The Issue The issue is whether the applicants-respondents Floyd and Alice Melton have provided reasonable assurances that their proposed dock meets the requirements of Chapter 403, Florida Statutes (1989) and Chapter 17, Florida Administrative Code, for issuance of a dredge and fill permit. Only four issues of disputed fact are raised by the pleadings in these cases: (1) whether the project will adversely affect navigation as that term is used in Section 403.918(2)(a)3., Florida Statutes; (2) whether the project will adversely affect recreational values in the vicinity of the project, in the context of the public interest test of Section 403.918(2)(a)4., Florida Statutes; (3) whether an increased number of boats at the proposed dock would cause "pollution" which would violate water quality criteria promulgated by the Department, and (4) whether the pilings will harm seagrasses in the vicinity of the dock.
Findings Of Fact An 85' dock perpendicular to the shoreline of the Meltons' property at Lot 4, Block 2, Buccaneer Point Estates, Key Largo, was in existence in 1988, some portion of which was apparently constructed without the benefit of a dredge and fill permit. On October 20, 1988, Floyd Melton applied to the Department (hereinafter "DER") for an after-the-fact permit for a 48' x 20' section, as an addition to a previously existing structure. After DER received the Meltons' permit application, an agency field inspector visited the site to determine whether the Meltons' proposed project could be constructed in conformance with Chapter 403, Florida Statutes, including the "public interest" tests at Section 403.918(2), and the "Keys Rule," Rule 17-312.420, Florida Administrative Code. The project site is located in Class III, Outstanding Florida Waters. The relevant factual determinations that DER personnel had to make at the Melton site, to ascertain compliance with the Keys Rule, were (a) the water depths, and (b) the presence or absence of seagrass communities in the proposed boat mooring area. The proposed 90' dock would have terminated over seagrass community in less than 5' of water depth. DER informed the Meltons, on February 9, 19890, that the permit would be denied unless they redesigned the dock to extend a distance of 275' out from the shore (289' total length), to where a water depth of 5' existed, limited the dock to a 4' width, and elevated the access walkway 6 feet above mean high water, to prohibit mooring along it and to increase light penetration underneath the dock. The Meltons amended their permit application to so comply. There are seagrasses under the entire length of the proposed dock. There are dense seagrass communities at the terminus of the proposed dock, surrounded by less dense seagrass communities. Under the boat currently moored near the terminus of the Meltons' uncompleted dock, there is a dense seagrass bed that is not adversely affected by the presence of the boat, which is moored in 5' of water. There is a "halo" of denuded bottom extending 4-6 inches around each piling, and occasional gouges that extend beyond the halo, which features are an ordinary and expected effect of driving pilings into the sea bed. Petitioners' expert's uncontroverted testimony is that 10 pilings placed in the dense seagrass bed at the end of the proposed dock would have no effect on the viability of that seagrass bed, while 100 pilings "would definitely damage" its viability. The survey introduced by the Meltons shows six pilings where the terminal platform is to be constructed, and three more offshore pilings for mooring purposes, for a total of nine. Other existing mooring pilings shown in the survey, landward of the proposed terminal platform, are to be removed in accordance with the permit. The water depth at the end of the Meltons' existing 85' dock is between 3.0' and 3.25', which is comparable to other existing docks in the area. Fast boats, such as water-skiing boats and one-person watercraft, operating in shallow water over a seagrass bed can damage seagrasses by "prop scarring" or by stirring up sediments. At another dock in the area, where the water depth is 3.75' at the dock's terminus, there is evidence of damage to seagrass beds by such prop-scarring. The water depth at the end of Petitioner Traurig's dock is only 1.67' to 2.0', necessitating very careful boat operation to prevent damage to seagrasses. The stipulated modification to the permit allowing three mooring pilings and requiring mooring waterward of the terminal platform clarifies DER's understanding that boats would only be moored on the waterward side of the terminal platform. No more than one or two boats can reasonably be moored at the facility. That is no more than could have been moored at the previous dock; in fact, it is equivalent to the two moored at Petitioner Traurig's dock. The environmental impact of the proposed Melton dock would be far less than that of the other docks along this shoreline, primarily because it causes boats to be operated and moored in deeper water. Neither the proposed project, nor the one or two boats that can be expected to moor at the terminal platform, will have any adverse effect on Florida Bay or the seagrass communities in the immediate vicinity. The entire area of Florida Bay except for the shoreline area where the Melton and other docks in the vicinity are located is open for navigation. It is between 0.4 and 0.5 miles from the end of the proposed dock to the nearest navigation channel. The proposed dock is not a hazard to navigation in that nearest channel, the Intracoastal Waterway. It is, however, an inconvenience and can present a hazard to unwary nighttime recreational users in the waters next to the shoreline where the Melton, Clarke, and Traurig docks are located. Petitioners' witnesses' testimony focused on how the Melton dock would force them to change their usual paths while recreating in the area, or traveling to and from nearby docks. Water-skiers and "knee-towers" have had to modify the route they used to take when water-skiing or knee-towing past the Melton property, now that much of the dock is in place. Some boat operators, Petitioners' witnesses included, continue to operate their boats so close to the Melton dock that near- collisions take place. A sailor chose to forego landing his catamaran at a dock near the Melton dock because its presence would have given him "a hard time getting out." Youngsters on "hydoslides" and "wet bikes," and in small boats, have passed landward of the outermost pilings of the uncompleted Melton dock, literally going under the structure, on several occasions. One neighbor witnessed three nighttime collisions with the uncompleted Melton dock by boaters, each of which ended when the boaters extricated themselves from the pilings. Traurig's tenant next door to the Meltons, when traveling to and from her dock, complained that "you can't go straight out anymore. You have to go out and then around. You have to be cautious..." Petitioner Traurig stated that the Melton dock would "almost cause her to jump out of her unpowered sailboat and tow it into her dock," as it would limit her ability to tack in the close confines created by the new dock. Petitioner Charles Clarke, whose property is separated from the Meltons by Petitioner Traurig's property, stated that the proposed dock is "an obstacle essentially to navigation and enjoyment of that waterway as I used it...," and that he is prevented from tacking into his dock by the presence of the Meltons' dock. Buccaneer Point is full of docks. The neighboring docks are generally approximately 100' long, while the Meltons' dock that DER proposes to permit will be 289' long, with mooring pilings and a boat extending this facility between 300' and 310' offshore. Boaters will be required to avoid this dock while recreating in the area, and while travelling to and from nearby docks. The proposed dock will discourage boaters and water- skiers from traveling through the very shallow waters off the ends of the other docks in the vicinity, potentially injuring themselves and the benthic communities. The Melton dock will not cross over the riparian lines of the Melton property. The project is clearly in the public interest by preventing ongoing adverse impacts of the existing dock, allowing the recolonization of habitat in those disturbed areas, and by extending the dock to prevent the destruction of the bay bottom. This is accomplished by elevating the dock to 6' and restricting its width to 4' in order to allow better sunlight penetration below the dock. This is also accomplished by prohibiting the mooring of vessels other than seaward of the terminus platform, thereby keeping vessels in deeper water to prevent additional destruction of the seagrass beds throughout the area. During the course of the final hearing, the Meltons and DER entered into several stipulations which will promote the absence of impact to the seagrass community. They have agreed that the following conditions will be made part of any permit issued by DER: The dock structure will be modified so that it is T-shaped rather than L-shaped. The terminal platform and access walkway will be of the dimensions contained in DER's "intent to issue." The access walkway can intersect the terminal platform at any point along the platform's 40' length. There will be 3 mooring pilings placed seaward of the terminal platform. The permit will restrict the mooring of vessels to the seaward side of the terminal platform. The Meltons will remove the 3 mooring pilings located to the right of the dock and 2 of the 4 pilings located to the left of the dock. The Meltons will not use a water-based barge in less than 2' of water in connection with the dock construction or driving or removing the pilings.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered granting the Meltons' application for a dredge and fill permit, conditioned upon the stipulations and the mitigative recommendation set forth in this Recommended Order. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16 day of October, 1990. LINDA H. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16 day of October, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NOS. 89-6051 and 89-6135 Petitioners' proposed findings of fact numbered 2, 3, 6, 7, 22d, 22g, 22j, and 22r have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioners' proposed findings of fact numbered 1, 22f, 22h, 22i, and 22n- 22q have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the evidence in this cause. Petitioners' proposed findings of fact numbered 4, 5, 19, 22a, 22c, 22e, 22i, 22k, and 22m have been rejected as being unnecessary for determination of the issues in this cause. Petitioners' proposed findings of fact numbered 8-18, 20, 21, 22b, 22s, and 22t have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting recitation of the testimony, argument of counsel, or conclusions of law. The Department's proposed findings of fact numbered 1, 2, 6, 8-10, 12, 14, 15, 17, 19-23, and 26 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. The Department's proposed finding of fact numbered 3 has been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the evidence in this cause. The Department's proposed findings of fact numbered 4, 5, and 25 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting recitation of the testimony, argument of counsel, or conclusions of law. The Department's proposed findings of fact numbered 7, 11, 13, 16, 18, and 24 have been rejected as being unnecessary for determination of the issues in this cause. Respondents Meltons' proposed findings of fact numbered 1-13 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael F. Chenoweth, Esquire 31 Garden Cove Drive Key Largo, Florida 33037 James S. Mattson, Esquire Joseph J. Vetrick, Esquire MATTSON, TOBIN & VETRICK Post Office Box 586 Key West, Florida 33037 Cecile I. Ross, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson, Esquire General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) should issue a letter of consent to use State-owned submerged lands (SL) and an environmental resource permit (ERP) (which are processed together as a SLERP) for the single-family dock proposed by Pamela C. Damico, which would extend 770 feet into the Atlantic Ocean from her property on Plantation Key in Monroe County (DEP Permit 44-0298211-001).
Findings Of Fact Pamela C. Damico owns property at 89505 Old Highway on Plantation Key in the Upper Florida Keys in Monroe County. Her property includes submerged land extending between 212 and 233 feet into the Atlantic Ocean, which is an Outstanding Florida Water (OFW). She applied to DEP for a permit to build a dock and boat mooring at her property. In its final configuration, the proposed docking structure would have an access pier from the shoreline that would extend across her submerged land, and then farther across State-owned submerged lands, for a total distance of 770 feet from the shoreline. A primary goal of the application was to site the mooring area in water with a depth of at least -4 feet mean low water (MLW). Mrs. Damico’s consultants believed that this was required for a SLERP in Monroe County. In addition, they were aware that -4 feet MLW would be required to get a dock permit from Islamorada, Village of Islands. The beliefs of Mrs. Damico’s consultants regarding the depth requirement for the mooring site were based in part on incorrect interpretations of DEP rules by certain DEP staff made both during Mrs. Damico’s application process and during the processing of other applications in the past. Those incorrect interpretations were based in part on ambiguous and incorrect statements in guidance documents published by DEP over the years. (Similarly, certain DEP staff made incorrect interpretations of DEP rules regarding a supposedly absolute 500-foot length limit for any dock in Monroe County.) See Conclusions of Law for the correct interpretations of DEP rules. Petitioner owns oceanfront property to the south and adjacent to Mrs. Damico’s. As expressed by Petitioner’s owner and operator, Dr. William Carter, Petitioner has concerns regarding impacts of the proposed docking structure on navigation, boating safety, and natural resources, including seagrasses, stony corals, tarpon, and bonefish. Several changes were made to the proposed docking structure to address concerns raised by Petitioner. In the earlier proposals, the access pier would have been supported by 10-inch square concrete piles, which must be installed using a construction barge and heavy equipment. In its final form, to reduce the direct impacts to the seagrasses and stony corals, it was proposed that the first 550 feet of the access pier from the point of origin on the shoreline would be installed using pin piles, which are made of aluminum and are 4.5 inches square inside a vinyl sleeve five inches square, and can be installed by hand. Instead of the planks originally proposed for the decking of the access pier, a grating material was substituted, which would allow greater light penetration to the seagrasses below. The orientation and length of the proposed docking structure was modified several times in an effort to achieve the optimal siting of the mooring platform. Handrails were proposed for the access pier, and no tie-up cleats are provided there. In combination with the elevation of the decking at five feet above mean high water (MHW), the handrails would discourage use of the pier for mooring by making it impractical if not impossible in most cases. Railing also was proposed for the north side of the mooring platform to discourage mooring there, and a sign was proposed to be placed on the north side of the platform saying that mooring there is prohibited. These measures were proposed to restrict mooring to the south side of the mooring platform, where a boat lift would be installed, which would protect the large seagrass beds that are on the north side of the terminal platform. (Mooring an additional boat along the end of the 8-foot long mooring platform, which faces the prevailing oceanic waves, is impractical if not impossible.) To make the docking structure less of a navigation and boating safety hazard, it was proposed that a USCG flashing white light would be installed at the end of the terminal platform. In its final configuration, the docking structure would preempt approximately 2,240 square feet of State-owned submerged land, plus approximately 200 square feet preempted by the proposed boat lift. In addition, it would preempt approximately 900 square feet of Mrs. Damico’s privately-owned submerged land. Mrs. Damico’s private property has approximately 352 linear feet of shoreline. Dr. Lin testified for Petitioner that the proposed docking structure would preempt a total of 3,760 square feet. This calculation included 520 square feet of preemption by the boat lift, but the proposed boat lift is for a smaller boat that would preempt only approximately 200 square feet. Intending to demonstrate that the proposed docking structure would wharf out to a consistent depth of -4 feet MLW, Mrs. Damico’s consultants submitted a bathymetric survey indicating a -4 MLW contour at the mooring platform. In fact, the line indicated on the survey is not a valid contour line, and the elevations in the vicinity do not provide reasonable assurance that the mooring area of the docking structure in its final configuration is in water with a consistent depth of -4 feet MLW, or that there is water of that depth consistently between the mooring area and the nearest navigable channel. The evidence does, however, provide reasonable assurance that the proposed mooring platform is in water with a consistent depth of at least -3 feet MLW, and that there is water of that depth consistently between the mooring area and the nearest navigable channel, which would avoid damage to seagrass bed and other biological communities. The evidence was not clear whether there is another possible configuration available to Petitioner to wharf out to a mooring area with a consistent depth of at least -3 feet MLW, not over seagrasses, and with water of that depth consistently between the mooring area and the nearest navigable channel, that would not require as long an access pier, or preempt as many square feet of State-owned submerged land. A noticed general permit (NGP) can be used for a dock of 2,000 square feet or less, in water with a minimum depth of -2 feet MLW, and meeting certain other requirements. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 62-341.215 and 62-341.427. The evidence was not clear whether an NGP can be used in an OFW in Monroe County in water less than -3 feet FLW, according to DEP’s interpretation of its rules. Cf. Fla. Admin. Code Ch. 62-312.400, Part IV. Initially, mitigation for impacts to natural resources was proposed. However, DEP’s staff determined that no mitigation was required because there would not be any adverse effects from the docking structure, as finally proposed. For the same reason, DEP staff determined that there would be no significant cumulative adverse impacts and that no further analysis of cumulative impacts was necessary. Actually, there will be adverse impacts to natural resources. The biologist for Mrs. Damico determined that there are some seagrasses and numerous stony corals in the footprint of the access pier, in addition to other resources less susceptible to impacts (such as macro-algae and loggerhead sponges). These organisms will be disturbed or destroyed by the installation of the access pier. The biologist quantified the impacts to round starlet corals by assuming the placement of two supporting piles, four feet apart, every ten feet for the length of the pier, and assuming impacts to the stony corals in a quadrat centered on each pile location and three times the diameter of the pile. Using this method, it was estimated that approximately 1,505 square centimeters of the stony corals would be destroyed by the installation of the docking structure. The impacts assessed by Mrs. Damico’s biologist and DEP assume that construction would “step out” from shore and, as construction proceeds, from already-built segments of the pier, until water depths allow for the use of a construction barge without unintended damage to the natural resources in the area. This construction method is not required by the proposed SLERP. It would have to be added as a permit condition. Petitioner did not prove that the impacts to a few seagrasses and approximately 1,505 square centimeters of the stony corals would damage the viability of those biological communities in the vicinity of the proposed docking structure. Direct and indirect impacts to other species from the installation and maintenance of the docking structure would not be expected. Impacts to listed species, including manatees and sawfish, would not be anticipated. Manatees sometimes are seen in the vicinity but do not rely on the area for foraging or breeding. Sawfish are more likely to frequent the bay waters than the ocean. Migratory tarpon and bonefish use the area and might swim out around the docking structure to avoid passing under it. Resident tarpon and some other fish species might congregate under the docking structure. The proposed docking structure does not block or cross any marked navigation channel and is in a shallow area near the shore where boats are supposed to be operated at reduced speeds. Nonetheless, the proposed structure poses more than a casual navigation hazard, especially due to its length, which is significantly greater than any docking structure in the vicinity. In conducting its staff analysis of the impacts on navigation and boating safety, DEP understood that the closest marked navigation channel is at least two miles away from the proposed docking structure. Actually, there also is a marked channel at the Tavernier Creek, which is less than half a mile north of the site. It is not uncommon for boaters to leave the marked Tavernier Creek channel to motor south in the shallow water closer to shore; they also sometimes cut across the shallow waters near the site to enter the Tavernier Creek channel when heading north. There also are other unmarked or unofficially-marked channels even closer to the proposed docking structure. In good weather and sea conditions, the proposed docking structure would be obvious and easy to avoid. In worse conditions, especially at night, it could be a serious hazard. To reduce the navigational hazard posed by the dock, reflective navigation indicators are proposed to be placed every 30 feet along both sides of the access pier, and the USCG flashing white light is proposed for the end of terminal platform. These measures would help make the proposed docking structure safer but would not eliminate the risks entirely. The light helps when it functions properly, it can increase the risk if boaters come to rely on it, and it goes out. Both the light and reflective indicators are less effective in fog and bad weather and seas. The risk increases with boats operated by unskilled and especially intoxicated boaters. It is common for numerous boaters to congregate on weekends and holidays at Holiday Isle, which is south of the proposed docking structure. Alcoholic beverages are consumed there. Some of these boaters operate their boats in the vicinity of the proposed docking structure, including “cutting the corner” to the Tavernier Creek pass channel, instead of running in deeper water to enter the pass at the ocean end of the navigation channel. This increases the risk of collision, especially at night or in bad weather and sea conditions. DEP sought comments from various state and federal agencies with jurisdiction over fisheries and wildlife. None of these agencies expressed any objection to the proposed docking structure. No representative from any of those agencies testified or presented evidence at the hearing. Area fishing guides and sports fishermen fish for bonefish and tarpon in the flats in the vicinity of the proposed docking structure. If built, the proposed docking structure would spoil this kind of fishing, especially bonefishing, or at least make it more difficult. The more similar docking structures installed in the area, the greater the difficulties in continuing to use the area for this kind of fishing. On the other hand, resident tarpon and some other fish species could be attracted by such docking structures. Mrs. Damico’s application initially offered a money donation to the Florida Keys Environmental Restoration Trust Fund if mitigation was required. The proposed permit includes a requirement to donate $5,000 to the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary (FKNMS), before construction begins, for the maintenance of mooring buoys to reduce recreational boater impacts at the coral reef areas. The reefs are miles from the site of the proposed docking structure, and the donation does not offset project impacts. Rather, as stated in the proposed permit, its purpose is to “satisfy public interest requirements.” As a federal agency, the FKNMS does not accept donations directly. Donations would have to be made to the Sanctuary Friends of the Florida Keys (SFFK) for use by the FKNMS for buoy maintenance. A condition would have to be added to the ERP to ensure that the donation would be used for the intended purpose. In a bid to defeat Mrs. Damico’s attempt to satisfy public interest requirements, Petitioner offered to donate $10,000 to SFFK for the buoy maintenance if DEP denied the permit. Petitioner’s offer should not affect the evaluation of the proposed docking structure under the public interest criteria. DEP staff evaluated the proposed ERP under the public interest criteria to be essentially neutral and determined that the $5,000 donation would make it clearly in the public interest. This analysis was flawed. With or without the $5,000 donation, the proposed docking structure would have an adverse effect on the public health, safety, and welfare; an adverse effect on navigation; an adverse effect on fishing or recreational values in the vicinity; and an adverse effect on the current condition and relative value of functions being performed by areas affected by the proposed activity. It would not have any positive public interest effects. Its effects would be permanent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that DEP enter a final order denying a permit for the proposed docking structure; if granted, there should be a condition requiring construction to “reach out” from shore and, as construction proceeds, from already-built segments of the pier, until water depths allow for the use of a construction barge without unintended damage to the natural resources in the area. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of October, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of October, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Patricia M. Silver, Esquire Silver Law Group Post Office Box 710 Islamorada, Florida 33036-0710 Brittany Elizabeth Nugent, Esquire Vernis and Bowling of the Florida Keys, P.A. at Islamorada Professional Center 81990 Overseas Highway, Third Floor Islamorada, Florida 33036-3614 Ronald Woodrow Hoenstine, III, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Herschel T. Vinyard, Jr., Secretary Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Tom Beason, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Lea Crandall, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue Whether Sam Patterson’s proposed dock project is exempt from the need to obtain an Environmental Resource Permit (ERP) from the Department of Environmental Protection (Department) under Florida Administrative Code Rules 40E-4.051(3)(c) and (d).
Findings Of Fact The Parties Mr. Scully resides at 941 Brookdale Drive, Boynton Beach, Florida, Lot 16, adjacent to and south-southeast of Mr. Patterson's residential property. The northern or rear portion of Mr. Scully's lot borders on an artificial canal that is designated a Class III water by Department rule. He does not have a dock per se; he moors his boat against and parallel to a narrow concrete area (and his lot line), separated by buffering material. Mr. Patterson, the applicant, owns the property at 930 Brookdale Drive, Boynton Beach, Florida, Lot 15. Lot 15 is north-northwest and adjacent to Mr. Scully’s property. This residential property is currently leased to others. The residential property (Lot 14) adjacent to and north-northeast of Mr. Patterson's lot is apparently owned by an individual named Meloche. The Department has the jurisdiction to determine whether the proposed project is exempt from ERP requirements. The Proposed Project On or about September 13, 2004, Mr. Patterson filed an application requesting an exemption to replace an existing five- foot by 21-foot (105-square feet) marginal dock in the same location, configuration, and dimensions as the existing dock. He also requested an exemption to install a five-foot by 16-foot (80-square feet) wooden finger pier extending perpendicular to and from the middle of the existing marginal dock. As of the final hearing, the project has been revised such that the wooden finger pier will extend 11.8 feet (rather than 16 feet) and perpendicular from the middle of the marginal dock. Mr. Patterson changed the length of the finger pier to comply with City regulations, which are not at issue in this case. The “Site Plan” is attached to the Department’s Notice of Determination of Exemption. (JE 1). The “Site Plan” shows a one-story residence on Mr. Patterson's Lot 15. The front of the lot measures 100 feet, whereas the rear of the lot (that abuts the canal on the easternmost portion of the lot) is 50 feet in length from south to north. The seawall is one-and-one-half feet in width. The existing marginal dock abuts the seawall running south to north and is 21 feet long and five feet wide. Small concrete platforms abut the marginal dock on the south and north. The Department reviewed the original application and on October 13, 2004, advised Mr. Patterson, in part, that his project was exempt from the need to obtain an ERP under Florida Administrative Code Rules 40E-4.051(3)(c) and (d). The Department had not reviewed the change to the project prior to the final hearing. See Finding of Fact 5. Lots 16, 15, and 14 are situated as a cul-de-sac (semi- circle) with the canal north of Lot 16, east of Lot 15, and south of Lot 14. Lot 14 is across the canal from Mr. Scully's Lot 16. There are five properties on each side of the canal, running west to east. The artificial canal runs directly east from Mr. Patterson’s property for an uncertain distance to the Intracoastal Waterway (ICW). Mr. Patterson’s property (Lot 15) is the western end-point for this canal. Mr. Patterson’s eastern property line (fronting the canal) is 50 feet in width. However, the precise width of the canal between Lots 14 and 16 is unclear. Ms. Smith reports (in her site inspection report of March 3, 2005 (JE 3)) that the canal is approximately 50 feet wide. Mr. Patterson testified that Karen Main with the City of Boynton Beach advised him that the consensus opinion of City employees reviewing the issue was that the canal measured 66 feet in width. There appears to be some widening of the canal east of Mr. Patterson’s property line and then the canal appears to straighten-out as it proceeds to the east to the ICW and past the easterly property lines for Lots 14 and 16. See (JEs 1-site plan; 5-aerial). The weight of the evidence indicates that the canal, between Lots 14 and 16, is approximately 60 to 66 feet wide. See, e.g., id. In the past, the prior owner of Lot 15 (Mr. Patterson's property) moored a boat at and parallel to the marginal dock, which means that the bow, for example, faced Lot 14 and the stern faced Lot 16. Mr. Patterson currently owns a 16-foot boat that he wants to moor at the marginal dock. However, he feels that it is unsafe to do so, particularly if Mr. Scully’s boat drifts. Meloche (Lot 14 to the north) has a fixed boatlift, which allows for the elevation of a boat out of the water, with the bow facing west toward and in front of the northern end of Mr. Patterson’s seawall. (JE 4). Mr. Scully moors his boat parallel to the shoreline of Lot 16 and perpendicular to Mr. Patterson’s 50-foot eastern seawall and property line. (JEs 4 and 6). Mr. Scully’s seawall intersects Mr. Patterson’s seawall such that when Mr. Scully’s 22-foot boat is moored at his seawall, it is also in front of the southern end of Mr. Patterson’s seawall. Id. When Mr. Scully’s boat is tightly moored at his seawall, it does not interfere with or block Mr. Patterson’s marginal dock. (JE 6). However, when Mr. Scully’s boat is loosely moored, it drifts toward the center of the canal in front of Mr. Patterson’s marginal dock. (JE 4). With no boat moored at the marginal dock, Mr. Scully is able to freely maneuver his boat to his seawall with limited “backing” of his boat required (stern first). With a boat consistently moored at Mr. Patterson’s marginal dock, Mr. Scully would have to back into his area beside his seawall in order to avoid colliding with that boat. Mr. Patterson’s finger pier would enable him to safely moor a boat perpendicular to the marginal dock. Centering the finger pier at the marginal dock is likely to make it easier for Mr. Patterson and Mr. Scully to navigate to their respective mooring areas, depending on the size of the boats moored by Mr. Patterson and Mr. Scully. (The Department, in reviewing similar exemption requests, does not consider the type and size of the boat(s) to be moored at the proposed dock or adjacent mooring site.) It is preferable for the boats to be moored, in this location, stern first, with the bow facing down the canal from the wake of the boats traveling in the ICW. Centering the finger pier at the marginal dock and mooring Mr. Patterson’s boat on the north side of the finger pier is likely to enable Meloche, Mr. Patterson, and Mr. Scully to moor their boats parallel to each other and avoid collisions.1 Placement of the finger pier at the northern end of the finger pier, while favored over the proposed location by Mr. Scully, is likely to interfere with Meloche’s use of his property and boatlift. With the finger pier centered on the marginal dock and a boat moored to the north, Mr. Scully can maneuver his boat to his seawall by “backing in” stern first. An experienced boater can accomplish this task in two to three maneuvers. Mr. Scully is an experienced boater and has lived on the canal for approximately eight years. Shortening the finger pier from 16 feet to 11.8 feet will not affect Mr. Patterson’s ability to safely moor a boat on the northern side of the finger pier. The Challenge Mr. Scully contends that the placement of the wooden finger pier and the mooring of a sizable boat on the proposed finger pier will interfere with his ability to navigate in and out of the canal in or around his property, and necessarily interfere with his ability to moor his boat adjacent to his property. He also contends that the marginal dock and the finger pier are two docks, not one. Resolution of the Controversy Replacement of the existing marginal dock will consist of replacing the decking and using the existing pilings. The existing marginal dock is currently functional. Reconstruction of the marginal dock and construction of the finger pier will be done by a licensed marine contractor. The licensed marine contractor will use best management practices to avoid water quality problems in the canal during construction. Construction of the proposed project is not expected to adversely affect flood control or violate water quality standards. The proposed project will not impede navigation. But see Endnote 1.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order concluding that Mr. Patterson’s proposed dock project, as revised, is exempt from the need to obtain an ERP. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of April, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES A. STAMPELOS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 2005.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Richard M. Woodley has two inactive contracting licenses numbered CB CA 17970 and CB CO 17970, and was so licensed in 1986. The Respondent's license CB CA 17970 qualified "Woodley Builders, Inc." with the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. At the time of the hearing, the Respondent was no longer in the construction contracting business as a licensed contractor. With respect to case number 87-2809, on December 15, 1985, the Respondent, on behalf of Woodley Builders, Inc., entered into a contract with Catherine M. Richardson and Jonathan P. Richardson to build a residence in or near Orlando, Florida. The contract price was $90,000, with $20,000 attributable to the land. The contract specified that payments would be made to Woodley Builders, Inc. "in accordance with the disbursement schedule set forth by the construction lender." P. Ex. 1, paragraph 7. Woodley Builders, Inc. also agreed in the contract to furnish to the Richardsons lien waivers as required by the construction lender for disbursements. The construction lender disbursed the following amounts on the indicated dates: $10,200 March 17, 1986 $10,200 March 19, 1986 $17,000 March 27, 1986 $17,000 April 24, 1986 To induce these disbursements, a total of $54,400, the Respondent signed lien waivers stating that all bills for labor and materials used had been paid in full. P. Ex. 5. At the time of signing, the Respondent told the construction lender that he had paid all bills due to that time, but had not paid bills not yet presented. T. 89. Thus, the lien waivers were intended to be a certification of the partial completion and payment for the work billed to the date of the waiver, and a promise to pay other bills for work already completed as such bills were presented. Six claims of liens were filed by subcontractors. The Richardsons hired a lawyer, and the lawyer was able to defend against two of the liens for failure to properly comply with procedures for mechanic's liens. Four liens for the following amounts and for work beginning on the dates indicated ultimately had to be satisfied by the Richardsons: $ 2,851.45 March 19, 1986 $13,462.34 March 7, 1986 $ 1,944.57 April 8, 1986 $ 785.01 April 9, 1986 These liens were for work commenced before the last lien waiver was signed on April 24, 1986. Thus, the Respondent failed to comply with the oral representations he made at the time of signing the lien waivers. The Richardsons were forced to execute a second mortgage in excess of $17,000 to pay off the unpaid liens. The Richardsons terminated the contract with Woodley Builders, Inc. when subcontractors quit working for lack of payment by Woodley Builders, Inc. Some money was obtained from family loans. It cost the Richardsons about $30,000 to have the house finished, which has added about $325 per month to their mortgage obligations. The Respondent and Woodley Builders, Inc. have not paid anything on these liens. Woodley Builders, Inc. filed bankruptcy. The Richardsons sued the Respondent as trustee for Woodley Builders, Inc. and obtained a default judgment for $149,839, which was a judgment of $32,380 in compensatory damages, trebled, plus costs, interest, and attorney's fees. With respect to case number 87-2810, on June 11, 1986, Woodley Builders, Inc. entered into a contract with Tom Jamieson to construct an addition to his residence in Orlando, Florida. The price of the work was $18,500. The contract specified that the price was a cash price, and that draws were to be made according to a schedule stated in the contract. Mr. Jamieson paid to Woodley Builders, Inc. about $11,700 of the contract price. At some time before completion of the addition, the owner, Mr. Jamieson, evidently became dissatisfied with the Respondent's work. Mr. Jamieson was given the Respondent's copy of the contract and refused to return it to the Respondent. Mr. Jamieson then owed the Respondent a draw of $3500, but refused to give it to him, and refused to have it put in escrow for the payment of subcontractors. The date that this occurred is not in evidence. T. 35-36, 39. Since Mr. Jamieson had taken back the contract, the Respondent thought that he (the Respondent) no longer had any legal proof of the contract (either scope of work or amount due), and thus had no contract to complete the work. He also did not receive the draw that was due. The Respondent thus ceased work on the addition for fear that he would not be paid without a copy of his contract. T. 36-37. The Respondent offered to complete the work. T. 51. The drywall contractor, Rick's Drywall, Inc., filed a lien for $465 for work done from August 12, 1986 and August 20, 1986. The Respondent would have paid this lien had Mr. Jamieson not terminated the contract and refused to give the Respondent a draw still due of $3500. T. 49-50. There may be a claim for unpaid electrical work in July, 1986, see P. Ex. 15, but it is impossible to tell if this occurred before or after Mr. Jamieson terminated the contract, or whether the Respondent had received draw money that should have paid this claim. The only evidence is that the Respondent had an agreement with the electrical subcontractor to pay that subcontractor at the time of the final draw, a draw never received as discussed above. T. 53. P. Ex. 11 is insufficient evidence that there were unpaid claims for roof trusses. Moreover, it cannot be determined whether the Respondent received a draw before contract termination which should have been used to pay for roof trusses. The Respondent had been a contractor for eight years before he began to have financial difficulties resulting in the problems with the Richardson's residence. There is no evidence of any prior discipline.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Construction Industry Licensing Board enter its final order finding in case number 87-2809 that the Respondent, Richard M. Woodley, violated sections 489.129(1)(m), 489.129(1)(j), and 489.119, Fla. Stat. (1986), misconduct in contracting by diversion of funds, and failure to supervise as a qualifying agent, and in case number 87-2810, dismissing the administrative complaint for failure of proof by clear and convincing evidence. It is further recommended for the violation set forth above that the license of the Respondent be suspended for one year. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of July, 1988. WILLIAM C. SHERRILL, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard M. Woodley 2521 Tuscaloosa Trail Maitland, Florida 32751 David Bryant, Esquire 1107 East Jackson, Suite 104 Tampa, Florida 33602 William O'Neil, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Nonroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Fred Seely, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32201
Findings Of Fact Sea Isles Condominium Association (Petitioner) is the riparian owner of lands at 25714 Hickory Boulevard, Bonita Springs, Florida 33923. The Petitioner's lands lie along the Broadway Channel connecting the Gulf of Mexico to Estero Bay. There are 84 upland units in the condominium. Some condominium residents without docking slips have requested that the Petitioner apply for expansion of the existing facility. The waters adjacent to Petitioner's upland property are located within the Estero Bay Aquatic Preserve (pursuant to Section 258.39(28), Florida Statutes) and are designated as Outstanding Florida Waters (OFW) by the Department of Environmental Regulation (DER). At some point in approximately 1982, the condominium developer sought approval for the construction of docking facilities. By letter of January 25, 1982, Richard P. Ludington, then Director of the Division of State Lands of the Department of Natural Resources (DNR), indicated that there was no objection to the proposed dock project. The parties to this case have jointly stipulated that the Ludington opinion was based on the fact that the proposed project was a private non-income producing facility (a lease therefore not being required) and was not in conflict with any existing rules. The DER issued permit number 36-42521-5E, dated February 9, 1982, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers issued general permit number SAJ-33, both approving and authorizing the construction of the docking facility. Although the water body had been designated as an aquatic preserve, there were no adopted administrative rules regulating such projects at the time of the initial dock construction. The approved sixteen slip docking facility was constructed along the margin of the shoreline in 1983 by the developer of the condominium. Due to extremely shallow water depths, only two of the slips were accessible. At some point thereafter, the Petitioner began efforts to remedy the unusable slip situation. Initially, the Petitioner desired to dredge the area, but was unable to secure approval to dredge from regulatory agencies. The Petitioner then began to consider additional solutions. The solution upon which the Petitioner decided was removal of the existing slips and construction of an extended boardwalk and dock located in navigable water. On March 28, 1985, the DNR notified the Petitioner that the project would require approval in the form of a submerged land lease from the Governor and Cabinet, sitting as the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund ("Board"). On August 20, 1985, the DER issued permit number 361011295, authorizing the removal of the existing structure and the construction of a 22 slip docking facility as proposed by the Petitioner. On behalf of the Board, the DNR reviews applications for leases of sovereignty submerged lands. In reviewing such requests, the DNR calculates the maximum amount of sovereignty submerged lands which may be preempted by a proposed facility. According to administrative rule, the area of sovereignty submerged land preempted by a private residential multi-slip docking facility may not exceed the total square footage equal to ten times the riparian waterfront footage of the affected waterbody. DNR's calculation of the affected shoreline indicated that the Petitioner's riparian waterfront measured 433 feet. Application of the 10:1 ratio would indicate that the area of sovereignty submerged land preempted by the proposed multi-slip docking facility could not exceed 4330 square feet. As early as 1986, a surveyor employed by the Petitioner believed the DNR shoreline calculation to be erroneous and determined the Petitioner's riparian shoreline to be 601 feet. After discussing the discrepancy between measurements, the DNR representative informed a representative of the Petitioner that Sea Isles could obtain a mean high waterline survey to determine the actual shoreline footage if it disagreed with the DNR calculation. Although there is testimony that a survey provided to the DNR established the mean high waterline, the greater weight of the evidence establishes that the survey was not identified as a mean high waterline survey, but as a safe upland line survey. No credible mean high waterline survey was provided to the DNR by the Petitioner at that time. Abutting the Petitioner's property to the south is a man-made channel which results in an unnatural extension of the shoreline. Such extensions are not included in computing the allowable square footage of sovereign submerged lands because the man-made shoreline does not abut sovereign submerged lands. It is unclear whether the calculations of shoreline were affected by this consideration. Despite the discrepancy, the Petitioner reduced the size of the requested docking facility to include a boardwalk and dock of ten slips totalling approximately 4300 square feet and extending 208 feet into the waterbody (approximately 35 percent of the waterbody's width). The length of the extension violates administrative rule provisions governing extension into a waterbody which are addressed elsewhere herein. On July 23, 1986, Lee County passed a resolution of approval for the proposed docking facility land lease and granted a variance to Lee County Ordinance 85-25. The resolution of approval contained additional requirements, included a provision restricting the approval to not more than ten slips. The Petitioner asserts that the determination of shoreline was incorrect and was the result of "mutual mistake". The evidence fails to establish that the Petitioner's acceptance of the DNR's shoreline determination was based upon "mutual mistake." The evidence establishes that the Petitioner's representatives were aware of the discrepancy. The fact that the Petitioner agreed to deed a 575 foot conservation easement to the Board (to offset the potential adverse impact on manatee habitat as discussed elsewhere herein) would suggest that the parties were aware that the 433 foot measurement was inaccurate. For whatever reason, the Petitioner agreed to the DNR shoreline and dock calculation which formed the basis for the lease approved by the Board. Prior to approval of the lease, the Board reviewed a written "public interest" assessment which indicates that the length of the boardwalk to the proposed docking facility exceeded standards set by administrative rules. Pursuant to rule, exceptions to length restrictions may be made only where the applicant demonstrates that such exception is necessary to insure reasonable riparian ingress and egress. The Petitioner apparently demonstrated that, given the location of the existing sand flat, such exception was necessary to provide ingress and egress. According to the written analysis, the proposed project adversely impacted the manatee habitat located in the aquatic preserve. The analysis states that 575 foot conservation easement to the Board would offset the potential adverse impact on manatee habitat. The Petitioner committed to the conservation easement in order to meet the public interest test required of all docking facilities within an aquatic preserve. Special lease condition paragraph 5 requires the Petitioner to record a conservation easement for approximately 575 linear feet of shoreline in perpetuity to run with the land. The provision requires that documentation of the recording of the easement be provided to the Board within thirty days of the Board action and prior to execution of the lease. The lease conditions clearly indicate that the Petitioner will not seek authority to expand the docking facility. Special lease condition paragraph 5 prohibits any additional docking facilities or any other such development along the lessee's shoreline. Review of proposed special lease condition paragraph 6 (as compared to the staff recommendation and a subsequent affidavit executed by the Petitioner's representative on June 6, 1987) indicates that the paragraph appears to contain a typographical error in deleting the word "not" from the condition. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that the Petitioner agreed not to request authorization to dredge the docking area or channel or to request additional expansion of the facility. On April 21, 1987, the Board, apparently acting against the staff recommendation, voted to grant to the Petitioner a submerged land lease for the construction of a ten slip facility. Representatives of the Petitioner appeared before the Board during consideration and approval of the lease. On June 6, 1987, a representative of the Petitioner executed an affidavit on behalf of the Petitioner which sets forth the language of special condition paragraph six as originally proposed. In the affidavit, the Petitioner's representative agrees not to apply for authorization to dredge the dock or access channel, or to request expansion of the facility. A deed of conservation easement dated October 21, 1985, and signed by a representative of the Petitioner, was attached to the materials submitted to the Board for the April 21, 1987 meeting. Contrary to the lease requirement, the attached deed of conservation easement was never recorded. In 1986 or 1987, a conservation easement was recorded by the Petitioner in favor of the Board, but the easement contained no legal description of the subject property. However, the recorded easement does prohibit additional docking facilities and waives the Petitioner's rights of ingress or egress related to any such additional facilities. In early 1991, the Petitioner requested approval to expand the existing dock from 10 to 14 slip. The expanded structure would preempt 5620 square feet of sovereign submerged land. On May 15, 1991, the DER granted approval of the four slip expansion. On November 27, 1991, the DNR, by letter signed by Michael E. Ashley, Chief of the Bureau of Submerged Lands and Preserves, denied the requested four slip expansion. The letter was prepared at the direction and with the approval of the Director of the Division of State Lands. Mr. Ashley cites two reasons for the denial. First, the request violated the terms of the existing lease which provides that there will be no expansion requested. Second, the Petitioner had failed to record the 575 foot conservation easement which was required by the terms of the original lease. The request for extension was not presented to the Governor and Cabinet for consideration, but was reviewed by the "agenda review committee" of the DNR. The committee includes the Deputy Director, two Deputy Assistant Executive Directors, the General Counsel, and the Cabinet Coordinator for the DNR. The committee reviews matters which are identified as potentially requiring Board action to resolve. Where issues exist related to existing sovereignty submerged land leases, the DNR attempts to resolve the matter without referral to the Board. The authority to conduct business in this manner has not been reduced to writing, but is based on verbal direction from the Board and from Cabinet assistants. Subsequent to the letter of denial issued by Mr. Ashley, the Petitioner on or about December 30, 1991, filed a conservation easement granting to the Board, a perpetual interest in a parcel of land lying ten feet landward of the Safe Upland Line as described in the deed recorded in the records of Lee County, Florida, (OR 2268, Page 0401) with the Clerk of Court for Lee County. The parcel of land identified in the deed runs along the shoreline for a distance of 601 feet. The easement provides for modification by the signed agreement of the parties. Because the Petitioner seeks to expand an existing lease, it is required to demonstrate an additional public benefit would result from approval of the request. The Petitioner has proposed to plant an area of mangroves in the shallow "sand bar" area located behind the existing slips. There is no additional public benefit related to the request. The evidence fails to establish that granting the request to expand the docking facility is in the public interest.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund enter a Final Order denying the request of Sea Isles Condominium Association to modify the existing sovereignty submerged land lease to provide for four additional boat slips to their existing ten slip docking facility. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 15th day of April, 1993 in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-1077 The following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the parties. Petitioner The Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 17. Rejected, not supported by the greater weight of credible and persuasive evidence. 19. Rejected as to comments by Miller, irrelevant. 20-21. Rejected, irrelevant. Rejected as to 6,010 square feet of permissible preemption. Based upon shoreline calculation which is not supported by the greater weight of credible and persuasive evidence. Rejected, irrelevant. The manatee information was required under the conditions of the existing lease, and do not constitute a benefit to be considered in addressing the request to modify the lease. Respondent The Respondent's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 16. Rejected, unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: The Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund c/o Kenneth Plante, General Counsel Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station #10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-3000 Robert Routa, Esquire Post Office Drawer 6506 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6506 L. Kathryn Funchess, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station #35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue The issue in these consolidated proceedings is whether the proposed single-family residential dock meets the requirements for a letter of consent for use of sovereignty submerged lands pursuant to chapters 253 and 258, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Chapters 18-20 and 18-21, such that the Consolidated Regulatory Exemption and Letter of Consent for Department of Environmental Protection File No. 0319584-003EE, as amended on September 30, 2020, should be granted.
Findings Of Fact The Parties DEP is the state agency charged with regulating specified activities in state jurisdictional surface waters, pursuant to chapter 373, part IV, Florida Statutes. Additionally, DEP is charged with performing all staff duties and functions for the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund ("Trustees" or "Board") related to the administration of state-owned lands pursuant to chapter 253, including sovereignty submerged lands in aquatic preserves, pursuant to chapter 258. In this case, DEP is responsible for reviewing the application for the dock and issuing the Dock Approval that has been challenged in these proceedings. Fondriest owns the upland property riparian to the sovereignty submerged lands on which the Dock is proposed to be, at 1953 Long Beach Drive, Big Pine Key, Florida. She is the applicant for the Dock Approval that has been challenged in these proceedings. The Trust owns the upland property located at 1975 Long Beach Drive, Big Pine Key, Florida. This property is located immediately adjacent to, and west of, Fondriest's property. DeMaria and Appel own the upland property located at 1997 Long Beach Drive, Big Pine Key. This property is located two parcels west of Fondriest's property. Appel owns two other upland properties located on Long Beach Drive, neither of which is located immediately adjacent to Fondriest's property. Crilly is the holder of a marine turtle permit issued by the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission ("FFWCC"), and she volunteers as a sea turtle monitor for the Long Beach Drive area of Big Pine Key. History of the Dock Approval and Notice of Agency Action As stated above, on December 10, 2019, DEP issued a regulatory general permit and letter of consent to Fondriest, approving the 2019 Approval, which was then proposed as an 800-square-foot structure for use as a pier for non-motorized vessels. There was no evidence presented that Petitioners received a clear point of entry to challenge DEP's proposed agency action issued on December 10, 2019, either through receipt of written notice by mail, or constructively through publication of notice of the proposed agency action in a newspaper or other publication medium. The Trust filed a Petition for Administrative Hearing on January 30, 2020; DeMaria filed a Verified Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing on January 31, 2020; and Crilly filed a Verified Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing on February 27, 2020. On September 11, 2020, Fondriest filed a revised application with DEP, reducing the size of the Dock to 500 square feet; requesting a verification of exemption from permitting, pursuant to rule 62-330.015(5)(b) and section 403.813(1)(b)2; and requesting authorization, pursuant to chapters 253 and 258, and chapters 18-20 and 18-21, to use sovereignty submerged lands. On September 30, 2020, DEP issued Florida Department of Environmental Protection’s Notice of Proposed Changes to Agency Action—i.e., the "Dock Approval"— 2 Because the Dock will have less than 500 square feet of over-water surface area, it is exempt, pursuant to section 403.813(1)(b). from permitting under chapters 373 or 403. Petitioners have stipulated that the Dock qualifies for the permitting exemption under section 403.813(1)(b). verifying the regulatory exemption and authorizing the use of the sovereignty submerged lands by a letter of consent.3 DEP's agency action proposing to approve the Dock supersedes all prior DEP agency action with respect to the Dock, and constitutes the proposed agency action at issue in these proceedings. Long Beach Drive and the Surrounding Area Fondriest's property is located on Long Beach Drive, Big Pine Key, in Monroe County. Long Beach Drive is located on a spit of land comprising the southern and westernmost part of Big Pine Key. The south side of Long Beach Drive, where Fondriest's, the Trust's, and DeMaria's and Appel's properties are located, borders the Straits of Florida.4 Thus, Fondriest's, the Trust's, and DeMaria's and Appel's properties are riparian to sovereignty submerged lands underlying the Straits of Florida. The land along Long Beach Drive is platted and has been developed for residential and commercial uses. The Long Beach Drive area of Big Pine Key is located within the Coupon Bight Aquatic Preserve ("CBAP"), an Outstanding Florida Water and aquatic preserve consisting of approximately 6,000 acres of bays, mangrove forests, seagrass beds, and offshore patch coral reefs. The Long Beach Drive area, including Fondriest's property, is characterized by a rocky shore, with some narrow sandy beaches. The shore accumulates a significant amount of weed wrack consisting of seaweed, seagrass, and other debris. A beach berm created by wave and tide action 3 The Dock Approval states that the Dock does not qualify for the federal State Programmatic General Permit for section 404 of the Clean Water Act and section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act. Separate federal approval for the Dock has been issued by the Army Corps of Engineers, and Monroe County has issued a Building–Floodplain–Development Permit for the Dock. 4 All references to the shore or shoreline along Long Beach Drive refer to the shore or shoreline abutting the Straits of Florida. exists along much of the shore. The berm is frequently overtopped by water during high tides and storms. The beach is disturbed due to frequent use by residents and sea turtle monitors. Among the activities that take place on the beach are kayak launching, beach walking, beach cleaning and restoration, vegetation planting, and sea turtle nest monitoring. Several docks already exist along the shore on Long Beach Drive. The longshore current along the shore at Long Beach Drive flows, and transports sand from, east to west. The existing mangroves, jetties, and points along the Long Beach Drive shoreline trap sand and cause accretion of updrift beaches and starvation of downdrift beaches. The competent, credible evidence establishes that the docks along the shoreline on Long Beach Drive do not significantly contribute to beach accretion, starvation, or erosion in the area. The Proposed Dock The Dock is a private residential single-family dock associated with Fondriest's single-family residence at 1953 Long Beach Drive. It will not be used for commercial purposes or residential habitation, and there are no boat houses, boat lifts, or other enclosures proposed or approved as part of the Dock. As approved, the Dock will occupy 498 square feet, consisting of a 142-foot-long by 3-foot-wide access dock and a 12-foot-long by 6-foot-wide (i.e., 72-square-foot) terminal platform, and extending a total length of 154 feet. The access dock will be constructed with pressure-treated lumber planks spaced half-an-inch apart, to allow light penetration. The supporting pilings are comprised of PVC-encased aluminum, spaced approximately 9 feet, 5 inches apart. The PVC casing will help protect the piles from corrosion, thus helping to protect water quality. The terminal platform, which also will be supported by PVC-encased aluminum pilings, will consist of fiberglass grating, which allows sunlight penetration in order to prevent shading of seagrasses and other benthic resources.5 The top of the terminal platform is designed to be a minimum height of five feet above the mean high water line ("MHWL"). Handrails will be constructed along each side of the dock for its entire length, to prevent vessel mooring in adjacent shallow areas, thus helping protect against damage to benthic resources. The Dock will be used solely for the water-dependent activities of launching vessels and swimming. Only non-motorized vessels, such as kayaks, canoes, and paddleboards, may be launched from the Dock, and then only when there is a minimum depth of 0.5 feet (six inches, or half-a-foot) of water at the terminal platform.6 Additionally, the terminal platform must include signs of at least one-square- foot each placed on each side of the platform, stating "no mooring of motorized vessels allowed." A ladder is proposed to be located on one side of the terminal platform to provide access to the water for swimming or kayak launching, and the Dock Approval imposes a requirement that the ladder cannot be located over seagrass or hard bottom benthic communities. Although some turbidity in the water column may be generated by launching kayaks or other non-motorized watercraft from the terminal platform, the turbidity would be temporary and would not exceed that currently generated by dragging or hauling a kayak or other vessel from the shore across the substrate, to access sufficient water depth for launching. To prevent potential trapping, under the Dock, of sea turtles and other animals, such as Key Deer, an enclosure consisting of barriers one inch apart must be constructed beneath the portion of the Dock's landward access ramp having less than three feet of clearance above grade. 5 This is a standard construction material frequently used for docks in Florida. As further discussed below, the benthic survey performed for the area comprising the footprint of the Dock showed that no seagrass beds or other significant benthic resources are present. 6 The 0.5-foot water depth is keyed to the mean low water datum. At mean high water, the water depth at the terminal platform is approximately 1.2 feet. The competent, credible evidence establishes that the rest of the Dock will be elevated approximately five feet above the MHWL, so will be of sufficient height to allow animals to pass under without being trapped or impeded, and will provide sufficient clearance for sea turtle monitors to pass under as they traverse the beach. The competent, credible evidence also shows that the Dock will not impede the flow of water. The design is such that there are no structures on, or beneath, the Dock that will act as dams to prevent, or otherwise affect, the flow of water under and around the Dock. The water depth at the end of the terminal dock is 0.5 feet at mean low water, and 1.2 feet at mean high water. The Dock does not extend out to a depth of four feet of water. The competent, credible evidence establishes that the Dock will not interfere with navigation. The water depth between the shore and the end of the Dock's terminal platform is too shallow to accommodate motorized watercraft, and the Dock will be of sufficient height to enable persons using non-motorized watercraft to pass under it. The Dock will be constructed to meet the 2017 Southern Building Code, so will be able to resist 180-mile-per-hour, three-second wind gusts. The credible, persuasive evidence establishes that in a storm, the decking and stringers on the Dock will be washed off the pilings and will not become windborne projectiles. The Dock pilings will be imbedded into the substrate to a minimum depth of five feet, using a vibration hammer, rather than drilling and punching the pilings into the substrate. Using a vibration hammer will generate less turbidity in the water column than using the drill-and-punch installation technique, and turbidity curtains must be erected and maintained around the construction footprint to control turbidity and protect water quality. Additionally, the pilings will be installed using a spud barge elevated above the substrate, which also will help reduce turbidity during construction. Any turbidity generated during construction will be temporary. Installing the dock pilings using a vibration hammer also will generate less noise than the drill-and-punch technique. The Jacksonville Office of the National Marine Fisheries Service has issued a biological opinion stating that the vibration hammer installation technique "may affect/is not likely to affect" certain species listed as endangered, threatened, or of special concern. Additionally, because the Dock will be constructed in an open waterbody, the noise generated by piling installation is anticipated to be insignificant. Construction of the Dock may only be conducted outside of sea turtle nesting season, which runs from April 15 to October 31. Dock construction activities also must meet the requirements and standards established by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service to protect manatees, sea turtle species, the Smalltooth Sawfish, and the Eastern Indigo Snake. The 2011 Standard Manatee Construction Conditions for In-Water Work require vessels to navigate at slow speeds; manatee awareness signs to be posted; and construction to stop if a manatee is spotted within 50 feet of the construction site. In any event, manatees are unlikely to be present in the vicinity of the Dock, due to the very shallow water. The sea turtle and Smalltooth Sawfish construction conditions require vessels to operate at idle speeds in the vicinity of the project; turbidity curtains to be erected and maintained; and construction to be stopped if individuals of these species are observed within 50 feet of the construction site. The Eastern Indigo Snake, an upland species, is unlikely to be present at the Dock construction site. To prevent harm to individuals of this species, the letter of consent requires that educational materials be distributed to the construction crew and educational signs be placed at the construction site. No permanent exterior lighting is authorized for the Dock. This will prevent the Dock from attracting sea turtles and other marine species that are drawn to light. No turning basins, access channels, or wave break devices are proposed to be constructed for or used by the Dock. Fondriest's property has approximately 100 linear feet of riparian shoreline. There are no other docks existing on the shoreline along Long Beach Drive for at least 65 linear feet in either direction. The Dock will be constructed perpendicular to the shoreline, and will be located in Fondriest's riparian area, set back more than 40 feet from each riparian line demarcating her riparian area. Thus, the Dock will be located well outside the 25-foot setback from each riparian line. Biological and Other Resources in the Vicinity of the Dock Much of the shoreline along Long Beach Drive below the MHWL, including that along Fondriest's property, consists of bare, hard rock. The water is extremely shallow, and the bare rock is exposed at low tide. Site assessments conducted in 2020 at the location and in the vicinity of the Dock, show that limestone caprock, loose rubble, and some deeper depressions in the rock exist in the footprint of the Dock. The substrate consists of hard, highly uneven rock, with pools of tannin-stained water. Water pooled in the rock depressions is heated at low tide and, due to rotting vegetation, is nutrient-rich. The dissolved oxygen levels are very low, rendering the pools incapable of supporting substantial marine life other than cyanobacteria and filamentous algae, both of which indicate poor water quality. Some algae species are attached to the limestone caprock in the footprint and immediate vicinity of the Dock. However, recent biological resource assessments show that no seagrass beds, corals, or other hard bottom communities exist in the footprint of the Dock. Thus, the competent, credible evidence shows that there are no aquatic resources of any significant value in the footprint, or immediate vicinity, of the Dock. A small seagrass bed is located near the terminal platform. The letter of consent requires avoidance of this seagrass bed during construction and use of the Dock. Additionally, as discussed above, turbidity curtains must be installed to prevent turbidity and siltation of this seagrass bed during construction. The evidence establishes that the area waterward of the MHWL along Long Beach Drive generally supports a rich aquatic community. Fish and aquatic invertebrates inhabit the water in the vicinity, and numerous bird species use the area waterward of the MHWL, including that bordering Fondriest's property, as feeding and foraging habitat. However, no non-speculative evidence was presented to show that the construction, presence, and use of the Dock will result in adverse effects to this aquatic community, or to any plant or animal species in this aquatic community. Additionally, the competent, credible evidence shows that none of these resources exist in the footprint, or immediate vicinity, of the Dock, and conditions have been imposed in the letter of consent to ensure that the construction and use of the Dock will not adversely affect these resources. To the extent that the vibration hammer installation of the pilings will result in noise that may cause fish, birds, and other animals to leave the area, that effect will be temporary and will cease when piling installation is completed. Although some benthic or attached species, such as seahorses, may be unable to leave the area, so may be subjected to noise stress, no persuasive, non-speculative evidence was presented showing that these species inhabit the area in the vicinity of the Dock. Thus, any alleged harm to these species is speculative. Because the Dock may only be used for nonmotorized vessels such as kayaks and canoes, use of the Dock will not generate noise or otherwise adversely affect the aquatic habitat waterward of the MHWL along Long Beach Drive. The Key Deer is listed as an endangered species. Key Deer traverse and forage along the shore at Long Beach Drive. No credible evidence was presented showing that the Dock would adversely affect the ability of Key Deer to traverse and forage on the beach on, or adjacent to, Fondriest's property. As discussed above, the Dock will be elevated waterward of the MHWL to approximately five feet above grade. The evidence showed that this height is sufficient to allow Key Deer to pass underneath without being impeded or trapped. No credible evidence was presented showing that the three-foot wide access ramp would interfere with Key Deer foraging or traversing along the beach. The competent, credible evidence establishes that the Loggerhead Sea Turtle and Green Sea Turtle, both of which are listed as endangered species, use the beach above the MHWL along Long Beach Drive, including the beach on Fondriest's property above the MHWL, for nesting. The FFWCC has determined, through its Florida Sea Turtle Nesting Beach Monitoring Program, that the shore along Long Beach Drive has a relatively low nesting density—i.e., within the lower 25% of nesting density values—for both of these sea turtle species. The evidence establishes that the Hawksbill Sea Turtle, Kemp's Ridley Sea Turtle, and Leatherback Sea Turtle do not use the beach along the Long Beach Drive shoreline for nesting. No competent, credible evidence was presented showing that significant sea turtle food sources are present in the footprint, or immediate vicinity, of the Dock. The competent, credible evidence does not show that the Dock will adversely affect the habitat value of the beach on Fondriest's property for sea turtle nesting, or that it will otherwise adversely affect nesting sea turtles and hatchlings. As previously discussed, an enclosure will be constructed under the access ramp to prevent nesting sea turtles and hatchlings from becoming trapped under the Dock. The competent, credible evidence establishes that the Dock will not adversely affect other protected species, including the Lower Keys Marsh Rabbit, the Keys Rice Rat, or the Mole Skink—none of which inhabit or use the marine/beach habitat present along the shore at Long Beach Drive. To this point, no evidence was presented showing that these species are, or ever have been, present on the beach at Long Beach Drive. Thus, no evidence was presented showing that the Dock adversely affect these species. The Dock will be Located in a Resource Protection Area 3 Areas within aquatic preserves are classified as Resource Protection Area ("RPA") 1, 2, or 3, for purposes of imposing restrictions and conditions on the use of sovereignty submerged lands, to protect discrete areas having high quality and transitioning habitat. The RPA 1 classification applies to areas within an aquatic preserve that have resources of the highest quality and condition. Areas classified as RPA 1 are characterized by the presence of corals, marine grassbeds, mangrove swamps, salt marshes, oyster bars, threatened or endangered species habitat, colonial water bird nesting sites, and archaeological and historical sites. The RPA 3 classification applies to areas within an aquatic preserve that are characterized by the absence of any significant natural resource attributes. The RPA 2 classification applies to areas within an aquatic preserve that are in transition, either having declining RPA 1 resources, or new pioneering resources within an RPA 3. Recent biological resource assessments conducted at the location of, and in the immediate vicinity of, the Dock show that no mangrove swamps, salt marshes, oyster bars, archaeological or historical resources, or colonial water bird nesting sites are present. As discussed above, although sea turtles nest on the beach along Long Beach Drive, this area does not constitute significant sea turtle nesting habitat, and there is no significant food source for adult or juvenile sea turtles in the vicinity of the Dock. Thus, the evidence shows that the Dock will not be located in an RPA 1. The biological resource assessments also showed that no transitioning resources are present at the location, or in the vicinity, of the Dock. The competent, credible evidence showed that current natural resource conditions at the site are the same as those that historically existed before Hurricane Irma struck the Long Beach Drive area in 2013. Thus, the evidence shows that the Dock will not be located in an RPA 2. Because there are no significant natural resource attributes or transitioning resources in the footprint and the immediate vicinity of the Dock, it is determined that the Dock will be located in an RPA 3.7 7 Some portions of the CBAP do contain seagrass beds, offshore coral patch reefs, and mangrove swamp communities, and provide habitat for protected species, including the Key Deer and colonial water birds, and, thus, merit an RPA 1 classification. By contrast, none of these habitats and conditions are present at the location, or in the vicinity, of the Dock. The definitions of RPA 1, 2, and 3 in rules 18-20.003(54), (55), and (56), respectively, refer to "areas within aquatic preserves" which contain specified resources types and quality. Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.004(54) through (56)(emphasis added). Additionally, rule 18-20.004(1)(a) provides that in determining whether to approve or deny a request to conduct an activity in an aquatic preserve, the Trustees will evaluate each request on a "case-by-case basis." See Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.004(1)(a)(emphasis added). These rules make clear that determining whether an activity will be located in an RPA 1, 2, or 3 necessarily entails a site-specific resource assessment to determine the type and quality of habitat, and the conditions present, at that specific site. As discussed above, the site-specific biological assessments conducted show that the Dock will be located in an RPA 3, and Petitioners did not present any site- specific evidence to rebut that classification. Cumulative Impacts Analysis In determining whether an activity proposed in an aquatic preserve may be approved, an analysis must be performed to determine the projected cumulative impacts of the activity. This analysis focuses on determining the impact of the proposed activity, combined with that of similar existing activities and similar activities currently under consideration for approval. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 18- 20.006. A cumulative impacts analysis performed by Fondriest's expert witness, Sandra Walters, showed that the Dock, in conjunction with similar existing docks and all other applications for docks that could be proposed for approval, will not result in adverse cumulative impacts to the aquatic resources in the CBAP. Walters's cumulative impacts analysis took into account both the acreage and linear footage of parcels within the CBAP for which a dock similar to the one at issue in this proceeding could be approved for construction. In performing a cumulative impacts analysis using linear feet of shoreline, Walters calculated a total of 19,357 feet, or 22.6 miles, of shoreline in the CBAP. Of this linear footage, approximately 7,500 linear feet of shoreline along Long Beach Drive and approximately 1,200 linear feet of shoreline along the ocean side of the Cook's Island portion of the CBAP are developable, for purposes of having the potential to be developed for a minimum-sized single-family residential dock similar to that proposed in this case. Walters's estimate is conservative, in that it included, as developable linear shoreline footage, parcels that likely could not be developed due to rate of growth, conservation easement, or other land use or environmental restrictions. Walters's linear footage analysis showed that approximately 5.7% of the entire CBAP shoreline possibly could be developed for construction of a perpendicular dock. Assuming that each of these docks is four feet wide—which is a valid assumption, using the four-foot maximum access dock width permitted under the aquatic preserves rules—a total of .23% of the shoreline would be impacted if a perpendicular dock was developed on each eligible parcel. Walters opined, credibly and persuasively, that this impact to the resources in the CBAP would be de minimis. In performing a cumulative impacts analysis on an acreage basis, Walters calculated that if a minimum-size single-family residential dock were developed on each of the 68 total developable lots within the CBAP, a total area of approximately 34,000 square feet, or approximately .013% of the acreage in the CBAP, would experience impacts similar to those created by the Dock. Walter credibly and persuasively opined that this impact to the resources in the CBAP would be de minimis. Walters used a conservative approach—i.e., projecting a realistic "worst case" scenario—in performing the cumulative impacts analysis. Specifically, she considered all parcels for which a minimum-size single-family residential dock reasonably could be proposed for approval in the future, rather than limiting her consideration of cumulative impacts to only those currently proposed for approval by the listed agencies. Additionally, she included impacts of similar dock projects for parcels that likely would not qualify for dock approval due to development restrictions. Thus, the cumulative impacts that Walters projected in her analysis are likely greater than the actual cumulative impacts of similar dock projects that reasonably can be anticipated to be developed in the area in the future. Petitioners presented the testimony of Michael Czerwinski regarding the cumulative impacts analysis required under the aquatic preserves rule for approval of an activity in an aquatic preserve. Czerwinski's analysis projected the potential cumulative impacts if every parcel along Long Beach Drive were developed with a minimum-size single-family residential dock, including the parcels on which development restrictions have been imposed such that they would not be eligible to be developed for a single-family residential dock. Based on this assumption, Czerwinski opined that such "buildout" along Long Beach Drive would result in a "cascading" or "nibbling" effect on the resources in the CBAP, and that there would be adverse impacts on sea turtle nesting habitat. Additionally, based on the unsupported assumption of maximum "buildout" of a single-family residential dock on every parcel along Long Beach Drive, Czerwinski projected that the resources within the entire CBAP would be adversely affected as a result of the cumulative impacts from approval of the Dock. Czerwinski's cumulative impacts analysis did not take into account the numerous parcels in the CBAP, including several on Long Beach Drive, that are unable to be developed for single-family residential docks due to conservation easements and local land development restrictions. As such, his analysis considered impacts which could not reasonably be expected to result in the Long Beach Drive area from approval of the Dock. Additionally, based on the unreasonable assumption of maximum dock buildout on every parcel on Long Beach Drive, Czerwinski projected adverse impacts to the entire CBAP as a result of the Dock. This analysis again failed to take into account that numerous parcels within the boundaries of the CBAP that are not located in the Long Beach Drive area also are under development restrictions that will prevent the construction of docks on those parcels. Czerwinski's analysis did not comply with the provisions of rule 18-20.005(1) and (3), which expressly limit the consideration of impacts to only those likely to affect the preserve and which reasonably could be expected to result from the proposed activity. For these reasons, Czerwinski's testimony regarding cumulative impacts as a result of the Dock was not credible or persuasive. As discussed above, Monroe County has issued a permit authorizing the construction of the Dock. This evidences that the Dock is permissible under the Monroe County local comprehensive plan. Additionally, as discussed in detail below, the Dock is an allowable use that is consistent with the CBAP Management Plan ("Management Plan"). As previously discussed, the competent, credible evidence establishes that there are no significant biological resources in the footprint, or in the immediate vicinity, of the Dock. Thus, the Dock will not cause the loss of beneficial biologic functions that would adversely impact the quality or utility of the CBAP. As previously discussed, the competent, credible evidence establishes that the Dock will not cause the loss of the beneficial hydrologic functions, either in the immediate vicinity of the Dock, or in the CBAP. As discussed above, the Dock will be a minimum-size single-family residential dock that will not adversely affect the quantity or flow of water. Accordingly, it is determined that the Dock will not have adverse cumulative impacts on the CBAP. Consistency with the CBAP Management Plan The Management Plan expressly identifies single-family private residential docks as an allowable use within CBAP, and specifies the standards that such docks must meet. Specifically, a dock may not extent waterward of the MHWL more than 500 feet or 20% of the width of the waterbody; must be designed to ensure maximum light penetration; the terminal platform may not be more than 160 square feet in area; and the access dock may not be wider than four feet. As discussed above, the Dock will comply with these standards. The Management Plan also delineates "management areas" within the CBAP, and describes resources and allowable uses within the different management areas. The Management Plan states that final determinations of allowable uses within a particular management plan are made by agency staff on a case-by-case basis. The sovereignty submerged lands along Long Beach Drive, out to a distance of 500 feet from shore, are designated as "Management Area SF/1." The sovereignty submerged lands bordering Fondriest's property are included within the Management Area SF/1. The resources included in Management Area SF/1 generally include grass beds, fringing mangroves, coral banks, coral heads, and hardbottom communities. However, as discussed above, the site-specific biological resource assessment surveys conducted on the sovereignty submerged lands bordering Fondriest's property showed that none of these resources are present at, or in the vicinity of, the Dock site. Furthermore, private single-family residential docks are expressly identified as an allowable use in the Management Area SF/1. Long Beach Drive is not a pristine, undeveloped shoreline. There are residences and some commercial uses along Long Beach Drive, with accessory uses such as seawalls, revetments, and private docks. The Dock is consistent with these existing uses and with the aesthetics of the shoreline on Long Beach Drive. Based on the foregoing, it is determined that the Dock is consistent with the CBAP Management Plan.8 Petitioners' Interests and Timeliness of Crilly's Petition The Trust's Interests The Trust owns a parcel of real property located at 1975 Long Beach Drive, immediately adjacent to, and west of, Fondriest's property. Barry Roberts and Gloria Meredith are the trustees of the Trust. 8 Rule 18-20.004(7) states, in pertinent part: "[t]he aquatic preserve management plans shall be used by [DEP] to preserve and restore the distinctive characteristics identified by the inventories for each aquatic preserve. The management plans for each aquatic preserve are available for guidance purposes only." Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.004(7)(emphasis added). Thus, to the extent a rule provision in chapter 18-20 conflicts with an aquatic preserve management plan, the rule controls. See Decarion v. Martinez, 537 So.2d 1083, 1084 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)(an agency must follow its own rules). Neither Roberts nor Meredith, in their individual capacity, is a petitioner in these proceedings. Meredith testified that she and Roberts purchased the property at 1975 Long Beach Drive because of its location and the natural resources in the area, including the tide pool habitat in the rock depressions along the shore, and the animals that forage along, and inhabit, the shore. Meredith testified that she and Roberts both have a keen personal interest in, and use and enjoy, the natural resources along the shore at Long Beach Drive. They engage in bird watching; nature photography; kayaking; and observing nature, including Key Deer, birds, nesting sea turtles, and fish and invertebrates inhabiting tide pools in the rock depressions along the shore. After Meredith and Roberts purchased the property, they placed it in the Trust in order to preserve it, and its value as a residential property, for their children and grandchildren to enjoy in the future. Meredith and Roberts, as trustees of the Trust, have significant concerns about the aesthetic impact the Dock will have on the Trust property, particularly its impact on the view of the beach and the sunrise over the water. Meredith expressed her personal concern regarding the Dock's impacts on the biological resources at, and in the vicinity of, the Dock, and she also expressed concern that the Dock would interfere with her ability to safely walk along the shoreline. She testified that she was concerned that approval of the Dock would constitute a precedent, resulting in the construction of more docks and piers which would adversely affect the natural resources and the beauty of the beach. Meredith conceded that the Dock will be located within Fondriest's riparian area, will be set back more than 25 feet from the common riparian line, and will not cross the common riparian line into the Trust's riparian area. DeMaria's and Appel's Interests DeMaria is an original Petitioner in Case No. 20-2474, which is part of these consolidated proceedings, and Appel has moved to intervene and become a party to that case. DeMaria and Appel own the Deer Run eco-lodge bed and breakfast ("Deer Run") located at 1997 Long Beach Drive, immediately west of the property owned by the Trust. The Deer Run property is not located immediately adjacent to Fondriest's property. Appel owns two other parcels on Long Beach Drive, neither of which is located immediately adjacent to Fondriest's property. DeMaria testified that she and Appel purchased the Deer Run property because they were attracted to the unspoiled natural environment along Long Beach Drive. Deer Run attracts guests from around the world, who are drawn to the natural environment. These guests engage in nature photography and in-water recreational activities, such as kayaking, paddle boarding, and windsurfing; and they use and enjoy the natural resources and aesthetics of the area. DeMaria and Appel both testified that the presence of a long dock in close proximity to Deer Run would interfere with the view of the water and sunrise from Deer Run, and would significantly detract from the natural beauty and aesthetics of the environment at, and in the immediate vicinity of, Deer Run. Both testified that the presence of the Dock would render Deer Run a less attractive destination for guests. DeMaria testified that the presence of the Dock would interfere with her personal view of the water and the sunrise over the water; her ability to walk along shoreline below the MHWL; and her personal use and enjoyment of the natural beauty and aesthetics of the area. DeMaria also volunteers as a sea turtle nest monitor under the authority of Crilly's marine turtle permit. She expressed concerns similar to those expressed by Crilly—specifically, that the existence of the Dock would interfere with her ability to safely traverse the shoreline below the MHWL on Long Beach Drive to perform her sea turtle monitoring activities. Appel echoed DeMaria's concerns regarding the alleged injury to Deer Run's ecotourism business as a result of the Dock. He also testified that the presence of the Dock on Fondriest's property would injure his personal use and enjoyment of the natural beauty and aesthetics of the Long Beach Drive area. Appel also serves as a volunteer sea turtle monitor, and, in connection with that activity, traverses the shoreline along Long Beach Drive. He testified that the presence of the Dock would interfere with his ability to safely traverse the shoreline below the MHWL to conduct sea turtle monitoring activities. Appel also testified regarding the potential for the Dock to be damaged in storms, resulting in flying and floating debris that may damage his properties and the natural resources in the area. Crilly's Interests and Timeliness of Petition Crilly is the holder of a marine turtle permit issued by FFWCC, authorizing her to monitor sea turtle nesting along the beach at Long Beach Drive. Other volunteer sea turtle nest monitors work with Crilly under the authority of her permit. Crilly and her team of sea turtle monitors walk the beach daily during sea turtle nesting season. Crilly's responsibilities under the marine turtle permit include monitoring sea turtle nesting and false crawls; collecting data on the number of hatchlings that emerge from each sea turtle nest; and collecting data on sea turtle nesting mortality. The data are provided to the FFWCC for use in sea turtle research. Crilly testified that the Dock will impede her ability and that of her team to safely traverse along the shore below the MHWL to perform the sea turtle monitoring duties authorized under her permit. Specifically, Crilly testified that because the property above the MHWL is private, she must walk along the shoreline below the MHWL. The rock is slippery with numerous depressions, and traversing under the Dock would be treacherous. She testified that "I personally would not crawl under a dock and, therefore, I would not ask any of my volunteers on my team to crawl under a dock." According to Crilly, if she and her sea turtle nest monitoring team are unable to traverse the shoreline where the Dock will be located, they will be required to retrace their steps to the roadway on Long Beach Drive, walk down the road to a public access point, walk down to the beach, and walk back to the Dock, significantly increasing the time and effort to conduct their sea turtle monitoring activities. Crilly testified that she "learned of" DEP's approval of the Dock on December 30, 2019. No evidence was presented regarding whether, or how, Crilly received notice of the 2019 Approval sufficient to provide a clear point of entry for purposes of commencing the time for her to challenge that proposed agency action. Crilly filed her Petition challenging the 2019 Approval on February 27, 2020. When DEP issued the Dock Approval on September 30, 2020, superseding the 2019 Approval, Crilly already had filed her Petition at DEP, and the Petition had been referred to DOAH. IX. Findings of Ultimate Fact Regarding Compliance with Applicable Rules The term "dock" is defined in chapters 18-20 and 18-21. Chapter 18-20, applicable to aquatic preserves, defines a dock as "a fixed or floating structure, including moorings, used for the purpose of berthing buoyant vessels either temporarily or indefinitely." Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.003(19). Chapter 18-21, which generally governs approvals to use sovereignty submerged lands, defines a dock as "a fixed or floating structure, including access walkways, terminal platforms, catwalks, mooring pilings, lifts, davits and other associated water-dependent structures, used for mooring and accessing vessels." Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-21.003(22). The Dock meets the definition of "dock" in both rules.9 As discussed above, the Dock Approval limits mooring to non-motorized vessels, and Fondriest, a riparian owner, will use the Dock to access the water for the water-dependent activities of kayaking, paddle-boarding, and other water-dependent activities such as swimming, snorkeling, and fishing, consistent with rule 18-20.004(1)(e)5. 9 The Dock is not a "pier," which is defined as "a structure in, or, or over sovereignty lands which is used by the public primarily for fishing or swimming." Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.003(41)(emphasis added). As discussed above, the Dock is a private single-family residential dock that will be constructed on sovereignty submerged lands waterward of Fondriest's property. It will not be open to, or used by, the public for fishing or swimming. As previously discussed, the Dock meets the 500-square-foot threshold for purposes of exemption from regulatory permitting, pursuant to section 403.813(1)(b). The evidence also establishes that the Dock is a "minimum-size" dock, as defined in rule 18-21.002(39). Specifically, the Dock's area has been reduced to the smallest size possible that will provide Fondriest reasonable access to the water for kayak launching. The Dock's reduced size also will minimize impacts to resources at, and in the vicinity of, the Dock. Thus, the Dock has been designed to minimize any adverse impacts to fish and wildlife and threatened and endangered species habitat, as required by rules 18-21.004(2)(b) and (i), and 18-21.004(7)(d). Compliance with Aquatic Preserve Management Policies, Standards, and Criteria Rule 18-20.004 establishes the policies, standards, and requirements for approval of uses of sovereignty submerged lands in aquatic preserves. As discussed above, the Dock extends a total of 154 feet waterward from the MHWL. This is substantially less than the allowable 500-foot maximum extent from the MHWL, and also is substantially less than 20% of the width of the Straits of Florida, which spans from the Florida Keys to Cuba. Thus, the Dock is consistent with rule 18-20.004(5)(a)1. The competent, credible evidence establishes that the Dock will not be located in an area of significant biological, scientific, historic, or aesthetic value. However, even if such resources were present, the Dock would not cause adverse impacts due to its specific design features and the use of best management practices during construction. As discussed above, the Dock will minimize shading by reduction of the width of the access dock from four feet to three feet; by elevation of both the access dock and the terminal platform five feet above mean high water; and by the use of light-penetrable grating for the terminal platform. The Dock is designed to ensure that vessel use will not cause harm to site- specific resources, as required by rule 18-20.004(5)(a)3. The types of vessels that may use the Dock are limited to non-motorized vessels, and the letter of consent is conditioned to allow vessel launching only when there is a minimum depth of 0.5 feet of water at the terminal platform. As previously discussed, the evidence establishes that the Dock will be located in an RPA 3. Nonetheless, the Dock will comply with design standards applicable to docks in an RPA 1 or RPA 2. Specifically, the Dock will be constructed of wooden planking less than eight inches wide, spaced half an inch apart after shrinkage; will be elevated five feet above the MHWL; and will have a terminal platform consisting of light-penetrable grating to minimize shading. As previously discussed, the terminal platform will have a total area of 72 square feet—well below the 160-square foot maximum size allowed in aquatic preserves under rule 18-20.004(5)(b)6. The Dock extends out from the shoreline to a depth of approximately -0.5 ft at mean low water. Thus, Dock meets the requirement that it may not extend out from the shoreline further than to a maximum water depth of -4 feet at mean low water. Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.004(5)(b)3. Consistency with Coupon Bight Aquatic Preserve Management Plan Rule 18-20.004(7), which addresses management plans for aquatic preserves, states, in pertinent part: "[t]he aquatic preserve management plans shall be used by the Department to preserve and restore the distinctive characteristics identified by the inventories for each aquatic preserve." Rule 18-20.004(3)(a) states, in pertinent part: "all proposed activities in aquatic preserves having management plans adopted by the Board must demonstrate that such activities are consistent with the management plan." For the reasons discussed in detail above, it is determined that the Dock is consistent with the Management Plan, and, thus, complies with rule 18-20.004(3)(a). Public Interest Demonstration Chapters 18-20 and 18-21 both require an analysis to determine whether an activity proposed to be conducted on sovereignty submerged lands meets an applicable public interest test. Rule 18-20.004(1)(b), the aquatic preserve rule's public interest test, states, in pertinent part: "[t]here shall be no further sale, lease or transfer of sovereignty lands except when such sale, lease or transfer is in the public interest (see subsection 18- 20.004(2), F.A.C., Public Interest Assessment Criteria)." However, with respect to private residential single-family docks, rule 18-20.004(4)(c) states, in pertinent part: "[f]or the purpose of this rule, a private, residential single-family docking facility which meets all the requirements of subsection 18-20.004(5), F.A.C., shall be deemed to meet the public interest requirements of paragraph 18-20.004(1)(b), F.A.C." Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.004(1)(b)(emphasis added). As discussed herein, the Dock meets all applicable requirements in rule 18- 20.004(5). Accordingly, the Dock meets the aquatic preserves public interest test in chapter 18-20. The Dock also meets the public interest test codified in chapter 18-21. Rule 18-21.003(53) defines "public interest" as "demonstrable environmental, social and economic benefits which would accrue to the public at large as a result of the proposed action, and which would clearly exceed all demonstrable environmental, social, and economic costs of the proposed action." Rule 18-21.004(1) states: "[f]or approval, all activities on sovereignty lands must be not contrary to the public interest, except for sales which must be in the public interest." Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-21.004(1)(emphasis added). In this case, the Dock provides recreational water access to the riparian owner, and, as discussed extensively, will not have any adverse impacts on sovereignty lands, aquatic resources, or listed species. Thus, it is determined that the Dock is not contrary to the public interest, as defined in chapter 18-21. Petitioners assert that the Dock is inconsistent with article X, section 11 of the Florida Constitution, which states: Sovereignty lands. – The title to lands under navigable waters, within the boundaries of the states, which have not been alienated, including beaches below mean high water lines, is held by the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, in trust for all the people. Sale of such lands may be authorized by law, but only when in the public interest. Private use of portions of such lands may be authorized by law, but only when not contrary to the public interest. Fla. Const., art. X, §11 (emphasis added). Chapters 253 and 258, and the implementing rules codified in chapters 18-20 and 18-21, authorize the use of sovereignty submerged lands for private residential single-family docks when not contrary to the public interest. As discussed above, the Dock is not contrary to the public interest under chapters 18-20 and 18-21. Thus, the use of sovereignty submerged lands for the Dock is consistent with article X, section 11 of the Florida Constitution. Petitioners raised, as a public interest concern, their ability to walk below the MHWL along the shoreline on Long Beach Drive. The evidence shows that the Dock will, within its narrow footprint, present a minor hindrance to Petitioners' ability to walk unimpeded along the shoreline below the MHWL. However, the competent, persuasive evidence established that Petitioners will be able to duck under the Dock, or walk around the end of the terminal platform, where the water is relatively shallow. Importantly, Petitioners did not cite any statutory or rule provisions affording completely unencumbered access, by the general public, to all sovereignty submerged lands.10 Cumulative Impacts Rule 18-20.006 requires that an activity proposed in an aquatic preserve be evaluated for its cumulative impact on the aquatic preserve’s natural system. As extensively discussed above, Fondriest's expert, Walters, conducted a comprehensive cumulative impacts analysis that addressed all pertinent considerations in rule 18-20.006, and she concluded that the Dock will not have any 10 A key purpose of chapters 18-20 and 18-21 is to establish standards for approval of private uses of sovereignty submerged lands which may, to a certain extent, hinder the general public's access to those sovereignty lands. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-21.004 ("[t]he following management policies, standards, and criteria shall be used in determining whether to approve, approve with conditions or modifications, or deny all requests for activities on sovereignty submerged lands"); and Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.004 ([t]he following management policies, standards, and criteria are supplemental to chapter 18-21 . . . and shall be uses in determining whether to approve, approve with conditions or modifications, or deny all requests for activities on sovereignty submerged lands in aquatic preserves.") adverse cumulative impacts on the CBAP as a whole, or on any significant biologic, hydrologic, or other resources within the CBAP. As discussed above, Walters's analysis was comprehensive; her testimony was credible and persuasive; and her conclusion that the Dock will not result in adverse cumulative impacts to the CBAP, or to any resources within the CBAP, was rule- based, and considered all pertinent factual information. Based on the foregoing, it is determined that the Dock will not cause adverse cumulative impacts to the CBAP, or to any resources within the CBAP, as required by rule 18-20.006. Minimization of Adverse Impacts to Sovereignty Submerged Lands and Resources Rule 18-21.004(2)(b) states, in pertinent part, that activities that would result in significant adverse impacts to sovereignty lands and associated resources may not be approved. As discussed above, the evidence establishes that there are no significant natural resources present at the location, or in the vicinity, of the Dock. Thus, the Dock will not have adverse impacts on such resources or on sovereignty submerged lands. Nonetheless, numerous protective measures have been imposed as conditions to the letter of consent, to minimize the potential for adverse water quality impacts and to protect aquatic resources. Based on the foregoing, it is determined that the Dock will meet the resource impact minimization requirements in rules 18-20.004(5)(a)1. and 18-21.004(2). Measures to Avoid and Minimize Adverse Impacts to Listed Species and Habitat 18-21.004(7)(e) requires that "construction, use, or operation of the structure or activity shall not adversely affect any species which is endangered, threatened[,] or of special concern, as listed in rules 68A-27.003, 68A-27.004[,] and 68A-27.005." DEP consulted with FFWCC on the Dock application, to determine its potential impacts to species listed as endangered, threatened, or of special concern. As discussed above, FFWCC provided recommendations to minimize the Dock's potential impacts to several listed species, and those recommendations have been imposed as conditions to the letter of consent. As discussed above, the Dock will implement numerous measures to ensure that construction and use will not adversely affect manatees, sea turtle species, the Smalltooth Sawfish, and the Eastern Indigo Snake. As discussed above, Key Deer forage on and traverse the shore along Long Beach Drive. The competent, credible evidence establishes that the Dock will not impose any substantial barrier to the Key Deer's use of the shore on Fondriest's property, and will not otherwise adversely affect the Key Deer. Also, as discussed above, the competent, credible evidence establishes that due to the lack of suitable habitat, other protected species, such as the Lower Keys Marsh Rabbit, Keys Rice Rat, and Florida Keys Mole Skink are unlikely to inhabit, or otherwise be present at or near, the Dock site. Thus, it is determined that the Dock will not have any adverse impacts on these species. Based on the foregoing, it is determined that the Dock will not have adverse impacts to listed species and their habitat. Riparian Rights Chapters 18-20 and 18-21 require that the riparian rights of owners of upland riparian property adjacent to an activity seeking approval to use sovereignty submerged lands be protected. Rule 18-20.004(4) states, in pertinent part: "[n]one of the provisions of this rule shall be implemented in a manner that would unreasonably infringe upon the traditional, common law and statutory riparian rights of upland property owners adjacent to sovereignty lands." Rule 18-21.004(3) states, in pertinent part: None of the provisions of this rule shall be implemented in a manner that would unreasonably infringe upon the traditional, common law riparian rights, as defined in section 253.141, F.S., of upland riparian property owners adjacent to sovereignty lands. Satisfactory evidence of sufficient upland interest is required for activities on sovereignty submerged lands riparian to the uplands. All structures and other activities must be designed and conducted in a manner that will not unreasonably restrict or infringe upon the riparian rights of adjacent upland riparian owners. [A]ll structures, including mooring pilings, breakwaters, jetties and groins, and activities must be set back a minimum of 25 feet inside the applicant's riparian line. Exceptions to the setbacks are private residential single- family docks associated with a parcel that has a shoreline frontage of less than 65 feet, where portions of such structures are located between riparian less than 65 feet apart. Pursuant to rule 18-21.003(63), "satisfactory upland interest" means owning the riparian uplands or having some other possessory or use interest, as specified in the rule. Section 253.141(1) defines riparian rights as follows: Riparian rights are those incident to land bordering upon navigable waters. They are rights of ingress, egress, boating, bathing, and fishing and such others as may be or have been defined by law. Such rights are not of a proprietary nature. They are rights inuring to the owner of the riparian land but are not owned by him or her. They are appurtenant to and are inseparable from the riparian land. The land to which the owner holds title must extend to the ordinary high watermark of the navigable water in order that riparian rights may attach. Conveyance of title to or lease of the riparian land entitles the grantee to the riparian rights running therewith whether or not mentioned in the deed or lease of the upland. Fondriest owns the upland property riparian to the sovereignty submerged lands on which the Dock is proposed to be located, and Petitioners stipulated that she has a satisfactory upland interest for purposes of rule 18-21.004(3). The Trust owns upland property bordering the Straits of Florida; thus, riparian rights inure to the Trust property, pursuant to section 253.141. As previously discussed, the evidence establishes that the Dock will be set back over 40 feet from the common riparian line between Fondriest's property and the Trust's property. To this point, Meredith acknowledged that the Dock would be set back more than 25 feet from the common riparian line, and will not intrude into the Trust's riparian area. No evidence was presented showing that the Dock would unreasonably interfere with the Trust's traditional riparian rights of navigation, boating, swimming, or fishing within its riparian area. Meredith testified that the Dock would obstruct the view of the waterbody, the shore, and the sunrise over the water, from the Trust property. She appeared to assert these interests on behalf of the Trust and herself. However, as more fully discussed below, under Florida law, the riparian right to an "unobstructed" view does not entail a view completely free of any infringement or restriction by structures or activities appurtenant to neighboring riparian properties. Rather, the right to an "unobstructed" view means that a riparian owner is entitled to a direct, unobstructed view of the channel of the waterbody and a direct means of ingress and egress to the channel. No evidence was presented that the Dock—which will be constructed perpendicular to the shoreline within Fondriest's riparian area—would obstruct the Trust's or Meredith's view of the channel of the Straits of Florida. Additionally, as previously discussed, the Trust presented no evidence to show that the presence of the Dock in Fondriest's riparian area would interfere with the Trust's direct ingress and egress to and from the channel of the Straits of Florida. Accordingly, it is determined that the Dock will not unreasonably infringe on the Trust's riparian rights. Similarly, it is determined that the Dock will not unreasonably infringe on the riparian rights incident to the Deer Run property, or to Appel's properties on Long Beach Drive. To this point, Demaria and Appel did not present any evidence showing that the Dock will obstruct their view of the channel of the Straits of Florida, either from the Deer Run property, or from Appel's properties. DeMaria and Appel also failed to present evidence showing that the Dock would interfere with direct ingress and egress to and from the channel of the Straits of Florida, either from the Deer Run property or from Appel's properties. Accordingly, it is determined that, consistent with section 253.141 and rule 18-21.004(3), the Dock will not unreasonably infringe on the riparian rights of the Trust or of DeMaria and Appel. General Requirements for Authorization to Use Sovereignty Submerged Lands As discussed above, the Dock will be constructed and used in a manner that will avoid and minimize adverse impacts to sovereignty submerged lands and resources, consistent with rule 18-21.004(7)(d). The competent, credible evidence also demonstrates that the construction and use of the Dock will not adversely affect listed species, consistent with rule 18-21.004(7)(e). As discussed above, the Dock will not unreasonably interfere with the riparian rights of the Petitioners, consistent with rule 18-21.004(7)(f). Additionally, the Dock will not constitute a navigational hazard, consistent with rule 18-21.004(7)(g). Due to the shallow water in the footprint and in the vicinity of the Dock, navigation in the area is typically by kayak or canoe. The competent, credible evidence shows that the Dock will not impede navigation of these types of vessels. Because the sandy beach areas on Long Beach Drive are in private ownership, the Dock will not interfere with the public easement for traditional uses of sandy beaches, as provided in section 161.141, Florida Statutes; thus, the Dock is consistent with rule 18-21.004(7)(h). Also, as discussed above, the Dock will be constructed, operated, and maintained solely for the water-dependent uses of launching non-motorized vessels and swimming, consistent with rule 18-21.004(7)(j).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection issue a Final Order granting Respondent Julia Fondriest's application for a Letter of Consent to Use Sovereignty Submerged Lands and verifying that the Dock is exempt from the requirement to obtain a regulatory permit, pursuant to section 403.813(1)(b). DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of February, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of February, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Julia Fondriest Doug Scheele Lifetime Dock & Lumber, Inc. 24536 Overseas Highway Summerland Key, Florida 33042 Luna E. Phillips, Esquire Gunster, Yoakley & Stewart, P.A. Suite 1400 450 East Las Olas Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Deborah K. Madden, Esquire Gunster, Yoakley & Stewart, P.A. Suite 1400 450 East Las Olas Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Paul Joseph Polito, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection Mail Stop 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Ralf Gunars Brookes, Esquire Ralf Brookes Attorney Suite 107 1217 East Cape Coral Parkway Cape Coral, Florida 33904 Noah Valenstein, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue Whether Wayne Zimmet's proposed single-family boat dock and lift project is exempt from the need to obtain an Environmental Resource Permit (ERP) from the Department of Environmental Protection (Department) under Florida Administrative Code Rule 40E-4.051(3)(c).1
Findings Of Fact Both Wayne Zimmet and Scott Rosenblum own property in Tequesta, Florida, in a community known as North Passage, which has a man-made navigation and drainage easement canal that terminates at its eastern end at Mr. Rosenblum's property, which is Lot 74, at 8738 Riverfront Terrace. Mr. Zimmet's property, which is Lot 75, at 8750 Riverfront Terrace, is south of the eastern terminus of the canal. The Rosenblum and Zimmet properties are adjacent and share a common boundary. There is an existing dock extending from Mr. Rosenblum's property into the canal. The existing dock is perpendicular to, and extends west from the middle of, the shore of the eastern terminus of the canal. There is a wooden walkway leading from the residence on Mr. Rosenblum's property to the existing dock. However, there also has been a wooden walkway leading from Mr. Zimmet's property to the existing dock. As indicated in the Preliminary Statement, there is a dispute between Mr. Zimmet and Mr. Rosenblum as to who is entitled to access and use the existing dock--and in particular the south side of the existing dock. That dispute will be resolved in state circuit court.2 For purposes of this proceeding, it will be assumed that Mr. Rosenblum has the right to use the existing dock. On or about May 25, 2006, Mr. Zimmet filed an application requesting an ERP exemption to install an eight-foot by twenty-foot (160-square feet) marginal dock with a two-pile elevator lift to designed to accommodate his boat, which is approximately 24.5 feet long (22 feet at the waterline) and eight feet wide. According to documentation submitted with the application, the proposed dock would be centered along the waterfront of his property and extend approximately four feet into the canal. The proposed boat lift would be skewed toward the western end of the proposed marginal dock with the intent being to dock his boat with the bow facing the west so that proposed dock could be used to enter and load the boat from the stern. This positioning of the proposed lift and boat at the proposed dock would skew a boat on the lift at the proposed dock about three feet to the west, away from the existing dock. Based on the evidence, it is found that Mr. Zimmet did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his proposed boat dock and lift, even if skewed to the west as indicated in the application drawings, would not "impede navigation" to and from the south side of the existing dock. (Otherwise, Mr. Zimmet's proposed dock and lift would not "impede navigation" in the canal.) This impediment to navigation to and from the south side of the existing dock is not a mere inconvenience. Although Mr. Rosenblum now only owns and uses a raft at the existing dock, he testified that he plans on purchasing and using a boat. Boats in the range of approximately 24.5 feet in length with a beam of 8 to 8.5 feet are common in the North Passage canal. A boat of that size docked at the south side of the existing dock would barely fit alongside Mr. Zimmet's boat, whether docked or on the lift, and there would not be a reasonable amount of clearance for navigating a boat of that size commonly to or from the south side of the existing dock if Mr. Zimmet's boat were docked at the proposed dock or on the proposed lift. (Likewise, if a boat of that size were docked on the south side of the existing dock, there would not be a reasonable amount of clearance for Mr. Zimmet to use his proposed dock and lift.) There was no evidence of any impediment to navigation to and from the north side of the existing dock.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order concluding that, absent a circuit court determination that Mr. Rosenblum does not have the right to access and use the south side of the existing dock, Mr. Zimmet's proposed dock and lift project is not exempt from the need to obtain an ERP. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of October, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of October, 2007.
The Issue The issues to be determined are whether Respondent Roy Voss is entitled to an exemption from the requirement to obtain an Environmental Resource Permit (“ERP”) and entitled to “consent by rule” to use sovereignty submerged lands to install five mooring pilings next to his existing dock in Stuart, Florida.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner Pirtle is the owner of real property located at 4622 Southeast Boatyard Drive, Stuart, Florida. The property includes a dock that has been operating as a commercial marina for over 20 years. Respondent Voss is the recipient of the authorizations which are challenged by Petitioner. Voss owns the real property located at 4632 Southeast Boatyard Drive, Stuart, Florida, which is located immediately south of Petitioner’s property. Voss has a private dock. The Pirtle and Voss properties are riparian lots on Manatee Pocket, which connects to the St. Lucie River. Both lots have 50 feet of waterfront. The Department is the state agency with the power and duty to regulate construction activities in waters of the state pursuant to chapter 373, Florida Statutes. The Department also serves as staff to the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (“Board of Trustees”) to review and act on certain construction activities on state sovereignty submerged lands under chapter 253. The Pirtle and Voss Docks The Pirtle dock is 101 feet long and is T-shaped. The Pirtle marina operates under a 1991 sovereignty submerged land lease issued by the Board of Trustees. The lease authorizes up to ten boat slips within the leased area. Pirtle has five boat slips on the south side of his dock, which are configured so that boats are moored perpendicular to the dock, usually with their bows pointed toward the Voss dock. The Voss dock is 120 feet long and has an L-shaped waterward end. The “L” extends to the south, away from the Pirtle dock. The Voss dock was built sometime after the Pirtle dock. Voss has moored several boats at his dock, including a 26-foot Grady White with an 8.5-foot beam, a 38-foot boat with a 15-foot beam, and a 42-foot boat a 15-foot beam. The 38-foot and 42-foot boats have each been moored along the north side of the Voss dock (nearest the Pirtle dock) in the past. The parties did not dispute the location of an imaginary “riparian line” running parallel to and generally equidistant between the Pirtle and Voss docks. Before Voss installed the five pilings which are the subject of this case, boats maneuvering into or out of the slips that are on the south side of the Pirtle dock (“the south slips”) often crossed over the riparian line. The Mooring Pilings On August 29, 2012, Voss applied for the authorizations to install five mooring pilings spaced 20 feet apart on the north side of and parallel to his dock. Voss said he intended to use the pilings to moor a new 38-foot boat with a 15-foot beam. Voss could use three pilings to moor a 38-foot boat. The mooring pilings are also farther from Voss's dock than needed to moor a boat with a 15-foot beam. Voss originally proposed to install the pilings on the riparian line. The Department reviewed the proposal and asked Voss to set the pilings back about three feet farther away from the Pirtle dock. The Department issued the authorizations to Voss on October 25, 2012, and he installed the five mooring pilings where the Department directed him to, about three feet inside the riparian line and 20 feet from his dock. The closest distance between the T-shaped end of the Pirtle dock and the nearest mooring piling is about 8.5 feet. Therefore, only boats with a beam (maximum width) less than 8.5 feet can pass this point when attempting to maneuver into or out of the south slips. Pirtle found out about the Voss pilings early in December 2012. He filed his petition for hearing with the Department on December 20, 2012. The timeliness of the petition was not disputed. The authorizations were issued by the Department without first conducting a site inspection to determine what effect the mooring pilings would have on the ability of boats to maneuver into and out of Pirtle’s south slips. After Pirtle filed his petition, four Department employees went to the site in a 21.5-foot boat with a beam of about 7.8 feet. The pilot of the boat, Jason Storrs, had difficulty maneuvering into and out of Pirtle’s south slips and had to be assisted by the other Department employees who stood in the boat and pushed off from the pilings. Without their assistance, the boat would have bumped into the pilings. An inexperienced boater would have greater difficulty attempting to enter or leave one of the south slips. It would be more difficult to maneuver a boat in or out of one of the south slips if Voss had a boat moored along the pilings. In windy and choppy water conditions, a person attempting to maneuver a boat into one of the south slips would risk damage to the boat and possible injury. The proximity of the mooring pilings to the slips on the south side of the Pirtle dock creates an unsafe condition. It is the practice of the Department to treat boating conditions that create a potential for damage to boats and injury to boaters as a “navigational hazard.” Voss's mooring pilings create a navigational hazard. The difficult and unsafe situation created by the mooring pilings would be obvious to boat owners considering whether to lease one of the south slips at the Pirtle marina. The south slips would be unattractive to potential customers of the marina. Pirtle’s ability to operate the south side of his marina is substantially impaired by Voss's pilings.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection deny the exemption and consent by rule. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of September, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of September, 2013.
The Issue The issues in this case involve the status of a private, single-family dock built by the late Edward Neal Imhoof and his widow, Juanette Imhoof, on the Indian River in New Smyrna Beach, Florida.
Findings Of Fact Juanette Imhoof owns and resides on a piece of residential property (Imhoof property) located at 1402 Riverside Drive, New Smyrna Beach, Florida. Mrs. Imhoof's ownership is evidenced by a warranty deed and a quitclaim deed. The warranty deed describes property bordered on the east side by a road named Riverside Drive. East of Riverside Drive is a strip of undeveloped land between Riverside Drive and the water line. Mrs. Imhoof claims this strip of undeveloped land as her riprarian uplands. Her quitclaim deed includes the property described in the warranty deed "together with any and all riparian rights appertaining to or belonging to the above described property." Petitioner, Harris J. Samuels, and his wife, own a piece of property adjacent to the south side of Mrs. Imhoof's claimed riparian uplands. Their lot narrows to approximately 35 feet wide at the river. They have a small dock which extends into the water from their riparian uplands. In the year 2000, Mrs. Imhoof's late husband, Edward Neal Imhoof, contacted DEP Central District Office about obtaining authorization to build a dock on the Imhoofs' riparian uplands. In April of 2000, Mrs. Lisa Prather (f/k/a Lisa Moll), at that time an Environmental Specialist with DEP, visited the Imhoof property in order to do a pre-application site inspection. Following the onsite inspection, Mrs. Prather received an exemption application from Mr. Imhoof on July 12, 2000, which included copies of the Imhoofs' warranty deed and quitclaim deed. The application also included a drawing of the proposed dock. According to the drawing, Mr. Imhoof intended to build his dock on the southern side of the claimed riparian upland. The access pier was depicted mostly parallel to and approximately ten feet from Petitioner's northern property line. Near the terminal platform, the access pier angled to the northeast, and the platform was centered on and perpendicular to the access pier. According to Florida Administrative Code Rule 18- 21.004, a dock must be set back "a minimum of 25 feet inside the applicant's riparian rights lines" unless it qualifies for a waiver. In order to qualify for a waiver, DEP must determine that locating the dock within 25 feet of the riparian rights lines will minimize or avoid impacts to natural resources. See Conclusion of Law 26, infra. However, Mrs. Prather testified that, at the time she received this application, it was not DEP's practice to consider the 25-foot setback requirement when granting exemptions. Subsequently, DEP's legal counsel advised her to consider such waivers when granting exemptions. Mrs. Prather relied on the quitclaim deed and the survey included in the application to determine that the Imhoof property had sufficient riparian upland interest to qualify for an exemption and BOT consent of use. In addition to these materials, Mrs. Prather relied on the Property Appraiser's records, which indicated that there are riparian rights attached to Lot 2, which was owned by Mr. and Mrs. Imhoof. In addition, almost every other similarly-situated property on Riverside Drive to the north of the Imhoofs' property has a dock built on the strip of land between Riverside Drive and the water line. Based on Mrs. Prather's review, DEP granted Mr. Imhoof's exemption application. On August 8, 2000, DEP issued Edward Neal Imhoof a Notice of Exemption for construction of a 628 square foot private, single-family dock on the Indian River in New Smyrna Beach. The Notice of Exemption informed Mr. Imhoof, among other things, that his proposed dock was "exempt from the need for an Environmental Resource Permit (ERP) under Rule 40C-4.051(11)(g), Florida Administrative Code." However, it also informed Mr. Imhoof that its regulatory exemption "determination shall expire after one year." In a separate authorization, it also informed him, that his proposed dock "qualifies for a consent to use sovereign, submerged lands" from the BOT. In relation to both authorizations, it also informed Mr. Imhoof,: "If you change the project from what you submitted, the authorization(s) granted may no longer be valid at the time of commencement of the project. Please contact us prior to beginning your project if you wish to make any changes." (Emphasis in original.) Construction on the dock in question did not commence within a year of the exemption determination. The evidence was confusing, but it appears that the Imhoofs may have sought a dock permit from the City of New Smyrna Beach during the summer of 2002, and that a question arose as to whether DEP would allow the Imhoofs to build their dock within ten feet from Petitioner's northern property line.5 On July 22, 2002, Mrs. Prather stated in an email to an individual named Seann Smith, who was not further identified by the evidence: "The Department is authorized to waive any setback waiver [sic] if it [sic] the proposed location will have less environmental impact. Therefore, Mr. Imhoof is authorized to construct his dock 10 feet from his property line." There was no other action from DEP waiving the setback requirement; nor was there any action to extend the duration of the regulatory exemption. Construction of the Imhoofs' dock did not begin until approximately April of 2003. On May 5, 2003, Mr. Samuels filed a complaint with DEP regarding the proximity of the Imhoof dock to his own. DEP also received a complaint from the City concerning the dock and trimming of mangroves. Also in May of 2003, Mrs. Prather received a telephone call from Chip Steele, an environmental consultant for the Imhoofs, who inquired as to setback requirements and requested a waiver. It appears that on May 23, 2003, Mr. Imhoof emailed a letter to Mrs. Prather at DEP requesting a waiver from the 25- foot setback requirement for the Imhoofs, who inquired as to a waiver from the setback requirement. It appears that he attached a copy of the email from Mrs. Prather to Seann Smith dated July 22, 2002.6 As further support for the granting of the waiver, Mr. Steele sent Mrs. Prather a photo of the property and a letter outlining his analysis for granting of a waiver of the 25-foot setback requirement, as well as a proposed location for the dock. Based on this information, as well as her previous site inspection in April of 2000, Mrs. Prather apparently confirmed that the dock was eligible for a waiver to the 25-foot setback requirement, and construction commenced. There was no evidence of any additional writing from Mrs. Prather or DEP determining that the 25-foot setback was waived. The dock, as built, is not in the same place as proposed in the materials previously provided by Mr. Imhoof and Mr. Steele. Instead, the access pier proceeded for most of its length, but not all the way through the mangrove fringe, approximately 11 feet from Petitioner's northern property line (as previously proposed). Then, earlier than previously proposed, and still within the mangrove fringe, the access pier angled to the northeast for a short distance, taking it farther away from Petitioner's northern property line (but apparently still within 25 feet of the property line), before angling back to the east and then to the southeast for short distances before terminating in the platform, which extended south towards the riparian rights line. As built, the platform of the Imhoofs' dock is approximately 17 feet north of the platform of Petitioner's dock. Mrs. Prather testified that the dock, as built, still falls within the parameters to be granted a waiver from the 25-foot setback requirement. Mrs. Prather testified that the first 80 feet of the access pier (where it parallels Petitioner's northern property line) is devoid of mangroves, whereas the remainder of the property was at least 85 percent covered with mangroves. Therefore, placing the dock on the south side would result in less destruction of natural vegetation and less loss of habitat. Aligning the dock wholly or partially through the middle of the lot, which was one of Petitioner's alternative proposals, would be more detrimental to the environment because it would bisect the healthy mangrove fringe. In addition, the dock, as built, has been elevated to minimize impact to the vegetation from shading, at a greater expense to the Imhoofs, even though it is not required to be. Mrs. Prather testified that the as-built location avoids or minimizes environmental impacts due to shading, edge effect, and diversity. Carolyn Schultz, a biologist, confirmed the testimony of Mrs. Prather. Mrs. Schultz testified that, on the southern boundary of the claimed riparian uplands, where the access pier was placed, fill material from Petitioner's property extends onto the Imhoofs' claimed riparian upland and has created an edge effect. As a result, this area already has been disturbed, and placement of the dock in that location, as opposed to the less impacted area elsewhere on the Imhoofs' claimed riparian uplands, would be less of an environmental impact. Petitioner presented an expert biologist, Joe H. Young, to testify regarding the placement of the Imhoof dock. It was Mr. Young's opinion that placing the dock farther to the north side of the property would result in less environmental impact. Mr. Young proposed angling the access pier to the northeast sooner (i.e., closer to Riverside Drive, namely approximately 112 feet from the road), and continuing it in that direction until termination in the platform, which would be much farther north (and farther away from the riparian rights line and Petitioner's dock) than as-built. Mr. Young calculated that approximately 30 square feet less mangrove fringe would be impacted under his proposal. (It appears that his proposed alternative dock also would still not meet the 25-foot setback requirement.) However, Mr. Young did not perform any type of percentage-of-cover or qualitative analysis. The Imhoofs' expert, Mrs. Schultz, performed such an analysis and found that the mangrove fringe was thicker and healthier (primarily, more diverse) where Mr. Young proposed that the dock be built. Even disregarding relative health of the mangrove fringe in the two locations, when she factored in percentage-of-cover, Mrs. Schultz found that 5 square feet less mangrove vegetation was impacted by the Imhoofs than would be under Mr. Young's proposal. Petitioner did not rebut the testimony of the opposing experts that the as-built location was preferred because of factors such as diversity, edge effect, and shading. The evidence is clear that, waterward of the mangrove fringe, there is no significant difference in natural resources to be impacted by placement of the Imhoofs' dock. In other words, placement of the terminal platform in the as- built configuration is not necessary to avoid or minimize adverse impacts to natural resources. Extending the platform to the north, away from the riparian rights line and Petitioner's dock, would be just as environmentally-friendly. Petitioner testified that the location of Mrs. Imhoof's dock, approximately 17 feet to the north of his dock, interferes with his riparian rights and the use of his dock for kayaks and sailboats. As for riparian rights, Petitioner accepted the riparian rights lines drawn by Respondents for purposes of this case. Those riparian rights lines indicate not only that Mrs. Imhoof's dock does not interfere with Petitioner's riparian rights but that Petitioner's dock actually interferes with Mrs. Imhoof's claimed riparian rights. As for launching and docking kayaks and sailboats, the location of Mrs. Imhoof's dock interferes with Petitioner to some degree, especially in certain current and wind conditions. Some degree of such interference may not be unreasonable, especially given the location of Petitioner's dock within Mrs. Imhoof's claimed riparian rights lines. But there was no valid, natural resource-based reason for the Imhoofs to construct the platform of their dock so as to extend south towards the riparian rights line and Petitioner's dock. The DEP representative who took Petitioner's complaint on May 5, 2003, wrote on the complaint form: "Mr. Imhoof constructed dock longer and closer to his dock than we authorized in our exemption of August 2000." The "we" appears to refer to DEP, not Petitioner. It appears from the evidence that Petitioner first learned of the existence of the Imhoofs' exemption in early May 2003, when he went to the City of New Smyrna Beach to complain about the location of the dock being constructed by the Imhoofs. However, on its face, the exemption appeared to have expired well before construction began. On May 20, 2003, DEP conducted a site investigation of the complaints against the Imhoofs. After the site visit, DEP representatives spoke to Petitioner and told him that the Imhoofs' dock was exempt and had a waiver from the setback requirement. On or about May 22, 2003, Mr. Samuels went to DEP's Central Office and obtained another copy of the expired exemption. On July 1, 2003, Mr. Samuels mailed DEP his Amended Petition. It was not clear from the evidence whether there was an earlier petition or, if so, when it was filed. Respondents did not file a motion to dismiss the Amended Petition as being untimely; however, their PRO raised this issue. It was not clear from the Amended Petition whether Petitioner was requesting an administrative hearing on proposed agency action (to determine de novo whether Mr. Imhoof's proposed dock should be exempt), or whether he was requesting revocation of the exemption for construction not consistent with the exemption. The Amended Petition did not articulate that the exemption expired before construction, or take the position that Mr. Imhoof's dock was constructed without the benefit of a valid regulatory exemption (or permit) and BOT consent of use.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order determining that Mrs. Imhoof: is entitled to a regulatory exemption for her dock; and should be given consent of use by the BOT for her dock, so long as the terminal platform extends to the north, away from the riparian rights line and Petitioner's dock. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of February, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S --- J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of February, 2004.
