapists, physical therapists, occupational therapists and speech therapists, work together on the plan of care and recovery of the ventilator patient including weaning the patient from the ventilator. Of those ventilator patients determined to be weanable, 75% are actually weaned from the machines. Ninety-two percent of the tracheotomy patients achieve decannulation. The average length of stay in the respiratory unit for Integrated's ventilator patients is 37 days, an average length of stay that meets that which defines the long-term care hospital patient, that is, in excess of 25 days. Infectious Disease Treatment at Integrated Just as long-term care hospitals, nursing homes offer infectious disease programs employing IV anti-biotic therapies. Integrated provides its patients with multiple antibiotic therapies. Among the IV anti-biotic therapies used at Integrated are cepo, fortaz and vancomycin. Integrated treats patients with pulmonary edema, pleural affusion, pulmonary embolus and pulmonary infarcts and patients with bi-lobar and multi-lobar pneumonia. Patients are treated with intravenous cortico steroids, intravenous bronchodilators, intraveous diuretics and intramuscular antimedics. Wound Care at Integrated Nursing homes offer wound management programs. There is significant overlap between patients treated for wounds at nursing homes and at long-term care hospitals. Limitations in care of the wound patient are similar as well. Just as a patient in need of surgical intervention for wound care, for example, would be discharged to an acute care hospital from a nursing home so would that patient be discharged to an acute care hospital from Specialty Hospital of Jacksonville, the model hospital for Palm Beach Regional's long-term care facility. Integrated offers wound and skin management treatment of the type described by Palm Beach Regional's proposal. Many of Integrated's patients recieve wound care upon admission. For instance, respiratory patients who have tracheotomies receive care for their wounds throughout the day. Integrated treats all levels of decubitous ulcers, including the most severe, Stage III and IV ulcers, as required by law in order to qualify for Medicare Certification. Complex Medical and Rehabilitative Care Integrated offers radiology and other imaging services on campus: mobile chest x-rays, normal x-rays, and video flouroscopy as well as an in-house staff of rehabilitation professionals: physical and registered occupational therapists and registered speech therapists. The rehabilitation programs proposed by Palm Beach Regional and those programs of other long-term care hospitals overlap significantly with those programs already offered at Integrated. The difference between the complex medical and rehabilitative care offered at Integrated and that proposed for Palm Beach Regional lies in the expected acuity of the patients. One would reasonably expect the patients to be slightly higher in acuity at Palm Beach Regional if approved than as are presently at Integrated. Nonetheless, the patients at Integrated are similar to those Palm Beach Regional would care for, in that Integrated treats patients with co-morbidities, including combinations of congestive heart failure, post-open heart surgery, arteriosclerotic heart disease and renal failure. Integrated's Services in General On an average month, Integrated offered 7.28 hours per day of nursing and respiratory, physical and occupational therapy care per day to the patients within its subacute unit. Forty percent of Integrated's subacute nursing hours are provided by registered nurses, 20% by licensed practical nurses, and the remaining 40% by certified nurse aides. A sample of Integrated's admissions noted numerous patients admitted with cardiopulmonary vent and ventilator needs. Integrated also maintains a large number of orthopedic patients in need of complex rehabilitation. Integrated treats patients with congestive heart failures, patients recovering from recent open- heart surgery, patients requiring specialized wound care, patients with post-operative cranial head injuries, and patients requiring tube feedings, IVS, ventilator and tracheostomy care. Integrated offers the equipment that is listed in the application as equipment to be purchased by Palm Beach Regional if approved. Integrated accepts patients who are medically unstable. These include patients admitted to Integrated's cardiopulmonary unit, patients with recent tracheostomies, patients on ventilators, patients with hemodialysis and peritoneal dialysis who have co- morbidities. Palm Beach Regional's application lists diagnoses of patients to be treated through long-term care which it claims are not appropriate for skilled nursing facilities. The application alludes to various types of comprehensive therapies, care and resources available for these patients. Yet, despite the application's claim that care of these patients is not appropriate for the skilled nursing facility, present at Integrated for the benefit of patients with the same diagnoses are very nearly all, if not all, of these therapies, care and resources. These include: IV antibiotic therapy, IV drips, plasma pheresis, management of severe decubitus ulcers, tracheotomy care with hourly suction, treatment with chest tubes and PCA pumps, cardiac monitoring, dialysis and an on-site pharmacy. Moreover, Integrated's roster of consulting physicians credentialed at the facility included the range of specialists listed in Palm Beach Regional's application. Integrated's roster of physician ranges from family practitioners to practitioners specializing in internal medicine, dermatology, neurology, and infectious disease control, to orthopedic specialists, physiatrists and psychiatrists, nearly the "full gamut" of specialties in medicine. Adverse Impact There will be adverse impact on Integrated if Palm Beach Regional's proposal is approved. The impact occurs as the result of a combination of significant overlap of services offered by Integrated and proposed for Palm Beach Regional and the likely loss of admissions to Integrated's subacute unit generated by patients discharged from JFK Hospital. JFK Hospital and Palm Beach Regional are each approximately 2 miles from Integrated. Approximately 85% of Integrated's subacute admissions come from JFK. A good estimate of how many patients JFK refers to Integrated's subacute unit on an annual basis is 460. It is reasonable to assume that many of these patients would be referred to Palm Beach Regional by its sister Columbia Hospital, JFK, if the application were approved. If only two-thirds of these patients were lost to Palm Beach Regional, using a conservative figure for contribution margin of $100 per patient day, the loss to Integrated would be about $1 million in contribution margin per year. Furthermore, if the application is approved, Integrated will also have to either raise salaries to keep qualified staff for ancillary staff or risk losing them because Palm Beach Regional proposes to offer ancillary staff salaries higher than those paid by Integrated. Certificate of Need Criteria The criteria to be used in evaluating the application are found in statutes, and in rules of the agency which implement these statutes. Section 408.035(1)Health Plans Neither the District 9 Treasure Coast Health Plan nor the State Health Plan contain any mention of long-term acute care beds. Both plans were written before there were any CON requirements for this type of bed. (b) Availability, Quality of Care, Efficiency,Appropriateness, Accessibility, Extent of Utilization and Adequacy of Like and Existing Services There is no agency rule regarding need determination for long-term acute care beds. Neither is long-term hospital care defined by agency rule as a referral service, one dependent upon other hospitals to refer patients. The service area for a referral hospital is larger than just one district. Patients are referred from districts 9 and 11 to the long-term care hospitals in District 10. This is certainly not surprising for patients in district 9 since there is no long- term hospital in the district and referrals are the common way for long-term hospitals to gain patients. Patients are referred from Districts 3, 5, 6 and 8 to the long-term care facility in Tampa. With the exception of the long-term care hospital in District 11 where the largest proportion of patients came from within the District 11, all of the long-term hospitals in the state, "had referrals from all over the place." (Tr. 288.) Palm Beach Regional itself proposes to serve patients from Districts 7 and 10. The reality is that long-term care hospitals are primarily referral hospitals. Nonetheless, since there is no agency rule defining long-term care hospitals as referral hospitals and since there is no agency rule defining the service area of a long-term care hospital, District 9 may be the appropriate service area for the health planning purposes of Palm Beach Regional's application. In order for the district to be the appropriate service area, however, the application must demonstrate that there is a need for a certain number of beds based on the data collected from District 9. Since there is no need methodology applicable to long- term care acute beds, Palm Beach Regional developed three different methodologies for the agency's consideration. The agency found the "components," (Tr. 910,) of the methodologies to be reasonable. Indeed, the agency never offered any other need methodology which it claimed was superior to those offered by the agency. Instead the agency criticizes the methodologies for failing to take into consideration the availability of like and existing services and alternative to the proposed services. Patients who will be served in the proposed facility are currently being served in either the short-term acute hospitals or skilled nursing facilities in nursing homes such as Integrated, both of which are less costly alternatives to this proposal. Palm Beach Regional anticipates referrals from other Columbia Hospitals in the districts; however, six of the eight Columbia Hospitals have skilled nursing units which propose to treat the same patients and conditions the applicant proposes to treat. Furthermore, at the time of hearing, five Columbia hospitals in the districts had 56 approved skilled nursing beds not then operational. Included among the 56 were the 12 skilled nursing unit beds transferred from Palm Beach Regional. Palm Beach Regional's presents arguments in favor of improved quality of care to the patient in need of care following stabilization of an acute episode. There is, however, no data to support a conclusion that outcomes are better in long-term care hospitals. As for the applicant’s ability and record to provide quality of care, there is little doubt. The testimony of Dr. Ron Luke as to the high quality of care to be provided by Palm Beach Regional was not challenged. The patients proposed to be served by the applicant are currently being served in hospitals, subacute units at nursing homes or hospitals, or in rehabilitation facilities. Some may even be in home health with high technology equipment. Transferring these patients to a long-term care facility has significant financial implications costly to the health care system. The 60 beds proposed in the application will, in all likelihood, be adequately utilized. In the case of long-term care hospitals, demand follows the supply because of the strong financial incentive to fill the beds. There is nothing to indicate, however, that acute care beds are not an alternative to long-term hospital beds. There are plenty of empty beds in acute care hospitals to be filled by patients who would be treated by the applicant. That these patients proposed to be treated by Palm Beach Regional might receive treatment, if the application is denied, in hospital-based skilled beds or, perhaps inappropriately at times, in nursing home skilled nursing units is not due to lack of alternatives. Rather, it is the product of financial pressure on the acute care hospitals to discharge patients from the acute setting. Effective utilization of at least 85 percent of cost- based services such as long-term services is an important consideration because fixed costs can be spread over more patient days, thereby decreasing the costs per patient day. The average utilization rate in Florida for long-term care beds is 66 percent. The most recent occupancy rate for Specialty Hospital is only 41 percent. The record of long-term care hospitals would indicate that the utilization projections by Palm Beach Regional are unreasonable. But, there was nothing established that indicated the three methodologies used by Dr. Luke were unreasonable in any way. Given that Palm Beach Regional will be able to draw patients from its sister Columbia acute care hospitals, all of whom will be anxious to provide patients to this long-term hospital, and given that long-term hospital care is a kind of care for which demand follows the supply, it is likely that utilization at Palm Beach Regional, if approved, will be strong. Despite the record of other long-term care hospitals, Palm Beach Regional’s utilization projections are reasonable. Need for Research and Educational Facilities There are no plans to provide research or education at this facility. Availability of Manpower, Management Personnel and Funds for Capital and Operating Expenditures The State Agency Action Report shows that the agency believes that there will be adequate levels of staffing available. The adequacy of the staffing levels was confirmed by the administrator of Specialty Hospital of Jacksonville. Palm Beach Regional will be able to adequately staff the hospital at the salary levels proposed in the application. Long-term acute care hospitals treat the very old. Since almost all of these people have Medicare coverage, economic access is not a problem for the individuals the applicant proposes to serve. The applicant has a 1% indigent commitment and a 5% projected Medicaid utilization. Geographic access is also served well by this facility. The facility is located where the population base of the elderly population is in District 9. Financial Feasibility The immediate financial feasibility of Palm Beach Regional is evident from its ability to open and operate for the first two years with a positive cash flow with a financing letter in the amount of $407,000 from Columbia. Palm Beach Regional, in its pro formas and the analysis underlying its pro formas concluded that it would be under the prospective payment system for six months before it could transer to a facility exempt from the prospective payment system. This conclusion is reasonable. Palm Beach Regional has two months to get the necessary certification changed prior to the end of its fiscal year. Palm Beach Regional will be able to institute the necessary six month evaluation, within CON constraints, when it chooses. Furthermore, Palm Beach Regional could change the end of its fiscal year so that the six-month time period could be accommodated. Finally, short-term financial feasibility was demonstrated by the pro forma which properly shows reimbursement levels for patients who were treated in the first six months, and who were discharged after the first six months. Under Medicare regulations, the hospital would be reimbursed on a cost basis for these patients. Palm Beach Regional projected an occupancy level of 85% in the first year of operation and 87% in the second year of operation. Neither Specialty Hospital of Jacksonville, the model for Palm Beach Regional, nor the other long-term care hospitals in Florida have occupancy levels that high. Comparison, however, is not valid. The long-term care hospitals that converted from acute care facilities converted their entire complement of beds which resulted in overbedding. In contrast, Palm Beach Regional seeks to convert only 60 of its 200 beds. The situation of Specialty is very different. It is a converted 105 bed facility which was in bankruptcy when it first started, limiting its ability to attract patients. Within its district, Specialty competes with Vencor of North Florida, a 60 bed facility. Not only does Palm Beach Regional not have any in-district competition, but it will benefit greatly from being a member of the Columbia system. Palm Beach Regional's application demonstrates financial feasibility, both immediate and long-term. Special Needs and Circumstances of HMOs Whether the facility provides an additional level in the continuum of care available to HMO patients is uncertain. It is not generally accepted that the level of care Palm Beach Regional argues it will provide, that is, a level between acute care and subacute care, even exists let alone whether such a level of care is necessary, cost-effective or the best means of treating patients. Needs and Circumstances of Entities Providing Substantial Portion of Services to Individuals Residing Outside the District There are no facilities in the district which provide a substantial portion of its service to individuals residing outside the district. Probable Impact on Costs of Providing Health Services Total property costs for Palm Beach Regional amount to $3.572 million per year, or approximately $250,000 per month. This includes depreciation, interest, insurance and all other property costs. Because Palm Beach Regional would enjoy cost- reimbursement from Medicare instead of being paid on the basis of the prospective payment system, Medicare would pay as much as $190 per patient day for simple property costs and not for patient care, if Palm Beach Regional's utilization projections prove true. Were Palm Beach Regional's utilization projections to turn out to be incorrect and Palm Beach Regional's occupancies were more in the range of other long-term care facilities, (50% the first year and 60% the second), the cost would be "into the $3-400 a day cost range for the cost of [the] ... property allocated per patient day, which would be picked up in their entirety or close to their entirety [by Medicare.]" (Tr. 782.) Either way, the high property costs of Palm Beach Regional would result, should the application be approved, in shifting a huge financial burden to Medicare. The result would be to "wind up costing the Federal government, the Medicare program, multiples of what it now cost[s] ... to treat those same patients in acute care hospitals." (Tr. 792). The Applicant's Past and Proposed Provision of Services to Medicaid and the Medically Indigent Palm Beach Regional projected a 5% Medicaid utilization but its commitment is to indigent care only and that being a mere 1%. The commitment to indigent care (as opposed to the projection for Medicaid care) is meager. Furthermore, Palm Beach Regional has little established pattern accepting patients in these payor classes. Given the savings to Columbia acute care hospitals which would feed patients to Palm Beach Regional, and ultimately, the profit to be enjoyed by the applicant, a commitment of 1% is lacking. That recognized, it must be said that the modesty of the commitment is consistent with the advantage Medicare's cost- reimbursement system provides long-term care hospitals. It is not to be expected that there will be many Medicaid or indigent patients utilizing long-term care hospitals. "The vast majority of the population utilizing the facility will be the elderly, virtually all of whom are covered by Medicare." (Palm Beach Regional's Proposed Recommended Order, p. 23, Tr. 339.) Still, a greater commitment, more along the lines of the commitment provided by St. Petersburg Health Care Management, Inc., with which Palm Beach Regional has drawn comparison, (See Findings of Fact, 123- 128, below,) would lend this criterion to favor the application rather than disfavor it. The Applicant's Past and Proposed Provision of Services Which Promotes a Continuum of Care There is no long-term hospital available in District 9. But whether that means Palm Beach Regional is adding a level to the continuum of care available for patients in the district is uncertain. There is no data to support the conclusion that long- term care hospitals provide a level of care between that of acute and subacute. Despite the earnestness with which Dr. Griffin and Dr. Williams hold their opinions to the contrary, their opinions are simply not yet accepted widely enough at this point to support such a conclusion. That Less Costly, More Efficient, or More Appropriate Alternatives to Such Inpatient Services are not Available Long-term care hospitals have existed for years by Act of Congress. "[W]hile there has been an active discussion of alternatives, so far they have not come up with one which has been moved into rule or legislation." (Tr. 421). Certainly keeping long-term care hospital patients covered by Medicare in acute care hospitals would be a less costly alternative. Whether caring for these patients in one facility or another is more cost-efficient, however, is unknown. At bottom, there is no determinative data on the issue of cost-efficiency. As for more appropriate alternatives, there is a group of long-term care hospital patients for whom it is less appropriate to be in a free-standing skilled nursing unit. But, the size of this group is uncertain. Certainly, from the point of view of care to the patient, it is at least equally appropriate for all long- term care patients to remain in acute care hospitals rather than be discharged to long-term care. Alternatives to New Construction As the result of renovations, the facility requires little capital to convert it to a 60 bed long-term care hospital. The capital outlay of $500,000 is an indication of how little actual construction is necessary to complete the project. Problems in Obtaining the Proposed Inpatient Care in the Absence of the Proposed New Service With the exception of inappropriately premature discharges of patients from the acute care hospital's acute care setting, there are beds available for appropriate care in the absence of approval of the application. There is an abundance of beds in acute care hospitals available to patients who might otherwise be discharged to the long-term care hospital. As for the patient for whom discharge from the acute care setting is appropriate who might be admitted to a long-term care hospital, there are available for inpatient care skilled nursing beds in one type of facility or another. Administrative Due Process Palm Beach Regional contends that it has been treated differently by the agency, without reasonable explanation, from St. Petersburg Health Care Management, Inc., a successful applicant for the conversion of a general acute care hospital to a long-term care hospital in another district. Initially approved by the agency, the "St. Petersburg" application, CON 8213, was not subjected to the scrutiny of a formal administrative hearing at the Division of Administrative Hearings. Nonetheless, in support of its claim of unfair treatment, portions of the St. Petersburg application and omissions response for Certificate of Need number 8213 were introduced into evidence by petitioner as well as the State Agency Action Report. There are similarities between the two applications. For example, both proposed conversion of underutilized facilities to long-term acute care beds, as well as reduction of the hospitals' complements of 200 acute care beds to 60 long-term care beds. But there are differences as well. The St. Petersburg commitment to indigent and Medicaid care is 500% of the commitment by Palm Beach Regional. St. Petersburg's commitment is a combined 5%: 2% to indigent and 3% to Medicaid. In contrast, Palm Beach Regional's commitment is 1%, to indigent care only. Palm Beach Regional stated in its application that "[p]atients classified as Medicaid payers are projected to equal 5.0% of total patient days in 1999, 2000, and 2001." Petitioner's Ex. No. 1, p. 79. As reasonable as this projection may be, it is just that: a projection, nothing more and a projection is a far cry from a commitment. There is another difference between the two applications. While the facilities from which Palm Beach Regional's application received letters of support were limited to Columbia's affiliated facilities, St. Petersburg received letters of support from three disproportionate share providers as well as numerous unaffiliated hospitals and nursing homes in the Pinellas and Pasco County areas. The difference is critical to an understanding of the likelihood that the facility will, in fact, meet its commitment to the historically underserved. As Ms. Elizabeth Dudek, Chief of the Certificate of Need and Budget Review Office at the Agency for Health Care Administration testified, "You have, in the case of having the support of all the disproportionate share providers ... more of an assurance that the historically underserved, the Medicaid and the indigent patients, will be served and get access to the service." (Tr. 902). Such an assurance is omitted unfortunately from Palm Regional’s application.
Recommendation ACCORDINGLY, it is recommended that the application of Palm Beach Regional to establish a long-term acute care hospital by delicensing 128 beds and converting 60 acute care beds to 60 long- term acute care beds be denied.DONE AND ORDERED this 24th day of March, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. DAVID MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 COPIES FURNISHED: Eric Tilton, Esquire Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of March, 1997. Gustafson, Tilton & Henning, P.A. 204 South Monroe Street, Suite 200 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Lesley Mendelson, Senior Attorney Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox, Building III Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Thomas F. Panza, Esquire Seann M. Frazier, Esquire Panza, Maurer, Maynard & Neel, P.A. 3600 North Federal Highway Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33308 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox, Building III Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Jerome W. Hoffman, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox, Building III Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403
The Issue Whether Certificate of Need (CON) Application No. 9992, filed by Sun City Hospital, Inc., d/b/a South Bay Hospital to establish a 112-bed replacement hospital in Riverview, Hillsborough County, Florida, satisfies, on balance, the applicable statutory and rule review criteria for approval.
Findings Of Fact The Parties A. South Bay South Bay is a 112-bed general acute care hospital located at 4016 Sun City Center Boulevard, Sun City Center, Florida. It has served south Hillsborough County from that location since its original construction in 1982. South Bay is a wholly-owned for-profit subsidiary of Hospital Corporation of America, Inc. (HCA), a for-profit corporation. South Bay's service area includes the immediate vicinity of Sun City Center, the communities of Ruskin and Wimauma (to the west and east of Sun City Center, respectively), and the communities of Riverview, Gibsonton, and Apollo Beach to the north. See FOF 68-72. South Bay is located on the western edge of Sun City Center. The Sun City Center area is comprised of the age- restricted communities of Sun City Center, Kings Point, Freedom Plaza, and numerous nearby senior living complexes, assisted- living facilities, and nursing homes. This area geographically comprises the developed area along the north side of State Road (SR) 674 between I–75 and U.S. Highway 301, north to 19th Avenue and south to the Little Manatee River. South Bay predominantly serves the residents of the Sun City Center area. In 2009, Sun City Center residents comprised approximately 57% of all discharges from SB. South Bay had approximately 72% market share in Sun City Center zip code 33573. (Approximately 32% of all market service area discharges came from zip code 33573.) South Bay provides educational programs at the hospital that are well–attended by community residents. South Bay provides comprehensive acute care services typical of a small to mid-sized community hospital, including emergency services, surgery, diagnostic imaging, non-invasive cardiology services, and endoscopy. It does not provide diagnostic or therapeutic cardiac catheterization or open-heart surgery. Patients requiring interventional cardiology services or open-heart surgery are taken directly by Hillsborough County Fire Rescue or other transport to a hospital providing those services, such as Brandon Regional Hospital (Brandon) or SJH, or are transferred from SB to one of those hospitals. South Bay has received a number of specialty accreditations, which include accreditation by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), specialty accreditation as an advanced primary stroke center, and specialty accreditation by the Society for Chest Pain. South Bay has also received recognition for its quality of care and, in particular, for surgical infection prevention and outstanding services relating to heart attack, heart failure, and pneumonia. South Bay's 112 licensed beds comprise 104 general medical-surgical beds and eight Intensive Care Unit (ICU) beds. Of the general medical-surgical beds, 64 are in semi-private rooms, where two patient beds are situated side-by-side, separated by a curtain. Forty-eight are in private rooms. Semi- private rooms present challenges in terms of infection control and patient privacy, and are no longer the standard of care in hospital design and construction. Over the years, SB has upgraded its hospital physical plant to accommodate new medical technology, including an MRI suite and state-of-the-art telemetry equipment. South Bay is implementing automated dispensing cabinets on patient floors for storage of medications and an electronic medication administration record system that provides an extra safety measure for dispensing medications. Since 2009, SB has implemented numerous programmatic initiatives that have improved the quality of care. South Bay is converting one wing of the hospital to an orthopedic unit. In 2001, South Bay completed a major expansion of its ED and support spaces, but has not added new beds. Patients presenting to the ED have received high quality of care and timely care. Since 2009, SB has improved its systems of care and triage of patients in the ED to improve patient flow and reduce ED wait times. Overall, South Bay has a reputation of providing high- quality care in a timely manner, notwithstanding problems with its physical plant and location. South Bay's utilization has been high historically. From 2006 to 2009, SB's average occupancy has been 79.5%, 80.3%, 77.2%, and 77.7%, respectively. Its number of patient discharges also increased in that time, from 6,190 in 2006 to 6,540 in 2009, at an average annual rate increase of 1.9%. (From late November until May, the seasonal months, utilization is very high, sometimes at 100% or greater.) Despite its relatively high utilization, SB has also had marginal financial results historically. It lost money in 2005 and 2007, with operating losses of $644,259 in 2005 and $1,151,496 in 2007 and bottom-line net losses of $447,957 (2005) and $698,305 (2007). The hospital had a significantly better year in 2009, with an operating gain of $3,365,113 and a bottom- line net profit of $2,144,292. However, this was achieved largely due to a reduction in bad debt from $11,927,320 in 2008 to $7,772,889 in 2009, an event the hospital does not expect to repeat, and a coincidence of high surgical volume. Its 2010 financial results were lagging behind those of 2009 at the time of the hearing. South Bay's 2009 results amount to an aberration, and it is likely that 2010 would be considerably less profitable. South Bay's marginal financial performance is due, in part, to its disproportionate share of Medicare patients and a disproportionate percentage of Medicare reimbursement in its payor mix. Medicare reimburses hospitals at a significantly lower rate than managed care payors. As noted, SB is organizationally a part of HCA's West Florida Division, and is one of two HCA-affiliated hospitals in Hillsborough County; Brandon is the other. (There are approximately 16 hospitals in this division.) Brandon has been able to add beds over the past several years, and its services include interventional cardiology and open-heart surgery. However, SB and Brandon combined still have fewer licensed beds than either St. Joseph's Hospital or Tampa General Hospital, and fewer than the BayCare Health System- affiliated hospitals in Hillsborough in total. South Bay's existing physical plant is undersized and outdated. See discussion below. Whether it has a meaningful opportunity for expansion and renovation at its 17.5-acre site is a question for this proceeding to resolve. South Bay proposes the replacement and relocation of its facility to the community of Riverview. In 2005, SB planned to establish an 80-bed satellite hospital in Riverview, on a parcel owned by HCA and located on the north side of Big Bend Road between I-75 and U.S. Highway 301. SB filed CON Application No. 9834 in the February 2005 batching cycle. The application was preliminarily denied by AHCA, and SB initially contested AHCA's determination. South Bay pursued the satellite hospital CON at that time because of limited availability of intercompany financing from HCA. By the time of the August 2007 batching cycle, intercompany financing had improved, allowing SB to pursue the bigger project of replacing and relocating the hospital. South Bay dismissed its petition for formal administrative hearing, allowing AHCA's preliminary denial of CON Application No. 9834 to become final, and filed CON Application No. 9992 to establish a replacement hospital facility on Big Bend Road in Riverview. St. Joseph's Hospital St. Joseph's Hospital was founded by the Franciscan Sisters of Allegany, New York, as a small hospital in a converted house in downtown Tampa in 1934. In 1967, SJH opened its existing main hospital facility on Martin Luther King Avenue in Tampa, Florida. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., a not-for-profit entity, is the licensee of St. Joseph's Hospital, an acute care hospital located at 3001 West Martin Luther King, Jr., Boulevard, Tampa, Florida. As a not-for-profit organization, SJH's mission is to improve the health care of the community by providing high- quality compassionate care. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., is a Medicaid disproportionate share provider and provided $145 million in charity and uncompensated care in 2009. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., is licensed to operate approximately 883 beds, including acute care beds; Level II and Level III neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) beds; and adult and child-adolescent psychiatric beds. The majority of beds are semi-private. Services include Level II and pediatric trauma services, angioplasty, and open-heart surgery. These beds and services are distributed among SJH's main campus; St. Joseph's Women's Hospital; St. Joseph's Hospital North, a newer satellite hospital in north Tampa; and St. Joseph's Children's Hospital. Except for St. Joseph's Hospital North, these facilities are land-locked. Nevertheless, SJH has continued to invest in its physical plant and to upgrade its medical technology and equipment. In February 2010, SJH opened St. Joseph's Hospital North, a state-of-the-art, 76-bed satellite hospital in Lutz, north Hillsborough County, at a cost of approximately $225 million. This facility is approximately 14 miles away from the main campus. This followed the award of CON No. 9610 to SJH for the establishment of St. Joseph's Hospital North, which was unsuccessfully opposed by University Community Hospital and Tampa General Hospital, two existing hospital providers in Tampa. Univ. Cmty. Hosp., Inc., d/b/a Univ. Cmty. Hosp. v. Agency for Health Care Admin., Case Nos. 03-0337CON and 03-0338CON. St. Joseph's Hospital North operates under the same license and under common management. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., is also the holder of CON No. 9833 for the establishment of a 90-bed state-of-the-art satellite hospital on Big Bend Road, Riverview, Hillsborough County. These all private beds include general medical-surgical beds, an ICU, and a 10-bed obstetrical unit. On October 21, 2009, the Agency revised CON No. 9833 with a termination date of October 21, 2012. This project was unsuccessfully opposed by TG, SB, and Brandon. St. Joseph's Hosp., Inc. v. Agency for Health Care Admin., Case No. 05-2754CON, supra. St. Joseph's Hospital anticipates construction beginning in October 2012 and opening the satellite hospital, to be known as St. Joseph's Hospital South, in early 2015. This hospital will be operating under SJH's existing license and Medicare and Medicaid provider numbers and will in all respects be an integral component of SJH. The implementation of St. Joseph's Hospital South is underway. SJH has contracted with consultants, engineers, architects, and contractors and has funded the first phase of the project with $6 million, a portion of which has been spent. The application for CON No. 9833 refers to "evidence- based design" and the construction of a state-of-the-art facility. (The design of St. Joseph's Hospital North also uses "evidence-based design.") St. Joseph's Hospital South will have all private rooms, general surgery operating rooms as well as endoscopy, and a 10-bed obstetrics unit. Although CON No. 9833 is for a project involving 228,810 square feet of new construction, SJH intends to build a much larger facility, approximately 400,000 square feet on approximately 70 acres. St. Joseph's Hospital Main's physical plant is 43 years old. The majority of the patient rooms are semi–private and about 35% of patients admitted at this hospital received private rooms. Notwithstanding the age of its physical plant and its semi–private bed configuration, SJH has a reputation of providing high quality of care and is a strong competitor in its market. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., has two facility expansions currently in progress at its main location in Tampa: a new five-story building that will house SJH neonatal intensive care unit, obstetrical, and gynecology services; and a separate, two-story addition with 52 private patient rooms. Of the 52 private patient rooms, 26 will be dedicated to patients recovering from orthopedic surgery, and will be large enough to allow physical therapy to be done in the patient room itself. The other 26 rooms will be new medical-surgical ICU beds at the hospital. At the same time that SJH expands its main location, it is pursuing a strategic plan whereby the main location is the "hub" of its system, with community hospitals and health facilities located in outlying communities. As proposed in CON Application No. 9610, St. Joseph's Hospital North was to be 240,000 square feet in size. Following the award of CON No. 9610, SJH requested that AHCA modify the CON to provide for construction of a larger facility. In its modification request, SJH requested to establish a large, state- of-the-art facility with all private patient rooms, and the desirability of private patient rooms as a matter of infection control and patient preference. AHCA granted the modification. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., thereafter planned to construct St. Joseph's Hospital North to be four stories in height. The plan was opposed. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., offered to construct a three-story building, large enough horizontally to accommodate the CON square footage modification. The offer was accepted. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., markets St. Joseph's Hospital North as "The Hospital of the Future, Today." The hospital was constructed using "evidence-based design" to maximize operational efficiencies and enhance the healing process of its residents –- recognizing, among other things, the role of the patient's family and friends. The facility's patient care units are all state-of-the-art and include, for example, obstetrical suites in which a visiting family member can spend the night. A spacious, sunlit atrium and a "healing garden" are also provided. The hospital's dining facility is frequented by community residents. In addition, SJH owns a physician group practice under HealthPoint Medical Group, a subsidiary of St. Joseph's Health Care Center, Inc. The group practice has approximately 19 different office locations, including several within the service area for the proposed hospital. The group includes approximately 106 physicians. However, most of the office locations are in Tampa, and the group does not have an office in Riverview, although there are plans to expand locations to include the Big Bend Road site. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., anticipates having to establish a new medical staff for St. Joseph's Hospital South, and will build a medical office building at the site for the purpose of attracting physicians. It further anticipates that some number of physicians on SB's existing medical staff will apply for privileges at St. Joseph's Hospital South. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., is the market leader among Hillsborough County hospitals and is currently doing well financially, as it has historically. For 2010, St. Joseph's Hospital Main's operating income was approximately $78 million. Organizationally, SJH has a parent organization, St. Joseph's Health Care Center, Inc., and is one of eight hospitals in the greater Tampa Bay area affiliated with BayCare. On behalf of its member hospitals, BayCare arranges financing for capital projects, provides support for various administrative functions, and negotiates managed care contracts that cover its members as a group. St. Joseph's Hospital characterizes fees paid for BayCare services as an allocation of expenses rather than a management fee for its services. In 2009, SJH paid BayCare approximately $42 million for services. St. Joseph's Hospital is one of three BayCare affiliates in Hillsborough County. The other two are St. Joseph's Hospital North and South Florida Baptist Hospital, a community hospital in Plant City. St. Joseph's Hospital South would be the fourth BayCare hospital in the county. Tampa General The Hillsborough County Hospital Authority, a public body appointed by the county, operated Tampa General Hospital until 1997. In that year, TG was leased to Florida Health Sciences Center, Inc., a non-profit corporation and the current hospital licensee. Tampa General is a 1,018-bed acute care hospital located at 2 Columbia Drive, Davis Island, Tampa, Florida. In addition to trauma surgery services, TG provides tertiary services, such as angioplasty, open-heart surgery, and organ transplantation. Tampa General operates the only burn center in the area. A rehabilitation hospital is connected to the main hospital, but there are plans to relocate this facility. Tampa General owns a medical office building. Tampa General is JCAHO accredited and has received numerous honors. Tampa General provides high-quality of care. Approximately half of the beds at TG are private rooms. Tampa General's service area for non-tertiary services includes all of Hillsborough County. Tampa General is also the teaching hospital for the University of South Florida's College of Medicine. As a statutory teaching hospital, TG has 550 residents and funds over 300 postgraduate physicians in training. Tampa General is the predominant provider of services to Medicaid recipients and the medically indigent of Hillsborough County. It is considered the only safety-net hospital in Hillsborough County. (A safety net hospital provides a disproportionate amount of care to indigent and underinsured patients in comparison to other hospitals.) A high volume of indigent (Medicaid and charity) patients are discharged from TG. In 2009, the costs TG incurred treating indigent patients exceeded reimbursement by $56.5 million. Approximately 33% of Tampa General's patients are Medicare patients and 25% commercial. Tampa General has grown in the past 10 years. It added 31 licensed acute care beds in 2004 and 82 more since SB's application was filed in 2007. In addition, the Bayshore Pavilion, a $300-million project, was recently completed. The project enlarged TG's ED, and added a new cardiovascular unit, a new neurosciences and trauma center, a new OB-GYN floor, and a new gastrointestinal unit. Facility improvements are generally ongoing. Tampa General's capital budget for 2011 is approximately $100 million. In 2010, TG's operating margin was approximately $43 million and a small operating margin in 2011. AHCA AHCA is the state agency that administers the CON law. Jeff Gregg testified that during his tenure, AHCA has never preliminarily denied a replacement hospital CON application or required consideration of alternatives to a replacement hospital. Mr. Gregg opined that the lack of alternatives or options is a relevant consideration when reviewing a replacement hospital CON application. T 468. The Agency's State Agency Action Report (SAAR) provides reasons for preliminarily approving SB's CON application. During the hearing, Mr. Gregg testified, in part, that the primary reasons for preliminary approval were issues related to quality of care "because the facility represents itself as being unable to expand or adapt significantly to the rapidly changing world of acute care. This is consistent with what [he has] heard about other replacement hospitals." T 413. Mr. Gregg also noted that SB focused on improving access "[a]nd as the years go by, it is reasonable to expect that the population outside of Sun City Center, the immediate Sun City Center area, will steadily increase and improve access for more people, and that's particularly true because this application includes both a freestanding emergency department and a shuttle service for the people in the immediate area. And that was intended to address their concerns based upon the fact that they have had this facility very conveniently located for them in the past at a time when there was little development in the general south Hillsborough area. But the applicant wants to position itself for the expected growth in the future, and we think has made an excellent effort to accommodate the immediate interests of Sun City Center residents with their promises to do the emergency, freestanding emergency department and the shuttle service so that the people will continue to have very comfortable access to the hospital." T 413-14. Mr. Gregg reiterated "that the improvements in quality outweigh any concerns that [the Agency] should have about the replacement and relocation of this facility; that if this facility were to be forced to remain where it is, over time it would be reasonable to expect that quality would diminish." T 435. For AHCA, replacement hospital applications receive the same level of scrutiny as any other acute care hospital applications. T 439-40. South Bay's existing facility and site South Bay is located on the north side of SR 674, an east-west thoroughfare in south Hillsborough County. The area around the hospital is "built out" with predominantly residential development. Sun City Center, an age-restricted (55 and older) retirement community, is located directly across SR 674 from the hospital as well as on the north side of SR 674 to the east of the hospital. Other residential development is immediately to the west of the hospital on the north side of SR 674. See FOF 3-6. Sun City Center is flanked by two north-south arterial roadways, I-75 to the west and U.S. Highway 301 to the east, both of which intersect with SR 674. The community of Ruskin is situated generally around the intersection of SR 674 and U.S. 41, west of I-75. The community of Wimauma is situated along SR 674 just east of U.S. Highway 301. South Bay is located in a three-story building that is well–maintained and in relatively good repair. The facility is well laid out in terms of design as a community hospital. Patients and staff at SB are satisfied with the quality of care and scope of acute care services provided at the hospital. Notwithstanding current space limitations, and problems in the ICU, see FOF 77-82, patients receive a high quality of care. One of the stated reasons for replacement is with respect to SB's request to have all private patient rooms in order to be more competitive with St. Joseph's Hospital South. South Bay's inpatient rooms are located within the original construction. The hospital is approximately 115,800 square feet, or a little over 1,000 square feet per inpatient bed. By comparison, small to mid-sized community hospitals built today are commonly 2,400 square feet per inpatient bed on average. All of SB's patient care units are undersized by today's standards, with the exception of the ED. ICU patients, often not ambulatory, require a higher level of care than other hospital patients. The ICU at SB is not adequate to meet the level of care required by the ICU patient. SB's ICU comprises eight rooms with one bed apiece. Eight beds are not enough. As Dr. Ksaibati put it at hearing: "Right now we have eight and we are always short . . . double . . . the number of beds, that's at least [the] minimum [t]hat I expect we are going to have if we go to a new facility." T 198-99 (emphasis added). The shortage of beds is not the only problem. The size of SB's ICU rooms is too small. (Problems with the ICU have existed at least since 2006.) Inadequate size prohibits separate, adjoining bathrooms. For patients able to leave their beds, therefore, portable bathroom equipment in the ICU room is required. Inadequate size, the presence of furniture, and the presence of equipment in the ICU room creates serious quality of care issues. When an EKG is conducted, the nurse cannot be present in the room. Otherwise, there would be no space for the EKG equipment. It is difficult to intubate a patient and, at times, "extremely dangerous." T 170. A major concern is when a life-threatening problem occurs that requires emergency treatment at the ICU patient's bedside. For example, when a cardiac arrest "code" is called, furniture and the portable bathroom equipment must be removed before emergency cardiac staff and equipment necessary to restore the function of the patient's heart can reach the patient for the commencement of treatment. Comparison to ICU rooms at other facilities underscores the inadequate size of SB's ICU rooms. Many of the ICU rooms at Brandon are much larger -- more than twice the size of SB's ICU rooms. Support spaces are inadequate in most areas, resulting in corridors (at times) being used for inappropriate storage. In addition, the hospital's general storage is inadequate, resulting in movable equipment being stored in mechanical and electrical rooms. Of the medical-surgical beds at SB, 48 are private and 64 are semi-private. The current standard in hospital design is for acute care hospitals to have private rooms exclusively. Private patient rooms are superior to semi-private rooms for infection control and patient well-being in general. The patient is spared the disruption and occasional unpleasantness that accompanies sharing a patient room –- for example, another patient's persistent cough or inability to use the toilet (many of SB's semi-private rooms have bedside commodes). Private rooms are generally recognized as promoting quality of care. South Bay's site is approximately 17.5 acres, bordered on all sides by parcels not owned by either SB or by HCA- affiliated entities. The facility is set back from SR 674 by a visitor parking lot. Proceeding clockwise around the facility from the visitor parking lot, there is a small service road on the western edge of the site; two large, adjacent ponds for stormwater retention; the rear parking lot for ED visitors and patients; and another small service road which connects the east side of the site to SR 674, and which is used by ambulances to access the ED. Dedicated parking for SB's employees is absent. A medical office building (MOB), which is not owned by SB, is located to the north of the ED parking lot. The MOB houses SB's Human Resources Department as well as medical offices. Most of SB's specialty physicians have either full or part-time offices in close proximity to SB. Employee parking is not available in the MOB parking lot. Some of SB's employees park in a hospital-owned parking lot to the north of the MOB, and then walk around the MOB to enter the hospital. South Bay's CEO and management employees park on a strip of a gravel lot, which is rented from the Methodist church to the northeast of the hospital's site. In 2007, as part of the CON application to relocate, SB commissioned a site and facility assessment (SFA) of the hospital. The SFA was prepared for the purpose of supporting SB's replacement hospital application and has not been updated since its preparation in 2007. The architects or engineers who prepared the SFA were not asked to evaluate proposed options for expansion or upgrade of SB on-site. However, the SFA concludes that the SB site has been built out to its maximum capacity. On the other hand, the SFA concluded that the existing building systems at SB met codes and standards in force when constructed and are in adequate condition and have the capacity to meet the current needs of the hospital. The report also stated that if SB wanted to substantially expand its physical plant to accommodate future growth, upgrades to some of the existing building systems likely would be required. Notwithstanding these reports and relative costs, expansion of SB at its existing site is not realistic or cost- effective as compared to a replacement hospital. Vertical expansion is complicated by two factors. First, the hospital's original construction in 1982 was done under the former Southern Standard Building Code, which did not contain the "wind-loading" requirements of the present-day Florida Building Code. Any vertical expansion of SB would not only require the new construction to meet current wind-loading requirements, but would also require the original construction to be retrofitted to meet current wind-loading requirements (assuming this was even possible as a structural matter). Second, if vertical expansion were to meet current standards for hospital square footage, the new floor or floors would "overhang" the smaller existing construction, complicating utility connections from the lower floor as well as the placement of structural columns to support the additional load. The alternative (assuming feasibility due to current wind-loading requirements) would be to vertically stack patient care units identical to SB's existing patient care units, thereby perpetuating its undersized and outdated design. Vertical expansion at SB has not been proposed by the Gould Turner Group (Gould Turner), which did a Master Facility Plan for SB in May 2010, but included a new patient bed tower, or by HBE Corporation (HBE). Horizontal expansion of SB is no less complicated. The hospital would more than double in size to meet the modern-day standard of 2,400 square feet per bed, and its site is too small for such expansion. It is apparent that such expansion would displace the visitor parking lot if located to the south of the existing building, and likely have to extend into SR 674 itself. South Bay's architectural consultant expert witness substantiated that replacing SB is justified as an architectural matter, and that the facility cannot be brought up to present-day standards at its existing location. According to Mr. Siconolfi, the overall building at SB is approximately half of the total size that would normally be in place for a new hospital meeting modern codes and industry standards. The more modest expansions offered by Gould Turner and HBE are still problematic, if feasible at all. Moreover, with either proposal, SB would ultimately remain on its existing 17.5-acre site, with few opportunities to expand further. Gould Turner's study was requested by SB's CEO in May 2010, to determine whether and to what extent SB would be able to expand on-site. (Gould Turner was involved with SB's recent ED expansion project area.) The resulting Master Facility Plan essentially proposes building a new patient tower in SB's existing visitor parking lot, to the left and right of the existing main entrance to SB. This would require construction of a new visitor parking lot in whatever space remained in between the new construction and SR 674. The Master Facility Plan contains no discussion of the new impervious area that would be added to the site and the consequential requirement of additional stormwater capacity, assuming the site can even accommodate additional stormwater capacity. This study also included a new 12-bed ICU and the existing ICU would be renovated into private patient rooms. For example, "[t]he second floor would be all telemetry beds while the third floor would be a combination of medical/surgical, PCU, and telemetry beds." In Gould Turner's drawings, the construction itself would be to the left and to the right of the hospital's existing main entrance. Two scenarios are proposed: in the first, the hospital's existing semi-private rooms would become private rooms and, with the new construction, the hospital would have 114 licensed beds (including two new beds), all private; in the second, some of the hospital's existing semi-private rooms would become private rooms and, with the new construction, the hospital would have 146 licensed beds (adding 34 beds), of which 32 would be semi-private. South Bay did not consider Gould Turner's alternative further or request additional, more detailed drawings or analysis, and instead determined to pursue the replacement hospital project, in part, because it was better not to "piecemeal" the hospital together. Mr. Miller, who is responsible for strategic decisions regarding SB, was aware of, but did not review the Master Facility Plan and believes that it is not economically feasible to expand the hospital. St. Joseph's Hospital presented testimony of an architect representing the hospital design/build firm of HBE, to evaluate SB's current condition, to provide options for expansion and upgrading on-site, and to provide a professional cost estimate for the expansion. Mr. Oliver personally inspected SB's site and facility in October 2010 and reviewed numerous reports regarding the facility and other documents. Mr. Oliver performed an analysis of SB's existing physical plant and land surrounding the hospital. HBE's analysis concluded that SB has the option to expand and upgrade on-site, including the construction of a modern surgical suite, a modern 10-bed ICU, additional elevators, and expansion and upgrading of the ancillary support spaces identified by SB as less than ideal. HBE's proposal involves the addition of 50,000 square feet of space to the hospital through the construction of a three-story patient tower at the south side of the hospital. The additional square footage included in the HBE proposal would allow the hospital to convert to an all-private bed configuration with either 126 private beds by building out both second and third floors of a new patient tower, or to 126 private beds if the hospital chose to "shell in" the third floor for future expansion. Under the HBE proposal, SB would have the option to increase its licensed bed capacity 158 beds by completing the second and third floors of the new patient tower (all private rooms) while maintaining the mix of semi-private and private patient rooms in the existing bed tower. The HBE proposal also provides for a phased renovation of the interior of SB to allow for an expanded post-anesthesia care unit, expanded laboratory, pharmacy, endoscopy, women's center, prep/hold/recovery areas, central sterile supply and distribution, expanded dining, and a new covered lobby entrance to the left side of the hospital. Phasing of the expansion would permit the hospital to remain in operation during expansion and renovation with minimal disruption. During construction the north entrance of the hospital would provide access through the waiting rooms that are currently part of the 2001 renovated area of the hospital with direct access to the circulation patterns of the hospital. The HBE proposal also provides for the addition of parking to bring the number of parking spaces on-site to 400. The HBE proposal includes additional stormwater retention/detention areas that could serve as attractive water features and, similar to the earlier civil engineering reports obtained by SB, proposes the construction of a parking garage at the rear of the facility should additional parking be needed in the future. However, HBE essentially proposes the alternative already rejected by SB: construction of a new patient tower in front of the existing hospital. Similar to Gould Turner, HBE proposes new construction to the left and right of the hospital's existing lobby entrance and the other changes described above. HBE's proposal recognizes the need for additional stormwater retention: the stand of trees that sets off the existing visitor parking lot from SR 674 would be uprooted; in their place, a retention pond would be constructed. Approval of the Southwest Florida Water Management District (SWFWMD) would be required for the proposal to be feasible. Assuming the SWFWMD approved the proposal, the retention pond would have to be enclosed by a fence. This would then be the "face" of the hospital to the public on SR 674. HBE's proposal poses significant problems. The first floor of the three-story component would be flush against the exterior wall of the hospital's administrative offices, where the CEO and others currently have windows with a vista of the front parking lot and SR 674. Since the three-story component would be constructed first in the "phased" construction, and since the hospital's administration has no other place to work in the existing facility, the CEO and other management team would have to work off-site until the new administrative offices (to the left of the existing hospital lobby entrance) were constructed. The existing main entrance to the hospital, which faces SR 674, would be relocated to the west side of the hospital once construction was completed in its entirety. In the interim, patients and visitors would have to enter the facility from the rear, as the existing main entrance would be inaccessible. This would be for a period of months, if not longer. For the second and third floors, HBE's proposal poses two scenarios. Under the first, SB would build the 24 general medical-surgical beds on the tower's second floor, but leave the third floor as "shelled" space. This would leave SB with a total of 106 licensed beds, six fewer than it has at present. Further, since HBE's proposal involves a second ICU at SB, 18 of the 106 beds are ICU beds, leaving 88 general medical-surgical beds. By comparison, SB currently has 104 general medical- surgical beds, meaning that it loses 16 general medical-surgical beds under HBE's first scenario. In the second scenario, SB would build 24 general medical-surgical beds on the third floor as well, and would have a total of 126 licensed beds. Since 18 of those beds would be ICU beds, SB would have 108 general medical-surgical beds, or only four more than it has at present. Further, the proposal does not make SB appreciably bigger. The second and third floors in HBE's proposal are designed in "elongated" fashion such that several rooms may be obscured from the nursing station's line of sight by a new elevator, which is undesirable as a matter of patient safety and security. Further, construction of the second and third floors would be against the existing second and third floors above the lobby entrance's east side. This would require 12 existing private patient rooms to be taken out of service due to loss of their vista windows. At the same time, the new second and third floors would be parallel to, but set back from, existing semi- private patient rooms and their vista windows along the southeast side of the hospital. This means that patients and visitors in the existing semi-private patient rooms and patients and visitors in the new private patient rooms on the north side of the new construction may be looking into each other's rooms. HBE's proposal also involves reorganization and renovation of SB's existing facility, and the demolition and disruption that goes with it. To accommodate patient circulation within the existing facility from the ED (at the north side of the hospital) to the new patient tower (at the south side of the hospital), two new corridors are proposed to be routed through and displace the existing departments of Data Processing and Medical Records. Thus, until the new administrative office space would be constructed, Data Processing and Medical Records (along with the management team) would have to be relocated off-site. Once the new first floor of the three-story component is completed, the hospital's four ORs and six PACU beds will be relocated there. In the existing vacated surgical space, HBE proposes to relocate SB's existing cardiology unit, thus requiring the vacated surgical space to be completely reconfigured (building a nursing station and support spaces that do not currently exist in that location). In the space vacated by the existing cardiology unit, HBE proposed expanding the hospital's clinical laboratory, meaning extensive demolition and reconfiguration in that area. The pharmacy is proposed to be relocated to where the existing PACU is located, requiring the building of a new pharmacy with a secure area for controlled substances, cabinets for other medications, and the like. The vacated existing pharmacy is in turn proposed to be dedicated to general storage, which involves still more construction and demolition, tearing out the old pharmacy to make the space suitable for general storage. HBE's proposal is described as a "substantial upgrade" of SB, but it was stated that a substantial upgrade could likewise be achieved by replacing the facility outright. This is SB's preference, which is not unreasonable. There have been documented problems with other hospital expansions, including patient infection due to construction dust. South Bay's proposal South Bay proposes to establish a 112-bed replacement hospital on a 39-acre parcel (acquired in 2005) located in the Riverview community, on the north side of Big Bend Road between I-75 and U.S. Highway 301. The hospital is designed to include 32 observation beds built to acute care occupancy standards, to be available for conversion to licensed acute care beds should the need arise. The original total project cost of $215,641,934, calculated when the application was filed in October 2007 has been revised to $192,967,399. The decrease in total project cost is largely due to the decrease in construction costs since 2007. The parties stipulated that SB's estimated construction costs are reasonable. The remainder of the project budget is likewise reasonable. The budgeted number for land, $9,400,000, is more than SB needs: the 39-acre parcel is held in its behalf by HCA Services of Florida, Inc., and was acquired in March 2005 for $7,823,100. An environmental study has been done, and the site has no environmental development issues. The original site preparation budgeted number of $5 million has been increased to $7 million to allow for possible impact fees, based on HCA's experience with similar projects. Building costs, other than construction cost, flow from the construction cost number as a matter of percentages and are reasonable. The equipment costs are reasonable. Construction period interest as revised from the original project budget is approximately $4 million less, commensurate with the revised project cost. Other smaller numbers in the budget, such as contingencies and start-up costs, were calculated in the usual and accepted manner for estimated project costs and are reasonable. South Bay's proposed service area (PSA) comprises six zip codes (33573 (Sun City Center), 33570 (Ruskin), 33569 (Riverview), 33598 (Wimauma), 33572 (Apollo Beach), and 33534 (Gibsonton)) in South Hillsborough County. These six zip codes accounted for 92.2% of SB's discharges in 2006. The first three zip codes, which include Riverview (33569), accounted for 76.1% of the discharges. Following the filing of the application in 2007, the U.S. Postal Service subdivided the former zip code 33569 into three zip codes: 33569, 33578, and 33579. (The proposed service area consists of eight zip codes.) The same geographic area comprises the three Riverview zip codes taken together as the former zip code 33569. In 2009, the three Riverview zip codes combined accounted for approximately 504 to 511/514 of SB's discharges, with 589 discharges in 2006 from the zip code 33569. Of SB's total discharges in 2009, approximately 8 to 9% originated from these three zip codes. In 2009, approximately 7,398 out of 14,424 market/service-area discharges, or approximately 51% of the total market discharges came from the three southern zip codes, 33573 (Sun City Center), 33570 (Ruskin), and 33598 (Wimauma). Also, approximately 81% of SB's discharges in 2009 originated from the same three zip codes. (The discharge numbers for SB for 2009 presented by St. Joseph's Hospital and SB are similar. See SB Ex. 9 at 11 and SJH Ex. 4 at 8-9. See also TG Ex. 4 at 3-4.) In 2009, SB and Brandon had an approximate 68% market share for the eight zip codes. See FOF 152-54 and 162-65 for additional demographic data. St. Joseph's Hospital had an approximate 5% market share within the service area and using 2009-2010 data, TG had approximately 6% market share in zip code 33573 and an overall market share in the three Riverview zip codes of approximately 19% and a market share of approximately 23% in zip code 33579. South Bay's application projects 37,292 patient days in year 1; 39,581 patient days in year 2; and 41,563 patient days in year 3 for the proposed replacement hospital. The projection was based on the January 2007 population for the service area as reflected in the application, and what was then a projected population growth rate of 20.8% for the five-year period 2007 to 2012. These projections were updated for the purposes of hearing. See FOF 246-7. The application also noted a downturn in the housing market, which began in 2007 and has continued since then. The application projected a five-year (2007-2012) change of 20.8% for the original five zip codes. At hearing, SB introduced updated utilization projections for 2010-2015, which show the service area population growing at 15.3% for that five-year period. South Bay's revised utilization projections for 2015- 2017 (projected years 1-3 of the replacement hospital) are 28,168 patient days in year 1; 28,569 patient days in year 2; and 29,582 patient days in year 3. The lesser utilization as compared with SB's original projections is partly due to slowed population growth, but predominantly due to SB's assumption that St. Joseph's Hospital will build its proposed satellite hospital in Riverview, and that SB will accordingly lose 20% of its market share. The revised utilization projections are conservative, reasonable, and achievable. With the relocation, SB will be more proximate to the entirety of its service area, and will be toward the center of population growth in south Hillsborough County. In addition, it will have a more viable and more sustainable hospital operation even with the reduced market share. Its financial projections reflect a better payor mix and profitability in the proposed location despite the projection of fewer patient days. Conversely, if SB remains in Sun City Center, it is subject to material operating losses even if its lost market share in that location is the same 20%, as compared to the 30 to 40% it estimates that it would lose in competition with St. Joseph's Hospital South. South Bay's medical staff and employees support the replacement facility, notwithstanding that their satisfaction with SB is very high. The proposal is also supported by various business organizations, including the Riverview Chamber of Commerce and Ruskin Chamber of Commerce. However, many of the residents of Sun City Center who testified opposed relocation of SB. See FOF 210-11. South Bay will accept several preconditions on approval of its CON application: (1) the location of SB on Big Bend Road in Riverview; (2) combined Medicaid and charity care equal to 7.0% of gross revenues; and (3) operating a free- standing ED at the Sun City location and providing a shuttle service between the Sun City location and the new hospital campus ("for patients and visitors"). SB Ex. 46, Schedule C. In its SAAR, the Agency preliminarily approved the application including the following: This approval includes, as a component of the proposal: the operation of a freestanding emergency department on a 24-hour, seven-day per week basis at the current Sun City location, the provision of extended hours shuttle service between the existing Sun City Center and the new campuses to transport patients and visitors between the facilities to locations; and the offering of primary care and diagnostic testing at the Sun City Center location. These components are required services to be provided by the replacement hospital as approved by the Agency. Mr. Gregg explained that the requirement for transport of patients and visitors was included based on his understanding of the concerns of the Sun City Center community for emergency as well as routine access to hospital services. Notwithstanding the Agency statement that the foregoing elements are required, the Agency did not condition approval on the described elements. See SB Ex. 12 at 39 and 67. Instead, the Agency only required SB, as a condition of approval, to provide a minimum of 7.0% of the hospital's patient days to Medicaid and charity care patients. (As noted above, SB's proposed condition says 7.0% of gross revenues.) Because conditions on approval of the CON are generally subject to modification, there would be no legal mechanism for monitoring or enforcement of the aspects of the project not made a condition of approval. If the Agency approves SB's CON application, the Agency should condition any approval based on the conditions referenced above, which SB set forth in its CON application. SB Ex. 12 at 39 and 67. See also T 450 ("[The Agency] can take any statement made in the application and turn that into a condition," although conditions may be modified.1 St. Joseph's Hospital and Tampa General are critical of SB's offer of a freestanding ED and proposed shuttle transportation services. Other than agreeing to condition its CON application by offering these services, SB has not evaluated the manner in which these services would be offered. South Bay envisions that the shuttle service (provided without charge) would be more for visitors than it would be for patients and for outpatients or patients that are ambulatory and able to ride by shuttle. Other patients would be expected to be transported by EMS or other medical transport. As of the date of hearing, Hillsborough County does not have a protocol to address the transport of patients to a freestanding ED. South Bay contacted Hillsborough County Fire Rescue prior to filing its CON application and was advised that they would support SB's establishment of a satellite hospital on Big Bend Road, but did not support the closure and relocation of SB, even with a freestanding ED left behind. See FOF 195-207. At hearing, SB representatives stated that SB would not be closed if the project is denied. Compliance with applicable statutory and rule criteria Section 408.035(1): The need for the health care facilities and health services being proposed The need for SB itself and at its current location is not an issue in this case. That need was demonstrated years ago, when SB was initially approved. For the Agency, consideration of a replacement hospital application "diminishes the concept of need in [the Agency's] weighing and balancing of criteria in this case." There is no express language in the CON law, as amended, which indicates that CON review of a replacement hospital application does not require consideration of other statutory review criteria, including "need," unless otherwise stipulated. Replacement hospital applicants, like SB, may advocate the need for replacement rather than expansion or renovation of the existing hospital, but a showing of "need" is still required. Nevertheless, institution-specific factors may be relevant when "need" is considered. The determination of "need" for SB's relocation involves an analysis of whether the relocation of the hospital as proposed will enhance access or quality of care, and whether the relocation may result in changes in the health care delivery system that may adversely impact the community, as well as options SB may have for expansion or upgrading on-site. In this case, the overall "need" for the project is resolved, in part, by considering, in conjunction with weighing and balancing other statutory criteria, including quality of care, whether the institution-specific needs of SB to replace the existing hospital are more reasonable than other alternatives, including renovation and whether, if replacement is recommended, the residents of the service area, including the Sun City Center area, will retain reasonable access to general acute care hospital services. The overall need for the project has not been proven. See COL 360-70 for ultimate conclusions of law regarding the need for this project. Section 408.035(2): The availability, quality of care, accessibility, and extent of utilization of existing health care facilities and health services in the service district of the applicant The "service district" in this case is acute care subdistrict 6-1, Hillsborough County. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C-2.100. The acute care hospital services SB proposes to relocate to Big Bend Road are available to residents of SB's service area. Except as otherwise noted herein with respect to constraints at SB, there are no capacity constraints limiting access to acute care hospital services in the subdistrict. The availability of acute care services for residents of the service area, and specifically the Riverview area, will increase with the opening of St. Joseph's Hospital South. All existing providers serving the service area provide high quality of care. Within the service district as a whole, SB proposes to relocate the existing hospital approximately 5.7 linear miles north of its current location and approximately 7.7 miles using I-75, one exit north. South Bay would remain in south Hillsborough County, as well as the southernmost existing health care facility in Hillsborough County, along with St. Joseph's Hospital South when it is constructed. The eight zip codes of SB's proposed service area occupy a large area of south Hillsborough County south of Tampa (to the northwest) and Brandon (to the northeast). Included are the communities of Gibsonton, Riverview, Apollo Beach, Ruskin, Sun City Center, and Wimauma. The service area is still growing despite the housing downturn, with a forecast of 15.3% growth for the five-year period 2010 to 2015. The service area's population is projected to be 168,344 in 2015, increasing from 145,986 in 2010. The service area is currently served primarily by SB, which is the only existing provider in the service area, and Brandon. For non-tertiary, non-specialty discharges from the service area in 2009, SB had approximately 40% market share, including market share in the three Riverview zip codes of approximately 10% (33569), 6% (33578), and 16% (33579). Brandon had approximately 28% of the market in the service area, and a market share in the three Riverview zip codes of approximately 58% (33569), 46% (33578), and 40% (33579). Thus, SB and Brandon have approximately a 61% market share in the Riverview zip codes and approximately a 68% market share service area-wide. The persuasive evidence indicates that Riverview is the center of present and future population in the service area. It is the fastest-growing part of the service area overall and the fastest-growing part of the service area for patients age 65 and over. Of the projected 168,334 residents in 2015, the three Riverview zip codes account for 80,779 or nearly half the total population. With its proposed relocation to Riverview, SB will be situated in the most populous and fastest-growing part of south Hillsborough County. At the same time, it will be between seven and eight minutes farther away from Sun City Center. In conjunction with St. Joseph's Hospital South when constructed, SB's proposed relocation will enhance the availability and accessibility of existing health care facilities and health services in south Hillsborough County, especially for the Riverview-area residents. However, it is likely that access will be reduced for the elderly residents of the Sun City Center area needing general acute care hospital services. St. Joseph's Hospital and Tampa General contend that: (1) it would be problematic to locate two hospitals in close proximity in Riverview (those being St. Joseph's Hospital South and the relocated SB hospital) and (2) SB's relocation would deprive Sun City Center's elderly of reasonable access to hospital services. St. Joseph's Hospital seems to agree that the utilization projections for SB's replacement hospital are reasonable. Also, St. Joseph's Hospital expects St. Joseph's Hospital South to reach its utilization as projected in CON Application No. 9833, notwithstanding the decline in population growth and the proposed establishment of SB's proposed replacement hospital, although the achievement of projected utilization may be extended. There are examples of Florida hospitals operating successfully in close proximity. The evidence at hearing included examples where existing unaffiliated acute care hospitals in Florida operate within three miles of each another; in two of those, the two hospitals are less than one-half mile apart. These hospitals have been in operation for years. However, some or all of the examples preceded CON review. There are also demographic differences and other unique factors in the service areas in the five examples that could explain the close proximity of the hospitals. Also, in three of the five examples, at least one of the hospitals had an operating loss and most appeared underutilized. One such example, however, is pertinent in this case: Tallahassee Memorial Hospital and Capital Regional Medical Center (CRMC) in Tallahassee, which are approximately six minutes apart by car. CRMC was formerly Tallahassee Community Hospital (TCH), a struggling, older facility with a majority of semi-private patient rooms, similar to South Bay. Sharon Roush, SB's current CEO, became CEO at TCH in 1999. As she explained at hearing, HCA was able to successfully replace the facility outright on the same parcel of land. TCH was renamed CRMC and re-opened as a state-of-the-art hospital facility with all private rooms. The transformation improved the hospital's quality of care and its attractiveness to patients, better enabling it to compete with Tallahassee Memorial Hospital. St. Joseph's Hospital and Tampa General also contend that SB's relocation would deprive Sun City Center's elderly of reasonable access to hospital services. When the application was filed in 2007, Sun City Center residents in zip code 33573 accounted for approximately 52% of all acute care discharges to SB and SB had a 69% market share. By 2009, Sun City Center residents accounted for approximately 57% of all SB discharges and SB had approximately 72% market share. Approximately half of the age 65-plus residents in the service area reside within the Sun City Center area. This was true in 2010 and will continue to be true in 2015. The projected percentage of the total population in the Sun City Center zip code over 65 for 2009-2010 is approximately 87%. This percentage is expected to grow to approximately 91% by 2015. Sun City Center also has a high percentage of residents who are over the age of 75. Demand for acute care hospital services is largely driven by the age of the population. The age 65-plus population utilizes acute-care hospital services at a rate that is approximately two to three times that of the age 64 and younger population. South Bay plans to relocate its hospital from the Sun City Center zip code 33573 much closer to an area (Riverview covering three zip codes) that has a less elderly population. Elderly patients are known to have more transportation difficulties than other segments of the population, particularly with respect to night driving and congested traffic in busy areas. Appropriate transportation services for individuals who are transportation disadvantaged typically require door-to- door pickup, but may vary from community to community. At the time of preliminary approval of SB's proposed relocation, the Agency was not provided and did not take into consideration data reflecting the percentage of persons in Sun City Center area who are aged 65 or older or aged 75 and older. The Agency was not provided data reflecting the number of residents within the Sun City Center area who reside in nursing homes or assisted living facilities. In general, the 2010 median household incomes and median home values for the residents of Sun City Center, Ruskin, and Gibsonton are materially less than the income and home values for the residents from the other service areas. Freedom Village is located near Sun City Center and within walking distance to SB. Freedom Village is comprises a nursing home, assisted living, and senior independent living facilities, and includes approximately 120 skilled nursing facility beds, 90 assisted living beds, and 30 Alzheimer's beds. Freedom Village is home to approximately 1,500 people. There are additional skilled nursing and assisted living facilities within one to two miles of SB comprising approximately an additional 400 to 500 skilled nursing facility beds and approximately 1,500 to 2,000 residents in assistant or independent living facilities. Residents in skilled nursing facilities and assisted living facilities generally require a substantial level of acute- care services on an ongoing basis. Many patients 65 and older requiring admission to an acute-care facility have complex medical conditions and co-morbidities such that immediate access to inpatient acute care services is of prime importance. Area patients and caregivers travel to SB via a golf cart to access outpatient health care services and to obtain post-discharge follow-up care. Although there are some crossing points along SR 674, golf carts are not allowed on SR 674 itself, and the majority of Sun City Center residents who utilize SB in its existing location do not arrive by golf cart -– rather, they travel by automobile. The Sun City Center area has a long–established culture of volunteerism. Residents of Sun City Center provide a substantial number of man-hours of volunteer services to community organizations, including SB. Among the many services provided by community volunteers is the Sun City Center Emergency Squad, an emergency medical transport service that operates three ambulances and provides EMT and basic life support transport services in Sun City Center 24-hours a day, seven days a week. The Emergency Squad provides emergency services free of charge, but charges patients for transport which is deemed a non-emergency. Most patients transported by the Emergency Squad are taken to the SB ED. It is customary for specialists to locate their offices adjacent to an acute-care hospital. Most of the specialty physicians on the medical staff of SB have full-time or part-time offices adjacent to SB. The location of physician offices adjacent to the hospital facilitates access to care by patients in the provision of care on a timely basis by physicians. The relocation of SB may result in the relocation of physician offices currently operating adjacent to SB in Sun City Center, which may cause additional access problems for local residents. In 2009, the SB ED had approximately 22,000 patient visits. Approximately 25% of the patients that visit the South Bay ED are admitted for inpatient care. South Bay recently expanded its ED to accommodate approximately 34,000 patient visits annually. The average age of patients who visit the South Bay ED is approximately 70. Patients who travel by ambulance may or may not experience undue transportation difficulties as a result of the proposed relocation of SB; however, patients also arrive at the South Bay ED by private transportation. But, most patients are transported to the ED by automobile or emergency transport. In October 2010, the Board of Directors of the Sun City Center Association adopted a resolution on behalf of its 11,000 members opposing the closure of SB. The Board of Directors and membership of Federation of Kings Point passed a similar resolution on behalf of its members. Residents of the Sun City Center area currently enjoy easy access to SB in part because the roadways are low-volume, low-speed, accessible residential streets. SR 674 is the only east-west roadway connecting residents of the Sun City Center area to I-75 and U.S. Highway 301. The section of SR 674 between I-75 and U.S. Highway 301 is a four-lane divided roadway with a speed limit of 40-45 mph. To access Big Bend Road from the Sun City Center area, residents travel east on SR 674 then north on U.S. Highway 301 or west on SR 674 then north on I-75. U.S. Highway 301 is a two-lane undivided roadway from SR 674 north to Balm Road, with a speed limit of 55 mph and a number of driveways and intersections accessing the roadway. (Two lanes from Balm Road South, then widened to six lanes from Balm Road North.) U.S. Highway 301 is a busy and congested roadway, and there is a significant backup of traffic turning left from U.S. Highway 301 onto Big Bend Road. A portion of U.S. Highway 301 is being widened to six lanes, from Balm Road to Big Bend Road. The widening of this portion of U.S. Highway 301 is not likely to alleviate the backup of traffic at Big Bend Road. I-75 is the only other north-south alternative for residents of the Sun City Center area seeking access to Big Bend Road. I-75 is a busy four-lane interstate with a 70 mph speed limit. The exchange on I-75 and Big Bend Road is problematic not only because of traffic volume, but also because of the unusual design of the interchange, which offloads all traffic on the south side of Big Bend Road, rather than divide traffic to the north and south as is typically done in freeway design. The design of the interchange at I-75 in Big Bend Road creates additional backup and delays for traffic seeking to exit onto Big Bend Road. St. Joseph's Hospital commissioned a travel (drive) time study that compared travel times to SB's existing location and to its proposed location from three intersections within Sun City Center. This showed an increase of between seven and eight minutes' average travel time to get to the proposed location as compared to the existing location of SB. The study corroborated SB's travel time analysis, included in its CON application, which shows four minutes to get to SB from the "centroid" of zip code 33573 (Sun City Center) and 11 minutes to get to SB's proposed location from that centroid, or a difference of seven minutes. The St. Joseph's Hospital travel time study also sets forth the average travel times from the three Sun City Center intersections to Big Bend Road and Simmons Loop, as follows: Intersection Using I-75 Using U.S. 301 South Pebble Beach Blvd. and Weatherford Drive 12 min. 17 secs. 14 min. 19 secs. Kings Blvd. and Manchester Woods Drive 15 min. 44 secs. 20 min. 39 secs. North Pebble Beach Blvd. and Ft. Dusquesna Drive 13 min. 15 secs. 15 min. 41 secs. The average travel time from Wimauma (Center Street and Delia Street) to Big Bend Road and Simmons Loop was 15 minutes and 16 seconds using I-75 and 13 minutes and 52 seconds using U.S. Highway 301, an increase of more than six minutes to the proposed site. The average travel time from Ruskin (7th Street and 4th Avenue SW) to Big Bend Road and Simmons Loop was 15 minutes and 22 seconds using U.S. 41 and 14 minutes and 15 seconds using I-75, an increase of more than five minutes to the proposed site. Currently, the average travel time from Sun City Center to Big Bend Road using U.S. Highway 301 is approximately to 16 minutes. The average travel time to Big Bend Road via I-75 assuming travel with the flow of traffic is approximately 13 minutes. The incremental increase in travel time to the proposed site for SB for residents of the Sun City Center area, assuming travel with the flow of traffic, ranges from nine to 11 minutes. For residents who currently access SB in approximately five to 10 minutes, travel time to Big Bend Road is approximately 15 to 20 minutes. As the area develops, traffic is likely to continue to increase. There are no funded roadway improvements beyond the current widening of U.S. Highway 301 north of Balm Road. Most of the roadways serving Sun City Center, Ruskin, and Wimauma have a county-adopted Level of Service (LOS) of "D." LOS designations range from "A" to "F", with "F" considered gridlock. Currently, Big Bend Road from Simmons Loop Road (the approximate location of SB's propose replacement hospital) to I-75 is at LOS "F" with an average travel speed of less than mph. Based on a conservative analysis of the projected growth in traffic volume, SR 674 east of U.S. Highway 301 is projected to degrade from LOS "C" to "F" by 2015. By 2020, several additional links on SR 674 will have degraded to LOS "F." The LOS of I-75 is expected to drop to "D" in the entirety of Big Bend Road between U.S. Highway 301 and I-75 is projected to degrade to LOS "F" by 2020. The Hillsborough County Fire Rescue Department (Rescue Department) opposes the relocation of SB to Big Bend Road. The Rescue Department supports SB's establishment of a satellite hospital on Big Bend Road, but does not support the closure of SB in Sun City Center. The Rescue Department anticipates that the relocation of SB will result in a reduction in access to emergency services for patients and increased incident response times for the Rescue Department. The Rescue Department would support a freestanding ED should SB relocate. David Travis, formerly (until February 2010) the rescue division chief of the Rescue Department, testified against SB's proposal. The basis of his opposition is his concern that relocating the hospital from Sun City Center to Riverview would tend to increase response times for rescue units operating out of the Sun City Center Fire Station. The term response time refers to the time from dispatch of the rescue unit to its arrival on the scene for a given call. Mr. Travis noted that rescue units responding from the Sun City Center Fire Station would make a longer drive (perhaps seven to eight minutes) to the new location in Riverview to the extent that hospital services are needed, and during the time of transportation would necessarily be unavailable to respond to another call. However, Mr. Travis had not specifically quantified increases in response times for Sun City Center's rescue units in the event that SB relocates. Further, SB is not the sole destination for the Rescue Department's Sun City Center rescue units. While a majority of the patients were transported to SB, out of the total patient transports from the greater Sun City Center area in 2009, approximately one-third went to other hospitals other than SB, including St. Joseph's Hospital, Tampa General, and Brandon. The Rescue Department is the only advanced life support (ALS) ground transport service in the unincorporated areas of Hillsborough County responding to 911 calls. The ALS vehicles provide at least one certified paramedic on the vehicle, cardiac monitors, IV medications, advanced air way equipment, and other services. The Rescue Department has two rescue units in south Hillsborough County - Station 17 in Ruskin and Station 28 in Sun City Center. (Station 22 is in Wimauma, but does not have a rescue unit.) Stations 17 and 28 run the majority of their calls in and around the Sun City Center area, with the majority of transports to the South Bay ED. The Rescue Department had 3,643 transports from the Sun City Center area in 2009, with 54.5% transports to SB. If SB is relocated to Big Bend Road, the rescue units for Stations 17 and 28 are likely to experience longer out-of- service intervals and may not be as readily available for responding to calls in their primary service area. The Rescue Department seeks to place an individual on the scene within approximately seven minutes, 90% of the time (an ALS personnel goal) in the Sun City Center area. Relocation of SB out of Sun City Center may make it difficult for the Rescue Department to meet this response time, notwithstanding the proximity of I-75. A rapid response time is critical to providing quality care. The establishment of a freestanding ED in Sun City Center would not completely alleviate the Rescue Department's concerns, including a subset of patients who may need to be transported to a general acute care facility. There are other licensed emergency medical service providers in Hillsborough County, with at least one basic life support EMS provider in Sun City Center. The shuttle service proposed by SB may not alleviate the transportation difficulties experienced by the patients and caregivers of Sun City Center. Also, SB has not provided a plan for the scope or method of the provisional shuttle services. Six residents of Sun City Center testified against SB's proposed relocation to Riverview, including Ed Barnes, president of the Sun City Center Community Association. Mr. Barnes and two other Sun City Center residents (including Donald Schings, president of the Handicapped Club, Sun City Center) spoke in favor of St. Joseph's Hospital's proposed hospital in Riverview at a public land-use meeting in July 2010, thus demonstrating their willingness to travel to Riverview for hospital services. Mr. Barnes supported St. Joseph's Hospital's proposal for a hospital in Riverview since its inception in 2005, when St. Joseph's Hospital filed CON Application No. 9833 and thought that St. Joseph's Hospital South would serve the Sun City Center area. There are no public transportation services per se available within the Sun City Center area. Volunteer transportation services are provided. In part, the door-to-door services are provided under the auspices of the Samaritan Services, a non-profit organization supported by donations and staffed by Sun City Center volunteers. It is in doubt whether these services would continue if SB is relocated. There is a volunteer emergency squad using a few vehicles that responds to emergency calls within the Sun City Center area, with SB as the most frequent destination. Approval of SB's project will not necessarily enhance financial access to acute care services. The relocation of SB is more likely than not to create some access barriers for low- income residents of the service area. The relocation would also be farther away from communities such as Ruskin and Wimauma as there are no buses or other forms of public transportation available in Ruskin, Sun City Center, or Wimauma. However, it appears that the Sun City Center residents would travel not only to Riverview, but north of Riverview for hospital services following SB's relocation, notwithstanding the fact that Sun City Center residents are transportation- disadvantaged. The Hillsborough County Board of County Commissioners recently amended the Comprehensive Land-Use Plan and adopted the Greater Sun City Center Community Plan, which, in part, lists the retention of an acute care hospital in the Sun City Center area as the highest health care planning priority. For Sun City Center residents who may not want to drive to SB's new location, SB will provide a shuttle bus, which can convey both non-emergency patients and visitors. South Bay has made the provision of the shuttle bus a condition of its CON. As noted herein, the CON's other conditions are the establishment of the replacement hospital at the site in Riverview; combined Medicaid and charity care in the amount of 7.0% of gross revenues; and maintaining a freestanding ED at SB. SB Ex. 46, Schedule C. Section 408.035(3): The ability of the applicant to provide quality of care and the applicant's record of providing quality of care South Bay has a record of providing high quality of care at its existing hospital. It is accredited by JCAHO, and also accredited as a primary stroke center and chest pain center. In the first quarter of 2010, SB scored well on "core measures" used by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) as an indicator of the quality of patient safety. South Bay received recognition for its infection control programs and successfully implemented numerous other quality initiatives. Patient satisfaction is high at SB. AHCA's view of the need for a replacement hospital is not limited according to whether or not the existing hospital meets broad quality indicators, such as JCAHO accreditation. Rather, AHCA recognizes the degree to which quality would be improved by the proposed replacement hospital -– and largely on that basis has consistently approved CON applications for replacement hospitals since at least 1991. See FOF 64-66. South Bay would have a greater ability to provide quality of care in its proposed replacement hospital. Private patient rooms are superior in terms of infection control and the patient's general well-being. The conceptual design for the hospital, included in the CON application, is the same evidence- based design that HCA used for Methodist Stone Oak Hospital, an award-winning, state-of-the-art hospital in San Antonio, Texas. Some rooms at SB are small, but SB staff and physicians are able, for the most part, to function appropriately and provide high quality of care notwithstanding. (The ICU is the exception, although it was said that patients receive quality of care in the ICU. See FOF 77-82.) Most of the rooms in the ED "are good size." Some residents are willing to give up a private room in order to have better access of care and the convenience of care to family members at SB's existing facility. By comparison, the alternative suggested by St. Joseph's Hospital does not use evidence-based design and involves gutting and rearranging roughly one-third of SB's existing interior; depends upon erecting a new patient tower that would require parking and stormwater capacity that SB currently does not have; requires SB's administration to relocate off-site during an indeterminate construction period; and involves estimated project costs that its witnesses did not disclose the basis of, claiming that the information was proprietary. South Bay's physicians are likely to apply for privileges at St. Joseph's Hospital South. Moreover, if SB remains at its current site, it is reasonable to expect that some number of those physicians would do less business at SB or leave the medical staff. Many of SB's physicians have their primary medical offices in Brandon, or otherwise north of Sun City Center. Further, many of the specialists at SB are also on staff at Brandon. St. Joseph's Hospital South would be more convenient for those physicians, in addition to having the allure of a new, state-of-the-art hospital. South Bay is struggling with its nursing vacancy rate, which was 12.3% for 2010 at the time of the hearing and had increased from 9.9% in 2009. The jump in nursing vacancies in 2010 substantially returned the hospital to its 2008 rate, which was 12.4%. As with its physicians, SB's nurses generally do not reside in the Sun City Center area giving its age restrictions as a retirement community; instead, they live further north in south Hillsborough County. In October 2007 when the application was filed, SB had approximately 105 employees who lived in Riverview. It is reasonable to expect that SB's nurses will be attracted to St. Joseph's Hospital South, a new, state-of-the-art hospital closer to where they live. Thus, if it is denied the opportunity to replace and relocate its hospital, SB could also expect to lose nursing staff to St. Joseph's Hospital South, increasing its nursing vacancy rate. Section 408.035(4): The availability of resources, including health personnel, management personnel, and funds for capital and operating expenditures, for project accomplishment and operation The parties stipulated that Schedule 2 of SB's CON application was complete and required no proof at hearing. South Bay will not have to recruit nursing or physician staff for its proposed replacement hospital. Its existing medical and nursing staff would not change, and would effectively "travel" with the hospital to its new location. Conversely, the replacement hospital should enhance SB's ability to recruit specialty physicians, which is currently a challenge for SB in its existing facility. The parties stipulated to the reasonableness of SB's proposed staffing for the replacement hospital as set out in Schedule 6A, but SJH and TG contend that the staffing schedule should also include full-time equivalent positions (FTEs) for the freestanding ED that SB proposes to maintain at its existing hospital. This contention is addressed in the Conclusions of Law, concerning application completeness under section 408.037, at COL 356-57. South Bay has sufficient funds for capital and operating expenditures for project accomplishment and operation. The project cost will be underwritten by HCA, which has adequate cash flow and credit opportunities. It is reasonable that SB's project will be adequately funded if the CON is approved. Section 408.035(5): The extent to which the proposed services will enhance access to health care for residents of the service district The specific area that SB primarily serves, and would continue to serve, is the service area in south Hillsborough County as identified in its application and exhibits. The discussion in section IV.B., supra, is applicable to this criterion and incorporated herein. With its proposed relocation to Riverview, SB will be situated in the most populous and fastest-growing part of south Hillsborough County; will be available to serve Sun City Center, Ruskin, and Wimauma; and will be between seven and eight minutes farther away from Sun City Center than it is at present. However, while the relocated facility will be available to the elderly residents of the Sun City Center area, access for these future patients will be reduced from current levels given the increase in transportation time, whether it be by emergency vehicle or otherwise. Section 408.035(6): The immediate and long-term financial feasibility of the proposal Immediate or "short-term" financial feasibility is the ability of the applicant to secure the funds necessary to capitalize and operate the proposed project. The project cost for SB's proposed replacement hospital is approximately $200 million. The costs associated with the establishment and operation of the freestanding ED and other services were not included in the application, but for the reasons stated herein, were not required to be projected in SB's CON application. South Bay demonstrated the short-term financial feasibility of the proposal. The estimated project cost has declined since the filing of the application in 2007, meaning that SB will require less capital than originally forecast. While Mr. Miller stated that he does not have authority to bind HCA to a $200 million capital project, HCA has indicated that it will provide full financing for the project, and that it will go forward with the project if awarded the CON. Long-term financial feasibility refers to the ability of a proposed project to generate a profit in a reasonable period of time. AHCA has previously approved hospital proposals that showed a net profit in the third year of pro forma operation or later. See generally Cent. Fla. Reg. Hosp., Inc. v. Agency for Health Care Admin. & Oviedo HMA, Inc., Case No. 05-0296CON (Fla. DOAH Aug. 23, 2006; Fla. AHCA Jan. 1, 2007), aff'd, 973 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). To be conservative, SB's projections, updated for purposes of hearing, take into account the slower population growth in south Hillsborough County since the application was originally filed. South Bay also assumed that St. Joseph's Hospital South will be built and operational by 2015. The net effect, as accounted for in the updated projections, is that SB's replacement hospital will have 28,168 patient days in year 1 (2015); 28,569 patient days in year 2 (2016); and 29,582 patient days in year 3 (2017). That patient volume is reasonable and achievable. With the updated utilization forecast, SB projects a net profit for the replacement hospital of $711,610 in 2015; $960,693 in 2016; and $1,658,757 in 2017. The financial forecast was done, using revenue and expense projections appropriately based upon SB's own most recent (2009) financial data. Adjustments made were to the payor mix and the degree of outpatient services, each of which would change due to the relocation to Riverview. The revenue projections for the replacement hospital were tested for reasonableness against existing hospitals in SB's peer group, using actual financial data as reported to AHCA. St. Joseph's Hospital opposed SB's financial projections. St. Joseph's Hospital's expert did not take issue with SB's forecasted market growth. Rather, it was suggested that there was insufficient market growth to support the future patient utilization projections for St. Joseph's Hospital South and SB at its new location and, as a result, they would have a difficult time achieving their volume forecasts and/or they would need to draw patients from other hospitals, such as Brandon, in order to meet utilization projections. St. Joseph's Hospital's expert criticized the increase in SB's projected revenues in its proposed new location as compared to its revenues in its existing location. However, it appears that SB's payor mix is projected to change in the new location, with a greater percentage of commercial managed care, thus generating the greater revenue. South Bay's projected revenue in the commercial indemnity insurance classification was also criticized because SB's projected commercial indemnity revenues were materially overstated. That criticism was based upon the commercial indemnity insurance revenues of St. Joseph's Hospital and Tampa General, which were used as a basis to "adjust" SB's projected revenue downward. St. Joseph's Hospital and Tampa General's fiscal-year 2009 commercial indemnity net revenue was divided by their inpatient days, added an inflation factor, and then multiplied the result by SB's year 1 (2015) inpatient days to recast SB's projected commercial indemnity net revenue. The contention is effectively that SB's commercial indemnity net revenue would be the same as that of St. Joseph's Hospital and Tampa General. There is no similarity between the three hospitals in the commercial indemnity classification. The majority of SJH's and TG's commercial indemnity net revenue comes from inpatients rather than outpatient cases; whereas the majority of SB's commercial indemnity net revenue comes from outpatient cases rather than inpatients. This may explain why SB's total commercial indemnity net revenue is higher than SJH or TG, when divided by inpatient days. The application of the lower St. Joseph's Hospital-Tampa General per-patient-day number to project SB's experience does not appear justified. It is likely that SB's project will be financially feasible in the short and long-term. Section 408.035(7): The extent to which the proposal will foster competition that promotes quality and cost-effectiveness South Bay and Brandon are the dominant providers of health care services in SB's service area. This dominance is likely to be eroded once St. Joseph's Hospital South is operational in and around 2015 (on Big Bend Road) if SB's relocation project is not approved. The proposed relocation of SB's facility will not change the geography of SB's service area. However, it will change SB's draw of patients from within the zip codes in the service area. The relocation of SB is expected to increase SB's market share in the three northern Riverview zip codes. This increase can be expected to come at the expense of other providers in the market, including TG and SJH, and St. Joseph's Hospital South when operational. The potential impact to St. Joseph's Hospital may be approximately $1.6 million based on the projected redirection of patients from St. Joseph's Hospital Main to St. Joseph's Hospital South, population growth in the area, and the relocation of SB. Economic impacts to TG are of record. Tampa General estimates a material impact of $6.4 million if relocation is approved. Notwithstanding, addressing "provider-based competition," AHCA in its SAAR noted: Considering the current location is effectively built out at 112 beds (according to the applicant), this project will allow the applicant to increase its bed size as needed along with the growth in population (the applicant's schedules begin with 144 beds in year one of the project). This will shield the applicant from a loss in market share caused by capacity issues and allow the applicant and its affiliates the opportunity to maintain and/or increase its dominant market share. SB Ex. 12 at 55. AHCA's observation that replacement and relocation of SB "will shield the applicant from a loss in market share caused by capacity issues" has taken on a new dimension since the issuance of the SAAR. At that time, St. Joseph's Hospital did not have final approval of CON No. 9833 for the establishment of St. Joseph's Hospital South. It is likely that St. Joseph's Hospital South will be operational on Big Bend Road, and as a result, SB, at its existing location, will experience a diminished market share, especially from the Riverview zip codes. In 2015 (when St. Joseph's Hospital proposes to open St. Joseph's Hospital South), SB projects losing $2,669,335 if SB remains in Sun City Center with a 20% loss in market share. The losses are projected to increase to $3,434,113 in 2016 and $4,255,573 in 2017. It follows that the losses would be commensurately more severe at the 30% to 40% loss of market share that SB expects if it remains in Sun City Center. St. Joseph's Hospital criticized SB's projections for its existing hospital if it remains in Sun City Center with a 20% loss in market share; however, the criticism was not persuasively proven. It was assumed that SB's expenses would decrease commensurately with its projected fewer patient days, thus enabling it to turn a profit in calendar year 2015 despite substantially reduced patient service revenue. However, it was also stated that expenses such as hospital administration, pharmacy administration, and nursing administration, which the analysis assumed to be variable, in fact have a substantial "fixed" component that does not vary regardless of patient census. South Bay would not, therefore, pay roughly $5 million less in "Administration and Overhead" expenses in 2015 as calculated. To the contrary, its expenses for "Administration and Overhead" would most likely remain substantially the same, as calculated by Mr. Weiner, and would have to be paid, notwithstanding SB's reduced revenue. The only expenses that were recognized as fixed by SJH's expert, and held constant, were SB's calendar year 2009 depreciation ($3,410,001) and short-term interest ($762,738), shown in the exhibit as $4,172,739 both in 2009 and 2015. Other expenses in SJH's analysis are fixed, but were inappropriately assumed to be variable: for example, "Rent, Insurance, Other," which is shown as $1,865,839 in 2009, appears to decrease to $1,462,059 in 2015. The justification offered at hearing, that such expenses can be re-negotiated by a hospital in the middle of a binding contract, is not reasonable. St. Joseph's Hospital's expert opined that SB's estimate of a 30 to 40% loss of market share (if SB remained in Sun City Center concurrent with the operation of St. Joseph's Hospital South) was "much higher than it should be," asserting that the loss would not be that great even if all of SB's Riverview discharges went to St. Joseph's Hospital South. (Mr. Richardson believes the "10 to 20 percent level is likely reasonable," although he opines that a 5 to 10% impact will likely occur.) However, this criticism assumes that a majority of the patients that currently choose SB would remain at SB at its existing location. The record reflects that Sun City Center area residents actively supported the establishment of St. Joseph's Hospital South, thus suggesting that they might use the new facility. Further, SB's physicians are likely to join the medical staff of St. Joseph's Hospital South to facilitate that utilization or to potentially lose their patients to physicians with admitting privileges at St. Joseph's Hospital South. Tampa General's expert also asserted that SB would remain profitable if it remained in its current location, notwithstanding the establishment of St. Joseph's Hospital South. It was contended that SB's net operating revenues per adjusted patient day increased at an annual rate of 5.3% from 2005 to 2009, whereas the average annual increase from 2009 to 2017 in SB's existing hospital projections amounts to 1.8%. On that basis, he opined that SB should be profitable in 2017 at its existing location, notwithstanding a loss in market share to St. Joseph's Hospital South. However, the 5.3% average annual increase from 2005 to 2009 is not necessarily predictive of SB's future performance, and the evidence indicated the opposite. Tampa General's expert did not examine SB's performance year-by-year from 2005 to 2009, but rather compared 2005 and 2009 data to calculate the 5.3% average annual increase over the five-year period. This analysis overlooks the hospital's uneven performance during that time, which included operating losses (and overall net losses) in 2005 and 2007. Further, the evidence showed that the biggest increase in SB's net revenue during that five-year period took place from 2008 to 2009, and was largely due to a significant decrease in bad debt in 2009. SB Ex. 16 at 64. (Bad debt is accounted for as a deduction from gross revenue: thus, the greater the amount of bad debt, the less net revenue all else being equal; the lesser the amount of bad debt, the greater the amount of net revenue all else being equal.) The evidence further showed that the 2009 reduction in bad debt and the hospital's profitability that year, is unlikely to be repeated. Overall, approval of the project is more likely to increase competition in the service area between the three health care providers/systems. Denial of the project is more likely to have a negative effect on competition in the service area, although it will continue to make general acute care services available and accessible to the Sun City Center area elderly (and family and volunteer support). Approval of the project is likely to improve the quality of care and cost-effectiveness of the services provided by SB, but will reduce access for the elderly residents of the Sun City Center area needing general acute care hospital services who will be required to be transported by emergency vehicle or otherwise to one of the two Big Bend Road hospitals, unless needed services, such as open heart surgery, are only available elsewhere. For example, if a patient presents to SB needing balloon angioplasty or open heart surgery, the patient is transferred to an appropriate facility such as Brandon. The presence of an ED on the current SB site may alleviate the reduction in access somewhat for some acute care services, although the precise nature and extent of the proposed services were not explained with precision. If its application is denied, SB expects to remain operational so long as it remains financially viable. Section 408.035(8): The costs and methods of the proposed construction, including the costs and methods of energy provision and the availability of alternative, less costly, or more effective methods of construction The parties stipulated that the costs and methods of the proposed construction, including the costs and methods of energy provision, were reasonable. St. Joseph's Hospital and Tampa General did not stipulate concerning the availability of alternative, less costly, or more effective methods of construction, and take the position that SB should renovate and expand its existing facility rather than replace and relocate the facility. Whether section 408.035(8) requires consideration (weighing and balancing with other statutory criteria) of potential renovation costs as alternatives to relocation was hotly debated in this case. For the reasons stated herein, it is determined that this subsection, in conjunction with other statutory criteria, requires consideration of potential renovation versus replacement of an existing facility. St. Joseph's Hospital offered expert opinion that SB could expand and upgrade its existing facility for approximately $25 million. These projected costs include site work; site utilities; all construction, architectural, and engineering services; chiller; air handlers; interior design; retention basins; and required movable equipment. This cost is substantially less than the approximate $200 million cost of the proposed relocation. It was proven that there are alternatives to replacing SB. There is testimony that if SB were to undertake renovation and expansion as proposed by SJH, such upgrades would improve SB's competitive and financial position. But, the alternatives proposed by SJH and TG are disfavored by SB and are determined, on this record, not to be reasonable based on the institutional- specific needs of SB. Section 408.035(9): The applicant's past and proposed provision of health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent Approval of SB's application will not significantly enhance access to Medicaid, charity, or underserved population groups. South Bay currently provides approximately 4% of its patient days to Medicaid beneficiaries and about 1% to charity care. South Bay's historic provision of services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent is reasonable in view of its location in Sun City Center, which results in a disproportionate share of Medicare in its current payor mix. South Bay also does not offer obstetrics, a service which accounts for a significant degree of Medicaid patient days. South Bay proposes to provide 7% of its "gross patient revenue" to Medicaid and charity patients as part of its relocation. South Bay's proposed service percentage is reasonable. Section 408.035(10): The applicant's designation as a Gold Seal Program nursing facility pursuant to s. 400.235, when the applicant is requesting additional nursing home beds at that facility The parties stipulated that this criterion is not applicable.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying CON Application No. 9992. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of August, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES A. STAMPELOS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of August, 2011.
The Issue Whether Certificate of Need Application No. 8614, filed by Vencor Hospitals South, Inc., meets, on balance, the applicable statutory and rule criteria. Whether the Agency for Health Care Administration relied upon an unpromulgated and invalid rule in preliminarily denying CON Application No. 8614.
Findings Of Fact Vencor Hospital South, Inc. (Vencor), is the applicant for certificate of need (CON) No. 8614 to establish a 60-bed long term care hospital in Fort Myers, Lee County, Florida. The Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA), the state agency authorized to administer the CON program in Florida, preliminarily denied Vencor's CON application. On January 10, 1997, AHCA issued its decision in the form of a State Agency Action Report (SAAR) indicating, as it also did in its Proposed Recommended Order, that the Vencor application was denied primarily due to a lack of need for a long term care hospital in District 8, which includes Lee County. Vencor is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Vencor, Inc., a publicly traded corporation, founded in 1985 by a respiratory/physical therapist to provide care to catastrophically ill, ventilator-dependent patients. Initially, the corporation served patients in acute care hospitals, but subsequently purchased and converted free-standing facilities. In 1995, Vencor merged with Hillhaven, which operated 311 nursing homes. Currently, Vencor, its parent, and related corporations operate 60 long term care hospitals, 311 nursing homes, and 40 assisted living facilities in approximately 46 states. In Florida, Vencor operates five long term care hospitals, located in Tampa, St. Petersburg, North Florida (Green Cove Springs), Coral Gables, and Fort Lauderdale. Pursuant to the Joint Prehearing Stipulation, filed on October 2, 1997, the parties agreed that: On August 26, 1996, Vencor submitted to AHCA a letter of intent to file a Certificate of Need Application seeking approval for the construction of a 60-bed long term care hospital to be located in Fort Myers, AHCA Health Planning District 8; Vencor's letter of intent and board resolution meet requirements of Sections 408.037(4) and 408.039(2)(c), Florida Statutes, and Rule 59C-1.008(1), Florida Administrative Code, and were timely filed with both AHCA and the local health council, and notice was properly published; Vencor submitted to AHCA its initial Certificate of Need Application (CON Action No. 8614) for the proposed project on September 25, 1996, and submitted its Omissions Response on November 11, 1996; Vencor's Certificate of Need Application contains all of the minimum content items required in Section 408.037, Florida Statutes; Both Vencor's initial CON Application and its Omissions Response were timely filed with AHCA and the local health council. During the hearing, the parties also stipulated that Vencor's Schedule 2 is complete and accurate. In 1994, AHCA adopted rules defining long term care and long term care hospitals. Rule 59C-1.002(29), Florida Administrative Code, provides that: "Long term care hospital" means a hospital licensed under Chapter 395, Part 1, F.S., which meets the requirements of Part 412, Subpart B, paragraph 412.23(e), [C]ode of Federal Regulations (1994), and seeks exclusion from the Medicare prospective payment system for inpatient hospital services. Other rules distinguishing long term care include those related to conversions of beds and facilities from one type of health care to another. AHCA, the parties stipulated, has no rule establishing a uniform numeric need methodology for long term care beds and, therefore, no fixed need pool applicable to the review of Vencor's CON application. Numeric Need In the absence of any AHCA methodology or need publication, Vencor is required to devise its own methodology to demonstrate need. Rule 59C-1.008(e) provides in pertinent part: If no agency policy exists, the applicant will be responsible for demonstrating need through a needs assessment methodology which must include, at a minimum, consideration of the following topics, except where they are inconsistent with the applicable statutory or rule criteria: Population demographics and dynamics; Availability, utilization and quality of like services in the district, subdistrict, or both; Medical treatment trends; and Market conditions. Vencor used a numeric need analysis which is identical to that prepared by the same health planner, in 1995, for St. Petersburg Health Care Management, Inc. (St. Petersburg). The St. Petersburg project proposed that Vencor would manage the facility. Unlike the current proposal for new construction, St. Petersburg was a conversion of an existing but closed facility. AHCA accepted that analysis and issued CON 8213 to St. Petersburg. The methodology constitutes a use rate analysis, which calculates the use rate of a health service among the general population and applies that to the projected future population of the district. The use rate analysis is the methodology adopted in most of AHCA's numeric need rules. W. Eugene Nelson, the consultant health planner for Vencor, derived a historic utilization rate from the four districts in Florida in which Vencor operates long term care hospitals. That rate, 19.7 patient days per 1000 population, when applied to the projected population of District 8 in the year 2000, yields an average daily census of 64 patients. Mr. Nelson also compared the demographics of the seven counties of District 8 to the rest of the state, noting in particular the sizable, coastal population centers and the significant concentration of elderly, the population group which is disproportionately served in long term care hospitals. The proposed service area is all of District 8. By demonstrating the numeric need for 64 beds and the absence of any existing long term care beds in District 8, Vencor established the numeric need for its proposed 60-bed long term care hospital. See Final Order in DOAH Case No. 97-4419RU. Statutory Review Criteria Additional criteria for evaluating CON applications are listed in Subsections 408.035(1) and (2), Florida Statutes, and the rules which implement that statute. (1)(a) need in relation to state and district health plans. The 1993 State Health Plan, which predates the establishment of long term care rules, contains no specific preferences for evaluating CON applications for long term care hospitals. The applicable local plan is the District 8 1996-1997 Certificate of Need Allocation Factors Report, approved on September 9, 1996. The District 8 plan, like the State Health Plan, contains no mention of long term care hospitals. In the SAAR, AHCA applied the District 8 and state health plan criteria for acute care hospital beds to the review of Vencor's application for long term care beds, although agency rules define the two as different. The acute care hospital criteria are inapplicable to the review of this application for CON 8614 and, therefore, there are no applicable state or district health plan criteria for long term care. (1)(b) availability, quality of care, efficiency, appropriateness, accessibility, extent of utilization and adequacy of like and existing services in the district; and (1)(d) availability and adequacy of alternative health care facilities in the district. Currently, there are no long term care hospitals in District 8. The closest long term care hospitals are in Tampa, St. Petersburg, and Fort Lauderdale, all over 100 miles from Fort Myers. In the SAAR, approving the St. Petersburg facility, two long term care hospitals in Tampa were discussed as alternatives. By contract, the SAAR preliminarily denying Vencor's application lists as alternatives CMR facilities, nursing homes which accept Medicare patients, and hospital based skilled nursing units. AHCA examined the quantity of beds available in other health care categories in reliance on certain findings in the publication titled Subacute Care: Policy Synthesis And Market Area Analysis, a report submitted to the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, on November 1, 1995, by Levin-VHI, Inc. ("the Lewin Report"). The Lewin Report notes the similarities between the type of care provided in long term care, CMR and acute care hospitals, and in hospital-based subacute care units, and subacute care beds in community nursing homes. The Lewin Report also acknowledges that "subacute care" is not well-defined. AHCA has not adopted the Lewin Report by rule, nor has it repealed its rules defining long term care as a separate and district health care category. For the reasons set forth in the Final Order issued simultaneously with this Recommended Order, AHCA may not rely on the Lewin Report to create a presumption that other categories are "like and existing" alternatives to long term care, or to consider services outside District 8 as available alternatives. Additionally, Vencor presented substantial evidence to distinguish its patients from those served in other types of beds. The narrow range of diagnostic related groups or DRGs served at Vencor includes patients with more medically complex multiple system failures than those in CMR beds. With an average length of stay of 60 beds, Vencor's patients are typically too sick to withstand three hours of therapy a day, which AHCA acknowledged as the federal criteria for CMR admissions. Vencor also distinguished its patients, who require 7 1/2 to 8 hours of nursing care a day, as compared to 2 1/2 to 3 hours a day in nursing homes. Similarly, the average length of stay in nursing home subacute units is less than 41 days. The DRG classifications which account for 80 percent of Vencor's admissions represent only 7 percent of admissions to hospital based skilled nursing units, and 10 to 11 percent of admissions to nursing home subacute care units. Vencor also presented the uncontroverted testimony of Katherine Nixon, a clinical case manager whose duties include discharge planning for open heart surgery for patients at Columbia-Southwest Regional Medical Center (Columbia-Southwest), an acute care hospital in Fort Myers. Ms. Nixon's experience is that 80 percent of open heart surgery patients are discharged home, while 20 percent require additional inpatient care. Although Columbia-Southwest has a twenty-bed skilled nursing unit with two beds for ventilator-dependent patients, those beds are limited to patients expected to be weaned within a week. Finally, Vencor presented results which are preliminary and subject to peer review from its APACHE (Acute Physiology, Age, and Chronic Health Evaluation) Study. Ultimately, Vencor expects the study to more clearly distinguish its patient population. In summary, Vencor demonstrated that a substantial majority of patients it proposes to serve are not served in alternative facilities, including CMR hospitals, hospital-based skilled nursing units, or subacute units in community nursing homes. Expert medical testimony established the inappropriateness of keeping patients who require long term care in intensive or other acute care beds, although that occurs in District 8 when patients refuse to agree to admissions too distant from their homes. (1)(c) ability and record of providing quality of care. The parties stipulated that Vencor's application complies with the requirement of Subsection 408.035(1)(c). (1)(e) probable economics of joint or shared resources; (1)(g) need for research and educational facilities; and (1)(j) needs of health maintenance organizations. The parties stipulated that the review criteria in Subsection 408.035(1)(e), (g) and (j) are not at issue. (f) need in the district for special equipment and services not reasonably and economically accessible in adjoining areas. Based on the experiences of Katherine Nixon, it is not reasonable for long term care patients to access services outside District 8. Ms. Nixon also testified that patients are financially at a disadvantage if placed in a hospital skilled nursing unit rather than a long term care hospital. If a patient is not weaned as quickly as expected, Medicare reimbursement after twenty days decreases to 80 percent. In addition, the days in the hospital skilled nursing unit are included in the 100 day Medicare limit for post-acute hospitalization rehabilitation. By contrast, long term care hospitalization preserves the patient's ability under Medicare to have further rehabilitation services if needed after a subsequent transfer to a nursing home. (h) resources and funds, including personnel to accomplish project. Prior to the hearing, the parties stipulated that Vencor has sufficient funds to accomplish the project, and properly documented its source of funds in Schedule 3 of the CON application. Vencor has a commitment for $10 million to fund this project of approximately $8.5 million. At the hearing, AHCA also agreed with Vencor that the staffing and salary schedule, Schedule 6, is reasonable. (i) immediate and long term financial feasibility of the proposal. Vencor has the resources to establish the project and to fund short term operating losses. Vencor also reasonably projected that revenues will exceed expenses in the second year of operation. Therefore, Vencor demonstrated the short and long term financial feasibility of its proposal. needs of entities serving residents outside the district. Vencor is not proposing that any substantial portion of it services will benefit anyone outside District 8. probable impact on costs of providing health services; effects of competition. There is no evidence of an adverse impact on health care costs. There is preliminary data from the APACHE study which tends to indicate the long term care costs are lower than acute care costs. No adverse effects of competition are shown and AHCA did not dispute the fact that Vencor's proposal is supported by acute care hospitals in District 8. costs and methods of proposed construction; and (2)((a)-(c) less costly alternatives to proposed capital expenditure. The prehearing stipulation includes agreement that the design is reasonable, and that proposed construction costs are below the median in that area. past and proposed service to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent. Vencor has a history of providing Medicaid and indigent care in the absence of any legal requirements to do so. The conditions proposed of 3 percent of total patient days Medicaid and 2 percent for indigent/charity patients proposed by Vencor are identical to those AHCA accepted in issuing CON 8213 to St. Petersburg Health Care Management, Inc. Vencor's proposed commitment is reasonable and appropriate, considering AHCA's past acceptance and the fact that the vast majority of long term care patients are older and covered by Medicare. services which promote a continuum of care in a multilevel health care system. While Vencor's services are needed due to a gap in the continuum of care which exists in the district, it has not shown that it will be a part of a multilevel system in District 8. (2)(d) that patients will experience serious problems obtaining the inpatient care proposed. Patients experience and will continue to experience serious problems in obtaining long term care in District 8 in the absence of the project proposed by Vencor. Based on the overwhelming evidence of need, and the ability of the applicant to establish and operate a high quality program with no adverse impacts on other health care providers, Vencor meets the criteria for issuance of CON 8614.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration issue CON 8614 to Vencor Hospitals South, Inc., to construct a 60-bed long term care hospital in Fort Myers, Lee County, District 8. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Paul J. Martin, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Kim A. Kellum, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 R. Terry Rigsby, Esquire Geoffrey D. Smith, Esquire Blank, Rigsby & Meenan, P.A. 204 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Respondent’s denial of Petitioner’s Level II appeal should be upheld or whether the inpatient residential mental health services provided to R.H. by McLean Hospital’s 3 East Dialectical Behavior Therapy (“DBT”) program from September 9, 2015, through September 22, 2015, and again from October 15, 2015, through December 11, 2015, were “medically necessary” and therefore covered under the terms of the State Employees’ PPO Group Health Insurance Plan.
Findings Of Fact DSGI is the state agency responsible for administration of the state group insurance program, pursuant to section 110.123, Florida Statutes. Petitioner, A.H., is a State of Florida employee and was insured through the State Employees’ PPO Group Health Insurance Plan (the “Plan”). R.H., the child of A.H., was eligible for coverage under A.H.’s health insurance policy as of September 1, 2015. Pursuant to contract, Florida Blue acts as DSGI’s third-party medical claims administrator for employee health insurance benefits. New Directions is Florida Blue’s subcontractor and third-party administrator for mental health and substance abuse reviews and authorizations. “Utilization management” is the process of reviewing a service claim to determine whether the service is a covered benefit under the Plan and whether the service is “medically necessary” as that term is defined in the Plan. In cases involving mental health or substance abuse services, the service must also satisfy the more detailed and specific coverage guidelines, titled “Medical Necessity Criteria,” established by New Directions.1/ Consistent with general practice in the field, the “medical necessity” criteria of the New Directions document observe the following levels of care, in increasing order of intensity: psychiatric outpatient; psychiatric intensive outpatient; psychiatric partial hospitalization; psychiatric residential; and psychiatric acute residential. In the interests of conserving medical resources and preserving patient liberty, safety, and dignity, every effort is made to place patients in the least intensive level of care consistent with effective treatment of their presenting condition. R.H., a female who was 15 years old during the period relevant to this proceeding, has been diagnosed with borderline personality disorder and has a history of eating disorders. Her treating psychologist in Florida, Nicolle Arbelaez Lopez, noted that R.H. was also being treated for generalized anxiety disorder. R.H. had an inpatient admission to the Renfrew Center in Florida for eating disorder treatment in May 2015. R.H. transitioned to partial hospitalization over the summer, followed by a step down to the Renfrew Center's intensive outpatient program, then by a step up back to partial hospitalization when her eating disorder behaviors worsened. Though less intensive than a full residential admission, intensive outpatient treatment and partial hospitalization allow patients to receive comparatively intensive treatment while remaining in their home environment.2/ R.H.’s final discharge from the Renfrew Center was on August 21, 2015. At the time she was admitted to McLean Hospital’s 3 East DBT program, R.H. had a recent history of engaging in superficial cutting of her arm. On August 30, 2015, R.H. intentionally hit herself in the hand with a hammer. R.H.’s mother took her to the emergency room for treatment and told the treating personnel that R.H. had fallen down some stairs. The hammer blow caused swelling and bruising but no broken bones. R.H. was also continuing to purge and restrict her food intake. R.H.’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Thania V. Quesdada, and her psychologist, Ms. Lopez, both urged that she be admitted to one of three nationally-recognized immersion DBT programs. Her family chose the program at McLean Hospital. DBT is a cognitive behavioral treatment that was originally developed to treat chronically suicidal individuals diagnosed with borderline personality disorder, though it is now employed for treatment of other conditions, including eating disorders. DBT teaches behavioral coping skills such as mindfulness, distress tolerance, interpersonal effectiveness, and emotional regulation. At the hearing, DSGI did not dispute the general efficacy of DBT treatment. However, DSGI did dispute whether R.H.’s presentation merited “immersion” DBT, i.e., a residential inpatient admission. McLean Hospital’s 3 East DBT program is self-pay and requires a minimum stay of 28 days. The program does not accept insurance and does not assist patients with insurance reimbursement efforts. Because of its stance on insurance, the 3 East DBT program is obviously not an in-network provider under the Plan. Prior to admission, Petitioner was aware that the 3 East DBT program did not accept insurance. R.H. was in residential treatment at McLean Hospital from September 9, 2015, through September 22, 2015. While at McLean Hospital, R.H. engaged in restricting and purging behaviors that led to medical instability. She was discharged to Cambridge Eating Disorder Center on September 23, 2015. She remained at the Cambridge Center until October 15, 2015. R.H.’s stay at the Cambridge Center was pre-certified by New Directions and is not at issue in this proceeding. On October 15, 2015, R.H. returned to McLean Hospital, again as a residential inpatient admission. She remained at McLean Hospital until her discharge on December 11, 2015. The total billed amount for R.H.’s two stays at McLean Hospital was $96,950, which was paid by the family out-of- pocket. Section 3-5 of the Plan sets forth the following under the heading “Mental Health and Substance Dependency Services”: “Physician office visits, Intensive Outpatient Treatment, Inpatient and Partial Hospitalization and Residential Treatment Services are covered based on medical necessity.” The general definition of “Medically Necessary” is set forth at section 15-4 of the Plan: [s]ervices required to identify or treat the Illness, injury, Condition, or Mental and Nervous Disorder a Doctor has diagnosed or reasonably suspects. The service must be: consistent with the symptom, diagnosis and treatment of the patient’s Condition; in accordance with standards of good medical practice; required for reasons other than convenience of the patient or the Doctor; approved by the appropriate medical body or board for the illness or injury in question; and at the most appropriate level of medical supply, service, or care that can be safely provided. The fact that a service, prescription drug, or supply is prescribed by a Doctor does not necessarily mean that the service is Medically Necessary. Florida Blue, CVS/Caremark, and DSGI determine whether a service, prescription drug, or supply is Medically Necessary. New Directions’ Medical Necessity Criteria guidelines provided the following admission criteria for psychiatric residential admissions: Must meet all of the following: A DSM diagnosis is the primary focus of active, daily treatment. There is a reasonable expectation of reduction in behaviors/symptoms with treatment at this level of care. The treatment is not primarily social, custodial, interpersonal, or respite care. The member has documented symptoms and/or behaviors that are a significant deterioration from baseline functioning and create a significant functional impairment in at least three (3) of the following areas: primary support social/interpersonal occupational/educational health/medical compliance ability to maintain safety for either self or others Must have one of the following: The member’s family members and/or support system demonstrate behaviors that are likely to undermine goals of treatment, such that treatment at a lower level of care is unlikely to be successful. This lack must be situational in nature and amenable to change as a result of the treatment process and resources identified during a residential confinement. The member has a documented history of an inability to be managed at an intensive lower level of care. There is a recent (in the last six months) history of multiple brief acute inpatient stays without a successful transition to a lower level of care, and at risk of admission to inpatient acute care. New Directions’ Medical Necessity Criteria guidelines provided the following admission criteria for eating disorder residential admissions: Must meet 1-4 and either 5, 6, or 7 A DSM diagnosis found in the Feeding and Eating Disorder section is the primary focus of active, daily treatment. There is a reasonable expectation of reduction in behaviors/symptoms with treatment at this level of care. The treatment is not primarily social, custodial, interpersonal, or respite care. The member has documented symptoms and/or behaviors that are a significant deterioration from baseline functioning and create a significant functional impairment in at least three (3) of the following areas: primary support social/interpersonal occupational/educational health/medical compliance ability to maintain safety for either self or others Must have one of the following: The member’s family members and/or support system demonstrate behaviors that are likely to undermine goals of treatment, such that treatment at a lower level of care is unlikely to be successful. This lack must be situational in nature and amenable to change as a result of the treatment process and resources identified during a residential confinement. The member has a documented history of an inability to be managed at an intensive lower level of care. There is a recent (in the last six months) history of multiple brief acute inpatient stays without a successful transition to a lower level of care, and at risk of admission to inpatient acute care. There are active biomedical complications that require 24-hour care, including, but not limited to: Adults Children/Adolescents Pulse <40 <50 Blood Pressure <90/60 <80/50 Orthostatic changes in BP Systolic: >20 point drop Systolic: > 20 point drop (Supine to standing) Diastolic: > 10 point drop Diastolic: > 10 point drop Potassium < 3 meq/l Hypokalemia Body temperature < 97 F Abnormal core temperature Electrolytes/ serum chemistry Significant deviation from normal Significant deviation from normal Must have either a. or b.: A low body weight that can reasonably lead to instability in the absence of intervention as evidenced by one of the following: Less than 85% of IBW or a BMI less than 16.5. Greater than 10% decrease in body weight within the last 30 days. In children and adolescents, greater than 10% decrease in body weight during a rapid growth cycle. Persistence or worsening of eating disorder behavior despite recent (with [sic] the last three months), appropriate therapeutic intervention in a structured eating disorder treatment setting. If PHP or IOP is contraindicated, documentation of the rationale supporting the contraindication is required. One of the following must be present: Compensatory behaviors (binging, purging, laxative abuse, excessive exercise, etc.) have caused significant physiological complications. Compensatory behaviors occur multiple times daily and have failed to respond to treatment at a lower level of care and acute physiologic imbalance can reasonably be expected. New Directions’ contact notes for this case indicate that it was called by someone named “Rachelle” on behalf of A.H.’s family on September 3, 2015. This person asked about the authorization process for McLean Hospital. No witness was presented who had direct knowledge of the contents of this conversation. The note indicates that “Rachelle” was advised that any authorization process must be initiated with New Directions by McLean Hospital. On September 9, 2015, the day R.H. was admitted to McLean Hospital, Florida Blue received what its notes reference as a “critical inquiry” message regarding this admission. A Florida Blue employee phoned the number attached to the message but discovered it was not for A.H. but for “someone at AllState Insurance who is out of the office.” (This person turned out to be Pearl Harrison, R.H.’s grandmother and qualified representative in this proceeding, who had not yet obtained a release to receive confidential medical information concerning R.H.). No number for A.H. could be found. Florida Blue contacted New Directions, which confirmed that no request for pre-authorization3/ had been received from McLean Hospital or the member. R.H.’s stays at McLean Hospital were not emergency admissions. The term “medical emergency” was not specifically defined in the 2015 Plan, but expert testimony at the hearing established that it is a term of common meaning and usage in the medical community. An emergency situation is one in which there is an immediate risk of death, serious bodily harm, or creation of an irreversible condition. If care is not administered immediately, the person will harm herself or someone else. Michael Shaw, the utilization management team leader for New Directions, explained that emergency care is not provided at the residential level of care, but in an inpatient setting under lock and key. The medical records indicated that R.H.’s last incident of self-harming behavior occurred about a week prior to her admission to McLean Hospital. Her injuries were superficial and she was in no immediate danger or risk of irreversible damage. Section 7-1 of the Plan provides for hospital admissions, including the following pertinent language as to non-emergency admissions to non-network hospitals and pre- certification for stays at non-network hospitals: Non-Network Hospital: Non-emergency Admission Every non-emergency admission to a non- network Hospital must be pre-certified. This means that before services are provided Florida Blue must certify the Hospital admission and provide the number of days for which certification is given. Precertification of non-network Hospital stays is your responsibility, even if the Doctor admitting you or your dependent to the Hospital is a Network Provider. Failure to obtain pre-certification will result in penalties (higher out-of-pocket costs). For more information on penalties, see “If You Do Not Pre-Certify Your Stay” within this section below. To pre-certify your stay in a non-network Hospital, ask your Doctor to call Florida Blue at (800) 955-5692 before your Hospital admission and provide the reason for hospitalization, the proposed treatment or surgery, testing, and the number of Hospital days anticipated. Florida Blue will review your Doctor’s request for admission certification and immediately notify your Doctor or the Hospital if your admission has been certified and the number of days for which certification has been given. If the admission is not certified, your Doctor may submit additional information for a second review. If your Hospital stay is certified and you need to stay longer than the number of days for which certification was given, your Doctor must call Florida Blue to request certification for the additional days. Your Doctor should make this call as soon as possible. * * * If You Do Not Pre-Certify Your Stay: Non- Network Hospital Benefits for covered services will be reduced by 25 percent of the covered charges, not to exceed a maximum benefit reduction of $500 IF you are admitted to a participating Hospital (Payment for Hospital Services or PHS Provider)[4/] that is not part of the Preferred Patient Care (PPC) Network and admission certification has not been requested on your behalf or the request is denied. This Plan will not pay room and board benefits for your first two days of hospitalization IF your non-network Hospital admission is denied, but you are admitted to a non-network Hospital anyway. This Plan will not pay room and board benefits for your entire Hospital stay IF you are admitted to a non-network Hospital without having your Doctor call prior to the admission. This Plan will not pay room and board benefits for the additional days that were not certified IF your non-network Hospital admission is certified but your stay is longer than the number of days for which the admission was certified. The Plan’s pre-certification requirement was not met. Neither A.H. nor McLean Hospital requested pre-certification. Mr. Shaw testified that he spoke to three different people at McLean Hospital, all of whom stated that the 3 East DBT program does not accept or work with insurance. Mr. Shaw was unable to generate the paperwork needed to begin the pre-certification process because McLean Hospital declined to share with him the necessary clinical information about R.H.5/ Although pre-certification was not obtained for R.H.’s stays at McLean Hospital, Florida Blue conducted a post-service review to determine whether the claim was eligible for reimbursement. Petitioner submitted a request for a Level I appeal pursuant to Section 12 of the Plan, under which a person denied benefits or payment of a claim for medical services may obtain a review by Florida Blue. Petitioner submitted a package of R.H.’s medical records for review. Prest & Associates, Inc., a URAC-approved independent review organization,6/ was retained to conduct an independent review of Petitioner’s claim. Dr. Barbara Center, a staff psychiatrist with Prest & Associates, performed a review designed to determine the medical necessity of R.H.’s stays at McLean Hospital. Dr. Center is board-certified in General Psychiatry, Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, and Addiction Medicine. Dr. Center reviewed the claim in terms of the New Directions criteria for psychiatric residential admissions and for eating disorder residential admissions. She performed two reviews, one for the admission starting on September 9, 2015, and another for the admission starting on October 15, 2015. Dr. Center stated that the McLean Hospital medical records provided by Petitioner gave a detailed description of R.H.’s history of present illness, past psychiatric history, and other elements of her history that were adequate for making a medical necessity determination. As to the September 9 admission, Dr. Center concluded that medical necessity criteria were not met for either a psychiatric residential or an eating disorder residential admission. As to the psychiatric residential criteria, Dr. Center concluded that R.H.’s admission failed to satisfy criteria 3, 4, and 5. Dr. Center testified that criterion 4 looks at symptoms and behaviors that represent a significant deterioration from the patient’s baseline functioning in several areas. R.H.’s primary support structures were stable. Her mother was clearly involved in her care and had the support of other family members. Dr. Center stated that the medical records showed no sign of substantial social or interpersonal deterioration, aside from some typical difficulty in starting high school. R.H. was having no medical instability at the time of admission. She was not at a dangerously low body weight. She had a recent onset of self-harming behaviors, but there was no documentation of acute risk issues that warranted placement in 24-hour care. As to criterion 5, Dr. Center testified that the records showed no indication that R.H.’s family and support system was unsupportive or unable to take her to treatment and participate in her care. There was no documentation that R.H. could not progress in a less intensive level of care. Dr. Center noted that R.H.’s prior treatment for eating disorders had been at varying levels of care and that R.H. had not had multiple brief acute inpatient stays. Criterion 3 is a diagnosis of exclusion, meaning that if there is no apparent medical necessity for the residential placement, then the reason must be “primarily social, custodial, interpersonal or respite care.” Dr. Center found in the records no support for a 24-hour residential placement. She noted that R.H.’s self-injury was of a recent onset and that McLean Hospital had ruled out any immediate prospect of self-injury or serious threat to other people. Cutting is not uncommon among adolescents and does not rise to the level of requiring residential care. Mental health providers distinguish between self-injurious behaviors and suicidal ideation, and McLean Hospital did not describe R.H. as suicidal. Dr. Center testified that, at the request of Mr. Shaw, she also reviewed R.H.’s admission in terms of the New Directions eating disorder residential criteria. Dr. Center noted that R.H. was not at a dangerous body weight (122 pounds, with a BMI of 22.2) at the time of her admission on September 9. There was no indication of medical instability or of out-of- control eating disorders requiring 24-hour care. Dr. Center testified that DBT is routinely taught on an outpatient basis and that she recommended outpatient treatment for the stay beginning on September 9. She opined that R.H. did not meet numbers 3 through 7 of the New Directions eating disorder residential criteria. As to the McLean Hospital admission beginning on October 15, 2015, Dr. Center recommended intensive outpatient treatment. Dr. Center knew that R.H. had been transitioned from McLean Hospital to the Cambridge Center to address the eating disorder as her primary symptom. Dr. Center felt that continuing R.H. in an intensive outpatient setting would help her stabilize and maintain the progress she had made at the Cambridge Center. Dr. Center stated that a basic tenet of medical care, and especially psychiatric care, is that the patient be treated in the least restrictive setting possible under the circumstances. She stated that it is always best to treat people in the environment they live in. Treatment in the 24- hour residential setting removes the patient from the stressors she will have to deal with when she goes home. Upon her readmission to the McLean Hospital from Cambridge Center, R.H. denied suicidal ideation and homicidal ideation, and the record disclosed nothing to indicate suicidal thoughts. R.H. denied auditory or visual hallucinations and her mood was described as “euthymic,” i.e., essentially normal. Dr. Center acknowledged that the medical record showed that R.H. had been in intensive outpatient treatment for her eating disorder at the Renfrew Center in Florida from July 23 through August 21, 2015, with limited success. Dr. Center stated that the issue for R.H. had recently changed from her eating disorder to her self-harming behavior and believed that an intensive outpatient program focusing on skills to deal with self-injurious behaviors would be the appropriate placement under the circumstances. Dr. Center also acknowledged that her review did not include the records of R.H.’s treating psychiatrist and therapist during her stay at Renfrew, and that their notes indicated that R.H.’s condition had regressed while in intensive outpatient care. Dr. Center testified that these records might have persuaded her to recommend a higher level of care, such as a partial hospital program, but that she still would not have recommended residential placement. After Dr. Center rendered her opinion that R.H.’s residential stays at McLean Hospital were not medically necessary, the claim was reviewed by Dr. Frank Santamaria, Florida Blue’s care management medical director. In rendering his opinion, Dr. Santamaria reviewed the medical records sent by Petitioner and McLean Hospital, the log of contact notes kept by New Directions, and Dr. Center’s report.7/ He testified that the available records were adequate to allow him to render an opinion as to medical necessity. Dr. Santamaria concluded that, as to the New Directions criteria for psychiatric residential admissions, R.H. failed to meet criteria 3, 4, and 5. He opined generally that when assessing the need for a residential stay, he is looking for someone who is at risk of self-harm or harming others or who has an acute severe psychiatric condition such as a psychotic disorder that requires confinement. Dr. Santamaria noted that R.H.’s eating disorder was not the primary concern at the time of her admissions to McLean Hospital; however, because the eating disorder was occurring at the same time as the psychiatric problem, he was also looking for medical manifestations of the eating disorder, such as severe weight loss affecting blood chemistry. Criterion 4 requires documented symptoms and/or behaviors that are a significant deterioration from baseline functioning and create a significant functional impairment in at least three of five listed areas. Under area 4a, “primary support,” Dr. Santamaria noted that R.H. had good support from her mother and grandmother. He did not believe that primary support was a problem.8/ As to area 4b, “social/interpersonal,” the notes indicated that R.H. recently had an altercation with a friend. Dr. Santamaria did not find such an altercation out of the ordinary for a 15-year-old and thus found no functional impairment under 4b. Area 4c, “occupational/educational,” appeared to pose no problem because the records indicated that R.H. was an A-B student, despite her rocky first week of high school. As to area 4d, “health/medical compliance,” Dr. Santamaria noted that R.H. had been compliant with medical instructions and her family had been good about seeking care for her. As to area 4e, “ability to maintain safety for either self or others,” Dr. Santamaria acknowledged that R.H. had hit her hand with a hammer and acted in other self-injurious ways, chiefly superficial cutting. He testified that such behaviors are not uncommon in younger populations and do not necessarily make the person a candidate for residential care. Self-injury alone does not satisfy the criterion, unless there is a concern for suicide or homicide. The hammer incident occurred in August, at least one week before R.H.’s admission to McLean Hospital. The McLean Hospital admission note of September 9, 2015, indicates no reported history of suicidal thinking. Dr. Santamaria found no documentation to indicate R.H. was aggressive against herself or others. She had no acute conditions such as psychotic disorders. Dr. Santamaria noted that even if area 4e were deemed to have been met, criterion 4 requires significant functional impairment and degradation from baseline functioning in at least three of the listed areas, and that R.H. at most satisfied one area of the criterion. Criterion 5 of the New Directions psychiatric residential criteria requires that one of three conditions relating to the patient’s support system or treatment history be met. Dr. Santamaria concluded that none of the three conditions were met. Condition 5c requires a recent history of multiple brief acute inpatient stays without a successful transition to a lower level of care. Dr. Santamaria conceded that the record he examined disclosed little information about prior therapies that had been tried with R.H., but he concluded that the record was sufficient to confirm that R.H. did not have multiple brief inpatient stays. He was reasonably confident that McLean Hospital would have documented such stays had they occurred because they would be a very significant part of her history. Dr. Santamaria also noted that R.H. had been able to transition to an intensive outpatient program from her inpatient admission to the Renfrew Center in May 2015. Condition 5a requires that family members or the patient’s support system demonstrate behaviors that are likely to undermine the goals of treatment, such that treatment at a lower level of care is unlikely to be successful. The record disclosed that R.H.’s mother, who was her custodial guardian, had a history of substance abuse but had gone through a rehabilitation program, attended Narcotics Anonymous regularly, and had been sober for one year at the time of R.H.’s October 15, 2015, admission to McLean Hospital. Dr. Santamaria testified that if R.H.’s mother were currently using drugs and R.H. had nowhere else to go, then condition 5a might be met. However, the actual situation presented by the medical record did not establish that R.H. was living in an unsafe environment that could undermine her treatment. As to condition 5b, a documented history of an inability to be managed at an intensive lower level of care, Dr. Santamaria concluded that R.H. had responded to various therapies in the past. As noted above, criterion 3 of the New Directions psychiatric residential criteria is exclusionary, i.e., if the placement appears not to be medically necessary, then one begins to seek another motivation, such as the desire for a change of pace or a respite for the family. Dr. Santamaria noted that DBT does not require placement at the residential level. It can be done at an intensive outpatient or partial hospitalization level, both of which are lower levels of care than residential.9/ This fact made Dr. Santamaria suspect that the prime motive for R.H.’s placement may have been custodial. Dr. Santamaria testified that he also analyzed R.H.’s admission under the New Directions eating disorder residential criteria. He stated that he could not be certain from the record whether McLean Hospital was treating R.H.’s eating disorder, as well as providing DBT, but he knew that McLean Hospital was mindful of the eating disorder. He also knew that R.H.’s transfer to the Cambridge Center was partly because her eating disorder was becoming worse. Dr. Santamaria concluded that R.H. did not satisfy criteria 3 through 7 for an eating disorder residential admission. Dr. Santamaria testified that R.H. did not meet eating disorder residential criteria 3 through 5 for the same reasons she did not meet the identical criteria 3 through 5 of the psychiatric residential criteria. Criterion 6 concerns biomedical complications of an eating disorder. Dr. Santamaria reviewed the medical records and concluded that R.H. presented none of the complications that would require 24-hour care at the time of her admission on September 9, 2015. Dr. Santamaria likewise found that R.H. satisfied neither factor 7a nor 7b of Criterion 7. As to 7a, R.H. did not present with a low body weight and there was no documentation that she had lost 10 percent of her body weight in the last 30 days. As to 7b, there was no evidence that R.H.’s “compensatory behaviors,” i.e., binging and purging, had caused “significant physiological complications” or that such behaviors occurred multiple times daily and did not respond to treatment “at an intensive lower level of care.” Dr. Santamaria testified that his analysis as to the October 15, 2015, admission was identical to that for the September 9, 2015, admission. As to both admissions, he believed that intensive outpatient was the appropriate level of care. Dr. Santamaria defined “intensive outpatient” as three hours of intensive therapy for at least three days per week. He believed that this level of care could address all of R.H.’s issues, including her self-injurious behavior. Dr. Santamaria concluded that if R.H. tried the intensive outpatient level of care and failed, then a higher level could be considered. Like Dr. Center, he stated that he might have recommended a partial hospitalization setting had he known that intensive outpatient had been tried and failed, but he still would not have recommended a 24-hour residential admission. Petitioner’s presentation implied that Florida Blue and/or Prest & Associates base their coverage decisions on financial considerations rather than strictly on the merits of the claims. Dr. Center and Dr. Santamaria both testified that they had no incentive, financial or otherwise, to deny a claim for reimbursement. Their testimony on this point is credible. Petitioner offered no direct evidence that Florida Blue or Prest & Associates directly pressure their physician employees to reject meritorious claims, and there is no evidence that Dr. Santamaria or Dr. Center based their recommendations on anything other than their assessment of R.H.’s medical records in light of the relevant medical necessity criteria. Petitioner raised questions about the completeness of the records examined by Dr. Santamaria and Dr. Center and sounded a skeptical note as to the diligence of the physicians’ efforts to obtain additional documentation. As found above, both Dr. Santamaria and Dr. Center testified that they had adequate documentation to render an opinion as to medical necessity in this case. Both physicians stated that in other cases they have taken additional steps to obtain missing information, including making peer-to-peer calls to the treating physicians or reaching out to the case managers, but that no such steps were necessary in this case. Both physicians conceded that not all of the medical records were available to them at the time of their reviews. They did not have records from R.H.’s stays at the Renfrew Center and the Cambridge Center or the notes of R.H.’s treating physicians in Florida. Both Dr. Center and Dr. Santamaria credibly testified that nothing in these additional records would have changed their opinion as to the medical necessity of residential treatment for R.H. Section 12 of the Plan, which sets forth the appeal process for a denied claim, expressly states: “Your appeal may include any additional documentation, information, evidence or testimony that you would like reviewed and considered during the appeal process.” This language is included in the explanations for both the Level I and Level II appeals. Nothing prevents the member from providing any documentation whatsoever during the appeal process. Dr. Center and Dr. Santamaria are physician reviewers, not medical investigators. If something Petitioner asserted to be relevant to the decision was missing from the files, it was not the fault of the reviewing physicians. It is ultimately the member’s responsibility to provide appropriate documentation for review. By letter dated April 5, 2016, Florida Blue notified Petitioner that it “remains unable to approve additional coverage and/or payment for the Residential Treatment.” The letter set forth the following rationale for the denial: Per the State Employees’ PPO Plan Booklet and Benefits Document page 5-5: “Services or supplies that are not Medically Necessary, as determined by Florida Blue and/or CVS Caremark clinical staff and Division of State Group Insurance, are non- covered.” Specifically, coverage for the Mental Health (Eating Disorder) Residential stays is denied as it does not meet the definition of medical necessity. This is for hospital stay on and after 09/09/2015 and 10/15/2015. The final decision to proceed with the requested services is between the provider and the member. Records show that the member was not deemed to be a present risk to self or to others. Though the member had a preoccupation with weight sand [sic] eating, there was no evidence of inability to adequately care for self with functioning in multiple sphere areas, including stabilization of the eating disorder issues. There was no report of medical instability or psychosis. The member was in a body weight range. The member was described as having her eating disorder symptoms under control. From the clinical evidence, this member could have been safely treated at each occasion at a lesser level of care such as in an eating disorder intensive outpatient setting. This review was done using New Directions Clinical Care criteria and is based on the opinion of a board certified psychiatrist. Services that are not medically necessary are not covered under your health benefit plan. The denial letter provided Petitioner with information regarding the Level II appeal process to DSGI, including a reference to the pertinent section of the Plan. The denial letter reiterated that Petitioner could submit any information or documentation that Petitioner believed could assist in DSGI’s review of the appeal. Petitioner submitted a request for a Level II appeal to DSGI on May 23, 2016. The Level II appeal was reviewed by DSGI’s legal nurse coordinator, Kathy Flippo. Ms. Flippo reviewed all of the documents reviewed by Dr. Center and Dr. Santamaria, plus additional records submitted by Petitioner with the Level II appeal request. Ms. Flippo determined that the stays at issue were non-emergency admissions that required pre-certification and that the pre-certification requirements of the Plan were not met. Ms. Flippo reached the same conclusions as Dr. Center and Dr. Santamaria regarding the New Directions psychiatric residential criteria. Ms. Flippo concluded that R.H. did not meet criteria 3, 4, or 5. Ms. Flippo testified that she did not review the case pursuant to the New Directions eating disorder residential criteria because Petitioner’s Level II appeal addressed only the psychiatric issues and because R.H.’s eating disorder stay at the Cambridge Center was covered by Florida Blue. By letter dated July 29, 2016, signed by Tami Fillyaw, director of DSGI, Petitioner was informed that the Level II appeal had been denied. The letter informed Petitioner of his rights under the Plan to file a petition for a formal or an informal hearing contesting the denial of the appeal and/or to request a binding external review from an Independent Review Organization (“IRO”).10/ Petitioner requested both an administrative hearing and an external review.11/ The external review was conducted under the auspices of the Medical Review Institute of America, Inc. (“MRIoA”), a URAC-accredited external review network. The MRIoA assigned a physician whom it stated is board-certified by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology in the specialties of General Psychiatry and Child & Adolescent Psychiatry.12/ The external review upheld the adverse determinations regarding coverage for the McLean Hospital stays. In its decision letter dated November 11, 2016, the MRIoA provided the following relevant clinical summary and findings: At the time in question, the patient was a 15 year old female with a variety of difficulties related to depression, anxiety, eating disorder symptoms, and symptoms of obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) with self-harming behaviors. This review has to do with a question of whether residential treatment center (RTC) level of care (LOC) for two episodes of service 9/9/15-9/22/15 and 10/15/15-12/11/15 met the plan criteria for medical necessity. It is noted that the patient was treated in a special eating disorders program on the dates between these two episodes. * * * The patient’s presentation did not meet the plan criteria for medical necessity for the dates in question. Specifically, the patient did not meet criteria #5 of the Admission Criteria. The patient is noted to have a caring and effective support system that would have supported a less intensive level of care. There was no recent history of inability to be effectively treated at an intensive level of service below residential treatment center (RTC) level of care (LOC), and there was no recent history of inability to transition from inpatient treatment into a less intensive level of care. At the time of admission to residential treatment, it is clear that the patient struggled with mood dysregulation along with episodes of food restriction and self- harming behaviors. She was not responding to attempts at outpatient treatment. The residential program in question was sought out specifically due to its approach to the utilization of DBT (dialectical behavior therapy). However, there is no indication that the patient could not have responded to attempts to escalate her treatment in the outpatient setting through the use of either intensive outpatient or partial hospitalization services. In particular, the patient could have been involved in a formal DBT program without utilization of residential treatment. Her symptom severity for the dates in question was not of a severity to require the use of round the clock observation and treatment. As a result, there was no medical necessity for residential treatment center (RTC) level of care (LOC). * * * The appeal letters from the patient’s family, outpatient providers, and residential facility discuss the need for residential treatment due to the patient’s symptoms severity, particularly the patient’s episodes of self-harming behavior and the need for her to participate in the immersive DBT program utilized at the residential program in question. The patient’s need for more intensive treatment is acknowledged. However, the patient’s recent treatment history was one of outpatient treatment with a previous history of residential treatment for eating disorder symptoms. For the DOS in question, the patient could have obtained appropriate and effective DBT in a less restrictive setting, such as either a partial hospitalization program (PHP) or an intensive outpatient program (IOP). Based on the above, the previous determination has been upheld. At the hearing, Petitioner complained that, prior to receiving the letter denying the Level II appeal, he had no inkling that medical necessity determinations were based on criteria produced by New Directions. The Plan’s definition of “medically necessary” does not reference the fact that Florida Blue relies on the New Directions criteria for medical necessity determinations in psychiatric and eating disorder admissions. Petitioner basically argues that not having the precise language of the New Directions medical necessity criteria deprived him and the medical providers of the ability to frame the coverage requests in such a way as to satisfy the criteria. The record evidence shows Florida Blue does not make the New Directions medical necessity criteria directly available to its members. In fact, New Directions is nowhere mentioned in the Plan. Witnesses for DSGI correctly stated that anyone can download the criteria from the New Directions website, but Petitioner pointed out that one must be aware the criteria exist before one can download them. If this case is typical, it appears that a Florida Blue member must be denied coverage and go through the appeal process before Florida Blue makes him aware of precisely how the determination of medical necessity is made. Dr. Santamaria testified that Florida Blue does not expect its members to have any knowledge of the New Directions criteria or to “understand all the medical jargon.” The member is expected to present Florida Blue with the best and most accurate medical information available (preferably before the services are rendered) and rely on Florida Blue to make the decision. Dr. Santamaria stated, “Your role is not to do the utilization management. That’s my role. Your role is, if you disagree with a coverage determination, to appeal it and to even have your doctor speak on your behalf or write a letter or do whatever. It’s not your role to access the documents and to use them on your own. That--that’s not what they were created for.” Dr. Santamaria emphasized that the member’s “role” is not to “meet criteria” but to provide Florida Blue with information sufficient to allow its experts to apply the criteria. While his phrasing may be condescending, Dr. Santamaria’s statement is basically accurate: the medical records determine whether the criteria have been met. Petitioner’s awareness of the particulars of the criteria would not change the substance of the medical record. The undersigned tends to agree with Petitioner that Florida Blue’s process could be more transparent. However, Petitioner failed to show how the outcome would have been different if the New Directions medical necessity criteria had been available to him or McLean Hospital. Every expert who examined the medical records agreed that R.H. did not meet the criteria for medical necessity. Their opinions are credited. Ms. Flippo emphasized that Florida Blue did not deny coverage merely because McLean Hospital’s 3 East DBT program was self-pay. If the member had been able to obtain pre- certification for hospitalization and a proper bill had been presented to Florida Blue, it would have been covered at the allowable non-network coverage amount. Ms. Flippo also stated that even if pre-certification had been obtained, Florida Blue would certainly not have covered the 70 days that R.H. spent in McLean Hospital. Ms. Flippo had never seen more than 15 days at a time approved, even for members who were floridly psychotic and admitted under the Baker Act. With modern treatments and medications, it is seldom necessary to keep patients at a residential level of care for months at a time. All of the experts agreed that DBT is more commonly provided on an outpatient basis. Additionally, Mr. Shaw pointed out that the ability of the insurer to pay the non-contracted, non-network rate to the hospital is contingent on the hospital’s willingness to accept insurance payments. McLean Hospital’s 3 East DBT program did not accept insurance. Mr. Shaw succinctly stated, “We’re not obligated to pay you back because you made the choice to go to a facility that takes your money but not ours.”
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of State Group Insurance, issue a final order denying Petitioner’s claim for coverage under the State Employees’ PPO Plan for R.H.’s residential treatment at McLean Hospital from September 9, 2015, to September 30, 2015, and October 15, 2015, to December 11, 2015. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 2017.
The Issue Whether the certificate of need application to convert 30 acute care beds to 30 adult psychiatric beds at Broward General Medical Center meets the statutory and rule criteria for approval.
Findings Of Fact The North Broward Hospital District (NBHD) is a special taxing district established by the Florida Legislature in 1951 to provide health care services to residents of the northern two-thirds of Broward County. NBHD owns and operates four acute care hospitals: Coral Springs Medical Center, North Broward Medical Center, Imperial Point Medical Center (Imperial Point), and Broward General Medical Center (Broward General). NBHD also owns and/or operates primary care clinics, school clinics, urgent care centers, and a home health agency. FMC Hospital, Ltd., d/b/a Florida Medical Center (FMC) is a 459-bed hospital with 74 inpatient psychiatric beds, 51 for adults separated into a 25-bed adult unit and a 26-bed geriatric psychiatric unit, and 23 child/adolescent psychiatric beds. FMC is a public Baker Act receiving facility for children and adolescents and operates a mental health crisis stabilization unit (CSU) for children and adolescents. FMC also operates separately located facilities which include a partial hospitalization program, an adult day treatment program, and a community mental health center. At Florida Medical Center South, FMC operates another day treatment program and partial hospitalization program. The Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) is the state agency which administers the certificate of need (CON) program for health care services and facilities in Florida. The NBHD applied for CON Number 8425 to convert 30 acute care beds to 30 adult psychiatric beds at Broward General. Broward General operates approximately 550 of its total 744 licensed beds. It is a state Level II adult and pediatric trauma center and the tertiary referral center for the NBHD, offering Level II and III neonatal intensive care, pediatric intensive care, cardiac catheterization and open heart surgery services. Broward General has 68 adult psychiatric beds and is a public Baker Act receiving facility for adults. Public Baker Act receiving facilities have state contracts and receive state funds to hold involuntarily committed mental patients, regardless of their ability to pay, for psychiatric evaluation and short-term treatment. See Subsections 394.455(25) and (26), Florida Statutes. Although they serve different age groups, both FMC and Broward General are, by virtue of contracts with the state, public Baker Act facilities. When a Baker Act patient who is an indigent child or adolescent arrives at Broward General, the patient is transferred to FMC. FMC also typically transfers indigent Baker Act adults to Broward General. At Broward General, psychiatric patients are screened in a separate section of the emergency room by a staff which has significant experience with indigent mental health patients. If hospitalization is appropriate, depending on the patient's physical and mental condition, inpatient psychiatric services are provided in either a 38-bed unit on the sixth floor or a 30- bed unit on the fourth floor of Broward General. In July 1995, Broward General also started operating a 20-bed mental health CSU located on Northwest 19th Street in Fort Lauderdale. Prior to 1995, the County operated the 19th Street CSU and 60 CSU beds on the grounds of the South Florida State Hospital (SFSH), a state mental hospital. Following an investigation of mental health services in the County, a grand jury recommended closing the 60 CSU beds at SFSH because of "deplorable conditions." In addition, the grand jury recommended that the County transfer CSU operations to the NBHD and the South Broward Hospital District (SBHD). As a result, the SBHD assumed the responsibility for up to 20 CSU inpatients a day within its existing 100 adult psychiatric beds at Memorial Regional Hospital. The NBHD assumed the responsibility for up to 40 CSU inpatients a day, including 20 at the 19th Street location. The additional 20 were to be redirected to either the 68 adult psychiatric beds at Broward General or the 47 adult psychiatric beds at Imperial Point. CSU services for adult Medicaid and indigent patients in the NBHD service area were transferred pursuant to contracts between the NBHD and Broward County, and the NBHD and the State of Florida, Department of Children and Family Services (formerly, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services). Based on the agreements, the County leases the 19th Street building in which Broward General operates the CSU. The County also pays a flat rate of $1.6 million a year in monthly installments for the salaries of the staff which was transferred from the County mental health division to the NBHD. The County's contract with the NBHD lasts for five years, from December 1995 to September 2000. Either party may terminate the contract, without cause, upon 30 days notice. The State contract, unlike that of Broward County, does not provide a flat rate, but sets a per diem reimbursement rate of approximately $260 per patient per day offset by projected Medicaid revenues. The State contract is renewable annually, but last expired on June 30, 1997. The contract was being re-negotiated at the time of the hearing in November 1997. Based on actual experience with declining average lengths of stay for psychiatric inpatients, the contract was being re-negotiated to fund an average of 30, not a maximum of 40 patients a day. If CON 8425 is approved, NBHD intends to use the additional 30 adult psychiatric beds at Broward General to meet the requirements of the State and County contracts, while closing the 19th Street CSU and consolidating mental health screening and stabilization services at Broward General. NBHD proposes to condition the CON on the provision of 70 percent charity and 30 percent Medicaid patient days in the 30 new beds. By comparison, the condition applicable to the existing 68 beds requires the provision of 3 percent charity and 25 percent Medicaid. When averaged for a total of 98 beds, the overall condition would be 23.5 percent charity and 26.5 percent Medicaid, or a total of 51 or 52 percent. The proposed project will require the renovation of 10,297 gross square feet on the fourth floor of Broward General at a cost of approximately $450,000. The space is currently an unused section of Broward General which contains 42 medical/surgical beds. Twelve beds will be relocated to other areas of the hospital. The renovated space will include seclusion, group therapy, and social rooms, as well as 15 semi- private rooms. Twelve of the rooms will not have separate bathing/showering facilities, and seven of those will also not have toilets within the patients' rooms. Need in Relation to State and District Health Plans - Subsection 408.035(1)(a), Florida Statutes The District 10 allocation factors include a requirement that a CON applicant demonstrate continuously high levels of utilization. The applicant is given the following evidentiary guidelines: patients are routinely waiting for admissions to inpatient units; the facility provides significant services to indigent and Medicaid individuals; the facility arranges transfer for patients to other appropriate facilities; and the facility provides other medical services, if needed. Broward General does not demonstrate continuously high utilization by having patients routinely waiting for admission. Broward General does meet the other criteria required by allocation factor one. The second District 10 allocation factor, like criterion (b) of the first, favors an applicant who commits to serving State funded and indigent patients. Broward General is a disproportionate share Medicaid provider with a history of providing, and commitment to continue providing, significant services to Medicaid and indigent patients. In fact, the NBHD provides over 50 percent of both indigent and Medicaid services in District 10. See also Subsection 408.035(1)(n), Florida Statutes. Allocation factor three for substance abuse facilities is inapplicable to Broward General which does not have substance abuse inpatient services. Allocation factor 4 for an applicant with a full continuum of acute medical services is met by Broward General. See also Rule 59C-1.040(3)(h), Florida Administrative Code. Broward General complies with allocation factor 5 by participating in data collection activities of the regional health planning council. The state health plan includes preferences for (1) converting excess acute care beds; (2) serving the most seriously mentally ill patients; (3) serving indigent and Baker Act patients; (4) proposing to establish a continuum of mental health care; (5) serving Medicaid-eligible patients; and (6) providing a disproportionate share of Medicaid and charity care. Broward General meets the six state health plan preferences. See also Rule 59C-1.040(4)(e)2., Florida Administrative Code, and Subsection 408.035(1)(n), Florida Statutes. Broward General does not meet the preference for acute care hospitals if fewer than .15 psychiatric beds per 1000 people in the District are located in acute care hospitals. The current ratio in the District is .19 beds per 1,000 people. Rule 59C-1.040(4)(3)3, Florida Administrative Code, also requires that 40 percent of the psychiatric beds needed in a district should be allocated to general hospitals. Currently, approximately 51 percent, 266 of 517 licensed District 10 adult inpatient psychiatric beds are located in general acute care hospitals. On balance, the NBHD and Broward General meet the factors and preferences of the health plans which support the approval of the CON application. See also Rule 59C- 1.040(4)(e)1. and Rule 59C-1.030, Florida Administrative Code. Numeric Need The parties stipulated that the published fixed need pool indicated no numeric need for additional adult inpatient psychiatric hospital beds. In fact, the numeric need calculation shows a need for 434 beds in District 10, which has 517 beds, or 83 more than the projected numeric need. In 1994- 1995, the District utilization rate was approximately 58 percent. The NBHD asserts that the need arises from "not normal" circumstances, specifically certain benefits from closing the 19th Street CSU, especially the provision of better consolidated care in hospital-based psychiatric beds, and the establishment of a County mental health court. The NBHD acknowledges that AHCA does not regulate CSU beds through the CON program and that CSU beds are not intended to be included in the calculation of numeric need for adult psychiatric beds. However, due to the substantial similarity of services provided, NBHD contends that CSU beds are de facto inpatient psychiatric beds which affect the need for CON- regulated psychiatric beds. Therefore, according to the NBHD, the elimination of beds at SFSH and at the 19th Street CSU require an increase in the supply of adult psychiatric beds. The NBHD also notes that approval of its CON application will increase the total number of adult psychiatric hospital beds in Broward County, but will not affect the total number of adult mental health beds when CSU and adult psychiatric beds are combined. After the CSU beds at SFSH closed, the total number of adult mental health beds in the County has, in fact, been reduced. NBHD projected a need to add 30 adult psychiatric beds at Broward General by combining the 1995 average daily census (ADC) of 48 patients with its assumption that it can add up to 10, increasing the ADC to 58 patients a day in the existing 68 beds. Based on its contractual obligation to care for up to 40 CSU inpatients a day, the NBHD projects a need for an additional 30 beds. The projection assumed that the level of utilization of adult inpatient psychiatric services at Broward General would remain relatively constant. With 40 occupied beds added to the 48 ADC, NBHD predicted an ADC of 88 in the new total of 98 beds, or 90 percent occupancy. The assumption that the ADC would remain fairly constant is generally supported by the actual experience with ADCs of 48.1, 51.5, and 45.8 patients, respectively, in 1995, 1996, and the first seven months of 1997. NBHD's second assumption, that an ADC of 40 CSU patients will be added is not supported by the actual experience. Based on the terms of the State and County contracts, up to 20 CSU patients have already been absorbed into the existing beds at the Imperial Point or Broward General, which is one explanation for the temporary increase in ADC in 1996, while up to 20 more may receive services at the 19th Street location. In 1996 and 1997, the ADC in the 19th Street CSU beds was 15.3 and 14.2, respectively, with monthly ranges in 1997 from a high of 17 in April to a low of 12 in June. The relatively constant annual ADCs in psychiatric and CSU beds are a reflection of increasing admissions but declining average lengths of stay for psychiatric services. The NBHD also projects that it will receive referrals from the Broward County Mental Health Court, established in June 1997. The Court is intended to divert mentally ill defendants with minor criminal charges from the criminal justice system to the mental health system. Actual experience for only three months of operations showed 7 or 8 admissions a month with widely varying average lengths of stay, from 6 to 95 days. The effect of court referrals on the ADC at Broward General was statistically insignificant into the fall of 1997. Newspaper reports of the number of inmates with serious mental illnesses do not provide a reliable basis for projecting the effect of the mental health court on psychiatric admissions to Broward General, since it is not equipped to handle violent felons. One of Broward General's experts also compared national hospital discharge data to that of Broward County. The results indicate a lower use rate in Broward County in 1995 and a higher one in 1996. That finding was consistent with the expert's finding of a growth in admissions and bed turnover rate which measures the demand for each bed. The expert also considered the prevalence of mental illness and hospitalization rates. The data reflecting expected increases in admissions, however, was not compared to available capacity in the County nor correlated with declining lengths of stay. The District X: Comprehensive Health Plan 1994 includes an estimate of the need for 10 CSU beds per 100,000 people, or a total of 133 CSU beds needed for the District. FMC argues that the calculation is incorrect because only the adult population should be included. Using only adults, FMC determined that 116 CSU beds are needed which, when added to 434 adult psychiatric beds needed in the February 1996 projection, gives a bed need for all mental health beds of 550. That total is less than the actual combined total number of 567 mental health beds, 517 adult psychiatric beds plus 50 CSU beds in 1995. Whatever population group is appropriate, the projection of the need for CSU beds is not reliable based on the evidence that, since the end of 1995, CSU services have been and, according to NBHD, should continue to be absorbed into hospital- based adult psychiatric units. For the same reason, the increase in adult psychiatric bed admissions from 1995 to 1996 does not establish a trend towards increasing psychiatric utilization, but is more likely attributable to the closing of CSU beds at SFSH. FMC's expert's comparison of data from three selected months in two successive years is also not sufficient to establish a downward trend in utilization at the 19th Street CSU, neither is the evidence of a decline in ADC by one patient in one year. Utilization is relatively static based on ADCs in existing Broward County adult psychiatric beds and in CSU beds. FMC established Broward General's potential to decrease average lengths of stay by developing alternative non-inpatient services as FMC has done and Broward General proposes to do. See Finding of Fact 37. Based on local health council reports, FMC's data reflects a rise in the ADC at Broward General to 52.7 in 1996, and a return to 46 in the first seven months of 1997. Using a 14.2 ADC for the 19th Street CSU, FMC projects that Broward General will reach an ADC of approximately 60 in the first year of operations if the CON is approved, not 88 as projected. Broward General acknowledged its capacity to add 10 more patients to the ADC without stress on the system. Having already absorbed 20 of up to 40 CSU patients at Imperial Point and Broward General in 1996 and 1997 resulting in an ADC of 48, and given the capacity to absorb 10 more, the NBHD has demonstrated a need to accommodate an ADC of 10 more adult psychiatric patients at Broward General, or a total ADC of 68 patients. The need to add capacity to accommodate an additional 10 patient ADC was not shown to equate to a need for 30 additional beds, which would result in an ADC of 68 patients in 98 beds, or 69 or 70 percent occupancy. Special Circumstances - Rule 59C-1.040(4)(d) The psychiatric bed rule provides for approval of additional beds in the absence of fixed numeric need. The "special circumstance" provision applies to a facility with an existing unit with 85 percent or greater occupancy. During the applicable period, the occupancy at Broward General was 74.15 percent. However, occupancy rates have exceeded 95 percent in the CSU beds on 19th Street. If up to 20 patients on 19th Street are added to the 48 ADC at Broward General, the result is that the existing 68 beds will be full. A full unit is operationally not efficient or desirable and allows no response to fluctuations in demand. Therefore, the state has established a desirable standard of 75 percent occupancy for psychiatric units, a range which supports the addition of 10 to 15 psychiatric beds at Broward General. Available Alternatives - Subsection 408.035(1)(b) and (d), Florida Statutes, and Rule 59C-1.040(4)(e)4., Florida Administrative Code The psychiatric bed rule provides that additional beds will "not normally" be added if the district occupancy rate is below 75 percent. For the twelve months preceding the application filing, the occupancy rate in 517 adult psychiatric beds in District 10 was approximately 58 percent. FMC's expert noted that each day an average of 200 adult psychiatric beds were available in District 10. Broward General argues that the occupancy rate is misleading. Five of the nine facilities with psychiatric beds are freestanding, private facilities, which are ineligible for Medicaid participation. Historically, the freestanding hospitals have also provided little charity care. One facility, University Pavilion, is full. Of the four acute care hospitals with adult psychiatric beds, Memorial Hospital in the SBHD, is not available to patients in the NBHD service area. Imperial Point, the only other NBHD facility with adult psychiatric beds, is not available based on its occupancy rate for the first seven months of 1997 of approximately 81 percent, which left an average of 9 available beds in a relatively small 47-bed unit. That leaves only Broward General and FMC to care for Medicaid and indigent adult psychiatric patients. FMC is the only possible alternative provider of services, but Broward General was recommended by the grand jury and was the only contract applicant. The occupancy rate in FMC's 51 adult beds was approximately 80 percent in 1995, 73 percent in 1996, and 77 percent for the first seven months in 1997. FMC has reduced average lengths of stay by having patients "step down" to partial hospitalization, day treatment and other outpatient services of varying intensities. The same decline in average lengths of stay is reasonably expected when Broward General implements these alternatives. Adult psychiatric services are also accessible in District 10 applying the psychiatric bed rule access standard. That is, ninety percent of the population of District 10 has access to the service within a maximum driving time of forty- five minutes. The CSU license cannot be transferred to Broward General. Broward County holds the license for CSU beds which, by rule, must be located on the first floor of a building. Although Broward General may not legally hold the CSU license and provide CSU services on the fourth floor of the hospital, there is no apparent legal impediment to providing CSU services in psychiatric beds. Quality of Care - Subsection 408.035(1)(c), Florida Statutes and Rule 1.040(7), Florida Administrative Code Broward General is accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations. The parties stipulated that Broward General has a history of providing quality care. Broward General provides the services required by Rule 59C-1.040(3)(h), Florida Administrative Code. Services Not Accessible in Adjoining Areas; Research and Educational Facilities; Needs of HMOs; Services Provided to Individuals Beyond the District; Subsections 408.035(1)(f),(g),(j), and (k), Florida Statutes Broward General does not propose to provide services which are inaccessible in adjoining areas nor will it provide services to non-residents of the district. Broward General is not one of the six statutory teaching hospitals nor a health maintenance organization (HMO). Therefore, those criteria are of no value in determining whether this application should be approved. Economics and Improvements in Service from Joint Operation - Subsection 408.035(1)(e), Florida Statutes The consolidation of the psychiatric services at Broward General is reasonably expected to result in economies and improvements in the provision of coordinated services to the mentally ill indigent and Medicaid population. Broward General will eliminate the cost of meal deliveries and the transfer of medically ill patients, but that potential cost-saving was not quantified by Broward General. Staff and Other Resources - Subsection 408.035(1)(h), Florida Statutes The parties stipulated that NBHD has available the necessary resources, including health manpower, management personnel, and funds to implement the project. Financially Feasibility - Subsection 408.035(1)(h) and (i), Florida Statutes The parties stipulated that the proposed project is financially feasible in the immediate term. The estimated total project cost is $451,791, but NBHD has $500,000 in funds for capital improvements available from the County and $700,000 from the Florida Legislature. As stipulated by the parties, NBHD has sufficient cash on hand to fund the project. Regardless of the census, the County's contractual obligation to the NBHD remains fixed at $1.6 million. The State contract requires the prospective payment of costs offset by expected Medicaid dollars. If the number of Medicaid eligible patients decreases, then state funding increases proportionately. The state assumed that 20 percent of the patients would qualify for Medicaid, therefore it reimburses the per diem cost of care for 80 percent of the patients. One audit indicated that 30 percent of the patients qualified for Medicaid, so that State payments for that year were higher than needed. The State contract apparently makes no provision to recover excess payments. The application projects a net profit of $740,789 for the first year of operations, and a net profit of $664,489 for the second year. If the State contract with NBHD is renewed to contemplate an average of 30 patients per day as opposed to up to 40 patients per day, then annual revenue could be reduced up to $400,000. Projected net profit will, nevertheless, exceed expenses when variable expenses are reduced correspondingly. If 20 state funded patients are already in psychiatric beds, and 20 more could be transferred from 19th Street, the result is an ADC of 68. Based on the funding arrangements, there is no evidence that the operation of a total of 98 beds could not be profitable, even with an ADC of 68, although it would be wasteful to have 30 extra beds. Impact on Competition, Quality Assurance and Cost-Effectiveness - Subsection 408.035(1)(l), Florida Statutes With a maximum of 68 inpatients or more realistically, under the expected terms of a renegotiated State contract, 58 to 60 inpatients in 98 beds, Broward General will reasonably attempt to expand the demand for its inpatient psychiatric services. Within the NBHD's legal service area, one-third of adult psychiatric patients not admitted to Broward General are admitted to FMC. Assuming a proportionate impact on competitors, FMC's expert projected that one-third of approximately 30 unfilled beds at Broward General will be filled by patients who would otherwise have gone to FMC. The projection of a loss of 9 patients from the ADC of FMC is reasonably based on an analysis showing comparable patient severity in the most prevalent diagnostic category. Given the blended payor commitment of approximately 51 or 52 percent total for Medicaid and charity in 98 beds, Broward General will be able to take patients from every payor category accepted at FMC. The loss of 9 patients from its ADC can reduce revenues by $568,967 at FMC. The impact analysis is reasonably based on lost patient days since most payers use a per diem basis for compensating FMC. For example, although Medicare reimbursement is usually based on diagnosis regardless of length of stay, it is cost-based for the geriatric psychiatric unit. Net profit at FMC, for the year 1996-1997, was expected to be approximately $4.5 million. FMC will also experience increased costs in transporting indigent patients from FMC to Broward General for admission and treatment. Because of the additional distance, the cost to transfer indigent patients is $20 more per patient from FMC to Broward General than it is from FMC to the 19th Street CSU. FMC typically stabilizes indigent adult psychiatric inpatients, then transfers them to either the 19th Street CSU or Broward General. From March through September of 1997, FMC transported approximately 256 indigent patients from FMC to the 19th Street CSU. In terms of quality assurance, the consolidation of psychiatric services at Broward General will allow all patients better access to the full range of medical services available at Broward General. The NBHD's operation of the 19th Street CSU is profitable. Approval of the CON application should reasonably eliminate all costs associated with operation of the 19th Street facility, and shift more revenues from the State and County contracts to Broward General. Some savings are reasonably expected from not having meal deliveries to 19th Street or patient transfers for medical care. The NBHD did not quantify any expected savings. Costs and Methods of Construction - Subsection 408.035(1)(m), Florida Statutes Broward General will relocate 12 of 42 medical/surgical beds and convert 30 medical/surgical beds to 30 adult psychiatric beds on one wing of the fourth floor, which is currently unused. Fifteen semi-private medical/surgical patient rooms will be converted into semi-private adult psychiatric rooms. Existing wards will be converted to two social rooms, one noisy and one quiet. With the removal of the walls of some offices, the architect designed a group therapy room. An existing semi-private room will be used as a seclusion room. Of the fifteen semi-private rooms, twelve will not have bathing or showering facilities and seven will not have toilets within the patients' rooms. At the time the hospital was constructed, the state required only a lavatory/sink in each patient room. AHCA's architect agreed to allow Broward General to plan to use central bathing and toilet facilities to avoid additional costs and diminished patient room sizes. Because the plan intentionally avoids construction in the toilets, except to enlarge one to include a shower, there is no requirement to upgrade to Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) standards. Therefore, the $23,280 construction cost contingency for code compliance is adequate. Although the projected construction costs are reasonable and the applicable architectural code requirements are met, the design is not the most desirable in terms of current standards. Patient privacy is compromised by the lack of toilets for each patient room. Past and Proposed Provision of Services to Promote a Continuum of Care in a Multi-level System - Subsection 408.035(1)(o), Florida Statutes Broward General is a tertiary acute care facility which provides a broad continuum of care. Because it already operates the CSU and provides CSU services in adult psychiatric beds, the proposal to relocate patients maintains but does not further promote that continuum of care. Broward General's plan to establish more alternatives to inpatient psychiatric care does promote and enhance its continuum of care. Capital Expenditures for New Inpatient Services - Subsection 408.035(2), Florida Statutes Broward General is not proposing to establish a new health service for inpatients, rather it is seeking to relocate an existing service without new construction. The criteria in this Subsection are inapplicable. Factual Conclusions Broward General did not establish a "not normal" circumstance based on the grand jury's findings and recommendations. The grand jury did not recommend closing 19th Street facility. Broward General did generally establish not normal circumstances based on the desirability of consolidating mental health services at Broward General to provide a single point of entry and to improve the quality of care for the 19th Street facility patients. Broward General failed to establish the need to add 30 beds to accomplish the objective of closing the 19th Street facility. Although the existing beds at Broward General may reasonably be expected to be full as a result of the transfer of 19th Street patients, the addition of 30 beds without sufficient demand results in an occupancy rate of 69 or 70 percent, from an ADC of 68 patients in 98 beds. Broward General has requested approximately twice as many beds as it demonstrated it needs. Broward General's CON application on balance satisfies the local and state health plan preferences. In general, FMC is the only alternative facility in terms of available beds, but is not the tax-supported public facility which the grand jury favored to coordinate mental health services. Broward General meets the statutory criteria for quality of care, improvements from joint operations, financial feasibility, quality assurance, cost-effectiveness, and services to Medicaid and indigent patients. The proposal is not the most desirable architecturally considering current standards. More importantly, Broward General did not demonstrate that it can achieve its projected occupancy without an adverse impact on FMC. The NBHD proposal will add too many beds to meet the targeted state occupancy levels in relatively a static market. Broward General's application does not include a partial request for fewer additional beds which would have allowed the closing of 19th Street, while maintaining some empty beds for demand fluctuations and avoiding an adverse impact on FMC.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration deny the application of the North Broward Hospital District for Certificate of Need Number 8425 to convert 30 medical/surgical beds to 30 adult psychiatric beds at Broward General Medical Center. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of April, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of April, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Paul J. Martin, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Paul Vazquez, Esquire Agency For Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Stephen A. Ecenia, Esquire R. David Prescott, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Underwood, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0551 David C. Ashburn, Esquire Gunster, Yoakley, Valdes-Fauli & Stewart, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 830 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Kindred Hospitals East, LLC ("Kindred") and Select Specialty Hospital-Palm Beach, Inc. ("Select-Palm Beach"), filed applications for Certificates of Need ("CONs") with the Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA" or the "Agency") seeking approval for the establishment of long-term care hospitals ("LTCHs") in Palm Beach County, AHCA District 9. Select-Palm Beach's application, CON No. 9661, seeks approval for the establishment of a 60-bed freestanding LTCH in "east central" Palm Beach County about 20 miles south of Kindred's planned location. Kindred's application, CON No. 9662, seeks approval for the establishment of a 70-bed LTCH in the "north central" portion of the county. The ultimate issue in this case is whether either or both applications should be approved by the Agency.
Findings Of Fact Long Term Care Hospitals Of the four classes of facilities licensed as hospitals by the Agency, "Class I or general hospitals," includes: General acute care hospitals with an average length of stay of 25 days or less for all beds; Long term care hospitals, which meet the provisions of subsection 59A-3.065(27), F.A.C.; and, Rural hospitals designated under Section 395, Part III, F.S. Fla. Admin. Code R. 59A-3.252(1)(a). This proceeding concerns CON applications for the second of Florida's Class I or general hospitals: LTCHs. A critically ill patient may be admitted and treated in a general acute care hospital, but, if the patient cannot be stabilized or discharged to a lower level of care on the continuum of care within a relatively short time, the patient may be discharged to an LTCH. An LTCH patient is almost always "critically catastrophically ill or ha[s] been." (Tr. 23). Typically, an LTCH patient is medically unstable, requires extensive nursing care with physician oversight, and often requires extensive technological support. The LTCH patient usually fits into one or more of four categories. One category is patients in need of pulmonary/respiratory services. Usually ventilator dependent, these types of LTCH patients have other needs as well that requires "complex comprehensive ventilator weaning in addition to meeting ... other needs." (Tr. 26). A second category is patients in need of wound care whose wound is life-threatening. Frequently compromised by inadequate nutrition, these types of LTCH patients are often diabetic. There are a number of typical factors that may account for the seriousness of the wound patient's condition. The job of the staff at the LTCH in such a case is to attend to the wound and all the other medical problems of the patient that have extended the time required for care of the wound. A third category is patients with some sort of neuro-trauma. These patients may have had a stroke and are often elderly; if younger, they may be victims of a car accident or some other serious trauma. They typically have multiple body systems that require medical treatment, broken bones and a closed head injury for example, that have made them "very sick and complex." (Tr. 27). The fourth category is referred to by the broad nomenclature of "medically complex" although it is a subset of the population of LTCH patients all of whom are medically complex. The condition of the patients in this fourth category involves two or more body systems. The patients usually present at the LTCH with "renal failure ... [and] with another medical condition ... that requires a ventilator ..." Id. In short, LTCHs provide extended medical and rehabilitative care to patients with multiple, chronic, and/or clinically complex acute medical conditions that usually require care for a relatively extended period of time. To meet the definition of an LTCH a facility must have an average length of inpatient stay ("ALOS") greater than 25 days for all hospital beds. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 59A-3.065(34). The staffs at general acute care hospitals and LTCHs have different orientations. With a staff oriented toward a patient population with a much shorter ALOS, the general acute care hospital setting may not be appropriate for a patient who qualifies for LTCH services. The staff at a general acute care hospital frequently judges success by a patient getting well in a relatively short time. It is often difficult for general acute care hospital staff to sustain the interest and effort necessary to serve the LTCH patient well precisely because of the staff's expectation that the patient will improve is not met in a timely fashion. As time goes by, that expectation continues to be frustrated, a discouragement to staff. The LTCH is unlike other specialized health care settings. The complex, medical, nursing, and therapeutic requirements necessary to serve the LTCH patient may be beyond the capability of the traditional comprehensive medical rehabilitation ("CMR") hospital, nursing home, skilled nursing facility ("SNF"), or, the skilled nursing unit ("SNU"). CMR units and hospitals are rarely, if ever, appropriate for the LTCH patient. Almost invariably, LTCH patients are not able to tolerate the minimum three (3) hours of therapy per day associated with CMR. The primary focus of LTCHs, moreover, is to provide continued acute medical treatment to the patient that may not yet be stable, with the ultimate goal of getting the patient on the road to recovery. In comparison, the CMR hospital treats medically stable patients consistent with its primary focus of restoring functional capabilities, a more advanced step in the continuum of care. Services provided in LTCHs are distinct from those provided in SNFs or SNUs. The latter are not oriented generally to patients who need daily physician visits or the intense nursing services or observations needed by an LTCH patient. Most nursing and clinical personnel in SNFs and SNUs are not experienced with the unique psychosocial needs of long-term acute care patients and their families. An LTCH is distinguished within the healthcare continuum by the high level of care the patient requires, the interdisciplinary treatment model it follows, and the duration of the patient's hospitalization. Within the continuum of care, LTCHs occupy a niche between traditional acute care hospitals that provide initial hospitalization care on a short-term basis and post-acute care facilities such as nursing homes, SNFs, SNUs, and comprehensive medical rehabilitation facilities. Medicare has long recognized LTCHs as a distinct level of care within the health care continuum. The federal government's prospective payment system ("PPS") now treats the LTCH level of service as distinct with its "own DRG system and ... [its] own case rate reimbursement." (Tr. 108). Under the LTCH PPS, each patient is assigned an LTC- DRG (different than the DRG under the general hospital DRG system) with a corresponding payment rate that is weighted based on the patient diagnosis and acuity. The Parties The Agency is the state agency responsible for administering the CON Program and licensing LTCHs and other hospital facilities pursuant to the authority of Health Facility and Services Development Act, Sections 408.031-408.045, Florida Statutes. Select-Palm Beach is the applicant for a free-standing 60-bed LTCH in "east Central Palm Beach County," Select Ex. 1, stamped page 12, near JFK Medical Center in AHCA District 9. Its application, CON No. 9661, was denied by the Agency. Select-Palm Beach is a wholly owned subsidiary of Select Medical Corporation, which provides long term acute care services at 83 LTCHs in 24 states, four of which are freestanding hospitals. The other 79 are each "hospitals-in-a- hospital" ("HIH" or "LTCH HIH"). Kindred is the applicant for a 70-bed LTCH to be located in the north central portion of Palm Beach County in AHCA District 9. Its application, CON No. 9662, was denied by the Agency. Kindred is a wholly owned subsidiary of Kindred Healthcare, Inc. ("Kindred Healthcare"). Kindred Healthcare operates 73 LTCHs, 59 of which are freestanding, according to the testimony of Mr. Novak. See Tr. 56-57. Kindred Healthcare has been operating LTCHs since 1985 and has operated them in Florida for more than 15 years. At the time of the submission of Kindred's application, Kindred Healthcare's six LTCHs in Florida were Kindred-North Florida, a 60-bed LTCH in Pinellas County, AHCA District 5; Kindred-Central Tampa, with 102 beds, and Kindred-Bay Area- Tampa, with 73 beds, both in Hillsborough County, in AHCA District 6; Kindred-Ft. Lauderdale with 64 beds and Kindred- Hollywood with 124 beds, both in Broward County, ACHA District 10; and Kindred-Coral Gables, with 53 beds, in Dade County, AHCA District 11. The Applications and AHCA's Review The applications were submitted in the first application cycle of 2003. Select-Palm Beach's application is CON No. 9661; Kindred's is CON No. 9662. Select-Palm Beach estimates its total project costs to be $12,856,139. Select-Palm Beach has not yet acquired the site for its proposed LTCH, but did include in its application a map showing three priority site locations, with its preferred site, designated "Site 1," located near JFK Medical Center. At $12,937,419, Kindred's estimate of its project cost is slightly more than Select-Palm Beach's. The exact site of Kindred's proposed LTCH had not been determined at the time of hearing. Kindred's preference, however, is to locate in the West Palm Beach area in the general vicinity of St. Mary's Hospital, in the northern portion of Palm Beach County along the I-95 corridor. This is approximately 15 to 20 miles north of Select's preferred location for its LTCH. There is no LTCH in the five-county service area that comprises District 9: Indian River, Okeechobee, St. Lucie, Martin, and Palm Beach Counties. There are two LTCHs in adjacent District 10 (to the south). They have a total of 188 beds and an average occupancy of 80 percent. The Agency views LTCH care as a district-wide service primarily for Medicare patients. At the time of the filing of the applications, the population in District 9 was over 1.6 million, including about 400,000 in the age cohort 65 and over. About 70 percent of the District 9 population lives in Palm Beach County. More than 70 percent of the District's general acute care hospitals are located in that county. Kindred's preferred location for its LTCH is approximately 40 to 50 miles from the closest District 10 LTCH; Select-Palm Beach is approximately 25 to 35 miles from the closest District 10 LTCH. The locations of Select Palm-Beach's and Kindred's proposed LTCHs are complementary. The SAAR Following its review of the two applications, AHCA issued its State Agency Action Report ("SAAR"). Section G., of the report, entitled "RECOMMENDATION," states: "Deny Con #9661 and CON #9662." Agency Ex. 2, p. 43. On June 11, 2003, the report was signed by Karen Rivera, Health Services and Facilities Consultant Supervisor Certificate of Need, and Mr. Gregg as the Chief of the Bureau of Health Facility Regulation. It contained a section entitled "Authorization for Agency Action" that states, "[a]uthorized representatives of the Agency for Health Care Administration adopted the recommendations contained herein and released the State Agency Action Report." Agency Ex. 2, p. 44. The adoption of the recommendations is the functional equivalent of preliminary denial of the applications. In Section F. of the SAAR under the heading of "Need," (Agency Ex. 2, p. 40), the Agency explained its primary bases for denial; it concluded that the applicants had not shown need for an LTCH in AHCA District 9. The discussions for the two, although not precisely identical, are quite similar: Select Specialty Hospital-Palm Beach, Inc.(CON #9661): The applicant's two methodological approaches to demonstrate need are not supported by any specific discharge studies or other data, including DRG admission criteria from area hospitals regarding potential need. The applicant also failed to provide any supporting documentation from area physicians or other providers regarding potential referrals. It was further not demonstrated that patients that qualify for LTCH services are not currently being served or that an access problem exists for residents in District 9. Kindred Hospitals East, L.L.C. (CON #9662): The various methodological approaches presented are not supported by any specific DRG admission criteria from area hospitals suggesting potential need. The applicant provided numerous letters of support for the project from area hospitals, physicians and case managers. However, the number of potential referrals of patients needing LTCH services was not quantified. It was further not demonstrated that patients that qualify for LTCH services are not currently being served or that an access problem exists for residents in District 9. Id. At hearing, the Agency's witness professed no disagreement with the SAAR and continued to maintain the same bases contained in the SAAR for the denials of the two applications The SAAR took no issue with either applicant's ability to provide quality care. It concluded that funding for each applicant was likely to be available and that each project appeared to be financially feasible once operating. The SAAR further stated that there were no major architectural concerns regarding Kindred's proposed facility design, but noted reservations regarding the need for further study and revision of Select Palm-Beach's proposed surgery/procedure wing, as well as cost uncertainties for Select Palm Beach because of such potential revisions. By the time of final hearing, however, the parties had stipulated to the reasonableness of each applicant's proposed costs and methods of construction. The parties stipulated to the satisfaction of a number of the statutory CON criteria by the two applicants. The parties agreed that the applications complied with the content and review process requirements of sections 408.037 and 409.039, Florida Statutes, with one exception. Select reserved the issue of the lack of a Year 2 of Schedule 6, (Staffing) in Kindred's application. The form of Schedule 6 provided by AHCA to Kindred (unlike other schedules of the application) does not clearly indicate that a second year of staffing data must be provided. The remainder of the criteria stipulated and the positions of the parties as articulated in testimony at hearing and in the proposed orders that were submitted leave need as the sole issue of consequence with one exception: whether Kindred has demonstrated that its project is financially feasible in the long term. Kindred's Long Term Financial Feasibility Select-Palm Beach contends that Kindred's project is not financially feasible in the long term for two reasons. They relate to Kindred's application and are stated in Select Palm Beach's proposed order: Kindred understated property taxes[;] Kindred completely fails to include in its expenses on Schedule 8, patient medical assistance trust fund (PMATF) taxes [citation omitted]. Proposed Recommended Order of Select-Palm Beach, Inc., p. 32, Finding of Fact 97. Raised after the proceeding began at DOAH by Select- Palm Beach, these two issues were not considered by AHCA when it conducted its review of Kindred's application because the issues were not apparent from the face of the application. AHCA's Review of Kindred's Application Kindred emerged from a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings on April 20, 2001, under a plan of reorganization. With respect to the events that led to the bankruptcy proceeding and the need to review prior financial statements, AHCA made the following finding in the SAAR: Under the plan [of reorganization], the applicant [Kindred] adopted the fresh start accounting provision of SOP 90-7. Under fresh start accounting, a new reporting entity is created and the recorded amounts of assets and liabilities are adjusted to reflect their estimated fair values. Accordingly, the prior period financial statements are not comparable to the current period statements and will not be considered in this analysis. Agency Ex. 2, p. 30. The financial statements provided by Kindred as part of its application show that Kindred Healthcare, Kindred's parent, is a financially strong company. The information contained in Kindred's CON application filed in 2003 included Kindred Healthcare's financial statements from the preceding calendar year. Kindred Healthcare's Consolidated Statement of Operations for the year ended December 31, 2002, showed "Income from Operations" to be more than $33 million, and net cash provided by operating activities (cash flow) of over $248 million for the period. Its Consolidated Balance Sheet as of December 31, 2002, showed cash and cash equivalents of over $244 million and total assets of over $1.6 billion. In light of the information contained in Kindred's CON application, the SAAR concluded with regard to short term financial feasibility: Based on the audited financial statements of the applicant, cash on hand and cash flows, if they continue at the current level, would be sufficient to fund this project as proposed. Funding for all capital projects, with the support of its parent, is likely to be available as needed. Agency Ex. 2, p. 30 (emphasis supplied). The SAAR recognized that Kindred projected a "year two operating loss for the hospital of $287,215." Agency Ex. 2, p. Nonetheless, the SAAR concludes on the issue of financial feasibility, "[w]ith continued operational support from the parent company, this project [Kindred's] is considered financially feasible." Id. The Agency did not have the information, however, at the time it reviewed Kindred's application that Kindred understated property taxes and omitted the Public Medicaid Trust Fund and Medical Assistance Trust Fund ("PMATF") "provider tax" of 1.5 percent that would be imposed on Kindred's anticipated revenues of $11,635,919 as contended by Select-Palm Beach. Consistent with Select Palm-Beach's general contentions about property taxes and PMATF taxes, "Kindred acknowledges that it likely understated taxes to be incurred in the operation of its facility." Kindred's Proposed Recommended Order, paragraph 50, p. 19. The parties agree, moreover, that the omitted PMATF tax is reasonably projected to be $175,000. They do not agree, however, as to the impact of the PMATF tax on year two operating loss. The difference between the two (approximately $43,000) is attributable to a corporate income tax benefit deduction claimed by Kindred so that the combination of the application's projected loss, the omitted PMATF tax, and the deduction yields a year two operating loss of approximately $419,000. Without taking into consideration the income tax benefit, Select-Palm Beach contends that adding in the PMATF tax produces a loss of $462,000. Kindred and Select-Palm Beach also disagree over the projection of property taxes by approximately $50,000. Kindred projects that the property taxes in year two of operation will be approximately $225,000 instead of the $49,400 listed in the application. Select-Palm Beach projects that they will be $50,000 higher at approximately $275,000. Whether Kindred's or Select-Palm Beach's figures are right, Kindred makes two points. First, if year two revenues and expenses, adjusted for underestimated and omitted taxes, are examined on a quarterly basis, the fourth quarter of year two has a better bottom line than the earlier quarters. Not only will the fourth quarter bottom line be better, but, using Kindred's figures, the fourth quarter of year two of operations is profitable. Second, and most importantly given the Agency's willingness to credit Kindred with financial support from its parent, Kindred's application included in its application an interest figure of $1.2 million for year one of operation and $1.03 million for year two. Kindred claims in its proposed recommended order that "[i]n reality ... this project will incur no interest expense as Kindred intends to fund the project out of cash on hand, or operating capital, and would not have to borrow money to construct the project." Id., at paragraph 54, p. 20. Through the testimony of John Grant, Director of Planning and Development for Kindred's parent, Kindred Healthcare, Kindred indicated at hearing that its parent might, indeed, fund the project: A ... Kindred [Healthcare] would likely fund this project out of operating capital. Like I said, in the first nine months of this year Kindred had operating cash flow of approximately $180 million. So it's not as if we would have to actually borrow money to complete a project like this. Q And what was the interest expense that you had budgeted in Year Two for this facility? A $1,032,000. Q ... so is it your statement then that this facility would not owe any interest back to the parent company? A That's correct. Tr. 221-222 (emphasis supplied). If the "financing interest" expense is excluded from Kindred's statement of projected expenses in Schedule 8 of the CON application, using Kindred's revised projections, the project shows a profit of approximately $612,0002 for the second year of operation. If Select-Palm Beach's figures and bottom line loss excludes the "finances interest" expense, the elimination of the expense yields of profit for year two of operations in excess of $500,000. If the support of Kindred's parent is considered as the Agency has signaled its willingness to do and provided that the project is, in fact, funded by Kindred Healthcare rather than financed through some other means that would cause Kindred to incur interest expense, Kindred's project is financially feasible in the long term. With the exception of the issue regarding Kindred's long term financial feasibility, as stated above, taken together, the stipulation and agreements of the parties, the Agency's preliminary review contained in the SAAR, and the evidence at hearing, all distill the issues in this case to one overarching issue left to be resolved by this Recommended Order: need for long term care hospital beds in District 9. Need for the Proposals From AHCA's perspective prior to the hearing, the only issue in dispute with respect to the two applications is need. This point was made clear by Mr. Gregg's testimony at hearing in answer to a question posed by counsel for Select-Palm Beach: Q. ... Assuming there was sufficient need for 130 beds in the district is there any reason why both applicants shouldn't be approved in this case, assuming that need? A. No. (Tr. 398). Both applicants contend that the application each submitted is superior to the other. Neither, however, at this point in the proceeding, has any objection to approval of the other application provided its own application is approved. Consistent with its position that both applications may be approved, Select-Palm Beach presented testimony through its health care planner Patricia Greenberg3 that there was need in District 9 for both applicants' projects. Her testimony, moreover, rehabilitated the single Kindred methodology of three that yielded numeric need less than the 130 beds proposed by both applications: Q ... you do believe that there is a need for both in the district. A I believe there's a need for two facilities in the district. Q It could support two facilities? A Oh, absolutely. Q And the disagreement primarily relates to the conservative approach of Kindred in terms of not factoring in out-migration and the narrowing the DRG categories? A Correct. ... Kindred actually had three models. Two of them support both facilities, but it's the GMLOS model that I typically rely on, and it didn't on the surface support both facilities. That's why I reconciled the two, and I believe that's the difference, is just the 50 DRGs and not including the out-migration. That would boost their need above the 130, and two facilities would give people alternatives, it would foster competition, and it would really improve access in that market. Tr. 150-51. Need for the applications, therefore, is the paramount issue in this case. Since both applicants are qualified to operate an LTCH in Florida, if need is proven for the 130 beds, then with the exception of Kindred's long term financial feasibility, all parties agree that there is no further issue: both applications should be granted. No Agency Numeric Need Methodology The Agency has not established a numeric need methodology for LTCH services. Consequently, it does not publish a fixed-need pool for LTCHs. Nor does the Agency have "any policy upon which to determine need for the proposed beds or service." See Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C-1.008(2)(e)1. Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.008(2), which governs "Fixed Need Pools" (the "Fixed Need Pools Rule") states that if "no agency policy exist" with regard to a needs assessment methodology: [T]he applicant will be responsible for demonstrating need through a needs assessment methodology which must include, at a minimum, consideration of the following topics, except where they are inconsistent with the applicable statutory or rule criteria: Population demographics and dynamics; Availability, utilization and quality of like services in the district, subdistrict or both; Medical treatment trends; and Market conditions. Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C-1.008(2)(e)2. The Fixed Need Pools Rule goes on to elaborate in subparagraph (e)3 that "[t]he existence of unmet need will not be based solely on the absence of a health service, health care facility, or beds in the district, subdistrict, region or proposed service area." Population, Demographics and Dynamics The first of the four topics to be addressed when an applicant is responsible for demonstrating need through a needs assessment methodology is "population, demographics and dynamics." The Agency has not defined service areas for LTCHs. Nonetheless, from a health planning perspective, it views LTCH services as being provided district-wide primarily for Medicare patients. Consistent with the Agency's view, Select-Palm Beach identified the entire district, that is, all of AHCA District 9, as its service area. It identified Palm Beach County, one of the five counties in AHCA District 9, as its primary service area. In identifying the service area for Select-Palm Beach, Ms. Greenberg drew data from various sources: population estimates for Palm Beach County and surrounding areas; the number of acute care hospital beds in the area; the number of LTCH beds in the area; the types of patients treated at acute care hospitals; and the lengths of stay of the patients treated at those hospitals. AHCA District 9 has more elderly than any other district in the State, and Palm Beach County has more than any other county except for Dade. Palm Beach County residents comprise 71% of the District 9 population. It is reasonably projected that the elderly population (the "65 and over" age cohort) in Palm Beach County is projected to grow at the rate of 8 percent by 2008. The "65 and over" age cohort is significant because the members of that cohort are most likely to utilize hospital services, including LTCH services. Its members are most likely to suffer complications from illness and surgical procedures and more likely to have co-morbidity conditions that require long- term acute care. Persons over 65 years of age comprise approximately 80 percent of the patient population of LTCH facilities. Both Select-Palm Beach and Kindred project that approximately 80 percent of their admissions will come from Medicare patients. Since 90 percent of admissions to an LTCH come from acute care facilities, most of the patient days expected at Select-Palm Beach's proposed LTCH will originate from residents in its primary service area, Palm Beach County. When looking at the migration pattern for patients at acute care facilities within Palm Beach County, the majority (90 percent) come from Palm Beach County residents. Thus, Select- Palm Beach's projected primary service area is reasonable. Just as Select-Palm Beach, Kindred proposes to serve the entire District. Kindred proposes that its facility be based in Palm Beach County because of the percentage of the district's population in the county as well as because more than 70% of the district's general acute care hospitals are in the county. Its selection of the District as its service area, consistent with the Agency's view, is reasonable. Currently there are no LTCHs in District 9. Availability, Utilization and Quality of Like Services The second topic is "availability, utilization and quality of like services." There are no "like" services available to District residents in the District. Select-Palm Beach and Kindred, therefore, contend that they meet the criteria of the second topic. There are like services in other AHCA Districts. For example, AHCA District 10 has at total of 188 beds at two Kindred facilities in Fort Lauderdale and Hollywood. The Agency, however, did not present evidence of their quality, that they were available or to what extent they are utilized by the residents of AHCA District 9. Medical Treatment Trends The third topic is medical treatment trends. Caring for patients with chronic and long term care needs is becoming increasingly more important as the population ages and as medical technology continues to emerge that prolongs life expectancies. Through treatment provided the medically complex and critically ill with state of the art mechanical ventilators, metabolic analyzers, and breathing monitors, LTCHs meet needs beyond the capability of the typical general acute care hospitals. In this way, LTCHs fill a niche in the continuum of care that addresses the needs of a small but growing patient population. Treatment for these patients in an LTCH, who otherwise would be cared for without adequate reimbursement to the general acute care hospital or moved to an alternative setting with staff and services inadequate to meet their needs, is a medical trend. Market Conditions The fourth topic to be addressed by the applicant is market conditions. The federal government's development of a distinctive prospective payment system for LTCHs (LTC-DRG), has created a market condition favorable to LTCHs. General acute care hospitals face substantial losses for the medically complex patient who uses far greater resources than expected on the basis of individual diagnoses. Medicare covers between 80 and 85 percent of LTCH patients. The remaining patients are covered by private insurance, managed care and Medicaid. LTCH programs allow for shorter lengths of stay in a general acute care facility, reduces re-admissions and provide more discharges to home. These benefits are increasingly recognized. Numeric Need Analysis Kindred presented a set of needs assessment methodologies that yielded numeric need for the beds applied for by Kindred. Select-Palm Beach did the same. Unlike Kindred, however, all of the needs assessment methodologies presented by Select-Palm Beach demonstrated numeric need in excess of the 130 beds proposed by both applications. Select-Palm Beach's methodologies, overall, are superior to Kindred's. Select-Palm Beach used two sets of needs assessment methodologies and sensitivity testing of one of the sets that confirmed the methodology's reasonableness. The two sets or needs assessment methodologies are: (1) a use rate methodology and (2) length of stay methodologies. The use rate methodology yielded projected bed need for Palm Beach County alone in excess of the 130 beds proposed by the two applicants. For the year "7/05 - 6/06" the bed need is projected to be 256; for the year "7/06 - 6/07" the bed need is projected to be 261; and, for the year "7/07 - 6/08" the bed need is projected to be 266. See Select Ex. 1, Bates Stamp p. 000036 and the testimony of Ms. Greenberg at tr. 114. If the use rate analysis had been re-computed to include two districts whose data was excluded from the analysis, the bed need yielded for Palm Beach County alone was 175 beds, a numeric need still in excess of the 130 beds proposed by both applicants. The use rate methodology is reasonable.4 The length of stay methodologies are also reasonable. These two methodologies also yielded numeric need for beds in excess of the 130 beds proposed. The two methodologies yielded need for 167 beds and 250 beds. Agency Denial The Agency's general concerns about LTCHs are not without basis. For many years, there were almost no LTCH CON applications filed with the Agency. A change occurred in 2002. The change in the LTCH environment in the last few years put AHCA in the position of having "to adapt to a rapidly changing situation in terms of [Agency] understanding of what has been going on in recent years with long-term care hospitals." (Tr. 358.) "... [I]n the last couple of years long-term care hospital applications have become [AHCA's] most common type of application." (Tr. 359.) At the time of the upsurge in applications, there was "virtually nothing ... in the academic literature about long- term care hospitals ... that could [provide] ... an understanding of what was going on ... [nor was there anything] in the peer reviewed literature that addressed long-term care hospitals" id., and the health care planning issues that affected them. Two MedPAC reports came out, one in 2003 and another in 2004. The 2003 report conveyed the information that the federal government was unable to identify patients appropriate for LTCH services, services that are overwhelmingly Medicare funded, because of overlap of LTCH services with other types of services. The 2004 report gave an account of the federal government decision to change its payment policy for a type of long-term care hospitals that are known as "hospitals-within- hospitals" (tr. 368) so that "hospitals within hospitals as of this past summer [2004] can now only treat 25 percent of their patients from the host hospital." Id. Both reports roused concerns for AHCA. First, if appropriate LTCH patients cannot be identified and other types of services overlap appropriately with LTCH services, AHCA cannot produce a valid needs assessment methodology. The second produces another concern. In the words of Mr. Gregg, The problem ... with oversupply of long-term care hospital beds is that it creates an incentive for providers to seek patient who are less appropriate for the service. What we know now is that only the sickest patient ... with the most severe conditions are truly appropriate for long-term care hospital placement. * * * ... [T]he MedPAC report most recently shows us that the greatest indicator of utilization of long-term care hospital services is the mere availability of those services. Tr. 368-369. The MedPAC reports, themselves, although marked for identification, were not admitted into evidence. Objections to their admission (in particular, Kindred's) were sustained because they had not been listed by AHCA on the stipulation required by the Pre-hearing Order of Instructions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued by the Agency for Health Care Administration that: approves Select-Palm Beach's application, CON 9661; and approves Kindred's application CON 9662 with the condition that financing of the project be provided by Kindred Healthcare. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of April, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of April, 2005.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner’s application for a Certificate of Need to establish a new 84-bed acute care hospital in Viera should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Parties Holmes and the Health First System Holmes, the applicant for the CON at issue in this case, is a not-for-profit corporation that operates two acute care hospitals in Brevard County: Holmes Regional Medical Center (HRMC) in Melbourne and Palm Bay Community Hospital (PBCH) in Palm Bay. HRMC opened in 1962. It is a 514-bed acute care hospital, with 504 acute care beds and 10 Level II neonatal intensive care (NICU) beds. HRMC provides tertiary-level services, including adult open-heart surgery, and it is the designated trauma center for Brevard County. HRMC has been recognized as one of the top 100 cardiovascular hospitals in the country, and it has received other recognitions for the high quality of care that it provides. PBCH opened in 1992. It is a 60-bed acute care hospital. PBCH does not provide tertiary-level services, and it does not provide obstetrical (OB) services. Holmes’ parent company is Health First, Inc. (Health First), which is a not-for-profit corporation formed in 1995 upon the merger of Holmes and the organization that operated Cape Canaveral Hospital (Cape Hospital). Cape Hospital is a 150-bed not-for-profit acute care hospital in Cocoa Beach. The range of services that Cape Hospital provides is broader than range of services provided at PBCH, but not as broad as the range of services provided at HRMC. For example, Cape Hospital provides OB services, but it does not have any NICU beds. All of the Health First hospitals are accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO). Health First provides a broad range of health care services in Brevard County in addition to the hospital services provided at HRMC, PBCH, and Cape Hospital. For example, it operates a hospice program, surgical center, outpatient facilities, and fitness centers. Health First also administers the Health First Health Plan (HFHP), which is the largest managed care plan in Brevard County. All of the Health First hospitals serve patients without regard to their ability to pay, and as more fully discussed in Part F(1)(g) below, Holmes provides a significant amount of care to Medicaid and charity patients at HRMC and PBCH. Holmes also provides health care services to the medically underserved through a program known as HOPE, which stands for Health, Outreach, Prevention, and Education. HOPE was established in the early 1990’s to provide free health care for at-risk children as well as free clinics (both fixed-site and mobile) for medically underserved patients throughout Brevard County. At the time of the final hearing, the free clinics operated by HOPE were being transitioned into a federally- qualified health center, the Brevard Health Alliance (BHA). After the transition, Holmes will no longer operate the clinics; however, Holmes is obligated to provide $1.3 million per year in funding to BHA and it will continue to provide services to at- risk children through the HOPE program. Health First administers a charitable foundation that raises money to support initiatives such as the cancer center at HRMC, the construction of a hospice house, and an Alzheimer’s support center. The foundation has raised approximately $7 million since its inception in October 2001. Wuesthoff Wuesthoff operates two not-for-profit acute care hospitals in Brevard County: Wuesthoff-Rockledge and Wuesthoff- Melbourne. Like Health First, Wuesthoff provides a broad range of health care services in Brevard County in addition to its acute care hospitals. The services include a nursing home, assisted living facility, clinical laboratory, hospice program, home health agency, diagnostic center, and fitness centers. Wuesthoff-Rockledge opened in 1941. It has 245 beds, including 218 acute care beds, 10 Level II NICU beds, and 17 adult inpatient psychiatric beds. Wuesthoff-Rockledge provides tertiary-level services, including adult open-heart surgery, and it is the only acute care hospital in Brevard County designated as a Baker Act receiving facility. Wuesthoff-Rockledge is in the process of adding 44 more beds, including a new 24-bed intensive care unit (ICU) that is projected to open in 2006 and 20 acute care beds. After those beds are added, Wuesthoff-Rockledge will have 289 beds. Currently, approximately 57 percent of Wuesthoff- Rockledge’s beds are in semi-private rooms and 43 percent of the beds are in private rooms. After the addition of the 44 new beds, the percentages will be 69 percent in semi-private rooms and 31 percent in private rooms. Wuesthoff-Melbourne opened in December 2002. It originally received CON approval for 50 beds in November 2000. Before it opened, it received CON approval for an additional 50 beds, which increased its licensed capacity to 100 beds. Wuesthoff-Melbourne opened with 65 beds, all of which are in private rooms. At the time of the hearing, Wuesthoff- Melbourne had that same number of beds and an occupancy rate of approximately 80 percent. In December 2004, Wuesthoff-Melbourne added an additional 50 beds. Wuesthoff was awaiting final licensure approval from the Agency for those beds at the time of the hearing. The approval will increase Wuesthoff-Melbourne’s licensed capacity to 115 beds, all of which are in private rooms. The additional 15 beds (beyond the 100 previously licensed) were added pursuant to the 2004 amendments to the CON law, which permit bed expansions at existing hospitals without CON approval. Wuesthoff-Melbourne was designed and engineered for approximately 200 beds, and it expects to have 134 beds in service in the near future. The space for the additional 19 beds (to expand from 115 to 134) has been shelled-in, and the bed expansion will likely be completed in late-2005 or early- 2006. All of those beds will be in private rooms. The expansion of Wuesthoff-Melbourne to 134 beds will occur notwithstanding the outcome of this proceeding, but the expansion of the facility to 200 beds depends in large part on the outcome of this proceeding. Wuesthoff-Melbourne provides all of the basic acute care services, including OB services. It does not provide tertiary-level services. The Wuesthoff hospitals are accredited by JCAHO. Wuesthoff has been recognized as one of the “100 Most Wired” hospitals by Hospitals & Health Networks magazine for the comprehensive information technology (IT) systems in place at its hospitals. The Wuesthoff hospitals serve all patients without regard to their ability to pay, and as discussed in Part F(1)(g) below, the Wuesthoff hospitals provide a significant amount of care to Medicaid and charity patients. Wuesthoff also provides health care services to the medically underserved through a free health clinic in Cocoa and a mobile unit that serves patients throughout Brevard County. Like Health First, Wuesthoff administers a charitable foundation that funds initiatives at the Wuesthoff hospitals and in the community. (3) Agency The Agency is the state agency that administers the CON program and is responsible for reviewing and taking final agency action on CON applications. Application Submittal and Preliminary Agency Action Holmes filed a letter of intent and a CON application in the first batching cycle of 2004 for hospital beds and facilities. Holmes’ letter of intent and CON application were timely and properly filed. Holmes application, CON 9759, proposes the establishment of a new 84-bed acute care hospital in the Viera area of Brevard County. The proposed hospital will be known as Viera Medical Center (VMC). The fixed need pool published by the Agency for the applicable batching cycle identified a need for zero new acute care beds in Subdistrict 7-1, which is Brevard County. There were no challenges to the published fixed need pool. The Agency comparatively reviewed Holmes’ application with the CON applications filed by Wuesthoff to add 34 beds at Wuesthoff-Melbourne (CON 9760) and to add 44 beds at Wuesthoff- Rockledge (CON 9761). On June 10, 2004, the Agency issued its State Agency Action Report (SAAR), which summarized the Agency’s findings and conclusions based upon its comparative review of the applications. The SAAR recommended denial of Holmes’ application and both of Wuesthoff's applications. After the Agency published notice of its intent to deny the applications in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Holmes timely petitioned the Agency for an administrative hearing on the denial of its application. Wuesthoff did not pursue an administrative hearing on the denial of its applications as a result of the 2004 amendments to the CON law, which became effective July 1, 2004. Under the new law, a CON is not needed to add acute care beds at an existing hospital and, as indicated above, the Wuesthoff hospitals are already in the process of adding the beds that they were seeking through CON 9760 and CON 9761. The Agency reaffirmed its opposition to Holmes’ application at the hearing through the testimony of Jeffrey Gregg, the Bureau Chief for the Agency’s CON program. Acute Care Subdistrict 7-1 / Brevard County The Agency uses a five-year planning horizon in determining the need for new acute care beds, and it calculates the inventory of acute care beds and considers CON applications for new acute care beds on a subdistrict basis. Brevard County is in Subdistrict 7-1. There are no other counties in the subdistrict. There are six existing acute care hospitals in Brevard County, all of which are not-for-profit hospitals: Parrish Medical Center (Parrish) in Titusville, Cape Hosptial, Wuesthoff-Rockledge, Wuesthoff-Melbourne, HRMC, and PBCH. Brevard County is a long, narrow county. It stretches approximately 70 miles north to south, but averages only 20 miles east to west. The county is bordered on the north by Volusia County, on the west by the St. Johns River and Osceola County, on the south by Indian River County, and on the east by the Atlantic Ocean. The major north-south arterial roads in the county are Interstate 95 (I-95) and U.S. Highway 1 (US 1). The Intracoastal Waterway also runs north and south through the eastern portion of the county. Other arterial roads in the south/central portion of the county are Murrell Road, Eau Gallie Boulevard and Wickham Road. Because of the county’s long and narrow geography, three recognized market areas for hospital services have developed in the county, i.e., northern, central, and southern. The northern area of the county, which includes the Titusville area, had approximately 63,000 residents in 2003. It is primarily served by one hospital: Parrish. The central area of the county, which includes the Rockledge and Cocoa areas, had approximately 163,000 residents in 2003. It is primarily served by two hospitals: Wuesthoff- Rockledge and Cape Hospital. The southern area of the county, which includes the Melbourne and Palm Bay areas, had approximately 276,000 residents in 2003. It is primarily served by three hospitals: HRMC, Wuesthoff-Melbourne, and Palm Bay. The Viera area, discussed below, overlaps the central and southern market areas and is primarily served by Wuesthoff- Rockledge, Wuesthoff-Melbourne, and HRMC. According to the data in Table 28 of the CON application, those hospitals together accounted for 90 percent of the patients from zip code 32940, which is the “main” Viera zip code. The evidence was not persuasive that the three market areas in Brevard County equate to “antitrust markets” from an economist’s standpoint, but it was clear that the hospitals and physicians in the county recognize the existence of the market areas. For example, there is very little overlap in the medical staffs of the hospitals in different market areas, but there is significant overlap in the medical staffs of the hospitals in the same market area, and the opening of Wuesthoff-Melbourne in south Brevard County impacted HRMC and PBCH, but had little impact on the hospitals in central Brevard County. Additionally, there is very little out-migration of patients from one area of the county to hospitals in another area. The data in Tables 18 and 19 of the CON application shows that in 2003, for example, 83.6 percent of south Brevard County adult medical/surgical patients were admitted to one of the three south Brevard County hospitals, and 79.5 percent adult medical/surgical patients in central Brevard County were admitted to one of the two hospitals in that area of the county. Viera Viera is an unincorporated area in south/central Brevard County that is being developed by The Viera Company (TVC). TVC is a for-profit land development company owned by A. Duda & Sons, Inc. (Duda). The Viera DRI Viera is being developed pursuant to a development of regional impact (DRI) development order that was first adopted by Brevard County in 1990. The original DRI included 3,000 acres east of I-95, which was developed primarily as residential subdivisions. In 1995, an additional 6,000 acres were added to the DRI west of I- 95, which is being developed as a mixed-use community. The portion of the DRI east of I-95 has effectively been built-out. The build-out date for the remainder of the DRI is 2020. The master plan for the DRI includes approximately 19,000 residential units, 3.7 million square feet (SF) of office space, 2.9 million SF of commercial space, a governmental center, six schools, parks, open space, and a 7,500-seat baseball stadium and practice facility used by the Florida Marlins. As of October 2004, over 5,800 homes and approximately 2 million SF of commercial and office space have been developed west of I-95 in addition to the governmental center, several schools, and the Florida Marlins’ facilities. There are approximately 12,000 acres of undeveloped, agricultural property adjacent to and to the west of the DRI that are owned by Duda and that, according to the chief operating officer of TVC, will likely be added to the DRI in the near future. The record does not reflect what type of uses will be developed on that property or when that development will begin. The DRI development order includes authorization for up to 470 hospital beds, with vested traffic concurrency for 150 beds. The master site plan for the DRI designates an area west of I-95 on the southwest corner of the Wickham Road/Lake Andrew Drive intersection as the “Proposed Viera Medical Park.” VMC is proposed for that location. The DRI development order provides all of the local government land use approvals, including traffic concurrency, that are necessary for VMC. TVC is developing Viera for and marketing it to retirees and younger persons, including families with children. The DRI includes age-restricted subdivisions, but it also includes amenities such as three elementary schools and a large regional park with ball fields and playgrounds. (2) Negotiations for a Hospital in Viera TVC has long wanted a hospital in Viera. Wuesthoff identified the Viera area as future growth area in the 1990’s and began establishing health care facilities in the area at that time. Wuesthoff has a diagnostic center, a lab facility, and a rehabilitation facility in the Suntree area, which is just to the east of the Viera DRI. Wuesthoff expressed interest in building a hospital in Viera in 1993 and, more recently, in 2003. In August 1993, Wuesthoff and TVC entered into an agreement that gave Wuesthoff a 10-year exclusive right to develop a hospital in Viera if certain conditions were met. However, Wuesthoff ultimately built Wuesthoff-Melborune in Melbourne (rather than in Viera), and the exclusivity provision in the August 1993 contract never went into effect. In July 2003, Wuesthoff sent a letter to TVC expressing its interest in obtaining an option to purchase 25 to acres within the Viera DRI to construct a hospital. In the letter, Wuesthoff stated that it would construct the hospital “within 10 years or when the population of Viera exceeds 40,000, whichever first occurs”; that the hospital would be “constructed similar to Wuesthoff Medical Center-Melbourne which currently encompasses 65 licensed beds in a 150,000 sq. ft. facility”; that it wanted the “sole right to build a hospital or hospital like facility in Viera . . . until 5 years after the opening of the hospital” and that it wanted TVC to “consider selling the desired land to Wuesthoff at a reduced price.” Wuesthoff’s July 2003 offer was not seriously considered by TVC because, by that time, TVC was in the process of finalizing its agreement for the sale of 50 acres to Health First for VMC. Additionally, the Health First agreement was more appealing to TVC because Health First was offering to purchase more property at a higher price than was Wuesthoff, and Health First was committed to building a hospital sooner than was Wuestoff. The contract between Health First and TVC was executed on August 5, 2003, and Health First has since closed on the purchase of the 50 acres at a cost of approximately $9 million. The Health First/TVC contract includes an exclusivity provision that prohibits the development of another hospital within the Viera DRI or on any of the lands owned by Duda until 2029 if Holmes constructs at least 70 percent of Phase I of the Viera Medical Park by August 31, 2006, and begins construction on a hospital with at least 80 beds by August 31, 2010. The contract also includes exclusivity provisions relating to the other uses being developed as part of the Viera Medical Park, but the exclusivity on those uses expires in 2010, at the latest. The exclusivity provision will be included in restrictive covenants that are recorded in the public records of Brevard County. The restrictive covenants will run with the land and will bind future purchasers of property from TVC and Duda. Exclusivity provisions are not uncommon in land- purchase contracts for large commercial projects or new hospitals. The August 1993 agreement between Wuesthoff and TVC included such a provision as did Wuestoff’s July 2003 offer. However, the length of the hospital exclusivity provision in the Health First/TVC contract and the fact that it applies to the land owned by Duda outside of the Viera DRI goes beyond what is reasonably necessary to allow the new hospital to become stabilized and has the potential to stifle competition for acute care hospital services in the Viera area for the next 25 years. Viera Medical Center (1) Generally Holmes conditioned the approval of its CON application on VMC being located at the "[i]ntersection of Lake Andrew Drive and Wickham Road, Viera, Florida." VMC was projected to open in 2008 as part of the Viera Medical Park that Health First is building on the 50 acres that it purchased from TVC at that location. VMC will be located in zip code 32940, which is the “main” Viera zip code. VMC will be built on 20 of the 50 acres purchased by Health First. The remaining 30 acres will be developed with the other health care facilities that will make up the Viera Medical Park. The development of the Viera Medical Park will be done in three phases. Phase I will include a fitness center; a medical office building; and outpatient facilities such as an urgent care center, an ambulatory surgical center, and a diagnostic imaging and rehabilitation center. Phase II will include VMC. Phase III may include a nursing home and/or assisted living facility as well as “multi-family retirement units.” VMC will be a 213,000 SF facility with 84 licensed beds, 16 “observation” beds, and a full emergency room (ER). The 84 licensed beds will consist of 72 acute care beds and a 12-bed critical care unit/ICU. All of the beds will be in private rooms. The total project cost for VMC is approximately $106 million, which will be funded primarily by tax-free bonds issued by Holmes. VMC will have a cardiac catheterization lab, but it will not provide interventional cardiology services such as angioplasty. VMC will not provide any tertiary-level services or OB services, and it will not have a dedicated pediatric unit. VMC will share management and administrative support services with HRMC so as to minimize duplication of those services and to reduce overhead costs. VMC will have an integrated IT system that will utilize electronic medical records and a computerized physician order entry system, as well as an electronic ICU (e-ICU). The e-ICU is an innovative critical care management system based upon a telemedicine platform that is in use at the existing Health First hospitals in Brevard County. Except for the e-ICU, which the Wuesthoff hospitals do not have, the IT systems at VMC will be materially the same as Wuesthoff’s award-winning IT systems. VMC will have a helipad without any weight restrictions and, as discussed in Part F(1)(a)(iv) below, VMC has been designed with hurricanes and other “contingency events” (e.g., bioterrorism) in mind. Demographics of VMC’s Proposed Service Area The primary service area (PSA) for VMC consists of zip codes 32934, 32935/36, 32940, and 32955/56; the secondary service area (SSA) consists of zip codes 32901/02/41, 32904, 32922/23/24, 32926/59, and 32927. Neither Wuesthoff nor the Agency contested the reasonableness of the PSA or the SSA. All of the zip codes targeted by VMC are within the primary service area of one or more of the existing hospitals, and there are three hospitals physically located within those zip codes. Wuesthoff-Melbourne and Wuestoff-Rockledge are located in VMC’s PSA, and HRMC is in VMC’s SSA. The 2003 population of the PSA was 108,436. In 2010, which would be VMC’s third year of operation, the PSA’s population is projected to be 128,498. The 65+ age cohort, which is the group that most heavily utilizes hospital services, is projected to make up 21.5 percent of the PSA’s population in 2010. That is a lower percentage than the projected populations of the 18-44 age cohort (29.1 percent) and the 45-65 age cohort (29.7 percent) in the PSA. VMC’s PSA has a more favorable payor-mix than the county as a whole. It has a lower percentage of Medicaid patients and a higher percentage of insured patients --i.e., commercial, HMO, PPO, workers comp, and Champus/VA patients -- than the county as a whole. Except for zip code 32935/36, each of the zip codes in VMC’s PSA has a higher median household income than Brevard County as a whole. Zip code 32935/36 is the zip code in which Wuesthoff-Melbourne is located. The zip code in which VMC will be located, 32940, has the highest median household income in Brevard County. The median household income in that zip code for 2004 was $67,000 as compared to the county-wide average of $44,000. Utilization Projections VMC was projected to open in January 2008, and Holmes' CON application contains utilization and financial projections for VMC's first three years of operation, i.e., 2008, 2009, and 2010. The utilization projections are based upon an average length of stay (ALOS) of 3.69 days, which is reasonable. The utilization projections are also based upon the assumption that by VMC’s third year of operation, it will have 26.9 percent market share in its PSA and a 7.4 percent market share in its SSA. VMC's projected market share in zip code 32940, which is its “home” zip code and the “main” Viera zip code, is projected to be 35 percent. The market share assumptions are reasonable and attainable. The utilization projections include a “ramp-up” period for VMC. Its annual occupancy rate in its first year of operation is projected to be 45.6 percent; its annual occupancy rate in its second year of operation is projected to be 65.7 percent; and in its third year of operation (2010), VMC is expected to have an annual occupancy rate of 76 percent with 6,313 discharges and 23,298 patient days. The occupancy rates, and the discharges and patient days upon which they are based, are reasonable and attainable.2 The application projects that VMC will redirect or “cannibalize” a significant percentage of its patients from the other Health First hospitals. The percentage of patients that VMC will cannibalize from the other Health First hospitals in each zip code varies from 75 percent to 45 percent, depending upon the proximity of the zip code to VMC. Overall, approximately 69.4 percent of VMC’s patients will be cannibalized patients, i.e., patients that would have otherwise gone to HRMC (66.2 percent), Cape Hosptial (3.2 percent), or PBCH (less than 0.1 percent). The remaining 30.6 percent of VMC’s patients will be patients that would have otherwise gone to Wuesthoff-Rockledge (15.8 percent) or Wuesthoff-Melbourne (14.8 percent). The record does not reflect the outpatient volume projected for VMC, but Holmes’ health planner conceded at the hearing that the projected outpatient revenues for VMC did not take into account the outpatient services that will be included in Phase I of the Viera Medical Park. As a result, the volume on which the outpatient revenues were based is overstated to some degree, but there was no credible evidence regarding the extent of the overstatement. VMC is projected to treat 15,851 patients in its ER in its first year of operation (2008), and by its third year of operation (2010), VMC is expected to treat 27,780 patients in its ER. The record does not reflect how those figures were calculated, nor does it reflect what percentage of those patients would have otherwise been treated in the ERs at HRMC, PBCH, or the Wuesthoff hospitals. However, the reasonableness of those figures was not contested by Wuesthoff or the Agency. Statutory and Rule Criteria Statutory Criteria -- Section 408.035, Florida Statutes (2004)3 Subsections (1), (2) and (5) -– Need for Proposed Services; Accessibility of Existing Services; and Enhancing Access According to the CON application (page 14), the need for VMC is justified based upon: The large population base and significant population growth projected for the [Viera] area. The need to improve access and reduce travel times for this significant population for both critical care and inpatient services. The projected need for additional acute care beds at HRMC and the benefits of delivering non-tertiary services away from [HRMC’s] campus. Additionally, the CON application (page 15) asserts that the approval of VMC will: Significantly enhance the area’s Homeland Security and disaster planning and preparedness. Enhance the quality of care delivered to area residents as a result of key design and information technology innovations planned for [VMC]. Provide access to cost-effective, quality of care for all residents of the service area, including the uninsured. In its PRO (page 19), Holmes identifies those same six issues as the “not normal” circumstances that justify approval of VMC. Holmes’ health planner conceded at the hearing that the VMC project is not intended to address any cultural, programmatic, or financial access problems, and that those potential “not normal” circumstances were not advanced in the CON application as bases for approval of VMC. Population of and Growth in the Viera Area There has been considerable growth in Viera over the past 15 years, and the demand for new homes in the Viera DRI remains strong. The projected population of the Viera DRI is expected to exceed 40,000 when the DRI is built-out in 2020, and that figure does not include the population of the Suntree area, which is outside of the Viera DRI and has a number of large residential subdivisions. Zip code 32940, which is the “main” Viera zip code, had a population of 22,940 in 2003. By 2010, that zip code is projected to have a population of 31,862. That is an increase of 38.9 percent, but only 9,000 persons. As stated above, the population of VMC's PSA is projected to increase from 108,436 (in 2003) to 128,489 (in 2010). That is an increase of 18.5 percent, but only 20,000 persons. The population of VMC’s PSA is projected to grow at a faster rate than Brevard County as a whole. Over the seven-year period used in the application (2003 to 2010), the annual growth rate for VMC’s PSA is projected to be 2.64 percent while the annual growth rate of Brevard County as a whole is projected to be 1.74 percent.4 Population growth in Florida is normal and, indeed, is expected. There is nothing extraordinary about the growth projected for zip code 32940 and/or VMC’s PSA. Accordingly, the population growth projected in the Viera area does not, in and of itself, justify the approval of VMC. Enhanced Access There are two main components to Holmes’ argument that VMC will enhance access. First, Holmes contends that VMC will reduce travel times for Viera residents and thereby enhance their access to hospital services. Second, Holmes contends that the approval of VMC will relieve pressure on the overcrowded ERs at the existing hospitals in Brevard County thereby enhancing access to ER services countywide. For Viera Residents VMC will provide more convenient access to hospital services for Viera residents (at least those in need of the basic, non-OB services that will be offered at VMC), and to that extent, VMC will enhance access for Viera residents. VMC will also provide more convenient ER access for Viera residents. Quicker access to an ER is generally beneficial to the patient, although certain heart-attack patients may benefit more by going to the ER of a hospital that can do an immediate angioplasty, such as Wuesthoff-Rockledge or HRMC. VMC will not necessarily enhance access for other residents of the PSA and SSA targeted by VMC (e.g., those outside of the Viera area) because many of those residents are closer to an existing hospital. Indeed, some of those residents would have to pass an existing hospital to get to VMC, which seems particularly unlikely for emergency patients. VMC will also not enhance access for patients in need of OB services or tertiary services that will not be offered at VMC. Convenience alone is not a basis for approving a new hospital, particularly where (as here) the evidence establishes that the residents of the area to be served by the new hospital currently have reasonable access to hospital services. VMC will be located approximately 10 miles south of Wuesthoff-Rockledge, and approximately 11 miles north of Wuesthoff-Melbourne. VMC will be approximately 15 miles northwest of HRMC. There are multiple routes from the Viera area to the Wuesthoff hospitals and HRMC. The routes are along major arterial roads, including I-95, US 1, Wickham Road, Murrell Road, Fiske Boulevard, and Eau Gallie Boulevard. All of those roads are at least four lanes wide. The travel-time studies presented by Wuesthoff show that it takes less than 15 minutes to drive from either of the Wuesthoff hospitals to the VMC site. There was anecdotal testimony suggesting longer travel times, particularly from the VMC site to Wuesthoff-Melbourne,5 but that testimony was not as persuasive as Wuesthoff’s travel-time studies. The travel-time studies presented by Wuesthoff were not without flaws. For example, the travel times were calculated by driving away from the Wuesthoff hospitals, rather than driving towards the hospitals as a potential patient from Viera would be doing. Holmes did not present its own travel- time studies, and notwithstanding the directional issue and the other unpersuasive criticisms of the study by Holmes’ traffic engineer, Wuesthoff’s studies are found to be credible and persuasive. Indeed, Holmes’ traffic engineer estimated that it would take 15 to 20 minutes to get from VMC to Wuesthoff- Melbourne using the most direct route (Transcript, at 668), which is consistent with Wuesthoff’s travel-time studies. It takes longer to drive from Viera to HRMC than it does to drive from Viera to either of the Wuesthoff hospitals. The travel-time studies did not directly address the issue, but the anecdotal testimony suggests that the travel times from Viera to HRMC are between 25 and 45 minutes depending upon the time of day and traffic conditions.6 There are several road segments on the routes between Viera and the Wuesthoff hospitals whose “v/c ratios”7 currently exceeds 1.0, which is an indication of an over-capacity road. However, there are roadway improvements planned or underway that will expand the capacity of those road segments by 2010. Indeed, a comparison of the 2003 (Exhibit H-23) and 2010 (Exhibit W-50) v/c ratios for the road segments on the routes between Viera and the Wuesthoff hospitals shows only marginal increases in the ratios, with many of the 2010 ratios projected to be lower than 0.8, which according to Holmes’ traffic engineer, indicates that the “roadway that is probably operating well within its ability to carry that traffic volume.” Holmes’ traffic engineer did not attempt to quantify the extent to which travel times would increase due to the marginal increases in the v/c ratios. Thus, his opinion that travel times would “increase significantly” and be “significantly greater” in the future is not persuasive. TVC is required to mitigate for the off-site traffic impacts generated by the development of the Viera DRI. In this regard, road improvements (e.g., additional lanes, traffic signals, etc.) will be made in the future as necessary to accommodate the additional population in the Viera DRI. In fact, there are significant road improvements currently underway that are being funded, at least in part, by TVC pursuant to the Viera DRI development order, including the six-laning of I-95 through the Viera area. In sum, the evidence establishes that persons in the PSA and SSA targeted by VMC, including residents of the Viera area, currently have reasonable access to acute care services, and the evidence was not persuasive that there will be access problems over the applicable five-year planning horizon such that a new hospital in Viera is necessary to enhance access. For ER Services in Central and South Brevard County The Brevard County government is the emergency medical services (EMS) provider for the county. Brevard County EMS responds to emergency calls throughout the county and its ambulances transport emergency patients to hospital ERs. Overcrowded ERs can adversely affect the EMS system in several ways. First, if the ER is overcrowded it can take longer for ambulances to off-load patients to the ER staff, which results a longer period of time that the ambulance is “out of service.” Second, if the closest hospital is on “diversion status” because of an overcrowded ER, ambulances will have to transport patients to a more distant hospital, which also results in the ambulance being out of service for a longer period of time. Longer out-of-service periods can, on a cumulative basis, strain the EMS system because an out-of-service ambulance is not able to respond to emergency calls in its service area and the EMS provider may have to shift other ambulances to cover the area at the risk of increasing response times for emergency calls. Brevard County EMS protocol requires ambulances to take patients to the closest hospital, unless the patient is a trauma patient or the closest hospital is on diversion status. Trauma patients are taken to HRMC, which is the designated trauma center for the county. A hospital requests diversion status from EMS when it is unable to accept additional emergency patients because its ER is overcrowded. The most common reasons that an ER is overcrowded is that it had a large number of emergency patients arrive at the same time or that there is a “bottleneck” in the ER caused by a lack of inpatient beds to move patients from the ER that need to be admitted to the hospital. If diversion status is granted, EMS will take emergency patients to another hospital, even if it is further away than the hospital on diversion. As noted above, this strains the EMS system and can result in longer response times for emergency calls, which in turn, can negatively impact patient care. If diversion status is denied, the hospital is required to continue to accept emergency patients. This can create a less than optimal setting for patient care because the hospital may not have adequate space or resources to treat the patient in a timely manner. Until recently, Brevard County EMS would not grant diversion status to a hospital in south Brevard County if either of the other two hospitals in that area of the county informed EMS that they could not take the patients. That policy recently changed, and EMS will now grant diversion status to a hospital in south Brevard County if either of the other two hospitals in that area of the county informs EMS that it can take the patients. The new EMS policy change makes it easier for hospitals in south Brevard County to be placed in diversion status. For example, under the old policy, diversion status would not be granted to HRMC if either Wuestoff-Melbourne or PBCH informed EMS that they could not take HRMC’s emergency patients, but under the new policy, diversion status will be denied to HRMC only if Wuesthoff-Melbourne and PBCH both inform EMS that they cannot take HRMC’s emergency patients. In Brevard County, having a hospital on diversion was “pretty rare” until 2002. Diversion requests have become more frequent since then, and they are no longer a seasonal phenomenon caused by the influx of “snowbirds” into the county. Diversion is a more frequent problem in south Brevard County than it is in central Brevard County, and in south Brevard County, the diversion requests have come primarily from HRMC. The evidence was not persuasive that ER overcrowding is a significant problem for the Wuesthoff hospitals or PBCH. Wuesthoff-Melbourne has not requested to go on diversion, and only one occasion was identified where HRMC’s diversion request was denied because Wuesthoff-Melbourne was unable to handle HRMC's diverted patients. That occasion occurred when Wuesthoff-Melbourne had only 65 beds and, hence, less ability than it currently has to move patients out of the ER to accommodate additional emergency patients. According to Holmes, VMC will enhance access to ER services in central and south Brevard County because it will increase the area-wide ER capacity and reduce the frequency of diversion requests, which in turn, will reduce strains on the EMS system and benefit patients. The "North Expansion" underway at HRMC (discussed below) will include a new ER that is expected to help address the overcrowding issues that have required HRMC to request diversion in the past. The new ER is designed with shelled-in space to facilitate future ER expansions as needed. In any event, the evidence was not persuasive that VMC will materially reduce the ER volume at HRMC. The record does not reflect what percentage of VMC’s projected ER patients would have otherwise been served at HRMC as compared to the Wuesthoff hospitals. Moreover, it is not likely that non-trauma emergency patients from the Viera area are contributing to the overcrowding in the ER at HRMC because, under EMS protocol, those patients currently are being taken to Wuesthoff-Melbourne or Wuesthoff-Rockledge, which are closer to Viera than is HRMC. Need to “Decompress” HRMC Holmes contends that VMC will help to “decompress” HRMC and that it is the only viable option for doing so. HRMC is a well-utilized facility. According to the SAAR, its annual occupancy rate for the 12-month period ending June 2003 was 81.22 percent. HRMC's occupancy rate tends to stay above 80 percent, and at times it is as high as 115 percent. If VMC is not approved, HRMC’s annual occupancy rate for 2008 is projected to be 83.9 percent, and by 2010, its occupancy rate is projected to increase to 90 percent. Even if VMC is approved, HRMC’s annual occupancy rate is projected to be 81.7 percent in 2010. Those figures assume that HRMC will maintain its current bed capacity and they do not take into account the impact of the expansion of the Wuesthoff hospitals. HRMC currently includes approximately 612,000 SF. It is located on 18 acres of property that is bounded by streets and developed properties. Holmes owns several parcels of land adjacent to HRMC, and it is continuing to acquire parcels as they come available. Much of the adjacent land owned by Holmes is used for parking, and notwithstanding a 500-space parking garage on the south side of HRMC, there is still a shortage of parking at HRMC. Some of its staff parks at a nearby shopping center and take a shuttle to the hospital. There is an area on the north side of HRMC identified as the site of a "future parking garage," but there are no current plans to construct that structure. The original portion of the hospital, which is referred to as the “core” area, was built in the 1960’s. The remainder of the hospital has been added over the years, which has resulted in a less than ideal facility layout and has created operating inefficiencies. Some of the hospital’s support functions and administrative offices are located off- site. HRMC has undertaken a series of construction projects in recent years to reduce inefficiencies and congestion at the hospital and to increase the percentage of private rooms at the hospital. Those projects include the construction of a new OB unit and, most significantly, the $100 million “North Expansion.” The North Expansion is an eight-story, 337,000 SF addition to the hospital that is expected to be completed by the end of 2006. It will include 144 patient rooms, a new ER with a number of new observation beds, and it will allow all of the hospital’s cardiology services to be located in contiguous space. The 144 patient rooms will include 14 cardiovascular ICU beds, 22 ICU beds, and 108 acute care beds. All of the beds will be in private rooms. The 144 beds added as part of the North Expansion will not increase the bed capacity at Holmes. The same number of existing licensed beds will be eliminated, either through the conversion of existing semi-private rooms to private rooms or because the rooms are located in space that will be demolished to construct the North Expansion. The North Expansion has been designed and engineered to withstand 200-mile per hour winds, which exceeds the applicable building code requirements for hurricane protection. The North Expansion has also been designed and engineered to accommodate future expansion at HRMC in several respects. First, it includes shelled-in space on the eighth floor for an additional 36 private patient rooms. Second, it is engineered (but not shelled-in) to allow the fourth through eighth floors to be further expanded to include up to 180 additional private patient rooms in what was referred to at the hearing as a “mirror image” of the tower being built as part of the North Expansion. Third, the ER includes shelled-in space for future expansions as well as adjacent open space into which the ER could be further expanded in the future. There is no current plan to finish the shelled-in space on the eighth floor, but Holmes’ facility manger testified that he expected that to occur as soon as funding is available, and perhaps prior to the completion of the North Expansion. The beds added on the eighth floor will not increase the licensed capacity at Holmes, but rather they will come from the conversion of 36 additional existing semi-private rooms to private rooms. There is also no current plan to construct the “mirror image” side of the fourth through eighth floors of the North Expansion. That construction will be done in conjunction with the renovation of the core area of the hospital and will initially be used to locate the services from the core area that are displaced by the renovation. After the renovation of the core area, however, the "mirror image" will be used for patient rooms. In conjunction with the construction of the North Expansion, HRMC expects to relocate some of its ancillary and support services from the core area into the space where the existing ER is located, which in turn will open up space in the core area for other purposes. The space created by the construction of the new OB unit will also be available for other uses after it is no longer needed as "swing space" during the construction of the North Expansion. Additionally, Holmes recently purchased a building directly behind HRMC into which it will likely locate other ancillary and support services. Currently, less than 40 percent of HRMC’s general acute care beds are in private rooms. After the North Expansion, almost 80 percent of those beds will be in private rooms. Ultimately, Holmes wants all of the beds at HRMC to be in private rooms. Private rooms are beneficial because they offer the patients and their families more privacy and a more restful environment, and they can also help reduce the spread of infections. However, private rooms can also create operational inefficiencies for nurses who have to visit more rooms (often on longer hallways) than they would to serve the same number of patients in semi-private rooms. High quality care can be provided in semi-private rooms, and HRMC and Wuesthoff-Rockledge each do so. Although patients may prefer private rooms and most new hospitals are being designed with only private rooms, private rooms are still best characterized as an amenity, not a necessity. As a result, and Holmes’ desire to convert all of HRMC’s semi-private rooms to private rooms does not justify the building a new hospital based upon alleged capacity constraints at HRMC. Indeed, if Holmes chose to do so, it could increase the bed capacity at HRMC with little or no additional cost by adding the 36 beds in the shelled-in eighth floor of the North Expansion and/or by not converting as many semi-private rooms into private rooms. Moreover, after the North Expansion, HRMC will have approximately 50 observation beds (as compared to 20 currently) in private rooms that can be used for inpatients as needed. Indeed, as a result of the 2004 amendments to the CON law, some of those beds could be converted to licensed acute care beds at any time without CON review. Even if the beds are not converted to licensed beds, they will still help to decompress HRMC because observation patients will not need to be placed in inpatient rooms while they are being observed and evaluated for possible admission to the hospital. Several Holmes’ witnesses testified that even if Holmes wanted to add bed capacity to HRMC by converting fewer semi-private rooms to private rooms or other means, it could not do so because of limitations on the space available to provide the support services necessary for those additional rooms. That testimony was not persuasive because the witnesses conceded that Holmes has not undertaken a thorough analysis of what it intends to do with the space created in the existing building by the relocation of services as part of the North Expansion, which as noted above, will free up additional space for support services in the core area. The evidence was also not persuasive that the alternative presented in the CON application for adding 84 beds to HRMC is realistic. That alternative, the cost of which is presented in Table 23 of the CON application, was prepared after the decision was made to seek approval of a CON for VMC; it was not an alternative actually considered by Holmes and, indeed, it was characterized by the Holmes’ witness who prepared the cost estimate as a “theoretical solution” and not a viable solution to adding beds. The cost estimate in Table 23 is based upon a plan that would require the acquisition of additional land across the street from HRMC and the construction of a new bed tower on that land and an adjacent parcel on which Holmes currently owns a medical office building. The bed tower would be connected to HRMC by a two-story bridge over the street. The plan also includes the construction of a new parking garage and an office building to replace the existing medical office building. The land and building costs of the plan were approximately $86.2 million, which is approximately $18.3 million more than the land and building costs of VMC. When the equipment costs are added, the total cost of the plan is approximately $120 million. Not only was the plan not a viable solution, its cost was clearly overstated. For example, the $450/SF cost of the new bed tower was irreconcilably higher than the $278/SF cost of VMC and the $2.5 million that Holmes represented to the Agency in October 2003 that it would cost to add 50 beds to HRMC. In sum, the evidence fails to support Holmes’ claim that the only way to add bed capacity to HRMC is through the $120 million plan presented in Table 23 of the CON application. The evidence also fails to support Holmes’ claim that VMC is the only viable option to decompress HRMC. Indeed, the evidence establishes that HRMC could be decompressed if PBCH was better utilized. Holmes contends that PBCH is too far away from Viera to be a viable alternative to HRMC for patients from the Viera area. The evidence supports that claim, but that claim ignores the fact that better utilization of PBCH by Palm Bay patients will help to decompress HRMC. PBCH is currently an underutilized facility, and it has been ever since it opened in 1992. According to the SAAR, PBCH's annual occupancy rate for the 12-month period ending June 2003 was only 51.5 percent. Its annual occupancy rate is projected to be only 60.1 percent in 2008 and 65.4 percent in 2010, which are well below the 75 to 80 percent optimum utilization level. Approximately 25 to 30 percent of HRMC’s patient volume comes from the Palm Bay zip codes. If those patients were redirected to PBCH, the utilization rate at HRMC would go down and the utilization rate at PBCH would go up. Redirecting Palm Bay patients to PBCH has the potential to decompress HRMC more than redirecting Viera patients to VMC because HRMC has approximately 7,000 admissions from the Palm Bay area, as compared to approximately 6,000 admissions from the Viera area. Holmes did not present any persuasive evidence as to why patients from the Palm Bay zip codes could not be redirected to PBCH as a means of decompressing HRMC. On this issue, there was credible evidence presented by Wuesthoff that virtually no elective cases are being done at PBCH and that PBCH is essentially being used as a triage facility for HRMC. Finally, the expansion of the Wuesthoff hospitals (particularly Wuesthoff-Melbourne) will help to decompress HRMC because the Wuesthoff hospitals will be able to serve more patients. As the Wuestoff hospitals' market share grows, HRMC’s market share (and patient volume) will decline.8 Enhanced Homeland Security and Disaster Planning Brevard County is susceptible to hurricanes because of its location on the east coast of Florida and the length of its coastline. The evidence was not persuasive that Brevard County is more susceptible to hurricanes than are the other counties on the east coast. The three major storms that affected the county in the summer of 2004 were not the norm. Brevard County has a comprehensive emergency management plan to prepare for and respond to hurricanes, as do all of the existing hospitals in the county. Those plans were tested in the summer of 2004 when the county was directly impacted by three of the four major storms that hit the state Florida. The hospitals’ hurricane plans include securing the building, discharging as many patients as possible prior to the arrival of the storm, and canceling elective surgeries scheduled around the time the storm is expected to hit the area. The plans also provide for the evacuation of some of the hospitals during particularly strong storms, i.e., Category 3 or above. Cape Hospital is particularly prone to evacuation when a strong hurricane threatens the area because it is located close to the ocean on a peninsula in the middle of the Intracoastal Waterway. Cape Hospital was evacuated twice during the summer of 2004. None of the hospitals in Brevard County were evacuated during the first storm, Hurricane Charley. Cape Hospital and Wuesthoff-Rockledge were evacuated prior to the second storm, Hurricane Francis. That was the first time that Wuesthoff-Rockledge was evacuated since it opened in 1941, and its ER remained open and staffed even though the remainder of the hospital was evacuated. Cape Hosptial’s patients were taken to HRMC, and Wuesthoff-Rockledge patients were taken to Wuesthoff-Melbourne. The evacuated patients were accompanied by physicians and nurses and were transported to the receiving hospitals by ambulance. The evacuation of Cape Hospital and Wuesthoff- Rockledge placed strains on the receiving hospitals and their staffs. At one point during the evacuation, HRMC had more than 700 patients in its 514-bed facility and Wuesthoff-Rockledge had 156 patients in its 65-bed facility. By all accounts, despite the strains placed on the receiving hospitals, the evacuations went smoothly and there were no adverse patient outcomes attributable to the evacuation. Indeed, the director of Brevard County’s Health Department testified that all of the hospitals in the county responded and performed “great” during the hurricanes, and that sentiment was echoed by physicians and administrators affiliated with both of the hospital systems involved in this case. Cape Hospital was evacuated again prior to the third storm, Hurricane Jeanne. Wuesthoff-Rockledge was not evacuated during that storm, and approximately 15 of Cape Hospital’s patients were taken to Wuesthoff-Rockledge. None of the Health First or Wuesthoff hospitals suffered any significant damage from the hurricanes. The approval of VMC will not eliminate the possibility that Cape Hospital, Wuesthoff-Rockledge, or some other hospital in Brevard County may have to evacuate during a future hurricane. VMC may provide a more convenient (or at least an additional) place to evacuate some of the patients from Cape Hospital during a future hurricane because VMC is closer to Cape Hospital than is HRMC. VMC will also be more inland than HRMC and it will be designed to withstand 165 mile per hour winds. Holmes conditioned the approval of its CON application on the inclusion of a "suitable parcel, fully equipped and designed to support temporary staging of Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT)" at VMC. A DMAT is essentially a mobile emergency room set up by the federal government after a natural disaster to help serve the medical needs of those affected by the disaster. The DMAT staging area at VMC will be an open field adjacent to the hospital that is “pre-plumbed” with water, electricity, and communication lines. In some situations, it is beneficial for a DMAT to be set up proximate to a hospital, and in that regard, VMC’s inland location and proximity to I-95 may make it an attractive location to set up a DMAT in the future. It is not necessary, however, for a DMAT to be set up proximate to a hospital. DMATs are fully self-sustaining and they can be set up anywhere, including a Wal-Mart parking lot. Indeed, in some situations, it is more beneficial for the DMAT to be located closer to the persons in need of its services than to a hospital. For example, after Hurricane Jeanne, a DMAT was set up near the Barefoot Bay community in southern Brevard County, which is miles from the closest hospital. VMC’s central-county location and proximity to I-95 would also make it a good point-of-dispensing (POD) for vaccines and medicines in the case of a severe biological emergency. However, like DMATs, PODs can be set up anywhere and it is not critical for a POD to be proximate to a hospital even though proximity might allow for greater medical oversight of the dispensing process. There are high-profile, “Tier 1” terrorist targets located in Brevard County, including Kennedy Space Center, Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Patrick Air Force Base, and Port Canaveral. There is also a nuclear power plant in Indian River County, just south of the Brevard County line. The nature of these targets is somewhat unique because they involve the country's space program, but the presence of multiple “Tier 1” terrorist targets is not unique to Brevard County and is not, in and of itself, a special circumstance that justifies approval of a new hospital. Brevard County has developed emergency management plans in conjunction with the state and federal governments to prepare for and respond to terrorist attacks on those targets. Those plans have been in place for many years, but they have been significantly strengthened since September 11, 2001. VMC will include decontamination areas and other design features to facilitate the treatment of victims of bio- terrorism. The existing hospitals in Brevard County have similar design features as well as comprehensive plans for dealing with bio-terrorism. The evidence was not persuasive that VMC, as an 84- bed, non-tertiary satellite hospital, will materially enhance County’s ability to deal with a large-scale terrorist attack, whether biological or otherwise. Similarly, the evidence was not persuasive that Brevard County’s emergency management plans for hurricanes and/or terrorism are deficient in any way or that the approval of VMC would result in material enhancements to those plans. Any enhancements attributable to VMC would be marginal, at best. The DMAT staging area and other design elements included at VMC to facilitate the hospital’s participation in the Brevard County’s response to hurricanes, terrorist attacks, or other contingencies are positive attributes. Inclusion of those features in VMC (or any new hospital for that matter) is reasonable despite the infrequency of those contingencies, but it does not follow that VMC should be approved simply because it will include those features. IT Innovations and Design Features The evidence was not persuasive that VMC will provide a higher quality of care than is currently being provided at the existing hospitals serving central and south Brevard County as a result of the “innovative” IT systems and the other design features that will be incorporated into VMC. See Part F(1)(b) below. Accordingly, the approval of VMC is not justified on that basis. Enhanced Access to Care for the Uninsured Holmes’ contention that VMC will enhance access for the uninsured implicates the issue of “financial access.” Financial access concerns arise when there is evidence that necessary services are being denied to patients based upon their inability to pay or their uninsured status. Holmes’ health planner acknowledged at the hearing that VMC was not intended to address any financial access concerns for patients in the Viera area and, indeed, there was no credible evidence of any financial access concerns in PSA and SSA targeted by VMC. As discussed in Part E(2) above, VMC’s PSA include a higher percentage of insured patients than Brevard County as a whole, and as discussed in Part F(1)(g) below, the existing hospitals are adequately serving the medically indigent patients in central and south Brevard County, both at the hospital and through outreach efforts such as the Holmes’ HOPE program and Wuesthoff’s free clinics. Accordingly, the evidence failed to establish that VMC will enhance access to care for the uninsured, and approval of VMC is not justified on that basis. Subsection (3) -- Applicant’s Quality of Care Holmes, the applicant, provides a high quality of care at HRMC and PBCH, and it is reasonable to expect that it will provide the same high quality of care at VMC. The Wuesthoff hospitals also provide a high quality of care, and Holmes' witnesses acknowledged that VMC was not proposed to address any problem with quality of care in central or south Brevard County. The evidence was not persuasive that the quality of care at VMC will be materially better (or worse) than that provided at Wuesthoff-Melbourne, which has a similar range of services that will be provided at VMC. The award-winning IT systems in place at the Wuesthoff hospitals are materially the same as those proposed for VMC except for e-ICU at VMC. The evidence was not persuasive that the e-ICU significantly enhances quality of care, and because the e-ICU is being used at the existing Health First hospitals in Brevard County, VMC will not be providing any new technology or service that is not already available to physicians and patients in the county. Thus, the "innovative" IT systems proposed for VMC do not provide an independent basis for approving the CON application. The evidence was not persuasive that VMC would exacerbate nursing or physician shortages in Brevard County thereby negatively affecting quality of care in the county. See Part F(1)(c) below. Subsection (4) -- Availability of Personnel and Resources for Operations Holmes and Health First have the management resources necessary to establish and operate VMC. Holmes’ CON application projects that VMC will have 241.4 full-time equivalents (FTEs) in its first year of operation, and that by its third year of operation, it will have 355.7 FTEs. Nursing positions -- registered nurses, licensed practical nurses, nursing aides, and nursing directors -- account for 123.1 of the FTEs in the first year of operation, and 189.2 of the FTEs in the third year of operation. According to the CON application, a significant number of the initial FTEs at VMC are expected to be filled by persons who transfer from Holmes’ existing campuses, HRMC and PBCH. The parties stipulated that the projected number of FTEs needed by position and the projected salaries contained in Holmes’ CON application are reasonable for the census projected at VMC. However, Wuesthoff disputed whether Holmes will be able to adequately staff VMC due to nurse and physician shortages in Brevard County and/or that VMC will exacerbate those shortages and make it more difficult to staff the existing hospitals in the county. There is a nursing shortage in Brevard County, as there is around Florida and across the nation, but the situation in Brevard County is improving. Wuesthoff was able to fully staff Wuesthoff-Melbourne prior to its opening in December 2002, even though the nursing shortage was more severe at that time. Additionally, Wuesthoff is currently in the process of adding beds at Wuestoff-Melbourne and Wuesthoff-Rockledge, and it expects to be able to recruit and retain the nurses necessary to staff those additional beds despite the current state of the nursing shortage. Holmes received “magnet designation” from the American Nurses Credentialing Center, which is a recognition of its excellence in nursing. No other hospital in Brevard County has magnet designation, and that designation helps Holmes attract and retain nurses. The evidence establishes that Holmes will be able to recruit and retain the nursing and other staff needed for VMC, and the evidence was not persuasive that the staffing of VMC will exacerbate the nursing shortage or otherwise significantly impact Wuesthoff. There is a shortage of physicians in Brevard County with certain specialties, including neurosurgery, neurology, orthopedics, dermatology, and gastroenterology. Like the nursing shortage, this problem is not unique to Brevard County and it is not as severe in Brevard County as it is elsewhere in the state. The shortage of physician specialists in Brevard County is to some extent hospital-specific. For example, there is only one neurosurgeon covering Wuesthoff-Rockledge and Cape Hospital, and Wuesthoff-Melbourne only has part-time coverage neurosurgical coverage, but Holmes has several neurosurgeons. Holmes has recently had success in recruiting new physicians to Brevard County, including specialists. One of the largest multi-specialty physician groups in Brevard County, whose physicians are on staff at Holmes’ and Wuestoff's hospitals, has also been successful recently in recruiting new physicians to the area. That group, Melbourne Internal Medicine Associates, will be adding more physicians whether or not VMC is approved. The evidence establishes that Holmes will be able to attract the necessary physician staff for VMC, just as Wuesthoff-Melbourne was able to do when it opened. Indeed there are a number of physicians who have offices in the Viera area that are closer to VMC than the existing hospitals where they have privileges. Holmes and Wuesthoff require physicians with privileges at their hospitals to provide coverage for ER calls on a rotational basis. Physicians with privileges at more than one of the hospitals are required to provide ER call coverage at multiple hospitals, which can create a problem if the physician is on-call at two (or more) hospitals at the same time. Physicians who choose obtain privileges at VMC will be required to provide ER call coverage at VMC. ER call coverage is a problem in Brevard County, but the evidence was not persuasive that the problem is as significant in Brevard County as it is elsewhere in the state or that VMC would seriously exacerbate the problem. More specifically, the evidence was not persuasive regarding the extent to which VMC would cause physicians to be on call at more than one hospital at the same time. Nor was the evidence persuasive regarding the likelihood that physicians would relinquish privileges at other hospitals in Brevard County to obtain privileges at VMC in such numbers that ER call coverage problems would be created for the other hospitals. Subsection (6) -- Financial Feasibility The parties stipulated that VMC is financially feasible in the short-term and that Holmes has sufficient availability of funds for VMC's capital and operating expenses. The long-term financial feasibility of VMC is in dispute. Generally, if a CON project will at least break even in the second year of operation, it is financially feasible in the long-term. If, however, the project continues to show a loss in the second year of operation it is not financially feasible in the long-term unless it is nearing break-even and it is demonstrated that the hospital will break even within a reasonable period of time. Agency precedent (e.g., Wellington, supra, at 73-74) and the evidence in this case (e.g., Exhibit W-57, at 22) establish that in the context of a satellite hospital project that is expected to “cannibalize” patients from the applicant’s existing hospital, it is important to consider the impact of the project on the entire hospital system in evaluating the long- term financial feasibility of the project. The net operating revenue projected on Schedule 7A of the CON application, which is the starting point for the net income/loss projected on Schedule 8A, is reasonable.9 On Schedule 8A of the CON application, in the column titled “VMC only,” Holmes projects that VMC will generate a net loss of $5.71 million in its first year of operation, but that it will generate net profits of $1.48 million and $5.11 million in its second and third years of operation. Thus, as a stand-alone entity, VMC is financially feasible in the long-term. However, the “VMC only” figures do not provide the complete picture of the financial feasibility of the VMC project because of the significant percentage of its patients that will be cannibalized from HRMC and PBCH. In evaluating the long-term financial feasibility of the VMC project, it is also important to consider the “incremental difference” column in Schedule 8A. That column reflects VMC’s net financial benefit (or burden) to Holmes after taking into account the patients that VMC is cannibalizing from HRMC and PBCH. The “incremental difference” column in Schedule 8A shows a net loss of $695,000 in the VMC’s first year of operation, and net profits of $605,000 and $983,000 in the second and third years of VMC’s operation. The incremental figures presented in the CON application identify the profit/loss that will be generated by the patients treated at VMC that are new to the Holmes’ system, but they do not take into account the fact that the patients treated at VMC that were cannibalized from the other Holmes’ hospitals would have generated a different profit/loss for the Holmes’ system if they were treated at one of the other Holmes’ hospitals. When incremental profit/loss associated with treating the cannibalized patients at VMC rather than HRMC or PBCH is factored in, the “incremental difference” generated by VMC will be net profits of $498,000 (year one); $720,000 (year two); and $252,000 (year three). Included in the “incremental difference” column on Schedule 8A (and embedded in the revised figures in the preceding paragraph) are negative figures on the “depreciation and amortization” line and the “interest” line. Those figures are intended to reflect the depreciation, amortization, and interest expenses that Holmes will “save” by building VMC rather than by adding 84 beds at HRMC. A critical assumption underlying the “savings” shown on those lines is that it would cost $120 million to add 84 beds to HRMC. To the extent that cost is overstated, then the depreciation, amortization, and interest expense “savings” on Schedule 8A are also overstated, as is the incremental net profit of the VMC project. The extent to which the net profit is overstated depends upon the extent to which the $120 million cost is overstated. For example, if the cost of adding 84 beds to HRMC is the same as the cost of VMC (i.e., $106 million rather than $120 million), then the depreciation, amortization, and interest expense shown in the “incremental difference” column on Schedule 8A would be $0 (rather than a negative number) because the depreciation, amortization, and interest expenses in the “with this project” and “without this project” columns would be the same. If, on the other hand, there was no cost associated with the addition of 84 beds at HRMC, then the depreciation, amortization, and interest expense shown in the “without this project” column would be $10.662 million lower in 2010 (see Endnote 10) and that amount would appear as a positive number -- i.e., expense -- rather than a negative number -- i.e., “savings” -- in the “incremental difference” column. The evidence was not persuasive that it will cost $120 million to add beds to HRMC, which is the amount underlying the projected “savings” in depreciation, amortization, and interest expense shown on Schedule 8A. Indeed, as discussed in Part F(1)(a)(iii) above, the evidence establishes that the alternative that gave rise to the $120 million cost estimate was not a viable option and that Holmes could add 84 beds at HRMC with little or no cost if it chose to do so by reducing the number of semi-private rooms that it converts to private rooms as part of the North Expansion and/or by finishing the shelled- in space on the eighth floor of the North Expansion. Accordingly, the “savings” embedded in Schedule 8A are grossly overstated as is the incremental net profit shown in that schedule. Specifically, in the third year of operation, when VMC is at a near-optimal occupancy level of 76 percent, the incremental net profit generated by VMC will be no more than $234,000 and, more likely, will be a net loss between $497,000 and $10.41 million.10 A net profit of $234,000 is a very marginal return on the $106 million cost of VMC, and is well below the three percent return that Holmes' seeks to achieve for its capital projects. However, according to Holmes' chief financial officer, the return generated by a project is not Holmes' paramount concern as a not-for profit organization, and at that level, the project would be considered financially feasible in the long-term. A $497,000 to $10.41 million incremental net loss would mean that the project is not financially feasible in the long-term. The “including this project” column on Schedule 8A projects that Holmes will have net income of approximately $31.1 million in 2010. Thus, even if VMC actually generated an incremental net loss in the range of $497,000 to $10.41 million in 2010, the Holmes' system would still be profitable. Subsection (7) -- Fostering Competition that Promotes Cost-Effectiveness Generally, competition for hospital services benefits consumers because it leads to lower prices and it creates incentives for hospitals to lower costs. It is not necessary for hospitals to be equal in size to compete, but the beneficial effects of competition will be greater if the hospitals are more equal. As explained by Dr. David Eisenstadt, Wuesthoff’s expert economist, “competitive constraints are a matter of degree” and “while it is true that a small hospital can pose some competitive constraint, it’s not correct that a small hospital can impose the same competitive constraint . . . as a large hospital could.” (Transcript at 1571-72). Holmes is, and historically has been, the dominant provider of hospital services in south Brevard County, with market shares exceeding 80 percent prior to the opening of Wuesthoff-Melbourne. Holmes still has a market share in excess of 70 percent in south Brevard County. A dominant hospital has the ability to set prices above competitive levels by commanding higher prices in negotiations with commercial payors. Holmes has done so in the past and, based upon the comparison of the commercial average net inpatient revenues reported by the Health First hospitals and the Wuesthoff hospitals in 2003 and 2004, it continues to do so. Holmes ability to set prices above competitive levels is enhanced by the fact that the largest managed care plan in Brevard County, HFHP, is operated by Health First. The original approval of the CON for Wuesthoff- Melbourne was based upon the Agency’s determinations that there was at that time a “compelling” need for competition for hospital services in south Brevard County; that the entry of a new, non-Health First provider into the market would give commercial payors and, ultimately, patients an alternative to Holmes, which because of its relationship with HFHP, had no incentive to negotiate competitive rates with other providers; and that competition would have the effect of reducing prices paid by the commercial payors to the hospitals and, ultimately, the premiums paid by patients. Wuesthoff-Melbourne’s entry into the market in December 2002 has not yet resulted in any material price reductions. Indeed, notwithstanding Wuesthoff-Melbourne’s presence in the market, HRMC increased its charges by 15 percent in 2003-04 and by an additional five percent in 2004-05. A hospital’s charges do not necessarily correspond to the prices that the hospital negotiates with commercial payors. However, in this case, there appears to be a correlation because Holmes had an 11.6 percent increase in net revenue per admission between 2003 and 2004 and it also had significant increases in the commercial average inpatient revenues per admission at HRMC and PBCH between 2003 and 2004. Moreover, the significant increase in charges at Holmes over the past two years is a strong indication that Holmes is not feeling any significant competitive pressure as a result of Wuesthoff-Melbourne’s presence in the market. Wuesthoff-Melbourne will be able to exert more competitive pressure on Holmes as its market share increases, particularly if Holmes’ market share continues to decline at the same time as is projected. As a result, Wuesthoff-Melbourne’s ability to expand and increase (or at least maintain) its market share in the growing Viera market is particularly significant to achieving price reductions (and/or minimizing price increases) in Brevard County.11 Holmes contends that even if VMC is approved, there will be sufficient competition in Viera because, according to Table 33 in the CON application, in 2010 the Health First hospitals will have a 50.5 percent market share of the PSA targeted by VMC and the Wuesthoff hospitals will have a 44.3 percent market share of the PSA. However, the approval of the VMC will have the effect of dramatically slowing the upward trend in Wuesthoff’s market share and corresponding downward trend of Health First’s market share in the PSA targeted by VMC because according to Tables 28 and 33 of the CON application, without VMC, the market share of the Wuesthoff hospitals in the PSA is projected to increase from 43.3 percent (in 2003) to 52.3 percent (in 2010), and the market share of the Health First Hospitals in the PSA is expected to decline from 51.2 percent (in 2003) to 42.5 percent (in 2010). Moreover, if VMC is approved, it is less likely that there will be sufficient need for additional acute care beds in the area to justify expanding Wuesthoff-Melbourne beyond 134 beds. That, in turn, will limit the competitive pressure that Wuesthoff-Melbourne will be able to exert on Holmes in the future. The evidence was not persuasive regarding the extent of the competitive pressure and/or price reductions that would result from the expansion of Wuesthoff-Melbourne rather than the approval of VMC.12 However, the fact remains that VMC will strengthen Holmes’ market position in central and south Brevard County, which will not foster competition that promotes cost effectiveness. Not only will the approval of VMC negatively affect the evolution of competition in south Brevard County, but it will effectively preclude the construction of another hospital in the Viera area until 2029 when the exclusivity provisions and restrictive covenants discussed in Part D(2) above expire. The evidence was not persuasive that there was an anticompetitive motivation underlying Holmes’ decision to propose VMC, but the evidence does establish that the approval of VMC will have anticompetitive effects. As a result, the criteria in Section 408.035(7), Florida Statutes, strongly weigh against the approval of Holmes’ CON application. Subsection (8) -- Costs and Methods of Construction The parties stipulated that the costs (including equipment costs), methods of construction, and energy provision for VMC are reasonable; that the architectural drawings for the VMC satisfy the applicable code requirements; and that the construction schedule for VMC is reasonable. Thus, VMC satisfies the criteria in Section 408.035(8), Florida Statutes. Subsection (9) -- Medicaid and Charity Care Holmes conditioned the approval of its application on VMC providing the following levels of Medicaid and charity care: At least 3.0 percent of inpatients at [VMC] will be covered by Medicaid and/or Medicaid HMOs. At least 2.3 percent of the gross revenues of [VMC] will be attributable to patients who meet the guidelines for charity care. The Medicaid and charity commitments are lower than the averages for Brevard County, but they are reasonable and attainable in light of the demographics of the area that will be served by VMC. Holmes has a history of providing considerable services to Medicaid and charity patients, both at its existing facilities and through community programs such as HOPE. Wuesthoff also has a history of providing considerable services to Medicaid and charity patients at its existing facilities and through community programs such as its free clinic in Cocoa. Wuesthoff-Rockledge is a Medicaid disproportionate share provider, which entitles it to a higher Medicaid reimbursement rate from the State as a “reward” for serving more than its fair share of Medicaid patients. Holmes' hospitals and Wuesthoff-Melbourne are not Medicaid disproportionate share providers. Wuesthoff-Melbourne has not been open long enough to qualify. The Wuesthoff hospitals have a contract with Well Care, which is the only Medicaid HMO in Brevard County. Holmes' hospitals do not have a contract with Well Care. On a dollar-amount basis, Holmes provides considerably more Medicaid and charity care than any other hospital in Brevard County, including the Wuesthoff hospitals. In fiscal year 2003, for example, Holmes’ Medicaid gross revenues were $53.7 million (as compared to $39.7 million for the Wuesthoff hospitals) and its charity care gross revenues were $27.8 million (as compared to $10.9 million for the Wuesthoff hospitals). The larger dollar-amount of Medicaid and charity care provided by Holmes is due, at least in part, to Holmes being almost twice the size of the Wuesthoff hospitals. On a percentage basis, Holmes provides approximately the same level of charity care as Wuesthoff-Rockledge, but it provides less Medicaid care than Wuesthoff-Rockledge. In fiscal year 2003, for example, 2.8 percent of Holmes’ gross revenue was charity care (as compared to 2.5 percent for Wuesthoff- Rockledge) and seven percent of Holmes’ patient days were attributable to Medicaid patients (as compared to 10.9 percent for Wuesthoff-Rockledge). According to Mr. Gregg, the Agency gives more weight to the percentage of Medicaid and charity care provided by a hospital than it does to the dollar amount of such services. However, Mr. Gregg acknowledged that Holmes satisfies the criteria in Section 408.035(9), Florida Statutes, based upon its history of providing services to the medically indigent and its Medicaid and charity commitments at VMC. Holmes' satisfaction of the criteria in Section 408.035(9), Florida Statutes, is not given great weight in this proceeding because the medically indigent in central and south Brevard County are currently being adequately served by the existing facilities and, more significantly, zip code 32940, in which VMC will be located and from which it is projected to draw the largest percentage of its patients, has a lower percentage of Medicaid/charity patients and a higher median household income than Brevard County as a whole. Subsection (10) -- Designation as a Gold Seal Nursing Homes The parties stipulated that Section 408.035(10), Florida Statutes, is not applicable because Holmes is not proposing the addition of any nursing home beds. Rule Criteria The Agency rules implicated in this case -- Florida Administrative Code Rules 59C-1.030(2) and 59C-1.038 -- do not contain any review criteria that are distinct from the statutory criteria discussed above. The “health care access criteria” and “priority considerations” in those rules focus primarily on the impact of the proposed facility on the medically indigent and other underserved population groups, as well as the applicant’s history of and/or commitment to serving those groups. Holmes satisfies those rule criteria, but they are not given great weight for the reasons discussed in Part F(1)(g) above. Impact of VMC on the Wuesthoff Hospitals As discussed above, VMC is projected to take patients that are currently being served by, or would otherwise be served by one of the existing hospitals in central or south Brevard County. Approximately 30 percent of VMC’s patient volume will come at the expense of the Wuesthoff hospitals. As a result of the projected population growth in central and south Brevard County over the planning horizon, the Wuesthoff hospitals are projected to have more admissions in 2010 than they currently have, whether or not VMC is approved. However, if VMC is approved, the Wuesthoff hospitals will have fewer admissions in 2010 than they would have had without VMC. The health planners who testified at the hearing agreed that in determining the impact of VMC on the Wuesthoff hospitals it is appropriate to focus on the number of admissions that the Wuesthoff hospitals would have received but for the approval of VMC. The Agency’s precedent is in accord. See Wellington, supra, at 54, 109 n.13. Holmes’ health planner projected in the CON application that the approval of VMC will result in the Wuesthoff hospitals having 1,932 fewer admissions in 2010 than they would have had without VMC, 998 at Wuesthoff-Rockledge and 934 at Wuesthoff-Melborune. Wuesthoff’s health planner projected that the approval of VMC will result in the Wuesthoff hospitals having 2,399 fewer admissions in 2010 than they would have had without VMC, 1,541 at Wuestoff-Rockledge and 858 at Wuesthoff-Melborune. The projections of Wuesthoff’s health planner are more reasonable because they are based upon more current market share data and, as to Wuesthoff-Melbourne, the projections may even be understated because its market share is still growing in the areas targeted by VMC. On a contribution-margin basis, the lost admissions projected by Wuesthoff’s health planner translate into a loss of approximately $3.9 million of income at Wuesthoff-Rocklege and a loss of approximately $2 million of income at Wuesthoff- Melbourne. Using the lost admissions projected by Holmes’ health planner, the lost income at Wuesthoff-Rockledge would be $2.51 million and the lost income at Wuesthoff-Melbourne would be $2.15 million. Thus, impact of VMC on the Wuesthoff system would be a lost income of at least $4.66 million and, more likely, $5.9 million. A loss of income in that range would be significant and adverse to the Wuesthoff hospitals, both individually and collectively. Even though the Wuesthoff system has a net worth of approximately $70.95 million, its net income (i.e., “excess of revenues over expenses”) was only $971,000 in 2003 and $1.1 million in 2004. The system is still recovering from a “devastating” financial year in 1999 when it reported a loss of almost $12 million. Wuesthoff-Melbourne reported a $4.1 million net loss in 2003, and as of June 2004, it had yet to show a profit. The significance of the projected lost income at the Wuesthoff hospitals is tempered somewhat by the increased patient volume that the hospitals are projected to have in 2010 even if VMC is approved. However, the evidence was not persuasive that the increased patient volumes will necessarily result in greater profits at the Wuesthoff hospitals in 2010.13 The approval of VMC will also likely result in a loss of outpatient volume at the Wuesthoff hospitals. However, there is no credible evidence regarding the amount of outpatient volume that would be lost or the financial impact of the lost outpatient volume on Wuesthoff.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency issue a final order denying Holmes’ application, CON 9759. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of June, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of June, 2005.
