The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondents violated Sections 475.25(1)(e) and (b), Florida Statutes (1995),1 by failing to provide timely written notification to the Florida Real Estate Commission (the "Commission") of any good faith doubt as to whom funds in Respondents' escrow account should be disbursed; by engaging in fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence, or breach of trust; and, if Respondents violated either or both statutes, what, if any, penalty should be imposed against Respondents' licenses.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for the regulation and discipline of licensees in the state. Respondents are both licensed in the state. Respondent Carey is licensed as a real estate broker and holds license number 0577832. The last license was issued to Respondent Carey as a broker at Crescent Properties, Inc., 200 N. Denning Drive, Suite 2, Winter Park, Florida 32789-3762. Respondent Carey was licensed and operating as broker and officer of Respondent Crescent Properties, Inc. ("Crescent"). Crescent is registered as a real estate broker corporation and holds registration number 0577832. The last registration was issued to Crescent as a broker, Crescent Properties, Inc., 200 N. Denning Drive, Suite 2, Winter Park, Florida 32789-3762. On October 10, 1995, Respondents and Estrella Acosta entered into a property management agreement for a residence located at 563 Northbridge Drive, Altamonte Springs, Florida. The landlord agreed to pay Respondents half of the first month's rent for securing a tenant and 10 percent of all rent payments for managing the property. On December 16, 1995, Respondents, as Acosta's agent, leased the property to Victor and Maria Thompson (the "tenants"). The lease agreement provided in relevant part that: the tenants would pay a $735.00 security deposit and $735.00 a month in rent for 12 months; Crescent would act as the landlord's agent and would collect all funds due under the lease. The tenants paid the $735.00 security deposit to Respondents. Respondents placed the security deposit into the escrow account. However, the tenants paid monthly rent directly to the landlord. By letter dated January 31, 1996, Acosta advised Respondents that Acosta was terminating the property management agreement. The letter requested that Respondents release the $735.00 security deposit to Acosta. On February 12, 1996, Respondents mailed a letter to the tenants. The letter requested the tenants' consent to release the security deposit to Acosta. The tenants did not respond to the letter. Respondents did not know whether the tenants agreed to or objected to release the security deposit. Respondents continued to hold the security deposit in Respondents' escrow account. Respondent Carey sought advice from the legal hot line service made available by the local Realtor association. Respondent Carey was confused and erroneously believed that the hot line acted as an agent for the Commission. Respondents did not advise the Commission in writing that Respondents had a good faith doubt as to whom the security deposit should be disbursed. Respondents did not send the tenants a certified letter advising that the tenants must respond by a date certain or Respondents would disburse the security deposit to Acosta. Respondents did not institute one of the settlement procedures set forth in Section 475.25(1)(d)1 including a request that the Commission issue an escrow disbursement order. Respondents had a good faith doubt as to whom the security deposit should be disbursed. Respondents mailed Acosta a monthly accounting dated February 6, 1996, which stated in relevant part: SECURITY DEPOSIT: $735.00 IN DISPUTE AN ESCROW DISBURSEMENT ORDER HAS BEEN FILED. The reference to a disbursement order was not a misrepresentation. Respondent believed that she was undertaking the appropriate steps for a disbursement order by following the advice obtained on the hot line provided by the local Realtor association. On February 12, 1996, less than two weeks after the landlord advised Respondents that the landlord had terminated the lease, Acosta filed a complaint against Respondents with Petitioner. By letter dated February 26, 1996, Petitioner notified Respondent Carey of Acosta's complaint. Respondents did not know whether Acosta's termination of the lease was based on a default by the tenants or was itself a default by the landlord. Pursuant to the terms of the lease agreement, Respondents asserted an offset against the landlord for half of the first month's lease and 10 percent of the lease payments due for the 12 month lease term. In a letter to Acosta dated August 27, 1996, Respondents stated in relevant part: Per my conversation with the Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate: It has been determined that your claim against us was unwarranted and false . . . You have caused everyone us, DBPR, our attorney, a great deal of unwarranted lost time . . . .
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order finding Respondents guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(e), not guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(b), issuing a written reprimand to Respondents, and requiring Respondent Carey to complete seven hours of continuing education in one or more escrow management courses for real estate brokers. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of January, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Hearings Hearings DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 4889675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative this 6th day of January, 1998.
The Issue Whether or not Petitioner's application for examination as a bail bondsman (limited surety agent) should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witness and his demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following relevant factual findings: On October 24, 1989, Petitioner submitted his application for examination as a limited surety agent (bail bondsman). In preparation to sit for the limited surety agent's examination, Petitioner completed a community services course and received a surety agent's certificate from Hillsborough Community College on April 23, 1989. Additionally, Petitioner completed the bail and bail bonds insurance independent study course offered by the Division of Continuing Education, the Department of Independent Study by correspondence of the University of Florida and was awarded a certificate of satisfactory completion on November 14, 1989. Question 8 of the application for examination as completed by Petitioner contained the following question: "Have you ever been charged with or convicted or pleaded guilty or no contest to a crime involving moral turpitude, , a felony , or a crime punishable by imprisonment of one (1) year or more under the law of any state, territory, or country, whether or not a judgement or conviction has been entered ? If yes, give date(s): What was the crime? Where and when were you charged? Did you plead guilty or nolo contendere? Were you convicted? Was adjudication withheld? Please provide a brief description of the nature of the offense charged. If there has been more than one such felony charge, provide an explanation as to each charge on an attachment. Certified copies of the information or indictment and final adjudication for each charge is required. Petitioner responded to Question 8 by indicating that he had not been charged with, or convicted or pled guilty or no contest to a crime involving moral turpitude; that he had been so charged with committing a felony; that the crime was one which was punishable by imprisonment for one year or more and he gave the dates of September 27, 1980, June 23, 1986 and October 23, 1987. Respondent replied to subsection (a) of question 8 by indicating that the crime was worthless checks/aggravated assault. Respondent's reply to subsection (b), question 8, was that he was charged in Tampa, Florida indicating the dates of September 27, 1984, June 23, 1986, and October 23, 1986. Respondent filed a negative response to subsections (c), (d), and (e) of question 8 and his reply to subsection (f) was that he was living in an apartment, that the manager would not repair anything and he put a stop payment on the check and they filed charges. By letter dated April 25, 1990, Respondent denied Petitioner's application for examination as a bail bondsman (limited surety agent) because he failed to divulge that he was charged on or about February 5, 1988, with three counts of worthless checks (Case Numbers 88-2363C, 88-2364C, and 88-4164A). On or about March 1, 1989, Petitioner pled nolo contendere to the above-referred worthless check charges. Petitioner does not dispute the fact that he failed to divulge the above-referred worthless check charges. However, Petitioner maintains that the subject charges were misdemeanors and did not amount to a crime involving moral turpitude and therefore did not need to be divulged. Petitioner's understanding comes from the training that he received in the independent study by correspondence of the bail and bail bond insurance correspondence training from the University of Florida. Moral turpitude, as defined in the course material submitted by Petitioner, is as follows: "Baseness, vileness, or dishonesty of a high degree. (44 So.2d 802). Demonstrating depravity in the private and social duties which a person owes to society. The term has been used in connection with such common crimes as bribery and larceny." Petitioner was married in 1980 and was divorced during late 1987. During this period, Petitioner and his former wife had a joint banking account and they continued that banking arrangement while they were separated during mid to late 1987 while dissolution proceedings were ongoing between them. Unbeknownst to Petitioner, his former wife "emptied" his checking account and when Petitioner wrote the checks for which he was criminally charged and is the subject of his examination denial, the checks were returned to the payees for insufficient funds. When the checks were returned, Petitioner did not know that they were returned until weeks later after three of the payees who were given the worthless checks had filed charges with the state attorney's office. During the interim, Petitioner picked up the checks and paid a service fee to the payees for the returned checks. For each of the worthless check charges, adjudication was withheld and Petitioner, after presenting proof of restitution, was ordered to pay $35.00 in court costs and a 5% surcharge to a criminal justice trust fund. Petitioner was required to divulge the worthless check charges that he failed to disclose to Respondent in response to subsection (b) of question 8.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner shall be authorized to sit for the examination as a limited surety agent upon submitting an addendum to his application for examination divulging the above worthless checks charges and the dispositions thereof with the appropriate fee. Upon successful passage of the examination and submission of the appropriate fee and license application, the Department shall issue Petitioner's license as a limited surety agent. Upon licensure as a limited surety agent, Petitioner shall be placed on probation pursuant to Section 648.53, Florida Statutes, for a period of six (6) months effective on the date that his first license is obtained. As a condition of probation, Petitioner shall strictly adhere to all provisions of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes and rules of the Department of Insurance and Treasurer. If during the period of probation, the Department has good cause to believe that Petitioner has violated the terms or conditions of his probation, it shall suspend or revoke the license and eligibility for licensure of Petitioner. 2/ DONE and ENTERED this day of November, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of November, 1990.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for licensure as a community association manager by examination should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Fred Storch (Storch), filed an application with Respondent, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Community Association Managers (Department) on April 14, 1998, for licensure as a community association manager by examination. The application contained the following question: Have you now or have you ever been licensed or certified in any profession such as real estate, insurance, securities, etc., in Florida or in any other state, province, district, territory, possession or nation? If the applicant answered "yes" to the question, the application required the applicant to list the name of the profession, the license number, the date the license was first obtained, and the current status of the license. Storch answered "yes" to the question and indicated that he currently had a real estate salesperson's license in Florida and a real estate broker's license in New York. At the final hearing, Storch testified that he had a current mortgage broker's license and a real estate salesperson's license from New York and that he was currently licensed in Florida as a real estate salesperson and had been licensed in Florida as a mortgage broker. The application contained the following question: Has any license, certification, registration, or permit to practice any regulated profession been revoked, annulled or suspended in this or any other state, province, district, territory, possession or nation or is any proceeding now pending? This includes any disciplinary action taken against you such as a reprimand, probation, etc. Storch answered "no" to the question. The following question was also on the application: Have you ever relinquished or withdrawn from any license, certification, registration or permit to practice any regulated profession in this or any other state, province, district, territory, possession or nation or is any proceeding now pending? Storch answered "yes" to the question and provided the following explanation. I relinquished my license as a Mortgage Broker because I was unable to submit to an audit on a timely basis due to my son's poor health. My son is afflicted with epilepsy, which cannot be controlled with medication. He is having surgery on April 21, 1998 at George Washington University Hospital, Washington, D.C., to eliminate the cause of his seizures. I have enclosed the documentation from the Comptroller's Office and my son's doctor. In 1994, Storch and the Florida Department of Banking and Finance (DBF) entered into a Stipulation and Consent Order which was incorporated in a Final Order, dated January 13, 1995. Storch and DBF agreed that Storch's mortgage broker's license was suspended until a location and occupational license was obtained. Storch agreed to pay an administrative fine of $500 and agreed to cease and desist all violations of Chapter 494, Florida Statutes. On February 12, 1997, DBF entered a Default Final Order and Notice of Rights, finding that Storch had acted as a mortgage broker without a current active license and that Storch had failed to provide his books and records for inspection as requested by DBF. Storch was ordered to cease and desist from violating Chapter 494, Florida Statutes, and all registrations and licenses previously issued to Storch, which included his mortgage broker's license, were revoked. By letter dated February 13, 1997, Storch advised DBF that he would be willing to turn in his license if DBF would not pursue any action against him then or in the future. On September 18, 1997, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, filed an Administrative Complaint against Storch alleging that Storch had violated Section 475.25(1)(s), Florida Statutes, because his residential mortgage broker's license had been revoked. On December 17, 1997, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, entered a Final Order, disciplining Storch's real estate salesperson's license. The Final Order stated that Storch was guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(s), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Administrative Complaint and required Storch to pay an administrative fine of $100.00 and investigative costs of $313.60.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Fred Storch's application for licensure as a community association manager. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of March, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Edward Broyles, Executive Director Regulatory Council of Community Association of Managers Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Thomas G. Thomas, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Fred Storch 7782 Edinburough Lane Delray Beach, Florida 33446
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent violated Section 475.25(1)(m), Florida Statutes (1997), by obtaining a license by fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment. (All Chapter and Section references are to Florida Statutes (1997) unless otherwise stated.)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for the regulation and discipline of real estate licensees in the state. Respondent is licensed in the state as a real estate sales person pursuant to license number 0640934. The last license issued to Respondent was c/o Raizor Realty, Inc., 12007 Cypress Run Road, Orlando, Florida 32836. On July 3, 1996, Respondent applied for a license as a real estate salesperson. On the application, Respondent signed a sworn affidavit that all of his answers were true and correct and: . . . are as complete as his/her knowledge, information and records permit, without any evasions or mental reservations whatsoever. . . . Question nine on the application asked Respondent whether he had ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of nolo contendere, even if adjudication was withheld. Respondent answered "no." Petitioner relied on the accuracy of the application and issued a license to Respondent. Respondent is active in the practice of real estate and depends on his license to earn a living. Respondent has no prior disciplinary history and has been licensed for approximately two years. On February 20, 1985, Respondent was adjudicated guilty of misdemeanor theft. The court suspended the sentence. Petitioner had changed the price stickers on a pair of shoes valued at $20 and on a jar of vitamins. The court found Respondent guilty of misdemeanor theft, fined him $100, and sentenced him to 30 days in jail. The jail sentence was suspended pending completion of six-months' probation. Respondent completed probation in a satisfactory and timely manner. Respondent did not willfully misstate a material fact. He conferred with friends. They advised Respondent that the matter was immaterial and more than seven years old. Respondent answered no to question nine on his application in the good faith belief that the crime was immaterial and not the type of offense addressed in the question. When Petitioner's investigator inquired of Respondent, Respondent answered all questions fully and truthfully and cooperated in the investigation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a Final Order finding Respondent not guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(m), and dismissing the charges against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of December, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Laura McCarthy, Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire 1999 West Colonial Drive, Suite 211 Orlando, Florida 32804 James Kimbler, Acting Division Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issues in this cause are presented through a bid protest filed by Hobbs Construction questioning the notice of the Florida Department of Transportation which rejected all bids on State Project No. 49010-3543, Franklin County, Florida, in which Hobbs was the apparent low bidder. In particular, Hobbs challenges the rejection of its bid, wherein the Department has claimed that Hobbs has failed to meet the Disadvantaged Business Enterprise contract requirements.
Findings Of Fact On June 14, 1984, Hobbs Construction and Development, Inc., submitted an application for recognition by the State of Florida, Department of Transportation, to perform work for the department in an additional work class for which Hobbs had not previously qualified. On June 22, 1984, this request for qualification was approved as evidenced by the correspondence of that date from J. Ted Barefield, Chief of Bureau of Contracts Administration, Department of Transportation, addressed to Hobbs. A copy of that correspondence may be found as Petitioner's exhibit number two admitted into evidence. The Notice of Qualification was received by Hobbs on June 26, 1984. Having been recognized in the new classification, Hobbs was entitled to qualify as a bidder on Budget Item 3112655, which is also known as State Project No. 49010-3543, Franklin County, Florida. (Prior to the new classification or qualification of Hobbs, Hobbs was entitled to purchase the plans for the aforementioned job, but was not entitled to receive the actual bidding documents [specifications] related to the job.) On June 26, 1984, the date that Hobbs was informed of its qualification to pursue the subject job in Franklin County, it obtained the bid packet, job specifications, from the Department of Transportation. Even before qualification, Hobbs being interested in the Franklin County job made attempts on June 21, 1984, to contact Disadvantaged Business Enterprise subcontractors, known as DBE subcontractors, realizing that the contract called for participation by a DBE subcontractor(s). Glen Powell Contracting, Inc., Lynnhaven, Florida, and Bryan L. Therman Contractors, Inc., of Chipley, Florida, were among the DBE subcontractors which Petitioner was interested in and attempted to contact. It was contemplated that those contractors would perform the installation of rip rap which constituted a high percentage of the project work. Oglesby and Hugg, a DBE subcontractor, was also contacted about installation of rip rap and indicated that they were not interested in the project. The contact with Therman was by talking to someone in hips office, leaving a message for Therman to call the Hobbs representative. The Therman group did not make a return call. Glen Powell and another official within the Glen Powell corporation, reviewed the project with officials of Hobbs' Construction Company and indicated that Powell would not be able to give a quote for the subcontracting rip rap work given the nearness of the time to submit the bid. Powell had been reached on June 25, 1984, and made the assessment of the bid materials on June 26, 1984, at which point he declined to give a price quote for the subcontracting rip rap work. Several DBE grassing subcontractors were also contacted by Hobbs and declined to perform work given the location of the project and the small amount of grassing to be installed. When the bid was submitted by Hobbs, the only DBE subcontractor that was listed was Black Olive Nursery and Landscaping of 21053 N.W. 37th Court, Miami, Florida. That class of work was landscaping in the amount of 9,599.30, which is approximately .6 percent of the Hobbs bid proposal in the amount of $1,585,170.30. Hobbs submitted the bid on the Franklin County project in time to meet the June 27, 1984, bid opening. When the bids were opened, Hobbs bid reported above was the apparent low bid for the project. As was the custom of the Department of Transportation, its Contracts Awards Committee met to determine the acceptability of the bids for the Franklin County project and to decide whether to go forward with the project in the face of the bids offered. At that time, the committee being of the belief that Hobbs and the second low bidder both failed to meet DBE participation requirements of the contract and being persuaded of the need to modify the plans and revise the specifications related to the installation of rip rap it was decided to reject all bids. That decision was by unanimous vote of the Contracts Award Committee of the Department of Transportation and this advice was accepted by the agency head. A copy of the minutes of that committee, which reflects the decision of the committee, may be found as Department's exhibit number two. On July 24, 1984, Hobbs was noticed of the Department's intent to reject all bids for reason that the Department desired to revise the plans and specifications and in view of the fact that, according to the Department, Hobbs had failed to meet the DBE contract requirements. A copy of this Notice of Bid Rejection may be found as Petitioner's exhibit number one admitted into evidence. That notice affords an opportunity for Hobbs to challenge the bid rejection through request for a Chapter 120, Florida Statutes hearing. Hobbs timely availed itself of that opportunity leading to the formal hearing which is the subject of this recommended order. To meet the DOE requirements of the contract, it was necessary for Hobbs to designate 2 percent of the contract amount for DOE subcontractor participation. In the alternative, if Hobbs was unable to achieve that goal, it was necessary for Hobbs to provide sufficient information to show that it had made a good faith effort to meet the goal. The issues joined in this case concern whether Hobbs timely provided its explanation of its good faith efforts to obtain DBE participation in the project and if that explanation was provided in a timely fashion, whether it was sufficient information to demonstrate good faith compliance. Within the specifications, a copy of which is found as joint exhibit number one, there are found Supplemental Special Provisions dating from May 31, 1984. Subarticles 2-5.3.2 and 2-5.3.3, deal with the question of DBE participation and the need to submit good faith efforts. The language of those provisions is as follows: 2-5.3.2 Submittals for Contracts with Goals: For all contracts for which DBE and/or WBE contract goals have been established, each contractor shall meet or exceed or demonstrate that it could not meet, despite its good faith efforts, the contract goals set by the Department. The DBE and WBE participation information shall be submitted with the Contractors bid proposal. Award of the Contract shall be conditioned upon submission of the DBE and WBE participation information with the bid proposal and upon satisfaction of the contract goals or, if the goals are not met, upon demonstrating that good faith efforts were made to meet the goals. The Contractors bid submission shall include the following information (Submitted on Form No. 141-12 - DBE/WBE Utilization Form No. 1): The names and addresses of certified DBE and WBE firms that will participate in the contract. Only DBEs and WBEs certified by the Department at the time the bid is submitted may be counted toward DBE and WBE goals. A description of the work each named DBE and WBE firm will perform. The dollar amount of participation by each named DBE and WBE firm. 2-5.3.3 Submittals for Evaluating Good Faith- Efforts: If the DBE or WBE goal is not met, sufficient information to demonstrate that the Contractor made good faith efforts to meet the goals shall be submitted. In evaluating a contractor's good faith efforts, the Department will consider: Whether the Contractor, at least seven days prior to the letting, provided written notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, or hand delivery, with receipt, to all certified DBEs and WBEs which perform the type of work which the Contractor intends to subcontract, advising the DBEs and WBEs (a) of the specific work the Contractor intends to subcontract; (b) that their interest in the contract is being solicited; and (c) how to obtain information about and review and inspect the contract plans and specifications. Whether the Contractor selected economically feasible portions of the work to be performed by DBEs or WBEs, including where appropriate, breaking down contracts or combining elements of work into economically feasible units. The ability of a contractor to perform the work with its own work force will not in itself excuse a contractor's failure to meet contract goals. Whether the Contractor provided interested DBEs or WBEs assistance in reviewing the contract plans and specifica- tions. Whether the DBE or WBE goal was met by other bidders. Whether the Contractor submits all quotations received from DBEs or WBEs, and for those quotations not accepted, an explanation of why the DBE or WBE will not be used during the course of the contract. Receipt of a lower quotation from a non-DBE or non-WBE will not in itself excuse a contractor's failure to meet contract goals; provided, however, a contractor's good faith efforts obligation does not require a contractor to accept a quotation from a DBE or WBE which exceeds the lowest quotation received from any subcontractor by more than one percent. Whether the contractor assisted interested DBEs and WBEs in obtaining any required bonding, lines of credit, or insurance. Whether the contractor elected to subcontract types of work that match the capabilities of solicited DBEs or WBEs. Whether the Contractor's efforts were merely pro forma and given all relevant circumstances, could not reasonably be expected to produce sufficient DBE and WBE participation to meet the goals. Whether the Contractor has on other contracts within the past six months utilized DBEs and WBEs. The above list is not intended to be exclusive or exhaustive and the Department will look not only at the different kinds of efforts that the Contractor has made but also the quality, quantity, and intensity of these efforts. These provisions are under the general heading of Preparation of Proposals related to Articles 2 through 5. Subarticle 2-5.3.2 indicates that the bidder shall establish its participation information related to DBE subcontractor with the bid proposal or if the goals are not met, demonstrate that good faith efforts were made to meet the goals. The contract is awarded upon condition that the DBE participation goals are met, or upon establishing that good faith efforts were made to meet the goals and that the goals were not attainable. The form known as the DBE Utilization Form No. 1 was provided in this instance. It contemplates information as to success in meeting the DBE goals. A copy of that form may be found as part of the joint exhibit one. It contains no specific place to explain the good faith efforts that were made by the Petitioner to achieve those goals, in view of the Petitioner's lack of success in meeting the goals and Hobbs didn't submit good bid information with its bid. The bid was also submitted under the ausnices of Rule 14-78.03, Florida Administrative Code (May 1984). The first effort which Hobbs made at describing his alleged good faith efforts to employ the assistance of DBEs came on August 29, 1984, in correspondence of its project manager. This correspondence is found as State of Florida, Department of Transportation's exhibit number three and is correspondence directed to another official within Hobbs Construction. This statement of efforts to obtain minority or DBE participation in the project was along the lines of testimony given in the course of the hearing. No information, related to compliance, was given to the Department of Transportation prior to its notice of intent to reject the bid of July 24, 1984. Having no obligation to request that information from Hobbs, the Department of Transportation did not attempt to stir Hobbs into action on the issue of indication of good faith, prior to its notice of intent to reject Hobbs bid. Hobbs' explanation was eventually advanced ate the final hearing. Factually, even if one were to assume that the Petitioner could submit its prebid letting efforts at good faith compliance with the DBE goals, at a time beyond the filing of its bid proposal, the efforts do not comport with the concept of good faith as described in Subarticle 2-5.3.3 of the bid proposal and Section 14-78.03, (2)(b) 4.b., Florida Administrative Code related to an assessment of the efforts at good faith compliance. In this sense, Hobbs failed to afford sufficient time for DBE subcontractors to provide responses to the opportunity to offer quotations for the subcontracted work. The Subarticle and Rule contemplate seven days notice prior to the bid letting. The contracts made by the Petitioner were less than seven days prior to the letting of June 27, 1984. This left the one subcontractor who expressed some interest in the project, Powell, inadequate time to offer its price quote. Petitioner tries to explain its position on the question of the timeliness of its attempt by stating that it only became qualified five days before the bid letting and was only informed of that qualification one day before th opening. Given the fact that the Petitioner made application for such qualification on June 14, 1984, only thirteen days before the bid letting, its tardiness did not leave adequate time to afford potential DBE subcontractors the opportunity to respond to the work opportunity envisioned in this project. Finally, given the close proximity in time between the efforts of the Petitioner to seek DBE participation and the bid letting date and the problem related to the Petitioner's late expression of an interest in qualification for this class of job, Petitioner cannot be said to have offered much in the way of quality and intensity in the efforts to enlist DBE subcontractors for this project, as envisioned by the Subarticle and Rule provisions describing good faith efforts at compliance.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondents' real estate licenses should be disciplined on the ground that Respondents allegedly violated a rule and various provisions within Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, as charged in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: When the events herein occurred, Respondents, Edward D. Armbruster and Colleen Michele Armbruster, were licensed real estate brokers having been issued license numbers 0002159 and 0362890, respectively, by Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Division). Respondents served as qualifying brokers and officers of Respondent, Armbruster Realty, Inc., a corporation registered as a real estate broker and located at 1031 West Nelson Avenue, DeFuniak Springs, Florida. The corporation holds license number 0211855, also issued by the Division. On July 10, 1996, Gerald and Joyce Singleton, who had just relocated to California, entered into a contract with James B. and Joyce Patten to sell their single-family residence located on Madison Street in the City of Freeport, Florida, for a price of $78,000.00. The contract called for the Pattens to pay $1,000.00 as an earnest money deposit, to be held in escrow by Respondents. The contract further provided that "[c]losing shall be within 30 days (more or less) after acceptance of this contract," and that "[i]n the event that buyer defaults and deposit is forfeited, it is agreed said deposit shall be divided equally between seller and broker." The transaction was handled by Geraldine Dillon (Dillon), a salesperson in Respondents' office, who is now retired. Because the Pattens had recently moved to Walton County from Washington State, and they were temporarily living with a relative in a mobile home, the time for closing was of the essence. Accordingly, the Pattens inserted into the contract a provision requiring that a closing be held within "30 days (more or less)." This meant that a closing should be held on or about August 10, 1996, give or take a few days. The parties acknowledge that property boundary problems were somewhat common in certain areas of Freeport, including the area where the subject property was located. To satisfy the bank and title company, a surveyor was engaged to prepare a survey of the property. However, the parties agree that the surveyor noted problems with the boundaries of the lot. When a second surveyor would not undertake the survey because of similar boundary problems, Joyce Patten, who was the principal negotiator for the couple, notified Dillon that they did not wish to close because of potential title problems and wanted a refund of their deposit. Notwithstanding this concern, Dillon advised Joyce Patten that a third surveyor would be hired, at the seller's expense, and he could "certify" the property. Although Joyce Patten expressed concern that the bank might not accept a third survey after two earlier ones had failed, and she did not want to pay for another survey, she did not instruct Dillon to stop the process. Accordingly, Dillon engaged the services of Tommy Jenkins, a local surveyor, to perform another survey. After a certified survey was obtained by Jenkins on August 12, 1996, which Respondents represent without contradiction satisfied the lender and title company, a closing was scheduled within the next few days. This closing date generally conformed to the requirement that a closing be held by August 10, 1996, "more or less." The seller, who by now had relocated to California, flew to Florida for the closing, and the title company prepared a closing statement and package. Just before the closing, however, Respondents learned through a representative of the title company that the Pattens were "cancelling the closing," apparently in violation of the contract. Shortly after the aborted closing, Joyce Patten requested that Dillon return their deposit. By this time, the Pattens had already entered into a second contract to buy another home in the same area and closed on that property before the end of August. Respondents were never informed of this fact by the Pattens. On August 21, 1996, Colleen Armbruster prepared a rather lengthy letter to the Pattens (with a copy to the sellers) in which she acknowledged that they had orally requested from Dillon that their escrow deposit be returned. The letter has been received in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 4. Armbruster stated that she was "perplexed" that they were demanding a refund of their earnest money deposit, given the fact that the seller had "met the terms and conditions of the sale." Armbruster outlined the three reasons in the contract which would allow the Pattens to withdraw without forfeiting their deposit, but noted that none were applicable here. Accordingly, she advised them that the seller would be consulted as to his wishes regarding the deposit, and that the Pattens should contact her if they had any questions. Through oversight, however, she did not include a notice to the Pattens that they must respond to her letter within a stated period of time reaffirming their demand for the trust funds, or the deposit thereafter would be disbursed pursuant to the contract. By failing to include this specific language, and sending the letter by regular rather than certified mail, return receipt requested, Respondents committed a technical, albeit minor, violation of an agency rule. Even so, the Pattens acknowledged receiving the letter, and there is no reason to believe that they did not understand its import, especially the requirement that they contact the broker if they disagreed with the proposed disbursement of the money. It can be reasonably inferred that the Pattens did not respond because they "figured [they weren't] going to be able to get [their] money back" due to their failure to perform. On September 13, 1996, the seller's attorney advised the Pattens by letter that the seller considered the deposit forfeited pursuant to paragraph 15(a) of the contract, which pertains to the "Default" provisions. The Pattens never responded to either letter, and they also failed to respond to telephone calls made by Respondents or their agents regarding this matter. In view of the Pattens' lack of response or reaffirmance of their demand, and the fact that they had already closed on another property, Respondents logically and fairly assumed that the Pattens were in agreement with the disbursement procedures outlined in Coleen Armbruster's letter of August 21. Accordingly, on September 17, 1996, Edward Armbruster, who had not been involved in this transaction to date, in good faith signed two disbursement checks giving $697.50 to the seller and retaining the balance for his firm. This division was consistent with the terms of the contract. In making this disbursement, there was no intent on the part of Respondents to trick, deceive, breach their trust, or in any way unlawfully deprive the Pattens of their deposit. Respondents did not notify the Florida Real Estate Commission (Commission) that they had received conflicting demands for a deposit, nor institute any other procedures regarding the deposit, since they no longer had any good faith doubt as to whom was entitled to their trust funds. This was because the Pattens had failed to respond to letters and telephone calls regarding the sellers' claim to the deposit. There is no evidence that Respondents have ever been the subject of prior disciplinary action during their lengthy tenure as licensees. At the same time, it is noted that Respondents acted in good faith throughout the process and genuinely believed that there was no dispute. It should also be recognized that, for at least part of the time, the Pattens were working two contracts simultaneously without advising the realtors.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a Final Order finding Respondents guilty of a technical violation of Rule 61J2-10.032(1), Florida Administrative Code, and Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes, and that they be given a reprimand. All other charges should be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of July, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of July, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Henry M. Solares, Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Christine M. Ryall, Esquire 400 West Robinson Street Suite N-308 Orlando, Florida 32801-1772 Edward D. Armbruster Colleen M. Armbruster Post Office Box 635 DeFuniak Springs, Florida 32433 Lynda L. Goodgame, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Joan B. Cross, is a registered real estate salesperson holding certificate number 0018497. On her application for registration in November, 1972, in answer to question 9 pertaining to having been arrested for or charged with the commission of an offense against the laws of the municipality or state, she answered "yes". She completed the "If yes, state details in full" question with "careless driving, 7-27-69 DWI 1970". Exhibit 2, Certified Copy of Court Record, shows that on May 6, 1965 Respondent was convicted of disorderly conduct and fined $15.00. Exhibit 3 and 4, Certified Records from the Criminal Court of Record, show that on June 9, 1969 Respondent was charged with, and found guilty of, unlawful possession of marijuana and of contributing to the dependency of minors. Adjudication of guilt was withheld and Respondent was placed on probation for 18 months. Testifying in her own defense Respondent acknowledged both offenses. With respect to the disorderly conduct charge, she stated she forgot to include that on her application. Following a lunch birthday party the group retired to a bar and when they became too noisy the police came and took them to the police station. With respect to the charges of possession of marijuana and barbiturates she testified that she was represented by counsel who advised her after the trial that she was not adjudicated and that she could forget the incident. She testified that she understood all record of this incident had been expunged, and that she could forget it. She also testified she didn't fully understand withholding adjudication of guilt. In this regard it is noted that she pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana and nolo contendere to the charge of contributing to the dependency of minors.
The Issue An Administrative Complaint dated June 20, 1997, alleges that the Respondents, Dessie B. Castell and A. Plus Service Network Realty, Inc., violated certain provisions of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, and Rule 61J2-10.032(1), Florida Administrative Code, by failing to notify the Florida Real Estate Commission within 15 business days of a good faith doubt as to appropriate disbursement of trust funds in an escrow account, and by failing to maintain those trust funds until disbursement was properly authorized. The issues for determination are whether those violations occurred and, if so, what discipline should be imposed upon the licensees.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Dessie B. Castell is, and was at all material times, a licensed real estate broker in Florida, having been issued license number 0342283 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. Ms. Castell is owner, president and qualifying broker of A. Plus Service Network Realty, Inc., which corporation is registered and licensed in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, at 901 Mock Avenue, Orlando, Florida. Ms. Castell negotiated a contract for sale and purchase of a home at 638 18th Street in Orlando, Florida. Rosemary Jackson was the proposed buyer and Valerie Crane, trustee, was the seller. At the time of the contract dated June 26, 1996, Ms. Castell had already been working with Rosemary Jackson and held a $500.00 escrow deposit from Ms. Jackson in her broker’s escrow account. Also, at the time of the contract on June 26, 1996, Ms. Jackson had been pre-qualified for an FHA loan through ESD Lending Corporation, Inc. The contract for sale and purchase between Ms. Jackson and Ms. Crane established July 2, 1996, as the closing date. Ms. Jackson liked the house and needed to move in quickly. The contract failed to close on July 2, 1996. Both Ms. Jackson and Ms. Castell understood that the ESD lending Corporation did not have an approved appraisal required by FHA for the loan. There was an appraisal done on the property for a previous prospective buyer and Ms. Crane furnished that appraisal to ESD before July 2, 1996. Ms. Crane’s own testimony was confused and conflicting as to whether the appraisal she furnished was approved. Ms. Jackson’s and Ms Castell’s testimony was clear and credible that they were never informed that the appraisal was approved, and Ms. Castell did not receive the HUD settlement papers required for closing. Soon after July 2, 1996, someone came to Ms. Jackson’s workplace identifying himself as a representative of Ms. Crane and offering to extend the closing and to provide a refrigerator and some other items. Ms. Jackson was suspicious of this person as she felt that he was trying to circumvent the mortgage company staff with whom she had been dealing. Ms. Jackson had looked at another house earlier that she did not like as well as the house offered by Ms. Crane; but since she needed to move quickly, Ms. Jackson told Ms. Castell to transfer her escrow deposit to a contract on this prior house. Ms. Castell did that on July 5, 1996, and that contract closed shortly thereafter. On July 6, 1996, Ms. Crane faxed to Ms. Castell a letter offering to add the refrigerator and to extend closing to the next Friday. The letter asked that the offer be accepted by 5:00 p.m. on that same day, the 6th or if not accepted, that the $500.00 deposit be released to Ms. Crane. When she received no response, Ms. Crane sent another letter to Ms. Castell on July 13, 1996, demanding the $500.00 escrow deposit, reiterating that Ms. Jackson forfeited her deposit when she did not close on the property after qualifying for the loan and reminding Ms. Castell of her obligation as escrow agent pursuant to Section 475.25, Florida Statutes, in the event of a dispute over the deposit. Ms. Crane sent a copy of her letter to the Florida Real Estate Commission. Ms. Castell and her company did not notify the Florida Real Estate Commission regarding a dispute over the $500.00 escrow deposit. She felt that it was Ms. Crane’s failure to provide an approved appraisal that caused the contract to expire on July 2, 1996, and thereafter, that she and the buyer were entitled to transfer the funds to another contract.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a final order dismissing the administrative complaint in this case. RECOMMENDED this 16th day of February, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Laura McCarthy, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Dean F. Mosley, Esquire McCrary & Mosley Suite 211 47 East Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Henry M. Solares, Division Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact At some point in late 1984 or early 1985, Respondent, DOT, solicited bids for its Project Number 77030-3510 to be accomplished in Seminole County, Florida. Three bids were submitted. The bid by Petitioner, Macasphalt, was in the amount of $186,367.05. The two other bidders were Martin Paving Company, whose bid was for $196,391.99 and Orlando Paving whose bid was in the amount of $213,054.56. Petitioner's bid was the lowest by approximately $10,000.00. This particular project required the contractors to meet certain goals in the area of Disadvantaged Business Enterprises (DBE) and Women-Owned Business Enterprises (WBE). The goals for this project were 7% for DBE and 3.05% for WBE. In its bid, Macasphalt showed that it would award 20.14% of the contract to DBE's but only 2.01% of the contract to WBE's. Martin Paving Company, on the other hand, whose bid was approximately $10,000.00 higher, indicated that it would award 19.19% of the contract to DBE's and 3.04% of the contract to WBE's. Orlando Paving, which was the highest bidder, showed 2.4% WBE. As a result of the fact that Petitioner failed to achieve 3% WBE, whereas the second lowest bidder exceeded the 3% WBE goal, Respondent declared Petitioner's bid nonresponsive for failure to meet the WBE goal and recommended award of the contract to the second lowest bidder, Martin Paving, even though Martin's bid was approximately $10,000.00 higher. The goals set by DOT must be met at the time of letting of the contract. If a contractor cannot meet these goals, he must submit satisfactory evidence of his good faith efforts to meet them in order to be considered responsive. In regard to the goals, DOT issues a monthly list of certified DBE/WBE contractors listed by the type of work they are qualified to do and the geographical area in which they operate. According to Mr. LaLonde, Macasphalt routinely sent out letters to a majority of the subcontractors they feel could do the work generally and a follow-up letter is sent monthly to those subcontractors who do the type of work needed in a particular contract. These letters are sent monthly because Macasphalt bids frequently on DOT contracts and bid lettings are done on a monthly basis. This procedure gives, they feel, DBE's and WBE's information on jobs on which the Petitioner is bidding and keeps them informed. In the instant case, to solicit WBE's, on January 9, 1985 Petitioner sent out letters by certified mail to 47 DBE/WBE's requesting bids on several projects including the one in question here and naming areas in which it anticipated issuing subcontracts. Items to be subcontracted on the instant project included. barricades and signs guard rails landscaping painting and striping trucking, and concrete. No solicitation was made of DBE/WBE's for quotes on asphalt work because that is Petitioner's prime business and it is, in the opinion of its officers, not feasible to subcontract work they do themselves. When it became obvious that Petitioner could not achieve the 3.05% WBE goal, Petitioner, pursuant to the terms of the contract documents, submitted a summary of its good faith efforts to achieve the WBE goals with the contract bid. The Petitioner's summary of good faith effort includes a "remarks" sheet on which the following comments exclusively are made: "We have exceeded DBE goal with a total of 20.14%. However, have only attained 2.01% FBE goal. All subcontract items except guardrail were reflected in DBE or FBE quotes received. No DBE or FBE quote was received for guardrail item." In addition, Petitioner submitted a form letter entitled, "Good Faith Efforts" apparently used in numerous contracts, which requires only the insertion of two numbers and two dates and copies of two different letters in blank sent to subcontractors on apparently a routine basis. In addition to the above, Petitioner submitted two copies of DOT's DBE/WBE Directory, one dated September, 1984 and the other dated January, 1985 in which various subcontractors are identified with check marks, the explanation for which is contained in the form letter referenced above. No explanation was made as to why some WBE's were not solicited. Upon receipt of Petitioner's bid with the good faith explanation included, it was submitted to Respondent's Good Faith Efforts Review Committee. This committee deals only with an analysis of the good faith efforts made by bidders. It has been in operation since its creation in August, 1984 and applies the standards established in Rule 14-78, F.A.C. Here, the committee evaluated Petitioner's good faith effort as outlined in the material submitted with the bid and, based on Petitioner's submission, concluded that Petitioner was non-responsive because its good faith efforts, as documented, were insufficient. The committee based its conclusion on the following considerations: Petitioner did not meet the seven day requirement for notice by certified mail. The sample letter indicated "certified mail" but no copies of receipt showing it was sent by certified mail or to whom it was sent by certified mail were included. All potential subcontractors (WBE's) were not contacted. The ability of the contractor to do the work himself "asphalt) will not justify failing to achieve the goal. Whether or not other bidders met the goal. The remarks sheet was inaccurate and inadequate. The explanation about failing to solicit from those subcontractors who did not do business in Seminole County is inconsistent. Some were solicited and some were not. One contractor (Fran) who operates in three categories and who works statewide, was not solicited by the Petitioner in any category. The criteria as set forth in Rule 14-78 are not exclusive or necessarily determinative. There is no specific definition of good faith efforts. The committee is given the latitude to make a judgment measure of the bidder's efforts opposed to the criteria set forth in the rule. Mr. Pitchford, Chairman of the committee, indicated that after the committee had been in operation for a while, the approach taken toward looking at the criteria set forth in the rule was more strictly and severely applied. No notice of this change in approach was set to any bidder, however Petitioner contends that this was misleading and that it submitted them on a previous successful demonstration of good faith efforts. In October, 1984 it submitted a bid on a contract which did not meet the DBE goal. Nonetheless, the evidence of good faith which it submitted at that time was not questioned and Petitioner was awarded the contract. This good faith information was the same kind of information as submitted here which was considered inadequate. No documentation to support any of this was forthcoming, however. Since each case must be taken and considered on its own merits, even if true, this is not necessarily inconsistent. Petitioner readily admits that it did not submit requests for bids to al; DBE/WBE subcontractors in the directory. However, it does claim that for the most part, it submitted solicitations to every WBE listed in the directory that worked in the specialty needed and in the geographical area of the project. Petitioner defends its exclusion of potential subcontractors on the basis that, for example, they had no experience with those subcontractors and were not familiar with them. In most cases, Petitioner left out companies that were not known to it. Mr. LaLonde could not be sure whether Petitioner solicited any potential subcontractor not solicited by Petitioner previously. He is certain, however, that Petitioner did solicit all subcontractors on the list who had been solicited previously. In any event, it is important to the Petitioner to know the subcontractors and how they perform because Petitioner, as the prime contractor, is responsible for the work whether it or its subcontractor accomplishes it. It is for this reason, the lack of familiarity with a subcontractor and its performance, that it did not solicit some WBE's which operate statewide. Petitioner has used many WBE's before and has never failed, it claims, to meet WBE goals prior to this occasion. It has previously failed to meet DBE goals, however, but still was awarded the contract if it was the low bidder. It is apparent, then, that if the above is true, Petitioner's demonstrated good faith efforts were considered satisfactory on those occasions. Based on that experience, Petitioner felt that the procedures used here which it claims had previously been demonstrated to be satisfactory, were again sufficient. It is significant to note that while the fact of the bid submissions reflects a difference of approximately $10,000.00 between Petitioner's bid and that submitted by the next lowest bidder, a computer analysis run on this solicitation reflects a different figure. On the computer analysis, Martin Paving's bid is listed at slightly over $203,000.00 as opposed to the bid face of slightly over $196,000.00. If the $203,000.00 figure is used, the 3.05% goal would not be met. This discrepancy was explained by Mr. Haverty who indicated that the initial figure submitted by the contractor on the bid form is used to assess whether the DBE/WBE goals are met. The issue of good faith effort is raised at a later date. Where, as here, it is determined that the original price is in error and the actual price means that the bidder has failed to meet the goal, if the error is less than 10%, the bid may still be considered responsive.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's bid on State Project Number 77030-3510, in Seminole County, Florida, be rejected as non-responsive for failure to meet the WBE goal. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Florida this 20th day of June, 1985. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: William B. Miller, Esquire Tower Place, Suite 600 3340 Peachtree Road, N.E. Atlanta, GA 30326 Larry D. Scott Staff Attorney Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 Paul A. Pappas Secretary Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, FL 32301
