Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, and at the time of the hearing, Charles Joseph Maher ("Respondent") was licensed in Florida as a life and health agent and general lines agent, doing business as "Maher Insurance". Medford On or about December 13, 1989, the Respondent completed an application for insurance and received a check in the amount of $557.00 from Kenneth Medford of North Fort Myers, Florida for automobile insurance to be issued by Atlanta Casualty Company. The check was made payable to the insurer. Although Mr. Medford testified that the Respondent told him the coverage would be bound, the insurance application clearly provides that the coverage was not bound at the time the application was completed. The Respondent mailed the application and check to Atlanta Casualty Company. Neither the application nor the check were received by Atlanta Casualty Company. There is no evidence that the Respondent mishandled the application and check or converted said funds to his own use. The check tendered by Mr. Medford has never been deposited and has never cleared the Medford checking account. Grandpa's Cycle Center On or about October 24, 1990, the Respondent received a check in the amount of $482.50 from Grandpa's Cycle Center of Fort Myers, Florida, constituting the estimated down payment on liability insurance to be issued by Bankers Insurance Company through the Florida Joint Underwriters Association. The actual down payment on the liability insurance was $250.00 which was remitted in the due course of business by the Respondent to Bankers Insurance Company. The policy was subsequently issued. A representative of the Respondent thereafter contacted Grandpa's Cycle Center and informed the insured that a refund of the excess down payment was due to the insured. The insured directed the Respondent's representative to retain the excess pending further direction. In part due to other matters not addressed by the Administrative Complaint filed in this case, the business relationship between the Respondent and the insured became somewhat strained and the insured terminated the relationship. On or about January 3, 1991, the Respondent tendered a check for $355.00 to the insured. The Respondent identified the total amount tendered to include a refund of $232.50 excess down payment and the remainder as "return premium" for a policy which had apparently been cancelled in August, 1990.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance enter a Final Order dismissing the complaint filed against Charles Joseph Maher. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 9th day of February, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-0490 The following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the parties. Petitioner The Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 3-4, 7. Rejected, not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Respondent The Respondent's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 3(a)-(k), 5(a)-(m). Rejected as cumulative or unnecessary except as otherwise adopted in this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil, General Counsel Office of State Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Lisa Santucci, Esq. Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Charles J. Maher Post Office Box 1420 Fort Myers, Florida 33902-1420
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Payroll Management, Inc. (“PMI”), a former self-insurer, should be required to increase its qualifying security deposit with the Florida Self- Insurers Guaranty Association, Inc. (“FSIGA”), from $5,144,108 to $7,434,705, as directed by the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (the “Department”).
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Department is the state agency responsible for administering the Workers’ Compensation Law, chapter 440, Florida Statutes. The Department’s responsibilities include administration of the self-insurance program in conjunction with FSIGA, pursuant to sections 440.38, 440.385, and 440.386, Florida Statutes. FSIGA is a private, not-for-profit corporation created by section 440.385. The chief purpose of FSIGA is to guarantee payment of covered workers’ compensation claims to employees of its insolvent member self-insurers. All self-insurers, other than public utilities and government entities, are required to be members of FSIGA as a condition of their authority to self- insure. § 440.385(1)(a), Fla. Stat. Sections 440.10(1) and 440.38(1) establish the general requirement that employers must obtain and maintain workers’ compensation insurance in Florida. The exception to this general requirement is set forth in section 440.38(1)(b), which allows an employer to self-insure after furnishing satisfactory proof to FSIGA that such employer “has the financial strength necessary to ensure timely payment of all current and future claims individually and on behalf of its subsidiary and affiliated companies with employees in this state and receiving an authorization from the department to pay such compensation directly.” § 440.38(1)(b), Fla. Stat. FSIGA pays the covered claims of current and former insolvent self-insurer members to the extent an insolvent self- insurer's security deposit is insufficient to cover the claims. An insolvency fund is established and managed by FSIGA for the purpose of meeting the obligations of insolvent members after the exhaustion of any security deposit. Pursuant to section 440.385(3)(a), FSIGA assesses its members to maintain the insolvency fund. In the event FSIGA determines that a current or former member lacks financial strength necessary to ensure timely payment of current and estimated future workers’ compensation claims, FSIGA may recommend that the Department require an increase to such member’s “security deposit in an amount determined by the association to be necessary to ensure payment of compensation claims.” § 440.385(3)(b)7.c., Fla. Stat. The Department is required to accept FSIGA’s recommendation unless it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the recommendation is erroneous. §§ 440.38(1)(b) and 440.385(6)(a), Fla. Stat. PMI is a privately owned professional employer organization headquartered in Fort Walton Beach. It has conducted business throughout Florida and the southeastern United States for over 30 years. PMI was authorized as a self- insurer for workers’ compensation in Florida on September 1, 2001. It was required to post an initial security deposit of $1,000,000 with FSIGA. Between 2001 and 2015, FSIGA made annual recommendations to the Department, pursuant to sections 440.38(1)(b) and 440.385(3)(b)7., as to whether PMI should be required to increase its qualifying security deposit based on a review of the company’s financial strength as reflected in its financial statements. By 2015, PMI’s security deposit had grown to $5,144,108. Through 2015, PMI had posted and maintained its qualifying security deposit every year it participated in the self-insurance program. In late March 2016, PMI submitted an actuarial report dated March 25, 2016, to FSIGA. The actuarial report was prepared by Steven Glicksman and determined that PMI’s estimated outstanding losses, i.e., the cost of unpaid claims, were $7,960,339 as of December 31, 2015, and that the actuarial present value of PMI’s estimated outstanding losses as of December 31, 2015, using a four-percent (4%) discount rate as prescribed by Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-5.218(2), was $7,434,705. The March 25, 2016, report included the following notes: Comparison to Previous Study The estimated outstanding losses (actuarial central estimate) are $7,960,339 as of December 31, 2015. This compares to $5,514,248 as of December 31, 2015 in the previous study (dated April 30, 2015). The variance is a material adverse deviation. The increases in 2015 are due primarily to actuarial payroll in 2015 being $173,681,101 compared to the projected payroll of $110,000,000. Greater payroll corresponds to an increased exposure to loss. We also observed that 2014 is emerging higher than previous projections. Potential for Material Adverse Deviation The estimated outstanding losses are the actuarial central estimate. It is based on the probable outcomes, but not all possible outcomes. The risk of material adverse deviation is a judgment as to actual losses materially exceeding the actuarial central estimate. The Actuarial Standard of Practice (ASOP 36) requires commentary when the actuary “reasonably believes that there are significant risks and uncertainties that could result in material adverse deviation.” ASOP 36 does not specify a materiality standard. As with all insurance programs, there is the possibility that losses will emerge worse than expected. PMI is a relatively small sized program. The historical loss experience had had an occasional large claim. PMI purchases reinsurance to mitigate the impact of catastrophic claims. It currently has a $500,000 self-insured retention. However, there is the potential for multiple large claims within the retention. There have [been several] operational changes that may have impacted loss development. There is convincing evidence that PMI has accelerated its paying losses and is reserving more adequately [than] it has in the recent past. There has been material change in the mix of class codes. There is a roll-forward extrapolation to December 31, 2016. We have supplemented internal data with insurance industry statistics and actuarial judgment. We have not set a materiality standard. However, based on the above factors, we believe that the estimated outstanding loss amount is subject to a significant level of risk of adverse deviation as of December 31, 2015 and December 31, 2016. This disclosure is based on ASOP 36 and is not intended to be exclusive to this situation. Differences in the disclosure from previous studies are not intended to be a material change in our opinion, unless specifically stated otherwise. It is not a qualification of the study. Effective May 1, 2016, PMI voluntarily terminated its authorization to self-insure its workers’ compensation claims in Florida. On May 11, 2016, FSIGA recommended that the Department require PMI to increase its qualifying security deposit by the amount of $2,290,597.1/ That recommendation was made pursuant to sections 440.38(l)(b) and 440.385(3)(b)7. and rules 69L- 5.209(l)(b) and 69L-5.218(2). The recommendation was based on FSIGA's review of PMI's financial statements and FSIGA’s determination of an equivalent credit rating of Caa3 for PMI, a rating that is less than investment grade.2/ FSIGA determined that PMI did not have the financial strength necessary to ensure timely payment of claims incurred as a self-insurer. The Department accepted FSIGA's recommendation, and by letter dated May 25, 2016, required PMI to increase its qualifying security deposit by the amount of $2,290,597, from $5,144,108 to $7,434,705. As of the date of the hearing, PMI had not posted the additional security with FSIGA. Brian Gee, FSIGA’s Executive Director, testified that he conducted an analysis of PMI's financial strength by examining its audited financial statements for the year ending December 31, 2013, and its draft financial statements for the year ending December 31, 2014.3/ He derived an equivalent credit rating by applying a public domain Moody’s Investors Service methodology. He checked his result against a proprietary Moody’s product called RISCCALC PLUS, a model based on a large database of financial statements. The RISCCALC PLUS model uses default frequencies to derive a credit rating. Mr. Gee’s analysis led him to conclude that PMI does not have the financial strength necessary to ensure the timely payment of its self-insured claims. Mr. Gee testified that his review of PMI’s financial information led him to conclude it lacks the financial strength to ensure timely payment of claims. He cited several factors supporting his conclusion: PMI has shown net losses over the past three years; the company is highly leveraged, with low owners’ equity relative to total liabilities; uncertainty regarding the collectability of a $4 million receivable from British Petroleum (“BP”)4/; and a large amount of back taxes owed to the Internal Revenue Service.5/ Mr. Gee also took note of the facts that PMI’s 2014 financial statement was labeled “draft” and was not a signed auditor’s opinion, and that PMI had supplied no financial statement at all for 2015. He stated that FSIGA had been requesting current financial information from PMI but was not receiving it. Mr. Gee concluded there was enough uncertainty in PMI’s financial situation that he could conclude the company lacked the financial strength to ensure the payment of current and future claims without regard to the calculation of an equivalent credit rating required by rule 69L-5.218(4). Mr. Gee’s conclusion is reasonable in light of the evidence and is hereby accepted. Rule 69L-5.209 requires current and former self- insurers, including PMI, to submit financial statements, audited in accordance with Generally Accepted Auditing Standards, to FSIGA no later than 120 days after the end of their fiscal year. PMI’s fiscal year ends on December 31. As of the hearing date, PMI had submitted only draft unsigned financial statements for fiscal year 2014,6/ and no financial statements at all for fiscal year 2015. On May 11, 2016, the Department received FSIGA's letter recommending the Department require PMI to increase its qualifying security deposit to $7,434,705. The recommendation was reviewed by staff of the Bureau of Financial Accountability (the “Bureau”) in the Department's Division of Workers' Compensation. Bureau Chief Greg Jenkins testified that the review did not involve recreating FSIGA’s work in developing an equivalent credit rating for PMI. FSIGA collects and reviews financial statements and loss reserve information from self- insurers pursuant to contract with the Department and is considered the Department’s financial expert as to these tasks. Mr. Jenkins stated that Bureau staff did review other information for accuracy, including the numerical values set forth in FSIGA’s recommendation letter. Based on his staff’s review, Mr. Jenkins approved the FSIGA recommendation. The Division of Workers’ Compensation, concluding that the FSIGA recommendation was not erroneous, recommended to Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) Jeff Atwater that the Department accept FSIGA’s recommendation and require PMI to increase its qualifying security deposit by $2,290,597, from $5,144,108 to $7,434,705. By letter dated May 25, 2016, signed by CFO Atwater, the Department required PMI to increase its security deposit by the stated amount. On or about October 19, 2016, PMI submitted an updated actuarial report dated October 18, 2016, to FSIGA. The updated actuarial report was prepared by Mr. Glicksman and determined that PMI’s estimated outstanding losses were $7,265,767 as of August 31, 2016, and that the actuarial present value of PMI’s estimated outstanding losses as of August 31, 2016, using a four percent (4%) discount rate as prescribed by rule 69L-5.218(2), was $6,775,263. Mr. Glicksman also included a projection of losses through December 31, 2016, which he explained as follows: The estimated outstanding losses (actuarial central estimate) are $5,758,346 as of December 31, 2016. The present value of the estimated outstanding losses (actuarial central estimate) is $5,369,488 based on a 4.0% interest rate as of December 31, 2016. These amounts assume old payment patterns. However, the amounts for December 31, 2016 are dependent on PMI’s actual payments from September 1, 2016 to December 31, 2016. Since greater payments results in lower estimated outstanding losses, it is possible that PMI will have estimated outstanding losses of less than $5,758,346 (present value $5,369,488) on December 31, 2016. In fact, we have observed that PMI has accelerated payments. From January 1, 2016 to August 31, 2016, paid losses equaled $4,963,579 ($620,488 per month). We have modeled a continuation of accelerated payments. Assuming projected losses paid of $1,959,647 ($477,395 per month) from September 1, 2016 to December 31, 2016, estimated outstanding losses are $5,356,187 and the present value of the estimated outstanding losses are $4,995,098 on December 31, 2016. We believe these amounts are reasonable. [Citations to internal exhibits omitted.] Mr. Glicksman testified that material differences emerged during the period between his completion of the March 25, 2016, report and the October 18, 2016, report. Mr. Glicksman explained that more recent information, including a date certain for PMI’s termination of its self-insurer authorization, improved loss information, increased reserves, and accelerated claims payments, led him to believe that the estimated losses were less than he had originally projected. Mr. Glicksman testified that, upon noticing that PMI’s claims payments had accelerated much faster than he expected, he contacted Ms. Mickle-Bee regarding the claims data. Ms. Mickle- Bee confirmed to Mr. Glicksman that PMI was closing claims as rapidly as possible. At the hearing, Ms. Mickle-Bee testified that PMI has always paid claims at an “aggressive” rate as an overall costs savings measure. She stated that the company’s experience has been that providing quick medical treatment and paying the bills greatly reduces the chances of litigation. Mr. Glicksman supported this view, testifying that “there’s nothing better than a closed claim to reduce costs.” Mr. Glicksman concluded by stating that “there could be no good outcome” to requiring PMI to increase its security deposit to $7,434,705. He testified, “They’re already holding more than enough money to pay off their claims . . . with almost certainty. And by pushing PMI into . . . a financial stress, it can’t improve their situation, it can only hurt it. I don’t know why they would do it.” Mr. Gee testified that he had as yet reached no conclusions about the October 18, 2016, actuarial report. He testified that a claims reviewer had been assigned to look at the case files, which are the main input into the actuarial process. Mr. Gee also stated that he had made “some preliminary findings about some self-insured retention numbers that appear to be incorrect,” but that he was awaiting results from the claims reviewer in order to draw a conclusion about the report. Mr. Jenkins testified that he has received a copy of PMI’s October 18, 2016, actuarial report. Mr. Jenkins stated that he had glanced at the report but was awaiting a recommendation from FSIGA before undertaking a thorough review of the document.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order requiring Payroll Management, Inc., to increase its qualifying security deposit with the Florida Self-Insurers Guaranty Association, Inc., by $2,290,597, from $5,144,108 to $7,434,705; or, in the alternative, that the Department of Financial Services withdraw its May 25, 2016, letter requiring Payroll Management, Inc., to increase its qualifying security deposit by the amount of $2,290,597, from $5,144,108 to $7,434,705 and issue a letter requiring PMI to increase its qualifying security deposit to the amount recommended by the Florida Self-Insurers Guaranty Association, Inc., after its review of the October 18, 2016, actuarial report submitted by Payroll Management, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of April, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of April, 2017.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint issued against him and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been at all times material to the instant matter, registered as a septic tank contractor with the Department. In July 2002, Respondent entered into a contract with Pro Gold Investments Corp. (Pro Gold), whose president and sole owner is Emerico Kemeny Fuller. The contract provided that Respondent would install a "new septic system" for Pro Gold at 453 Blue Road in Coral Gables, Florida (Blue Road Property) for $4,600.00, a job that should have taken only a "few days" to complete. Pro Gold gave Respondent a "job deposit" of $2,300.00. In July 2003, Pro Gold, by Warranty Deed, conveyed title to the Blue Road Property to Maurits de Blank's company, Mortgage Lending Company LLC (MLC), and it also executed a Bill of Sale, Absolute and Assignments of Contracts, which read as follows: PRO GOLD INVESTMENTS CORP, as Seller, in consideration of Ten Dollars ($10.00) and other valuable consideration paid to it by MORTGAGE LENDING COMPANY, LLC, as Buyer, the receipt of which is acknowledged hereby sells, assigns, grants, transfers, and conveys to Buyer all of Seller's right, title, and interest in the following described goods, contracts and personal property: SEE ATTACHED EXHIBIT "A- PROPERTY" AND EXHIBIT "B- CONTRACTS ASSIGNED" Seller covenants and agrees that it is the lawful owner of goods, contracts, rights or interests transferred hereby; that they are free from all encumbrances, except for outstanding amounts due, if any, to those parties set forth on Exhibit "B," and that it has the right to sell, transfer and assign the goods, properties and rights set forth in the attached Exhibit "A," and the right to transfer and assign the contracts, rights or interests shown on Exhibit "B," and will warrant and defend same against the lawful claims and demands or all persons. The "attached Exhibit 'A- Property'" read, in pertinent part, as follows: (Regarding transfer of 453 Blue Road, Coral Gables, Florida, "the Real Property") (Mortgage currently in favor of Mortgage Lending Company, LLC "the Mortgage") All property rights of any kind whatsoever, whether in property that is real, fixed, personal, mixed or otherwise and whether in property that is tangible or intangible, including, without limitation, all property rights in all property of any kind whatsoever that is owned or hereafter acquired by the Company and that is associated with, appurtenant to or used in the operation of the Real Property or is located on, at or upon the Real Property and is associated with or used in connection with or in operation of any business activity conducted on, at or upon the Real Property, and including, without limitation, the following: * * * All right, title, and interest in those certain contracts and agreements [set] forth in the attached Exhibit "B," which are hereby transferred and assigned to Mortgage Lending Company LLC. Among the "contracts and agreements [set] forth in the attached Exhibit 'B,'" was the aforementioned July 2002, contract wherein Respondent agreed to install a "new septic system" for Pro Gold on the Blue Road Property (Septic System Contract). This contract was still executory. Respondent had not done any work on the site in the year that had passed since the contract had been signed. In the beginning of August 2003, Mr. de Blank met with Respondent and advised him that MLC was the new owner of the Blue Road Property and that MLC had also received an assignment of the Septic System Contract from Pro Gold. In response to this advisement, Respondent stated "he did not do assignments." Following this meeting, Mr. de Blank sent Respondent documentation supporting the assertions he had made regarding MLC's ownership of the Blue Road Property and its having been assigned the Septic System Contract. Mr. de Blank then attempted, unsuccessfully, to make contact with Respondent by telephone. He "left messages," but his telephone calls were not returned. These efforts to telephonically communicate with Respondent having failed, Mr. de Blank "decided that it may make some sense to start a letter writing program." As part of that "program," on September 8, 2003, Mr. de Blank sent Respondent the following letter: Re: 453 Blue Road, Coral Gables As background, and in chronological order: Pro Gold Investments purchased the above cited property and obtained a construction loan from our firm. One of the conditions was that all construction contracts would be assignable to our firm in the event of default. Pro Gold Investments entered into contract with your firm to install a new septic tank and drainfield at 453 Blue Road. Pro Gold Investments defaults and forfeits title in lieu of foreclosure. The deed was recorded on August 4, 2003, at Bk/Pg: 21484/4283. Not recorded but attached for your reference is an assignment of contracts to include the contract Pro Gold Investments entered into with your firm. See further attachment. The original can be inspected in my office. At this point, I request you proceed with the work as soon as practical and under identical conditions as originally agreed with Pro Gold Investments. Please call me at . . . to confirm a start date. Mr. de Blank did not receive any response to his letter. He finally was able, however, to reach Respondent on the telephone. During this telephone conversation, Mr. de Blank made arrangements to meet Respondent at the Blue Road Property to discuss Respondent's doing the work Respondent had agreed to do in the Septic System Contract. This meeting between Mr. de Blank and Respondent took place on September 11, 2003. During the meeting, Mr. de Blank went over with Respondent "what the job [was] going to be." Although Respondent indicated that he was "going to put in th[e] septic tank" per the Septic System Contract, Mr. de Blank had his doubts that Respondent would be true to his word. Following the meeting, Mr. de Blank sent Respondent the following letter: Re: 453 Blue Road, Coral Gables We met today to discuss the above referenced job. My understanding is: You will start the job no later than the first week of October and will complete the job no later th[a]n the last week of October. I will obtain a copy of the approved permit. You indicated you will not need a survey.[1] Should you change you[r] mind, you can always refer to a survey I keep on site. You will have your insurance agent mail to my address a certificate of insurance. Though not discussed: I would like a partial release of payments made to date for the job. See further the attachment. Assuming you concur, then please send a signed and notarized copy to Maurits de Blank, Mortgage Lending Company, Post Office Box 430336, Miami, Florida 33143. Note that I prefer for various legal reasons that you use the release form as provided. Once the job has been started, I would like a list of firms supplying materials to the job. Notwithstanding that he had promised Mr. de Blank that he would "start the job no later than the first week of October," by the middle of October Respondent had yet to even "pull a septic tank construction permit from the City of Coral Gables" (that was needed before any on-site work could begin).2 In an attempt to find out from Respondent what was the cause of the delay, Mr. de Blank started a "calling campaign," but Respondent neither answered the telephone when Mr. de Blank called nor returned Mr. de Blank's calls. On October 19, 2003, Mr. de Blank sent the following letter to Respondent (by certified United States Mail, return receipt requested): Re: 453 Blue Road, Coral Gables I need a firm commitment when you will start and finish septic tank at above address. If you cannot perform the work, then I will need a refund of the deposit given to your firm. Please call to discuss. The end of the month was fast approaching, and Respondent had neither contacted Mr. de Blank nor begun the Septic System Contract on-site work. After paying a visit to Coral Gables City Hall and learning that Respondent had still not even "pull[ed] a septic tank construction permit from the City of Coral Gables," Mr. De Blank found another septic tank contractor, Westland Septic Tank Corp., to do the installation work for MLC that Respondent was contractually obligated to perform. MLC paid Westland $4,400.00 to do the work. Westland completed the job some time prior to November 4, 2003. The work passed all of the necessary inspections. Upon learning that MLC had contracted with Westland, Respondent sent Mr. de Blank a letter complaining that Mr. de Blank had not given Respondent an adequate opportunity to meet his obligations under the Septic System Contract. In the letter, Respondent offered to return only $500.00 of the $2,300 down payment he had received from Pro Gold. Mr. de Blank subsequently informed Respondent that this was not satisfactory and that he wanted the "full deposit back." He added that if he did not get it, he would "go to court." Not having received any portion of the "deposit back," Mr. de Blank, acting on behalf of MLC, in mid-November 2003, filed suit against Respondent in Miami-Dade County Court. On May 14, 2004, a Final Judgment was entered in Miami-Dade County Court Case No. 0313813 in favor of MLC and against Respondent "in the amount of $1,675.00 plus court costs in the amount of $121.00." As of the date of the final hearing in this case, Respondent had not made any payments to MLC. In view of the foregoing, it is found that Respondent abandoned for 30 consecutive days, without any apparent good cause, a project in which he was under contractual obligation to complete; and his failure to go forward with the project, combined with his failure to return any of the deposit he had received, caused monetary harm to a party to whom he was contractually obligated.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby: RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order finding Respondent guilty of the misconduct alleged in the Administrative Complaint and disciplining him therefor by fining him $500.00 and suspending his registration for 90 days. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of February, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of February, 2005.
The Issue Is Worldwide Investment Group, Inc. (Worldwide) entitled to apply to the State of Florida, Department of Environmental Protection (the Department) for funds to reimburse Worldwide for costs associated with petroleum clean-up at 500 Wells Road, Orange Park, Florida, Facility ID#108736319? See Section 376.3071(12), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Property Howard A. Steinberg is a Certified Public Accountant, (CPA) licensed to practice in Florida. In addition to his work as a CPA, Mr. Steinberg has other business interests. Among those interests is Worldwide, a corporation which Mr. Steinberg formed for the purpose of acquiring certain assets, or properties, from Home Savings Bank and American Homes Service Corporation (Home Savings Bank). Worldwide became a corporation in July 1996. Mr. Steinberg is the sole shareholder of that corporation and has been since the inception of the corporation. In addition to controlling all of the assets within Worldwide, Mr. Steinberg is the sole officer of the corporation. The corporation has no other employees. Worldwide has its office in Hollywood, Florida, in the same physical location as Mr. Steinberg's accounting firm of Keystone, Steinberg and Company, C.P.A. Under its arrangement with Home Savings Bank, Worldwide acquired property known as Save-A-Stop at 500 Wells Road, Orange Park, Florida. Mr. Steinberg engaged the law firm of Burnstein and Knee, to assist Worldwide in the purchase of the Save-A-Stop property. The Save-A-Stop property is a commercial parcel that has experienced environmental contamination from petroleum products. To address that problem the firm of M. P. Brown & Associates, Inc., (Brown) was paid for services in rendering environmental clean-up of that site. Substantial work had been done by Brown to remediate the contamination before Worldwide purchased the property from Home Savings Bank. Home Savings had paid Brown for part of the costs of clean-up before Worldwide acquired the Save- A-Stop property. After the purchase, Mr. Steinberg paid Brown to finish the clean-up. Application for Reimbursement Mr. Steinberg, as owner of Worldwide, understood that the possibility existed that Worldwide could be reimbursed for some of the clean-up costs by resorting to funds available from the Department. On July 29, 1997, Bonnie J. Novak, P.G., Senior Environmental Geologist for Brown, wrote to Mr. Steinberg to provide a cost estimate for preparing a reimbursement application in relation to the Save-A-Stop property. The cost to prepare the application was $1,870.00. On August 27, 1996, Mr. Steinberg accepted the offer that had been executed by Brown by Mr. Steinberg signing a contract, and by calling for Brown to prepare an application, to be presented to the Department for reimbursement of costs expended in the clean-up. In furtherance of the agreement between Worldwide and Brown, $935.00 was paid as part of the costs of preparation of the application. This payment was by a check mailed on August 27, 1996. The balance of the fee was to be paid upon the completion of the preparation of the application. In 1996, outside the experience of his businesses, Mr. Steinberg was having difficulties in his marriage. To address the situation, Mr. Steinberg filed a Petition for Dissolution of Marriage. That Petition was filed in April 1996, at which time Mr. Steinberg assumed custody of the children of that marriage, with no right for their mother to unaccompanied visits. After filing for dissolution, Mr. Steinberg relied on others to assist him in dealing with his personal and business life. From December 1996 through January 6, 1997, Mr. Steinberg was particularly influenced by the upheaval in his personal life. It caused him to request extension of deadlines from the Internal Revenue Service for the benefit of his clients whom he served as a CPA. During December, Mr. Steinberg was only in his office for approximately 10 percent of the normal time he would have spent had conditions in his personal life been more serene. On January 6, 1997, the conditions in Mr. Steinberg's personal life took a turn for the worse when his wife committed suicide. In December 1996, attorney Jerrold Knee, who had assisted Mr. Steinberg as counsel in purchasing the Save-A-Stop property, spoke to someone at Brown concerning the status of the preparation of the application for reimbursement of funds expended in the clean-up. He was told that the application was being worked on. Mr. Knee was aware that the deadline for filing the application was December 31, 1996. Mr. Steinberg was also aware of the December 31, 1996, deadline for submitting the application. In that connection, Mr. Knee was familiar with the difficulties that Mr. Steinberg was having in Mr. Steinberg's marriage in 1996. Mr. Knee knew that Mr. Steinberg was infrequently in the office attending to business. Mr. Knee surmised that Mr. Steinberg was relying upon Mr. Knee to make certain that the application was timely submitted, and Mr. Knee felt personally obligated to assist Mr. Steinberg in filing the application, given the knowledge that Mr. Steinberg was not in the office routinely during December 1996. His sense of responsibility did not rise to the level of a legal obligation between lawyer and client. Although Mr. Knee was aware of the pending deadline for submitting the application for reimbursement, and had inquired about its preparation by Brown, and had discussed it with Mr. Steinberg, Mr. Knee never specifically committed to making certain that the reimbursement application was filed on time. As it had committed to do, Brown prepared the reimbursement application for the Save-A-Stop site. The application was for the total amount of $58,632.85, not including preparation charges and CPA Fees. Written notification of the preparation of the application was provided to Mr. Steinberg on December 12, 1996. The correspondence reminded Mr. Steinberg that the application needed CPA approval, an invoice and registration, and a signed certification affidavit. Most importantly, the notification reminded Mr. Steinberg that an original and two copies of the application must be sent to a person within the Department prior to December 31, 1996. The notification specifically indicated the name of that individual within the Department and set forth that person's address. The notification arrived in Mr. Steinberg's office during the week of December 12, 1996. That notification was not opened until late January or early February 1997. Mr. Steinberg opened the letter at that time. During December 1996 Mr. Steinberg was responsible for opening the mail received in his office. No other person was expected to open that mail for the benefit of Worldwide. Untimely Application On February 6, 1997, Worldwide submitted its application for reimbursement for clean-up at the Save-A-Stop location. That application was received by the Department on February 7, 1997. The Department has consistently interpreted the statutory deadline for submitting reimbursement applications in accordance with Section 376.3071(12), Florida Statutes, (Supp. 1996) to be absolute. Consequently, on February 11, 1997, the Department denied the Worldwide application because it had been filed beyond the December 31, 1996, deadline recognized by the statute. Worldwide contested that proposed agency action by requesting a hearing to examine the issue of the timing of the application submission. Consequences of Untimely Application In Florida, petroleum taxes are deposited for the benefit of the Inland Protection Trust Fund. The Florida Legislature allows monies to be appropriated from those deposited funds. In that budgetary process, the Governor's office serves as liaison in requesting the Legislature to appropriate monies from the Inland Protection Trust Fund in relation to the costs of cleanup of sites contaminated by petroleum products. To assist the Governor's office, the Department identifies the need for covering the costs of the clean-up and makes a recommendation to the Governor to provide to the Legislature concerning the amount to be appropriated for the clean-up. In the history of the clean-up program, in 1995, problems were experienced with fraudulent and inflated claims calling for reimbursement for the cost of clean-up. This led to a debt of approximately $550,000,000.00. There was a concern that that debt could not be repaid in a reasonable time frame. In response, the Department, as authorized by the Legislature in action taken in 1996, negotiated a bond transaction through the Inland Protection Financing Corporation. With the advent of the bond issue, $343,000,000.00, not to include the cost of funding the bond, was made available to pay for petroleum clean-up. That bond issue was designed to fund the payment of reimbursement applications that had been received before the end of the life of the petroleum clean-up reimbursement program in place. During the 1996 session, in which the Legislature approved the bond issue, the Legislature also made changes to the petroleum clean-up program. The changes were fundamental in that applicants were no longer reimbursed for clean-up work that had been performed. With the advent of the legislative changes, petroleum clean-up, under a system calling for payment from the fund, could only be conducted if an applicant was pre-approved to conduct the clean- up. As part of that process of gaining funds pursuant to the bond issue, the Department performed an analysis, as authorized by the Legislature, to determine that amount necessary to pay existing obligations that had accrued under the petroleum clean-up reimbursement program that predated the Legislative change in 1996. To ascertain the existing obligation, the Department totaled the known dollar amount associated with the existing reimbursement applications and a portion of unreviewed reimbursement applications that had been received. The Department adjusted the sum to be paid in association with applications that had not been reviewed to that point, having in mind prior experience in which only 82 percent of claims had been allowed. The overriding concern by the Department was that it needed to determine whether the bond issue would be sufficient to defease the backlog of applications for reimbursement previously filed. Information concerning the reimbursement obligations was made known to the Florida Supreme Court in bond validation proceedings held before that court. The Inland Protection Finance Corporation was also made aware of the reimbursement obligations. In 1997, the Department gave further information to the Inland Protection Financing Corporation, indicating that the amount of bond was sufficient for reimbursement obligations. The Department in association with the terms of the bond transaction agreed that the bond proceeds would not be used to fund claims that were received after January 3, 1997. The deadline for submitting applications had been extended until January 3, 1997, by virtue of a statutory amendment found at Section 376.3071(12), Florida Statutes, (1997). Therefore, consistent with the statutory change, the Department had allowed applications submitted after December 31, 1996, but before January 4, 1997, to be considered on their merits. The December 31, 1996, deadline had existed under Section 376.3071(12), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996). The statutory change occurred because a number of applications that were filed pursuant to the December 31, 1996, deadline set forth in Section 376.3071(12), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996) did not meet that deadline. The reason for this failure was due to weather conditions that caused overnight couriers, Federal Express and United Parcel Service, to be unable to deliver parcels to the Tallahassee, Florida, airport. These applications, as other applications, were sent to the Department at a Tallahassee, Florida, address. Based on the inability of the two couriers to deliver applications under the timeline anticipated, the Department did not receive that group of applications until January 2, 1997. Subsequently, the applications were accepted as timely based upon the amendment found in Section 376.371(12), Florida Statutes (1997) which extended the filing deadline until January 3, 1997. As a policy consideration, the Department believes it must strictly enforce the deadline for submission of reimbursement applications, as extended by the Legislature, to avoid the future accrual of debt for applications submitted after January 3, 1997, which the Department cannot reasonably anticipate. Apropos of the present case, the Department does not believe that it is well-advised to allow even a single claim for reimbursement, if that claim was received after January 3, 1997. To date, 64 applications have been received by the Department subsequent to December 31, 1996. All but six of those applications were received no later than January 3, 1997. Two of that six applications for reimbursement are still pending before the Department. Historically 22,000 applications for petroleum clean-up have been received by the Department since 1986. At the time of the hearing, 9,000 applications were pending before the Department. In December 1996, 3,000 applications were received calling for reimbursement of costs. At the time of hearing, approximately $340,000,000 in reimbursement claims had not been satisfied. Petitioner makes its claim to be excepted from the deadline for submitting its application based upon the doctrine of equitable tolling.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying the application of Worldwide to participate in the reimbursement program for clean-up expenses as untimely. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of May, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: P. Tim Howard, Esquire P. Tim Howard and Associates, P.A. 1424 East Piedmont Drive, Suite 202 Tallahassee, Florida 32312 Jeffrey Brown, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Kathy Carter, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 F. Perry Odom, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Virginia B. Wetherell, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state governmental licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular Section 20.30, F.S., Chapters 120.455 and 475, F.S., and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent is now and at all times material hereto was a licensed real estate salesman in the State of Florida having been issued License No. 0418629, in accordance with Chapter 475, F.S. The last license issued was as a salesman with a home address of 594 Andrews Street, Ormond Beach, Florida, 32075. From April 8, 1987, until September 11, 1987 he was on inactive status. From September 11, 1987 until at least November, 1987, he was on active status. His license expired March 31, 1988 and has not been renewed. Respondent and the owners (Goldsmiths) of certain property at 49 Sea Island Drive, North Ormond Beach, Florida, entered into an equity sharing agreement on October 1, 1986. Thereafter, Respondent was half owner of the property, and acted as agent for himself and the Goldsmiths for management and rental of the property. Sometime in early 1987, Respondent's former wife contacted Richard M. Dow of Watson Realty Corporation concerning Watson Realty Corporation's assuming management and rental authority over the property. Mr. Dow gave Respondent's wife a packet of information which included several types of material, including but not limited to, a blank standard lease form which had been stamped at the top with the name WATSON REALTY CORPORATION 425 S. YONGE STREET [U.S. 1] ORMOND BEACH, Florida 32074 The name "Watson Realty" was also printed in the body of the lease as agent for the premises, which, like all other crucial information was left blank. No agreement was ever reached by which Watson Realty Corp. or Mr. Dow were to take over management of the premises. On or about April 1, 1987, while still on active license status, the Respondent negotiated a six month lease of the premises at 49 Sea Island Drive, North Ormond Beach, Florida, with Sidney and Edythe Hirsch. By filling out the blank lease form obtained from Watson Realty Corp., Respondent entered into the six-month lease on behalf of himself and the Goldsmiths. He filled out the blank spaces with his name as lessor and the Hirsches as lessees, and crossed out the "Watson Realty Corp." in the body of the lease, substituting his own name therefor. He failed to cross out the stamped Watson Realty Corp. name and address at the top of the page. At the time of the signing of the lease, Respondent advised Mr. Hirsch that he was a licensed real estate agent because he had been taught he must make such disclosures in personal dealings so as not to take advantage of laymen. At formal hearing, he denied ever representing himself as an agent of Watson Realty Corp. or of Mr. Dow. Mr. Hirsch likewise testified that no such representation was made, only that Respondent said something like, "I work with them." Both Respondent and Mr. Hirsch concur that Respondent represented himself as the owner of the property in question without mentioning the Goldsmiths' interest. Hirsch knew and agreed to the scratching through of the Watson corporate name in the body of the contract, and to the substitution of Respondent's name therefor, but no one thought to cross through the stamped Watson name and address at the top of the page. In connection with the lease, Mr. Hirsch gave to the Respondent a $600 security deposit. Respondent shared the rent proceeds with the Goldsmiths even though he did not include their names on the lease or specifically advise the Hirsches of the Goldsmiths' interest in the property. Although the better course of action would have been for Respondent to make a fuller disclosure and to accurately make out the lease agreement with regard to the Goldsmiths' interest, no fraud or intent to defraud either the Goldsmiths or the Hirsches was demonstrated in Respondent's omissions in this regard. At no time alleged herein was Respondent registered as a real estate salesman in the employ of Watson Realty Corp. and at no time was the Respondent employed by Watson Realty Corp. in any capacity. Upon the termination of the lease period, the Hirsches vacated the house and made demands upon the Respondent for the return of their $600 security deposit. The Respondent refused to return the deposit because of substantial damage to the property in three rooms of the house. Hirsches' attorney and Respondent met to attempt to resolve the issue and then had a trial date set. Respondent appeared on the originally scheduled trial date but the case was continued. Respondent separated from his wife and moved to a different address without maintaining contact with the Hirsches' attorney, the court, the Department of Professional Regulation, or the Florida Real Estate Commission (FREC). Over a period of time, he lived at several addresses and eventually moved out of state. Although he was still living in the State of Florida at the time, he did not appear for trial on the security deposit demand, and on January 14, 1988, the Hirsches obtained a civil judgment against Respondent for payment of the $600 security deposit. Respondent had not satisfied the judgment as of the date of the filing of the Administrative Complaint herein and did not do so up through the date of formal hearing. Although Respondent expended a great deal of effort at formal hearing attempting to establish that he never received actual notice of the trial date for the $600 civil damages suit due to his frequent change of addresses during the course of his divorce, that is immaterial because the law presumes notice once suit is filed and properly served as apparently occurred in that case. Unless set aside, the judgment against Respondent was final and Respondent owed Hirsch the money due under it. However, under the circumstances, it is found that Respondent did not fail to pay Hirsch on the judgment through any intent to defraud, but merely through a misunderstanding as to the effect of the judgment. Mr. Hirsch eventually sought and obtained reimbursement of the $600 judgment amount from the FREC client security fund. The fund paid after significant unsuccessful attempts had been made to find Respondent. Respondent also maintained that he did not know about the reimbursement proceedings instituted by FREC until four days before formal hearing and he made offers at formal hearing to pay off this amount. He was not charged in the pending Administrative Complaint in this proceeding with any fraud with regard to his failure to respond to service in the FREC client security fund reimbursement proceeding.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of May, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of May, 1989. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 88-6331 The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), F.S., upon the parties' respective Proposed Findings of Fact (PFOF): Petitioner' s PFOF: Petitioner filed no PFOF. Respondent' s PFOF: 1,13,14 Accepted in part; the remainder is rejected as subordinate to the facts as found. 2-5 Rejected as subordinate to the facts as found. 6-12 Rejected as immaterial and as referencing and relying upon matters outside the record as created at formal hearing. 15,16 Rejected in part as subordinate to the facts as found and in part as cumulative and otherwise as mere argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur R. Shell, Jr. Senior Attorney Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation 400 W. Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Mr. Frederick A. Bentley 402 Daytona Avenue Holly Hill, Florida 32017 Darlene F. Keller, Director Division of Real Estate 400 W. Robinson Street Tallahassee, Florida 32802 Kenneth Easley, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
