Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner has leased the motor vehicle that is the subject of the instant controversy, a 1992 Merdedes-Benz 300SE (hereinafter referred to as the "subject vehicle"), from Bill Ussery Motors, Inc., an automobile dealership located in Coral Gables, Florida (hereinafter referred to as the "Dealership"), since October 30, 1991, when he took delivery of the vehicle. At the time of delivery, the subject vehicle was new. Thereafter, various problems developed with the subject vehicle. Petitioner reported these problems to the Dealership, but the Dealership was unable to completely rectify them within 18 months of the date of delivery. Petitioner drove the vehicle less than 24,000 miles during this 18-month period. Some of the problems that Petitioner reported during the first 18 months of his possession of the vehicle still persist today. On or about April 23, 1993, Petitioner sent a completed Motor Vehicle Defect Notification form to the manufacturer requesting that it "make a final attempt to correct the . . . reported . . defects." The manufacturer responded by sending the following letter, dated April 27, 1993, to Petitioner: This will acknowledge the Motor Vehicle Defect Notification form you completed, which was received by this office today. This letter shall serve as a written request to provide Mercedes-Benz of North America ("MBNA") with an opportunity to inspect, verify and if necessary, repair your vehicle. As you are aware, Bill Ussery Motors, Inc., located in Coral Gables, Fl., is a reasonably accessible repair facility. Mr. Eric Moore, Field Service Manager, will contact you to make an appointment to meet with you. If you have any questions or wish to discuss this matter further, please do not hesitate to call me at (904)443-2150. In or about December of 1993, Petitioner retained Joseph Portuondo, Esquire, who sent, on Petitioner's behalf, the following letter, dated December 13, 1993, to the manufacturer: As you know, Mr. Palaez has experienced such difficulty with his automobile that it led to his filing of a Motor Vehicle Defect Notification with you on April 23, 1993. Thereafter, on April 27, 1993, you directed Mr. Palaez to Bill Ussery [Motors], Inc. of Coral Gables, Florida, to attempt the last chance repairs to his automobile. Mr. Palaez complied with your instructions. However, the defects in the automobile remain unresolved and out of service days are well in excess of those required under the Lemon Laws of this state. Simply put, Mr. Palaez has a lemon for which we demand a remedy. As such, we hereby demand that Mr. Palaez be immediately refunded the full purchase price of the vehicle. In the event that you do not immediately provide a refund, we hereby demand that this matter be referred to the appropriate state-certified settlement program. Needless to say, if we are unsatisfied with this matter, we will proceed for relief to the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board of the Office of the Attorney General. We trust that our position in this matter is clear. It is truly unfortunate that Mercedes-Benz and its dealer have chosen to treat Mr. Palaez so poorly as a customer that he has had to resort to judicial relief. In response to Portuondo's letter, the manufacturer sent him the following letter, dated December 21, 1993: We are writing in response to the correspondence received by this office today, regarding your client's vehicle. Mercedes-Benz of North America is concerned in this matter and as a result, your concerns have been assigned to Mr. Eric Moore, Field Service Manager, a member of our staff for handling. You will, if not already, be contacted by him in the near future. Thank you for bringing this matter to our attention. On or about December 29, 1993, Portuondo sent Petitioner a copy of the manufacturer's December 21, 1993, letter, along with the following cover letter: Enclosed herein please find a letter recently received [with respect to the above-referenced] subject matter. I will let you know if there is any progress. Petitioner waited until August 12, 1994, to file with the Department his Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board. He did not file a request sooner because, from April of 1993, the manufacturer and Dealership had repeatedly made representations to him, upon which he relied, that they would either make the necessary repairs to the subject vehicle or otherwise resolve the matter to his satisfaction so that there would be no need for him to resort to arbitration or litigation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order finding that Petitioner's request for arbitration is not time-barred. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 20th day of March, 1995. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of March, 1995.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: On February 12, 1993, Petitioner took delivery of a new 1/ 1993 Chevrolet C-1500 truck that he had purchased from Maroone Chevrolet, a Florida Chevrolet dealership. Thereafter, various problems developed with the vehicle. Petitioner reported these problems to Steve Moore Chevrolet, the Chevrolet dealership to which he brought the vehicle to be serviced (hereinafter referred to as the "Servicing Dealership"). The Servicing Dealership, however, was unable to remedy these problems within 18 months of the date of delivery (hereinafter referred to as the "18-month post-delivery period"). During the 18-month post-delivery period, Petitioner drove the vehicle more than 24,000 miles. By June 14, 1994 (approximately 16 months after the date of delivery), he had already driven the vehicle 26,569 miles. 2/ At least some of the problems that Petitioner reported during the 18- month post-delivery period still persist today. In the summer of 1995, Petitioner sent a completed Motor Vehicle Defect Notification form to the manufacturer of the vehicle, the Chevrolet Motor Division of General Motors (hereinafter referred to as "Chevrolet"), requesting that it "make a final attempt to correct the . . . reported . . defects." The notice was received by Chevrolet's customer assistance branch office in Tampa on August 16, 1995. Chevrolet, through its employee, Jennifer Kenyon, responded to the notice by sending the following letter, dated August 18, 1995, to Petitioner: This is to acknowledge receipt on August 18, 1995 by the Chevrolet Motor Division of your demand letter dated July 28, 1995. Please be advised that Chevrolet Motor Division stands ready to make any necessary adjustments, repairs, or replacements to any component contained on or in the motor vehicle now belonging to you bearing Vehicle Identification Number . . . which does not conform to the purpose for which they were intended or manufactured and which fall within the limitation set forth in the New Vehicle Limited Warranty supplied with said vehicle by General Motors, Chevrolet Motor Division. Should Chevrolet Motor Division's attempts to adjust, repair, or replace said component(s) to your satisfaction fail, you would be offered the arbitration process as a means of settling your dispute with General Motors, Chevrolet Motor Division. Please contact Steve Moore Chevrolet so they may assist in making arrangements for an inspection and/or repair. Petitioner telephoned Kenyon after receiving Kenyon's letter. During their telephone conversation, Kenyon told Petitioner that Chevrolet would probably "buy the vehicle back" from him, but that no final decision would be made until it was determined whether he "qualified for the Lemon Law." During a subsequent telephone conversation, Kenyon told Petitioner that a determination had been made that Petitioner did not "qualify for the Lemon Law" and that, although Chevrolet would not repurchase his vehicle, it would "work with him." Petitioner subsequently telephoned the Florida Attorney General's Office (hereinafter referred to the "AGO"). The AGO referred Petitioner to the Department. When Petitioner contacted the Department, he was advised to file a complaint/arbitration request with the Better Business Bureau's Auto Line program (hereinafter referred to as the "BBB program"), a certified arbitration program in which Chevrolet participates. Petitioner followed the advice he was given. On or about September 22, 1995, he filed a complaint/arbitration request with the BBB program. On September 27, 1995, the BBB program sent Petitioner a letter which read as follows: After careful review of your case, we have determined that your complaint is not eligible for further handling in the BBB AUTO LINE program. We have made this determination for the following reasons: The claim was not filed with the BBB within 6 months after the end of the Lemon Law Rights Period in order to pursue arbitration requesting assistance in replacement or repurchase of the vehicle. While we refer all cases to the manufacturer for review, we cannot require the manufacturer to submit to arbitration unless the claim is within the specific program limits. The program eligibility information is explained in the program summary. You may want to contact the Division of Consumer Services at 1-800-321-5366 to see if you qualify under the lemon law. While I am sorry we were not able to help you with your automotive complaint, I want to thank you for your interest in the BBB AUTO LINE program. Please contact us if you have any questions or if you believe we have made an error. On November 2, 1995, Petitioner filed with the Department a Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board. By letter dated November 3, 1995, the Department advised Petitioner that "a determination ha[d] been made to reject [his request because t]he request was not submitted in a timely manner."
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for arbitration because it is time-barred. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 22nd day of March, 1996. STUART M. LERNER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 1996.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's request for arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board pursuant to Chapter 681, Florida Statutes, should be denied on the ground that the request was not timely filed with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Division of Consumer Services (hereinafter referred to as the "Department")?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, the factual stipulations into which the parties have entered, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner purchased the motor vehicle that is the subject of the instant controversy, a 1991 Mitsubishi Eclipse, on May 23, 1991, from King Mitsubishi, a Mitsubishi dealership located in Lighthouse Point, Florida (hereinafter referred to as the "Dealership"). Various problems developed with the vehicle which Petitioner reported to the Dealership, but the Dealership was unable to rectify within 18 months of the date of purchase. During this 18-month time frame Petitioner drove the vehicle less than 24,000 miles. Several of the problems that Petitioner reported during the first 18 months of her ownership of the vehicle still persist today. In June or July of 1993, Petitioner began considering the possibility of seeking arbitration under the State of Florida's "Lemon Law." To find out more about her rights, she obtained from a friend, and reviewed, a Florida state government publication on the "Lemon Law." In September of 1993, Petitioner sent a completed Motor Vehicle Defect Notification form to the Dealership requesting that it "make a final attempt to correct the . . . reported . . defects." On November 12, 1993, Petitioner brought the vehicle to the Dealership for such repairs to be made. When she picked up the vehicle five days later, she discovered that the defects she had reported had not been remedied. Dissatisfied with these results, Petitioner telephoned the Department and asked to be sent a Request for Arbitration form. She received the form on November 29, 1993. Petitioner then proceeded to gather the documentation that she needed to fill out the form. After gathering this documentation, Petitioner telephoned the Department a second time because she had some questions regarding certain items on the form. Her questions having been answered by the Department representative to whom she spoke, Petitioner completed the form and, on December 2, 1993, mailed the completed form to the Department. The Department received the completed form on December 6, 1993. At no time did Petitioner, a layperson acting without the benefit of legal counsel, ever intend to forfeit her right to request arbitration under Chapter 681, Florida Statutes. She was not under the impression, nor did the Department representatives to whom she spoke give her reason to believe, that if she failed to file her request for arbitration on or before November 23, 1993, her inaction would be deemed a waiver of her right to request arbitration under Chapter 681, Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order finding Petitioner's request for arbitration to have been timely filed and therefore not subject to dismissal on the ground of untimely filing. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 11th day of May, 1994. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 94-0755 The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on the "findings of facts" proposed by the parties in their post-hearing submittals: Petitioner's Proposed Findings Accepted and incorporated in substance, although not necessarily repeated verbatim, in this Recommended Order.. Not incorporated in this Recommended Order because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. Accepted and incorporated in substance. 4-5. Rejected as findings of fact because they are more in the nature of conclusions of law. 6-7. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected as a finding of fact because it is more in the nature of a summary of evidence adduced at hearing than a finding of fact based upon such evidence. First sentence: Rejected as a finding of fact because it is more in the nature of a summary of testimony adduced at hearing than a finding of fact based upon such testimony; Second sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected as a finding of fact because it is more in the nature of a summary of testimony adduced at hearing than a finding of fact based upon such testimony. The Department's Proposed Findings 1-4. Accepted and incorporated in substance COPIES FURNISHED: Robert Feldman, Esquire Berman & Feldman 2424 Northeast 22nd Street Pompano Beach, Florida 33062-3099 Barbara Edwards, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 515 Mayo Building 2002 Old St. Augustine Road, B-12 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford, Commissioner Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent properly denied Petitioner’s request for arbitration before the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the Florida Department of Agriculture And Consumer Services, Division of Consumer Services. Respondent administers the “Motor Vehicle Enforcement Warranty” set forth in Chapter 681, Florida Statutes, inclusive of the Florida New Vehicle Arbitration Board. Petitioner is a consumer who took delivery of the then new motor vehicle at issue on December 8, 1995. He received no information from the dealership where he purchased the vehicle concerning his rights to access to Respondent’s arbitration program. On June 1, 1998, Respondent received Petitioner’s request for arbitration. Petitioner’s vehicle had 24,000 miles on it at that time. Petitioner’s arbitration request disclosed vehicle problems requiring at least three repair attempts. Petitioner’s request failed to provide a copy of any written defect notification, or other written notification to the manufacturer of the vehicle. In his arbitration application and later at the final hearing, Petitioner maintained that he had provided the manufacturer with such written notification. However, despite Respondent’s repeated request of Petitioner to provide Respondent with copies of that notification, Petitioner failed to provide any such documentation. The fourth notice by Respondent to Petitioner informed him that a copy of such notification must be received by Respondent no later than August 3, 1998. Petitioner failed to provide Respondent with a copy of the manufacturer notification by the deadline of August 3, 1998. Thereafter, by letter dated August 5, 1998, Respondent notified Petitioner that his request for arbitration was denied as ineligible. At the final hearing, the testimony of Respondent’s spokesman, James D. Morrison, established that Petitioner’s failure to provide Respondent with a copy of the Motor Vehicle Defect Information form sent to the manufacturer by Petitioner was the sole reason that Petitioner’s application for arbitration was denied. As further established by Morrison’s testimony, the rationale of Respondent for the requirement of the copy of Petitioner’s notification to the manufacturer, and copy of receipt of acceptance by the manufacturer, is to ascertain that Petitioner has complied with Section 681.104, Florida Statutes, requiring that all applicants for arbitration first notify the vehicle manufacturer by registered or express mail of such application.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner’s application. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of April, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of April, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Howard C. Holtzendorf, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 515 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Arthur H. Baredian 275 Ravine Street Jacksonville, Florida 32206 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Bob Crawford, Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
