The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Petitioner’s request for arbitration under Florida’s Lemon Law was timely submitted.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Respondent, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, (DOA), was the state agency in Florida responsible for the administration of the Florida New Car Lemon Law. This law provides for compulsory arbitration in those cases where the vehicle qualifies under the terms of the statute. Petitioner, Greco Carreras, purchased a new, 1994 Ford Ranger truck on June 8, 1994 from Ernie Hare Ford in Tampa, Florida. Thereafter, it was necessary for him to take the vehicle in for service, due to transmission and clutch problems. These visits were: March 1, 1995 Howard Smith Ford, OK 20,591 mi. Aug. 15, 1995 Ernie Hare Ford, Tpa., FL 31,935 mi. Jan. 23, 1996 “ “ “ “ “ 37,071 mi. Apr. 1, 1996 “ “ “ “ “ 41,450 mi. May. 20, 1996 “ “ “ “ “ 45,964 mi. Oct. 8, 1996 “ “ “ “ “ 52,521 mi. Petitioner had put 24,000 miles on his vehicle, by his own admission, sometime in May 1995. In any case, from the above dates and mileage points, it is clear that the 24,000 mile point was reached before August 15, 1995 when he had 31,935 miles on it at the time he first brought the vehicle in to the Florida dealer who sold it to him for service. On or about December 9, 1996, Petitioner executed and forward to the DOA a Request for Arbitration by the Florida Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board. This request for was received in the Department on December 12, 1996. Under the provisions of Section 681.102(9), Florida Statutes, the “Lemon Law rights period” is defined as: the period ending 18 months after the date of the original delivery of a motor vehicle to a consumer or the first 24,000 miles of operation, whichever occurs first. Consumers are required to request arbitration within 6 months after the expiration of the Lemon Law rights period, or within 30 days after the final action of a certified procedure, whichever occurs later. Ford Motor Company has no certified procedure in Florida. Therefore, the deadline for filing is six months after the expiration of the rights period. That would have been January 14, 1996 (18 months after Petitioner took delivery of the vehicle) or in May, 1995 (when he reached 24,000 miles on the vehicle, whichever came earlier. In this case, giving Petitioner the benefit of the doubt, his initial rights period was determined to have ended on or before August 15, 1995, when he put 24,000 miles on his car as evidenced by the repair receipt from Ernie Hare Ford reflecting 31,935 miles on the vehicle when it was brought in for service. The initial Lemon Law rights period may be extended for an additional six months if items of nonconformity which are reported to the dealer within the original period, remain uncorrected at the end thereof. The Department assumed that Petitioner qualified for this extension. This extended the time to February 15, 1996. Consumers have up to six additional months after the expiration of the Lemon Law rights period, as extended, to file for relief under the statute. In this case, Petitioner had until August 15, 1996 to file his request for arbitration. The copy of Petitioner’s request which was received into evidence reflects that he signed it on December 9, 1996, and it was received in the Department on December 12, 1996. This is more than three and a half and almost four months beyond the filing deadline in this case, and constitutes the Department’s basis for denial of Petitioner’s request for arbitration. Petitioner claimed at hearing that the reason he filed his request for arbitration was because the vehicle he purchased was a lemon. Though he purchased it new, it has been in the shop for repair of the same problem more than three times. Notwithstanding the wording of Florida’s Lemon Law in the pamphlet he was given at the time he purchased the car, Petitioner has some problem with the wording used and the way the 18 month/24,000 mile criteria are applied. Because of the fact that he had almost 24,000 miles on the vehicle the first time he brought it in for repair on March 1, 1995, less than nine months after he took delivery of it, he feels use of the 18 month criteria would have given him greater opportunity to find out what he needed to do. No doubt, he contends, had he filed for arbitration right after the third visit for the same problem, in January 1996, he would have been timely. However, he was being generous to the dealer in allowing them to try to fix the problem, an unfortunate mistake on his part. Petitioner also claims he was advised by an unidentified representative of the Department with whom he spoke by telephone after the September 1996 repair, (sometime in early December 1996) that he was still within the time constraints of the statute. At that time, he claims, he advised the individual with whom he spoke of the repair history of the vehicle and how many miles the vehicle had been driven. He was, apparently, wrongly advised.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer services enter a final order denying Petitioner’s Request for Arbitration under the Florida Lemon Law as untimely filed. DONE and ENTERED this 10th day of April, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of April, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Greco Carreras 10420 North 22nd Street Tampa, Florida 33612 Rhonda Long Bass, Esquire Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 515 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Pl-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
Findings Of Fact From October 1, 1975, up to and including April 14, 1976, the Respondent, Bobbie P. Miles, d/b/a D. J. `s Lounge, held State of Florida Alcoholic Beverage License No. 26-91, Series 2-COP, for operation at a premises of 6644 Arlington Road, Jacksonville, Florida. A copy of this license is found in Composite Exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence. Sometime in the beginning of April, 1976, Detective Claude Locke with the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office, received information from an informant that a minor female was selling alcoholic beverages in D. J.`s Lounge. This minor female was identified as being 5 foot 7 inches tall with reddish blonde hair. Locke went to D. J.`s Lounge and was served a beer by a woman fitting that description. No other employee in the bar was serving alcoholic beverages while he was there for 45 minutes. Subsequent to his investigation of the bar, Officer Locke contacted the State of Florida, Division of Beverage, about his activities. Officers B. W. Rowe and K. A. Boyd of the Division of Beverage acting on Officer Locke's report went to D. J.`s Lounge on April 14, 1976. The officers took a seat at the bar and a white female who was playing the pinball machine went to the bar and served them alcoholic beverages by serving the beverage and taking the money and returning the change from the purchase. This person who served them had reddish blond hair and was later identified in the course of the hearing as being one Darlene Usury. After Darlene Usury served the beer to the officers she went behind the bar and poured herself a beer and began to drink that beer. Her glass of alcoholic beverage was checked by the officers on the basis of their expertise and found to be an alcoholic beverage, and is offered into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 3, admitted. The alcoholic beverage served them was also tasted, based upon their expertise and found to be an alcoholic beverage. There was another woman working at the bar on April 14, 1976. This woman was Donna Moody. Ms. Moody indicated that Usury was not employed in the bar and that she had never checked her identification because the owner of the bar, Bobbie P. Miles, had allowed Darlene Usury to drink on other occasions. Later in the evening of April 14, 1976, the owner and Respondent, Bobbie P. Miles, came to the bar and indicated that he had met Darlene Usury at another establishment which he was operating and had been shown an identification. This identification was a Pennsylvania license issued to Debra Yanni, and this identification showed Darlene R. Usury to be more than 18 years of age on April 14, 1976. The identification card is Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2 admitted into evidence. The identification card does not have a photograph. The identification card was initially shown to Bobbie P. Miles at the Jubille Bar a year or more before April 14, 1976. Darlene R. Usury was in fact 17 years old on April 14, 1976, at the time she served the alcoholic beverages to the beverage officers and consumed an alcoholic beverage. Darlene Usury explained that her action of serving the beer to the beverage officers was an isolated incident and she only did it to help out Donna Moody, the person in charge of the bar on that night. Bobbie P. Miles said that Darlene R. Usury was not employed on that night or on any other night. Although Darlene R. Usury had served the alcoholic beverages to Officers Rowe and Boyd, Donna Moody was also working behind the bar at that time. Officer Locke was unable to identify Darlene R. Usury as the woman who had served him alcoholic beverages on the prior occasion in April, 1976.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the licensee, Bobbie P. Miles, be fined in the amount of $150.00 for the violation as established by the Administrative Complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 1st day of August, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Charles F. Tunnicliff, Esquire Division of Beverage 725 Bronough Street The Johns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Bobbie P. Miles pro se 6644 Arlington Road Jacksonville, Florida
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to arbitration before the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board under Chapter 681, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On November 30, 1993, Petitioner took delivery of a new, 1994 Mercedes Benz SL600, bearing vehicle identification number WDBFA76EORF093081. The selling dealer was Regency Autohaus, Inc. in Naples, Florida, which is where delivery to Petitioner took place. Petitioner experienced numerous mechanical problems with the vehicle starting shortly after taking delivery. Problems during the first year of ownership included air conditioning that would not work and a transmission problem that would not permit use of gears other than third. On February 22, 1995, Petitioner sent to Mercedes Benz a Motor Vehicle Defect Notification. Petitioner continued to experience problems with the car and, on May 9, 1996, sent Mercedes Benz a second Motor Vehicle Defect Notification. Despite repeated attempts by Mercedes Benz to repair largely recurring problems with the car, Petitioner was unable to obtain satisfactory repairs. Twice, the Mercedes Benz dealer in Louisville, Kentucky, where Petitioner lives part of the year, towed the car to the shop to repair a failure of the car to start. Keeping the car 11 days the first time and six days the second time, the Louisville dealer could not determine the source of the problem. Later, in September 1996, the Louisville dealer kept the car for 13 days trying to fix several problems. At this time, the car had 23,692 miles on it. The issue in this case is whether Petitioner made a timely demand for arbitration under the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board, Chapter 681, Florida Statutes. The Motor Vehicle Defect Notifications that Petitioner sent to Mercedes Benz are not demands for arbitration. The forms state that, under the Florida Lemon Law, the purchaser is “requesting that [the manufacturer] make a final attempt to correct the continuing substantial defect(s) or condition(s).” In the spring of 1996, Petitioner spoke with several representatives of Mercedes Benz and Respondent about arbitration and procedures under the Florida Lemon Law. By letter to a national Mercedes Benz representative dated April 24, 1996, Petitioner complained about the car and the discourteous treatment he had received from another Mercedes Benz employee. The letter explains why Petitioner does “not want to keep this vehicle” and warns that, if Petitioner did not hear from someone at Mercedes Benz within five days, he would “have no alternative but take further action.” By letter dated May 9, 1996, Petitioner sent the Office of the Attorney General a letter with a copy of the second Motor Vehicle Defect Notification. The letter notes that the car was in the shop for repairs for more than 15 days prior to the expiration of 18 months and thus appears to be covered by the Florida Lemon Law. The letter concludes: “I have requested that the purchase price be refunded or that the vehicle be repaired.” By letter dated May 23, 1996, Petitioner informed a Mercedes Benz representative in St. Petersburg, Florida, that Petitioner had researched his rights under the Florida Lemon Law. Petitioner stated that Mercedes Benz had to replace the vehicle or refund the purchase price. Petitioner added, “If your company fails to do this, then the only alternative would be to arbitrate the matter . . ..” The letter concludes: “It would seem to me that your company should be willing to go ahead and do this rather than go through the arbitration and be ordered to do something that you could voluntarily do. Please advise your thoughts on the matter.” On July 5, 1996, Petitioner filed a Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board. Immediately above Petitioner’s signature, which is dated June 28, 1996, the form warns that persons making false statements with the intent to mislead a public servant in the performance of his official duty are guilty of misdemeanor violations of cited Florida Statutes. The form adds: I hereby request arbitration of my case with the Florida New Motor Vehicle Board. I certify that all statements made in connection with this request are true and correct to the best of my knowledge. I understand that this document and its attachments are public records. The letters of April 29 and May 9 and 23 are not demands for arbitration. They are demands for the remedies that are available under the Florida Lemon Law, but they are not demands for arbitration. Nowhere in these three letters does Petitioner, who is an attorney, make a definitive demand of Mercedes Benz or Respondent for arbitration. The letters mention Mercedes Benz’s liability under the Florida Lemon Law and the remedies available under the law. The letters implicitly warn of arbitration, but continue to reflect Petitioner’s strategy during this period to try to work out this matter without the necessity of legal proceedings. Mercedes Benz does not maintain a certified procedure for the resolution of disputes of the type involved in this case.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order denying Petitioner’s request for arbitration before the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board under Chapter 681, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 29th day of January, 1997. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of January, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert L. Bertram Post Office Box 25 Jamestown, Kentucky 42629-0025 Attorney Rhonda Long Bass Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Room 515, Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, Ingram Grove Services, Inc., (Ingram), was a commercial grower of citrus fruit and a licensed citrus fruit dealer in Florida. Mark Fetzer, Inc. (Fetzer), was also a grower and a licensed citrus fruit dealer in Florida. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company was an insurance company authorized to write surety bonds in this state during the 1991-1992 citrus shipping season and was the underwriter of Fetzer's bond for the transaction in issue herein. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company was an insurance company authorized to write surety bonds in this state during the 1991-1992 citrus shipping season and was the underwriter of Ingram's bond for the transaction herein. By contract number 518, dated January 14, 1992, and drafted on the letterhead of Mark Fetzer, Inc., Ingram, the grower, sold and conveyed to Fetzer, the buyer, approximately 20,000 boxes of valencia oranges at a price of $10.50 per box, with a moving date of April 30, 1992. This description was intended to cover all valencia oranges grown by Ingram and contained in Suncrest #11 field in Sebring, Florida and included transportation to Polk County. Ingram was authorized to, and did, request a deposit of $1.00 per box, and by check dated April 27, 1992, Fetzer paid Ingram the sum of $20,000. The oranges were to be delivered by Ingram to the Commercial Carriers Cold Storage, (CCCS), facility in Auburndale, Florida. The entire crop of fruit covered by this contract was to be paid for within 30 days of delivery to CCCS. The contract did not prohibit Fetzer from re-selling the fruit covered thereby. Ingram and Fetzer had done business together for several years, since 1985. In every case, each had paid what was owed to the other, but it is admitted that on occasion, such payment was delayed for a short time. Neither had ever failed to ultimately pay what was owed the other, however. Sometime after delivery of the fruit to CCCS by Ingram, Fetzer sold 3,000 of the boxes to Vero Beach Groves, Inc., (VB), a producer of commercial orange juice for commercial sales. At that time, and at all times pertinent to the issues herein, VB was having financial difficulties. Evidence of record indicates that at the time, VB owed approximately $32,000 to Fetzer, somewhat more than $60,000 to Ingram, and over $600,000 to Florida Growers, another entity not pertinent to the issues herein. The terms of Fetzer's sale to VB called for a payment of $13.65 per box. This included $11.65 per box for the oranges then delivered, including 15 brokerage, and $2.00 per box to satisfy VB's antecedent debt to Fetzer. If all the Ingram fruit were resold by Fetzer to VB, this procedure would have paid off VB's debt to Fetzer before all the Ingram fruit was pulled out of storage. When the antecedent debt was liquidated, the price per box would have been reduced to $11.65. Fetzer had not allowed VB's debt to it to grow very large, and the above practice, which had been followed for several years, had to this point, been successful. There was no dispute under the terms of the contract between Ingram and Fetzer until sometime in mid-May, 1992 when, prior to the delivery of any fruit, Mr. Ingram called Mr. Fetzer and asked for a meeting. At that meeting, Mr. Ingram told Mr. Fetzer that unless an agreement was made to get him, Ingram, a debt reduction procedure similar to Fetzer's, he would not make available to Fetzer the fruit called for under the contract. Mr. Ingram indicated at the hearing that when he heard Fetzer had contracted with VB, in light of VB's tenuous financial condition, he was concerned about being able to get paid and this caused him to seek the meeting with Fetzer. However, he did not communicate this to Fetzer nor did he ask Fetzer for payment in advance or some security for the obligation. In fact, according to Fetzer, he had the money available, in cash, to pay the entire amount owed Ingram if necessary. In addition, Fetzer told Ingram that even if VB could not take the fruit, there were at least 3 -5 other "juicers" to whom he could sell the fruit and pay Ingram. In point of fact, the fruit was subsequently sold, by Ingram, to other juice processors at a per box price which varied from $12.50 to $13.35. Nonetheless, Fetzer tried to work the situation out for all concerned with no consideration given him for any purported change to the contract. Faced with the potential for not being able to get the fruit for sale to VB, the contract with whom was worth in excess of $200,000 to him, Fetzer met with a representative of VB and reached an agreement with it whereby VB would pay an additional $3.35 over the $13.65 so that Ingram could be paid. At this meeting he was told by Mr. Kordick, VB's vice president, that VB would work something out with Ingram for the remaining fruit. Thereafter, VB agreed with Ingram to make additional payments to Ingram. It appears, however, that this agreement to pay the extra on Ingram's antecedent debt was more acquiescence to coercion than voluntary agreement. Fetzer then released the first shipment of oranges to VB. VB paid for the shipment of oranges when it came in.It also issued four checks in the amount of $1,680.00 each fdor payment on VB's antecedent debt to Ingram which were made payable to Ingram or Fetzer. These four checks were cashed by Fetzer and were dishonored. They were ultimately redeemed by VB after several weeks, but none of the funds were transmitted by Fetzer to Ingram. Fetzer kept them as compensation for the amount of profit he lost because of Ingram's refusal to release any more oranges after the first shipment. In addition, Fetzer did not pay Ingram for the first 3,000 box shipment. After the first shipment was delivered to VB, Mr. Fetzer was contacted by VB's representative, Mr. Kordick, who advised VB could not pay the amount asked for the fruit which included the "surcharge" to reimburse Ingram because the processed juice would not bring enough to cover it. Admittedly, Mr. Fetzer did not ask Mr. Ingram to rescind the requirement for the "surcharge" payment. Had he done so and had Ingram agreed, it is most likely that VB could have purchased all the oranges from the entire contract and paid for it. All Fetzer did was tell Ingram he should not place the extra burden on VB, and as it was, VB went out of business. Mr. Fetzer knew of the arrangements for the "surcharge" that Ingram wanted before the delivery of the one shipment to VB and requested that shipment knowing what was required. He decided to go along with Ingram to see what would happen even though he felt by then that Ingram had breached the contract. However, he did not put this in writing to Ingram. He felt he had no choice due to Mr. Ingram's representation to him at their May meeting that it would be Ingram's way or not at all. Fetzer went along with it because he saw it as the only way to potentially get the money owed him by VB. Considering the net amount paid by Fetzer as deposit, ($20,000 - $3,000 = $17,000); the amount of antecedent debt unrecoverable due to Ingram's actions, ($26,000) and the anticipated profit lost of the remaining boxes un- delivered by Ingram, ($14,950), Ingram owes Fetzer a gross total of $57,590. From this must be deducted the $6,720 which Fetzer collected from VB on Ingram's behalf but which was not delivered to Ingram, and the $31,500 unpaid for the 3,000 boxes delivered, leaving Ingram's net obligation to Fetzer as $19,730.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that A Final Order be issued by the Commissioner of Agriculture awarding the sum of $19730 to Mark Fetzer, Inc. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of June, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR FETZER: & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Not a Finding of Fact but a statement of the law. Not a Finding of Fact but a Conclusion of Law. Accepted as a restatement of the case history. - 9. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 11. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein except that the debt of VB to Ingram was approximately $60,000. Accepted that no tripartite agreement was reached. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Not a Finding of Fact. Accepted. Not a Finding of fact but a restatement of testimony. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted that Ingram resold to others the fruit not released to Fetzer. Not a Finding of Fact but a statement of law. Accepted and incorporated herein with amount stated. Accepted and incorporated herein. FOR INGRAM: & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. First sentence rejected in so far as it indicates a tri-party agreement. VB's participation was more a matter of acquiescence than agreement. Second sentence accepted and incorporated herein. First sentence rejected. Fetzer did not decline to take fruit as called for in the original contract. Second sentence accepted as it notes the sale to third parties but not "as a result" of Fetzer's failure to take the fruit. Not a Finding of Fact but a Conclusion of law. Rejected as contra to the weight of the evidence. Rejected. Not a proper Finding of Fact but more a comment on the state of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas A. Lockwood, III, Esquire Peterson, Myers, Craig, Crews, Brandon & Puterbaugh, P.A. P.O. Drawer 7608 Lake Region Plaza, Suite 300 141 5th Street, N.W. Winter Haven, Florida 33883-7608 C. Kennon Hendrix, Esquire Hendrix & Brennan P.O. Box 520- 2043 14th Avenue Vero Beach, Florida 32961-0520 Chester C. Payne Financial Examiner Analyst Office of Citrus Bond and License Division of Marketing Development Department of Agriculture P.O. Box 1072 500 Third Street, N.W. Winter Haven, Florida 33882-1072 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing and Bond Department of Agriculture 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
The Issue Whether Respondent, The Citrus Store, a citrus fruit dealer, owes Petitioner, Hutchinson Groves, Inc., a grower of Florida citrus products, a sum of money for citrus fruit harvested from Petitioner's groves. SUMMARY DISPOSITION On or about December 16, 2003, Petitioner, Hutchinson Groves, Inc., filed a complaint with the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (the "Department"), alleging that Respondent, The Citrus Store, owes Petitioner the sum of $27,117.59, for oranges harvested from Petitioner's groves by Respondent pursuant to a written contract. Respondent conceded that it owed some lesser amount to the owner of the groves in question. However, the matter was complicated by the fact that, subsequent to the execution of the contract with Respondent, Petitioner had sold those groves to a third party who also asserted a claim to the proceeds from the sale of the fruit to Respondent. The matter was the subject of litigation in the Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Highlands County (Case No. GC-02-587), which caused the Department to delay forwarding the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings until December 2, 2005. The case was assigned to the undersigned and set for hearing on February 2, 2006. The hearing was convened as scheduled. Prior to the taking of testimony, the parties discussed settlement of the matter. At the conclusion of their discussions, the parties stipulated: that the Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over this matter and the parties thereto pursuant to Section 120.569 and Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (2005); that, at all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner was a "producer" pursuant to Subsection 601.03(29), Florida Statutes; that, at all times relevant to this proceeding, The Citrus Store was a "citrus fruit dealer" pursuant to Subsection 601.03(8), Florida Statutes; that Respondent owes Petitioner $27,117.59 for the oranges harvested from Petitioner's groves; and that no interest would be sought or assessed against Respondent on the principal amount owing to Petitioner. Based on the foregoing stipulations, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered requiring Respondent, The Citrus Store, to pay to Petitioner, Hutchinson Groves, Inc., the principal sum of $27,117.59, without interest. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of February, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of February, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathy Alves Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland Post Office Box 87 Baltimore, Maryland 21203 William Hutchinson Hutchinson Groves, Inc. 1323 Edgewater Point Drive Sebring, Florida 33870 Clifford R. Rhoades, Esquire Clifford R. Rhoades, P.A. 227 North Ridgewood Drive Sebring, Florida 33870 Anthony W. Surber, Esquire Harbsmeier, DeZayas, Harden & DeBari, L.L.P. 5116 South Lakeland Drive Lakeland, Florida 33813 Chris Green, Chief Bureau of License and Bond Division of Marketing 407 South Calhoun Street, Mail Station 38 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel 407 South Calhoun Street, Suite 520 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
The Issue Whether respondent's alcoholic beverage license should be suspended or revoked for alleged violations of the Beverage Law, Chapters 561 and 562, Florida Statutes (1981).
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, respondent held alcoholic beverage license No. 15-388 2-COP, authorizing it to sell beer and wine at its business known as Golden Dolphin #2, ("licensed premises") located at 218-B Highway A1A, Satellite Beach, Florida. The licensed premises includes a bar, lounge, and stage where nude or partially nude dancers provide live entertainment. I. Alleged Violations Occurring On July 3, 1980 During the evening of July 3, 1980, Beverage Officers B. A. Watts and Kevin Ashcroft entered the licensed premises in an undercover capacity. Officer Watts sat down at a table and ordered a beer. Patricia Belle Gardener a/k/a "Peaches," employed by respondent, approached and sat down at his table. While they were talking, Anita Jackson, a waitress employed by respondent, approached and asked him, "Do you want to buy Peaches a drink?" or words to that effect. He turned to Peaches and asked her if she wanted a drink; she answered "Yes." He then ordered a wine cocktail for her and paid Ms. Jackson $5.00. (Testimony of Watts.) Later that evening, Peaches asked Officer Watts if he would buy her another drink. He replied that the price was rather steep but that, if she got part of it, he would agree. After she replied that she received a commission from the sale, he agreed. She summonned waitress Jackson, and told her that he wanted another drink. Ms. Jackson asked Officer Watts if he wanted a bottle, which she said was a "better deal." (Tr. 32) After hearing the price, he declined and ordered her another wine cocktail. (Testimony of Watts.) Officer Watts then asked Peaches what time she got off work and if she had a date. She told him the time, and that she did not have a date. He asked if she liked to have a good time, to which she replied, "Yes, how much money have you got?" (Tr.33) He answered "How much will it take?" and offered her $20. She said "that's not enough." He asked, "[H]ow about $30?" (Tr.33) She agreed. He asked, "What will $30 get me?" and she replied, "Half and half," which--in street talk--means oral and sexual intercourse. (Testimony of Watts.) Officer Ashcroft, who had entered the premises with Officer Watts, had seated himself at the bar. He was approached by Laurie Thornton, another female dancer employed by respondent, who asked, "How about buying me a drink?" or words to that effect. He declined, after which she approached another patron at the bar. (Testimony of Ashcroft.) No evidence was adduced to show that respondent, through its owners or managers, knew that its employees were asking or soliciting customers to purchase alcoholic beverages for the employees' consumption. II. Alleged Violations Occurring On February 19, 1981 In February, 1981, DABT launched another investigation of the licensed premises. On February 19, 1981, Beverage Officers Fred Dunbar and Rufus Blanton entered the licensed premises, set at a table near the dance stage, and ordered beers from Helen Davis, a waitress employed by respondent. McKinney Rojas, a/k/a Tia Marie, a dancer employed by respondent, approached them and sat down at their table. Almost immediately, waitress Davis appeared and asked "Are you going to buy Ti [meaning Tia Marie] a drink?" (Tr.-73) Officer Dunbar replied, "Ti ain't said nothing about wanting a drink." (Tr.-73) Tia Marie then explained: Fred, let me explain it to you. This is a beer and wine bar, and it's against the rules for us to drink beer. What I'd like for you to do is buy me a bottle of champagne. Helen will bring it to us in a bucket of ice with two glasses and we can sit here and drink it together, and we can talk. (Tr.-73) Officer Dunbar agreed and ordered a small (6.3 oz.) bottle champagne for $10.00. Waitress Davis then brought it to the table with a bucket of ice and one glass. He continued to drink his beer; she drank the champagne and remained at the table for approximately 45 minutes, then excused herself because it was her turn to dance on stage. (Testimony of Dunbar, Blanton.) Tia Marie then returned to the beverage officers table. Almost immediately waitress Davis appeared and asked Officer Dunbar if he was going to buy Tia Marie another bottle. He declined. Tia Marie then stood up, and asked Officer Blanton if he was going to buy her a bottle. Waitress Davis asked him the same question. He agreed, waitress Davis brought another bottle of champagne, and he paid her $10.00. During this conversation, Tia Marie explained to the officers that she was getting a 25 percent commission for the drinks customers bought for her; that they were really paying for her company, not for the champagne. (Testimony of Blanton, Dunbar.) During that same evening, Beverage Officer Watts entered the licensed premises and sat at another table near the dance stage. He ordered a beer from waitress Davis. Shortly thereafter, "Sabal," a female dancer employed by respondent, sat down at his table and engaged him in conversation. A few minutes later, waitress Davis appeared and asked if he wanted to buy Sabal a drink. He turned to Sabal and asked her what she wanted. She replied, "Helen [Davis] can explain it to you." (Tr.-46) Ms. Davis then explained that he could buy a bottle of champagne for Sabal for $10.00. He agreed. (Testimony of Watts.) After Sabal finished drinking the champagne, she asked Officer Watts if he would buy her another bottle. He replied that it was a rather steep price, that he might agree if she got something out of it. After being assured that she received a commission of $3.00 per bottle, he agreed to purchase her another for $10.00. Waitress Davis, again, brought it to the table. After finishing her second bottle, Sabal told Officer Watts that it was her turn to dance and went to the nearby stage. (Testimony of Watts.) III. Alleged Violations Occurring On February 26, 1981 On February 26, 1981, the three beverage officers (Watts, Dunbar and Blanton) returned to the licensed premises. Officers Dunbar and Blanton again sat at a table near the stage, Officer Watts sat at another. While seated at their table, Officers Dunbar and Blanton were approached by "Dominique" (later identified as Madeline C. Droege), a female dancer employed by respondent. Dominique was wearing black panties, stockings with a garter belt, high-heeled shoes, and a silk elastic-like material covering her breasts. Almost immediately, waitress Davis appeared and asked, "Are you going to buy Dominique a drink?" (Tr.-77) Officer Dunbar replied, "We're not going to go through all that again are we?" (Tr.-77) Waitress Davis laughed, and Dominique said she would like to have some wine. But before he agreed to buy her wine, the conversation turned to the subject of lap dancing. (Testimony of Dunbar, Blanton) Dominique told Officer Blanton that she would perform a lap dance for him for $5.00. He agreed. When the next song started, she removed the silk material covering her breasts and straddled Officer Blanton's lap. Wearing only panties and high-heeled shoes, she simulated sexual intercourse by rotating and gyrating the lower part of her body. During the lap dance, she massaged her breasts with her hands. Later that evening she also performed the same type of dance on Officer Watts, for which she was also paid $5.00. (Testimony of Blanton, Watts.) After Dominique departed, Michelle Smith, another female dancer employed by respondent, approached the officers' table and asked if she could join them. They agreed, she sat down, and then waitress Davis appeared, asking, "Are you going to buy Michelle a bottle of champagne?" (Tr.-80) At first, he resisted. But Miss Smith encouraged him, "Oh, come on, Fred, buy me a bottle of champagne. (Tr.-81) He finally agreed, and waitress Davis brought a bucket of ice, a glass, and a small bottle of champagne, for which he paid $10.00. Miss Smith also told the officers that she received a commission on the champagne sales. After drinking half of the bottle she left the table, explaining that she had to go backstage. (Testimony of Dunbar.) She returned to the table a few minutes later, finished the bottle of champagne, and requested another. At the same time, she turned the bottle upside down in the ice bucket and admitted that this was a signal to the waitress that she wanted another bottle. Waitress Davis then returned to the table and--at Miss Smith's request--Officer Dunbar purchased her a second bottle of champagne. She later requested that he purchase a third bottle, but he declined, explaining that he was out of money. She then left the table and performed a striptease on the nearby stage. (Testimony of Dunbar.) Before leaving the premises, the two officers were approached by Tia Marie, the same dancer whom they had met on February 19, 1981. She sat at the table and asked Officer Blanton to buy her a drink. He agreed and waitress Davis returned with a bottle of champagne. Tia Marie consumed the champagne, then turned the bottle upside down on the ice bucket. (Testimony of Dunbar, Blanton) That same evening, Office Watts--who had seated himself at another table nearby--was also approached by Dominique, who sat down and engaged him in conversation. Waitress Davis soon appeared and asked if he would like to buy the lady a drink. He said the lady had not asked for one; Dominique responded that she would like to have one. She then ordered a bottle of champagne for which Officer Watts paid the waitress $10.00. (Testimony of Watts.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent's alcoholic beverage license be revoked for multiple violations of the Beverage Law. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 20th day of April, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of April, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: James N. Watson, Jr., Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Samuel S. Henderson, Esquire and Jerrold A. Bross, Esquire 1365 North Courtney Parkway, Suite D Merritt Island, Florida 32952 Gary Rutledge, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Howard M. Rasmussen, Director Department of Business Regulation Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the Petitioners' Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board should be granted or denied.
Findings Of Fact Pursuant to Section 681.109, Florida Statutes, Respondent's Division of Consumer Services is the state agency in Florida charged with the responsibility to receive and evaluate consumer requests for arbitration pursuant to Chapter 681, which is officially known as the Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act, but which is more commonly referred to as the "Lemon Law". As part of its responsibilities, the Division of Consumer Services determines whether complaints it receives from consumer against manufacturers pursuant to the "Lemon Law" qualify for referral to the Department of Legal Affairs for further proceedings before the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board. 1/ On March 29, 1995, Respondent received and filed Petitioners' Request for Arbitration under the provisions of the Lemon Law. Section 681.102(9), Florida Statutes, defines the "Lemon Law rights period" as being ". . . the period ending 18 months after the date of the original delivery of a motor vehicle to a consumer or the first 24,000 miles of operation, whichever first occurs." The automobile that is the subject of Petitioners' complaint is a Toyota Camry. The Petitioners took delivery of this vehicle on July 25, 1992, the date they leased the vehicle from a Toyota dealer. Eighteen months from July 25, 1992, is January 25, 1994. It was not until September 1, 1994, that Petitioners put 24,000 miles on the vehicle. The initial Lemon Law period, as defined by Section 681.102(9), Florida Statutes, expired for the subject vehicle on January 25, 1994. Petitioners made complaints to the dealer prior to January 25, 1994, that remained uncured after January 25, 1994. Because of those complaints, the Respondent assumed that the Lemon Law period was extended for an additional six month period pursuant to Section 681.104(3)(b), Florida Statutes. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the Petitioners, the Respondent determined that the extended Lemon Law period expired July 25, 1994. It is found that the extended Lemon Law period for the subject vehicle expired on or before July 25, 1994. Pertinent to this proceeding, Section 681.109(4), Florida Statutes, provides that a consumer must request arbitration before the Arbitration Board within six months after the expiration of the extended Lemon Law rights period. Because of that provision, the Petitioners had until January 25, 1995, to file its request for relief under the Lemon Law. The request for relief under the Lemon Law, first filed by Petitioners on March 29, 1995, was not timely.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent enter a final order that denies the Petitioners' Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board on the grounds that the request was not timely. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of October, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of October, 1995.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this hearing is whether Petitioner should be certified by Respondent as qualified for arbitration services by the Office of the Florida Attorney General.
Findings Of Fact The Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services is the state agency in Florida charged with the responsibility under the Florida Lemon Law to receive and evaluate customer complaints and Requests for Arbitration in disputes with automobile manufacturers and dealers doing business in this state, and to determine if the request qualifies for referral to the Attorney General for further processing and action. Michael F. Morrow, then the husband of Petitioner herein, Sandy Morrow, purchased a 1992 Ford explorer from Gary Brown Ford, Inc. in Hudson, Florida on April 8, 1992. The total purchase price was $19,967.94. A deposit of $1,000 was made at the time of the order, and the balance of $18,967.94 was paid in cash at the time of delivery of the vehicle on April 29, 1992. Less than one month after delivery, the Morrows began to have problems with the vehicle. On May 14, 1992 the vehicle would not start and was towed to the dealership for repairs. It was returned after 5 days. On September 21, 1992, the vehicle's paint was noticed to be chipping off and the vehicle was again returned to the dealer for correction. This time it was kept for 8 days. When, on September 28, 1992, Ms. Morrow went to retrieve the vehicle, she noticed that various chips had not been repaired, so she left it with the dealer for another 4 days. On November 22, 1993, Ms. Morrow replaced the battery in the vehicle. At this time, the vehicle was only 19 months old. A radio/cassette player problem noticed at that time was un-traceable and ignored by the dealer. However, on July 14, 1994, after parts on the vehicle had begun falling apart, Ms. Morrow again brought the vehicle in for repairs and left it for 1 day. At this time the dealer repaired the armrest. It also corrected a mildew odor in the air conditioning and a failure of that unit to cool; replaced missing screws in the driver's seat; and fixed the rear windshield washer which had broken off. In addition, the radio/cassette player problem still existed and was not fixed. On August 8, 1994, because the radio/cassette player was still not working, Ms. Morrow returned the vehicle to the dealer and left it for 16 days until August 23, 1994. Approximately one month later, on September 24, 1994, while Ms. Morrow was on vacation with the vehicle, the air conditioning stopped working. Having achieved no satisfaction from the dealer, Ms. Morrow took the vehicle to another mechanic who repaired the unit in one day. Nonetheless, four days later, on September 28, 1994, when Ms. Morrow opened the vehicle door, the door lock fell out. No tampering with the lock could be found, and the vehicle was in repair for 1 day. On November 1, 1994, the rear window washer stopped working and the vehicle was in the shop for 1 day. The following day, Bill Currie Ford, a Tampa Ford dealership, took the vehicle in for repainting due to fading. The vehicle was in the shop for 21 days. When it was returned, Ms. Morrow noticed that the interior was coated with a red/orange residue, the carpets were not reinstalled, and various parts were left lying inside. When she complained, she was told by the service manager that they had had to take the car apart to repaint it. The following day, the dealership cleaned the paint residue from the inside of the vehicle, but Ms. Morrow had to reinstall the carpet and replace some of the parts herself. While all this was going on, and since she was still getting little, if any, satisfaction from the dealer, Ms. Morrow telephoned the Department's Office of Consumer Services. The individual with whom she spoke advised her to go through the Ford Motor Company consumer appeals process first. As a result, on August 16, 1994, Ms. Morrow wrote to the Ford Consumer Appeals Board and outlined her litany of complaints regarding the vehicle in question. By letter dated October 8, 1994, the Dispute Settlement Board of Ford Motor Company advised Ms. Morrow that since most of her complaints, those relating to the paint, rear washer, arm rest, seat, radio and air conditioner, had been resolved, it was the unanimous opinion of the Board that she be offered a 12 month/12,000 mile Extended Service Plan and be reimbursed $10.60 for air deodorizing. Ms. Morrow was also advised that if she rejected this offer in settlement, she could pursue arbitration with the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board administered by the office of the Florida Attorney General. She was also notified of the fact that her Request for Arbitration must be filed within either 6 months after the expiration of the Lemon Law rights period, or within 30 days after the final action by Ford's board, whichever was later. On November 17, 1994, Ms. Morrow signed her Request for Arbitration which was received in the Department on November 22, 1994. The Request was reviewed and a decision made to reject it as untimely on November 30, 1994. That decision was communicated to Ms. Morrow in Mr. Hamrick's letter mentioned previously. The decision to reject Ms. Morrow's Request for Arbitration as untimely was based on a calculation of the time which elapsed after the decision of the Ford Settlement Board on October 8, 1994. The Department computed the thirty days period to expire on November 7, 1994. The Lemon Law rights period of 18 months from the date of delivery of the vehicle expired on October 29, 1993. However, because at that time all complaints regarding the vehicle had not been corrected, it was extended to April 29, 1994. Under either scenario, and applying that most liberal to Ms. Morrow, her Request for Arbitration, signed on November 17, 1994, and received by the Department on November 22, 1994, was considered untimely. Under the terms of the Florida Lemon Law, if the complainant does not meet the eligibility requirements for requesting arbitration, the Department has no authority to send the complaint to the Attorney General for arbitration.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued by the Department of Agriculture denying Ms. Morrow's request for arbitration services. RECOMMENDED this 4th day of April, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of April, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Sandy Morrow 4022 Shamrock Tampa, Florida 33611 John S. Koda, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Room 515, Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol - PL10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Petitioner is eligible to participate in arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board concerning his purchase of a 1995 Saturn automobile.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Respondent, Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, was the state agency responsible for the administration of matters regarding the implementation of the Lemon Law for motor vehicles in this state. Chapter 681, Florida Statutes, deals with motor vehicle sales warranties, and incorporates Florida’s Lemon Law as it is pertinent to this matter. Petitioner, Marshall E. Pitts, III, a resident of Groveland, Florida, purchased a 1995 Saturn SLI automobile on or about March 14, 1995, from Saturn of Orlando. The purchase order/contract for sale bears a date of March 14, 1995. The purchase price of the vehicle was $13,750. Petitioner had a trade-in valued at $8,400, which left a difference of $5,350 to be paid. In his request for arbitration, Petitioner indicated the purchase date as March 16, 1995, and the Department, giving him the benefit of the doubt in calculating the allowable time for filing under the Lemon Law, considered the March 16, 1995, date as the date of purchase/delivery which initiates the running of the time for filing a request for arbitration. The Lemon Law calls for filing for arbitration within 18 months or 24,000 miles of delivery. Therefore, the initial filing deadline was September 16, 1996. The vehicle reached 24,000 miles on the odometer sometime in November 1996. The Lemon Law statute allows an extension of six months for filing if a nonconformity has been reported but not cured by the manufacturer or its representative by the expiration of the Lemon Law period. Petitioner took the vehicle in for repairs to the safety belt three times starting sometime in October 1995. Exact dates are not shown. He also took it in for repairs to the transaxle three times, on March 21, 1996, September 19, 1996, and on January 31, 1997. The trouble with the transaxle was not corrected within the Lemon Law rights period. Because of this, a six-month extension for triple reports of difficulty was implemented. This extended the filing deadline to March 16, 1997. Petitioner was afforded an additional six-months extension because of the wording of the statute which grants an individual six months after the expiration of the Lemon Law Rights period to request arbitration. Application of this additional six months extended the filing deadline to September 16, 1997. Petitioner submitted his request for arbitration on October 29, 1997, and it was received in the Department on November 5, 1997. At the time of filing the request, there were 77,000 miles on the vehicle’s odometer. Petitioner claims he did not receive any notification of his rights under the Lemon Law from the dealer at the time he took delivery of the vehicle. He claims it was only when talking with an attorney late in the process that he learned of the existence of the arbitration procedure. A dealer of new cars is required by law to provide the purchaser of a new vehicle with a copy of the Department’s brochure which outlines the Lemon Law program. Petitioner also recites a litany of complaints regarding the vehicle and the treatment he received from both the selling dealer and the manufacturer. Unfortunately, traumatic as these problems must have been to him, they have no relevance to the issues here.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a Final Order denying Petitioner’s request for arbitration under the Florida Lemon Law as untimely filed. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of April, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of April, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Marshall E. Pitts, III 3831 Soto Road Groveland, Florida 34736 Rhonda Long Bass, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 515 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
