Conclusions THE PARTIES resolved all disputed issues and executed a Settlement Agreement. The parties are directed to comply with the terms of the attached settlement agreement. Based on the foregoing, this file is CLOSED. DONE and ORDERED on this the day of &kvacy , 2010, in Tallahassee, Florida. 1 Filed February 26, 2010 3:40 PM Division of Administrative Hearings. A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO A JUDICIAL REVIEW WHICH SHALL BE INSTITUTED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF ARCA, AND A SECOND COPY ALONG WITH FILING FEE AS PRESCRIBED BYLAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE AGENCY MAINTAINS ITS HEADQUARTERS OR WHERE A PARTY RESIDES. REVIEW PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FLORIDA APPELLATE RULES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED. Copies furnished to: David W. Nam, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration (Interoffice Mail) Joanne B. Erde, P.A. Duane Morris LLP 200 South Biscayne Boulevard Suite 3400 Miami, Florida 33131 (U.S. Mail) Donna Holshouser Stinson Broad and Cassel 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 400 P.O. Drawer 11300 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 (U.S. Mail) Bureau of Medicaid Program Analysis Attn: Michele Hudson, Bureau Chief CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished to the above named addressees by U.S. Mail or electronic transmission on this the f 7,2010. Richard Shoop, Esquire Agency Clerk State of Florida Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Building #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 (850) 922-5873 : '
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner’s application for a Certificate of Need to establish a new 84-bed acute care hospital in Viera should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Parties Holmes and the Health First System Holmes, the applicant for the CON at issue in this case, is a not-for-profit corporation that operates two acute care hospitals in Brevard County: Holmes Regional Medical Center (HRMC) in Melbourne and Palm Bay Community Hospital (PBCH) in Palm Bay. HRMC opened in 1962. It is a 514-bed acute care hospital, with 504 acute care beds and 10 Level II neonatal intensive care (NICU) beds. HRMC provides tertiary-level services, including adult open-heart surgery, and it is the designated trauma center for Brevard County. HRMC has been recognized as one of the top 100 cardiovascular hospitals in the country, and it has received other recognitions for the high quality of care that it provides. PBCH opened in 1992. It is a 60-bed acute care hospital. PBCH does not provide tertiary-level services, and it does not provide obstetrical (OB) services. Holmes’ parent company is Health First, Inc. (Health First), which is a not-for-profit corporation formed in 1995 upon the merger of Holmes and the organization that operated Cape Canaveral Hospital (Cape Hospital). Cape Hospital is a 150-bed not-for-profit acute care hospital in Cocoa Beach. The range of services that Cape Hospital provides is broader than range of services provided at PBCH, but not as broad as the range of services provided at HRMC. For example, Cape Hospital provides OB services, but it does not have any NICU beds. All of the Health First hospitals are accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO). Health First provides a broad range of health care services in Brevard County in addition to the hospital services provided at HRMC, PBCH, and Cape Hospital. For example, it operates a hospice program, surgical center, outpatient facilities, and fitness centers. Health First also administers the Health First Health Plan (HFHP), which is the largest managed care plan in Brevard County. All of the Health First hospitals serve patients without regard to their ability to pay, and as more fully discussed in Part F(1)(g) below, Holmes provides a significant amount of care to Medicaid and charity patients at HRMC and PBCH. Holmes also provides health care services to the medically underserved through a program known as HOPE, which stands for Health, Outreach, Prevention, and Education. HOPE was established in the early 1990’s to provide free health care for at-risk children as well as free clinics (both fixed-site and mobile) for medically underserved patients throughout Brevard County. At the time of the final hearing, the free clinics operated by HOPE were being transitioned into a federally- qualified health center, the Brevard Health Alliance (BHA). After the transition, Holmes will no longer operate the clinics; however, Holmes is obligated to provide $1.3 million per year in funding to BHA and it will continue to provide services to at- risk children through the HOPE program. Health First administers a charitable foundation that raises money to support initiatives such as the cancer center at HRMC, the construction of a hospice house, and an Alzheimer’s support center. The foundation has raised approximately $7 million since its inception in October 2001. Wuesthoff Wuesthoff operates two not-for-profit acute care hospitals in Brevard County: Wuesthoff-Rockledge and Wuesthoff- Melbourne. Like Health First, Wuesthoff provides a broad range of health care services in Brevard County in addition to its acute care hospitals. The services include a nursing home, assisted living facility, clinical laboratory, hospice program, home health agency, diagnostic center, and fitness centers. Wuesthoff-Rockledge opened in 1941. It has 245 beds, including 218 acute care beds, 10 Level II NICU beds, and 17 adult inpatient psychiatric beds. Wuesthoff-Rockledge provides tertiary-level services, including adult open-heart surgery, and it is the only acute care hospital in Brevard County designated as a Baker Act receiving facility. Wuesthoff-Rockledge is in the process of adding 44 more beds, including a new 24-bed intensive care unit (ICU) that is projected to open in 2006 and 20 acute care beds. After those beds are added, Wuesthoff-Rockledge will have 289 beds. Currently, approximately 57 percent of Wuesthoff- Rockledge’s beds are in semi-private rooms and 43 percent of the beds are in private rooms. After the addition of the 44 new beds, the percentages will be 69 percent in semi-private rooms and 31 percent in private rooms. Wuesthoff-Melbourne opened in December 2002. It originally received CON approval for 50 beds in November 2000. Before it opened, it received CON approval for an additional 50 beds, which increased its licensed capacity to 100 beds. Wuesthoff-Melbourne opened with 65 beds, all of which are in private rooms. At the time of the hearing, Wuesthoff- Melbourne had that same number of beds and an occupancy rate of approximately 80 percent. In December 2004, Wuesthoff-Melbourne added an additional 50 beds. Wuesthoff was awaiting final licensure approval from the Agency for those beds at the time of the hearing. The approval will increase Wuesthoff-Melbourne’s licensed capacity to 115 beds, all of which are in private rooms. The additional 15 beds (beyond the 100 previously licensed) were added pursuant to the 2004 amendments to the CON law, which permit bed expansions at existing hospitals without CON approval. Wuesthoff-Melbourne was designed and engineered for approximately 200 beds, and it expects to have 134 beds in service in the near future. The space for the additional 19 beds (to expand from 115 to 134) has been shelled-in, and the bed expansion will likely be completed in late-2005 or early- 2006. All of those beds will be in private rooms. The expansion of Wuesthoff-Melbourne to 134 beds will occur notwithstanding the outcome of this proceeding, but the expansion of the facility to 200 beds depends in large part on the outcome of this proceeding. Wuesthoff-Melbourne provides all of the basic acute care services, including OB services. It does not provide tertiary-level services. The Wuesthoff hospitals are accredited by JCAHO. Wuesthoff has been recognized as one of the “100 Most Wired” hospitals by Hospitals & Health Networks magazine for the comprehensive information technology (IT) systems in place at its hospitals. The Wuesthoff hospitals serve all patients without regard to their ability to pay, and as discussed in Part F(1)(g) below, the Wuesthoff hospitals provide a significant amount of care to Medicaid and charity patients. Wuesthoff also provides health care services to the medically underserved through a free health clinic in Cocoa and a mobile unit that serves patients throughout Brevard County. Like Health First, Wuesthoff administers a charitable foundation that funds initiatives at the Wuesthoff hospitals and in the community. (3) Agency The Agency is the state agency that administers the CON program and is responsible for reviewing and taking final agency action on CON applications. Application Submittal and Preliminary Agency Action Holmes filed a letter of intent and a CON application in the first batching cycle of 2004 for hospital beds and facilities. Holmes’ letter of intent and CON application were timely and properly filed. Holmes application, CON 9759, proposes the establishment of a new 84-bed acute care hospital in the Viera area of Brevard County. The proposed hospital will be known as Viera Medical Center (VMC). The fixed need pool published by the Agency for the applicable batching cycle identified a need for zero new acute care beds in Subdistrict 7-1, which is Brevard County. There were no challenges to the published fixed need pool. The Agency comparatively reviewed Holmes’ application with the CON applications filed by Wuesthoff to add 34 beds at Wuesthoff-Melbourne (CON 9760) and to add 44 beds at Wuesthoff- Rockledge (CON 9761). On June 10, 2004, the Agency issued its State Agency Action Report (SAAR), which summarized the Agency’s findings and conclusions based upon its comparative review of the applications. The SAAR recommended denial of Holmes’ application and both of Wuesthoff's applications. After the Agency published notice of its intent to deny the applications in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Holmes timely petitioned the Agency for an administrative hearing on the denial of its application. Wuesthoff did not pursue an administrative hearing on the denial of its applications as a result of the 2004 amendments to the CON law, which became effective July 1, 2004. Under the new law, a CON is not needed to add acute care beds at an existing hospital and, as indicated above, the Wuesthoff hospitals are already in the process of adding the beds that they were seeking through CON 9760 and CON 9761. The Agency reaffirmed its opposition to Holmes’ application at the hearing through the testimony of Jeffrey Gregg, the Bureau Chief for the Agency’s CON program. Acute Care Subdistrict 7-1 / Brevard County The Agency uses a five-year planning horizon in determining the need for new acute care beds, and it calculates the inventory of acute care beds and considers CON applications for new acute care beds on a subdistrict basis. Brevard County is in Subdistrict 7-1. There are no other counties in the subdistrict. There are six existing acute care hospitals in Brevard County, all of which are not-for-profit hospitals: Parrish Medical Center (Parrish) in Titusville, Cape Hosptial, Wuesthoff-Rockledge, Wuesthoff-Melbourne, HRMC, and PBCH. Brevard County is a long, narrow county. It stretches approximately 70 miles north to south, but averages only 20 miles east to west. The county is bordered on the north by Volusia County, on the west by the St. Johns River and Osceola County, on the south by Indian River County, and on the east by the Atlantic Ocean. The major north-south arterial roads in the county are Interstate 95 (I-95) and U.S. Highway 1 (US 1). The Intracoastal Waterway also runs north and south through the eastern portion of the county. Other arterial roads in the south/central portion of the county are Murrell Road, Eau Gallie Boulevard and Wickham Road. Because of the county’s long and narrow geography, three recognized market areas for hospital services have developed in the county, i.e., northern, central, and southern. The northern area of the county, which includes the Titusville area, had approximately 63,000 residents in 2003. It is primarily served by one hospital: Parrish. The central area of the county, which includes the Rockledge and Cocoa areas, had approximately 163,000 residents in 2003. It is primarily served by two hospitals: Wuesthoff- Rockledge and Cape Hospital. The southern area of the county, which includes the Melbourne and Palm Bay areas, had approximately 276,000 residents in 2003. It is primarily served by three hospitals: HRMC, Wuesthoff-Melbourne, and Palm Bay. The Viera area, discussed below, overlaps the central and southern market areas and is primarily served by Wuesthoff- Rockledge, Wuesthoff-Melbourne, and HRMC. According to the data in Table 28 of the CON application, those hospitals together accounted for 90 percent of the patients from zip code 32940, which is the “main” Viera zip code. The evidence was not persuasive that the three market areas in Brevard County equate to “antitrust markets” from an economist’s standpoint, but it was clear that the hospitals and physicians in the county recognize the existence of the market areas. For example, there is very little overlap in the medical staffs of the hospitals in different market areas, but there is significant overlap in the medical staffs of the hospitals in the same market area, and the opening of Wuesthoff-Melbourne in south Brevard County impacted HRMC and PBCH, but had little impact on the hospitals in central Brevard County. Additionally, there is very little out-migration of patients from one area of the county to hospitals in another area. The data in Tables 18 and 19 of the CON application shows that in 2003, for example, 83.6 percent of south Brevard County adult medical/surgical patients were admitted to one of the three south Brevard County hospitals, and 79.5 percent adult medical/surgical patients in central Brevard County were admitted to one of the two hospitals in that area of the county. Viera Viera is an unincorporated area in south/central Brevard County that is being developed by The Viera Company (TVC). TVC is a for-profit land development company owned by A. Duda & Sons, Inc. (Duda). The Viera DRI Viera is being developed pursuant to a development of regional impact (DRI) development order that was first adopted by Brevard County in 1990. The original DRI included 3,000 acres east of I-95, which was developed primarily as residential subdivisions. In 1995, an additional 6,000 acres were added to the DRI west of I- 95, which is being developed as a mixed-use community. The portion of the DRI east of I-95 has effectively been built-out. The build-out date for the remainder of the DRI is 2020. The master plan for the DRI includes approximately 19,000 residential units, 3.7 million square feet (SF) of office space, 2.9 million SF of commercial space, a governmental center, six schools, parks, open space, and a 7,500-seat baseball stadium and practice facility used by the Florida Marlins. As of October 2004, over 5,800 homes and approximately 2 million SF of commercial and office space have been developed west of I-95 in addition to the governmental center, several schools, and the Florida Marlins’ facilities. There are approximately 12,000 acres of undeveloped, agricultural property adjacent to and to the west of the DRI that are owned by Duda and that, according to the chief operating officer of TVC, will likely be added to the DRI in the near future. The record does not reflect what type of uses will be developed on that property or when that development will begin. The DRI development order includes authorization for up to 470 hospital beds, with vested traffic concurrency for 150 beds. The master site plan for the DRI designates an area west of I-95 on the southwest corner of the Wickham Road/Lake Andrew Drive intersection as the “Proposed Viera Medical Park.” VMC is proposed for that location. The DRI development order provides all of the local government land use approvals, including traffic concurrency, that are necessary for VMC. TVC is developing Viera for and marketing it to retirees and younger persons, including families with children. The DRI includes age-restricted subdivisions, but it also includes amenities such as three elementary schools and a large regional park with ball fields and playgrounds. (2) Negotiations for a Hospital in Viera TVC has long wanted a hospital in Viera. Wuesthoff identified the Viera area as future growth area in the 1990’s and began establishing health care facilities in the area at that time. Wuesthoff has a diagnostic center, a lab facility, and a rehabilitation facility in the Suntree area, which is just to the east of the Viera DRI. Wuesthoff expressed interest in building a hospital in Viera in 1993 and, more recently, in 2003. In August 1993, Wuesthoff and TVC entered into an agreement that gave Wuesthoff a 10-year exclusive right to develop a hospital in Viera if certain conditions were met. However, Wuesthoff ultimately built Wuesthoff-Melborune in Melbourne (rather than in Viera), and the exclusivity provision in the August 1993 contract never went into effect. In July 2003, Wuesthoff sent a letter to TVC expressing its interest in obtaining an option to purchase 25 to acres within the Viera DRI to construct a hospital. In the letter, Wuesthoff stated that it would construct the hospital “within 10 years or when the population of Viera exceeds 40,000, whichever first occurs”; that the hospital would be “constructed similar to Wuesthoff Medical Center-Melbourne which currently encompasses 65 licensed beds in a 150,000 sq. ft. facility”; that it wanted the “sole right to build a hospital or hospital like facility in Viera . . . until 5 years after the opening of the hospital” and that it wanted TVC to “consider selling the desired land to Wuesthoff at a reduced price.” Wuesthoff’s July 2003 offer was not seriously considered by TVC because, by that time, TVC was in the process of finalizing its agreement for the sale of 50 acres to Health First for VMC. Additionally, the Health First agreement was more appealing to TVC because Health First was offering to purchase more property at a higher price than was Wuesthoff, and Health First was committed to building a hospital sooner than was Wuestoff. The contract between Health First and TVC was executed on August 5, 2003, and Health First has since closed on the purchase of the 50 acres at a cost of approximately $9 million. The Health First/TVC contract includes an exclusivity provision that prohibits the development of another hospital within the Viera DRI or on any of the lands owned by Duda until 2029 if Holmes constructs at least 70 percent of Phase I of the Viera Medical Park by August 31, 2006, and begins construction on a hospital with at least 80 beds by August 31, 2010. The contract also includes exclusivity provisions relating to the other uses being developed as part of the Viera Medical Park, but the exclusivity on those uses expires in 2010, at the latest. The exclusivity provision will be included in restrictive covenants that are recorded in the public records of Brevard County. The restrictive covenants will run with the land and will bind future purchasers of property from TVC and Duda. Exclusivity provisions are not uncommon in land- purchase contracts for large commercial projects or new hospitals. The August 1993 agreement between Wuesthoff and TVC included such a provision as did Wuestoff’s July 2003 offer. However, the length of the hospital exclusivity provision in the Health First/TVC contract and the fact that it applies to the land owned by Duda outside of the Viera DRI goes beyond what is reasonably necessary to allow the new hospital to become stabilized and has the potential to stifle competition for acute care hospital services in the Viera area for the next 25 years. Viera Medical Center (1) Generally Holmes conditioned the approval of its CON application on VMC being located at the "[i]ntersection of Lake Andrew Drive and Wickham Road, Viera, Florida." VMC was projected to open in 2008 as part of the Viera Medical Park that Health First is building on the 50 acres that it purchased from TVC at that location. VMC will be located in zip code 32940, which is the “main” Viera zip code. VMC will be built on 20 of the 50 acres purchased by Health First. The remaining 30 acres will be developed with the other health care facilities that will make up the Viera Medical Park. The development of the Viera Medical Park will be done in three phases. Phase I will include a fitness center; a medical office building; and outpatient facilities such as an urgent care center, an ambulatory surgical center, and a diagnostic imaging and rehabilitation center. Phase II will include VMC. Phase III may include a nursing home and/or assisted living facility as well as “multi-family retirement units.” VMC will be a 213,000 SF facility with 84 licensed beds, 16 “observation” beds, and a full emergency room (ER). The 84 licensed beds will consist of 72 acute care beds and a 12-bed critical care unit/ICU. All of the beds will be in private rooms. The total project cost for VMC is approximately $106 million, which will be funded primarily by tax-free bonds issued by Holmes. VMC will have a cardiac catheterization lab, but it will not provide interventional cardiology services such as angioplasty. VMC will not provide any tertiary-level services or OB services, and it will not have a dedicated pediatric unit. VMC will share management and administrative support services with HRMC so as to minimize duplication of those services and to reduce overhead costs. VMC will have an integrated IT system that will utilize electronic medical records and a computerized physician order entry system, as well as an electronic ICU (e-ICU). The e-ICU is an innovative critical care management system based upon a telemedicine platform that is in use at the existing Health First hospitals in Brevard County. Except for the e-ICU, which the Wuesthoff hospitals do not have, the IT systems at VMC will be materially the same as Wuesthoff’s award-winning IT systems. VMC will have a helipad without any weight restrictions and, as discussed in Part F(1)(a)(iv) below, VMC has been designed with hurricanes and other “contingency events” (e.g., bioterrorism) in mind. Demographics of VMC’s Proposed Service Area The primary service area (PSA) for VMC consists of zip codes 32934, 32935/36, 32940, and 32955/56; the secondary service area (SSA) consists of zip codes 32901/02/41, 32904, 32922/23/24, 32926/59, and 32927. Neither Wuesthoff nor the Agency contested the reasonableness of the PSA or the SSA. All of the zip codes targeted by VMC are within the primary service area of one or more of the existing hospitals, and there are three hospitals physically located within those zip codes. Wuesthoff-Melbourne and Wuestoff-Rockledge are located in VMC’s PSA, and HRMC is in VMC’s SSA. The 2003 population of the PSA was 108,436. In 2010, which would be VMC’s third year of operation, the PSA’s population is projected to be 128,498. The 65+ age cohort, which is the group that most heavily utilizes hospital services, is projected to make up 21.5 percent of the PSA’s population in 2010. That is a lower percentage than the projected populations of the 18-44 age cohort (29.1 percent) and the 45-65 age cohort (29.7 percent) in the PSA. VMC’s PSA has a more favorable payor-mix than the county as a whole. It has a lower percentage of Medicaid patients and a higher percentage of insured patients --i.e., commercial, HMO, PPO, workers comp, and Champus/VA patients -- than the county as a whole. Except for zip code 32935/36, each of the zip codes in VMC’s PSA has a higher median household income than Brevard County as a whole. Zip code 32935/36 is the zip code in which Wuesthoff-Melbourne is located. The zip code in which VMC will be located, 32940, has the highest median household income in Brevard County. The median household income in that zip code for 2004 was $67,000 as compared to the county-wide average of $44,000. Utilization Projections VMC was projected to open in January 2008, and Holmes' CON application contains utilization and financial projections for VMC's first three years of operation, i.e., 2008, 2009, and 2010. The utilization projections are based upon an average length of stay (ALOS) of 3.69 days, which is reasonable. The utilization projections are also based upon the assumption that by VMC’s third year of operation, it will have 26.9 percent market share in its PSA and a 7.4 percent market share in its SSA. VMC's projected market share in zip code 32940, which is its “home” zip code and the “main” Viera zip code, is projected to be 35 percent. The market share assumptions are reasonable and attainable. The utilization projections include a “ramp-up” period for VMC. Its annual occupancy rate in its first year of operation is projected to be 45.6 percent; its annual occupancy rate in its second year of operation is projected to be 65.7 percent; and in its third year of operation (2010), VMC is expected to have an annual occupancy rate of 76 percent with 6,313 discharges and 23,298 patient days. The occupancy rates, and the discharges and patient days upon which they are based, are reasonable and attainable.2 The application projects that VMC will redirect or “cannibalize” a significant percentage of its patients from the other Health First hospitals. The percentage of patients that VMC will cannibalize from the other Health First hospitals in each zip code varies from 75 percent to 45 percent, depending upon the proximity of the zip code to VMC. Overall, approximately 69.4 percent of VMC’s patients will be cannibalized patients, i.e., patients that would have otherwise gone to HRMC (66.2 percent), Cape Hosptial (3.2 percent), or PBCH (less than 0.1 percent). The remaining 30.6 percent of VMC’s patients will be patients that would have otherwise gone to Wuesthoff-Rockledge (15.8 percent) or Wuesthoff-Melbourne (14.8 percent). The record does not reflect the outpatient volume projected for VMC, but Holmes’ health planner conceded at the hearing that the projected outpatient revenues for VMC did not take into account the outpatient services that will be included in Phase I of the Viera Medical Park. As a result, the volume on which the outpatient revenues were based is overstated to some degree, but there was no credible evidence regarding the extent of the overstatement. VMC is projected to treat 15,851 patients in its ER in its first year of operation (2008), and by its third year of operation (2010), VMC is expected to treat 27,780 patients in its ER. The record does not reflect how those figures were calculated, nor does it reflect what percentage of those patients would have otherwise been treated in the ERs at HRMC, PBCH, or the Wuesthoff hospitals. However, the reasonableness of those figures was not contested by Wuesthoff or the Agency. Statutory and Rule Criteria Statutory Criteria -- Section 408.035, Florida Statutes (2004)3 Subsections (1), (2) and (5) -– Need for Proposed Services; Accessibility of Existing Services; and Enhancing Access According to the CON application (page 14), the need for VMC is justified based upon: The large population base and significant population growth projected for the [Viera] area. The need to improve access and reduce travel times for this significant population for both critical care and inpatient services. The projected need for additional acute care beds at HRMC and the benefits of delivering non-tertiary services away from [HRMC’s] campus. Additionally, the CON application (page 15) asserts that the approval of VMC will: Significantly enhance the area’s Homeland Security and disaster planning and preparedness. Enhance the quality of care delivered to area residents as a result of key design and information technology innovations planned for [VMC]. Provide access to cost-effective, quality of care for all residents of the service area, including the uninsured. In its PRO (page 19), Holmes identifies those same six issues as the “not normal” circumstances that justify approval of VMC. Holmes’ health planner conceded at the hearing that the VMC project is not intended to address any cultural, programmatic, or financial access problems, and that those potential “not normal” circumstances were not advanced in the CON application as bases for approval of VMC. Population of and Growth in the Viera Area There has been considerable growth in Viera over the past 15 years, and the demand for new homes in the Viera DRI remains strong. The projected population of the Viera DRI is expected to exceed 40,000 when the DRI is built-out in 2020, and that figure does not include the population of the Suntree area, which is outside of the Viera DRI and has a number of large residential subdivisions. Zip code 32940, which is the “main” Viera zip code, had a population of 22,940 in 2003. By 2010, that zip code is projected to have a population of 31,862. That is an increase of 38.9 percent, but only 9,000 persons. As stated above, the population of VMC's PSA is projected to increase from 108,436 (in 2003) to 128,489 (in 2010). That is an increase of 18.5 percent, but only 20,000 persons. The population of VMC’s PSA is projected to grow at a faster rate than Brevard County as a whole. Over the seven-year period used in the application (2003 to 2010), the annual growth rate for VMC’s PSA is projected to be 2.64 percent while the annual growth rate of Brevard County as a whole is projected to be 1.74 percent.4 Population growth in Florida is normal and, indeed, is expected. There is nothing extraordinary about the growth projected for zip code 32940 and/or VMC’s PSA. Accordingly, the population growth projected in the Viera area does not, in and of itself, justify the approval of VMC. Enhanced Access There are two main components to Holmes’ argument that VMC will enhance access. First, Holmes contends that VMC will reduce travel times for Viera residents and thereby enhance their access to hospital services. Second, Holmes contends that the approval of VMC will relieve pressure on the overcrowded ERs at the existing hospitals in Brevard County thereby enhancing access to ER services countywide. For Viera Residents VMC will provide more convenient access to hospital services for Viera residents (at least those in need of the basic, non-OB services that will be offered at VMC), and to that extent, VMC will enhance access for Viera residents. VMC will also provide more convenient ER access for Viera residents. Quicker access to an ER is generally beneficial to the patient, although certain heart-attack patients may benefit more by going to the ER of a hospital that can do an immediate angioplasty, such as Wuesthoff-Rockledge or HRMC. VMC will not necessarily enhance access for other residents of the PSA and SSA targeted by VMC (e.g., those outside of the Viera area) because many of those residents are closer to an existing hospital. Indeed, some of those residents would have to pass an existing hospital to get to VMC, which seems particularly unlikely for emergency patients. VMC will also not enhance access for patients in need of OB services or tertiary services that will not be offered at VMC. Convenience alone is not a basis for approving a new hospital, particularly where (as here) the evidence establishes that the residents of the area to be served by the new hospital currently have reasonable access to hospital services. VMC will be located approximately 10 miles south of Wuesthoff-Rockledge, and approximately 11 miles north of Wuesthoff-Melbourne. VMC will be approximately 15 miles northwest of HRMC. There are multiple routes from the Viera area to the Wuesthoff hospitals and HRMC. The routes are along major arterial roads, including I-95, US 1, Wickham Road, Murrell Road, Fiske Boulevard, and Eau Gallie Boulevard. All of those roads are at least four lanes wide. The travel-time studies presented by Wuesthoff show that it takes less than 15 minutes to drive from either of the Wuesthoff hospitals to the VMC site. There was anecdotal testimony suggesting longer travel times, particularly from the VMC site to Wuesthoff-Melbourne,5 but that testimony was not as persuasive as Wuesthoff’s travel-time studies. The travel-time studies presented by Wuesthoff were not without flaws. For example, the travel times were calculated by driving away from the Wuesthoff hospitals, rather than driving towards the hospitals as a potential patient from Viera would be doing. Holmes did not present its own travel- time studies, and notwithstanding the directional issue and the other unpersuasive criticisms of the study by Holmes’ traffic engineer, Wuesthoff’s studies are found to be credible and persuasive. Indeed, Holmes’ traffic engineer estimated that it would take 15 to 20 minutes to get from VMC to Wuesthoff- Melbourne using the most direct route (Transcript, at 668), which is consistent with Wuesthoff’s travel-time studies. It takes longer to drive from Viera to HRMC than it does to drive from Viera to either of the Wuesthoff hospitals. The travel-time studies did not directly address the issue, but the anecdotal testimony suggests that the travel times from Viera to HRMC are between 25 and 45 minutes depending upon the time of day and traffic conditions.6 There are several road segments on the routes between Viera and the Wuesthoff hospitals whose “v/c ratios”7 currently exceeds 1.0, which is an indication of an over-capacity road. However, there are roadway improvements planned or underway that will expand the capacity of those road segments by 2010. Indeed, a comparison of the 2003 (Exhibit H-23) and 2010 (Exhibit W-50) v/c ratios for the road segments on the routes between Viera and the Wuesthoff hospitals shows only marginal increases in the ratios, with many of the 2010 ratios projected to be lower than 0.8, which according to Holmes’ traffic engineer, indicates that the “roadway that is probably operating well within its ability to carry that traffic volume.” Holmes’ traffic engineer did not attempt to quantify the extent to which travel times would increase due to the marginal increases in the v/c ratios. Thus, his opinion that travel times would “increase significantly” and be “significantly greater” in the future is not persuasive. TVC is required to mitigate for the off-site traffic impacts generated by the development of the Viera DRI. In this regard, road improvements (e.g., additional lanes, traffic signals, etc.) will be made in the future as necessary to accommodate the additional population in the Viera DRI. In fact, there are significant road improvements currently underway that are being funded, at least in part, by TVC pursuant to the Viera DRI development order, including the six-laning of I-95 through the Viera area. In sum, the evidence establishes that persons in the PSA and SSA targeted by VMC, including residents of the Viera area, currently have reasonable access to acute care services, and the evidence was not persuasive that there will be access problems over the applicable five-year planning horizon such that a new hospital in Viera is necessary to enhance access. For ER Services in Central and South Brevard County The Brevard County government is the emergency medical services (EMS) provider for the county. Brevard County EMS responds to emergency calls throughout the county and its ambulances transport emergency patients to hospital ERs. Overcrowded ERs can adversely affect the EMS system in several ways. First, if the ER is overcrowded it can take longer for ambulances to off-load patients to the ER staff, which results a longer period of time that the ambulance is “out of service.” Second, if the closest hospital is on “diversion status” because of an overcrowded ER, ambulances will have to transport patients to a more distant hospital, which also results in the ambulance being out of service for a longer period of time. Longer out-of-service periods can, on a cumulative basis, strain the EMS system because an out-of-service ambulance is not able to respond to emergency calls in its service area and the EMS provider may have to shift other ambulances to cover the area at the risk of increasing response times for emergency calls. Brevard County EMS protocol requires ambulances to take patients to the closest hospital, unless the patient is a trauma patient or the closest hospital is on diversion status. Trauma patients are taken to HRMC, which is the designated trauma center for the county. A hospital requests diversion status from EMS when it is unable to accept additional emergency patients because its ER is overcrowded. The most common reasons that an ER is overcrowded is that it had a large number of emergency patients arrive at the same time or that there is a “bottleneck” in the ER caused by a lack of inpatient beds to move patients from the ER that need to be admitted to the hospital. If diversion status is granted, EMS will take emergency patients to another hospital, even if it is further away than the hospital on diversion. As noted above, this strains the EMS system and can result in longer response times for emergency calls, which in turn, can negatively impact patient care. If diversion status is denied, the hospital is required to continue to accept emergency patients. This can create a less than optimal setting for patient care because the hospital may not have adequate space or resources to treat the patient in a timely manner. Until recently, Brevard County EMS would not grant diversion status to a hospital in south Brevard County if either of the other two hospitals in that area of the county informed EMS that they could not take the patients. That policy recently changed, and EMS will now grant diversion status to a hospital in south Brevard County if either of the other two hospitals in that area of the county informs EMS that it can take the patients. The new EMS policy change makes it easier for hospitals in south Brevard County to be placed in diversion status. For example, under the old policy, diversion status would not be granted to HRMC if either Wuestoff-Melbourne or PBCH informed EMS that they could not take HRMC’s emergency patients, but under the new policy, diversion status will be denied to HRMC only if Wuesthoff-Melbourne and PBCH both inform EMS that they cannot take HRMC’s emergency patients. In Brevard County, having a hospital on diversion was “pretty rare” until 2002. Diversion requests have become more frequent since then, and they are no longer a seasonal phenomenon caused by the influx of “snowbirds” into the county. Diversion is a more frequent problem in south Brevard County than it is in central Brevard County, and in south Brevard County, the diversion requests have come primarily from HRMC. The evidence was not persuasive that ER overcrowding is a significant problem for the Wuesthoff hospitals or PBCH. Wuesthoff-Melbourne has not requested to go on diversion, and only one occasion was identified where HRMC’s diversion request was denied because Wuesthoff-Melbourne was unable to handle HRMC's diverted patients. That occasion occurred when Wuesthoff-Melbourne had only 65 beds and, hence, less ability than it currently has to move patients out of the ER to accommodate additional emergency patients. According to Holmes, VMC will enhance access to ER services in central and south Brevard County because it will increase the area-wide ER capacity and reduce the frequency of diversion requests, which in turn, will reduce strains on the EMS system and benefit patients. The "North Expansion" underway at HRMC (discussed below) will include a new ER that is expected to help address the overcrowding issues that have required HRMC to request diversion in the past. The new ER is designed with shelled-in space to facilitate future ER expansions as needed. In any event, the evidence was not persuasive that VMC will materially reduce the ER volume at HRMC. The record does not reflect what percentage of VMC’s projected ER patients would have otherwise been served at HRMC as compared to the Wuesthoff hospitals. Moreover, it is not likely that non-trauma emergency patients from the Viera area are contributing to the overcrowding in the ER at HRMC because, under EMS protocol, those patients currently are being taken to Wuesthoff-Melbourne or Wuesthoff-Rockledge, which are closer to Viera than is HRMC. Need to “Decompress” HRMC Holmes contends that VMC will help to “decompress” HRMC and that it is the only viable option for doing so. HRMC is a well-utilized facility. According to the SAAR, its annual occupancy rate for the 12-month period ending June 2003 was 81.22 percent. HRMC's occupancy rate tends to stay above 80 percent, and at times it is as high as 115 percent. If VMC is not approved, HRMC’s annual occupancy rate for 2008 is projected to be 83.9 percent, and by 2010, its occupancy rate is projected to increase to 90 percent. Even if VMC is approved, HRMC’s annual occupancy rate is projected to be 81.7 percent in 2010. Those figures assume that HRMC will maintain its current bed capacity and they do not take into account the impact of the expansion of the Wuesthoff hospitals. HRMC currently includes approximately 612,000 SF. It is located on 18 acres of property that is bounded by streets and developed properties. Holmes owns several parcels of land adjacent to HRMC, and it is continuing to acquire parcels as they come available. Much of the adjacent land owned by Holmes is used for parking, and notwithstanding a 500-space parking garage on the south side of HRMC, there is still a shortage of parking at HRMC. Some of its staff parks at a nearby shopping center and take a shuttle to the hospital. There is an area on the north side of HRMC identified as the site of a "future parking garage," but there are no current plans to construct that structure. The original portion of the hospital, which is referred to as the “core” area, was built in the 1960’s. The remainder of the hospital has been added over the years, which has resulted in a less than ideal facility layout and has created operating inefficiencies. Some of the hospital’s support functions and administrative offices are located off- site. HRMC has undertaken a series of construction projects in recent years to reduce inefficiencies and congestion at the hospital and to increase the percentage of private rooms at the hospital. Those projects include the construction of a new OB unit and, most significantly, the $100 million “North Expansion.” The North Expansion is an eight-story, 337,000 SF addition to the hospital that is expected to be completed by the end of 2006. It will include 144 patient rooms, a new ER with a number of new observation beds, and it will allow all of the hospital’s cardiology services to be located in contiguous space. The 144 patient rooms will include 14 cardiovascular ICU beds, 22 ICU beds, and 108 acute care beds. All of the beds will be in private rooms. The 144 beds added as part of the North Expansion will not increase the bed capacity at Holmes. The same number of existing licensed beds will be eliminated, either through the conversion of existing semi-private rooms to private rooms or because the rooms are located in space that will be demolished to construct the North Expansion. The North Expansion has been designed and engineered to withstand 200-mile per hour winds, which exceeds the applicable building code requirements for hurricane protection. The North Expansion has also been designed and engineered to accommodate future expansion at HRMC in several respects. First, it includes shelled-in space on the eighth floor for an additional 36 private patient rooms. Second, it is engineered (but not shelled-in) to allow the fourth through eighth floors to be further expanded to include up to 180 additional private patient rooms in what was referred to at the hearing as a “mirror image” of the tower being built as part of the North Expansion. Third, the ER includes shelled-in space for future expansions as well as adjacent open space into which the ER could be further expanded in the future. There is no current plan to finish the shelled-in space on the eighth floor, but Holmes’ facility manger testified that he expected that to occur as soon as funding is available, and perhaps prior to the completion of the North Expansion. The beds added on the eighth floor will not increase the licensed capacity at Holmes, but rather they will come from the conversion of 36 additional existing semi-private rooms to private rooms. There is also no current plan to construct the “mirror image” side of the fourth through eighth floors of the North Expansion. That construction will be done in conjunction with the renovation of the core area of the hospital and will initially be used to locate the services from the core area that are displaced by the renovation. After the renovation of the core area, however, the "mirror image" will be used for patient rooms. In conjunction with the construction of the North Expansion, HRMC expects to relocate some of its ancillary and support services from the core area into the space where the existing ER is located, which in turn will open up space in the core area for other purposes. The space created by the construction of the new OB unit will also be available for other uses after it is no longer needed as "swing space" during the construction of the North Expansion. Additionally, Holmes recently purchased a building directly behind HRMC into which it will likely locate other ancillary and support services. Currently, less than 40 percent of HRMC’s general acute care beds are in private rooms. After the North Expansion, almost 80 percent of those beds will be in private rooms. Ultimately, Holmes wants all of the beds at HRMC to be in private rooms. Private rooms are beneficial because they offer the patients and their families more privacy and a more restful environment, and they can also help reduce the spread of infections. However, private rooms can also create operational inefficiencies for nurses who have to visit more rooms (often on longer hallways) than they would to serve the same number of patients in semi-private rooms. High quality care can be provided in semi-private rooms, and HRMC and Wuesthoff-Rockledge each do so. Although patients may prefer private rooms and most new hospitals are being designed with only private rooms, private rooms are still best characterized as an amenity, not a necessity. As a result, and Holmes’ desire to convert all of HRMC’s semi-private rooms to private rooms does not justify the building a new hospital based upon alleged capacity constraints at HRMC. Indeed, if Holmes chose to do so, it could increase the bed capacity at HRMC with little or no additional cost by adding the 36 beds in the shelled-in eighth floor of the North Expansion and/or by not converting as many semi-private rooms into private rooms. Moreover, after the North Expansion, HRMC will have approximately 50 observation beds (as compared to 20 currently) in private rooms that can be used for inpatients as needed. Indeed, as a result of the 2004 amendments to the CON law, some of those beds could be converted to licensed acute care beds at any time without CON review. Even if the beds are not converted to licensed beds, they will still help to decompress HRMC because observation patients will not need to be placed in inpatient rooms while they are being observed and evaluated for possible admission to the hospital. Several Holmes’ witnesses testified that even if Holmes wanted to add bed capacity to HRMC by converting fewer semi-private rooms to private rooms or other means, it could not do so because of limitations on the space available to provide the support services necessary for those additional rooms. That testimony was not persuasive because the witnesses conceded that Holmes has not undertaken a thorough analysis of what it intends to do with the space created in the existing building by the relocation of services as part of the North Expansion, which as noted above, will free up additional space for support services in the core area. The evidence was also not persuasive that the alternative presented in the CON application for adding 84 beds to HRMC is realistic. That alternative, the cost of which is presented in Table 23 of the CON application, was prepared after the decision was made to seek approval of a CON for VMC; it was not an alternative actually considered by Holmes and, indeed, it was characterized by the Holmes’ witness who prepared the cost estimate as a “theoretical solution” and not a viable solution to adding beds. The cost estimate in Table 23 is based upon a plan that would require the acquisition of additional land across the street from HRMC and the construction of a new bed tower on that land and an adjacent parcel on which Holmes currently owns a medical office building. The bed tower would be connected to HRMC by a two-story bridge over the street. The plan also includes the construction of a new parking garage and an office building to replace the existing medical office building. The land and building costs of the plan were approximately $86.2 million, which is approximately $18.3 million more than the land and building costs of VMC. When the equipment costs are added, the total cost of the plan is approximately $120 million. Not only was the plan not a viable solution, its cost was clearly overstated. For example, the $450/SF cost of the new bed tower was irreconcilably higher than the $278/SF cost of VMC and the $2.5 million that Holmes represented to the Agency in October 2003 that it would cost to add 50 beds to HRMC. In sum, the evidence fails to support Holmes’ claim that the only way to add bed capacity to HRMC is through the $120 million plan presented in Table 23 of the CON application. The evidence also fails to support Holmes’ claim that VMC is the only viable option to decompress HRMC. Indeed, the evidence establishes that HRMC could be decompressed if PBCH was better utilized. Holmes contends that PBCH is too far away from Viera to be a viable alternative to HRMC for patients from the Viera area. The evidence supports that claim, but that claim ignores the fact that better utilization of PBCH by Palm Bay patients will help to decompress HRMC. PBCH is currently an underutilized facility, and it has been ever since it opened in 1992. According to the SAAR, PBCH's annual occupancy rate for the 12-month period ending June 2003 was only 51.5 percent. Its annual occupancy rate is projected to be only 60.1 percent in 2008 and 65.4 percent in 2010, which are well below the 75 to 80 percent optimum utilization level. Approximately 25 to 30 percent of HRMC’s patient volume comes from the Palm Bay zip codes. If those patients were redirected to PBCH, the utilization rate at HRMC would go down and the utilization rate at PBCH would go up. Redirecting Palm Bay patients to PBCH has the potential to decompress HRMC more than redirecting Viera patients to VMC because HRMC has approximately 7,000 admissions from the Palm Bay area, as compared to approximately 6,000 admissions from the Viera area. Holmes did not present any persuasive evidence as to why patients from the Palm Bay zip codes could not be redirected to PBCH as a means of decompressing HRMC. On this issue, there was credible evidence presented by Wuesthoff that virtually no elective cases are being done at PBCH and that PBCH is essentially being used as a triage facility for HRMC. Finally, the expansion of the Wuesthoff hospitals (particularly Wuesthoff-Melbourne) will help to decompress HRMC because the Wuesthoff hospitals will be able to serve more patients. As the Wuestoff hospitals' market share grows, HRMC’s market share (and patient volume) will decline.8 Enhanced Homeland Security and Disaster Planning Brevard County is susceptible to hurricanes because of its location on the east coast of Florida and the length of its coastline. The evidence was not persuasive that Brevard County is more susceptible to hurricanes than are the other counties on the east coast. The three major storms that affected the county in the summer of 2004 were not the norm. Brevard County has a comprehensive emergency management plan to prepare for and respond to hurricanes, as do all of the existing hospitals in the county. Those plans were tested in the summer of 2004 when the county was directly impacted by three of the four major storms that hit the state Florida. The hospitals’ hurricane plans include securing the building, discharging as many patients as possible prior to the arrival of the storm, and canceling elective surgeries scheduled around the time the storm is expected to hit the area. The plans also provide for the evacuation of some of the hospitals during particularly strong storms, i.e., Category 3 or above. Cape Hospital is particularly prone to evacuation when a strong hurricane threatens the area because it is located close to the ocean on a peninsula in the middle of the Intracoastal Waterway. Cape Hospital was evacuated twice during the summer of 2004. None of the hospitals in Brevard County were evacuated during the first storm, Hurricane Charley. Cape Hospital and Wuesthoff-Rockledge were evacuated prior to the second storm, Hurricane Francis. That was the first time that Wuesthoff-Rockledge was evacuated since it opened in 1941, and its ER remained open and staffed even though the remainder of the hospital was evacuated. Cape Hosptial’s patients were taken to HRMC, and Wuesthoff-Rockledge patients were taken to Wuesthoff-Melbourne. The evacuated patients were accompanied by physicians and nurses and were transported to the receiving hospitals by ambulance. The evacuation of Cape Hospital and Wuesthoff- Rockledge placed strains on the receiving hospitals and their staffs. At one point during the evacuation, HRMC had more than 700 patients in its 514-bed facility and Wuesthoff-Rockledge had 156 patients in its 65-bed facility. By all accounts, despite the strains placed on the receiving hospitals, the evacuations went smoothly and there were no adverse patient outcomes attributable to the evacuation. Indeed, the director of Brevard County’s Health Department testified that all of the hospitals in the county responded and performed “great” during the hurricanes, and that sentiment was echoed by physicians and administrators affiliated with both of the hospital systems involved in this case. Cape Hospital was evacuated again prior to the third storm, Hurricane Jeanne. Wuesthoff-Rockledge was not evacuated during that storm, and approximately 15 of Cape Hospital’s patients were taken to Wuesthoff-Rockledge. None of the Health First or Wuesthoff hospitals suffered any significant damage from the hurricanes. The approval of VMC will not eliminate the possibility that Cape Hospital, Wuesthoff-Rockledge, or some other hospital in Brevard County may have to evacuate during a future hurricane. VMC may provide a more convenient (or at least an additional) place to evacuate some of the patients from Cape Hospital during a future hurricane because VMC is closer to Cape Hospital than is HRMC. VMC will also be more inland than HRMC and it will be designed to withstand 165 mile per hour winds. Holmes conditioned the approval of its CON application on the inclusion of a "suitable parcel, fully equipped and designed to support temporary staging of Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT)" at VMC. A DMAT is essentially a mobile emergency room set up by the federal government after a natural disaster to help serve the medical needs of those affected by the disaster. The DMAT staging area at VMC will be an open field adjacent to the hospital that is “pre-plumbed” with water, electricity, and communication lines. In some situations, it is beneficial for a DMAT to be set up proximate to a hospital, and in that regard, VMC’s inland location and proximity to I-95 may make it an attractive location to set up a DMAT in the future. It is not necessary, however, for a DMAT to be set up proximate to a hospital. DMATs are fully self-sustaining and they can be set up anywhere, including a Wal-Mart parking lot. Indeed, in some situations, it is more beneficial for the DMAT to be located closer to the persons in need of its services than to a hospital. For example, after Hurricane Jeanne, a DMAT was set up near the Barefoot Bay community in southern Brevard County, which is miles from the closest hospital. VMC’s central-county location and proximity to I-95 would also make it a good point-of-dispensing (POD) for vaccines and medicines in the case of a severe biological emergency. However, like DMATs, PODs can be set up anywhere and it is not critical for a POD to be proximate to a hospital even though proximity might allow for greater medical oversight of the dispensing process. There are high-profile, “Tier 1” terrorist targets located in Brevard County, including Kennedy Space Center, Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Patrick Air Force Base, and Port Canaveral. There is also a nuclear power plant in Indian River County, just south of the Brevard County line. The nature of these targets is somewhat unique because they involve the country's space program, but the presence of multiple “Tier 1” terrorist targets is not unique to Brevard County and is not, in and of itself, a special circumstance that justifies approval of a new hospital. Brevard County has developed emergency management plans in conjunction with the state and federal governments to prepare for and respond to terrorist attacks on those targets. Those plans have been in place for many years, but they have been significantly strengthened since September 11, 2001. VMC will include decontamination areas and other design features to facilitate the treatment of victims of bio- terrorism. The existing hospitals in Brevard County have similar design features as well as comprehensive plans for dealing with bio-terrorism. The evidence was not persuasive that VMC, as an 84- bed, non-tertiary satellite hospital, will materially enhance County’s ability to deal with a large-scale terrorist attack, whether biological or otherwise. Similarly, the evidence was not persuasive that Brevard County’s emergency management plans for hurricanes and/or terrorism are deficient in any way or that the approval of VMC would result in material enhancements to those plans. Any enhancements attributable to VMC would be marginal, at best. The DMAT staging area and other design elements included at VMC to facilitate the hospital’s participation in the Brevard County’s response to hurricanes, terrorist attacks, or other contingencies are positive attributes. Inclusion of those features in VMC (or any new hospital for that matter) is reasonable despite the infrequency of those contingencies, but it does not follow that VMC should be approved simply because it will include those features. IT Innovations and Design Features The evidence was not persuasive that VMC will provide a higher quality of care than is currently being provided at the existing hospitals serving central and south Brevard County as a result of the “innovative” IT systems and the other design features that will be incorporated into VMC. See Part F(1)(b) below. Accordingly, the approval of VMC is not justified on that basis. Enhanced Access to Care for the Uninsured Holmes’ contention that VMC will enhance access for the uninsured implicates the issue of “financial access.” Financial access concerns arise when there is evidence that necessary services are being denied to patients based upon their inability to pay or their uninsured status. Holmes’ health planner acknowledged at the hearing that VMC was not intended to address any financial access concerns for patients in the Viera area and, indeed, there was no credible evidence of any financial access concerns in PSA and SSA targeted by VMC. As discussed in Part E(2) above, VMC’s PSA include a higher percentage of insured patients than Brevard County as a whole, and as discussed in Part F(1)(g) below, the existing hospitals are adequately serving the medically indigent patients in central and south Brevard County, both at the hospital and through outreach efforts such as the Holmes’ HOPE program and Wuesthoff’s free clinics. Accordingly, the evidence failed to establish that VMC will enhance access to care for the uninsured, and approval of VMC is not justified on that basis. Subsection (3) -- Applicant’s Quality of Care Holmes, the applicant, provides a high quality of care at HRMC and PBCH, and it is reasonable to expect that it will provide the same high quality of care at VMC. The Wuesthoff hospitals also provide a high quality of care, and Holmes' witnesses acknowledged that VMC was not proposed to address any problem with quality of care in central or south Brevard County. The evidence was not persuasive that the quality of care at VMC will be materially better (or worse) than that provided at Wuesthoff-Melbourne, which has a similar range of services that will be provided at VMC. The award-winning IT systems in place at the Wuesthoff hospitals are materially the same as those proposed for VMC except for e-ICU at VMC. The evidence was not persuasive that the e-ICU significantly enhances quality of care, and because the e-ICU is being used at the existing Health First hospitals in Brevard County, VMC will not be providing any new technology or service that is not already available to physicians and patients in the county. Thus, the "innovative" IT systems proposed for VMC do not provide an independent basis for approving the CON application. The evidence was not persuasive that VMC would exacerbate nursing or physician shortages in Brevard County thereby negatively affecting quality of care in the county. See Part F(1)(c) below. Subsection (4) -- Availability of Personnel and Resources for Operations Holmes and Health First have the management resources necessary to establish and operate VMC. Holmes’ CON application projects that VMC will have 241.4 full-time equivalents (FTEs) in its first year of operation, and that by its third year of operation, it will have 355.7 FTEs. Nursing positions -- registered nurses, licensed practical nurses, nursing aides, and nursing directors -- account for 123.1 of the FTEs in the first year of operation, and 189.2 of the FTEs in the third year of operation. According to the CON application, a significant number of the initial FTEs at VMC are expected to be filled by persons who transfer from Holmes’ existing campuses, HRMC and PBCH. The parties stipulated that the projected number of FTEs needed by position and the projected salaries contained in Holmes’ CON application are reasonable for the census projected at VMC. However, Wuesthoff disputed whether Holmes will be able to adequately staff VMC due to nurse and physician shortages in Brevard County and/or that VMC will exacerbate those shortages and make it more difficult to staff the existing hospitals in the county. There is a nursing shortage in Brevard County, as there is around Florida and across the nation, but the situation in Brevard County is improving. Wuesthoff was able to fully staff Wuesthoff-Melbourne prior to its opening in December 2002, even though the nursing shortage was more severe at that time. Additionally, Wuesthoff is currently in the process of adding beds at Wuestoff-Melbourne and Wuesthoff-Rockledge, and it expects to be able to recruit and retain the nurses necessary to staff those additional beds despite the current state of the nursing shortage. Holmes received “magnet designation” from the American Nurses Credentialing Center, which is a recognition of its excellence in nursing. No other hospital in Brevard County has magnet designation, and that designation helps Holmes attract and retain nurses. The evidence establishes that Holmes will be able to recruit and retain the nursing and other staff needed for VMC, and the evidence was not persuasive that the staffing of VMC will exacerbate the nursing shortage or otherwise significantly impact Wuesthoff. There is a shortage of physicians in Brevard County with certain specialties, including neurosurgery, neurology, orthopedics, dermatology, and gastroenterology. Like the nursing shortage, this problem is not unique to Brevard County and it is not as severe in Brevard County as it is elsewhere in the state. The shortage of physician specialists in Brevard County is to some extent hospital-specific. For example, there is only one neurosurgeon covering Wuesthoff-Rockledge and Cape Hospital, and Wuesthoff-Melbourne only has part-time coverage neurosurgical coverage, but Holmes has several neurosurgeons. Holmes has recently had success in recruiting new physicians to Brevard County, including specialists. One of the largest multi-specialty physician groups in Brevard County, whose physicians are on staff at Holmes’ and Wuestoff's hospitals, has also been successful recently in recruiting new physicians to the area. That group, Melbourne Internal Medicine Associates, will be adding more physicians whether or not VMC is approved. The evidence establishes that Holmes will be able to attract the necessary physician staff for VMC, just as Wuesthoff-Melbourne was able to do when it opened. Indeed there are a number of physicians who have offices in the Viera area that are closer to VMC than the existing hospitals where they have privileges. Holmes and Wuesthoff require physicians with privileges at their hospitals to provide coverage for ER calls on a rotational basis. Physicians with privileges at more than one of the hospitals are required to provide ER call coverage at multiple hospitals, which can create a problem if the physician is on-call at two (or more) hospitals at the same time. Physicians who choose obtain privileges at VMC will be required to provide ER call coverage at VMC. ER call coverage is a problem in Brevard County, but the evidence was not persuasive that the problem is as significant in Brevard County as it is elsewhere in the state or that VMC would seriously exacerbate the problem. More specifically, the evidence was not persuasive regarding the extent to which VMC would cause physicians to be on call at more than one hospital at the same time. Nor was the evidence persuasive regarding the likelihood that physicians would relinquish privileges at other hospitals in Brevard County to obtain privileges at VMC in such numbers that ER call coverage problems would be created for the other hospitals. Subsection (6) -- Financial Feasibility The parties stipulated that VMC is financially feasible in the short-term and that Holmes has sufficient availability of funds for VMC's capital and operating expenses. The long-term financial feasibility of VMC is in dispute. Generally, if a CON project will at least break even in the second year of operation, it is financially feasible in the long-term. If, however, the project continues to show a loss in the second year of operation it is not financially feasible in the long-term unless it is nearing break-even and it is demonstrated that the hospital will break even within a reasonable period of time. Agency precedent (e.g., Wellington, supra, at 73-74) and the evidence in this case (e.g., Exhibit W-57, at 22) establish that in the context of a satellite hospital project that is expected to “cannibalize” patients from the applicant’s existing hospital, it is important to consider the impact of the project on the entire hospital system in evaluating the long- term financial feasibility of the project. The net operating revenue projected on Schedule 7A of the CON application, which is the starting point for the net income/loss projected on Schedule 8A, is reasonable.9 On Schedule 8A of the CON application, in the column titled “VMC only,” Holmes projects that VMC will generate a net loss of $5.71 million in its first year of operation, but that it will generate net profits of $1.48 million and $5.11 million in its second and third years of operation. Thus, as a stand-alone entity, VMC is financially feasible in the long-term. However, the “VMC only” figures do not provide the complete picture of the financial feasibility of the VMC project because of the significant percentage of its patients that will be cannibalized from HRMC and PBCH. In evaluating the long-term financial feasibility of the VMC project, it is also important to consider the “incremental difference” column in Schedule 8A. That column reflects VMC’s net financial benefit (or burden) to Holmes after taking into account the patients that VMC is cannibalizing from HRMC and PBCH. The “incremental difference” column in Schedule 8A shows a net loss of $695,000 in the VMC’s first year of operation, and net profits of $605,000 and $983,000 in the second and third years of VMC’s operation. The incremental figures presented in the CON application identify the profit/loss that will be generated by the patients treated at VMC that are new to the Holmes’ system, but they do not take into account the fact that the patients treated at VMC that were cannibalized from the other Holmes’ hospitals would have generated a different profit/loss for the Holmes’ system if they were treated at one of the other Holmes’ hospitals. When incremental profit/loss associated with treating the cannibalized patients at VMC rather than HRMC or PBCH is factored in, the “incremental difference” generated by VMC will be net profits of $498,000 (year one); $720,000 (year two); and $252,000 (year three). Included in the “incremental difference” column on Schedule 8A (and embedded in the revised figures in the preceding paragraph) are negative figures on the “depreciation and amortization” line and the “interest” line. Those figures are intended to reflect the depreciation, amortization, and interest expenses that Holmes will “save” by building VMC rather than by adding 84 beds at HRMC. A critical assumption underlying the “savings” shown on those lines is that it would cost $120 million to add 84 beds to HRMC. To the extent that cost is overstated, then the depreciation, amortization, and interest expense “savings” on Schedule 8A are also overstated, as is the incremental net profit of the VMC project. The extent to which the net profit is overstated depends upon the extent to which the $120 million cost is overstated. For example, if the cost of adding 84 beds to HRMC is the same as the cost of VMC (i.e., $106 million rather than $120 million), then the depreciation, amortization, and interest expense shown in the “incremental difference” column on Schedule 8A would be $0 (rather than a negative number) because the depreciation, amortization, and interest expenses in the “with this project” and “without this project” columns would be the same. If, on the other hand, there was no cost associated with the addition of 84 beds at HRMC, then the depreciation, amortization, and interest expense shown in the “without this project” column would be $10.662 million lower in 2010 (see Endnote 10) and that amount would appear as a positive number -- i.e., expense -- rather than a negative number -- i.e., “savings” -- in the “incremental difference” column. The evidence was not persuasive that it will cost $120 million to add beds to HRMC, which is the amount underlying the projected “savings” in depreciation, amortization, and interest expense shown on Schedule 8A. Indeed, as discussed in Part F(1)(a)(iii) above, the evidence establishes that the alternative that gave rise to the $120 million cost estimate was not a viable option and that Holmes could add 84 beds at HRMC with little or no cost if it chose to do so by reducing the number of semi-private rooms that it converts to private rooms as part of the North Expansion and/or by finishing the shelled- in space on the eighth floor of the North Expansion. Accordingly, the “savings” embedded in Schedule 8A are grossly overstated as is the incremental net profit shown in that schedule. Specifically, in the third year of operation, when VMC is at a near-optimal occupancy level of 76 percent, the incremental net profit generated by VMC will be no more than $234,000 and, more likely, will be a net loss between $497,000 and $10.41 million.10 A net profit of $234,000 is a very marginal return on the $106 million cost of VMC, and is well below the three percent return that Holmes' seeks to achieve for its capital projects. However, according to Holmes' chief financial officer, the return generated by a project is not Holmes' paramount concern as a not-for profit organization, and at that level, the project would be considered financially feasible in the long-term. A $497,000 to $10.41 million incremental net loss would mean that the project is not financially feasible in the long-term. The “including this project” column on Schedule 8A projects that Holmes will have net income of approximately $31.1 million in 2010. Thus, even if VMC actually generated an incremental net loss in the range of $497,000 to $10.41 million in 2010, the Holmes' system would still be profitable. Subsection (7) -- Fostering Competition that Promotes Cost-Effectiveness Generally, competition for hospital services benefits consumers because it leads to lower prices and it creates incentives for hospitals to lower costs. It is not necessary for hospitals to be equal in size to compete, but the beneficial effects of competition will be greater if the hospitals are more equal. As explained by Dr. David Eisenstadt, Wuesthoff’s expert economist, “competitive constraints are a matter of degree” and “while it is true that a small hospital can pose some competitive constraint, it’s not correct that a small hospital can impose the same competitive constraint . . . as a large hospital could.” (Transcript at 1571-72). Holmes is, and historically has been, the dominant provider of hospital services in south Brevard County, with market shares exceeding 80 percent prior to the opening of Wuesthoff-Melbourne. Holmes still has a market share in excess of 70 percent in south Brevard County. A dominant hospital has the ability to set prices above competitive levels by commanding higher prices in negotiations with commercial payors. Holmes has done so in the past and, based upon the comparison of the commercial average net inpatient revenues reported by the Health First hospitals and the Wuesthoff hospitals in 2003 and 2004, it continues to do so. Holmes ability to set prices above competitive levels is enhanced by the fact that the largest managed care plan in Brevard County, HFHP, is operated by Health First. The original approval of the CON for Wuesthoff- Melbourne was based upon the Agency’s determinations that there was at that time a “compelling” need for competition for hospital services in south Brevard County; that the entry of a new, non-Health First provider into the market would give commercial payors and, ultimately, patients an alternative to Holmes, which because of its relationship with HFHP, had no incentive to negotiate competitive rates with other providers; and that competition would have the effect of reducing prices paid by the commercial payors to the hospitals and, ultimately, the premiums paid by patients. Wuesthoff-Melbourne’s entry into the market in December 2002 has not yet resulted in any material price reductions. Indeed, notwithstanding Wuesthoff-Melbourne’s presence in the market, HRMC increased its charges by 15 percent in 2003-04 and by an additional five percent in 2004-05. A hospital’s charges do not necessarily correspond to the prices that the hospital negotiates with commercial payors. However, in this case, there appears to be a correlation because Holmes had an 11.6 percent increase in net revenue per admission between 2003 and 2004 and it also had significant increases in the commercial average inpatient revenues per admission at HRMC and PBCH between 2003 and 2004. Moreover, the significant increase in charges at Holmes over the past two years is a strong indication that Holmes is not feeling any significant competitive pressure as a result of Wuesthoff-Melbourne’s presence in the market. Wuesthoff-Melbourne will be able to exert more competitive pressure on Holmes as its market share increases, particularly if Holmes’ market share continues to decline at the same time as is projected. As a result, Wuesthoff-Melbourne’s ability to expand and increase (or at least maintain) its market share in the growing Viera market is particularly significant to achieving price reductions (and/or minimizing price increases) in Brevard County.11 Holmes contends that even if VMC is approved, there will be sufficient competition in Viera because, according to Table 33 in the CON application, in 2010 the Health First hospitals will have a 50.5 percent market share of the PSA targeted by VMC and the Wuesthoff hospitals will have a 44.3 percent market share of the PSA. However, the approval of the VMC will have the effect of dramatically slowing the upward trend in Wuesthoff’s market share and corresponding downward trend of Health First’s market share in the PSA targeted by VMC because according to Tables 28 and 33 of the CON application, without VMC, the market share of the Wuesthoff hospitals in the PSA is projected to increase from 43.3 percent (in 2003) to 52.3 percent (in 2010), and the market share of the Health First Hospitals in the PSA is expected to decline from 51.2 percent (in 2003) to 42.5 percent (in 2010). Moreover, if VMC is approved, it is less likely that there will be sufficient need for additional acute care beds in the area to justify expanding Wuesthoff-Melbourne beyond 134 beds. That, in turn, will limit the competitive pressure that Wuesthoff-Melbourne will be able to exert on Holmes in the future. The evidence was not persuasive regarding the extent of the competitive pressure and/or price reductions that would result from the expansion of Wuesthoff-Melbourne rather than the approval of VMC.12 However, the fact remains that VMC will strengthen Holmes’ market position in central and south Brevard County, which will not foster competition that promotes cost effectiveness. Not only will the approval of VMC negatively affect the evolution of competition in south Brevard County, but it will effectively preclude the construction of another hospital in the Viera area until 2029 when the exclusivity provisions and restrictive covenants discussed in Part D(2) above expire. The evidence was not persuasive that there was an anticompetitive motivation underlying Holmes’ decision to propose VMC, but the evidence does establish that the approval of VMC will have anticompetitive effects. As a result, the criteria in Section 408.035(7), Florida Statutes, strongly weigh against the approval of Holmes’ CON application. Subsection (8) -- Costs and Methods of Construction The parties stipulated that the costs (including equipment costs), methods of construction, and energy provision for VMC are reasonable; that the architectural drawings for the VMC satisfy the applicable code requirements; and that the construction schedule for VMC is reasonable. Thus, VMC satisfies the criteria in Section 408.035(8), Florida Statutes. Subsection (9) -- Medicaid and Charity Care Holmes conditioned the approval of its application on VMC providing the following levels of Medicaid and charity care: At least 3.0 percent of inpatients at [VMC] will be covered by Medicaid and/or Medicaid HMOs. At least 2.3 percent of the gross revenues of [VMC] will be attributable to patients who meet the guidelines for charity care. The Medicaid and charity commitments are lower than the averages for Brevard County, but they are reasonable and attainable in light of the demographics of the area that will be served by VMC. Holmes has a history of providing considerable services to Medicaid and charity patients, both at its existing facilities and through community programs such as HOPE. Wuesthoff also has a history of providing considerable services to Medicaid and charity patients at its existing facilities and through community programs such as its free clinic in Cocoa. Wuesthoff-Rockledge is a Medicaid disproportionate share provider, which entitles it to a higher Medicaid reimbursement rate from the State as a “reward” for serving more than its fair share of Medicaid patients. Holmes' hospitals and Wuesthoff-Melbourne are not Medicaid disproportionate share providers. Wuesthoff-Melbourne has not been open long enough to qualify. The Wuesthoff hospitals have a contract with Well Care, which is the only Medicaid HMO in Brevard County. Holmes' hospitals do not have a contract with Well Care. On a dollar-amount basis, Holmes provides considerably more Medicaid and charity care than any other hospital in Brevard County, including the Wuesthoff hospitals. In fiscal year 2003, for example, Holmes’ Medicaid gross revenues were $53.7 million (as compared to $39.7 million for the Wuesthoff hospitals) and its charity care gross revenues were $27.8 million (as compared to $10.9 million for the Wuesthoff hospitals). The larger dollar-amount of Medicaid and charity care provided by Holmes is due, at least in part, to Holmes being almost twice the size of the Wuesthoff hospitals. On a percentage basis, Holmes provides approximately the same level of charity care as Wuesthoff-Rockledge, but it provides less Medicaid care than Wuesthoff-Rockledge. In fiscal year 2003, for example, 2.8 percent of Holmes’ gross revenue was charity care (as compared to 2.5 percent for Wuesthoff- Rockledge) and seven percent of Holmes’ patient days were attributable to Medicaid patients (as compared to 10.9 percent for Wuesthoff-Rockledge). According to Mr. Gregg, the Agency gives more weight to the percentage of Medicaid and charity care provided by a hospital than it does to the dollar amount of such services. However, Mr. Gregg acknowledged that Holmes satisfies the criteria in Section 408.035(9), Florida Statutes, based upon its history of providing services to the medically indigent and its Medicaid and charity commitments at VMC. Holmes' satisfaction of the criteria in Section 408.035(9), Florida Statutes, is not given great weight in this proceeding because the medically indigent in central and south Brevard County are currently being adequately served by the existing facilities and, more significantly, zip code 32940, in which VMC will be located and from which it is projected to draw the largest percentage of its patients, has a lower percentage of Medicaid/charity patients and a higher median household income than Brevard County as a whole. Subsection (10) -- Designation as a Gold Seal Nursing Homes The parties stipulated that Section 408.035(10), Florida Statutes, is not applicable because Holmes is not proposing the addition of any nursing home beds. Rule Criteria The Agency rules implicated in this case -- Florida Administrative Code Rules 59C-1.030(2) and 59C-1.038 -- do not contain any review criteria that are distinct from the statutory criteria discussed above. The “health care access criteria” and “priority considerations” in those rules focus primarily on the impact of the proposed facility on the medically indigent and other underserved population groups, as well as the applicant’s history of and/or commitment to serving those groups. Holmes satisfies those rule criteria, but they are not given great weight for the reasons discussed in Part F(1)(g) above. Impact of VMC on the Wuesthoff Hospitals As discussed above, VMC is projected to take patients that are currently being served by, or would otherwise be served by one of the existing hospitals in central or south Brevard County. Approximately 30 percent of VMC’s patient volume will come at the expense of the Wuesthoff hospitals. As a result of the projected population growth in central and south Brevard County over the planning horizon, the Wuesthoff hospitals are projected to have more admissions in 2010 than they currently have, whether or not VMC is approved. However, if VMC is approved, the Wuesthoff hospitals will have fewer admissions in 2010 than they would have had without VMC. The health planners who testified at the hearing agreed that in determining the impact of VMC on the Wuesthoff hospitals it is appropriate to focus on the number of admissions that the Wuesthoff hospitals would have received but for the approval of VMC. The Agency’s precedent is in accord. See Wellington, supra, at 54, 109 n.13. Holmes’ health planner projected in the CON application that the approval of VMC will result in the Wuesthoff hospitals having 1,932 fewer admissions in 2010 than they would have had without VMC, 998 at Wuesthoff-Rockledge and 934 at Wuesthoff-Melborune. Wuesthoff’s health planner projected that the approval of VMC will result in the Wuesthoff hospitals having 2,399 fewer admissions in 2010 than they would have had without VMC, 1,541 at Wuestoff-Rockledge and 858 at Wuesthoff-Melborune. The projections of Wuesthoff’s health planner are more reasonable because they are based upon more current market share data and, as to Wuesthoff-Melbourne, the projections may even be understated because its market share is still growing in the areas targeted by VMC. On a contribution-margin basis, the lost admissions projected by Wuesthoff’s health planner translate into a loss of approximately $3.9 million of income at Wuesthoff-Rocklege and a loss of approximately $2 million of income at Wuesthoff- Melbourne. Using the lost admissions projected by Holmes’ health planner, the lost income at Wuesthoff-Rockledge would be $2.51 million and the lost income at Wuesthoff-Melbourne would be $2.15 million. Thus, impact of VMC on the Wuesthoff system would be a lost income of at least $4.66 million and, more likely, $5.9 million. A loss of income in that range would be significant and adverse to the Wuesthoff hospitals, both individually and collectively. Even though the Wuesthoff system has a net worth of approximately $70.95 million, its net income (i.e., “excess of revenues over expenses”) was only $971,000 in 2003 and $1.1 million in 2004. The system is still recovering from a “devastating” financial year in 1999 when it reported a loss of almost $12 million. Wuesthoff-Melbourne reported a $4.1 million net loss in 2003, and as of June 2004, it had yet to show a profit. The significance of the projected lost income at the Wuesthoff hospitals is tempered somewhat by the increased patient volume that the hospitals are projected to have in 2010 even if VMC is approved. However, the evidence was not persuasive that the increased patient volumes will necessarily result in greater profits at the Wuesthoff hospitals in 2010.13 The approval of VMC will also likely result in a loss of outpatient volume at the Wuesthoff hospitals. However, there is no credible evidence regarding the amount of outpatient volume that would be lost or the financial impact of the lost outpatient volume on Wuesthoff.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency issue a final order denying Holmes’ application, CON 9759. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of June, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of June, 2005.
The Issue Assuming a need for additional hospital beds in Broward County by 1987, the agreed "planning horizon," the question becomes which, if any, of the six or seven proposals advanced in these proceedings would be the best means of meeting the need. Central to the bed need issue in this case is the parties' enigmatic stipulation: 2/ that there is a need for acute care beds in Broward County in 1987, and this need should be determined on a regionalized basis. Pembroke Pines joins in this stipulation only to the extent that a need does not exist in the proposed service area of SBHD. Prehearing Stipulation C.8. The parties were unable to agree on where these regional boundaries should be drawn, among other things.
Findings Of Fact There is a glut of hospital beds in Broward County. Twenty hospitals have some 6,000 licensed or authorized beds in the county exclusive of free- standing psychiatric hospitals and their beds. In 1980, when Broward County's population numbered 1,018,200, six thousand beds would have been at least a quarter again too many by accepted standards. In 1987, Broward County's population has been projected to be between 1,137,160 and 1,276,911 by the University of Florida's Bureau of Economic and Business Research (BEBR). Other population projections for the year 1987 range all the way to 2,260,700, but it is highly unlikely that so many people will ever live in Broward County, much less by the year 1987. There is no assurance that even BEBR's high projection of 1,276,911 will be reached by 1987. If it should be, the ratio of beds to population in Broward County as a whole would only then fall within the upper reaches of arguably appropriate levels, assuming no additional beds in the interim. CENTROID MOVES WEST Whatever its magnitude, there is no reason to expect population growth to cluster around existing hospitals. Contrary trends have, indeed, already emerged. Population growth in western Broward County is expected to continue at a rate in excess of the rate for the county as a whole. From 1970 to 1980, the population in Broward County's western and central planning subregions (see Appendix) combined went from 140,581 to 417,461 while the population in eastern Broward County went from 479,518 to 600,736. Broward County is most densely populated in its eastern portion, but, increasingly, people have been moving into housing further west in the county. The result has been rapidly growing occupancy at Bennett, the county's westernmost hospital; and high occupancy, often to capacity, at University, which is further north than Bennett but almost as far west. Occupancy rates at Pembroke Pines, the southwestern most hospital in the county, have also increased. If additional hospital beds could be added in the west without affecting the efficiency of operations at other hospitals in the west, their addition would still have the effect of depressing demand for hospital beds in eastern Broward County or, at least, of slowing the rate of increase in demand. The four public hospitals along the Atlantic seaboard are operating at efficient occupancy levels and, in the case of SBHD's Memorial Hospital (Memorial), at capacity, but many hospitals in eastern Broward County are operating extremely inefficiently, including HCA's North Beach Medical Center (North Beach) with 1981 average occupancy of 37.1 percent, and Humana's Community Hospital of South Broward (Community), with 1981 average occupancy of 42.7 percent. THE PROPOSALS HCA, NBHD and Humana, the three organizations which together already own and operate half of the short-term hospitals in Broward County are vying for the right to build a new hospital in the northwest part of the county. In addition to its contention that a new hospital should be built in the northwest to open in 1987, HCA argues that present conditions justify expansion of University long before then, and Humana put on evidence tending to show a need for expansion at Bennett by 1987. SBHD has proposed a new hospital for southwest Broward to open at 84 beds in 1987 and go to 128 beds in 1988. Bennett's expansion is the only other proposal to meet (at least in part) the bed need alleged to exist in southwest Broward. THE NORTHWEST By anybody's reckoning, HCA's Margate is located in northwest Broward already. Depending on how far south the boundary of a northwest region is drawn, HCA's University can also be said to be located in northwest Broward. Humana's Cypress Community Hospital (Cypress), the closest hospital to the east, lies north of University and south of Margate; and Bennett is almost due south of University. NBHD's North Broward Hospital lies further east and considerably north of Cypress. HCA acquired Margate by acquiring or merging with Hospital Affiliates International (HAI) the for-profit hospital chain that formerly owned Margate. Even before the acquisition, planning had begun (by HAI) to replace the facility. Licensed at 150 beds, its effective capacity is significantly lower. Situated on 3.7 acres that do not provide adequate parking, Margate is, in numerous respects, an example of how hospitals should not be built. Hospital ancillary departments were added to a physical plant originally designed as a nursing home and the result has been narrow, dead end corridors and a pathetic 400 gross square feet per bed. There was uncontroverted testimony that the corridors amounted to "life and safety code" violations. No other such violations were specified, however, nor was any statute or regulation cited with respect to the corridors. The testimony was, in fact, that HRS has granted a variance for the corridors based on a similar variance by the Joint Commission on Accreditation. The evidence revealed no request by any licensing or other authority to renovate or to replace Margate, nor any threat to delicense so much as a single bed at Margate. HCA proposes nevertheless to close Margate down when it opens a new 250-bed hospital on 15-acres of a 21-acre site two miles to the north, at a total project cost of $33,750,577. Alternatively, HCA argues it is statutorily entitled to build a 150- bed replacement hospital, and uncontroverted testimony put the project cost at $25,696,403, rather than three-fifths of the 250-bed hospital cost used by HRS. Replacing Margate on its existing site, like renovating it, would not be economical, and for many of the same reasons. Whether at 150 or 250 beds, the HCA proposals include 24 intermediate care, 20 obstetric, 14 pediatric and 12 critical care beds. The proposed hospital would have Margate's medicare and medicaid provider numbers, so that it would not be a "new hospital" under TEFRA regulations. At 150 beds, 929 square feet per bed are contemplated at a cost of $171,309 per bed. At 250 beds, 766 square feet per bed are contemplated at a cost of $135,002 per bed. Humana proposes to build a new 150 bed hospital on a site yet to be acquired in northwest Broward at a project cost of $27,772,500. As proposed, 3/ Coral Ridge General Hospital would have 20 obstetrical beds, 20 pediatric beds, 10 critical care beds and 100 medical-surgical beds. There would be 972 square feet per bed at a cost per bed of $185,150. Larger by a third but in many other ways comparable to Humana's proposed Coral Ridge is NBHD's proposal for a new hospital. At 200 beds, the total project cost would be $37,203,658 or $186,018 per bed and there would be some 950 square feet per bed. Twenty-four obstetric, 20 pediatric, 16 critical care and 140 medical-surgical beds are proposed. A site of approximately 20 acres has been donated, subject to CON approval of the project. University seeks immediate authority to house 73 additional medical- surgical beds in shelled-in space now available on site. University's 209 beds had 83.2 percent average occupancy in 1981, and, at the time of hearing, when it was full to overflowing, University had experienced 87 percent average occupancy for 1982. The uncontroverted evidence was that University can add 73 beds at a total project cost in the neighborhood of $310,000, or $4,227 per bed, resulting in 576 square feet per bed at University. These figures do not reflect associated ancillary costs already or to be incurred. SOUTH AND CENTRAL Although Bennett has not yet reached efficient occupancy levels, a strong trend in that direction has been demonstrated. Average occupancy in 1981 was 63.5 percent, up from 58.5 percent in 1980. By CON number 1996, dated March 15, 1982, Bennett was authorized to spend $8,780,100 to build a parking garage, establish a separate day surgery and expand ancillaries. In these proceedings it seeks authority to add 64 beds in existing shelled-in space. Of these beds 30 would be "minimal care" beds and the remainder would be medical-surgical beds. Exclusive of ancillary costs already authorized, the project cost would be $1,600,000 or $25,000 per bed. Finally SBHD's proposed WBH would have 128 beds at a total project cost of $38,386,000 or $299,891 per bed. WBH would have 852 square feet per bed, 8 critical care beds and 120 medical-surgical beds, and would be built with a view toward expansion. It would operate as a "satellite" of Memorial. DRAWING LINES In order to analyze the County by regions, boundaries must be drawn. Each applicant for a certificate of need (CON) to add hospital beds in northwest Broward county defined "northwest" differently. Both Humana and NBHD saw the hospitals they proposed as serving the 1987 need each identified in its particular northwest planning area. For its purposes, Bennett defined a west central region of Broward County; and SBHD defined its proposed service area for WBH to include the southwest and part of the south central Broward County planning regions. Objections to the WBH proposal focused on southern Broward County, an aggregate of planning subregions extending east to the ocean. SBHD, HCA and Bennett all analyzed bed need on the basis of regions coterminous with the service areas of specific institutions: that of the proposed WBH, in the case of the SBHD; the combined service areas of University and Margate, in the case of HCA; and Bennett's own service area. Defining the service area of an existing institution is a different problem than forecasting the perimeters of a hospital's service area, before the hospital is built. The key to defining historical service areas is information about where patients served by a hospital lived. Hospitals keep data on patient origin by zip code, and the South Florida Hospital Association compiled some of this information for 1979, in its Hospitalization Utilization and Patient Origin Project (HUPOP). Studies like HUPOP provide a basis for judgments about whether a particular zip code furnishes a hospital a great enough fraction of its total patients (or patient days) to be considered part of the hospital's primary or secondary service area. A lightly populated zip code might be included in a hospital's service area on the basis of the size of the share of all patients it sends to hospitals who go to that particular institution, even if the number is a small fraction of the total for the hospital. As the parties demonstrated at great length, it is possible to attach undue significance to regional or other boundaries. They are not, after all, magical barriers through which persons seeking hospital care cannot pass. Beds available to people living within a region do not cease to exist just because they are located on the other side of some arbitrary line. No hospital in Broward County meets the need of the whole population within its service area, or serves nobody outside its service area. There are substantial overlaps in hospital service areas. Any calculation of need must take beds already available into account. The parties' stipulation that there is a need for an unspecified number 3/ of additional beds in an unspecified northwest region does not address the question of what beds outside any such area are nevertheless available to residents of the area. DEMOGRAPHIC PROJECTIONS Once an area is defined, the next step is forecasting its population for the year 1987. Such forecasts begin with census counts or population estimates, which require judgment and extrapolation themselves, unless an actual count in a census block or other census division is relied on. Taking points at either end of a time interval, future projections are made using linear extrapolation, proportional growth, shift-share and other methodologies. Forecasts represent a weighted average of these projections, informed by a judgment on such things as "ultimate build out," and the likely effects of anticipated transportation improvements. Forecasts of population cohorts or components are also pertinent because child bearing women and children have special needs, and because older people are more likely to use hospital beds than younger people. John Short and Associates, Inc., forecast a total population of 256,800 in the northwest area defined by HCA (NW-HCA) in 1987, based on medium projections by the Bureau of Economic and Business Research at the University of Florida. Urban Decision Systems, Inc. forecast a total population of 110,053 for the northwest Broward County planning subregion used by NBHD (NW-NBHD), and Dr. Ladner projected a population increase in the northwest area as defined by Humana (NW-HU) of 76,812 between 1982 and 1987. In making his only population projection for NW-HU, Dr. Ladner assumed an 8.6 percent compound annual growth rate, which the weight of the evidence showed to be unrealistically high. For that and other reasons, Dr. Ladner's population forecast has not been deemed reliable. The John Short and Urban Decisions forecasts are theoretically compatible, pertaining, as they do, to two different areas, They represent compound annual growth rates of 6.69 and 5.86 percent, respectively, and together indicate the likely order of magnitude of the growth of population in northwest Broward County by 1987. The population in western Broward generally, and northwest Broward in particular, is younger on average than the population of the county as a whole. In the northwest planning subregion, 21.7 percent of the population was under 15, 59 percent was 15 to 64, and 19.3 percent was 65 or older in 1980. Also in 1980, women aged 15 to 44 comprised 20.1 percent of the population. Assuming the population of the northwest planning subregion ages slightly in line with the projections for the county as a whole, 19.4 percent of the population in 1987 should be under 15, 80.2 percent should be under 65 and 19.8 percent should be 65 or over. The proportion of women 15 to 44 should grow to 20.8 percent. Dr. Ladner's 1987 projection for Bennett's service area, zip codes 33313, 33314, 33317, 33322, 33323, 33324, 33325, 33326, 33327, 33328, 33330, 33331 and 33332, reflects the same methodology he used for the northwest. Even though the part of Bennett's service area to the south and west of the hospital is not as well developed as northwest Broward, so that there is more justification for Dr. Ladner's growth rate assumption there, his projections for Bennett's service area of 252,644 5/ in 1985 and 368,050 in 1990 are probably too high. Thousands of acres of residential and other development are planned or under construction in these zip codes, however. If Arvida sells 2,680 housing units between now and 1987 in its Indian Trace development in zip code 33327 (whether it can depends on interest rates and other factors) and if household size there averages 2.7, as projected, that development alone would house 7,236 additional persons in 1987. Some time between 1984 and 1988, construction of I-75 will be completed, and southwest Broward will become a 30-minute commute from Miami. When 1-95 was completed in south Palm Beach County, annual population growth jumped from 5,000 to 33,000. The land in Palm Beach County cost less to develop and is closer to the ocean, although further from Miami, than land in southwest Broward County. Population forecasts for the southwest and south central Broward planning regions have been made by Dr. Stanley Smith and by Urban Decisions Systems, Inc. For the two regions combined, their projections for 1987 are 183,700 and 173,800, respectively. For the WBH proposed service area, as revised, zip codes 33025, 33026, 33027, 33028, 33029, 33326, 33327, 33328, 33330, 33331 and 33332, Dr. Smith forecast a 1987 population of 69,128. This number was arrived at without reference to the projected opening of Interstate Highway 75, but Dr. Smith did not think that prospect called for an adjustment in the forecast. For south Broward County, as a whole, i.e., the southwest, southeast and south central planning subregions combined, Dr. Smith projected a population of 380,711 in 1986, and 388,795 in 1987. Gateway's Exhibit No. 16. In 1980, 10.6 percent of the population in the revised WBH proposed service area was 65 or over, as compared to 21.7 percent in the three south regions as a whole. NBHD FORMULAE If facilities in an area serve only that area and nobody enters or leaves the area for hospitalization, the use rate of the population will be the sum of draw rates of the hospitals in the area. In analyzing the need for a specific institution, or assessing the likely draw of a new institution, it is necessary to assign some fraction of the whole population in its service area as its market share. Existing institutions have historical market shares which can be used where historical conditions are not predicted to change, while, for new institutions, other assumptions have to be made. Demand-based need formulae express utilization rates as patient days per 1,000 population. Translating patient days per thousand persons per year to beds needed per thousand persons requires dividing by 365 to get an average daily census per thousand persons then multiplying by the inverse of the optimal average occupancy rate assumed. One hundred percent occupancy of hospital beds on a regular basis would be undesirable, if achievable, because of the lack of reserve capacity to meet fluctuating demand. As a practical matter the problems of matching patients in hospital rooms with more than one bed on the basis of gender, service, smoking habits, and diagnosis prevent 100 percent utilization. For acute care medical-surgical beds, an average occupancy of 80 percent is a desideratum with which no health care planner who testified disagreed, although Dr. Schoeman spoke in terms of 80 to 85 percent average occupancy. Even lower average occupancies are recommended for certain specialty beds, including obstetric (75 percent), pediatric (65 percent) and cardiac intensive care (75 percent) beds. Eighty percent average occupancy as a health planning goal for all short-term beds taken together is supported by the weight of the evidence. (The Florida Task Force on Institutional Needs calls for a 79.4 percent weighted average occupancy). The goal of 80 percent occupancy underlies the national standard of 4 beds per 1,000 persons. This average also reflects the age distribution of the national population and other nationally average conditions. In 1980, 11.3 percent of the population in the United States was 65 or over, while the 65 and older age group made up 22 percent of Broward County's population. In Broward County, where the population is older on average than the population of the country as a whole and where there is significant seasonal variation in population (so that greater reserve capacity is desirable), the consensus is that 4.5 beds per 1,000 persons is a more appropriate rule of thumb. Based on historical demand in Broward County, Mr. Baehr of Amherst Associates, Inc. made an "area specific" analysis. In 1981, 752.1 patient days in Broward County hospitals were attributed on average to every 1,000 persons in Broward County under 65, while 3,442.8 patient days were attributed on average to every 1,000 Broward County residents 65 and older. Mr. Baehr also calculated service specific use rates and, on that basis, the need for, obstetric and pediatric beds. These specialized use rates are reflected in the aggregate use rates for the under 65 age cohort, but breaking them out separately permits the use of service specific occupancy rates. Mr. Baehr's 1981 Broward County use rates correspond to 2.58 beds per 1,000 persons under 65 (at 80 percent occupancy for all services) and 11.79 beds per 1,000 persons 65 and older. Free-standing psychiatric facilities were excluded from the calculations. To the extent the number of people leaving Broward County for hospitalization exceeds the number entering Broward County for that purpose, these utilization rates understate demand. A net outflow of this kind can be inferred from Medpar data reflecting such movement by medicare patients. Dr. Schoeman adjusted Broward County use rates for out-migration and concluded that county-wide use rates were 810.2 patient days per 1,000 population under age 65 and 3623.8 patient days per 1,000 population 65 and over. Dr. Schoeman's 1981 Broward County use rates correspond to 2.7747 beds per 1,000 under 65 (at 80 percent occupancy for all services) and 12.41 beds per 1,000 persons 65 and older (at 80 percent occupancy). The Health Systems Plan, which lacks any legal significance, but purportedly reflects local conditions, uses 861.8 patient days per 1,000 population under 65 and 3204.6 patient days per 1,000 population 65 and over. These numbers correspond to 2.95 and 10.97 beds per 1,000, respectively. At least in the absence of area-specific utilization rates, other utilization rates are used by health care planners. Dr. Kennedy calculated use rates specific to five zip codes in South Broward County for the year 1979 for each of four age cohorts, but testified that the most reasonable utilization rates to use in South Broward were those developed by the Florida Task Force on Institutional Need (TFIN), viz.: Medical-Surgical Patient Days per 1,000 Persons 0-64 565.9 65 and over 2982.2 ICC and CCU 0-64 43.1 65 and over 321.1 Psychiatric 0-64 44.9 65 and over 44.6 Obstetrics Females 15-44 186.3 Pediatrics 0-14 149.2 Gateway's Exhibit No. 12, Table 2, page 4. These figures supposedly represent the experience in Florida statewide. Finally, in the southern United States in 1980, utilization rates calculated from the National Hospital Discharge Survey (NHDS) were 348.2 patient days per 1,000 population under 15, 796.5 patient days per 1,000 population aged 15 to 44, 1,554.9 patient days per 1,000 population aged 45 to 64 and 3,994.2 patient days per 1,000 population 65 or over. The choice of appropriate utilization rates is complicated by the fact that there is no guarantee that historic rates will persist. Advances in medical science may make hospitalization for some conditions obsolete. Aging of the population over 65 on account of continued disproportionately elderly in- migration may result in greater utilization rates. Aging of the 15 to 64 age cohort would presumably result in greater utilization of certain services but might result in less utilization of obstetric beds, and so forth. The 1981 Broward County use rates adjusted for out-migration may prove an unreliable guide to future hospital utilization rates but no other use rates were shown by the evidence to be more reliable. Assuming these rates and applying the average occupancy rate of 80 percent, bed need in Broward County can appropriately be predicted by a weighted average of 2.7747 beds per 1,000 population under age 65, and 12.41 beds per 1,000 population 65 and older. FINANCIAL FEASIBILITY The two-tined "immediate and long-term" financial feasibility criterion was described by HRS' Mr. Konrad as a "go-no go gauge." With respect to each application, the questions are 1) whether financing for start-up costs is available and 2) whether the facility will have enough revenue to support operations, on a long-term basis. GO It is clear from the evidence that HCA and Humana each have access to massive amounts of capital, much more than needed to accomplish any or all of their respective expansion and construction proposals in Broward County. HCA proposes to use 100 percent equity for each of its projects. Humana plans 22.3 percent equity and 77.7 percent debt for the new hospital; and 86 percent equity and 14 percent debt for its expansion project at Bennett. Issue was not joined as to their contentions, amply supported by expert opinion, that operations at proposed facilities would quickly become profitable. Although HCA's showing in this regard as to the proposed 150-bed version of NWBRMC was fairly broad brush, nothing in the evidence raised any doubt but that, with substantial occupancy assured (by Margate's closing) almost from the start, NWBRMC would be profitable at 150 beds. NBHD is a legislatively created tax district charged with serving the hospital needs of residents of the district. NBHD has ad valorem taxing authority and also has a healthy operating margin, partly because it charges indigent care against tax revenues, not at cost, but at full charges. In addition, it has accumulated, in a funded depreciation account, all the equity it plans to use to build a new 200-bed hospital in northwest Broward. NBHD had originally planned to issue bonds for the total project cost but changed its plans for fear medicare and medicaid reimbursement for the additional interest expense might be jeopardized, because the additional borrowing might be deemed unnecessary. In the past, NBHD has expended five or six million dollars annually for routine equipment and other capital costs. At the time of the hearing, NBHD had CONs authorizing work (to be done over periods of time not specified in the record) at a cost of at least $58,000,000, including expenditures for revenue- generating extra beds at its North Broward Hospital. NBHD's debt capacity is on the order of $100,000,000, in the event it becomes necessary to issue bonds in an amount greater than the $16,815,000 now contemplated. NBHD also has a line of bank credit ($35,000,000 at half of prime) that should give it some flexibility in timing going to market for its permanent financing, even though, under its charter, NBHD's short-term borrowing is limited to no more than 15 percent of its assets for no more than one year. HCA sought to show that NBHD's proposal was not financially feasible by trying to show that NBHD could not muster the capital necessary to build a new 200 bed hospital, sustain the loss anticipated during the initial year of operations, and meet its other commitments, but these efforts fell short of the mark. There was no attempt to discredit the revenue projections for the 200-bed hospital or to prove that it would not become profitable in the second year of operations, if built. NO GO The evidence showed that WBH is not financially feasible as far as financing construction, unless planned renovations at SBHD's Memorial are scaled down to levels significantly below those contemplated in an outstanding CON, or delayed past completion times contemplated when the outstanding renovation CON was applied for. At the time of the hearing, no amendment of the renovation CON had been obtained, nor, as far as the evidence showed, had any been applied for. SBHD filed its application for a CON for the modernization of Memorial at or about the time (in the same batching cycle) as it filed its application for a CON for WBH. In the Memorial modernization application it sought, and it has since received, authorization to make capital improvements to Memorial costing $95,419,000 to be completed in November of 1985. Gateway's Exhibit No. In order to accomplish this, it planned to borrow $75,245,000 by issuing tax-exempt bonds. In order to build WBH, which it planned to open (at 84 beds) in January of 1987, SBHD planned to issue tax-exempt bonds in the amount of $31,930,000. Arthur R. Guastella, a municipal investment banker retained by SBHD, testified that SBHD was not in a position to incur additional indebtedness of more that $80,000,000, in May of 1981. (Vol. 36, 37) Because of tax revenues, SBHD's revenues have exceeded expenses in the last few years despite operating losses at Memorial and the walk-in center SBHD operates near Pembroke Pines. SBHD has nevertheless been able to put aside only $1,000,000 for WBH. Management conceded that building WBH was incompatible with renovating Memorial on schedule. In short, SBHD is in the posture of seeking authority for projects which, taken together, it lacks the financial wherewithal to accomplish. SBHD failed to demonstrate financial feasibility in another important respect, counsel's heroic efforts notwithstanding. The basic assumptions of average annual occupancy at WBH in the beginning years, which underlie the Price, Waterhouse projections, were not established as reasonable by competent evidence. These assumptions were first predicated on an analysis, prepared by Herman Smith Associates, of demand in the service area originally proposed by WBH; but faulty population projections came to light and the work of Herman Smith Associates was not relied on at hearing. Instead, a much larger service area was drawn, including some zip codes closer to other hospitals than to the site proposed for WBH, and various problematic assumptions were made (e.g., a 100 percent draw rate from several zip codes). This work was done by a certified public accountant with an admitted lack of expertise in projecting bed need, and no health care planner or other qualified expert testified that the utilization or occupancy rates projected for WBH were reasonable. Detailed information about the population of south Broward County and its likely growth was put on by SBHD and other parties. The record is replete with competent evidence of various methods of projecting a population's bed need, based on the number, age and sex of the population. It is thus possible to calculate bed need for southern Broward County, each of the three planning subregions there, and the service areas proposed for WBH. Even when reduced by the number of beds already available in an area, bed need does not automatically translate into demand for beds at a particular institution, however; and SBHD failed to prove the reasonableness of its demand or utilization assumptions for WBH. SBHD has argued that Gateway's expert, Dr. Kennedy, supplied this omission with his Newtonian "spatial interaction model," but the record does not support this contention. For one thing, the model was shown to be a highly unreliable predictor of real world phenomena. For another, time unrelated to population change is not a variable in the model, nor is a lag in utilization at a new hospital otherwise taken into account, so that the 46 percent occupancy figure for WBH in 1987 on which SBHD seeks to rely is, according to Dr. Kennedy, unrealistically high for an initial operating year. Even if WBH opened in 1986, Dr. Kennedy predicted something like 33 percent average occupancy for 1987. Gateway's Exhibit No. 12, p. 28. For 1989, the Price, Waterhouse compilation that SBHD offered in an effort to prove WBH's financial feasibility, SBHD Exhibit No. 184, assumes 39,274 patient days at WBH, which represents an average daily census of 107.6 or average occupancy for 1989 of 84 percent. Without the "start-up curve" adjustment, Dr. Kennedy's model predicts less than 50 percent occupancy on average for 1989 at WBH. With the adjustment, the figure is lower. SBHD has also argued that evidence of record of utilization projections at other proposed hospitals should be looked to in order to show the reasonableness of its utilization assumptions for WBH. For the first two years, occupancy levels projected at WBH do closely parallel similar projections for, e.g., the new 200 bed hospital proposed by NBHD, but this in no way shows the reliability of the utilization assumptions used for the projections at WBH. Assuming some bed need arguendo, WBH's draw rate and so its utilization and occupancy levels would depend on, among other things, its location vis-a-vis physicians' offices, other hospitals, patients' residences and so forth, factors that differ in south Broward from conditions in northwest Broward. As proposed, WBH would be smaller, have fewer services and a different medical staff than the hospital proposed by NBHD. Among the consequences of the opening of Interstate 75 may be a dramatic shift to utilization of Dade County hospitals by the population of southwest Broward County. Lifemark, who owns and operates Palmetto General located in North Dade County on I-75, did not prove, however, that any such shift can be counted on to occur. Palmetto is currently operating at efficient levels and management is contemplating expansion based on the prospect of population growth in Dade County alone, although no letter of intent to apply for a CON has yet been filed. While Palmetto serves about four percent of the need for patient days attributable to southwest Broward's population, this represents something under one percent of Palmetto's total patient days. EXPANSION PROPOSALS COMPARED University hospital, at the time of the hearing, had occupancy rates which interfered with its efficient operation and required frequent emergency room to emergency room and other transfers. The parties stipulated: that University has experienced an occupancy level for the past year of approximately 87 percent including an occupancy level in excess of 90 percent during certain winter months. The parties further stipulate that in the case of University such occupancy levels have resulted in an adverse impact on certain aspects of patient care. Specifically, there have been problems in treating emergency room patients because of the emergency room being used as a holding area for patients that are waiting for beds to be available. There is difficulty in assuring continuity of care as patients have had to receive hospital care at facilities for which their regular physician does not have staff privileges, and a new physician had to be involved. There have been significant problems and inconveniences to patients as a result of the unavailability of beds. Furthermore, there have been difficulties encountered in spouses, relatives, and friends being able to visit patients when such patients have had to receive their care at other hospitals because of transportation difficulties (which is particularly a problem for the elderly). The demand for University's services has been convincingly demonstrated by real people seeking hospital care there. Beginning with a 1987 population forecast (extrapolated linearly from Dr. Ladner's 1985 and 1990 projections) that was probably too high for the area within zip codes 33313, 33314, 33317, 33322, 33323, 33324, 33325, 33326, 33327, 33328, 33330, 33331, and 33332 (Bennett's service area), Mr. Richardson multiplied by a use rate that was probably too low and assumed an 80 percent occupancy rate to calculate a 1987 bed need for the area of 1,291 beds. The understated use rate tends to compensate for the overstated population projection, and the end result is not unreasonable. From 1,291, beds already available at Bennett (204), Florida Medical Center (400), Plantation General (262) and Doctors General (202) were subtracted and a net bed need of 221 was forecast for Bennett's service area. Proceeding in the same manner with reference to Bennett's primary service area only (the same area except for zip codes 33317, 33330, 33331 and 33332), a net bed need of 145 was forecast there for 1987. Finally, applying the same utilization rate to the increment by which the population of Bennett's service area is projected (extrapolation from Ladner) to increase between 1982 and 1987 yields a prediction that the incremental population alone will use 323 beds a day on average. Allotting 177 of these full beds (average daily census) among Bennett and the other hospitals in the service area would bring each of them to 80 percent average occupancy and still leave an average daily census of 146, which, again assuming 80 percent occupancy, is a prediction of bed need in Bennett's service area of 183 for 1987. These predictions assume that the hospitals in Bennett's service area will draw no more patient days from outside the service area in 1987 than they do in 1982, but also unrealistically assume that the hospitals in the service area will have a combined 100 percent draw of patients in the service area. Bennett's primary service area overlaps University's secondary service area. No allowance has been made for any increase in University's draw that might result from expansion at University, nor has the historical draw of hospitals outside the service area been taken into account. Due east of Bennett is the largest aggregation of underutilized hospital beds in the county. In the east central planning subregion, the ratio of beds to population is 7.1 per 1,000. Among the 64 beds Bennett proposes to add are 30 "minimal care" beds. At least by that name, there are no such hospital beds in Florida, and only 52 in the United States. The room charge for a "minimal care" bed is expected to be 25 or 30 percent less than the comparable charge for a medical-surgical bed, reflecting lower nurse to bed ratios for "minimal care" beds than for ordinary medical-surgical beds. A condominium medical office complex adjacent to Bennett is expected to be finished by the fall of this year. The complex' 55,000 square feet are expected to provide office space for 41 physicians who together already account for 34 percent of Bennett's admissions. These condominium offices are already sold even though construction has not been completed. NEW HOSPITAL PROPOSALS FOR NORTHWEST COMPARED HCA contends that 73 new beds are needed in NW-HCA now and an additional 100 by 1987, for a total of 173; HRS and NBHD contend that 200 new beds are needed in NW-NBHD in 1987; and Humana contends that 223 beds are needed in NW-HU, plus 64 beds at Bennett, for a total of 287 by 1987. In making its case for the low number, HCA unilaterally assumed it should have the same market share it now enjoys in NW-HCA in 1987, and ignoring the increased attractiveness of a new 250 bed facility, as compared to Margate, put on evidence tending to show that, if all 173 beds were allotted to HCA, population increase in NW-HCA would assure their efficient utilization in 1987 without increasing the proportion of patient days from NW-HCA at University and the proposed 250-bed NWBRMC combined over the proportion now received by Margate and University combined. The evidence showed that adding 173 beds in NW-HCA would still leave a bed NBHD of 76 assuming 80 percent average occupancy, to be met by hospital beds outside of NW-HCA. NBHD put on evidence tending to show that the 1987 population in NW- NBHD could efficiently use 471 hospital beds. Assuming Margate or a hospital replacing Margate supplied 150 beds, 321 beds would still be needed in 1987 to serve the residents of NW-NBHD, NBHD contends. These forecasts ate based on the most conservative population and utilization predictions for northwest Broward County. Humana tried to prove that 254 additional beds will be needed in NW-HU by 1987, of which an expansion at University would supply 73, leaving 181. The 181 figure should be reduced by 34, Humana contends, because "since Margate experienced an average occupancy of 57.5 percent in 1981, it must be allocated an additional 34 patients per bed [sic] to raise it to the 80 percent occupancy level," Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order of Petitioners, Humedicenter, Inc. d/b/a Coral Ridge General Hospital and Humana of Florida, Inc. d/b/a Bennett County Hospital, p. 72, leaving 147 beds needed which Humana's proposed 150 bed hospital would supply. This argument is difficult to follow, but Humana's incremental analysis (with low use rates tending to compensate for exaggerated population projections) does suggest that opening 250 or so beds in NW-HU in 1987 would not depress patient flows to hospitals outside NW-HU below current levels. Unlike HCA, neither Humana nor NBHD has a hospital in northwest Broward County (NW-NBHD, NW-HU or NW-HCA). Competition would be enhanced there by building a new non-HCA hospital in the area, although it is true that most people presently leave the area to go to non-HCA hospitals. It is possible to overstate the advantage of competition in this context, moreover, inasmuch as people generally go to the hospital a physician recommends or, in emergencies, to the closest hospital. Competition may only foster better amenities for the medical staff rather than lower charges to the patients, but efforts by physicians or others to improve quality of care for patients would presumably have more chance of success in a competitive environment. Miami-Dade puts on continuing education programs for nurses at Humana's five south Florida hospitals and a new Humana hospital in northwest Broward would presumably also make space available for them. HCA and NBHD also have various training programs at their Broward County facilities. There was no showing that facilities for training in Broward County were limited. Humana publishes pamphlets about new medical technology for physicians on staff at its hospitals. With respect to expansion and new hospital proposals alike, the parties stipulated: The applicants and HRS agree that each applicant can adequately staff its project with all necessary personnel, including technical, nursing, and-medical personnel, and that this is not a comparative issue in this proceeding. Pembroke Pines does not join in this stipulation. The applicants and HRS agree that each applicant has adequate community support for its proposed project, and that this is not a comparative issue in this proceeding. Pembroke Pines does not join in this stipulation. 11. The parties agree that a new hospital in the northwest Broward area would attract a large number of physicians presently practicing in that area to join the medical staff of the new hospital. The need to cover this hospital, in addition to hospitals currently being covered, will result in physician inconvenience and more travel time. The most important comparative issues joined by the parties involved financial projections. FINANCIAL COMPARISONS The parties' proposed construction costs are not strictly comparable. The incremental costs per bed stated by Bennett, University and for the "additional" 100 beds at the proposed 250 bed version of NWBRMC do not reflect all of the costs that are properly associated with making a hospital bed available for occupancy. But it is true that construction costs for expansion are less than those for new construction when there is excess ancillary capacity and ordinarily even where there is not. Even among the non-incremental projections for new hospitals, there have been different assumptions about, among other things, inflation rates for different items and the dates operations would begin. Under one view, the site donated to NBHD, and any other gifts to NBHD for a new hospital, should be counted as costs of the new hospital. The parties have stipulated that projected construction costs are reasonable, and the costs of constructing a hospital are only the beginning, in any event. Once occupancies projected for the second or third year of operations are reached, any of the three new hospitals proposed for the northwest will have gross revenues every year well in excess of the "total project costs" expected to be incurred to build the hospital in the first place. CHARGE COMPARISONS Since people are hospitalized for a whole range of maladies, and receive different kinds and combinations of diagnostic and therapeutic services while in hospital, it is difficult to compare the charges for or cost of care at one hospital with the charges for or cost of care at another. It will not do to look at room charges only as a sort of gauge, because the medicare program has created pressure to keep room charges down, and hospitals have responded to the pressure by increasing charges for ancillary services. To take the most recent increases into account, therefore, ancillaries have to be included, even though they vary from patient to patient. NBHD's Exhibit 55 reflects one approach to comparing hospital charges. There charges for the 30 services most frequently "sold" by hospitals are listed for three of the four HCA Broward County hospitals, two of Humana's three Broward County hospitals and all three of NBHD's hospitals, for fiscal years ended in 1982. One difficulty with this approach is that at least one service listed on this exhibit (as "chemical profile"), evidently means one thing to one hospital laboratory and something else to another. Affecting all the comparisons on the chart is the difference among fiscal year ends for NBHD (June 30), Humana (August 31), and HCA (December 31). With hospital charges in Broward County escalating at annual rates on the order of 14 or 15 percent, a half year's difference in fiscal year ends can make essentially identical charge structures appear to differ significantly. HCA complains, in addition, that there is no justification for including one (Margate) but not the other (North Beach) of the Broward County hospitals it acquired from HAI. Humana's Community Hospital of South Broward was also omitted. Both Community and North Beach have extremely low occupancy rates, however, well below what anybody is projecting for a new hospital in northwest Broward County. Even making a rough adjustment for inflation, NBHD's charges were lower, on average, in more categories than the two Broward Humana Hospitals' average charges, than vice versa; and the same is true as between NBHD's average charges and the three Broward HCA hospitals' average charges. Invoking formulas developed by the Health Care Cost Containment Board, the parties made various comparisons using "gross revenue per adjusted patient day, gross revenue per admission," "total net revenue per adjusted patient day," and "total net revenue per adjusted admission." See NBHD Exhibit No. 71. The for-profit hospitals, but not NBHD's hospitals, subtract income taxes in arriving at "total net revenue." Using the same HCA and Humana Broward County hospitals whose charges were compared to all of NBHD's hospitals in NBHD Exhibit No. 55, average gross revenues were computed for fiscal years ended 1981 and stated per adjusted patient day ($340.60 for NBHD, $475.72 for HCA and $476.38 for Humana) and per adjusted admission ($2,870.70 for NBHD $3,154.67 for HCA, and $3,365.70 for Humana). NBHD Exhibit No. 56. On average, HCA's Florida hospitals' total net revenue per adjusted patient day is about five percent lower than the average for Humana's hospitals in Florida in 1980. HCA Exhibit No. 20. In 1980, the average total net revenue per adjusted patient day for HCA's Plantation General and University Community was $291.50 as compared to the $252.80 average for the two smaller of the three NBHD hospitals. HCA Exhibit No. 18. On the other hand, the 1980 average total net revenue per adjusted admission for the same two HCA hospitals was $1,842.60, as opposed to $2,363.60 for the same two NBHD hospitals. HCA Exhibit No. 18. Since indigent patients have longer average stays than other hospital patients, and NBHD treats significantly more indigent patients than HCA's University, Margate and Plantation, or Humana's Bennett and Cypress, the NBHD "adjusted admission" in charge or cost per adjusted admission comparisons represents more patient days. COST COMPARISONS In Broward County historically, average net operating expense per adjusted patient day and per adjusted admission at HCA's Plantation and University exceeded the NBHD averages in 1981. HCA Exhibit No. 25. For fiscal years ended 1981, HCA (Margate, University and Plantation) Humana (Cypress and Bennett) and NBHD incurred average costs per adjusted patient day of, respectively, $311.29, $289.79 and $262.27. NBHD Exhibit No. 56. NBHD's average cost per adjusted admission was higher than the others, on account of longer average stays. Because of the differing assumptions underlying the various pro forma financial statements, expenses stated there are not strictly comparable, although HCA produced a witness who made arithmetic adjustments purportedly simulating uniform inflation assumptions for comparative purposes, with reference to the proposed 250 bed NWBRMC. Hospitals have variable operating costs, fixed operating costs and fixed capital costs (which are related to construction costs and reflect financing costs). It is because fixed costs are so high (60 percent on average in the industry) that occupancy levels are crucial to a hospital's financial viability. In general, hospitals with 200 to 400 beds are more efficient than larger or smaller hospitals. Satellite hospitals like the proposed WBH enjoy certain economies by sharing administration, purchasing and the like with another established hospital. Both HCA and Humana buy hospital equipment and supplies at substantial discounts, comparable to those available through shared purchasing organizations to which NBHD (which has 1,304 approved beds itself as well as the possibility of discounts on account of governmental status) belongs. Private patients and insurers pay charges but hospitals are reimbursed through the medicare and medicaid programs in amounts fixed by a cost-based formula. (This amount comes to less than charges, and the difference is known as the medicaid or medicare "contractual.") Changes in the reimbursement formula have been dictated by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1981 (TEFRA), but not yet fully implemented. The consensus is that new TEFRA regulations will slow the rate of growth in reimbursement rates. These new regulations designate a base year for existing institutions by which to measure cost increases, but exempt new hospitals from certain reimbursement caps. HCA showed that it makes better economic sense to start over and build a new hospital than to renovate Margate, but did not show it was under legal compulsion to do either. Taking replacement of Margate as a given, HCA argues that the cost of adding 100 beds in northwest Broward County should be viewed as the difference between the cost of building NWBRMC at 250 beds and the cost of building it at 150 beds. In projecting both of these costs, HCA ignored the cost of closing Margate, 6/ but the cost of closing Margate would be the same whether it was replaced by a 150-bed or a 250-bed hospital, so the difference between the replacement costs would be unaffected. The incremental cost per bed is less meaningful than the relative per-bed costs for the whole institution at 150 as opposed to 250 beds. Any savings in construction costs inures first to the benefit of HCA. Such savings benefit the public directly only to the extent they may affect costs for medicaid or medicare reimbursement purposes. With respect to the proposed Margate replacement, the question of medicare and medicaid reimbursement is complicated by the change proposed in the ratio of debt to equity. Assuming optimal occupancies, however, operating a hospital with 200 to 400 beds would be less costly per bed than operating a 150-bed hospital, and these economies should be reflected in lower medicaid and medicare reimbursement. INDIGENT CARE Not all hospitals seek to serve the poor. Those that do receive medicaid reimbursement for services rendered to some, but not all, of their patients who are otherwise uninsured and unable to pay. Humana's Cypress did not have a medicaid provider number at the time of hearing. HCA's University had no medicaid contract until September of 1982 and has had less than one percent medicaid utilization since then. At its three hospitals, on average, NBHD has six to eight percent medicaid utilization. While NBHD hospitals are reimbursed for services to indigent persons ineligible for medicaid benefits at full charges, paid from NBHD's ad valorem tax revenues, HCA and Humana's hospitals in Broward County receive nothing for services rendered to medically indigent persons who are medicaid-ineligible. 7/ In addition, some patients with the ability to pay for hospital services fail to do so. Their charges are cumulated under the heading "bad debts." For want of complete information, some charges for indigent care may end up in this category. In the fiscal year ending August 31, 1982, Cypress' bad debts amounted to 3.3 percent of total revenues as compared to NBHD's 11 or 12 percent in recent years. NBHD has deposit requirements, but does not enforce them in every case at its hospitals. Some 27 to 30 percent of NBHD's hospitals' services are provided to persons unable to make full payment. Nobody is denied medical care for inability to pay at NBHD's existing hospitals. This policy would apply at the proposed 200 bed hospital in the northwest, as well. The sole exception to this policy has been NBHD's refusal to accept "economic transfers." Attempts by for-profit hospitals to transfer patients whose resources have been exhausted or whose inability to pay has become clear, in order to free beds for paying patients, have been resisted by NBHD, although medically indigent patients are accepted for transfer to NBHD hospitals whenever they need services that are unavailable at the transferring hospital. The HCA and Humana hospitals in Broward County do not turn emergencies away for inability of patients to pay, but do not, as a general rule, accept non-emergent cases when there is no assurance they will be paid. There are exceptions: On occasion medical staff admit non-emergent, indigent patients. Northwest Broward County is attractive to HCA, Humana and NBHD just because of the low numbers of indigent persons there, perhaps three or four percent of the population. In its second year of operation, a new hospital in northwest Broward County can expect less than one admission of an indigent patient per day. Medicare utilization should also be significantly lower than elsewhere in the county, where 56.4 percent of total patient days are attributable to medicare patients on average. TAXES AND SUBSIDIES Under current regulations, for-profit hospitals like HCA's and Humana's, but not nonprofit hospitals like NBHD's receive a return on equity component in medicare and medicaid reimbursement. (The rate is a healthy 150 percent of an average interest rate on certain government securities.) All other things being equal, an HCA or Humana hospital in northwest Broward would, if financed even in part by equity, receive more governmental reimbursement for rendering the same medicare or medicaid services than a hospital owned and run by NBHD, how much more depending on the debt-equity mix. HCA proposes to use 100 percent equity, in replacing Margate. On the other hand, HCA and Humana pay federal income and other taxes which NBHD does not pay. For comparative purposes, it is appropriate to assess the net fiscal impact of each proposal on government, but, with consolidated tax accounting and the number and diverse financial circumstances of HCA and Humana hospitals, setting medicare and medicaid payments off against federal income taxes can be viewed in more than one way. Federal tax liability that would otherwise arise from profits from operations at one HCA or Humana hospital can be offset by losses from operations at another hospital. NBHD not only pays no taxes, it also levies a tax, on real property within District boundaries. About four fifths of these revenues, on the order of $28,000,000 or $29,000,000 annually, are allocated to charges for "indigent care." There would be no NBHD for a tax increase to finance a new hospital, however. The "funded depreciation" account from which the equity contribution is to come does not, moreover, contain past tax receipts, except to the extent the fraction of NBHD's operating margin attributable to indigent care made its way into "funded depreciation." Similarly, tax revenues would not be used to operate the proposed hospital, except to the extent tax revenues were used to pay charges for the care of indigent patients. The terms "cost-shifting" or "charge shifting" describe the fact that some payers subsidize other payers. In the case of for-profit hospitals, private pay patients and third party payors other than the government pay rates that are set high enough to cover expenses incurred in treating patients whose bills go unpaid and to make up for the medicaid and medicare contractuals. With respect to NBHD hospitals, tax revenues are looked to to pay the full cost of the care of medically indigent persons, but bad debts are still reflected in the NBHD charge structures. To the extent for-profit hospitals provide services to medically indigent persons, the cost of those services is shifted to uninsured private pay patients, persons who pay premiums for hospital insurance, and the medicare and medicaid programs. On the other hand, all owners of taxable real property within the North Broward Hospital District bear the expense of the treatment of medically indigent persons at NBHD hospitals. Aside from expanding by building new hospitals, a course on which HCA, Humana, and NBHD alike seem to have embarked, these organizations have different uses for profits or any positive operating margin which a new hospital in the northwest might generate. Humana uses such money for corporate overhead, including shareholders' dividends, and to finance things like the work of Dr. Rollo who, in conjunction with researchers at Vanderbilt University and elsewhere, evaluates new medical technology as it becomes available. Humana also designates some of its hospitals "centers of excellence" in certain fields, encouraging research and specialized treatment of particular afflictions. HCA uses money from operations of its hospitals for overhead and other corporate purposes. Money from the NBHD hospitals' operations is used to finance specialized services in Broward County, principally at Broward General, which has, among other costly and unprofitable services, a substantial neonatology unit. LESS EXPENSIVE FOR WHOM For people who pay no taxes, have no hospitalization insurance, and are unable to pay hospital bills, the cost of each of the proposals for the northwest would be the same: nothing. (These people might not have access to services at a for-profit institution, however.) Private insurers, those that pay their premiums, federal taxpayers who finance the medicaid and medicare programs, taxpayers in the North Broward Hospital District and patients themselves all will bear part of the cost of any new hospital in northwest Broward. Private pay patients and their insurers will supply almost half of the total patient revenue. Historically, charges, which are the basis for these patients' payment, have been lower at NBHD hospitals than at HCA's or Humana's Broward County hospitals, on average, as reflected most clearly by the gross revenue per adjusted patient day comparisons. It is little consolation to private payers that Humana and HCA pay taxes while NBHD does not. But, in forecasting the relative costs to cost-based payors, projected federal income taxes should be subtracted from reimbursement for equity projected to be received by Humana and HCA through the medicare and medicaid programs. Even after income taxes are netted, HCA or Humana would receive compensation for equity that NBHD would not receive. Especially in light of evidence that shows that NBHD's expenses per patient day have been lower in the past than such expenses at the for-profit hospitals, the weight of the evidence established that cost-based reimbursement at a new northwest Broward hospital would, in all probability, be less if the hospital were operated by NBHD than if it were operated by HCA or Humana. Because of the medicare and medicaid rules allowing a return on equity component in reimbursement of providers, an NBHD hospital would receive less medicare and medicaid reimbursement even if the NBHD hospital had the same operating costs. The taxpayers of the District pay for the care of the medically indigent at NBHD hospitals, but not for the care of these persons at Broward County's Humana and HCA hospitals. There is no provision, presently, for using NBHD tax revenues to pay for the care at HCA or Humane hospitals in Broward County of medically indigent persons who are not eligible for medicare or medicaid. On the other hand, to the extent medically indigent persons are cared for by HCA and Humana, the costs of that care are "shifted" to, among others, private pay patients which, if persons paying for hospital insurance are included, constitute a group within the North Broward Hospital District that presumably overlaps substantially with taxpayers in the District. OBSTETRICS AND PEDIATRICS The parties stipulated that 20 to 24 obstetric beds were needed in northwest Broward County. Each proposal for a new hospital in northwest Broward County contemplates an obstetric service of this magnitude. Eighteen obstetric beds and 24 pediatric beds will be needed in 1987 to serve the population of NW- NBHD alone. There is presently a shortage of obstetric beds in Broward County as a whole. The site proposed for the new NBHD hospital in northwest Broward County is considerably further from other obstetric beds in the county than the site proposed for NWBRMC, although NWBRMC is mere central to the northern part of the county where there is a dearth of obstetric beds. In general, traffic in Broward County moves better north and south than east and west. Humana is not so committed to any particular site, that it could not build a hospital even further away. 8/ At NBHD's Broward General a training program for physicians wishing to specialize in obstetrics is already in place. Broward General has an intensity of pediatric and obstetric services that make it a desirable location for such a program for residents. A community hospital serving a population with a significant child bearing cohort, like that proposed for the northwest, would be an appropriate complement to the existing program.
Recommendation It is accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That HRS dismiss Lifemark as a party to these proceedings. That HRS grant NBHD's application for a CON to build a 200-bed hospital, in its entirety. That HRS grant HCA's application to build NWBRMC but only at 150 beds and without an obstetric service; and that HCA be authorized to expend to that end $25,969,403.00, less an appropriate adjustment for the lack of an obstetric service. That HRS deny the application for a CON to build a new hospital filed by South Broward Hospital District in its entirety. That HRS deny the application for a CON to build a new hospital filed by Humedicenter, Inc. d/b/a Coral Ridge General Hospital in its entirety. That HRS deny University Community Hospital's application for a CON to add beds there in its entirety. That HRS deny the application for a CON to add beds filed by Humana of Florida, Inc. d/b/a Bennett Community Hospital, in its entirety. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 12th day of April, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of April, 1983.
The Issue Whether the certificate of need (CON) applications filed by New Port Richey Hospital, Inc., d/b/a Community Hospital of New Port Richey (Community Hospital) (CON No. 9539), and Morton Plant Hospital Association, Inc., d/b/a North Bay Hospital (North Bay) (CON No. 9538), each seeking to replace and relocate their respective general acute care hospital, satisfy, on balance, the applicable statutory and rule criteria.
Findings Of Fact The Parties AHCA AHCA is the single state agency responsible for the administration of the CON program in Florida pursuant to Chapter 408, Florida Statutes (2000). The agency separately reviewed and preliminarily approved both applications. Community Hospital Community Hospital is a 300,000 square feet, accredited hospital with 345 licensed acute care beds and 56 licensed adult psychiatric beds, located in southern New Port Richey, Florida, within Sub-District 5-1. Community Hospital is seeking to construct a replacement facility approximately five miles to the southeast within a rapidly developing suburb known as "Trinity." Community Hospital currently provides a wide array of comprehensive inpatient and outpatient services and is the only provider of obstetrical and adult psychiatric services in Sub-District 5-1. It is the largest provider of emergency services in Pasco County with approximately 35,000 visits annually. It is also the largest provider of Medicaid and indigent patient days in Sub-District 5-1. Community Hospital was originally built in 1969 and is an aging facility. Although it has been renovated over time, the hospital is in poor condition. Community Hospital's average daily census is below 50 percent. North Bay North Bay is a 122-bed facility containing 102 licensed acute care beds and 20 licensed comprehensive medical rehabilitation beds, located approximately one mile north of Community Hospital in Sub-District 5-1. It serves a large elderly population and does not provide pediatric or obstetrical care. North Bay is also an aging facility and proposes to construct a replacement facility in the Trinity area. Notably, however, North Bay has spent approximately 12 million dollars over the past three years for physical improvements and is in reasonable physical condition. Helen Ellis Helen Ellis is an accredited hospital with 150 licensed acute care beds and 18 licensed skilled nursing unit beds. It is located in northern Pinellas County, approximately eight miles south of Community Hospital and nine miles south of North Bay. Helen Ellis provides a full array of acute care services including obstetrics and cardiac catheterization. Its daily census average has fluctuated over the years but is approximately 45 percent. Mease Mease operates two acute care hospitals in Pinellas County including Mease Dunedin Hospital, located approximately 18 to 20 miles south of the applicants and Mease Countryside Hospital, located approximately 16 to 18 miles south of Community and North Bay. Each hospital operates 189 licensed beds. The Mease hospitals are located in the adjacent acute care sub-district but compete with the applicants. The Health Planning District AHCA's Health Planning District 5 consists of Pinellas and Pasco Counties. U.S. Highway 41 runs north and south through the District and splits Pasco County into Sub- District 5-1 and Sub-District 5-2. Sub-District 5-1, where Community Hospital and North Bay are located, extends from U.S. 41 west to the Gulf Coast. Sub-District 5-2 extends from U.S. 41 to the eastern edge of Pasco County. Pinellas County is the most densely populated county in Florida and steadily grows at 5.52 percent per year. On the other hand, its neighbor to the north, Pasco County, has been experiencing over 15 percent annual growth in population. The evidence demonstrates that the area known as Trinity, located four to five miles southeast of New Port Richey, is largely responsible for the growth. With its large, single- owner land tracts, Trinity has become the area's fuel for growth, while New Port Richey, the older coastal anchor which houses the applicants' facilities, remains static. In addition to the available land in Trinity, roadway development in the southwest section of Pasco County is further fueling growth. For example, the Suncoast Highway, a major highway, was recently extended north from Hillsborough County through Sub-District 5-1, west of U.S. 41. It intersects with several large east-west thoroughfares including State Road 54, providing easy highway access to the Tampa area. The General Proposals Community Hospital's Proposal Community Hospital's CON application proposes to replace its existing, 401-bed hospital with a 376-bed state- of-the-art facility and relocate it approximately five miles to the southeast in the Trinity area. Community Hospital intends to construct a large medical office adjacent to its new facility and provide all of its current services including obstetrical care. It does not intend to change its primary service area. North Bay's Proposal North Bay's CON application proposes to replace its existing hospital with a 122-bed state-of-the-art facility and also plans to relocate it approximately eight miles to the southeast in the Trinity area of southwestern Pasco County. North Bay intends to provide the same array of services it currently offers its patients and will not provide pediatric and obstetrical care in the proposed facility. The proposed relocation site is adjacent to the Trinity Outpatient Center which is owned by North Bay's parent company, Morton Plant. The Outpatient Center offers a full range of diagnostic imaging services including nuclear medicine, cardiac nuclear stress testing, bone density scanning, CAT scanning, mammography, ultrasound, as well as many others. It also offers general and specialty ambulatory surgical services including urology; ear, nose and throat; ophthalmology; gastroenterology; endoscopy; and pain management. Approximately 14 physician offices are currently located at the Trinity Outpatient Center. The Condition of Community Hospital Facility Community Hospital's core facilities were constructed between 1969 and 1971. Additions to the hospital were made in 1973, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1979, 1981, 1992, and 1999. With an area of approximately 294,000 square feet and 401 licensed beds, or 733 square feet per bed, Community Hospital's gross area-to-bed ratio is approximately half of current hospital planning standards of 1,600 square feet per bed. With the exception of the "E" wing which was completed in 1999, all of the clinical and support departments are undersized. Medical-Surgical Beds And Intensive Care Units Community Hospital's "D" wing, constructed in 1975, is made up of two general medical-surgical unit floors which are grossly undersized. Each floor operates 47 general medical-surgical beds, 24 of which are in three-bed wards and 23 in semi-private rooms. None of the patient rooms in the "D" wing have showers or tubs so the patients bathe in a single facility located at the center of the wing on each floor. Community Hospital's "A" wing, added in 1973, is situated at the west end of the second floor and is also undersized. It too has a combination of semi-private rooms and three-bed wards without showers or tubs. Community Hospital's "F" wing, added in 1979, includes a medical-surgical unit on the second and third floor, each with semi-private and private rooms. The second floor unit is centrally located between a 56-bed adult psychiatric unit and the Surgical Intensive Care Unit (SICU) which creates security and privacy issues. The third floor unit is adjacent to the Medical Intensive Care Unit (MICU) which must be accessed through the medical-surgical unit. Neither intensive care unit (ICU) possesses an isolation area. Although the three-bed wards are generally restricted to in-season use, and not always full, they pose significant privacy, security, safety, and health concerns. They fail to meet minimum space requirements and are a serious health risk. The evidence demonstrates that reconfiguring the wards would be extremely costly and impractical due to code compliance issues. The wards hinder the hospital's acute care utilization, and impair its ability to effectively compete with other hospitals. Surgical Department and Recovery Community Hospital's surgical department is separated into two locations including the main surgical suite on the second floor and the Endoscopy/Pain Management unit located on the first floor of "C" wing. Consequently, the department cannot share support staff and space such as preparation and recovery. The main surgical suite, adjacent recovery room, and central sterile processing are 25 years old. This unit's operating rooms, cystoscopy rooms, storage areas, work- stations, central sterile, and recovery rooms are undersized and antiquated. The 12-bay Recovery Room has no patient toilet and is lacking storage. The soiled utility room is deficient. In addition, the patient bays are extremely narrow and separated by curtains. There is no direct connection to the sterile corridor, and staff must break the sterile field to transport patients from surgery to recovery. Moreover, surgery outpatients must pass through a major public lobby going to and returning from surgery. The Emergency Department Community Hospital's existing emergency department was constructed in 1992 and is the largest provider of hospital emergency services in Pasco County, handling approximately 35,000 visits per year. The hospital is also designated a "Baker Act" receiving facility under Chapter 394, Florida Statutes, and utilizes two secure examination rooms for emergent psychiatric patients. At less than 8,000 total square feet, the emergency department is severely undersized to meet the needs of its patients. The emergency department is currently undergoing renovation which will connect the triage area to the main emergency department. The renovation will not enlarge the entrance, waiting area, storage, nursing station, nor add privacy to the patient care areas in the emergency department. The renovation will not increase the total size of the emergency department, but in fact, the department's total bed availability will decrease by five beds. Similar to other departments, a more meaningful renovation cannot occur within the emergency department without triggering costly building code compliance measures. In addition to its space limitations, the emergency department is awkwardly located. In 1992, the emergency department was relocated to the front of the hospital and is completely separated from the diagnostic imaging department which remained in the original 1971 building. Consequently, emergency patients are routinely transported across the hospital for imaging and CT scans. Issues Relating to Replacement of Community Hospital Although physically possible, renovating and expanding Community Hospital's existing facility is unreasonable. First, it is cost prohibitive. Any significant renovation to the 1971, 1975, 1977, and 1979 structures would require asbestos abatement prior to construction, at an estimated cost of $1,000,000. In addition, as previously noted, the hospital will be saddled with the major expense of complying with all current building code requirements in the 40-year-old facility. Merely installing showers in patient rooms would immediately trigger a host of expensive, albeit necessary, code requirements involving access, wiring, square footage, fireproofing columns and beams, as well as floor/ceiling and roof/ceiling assemblies. Concurrent with the significant demolition and construction costs, the hospital will experience the incalculable expense and loss of revenue related to closing major portions, if not all, of the hospital. Second, renovation and expansion to the existing facility is an unreasonable option due to its physical restrictions. The 12'4" height of the hospital's first floor limits its ability to accommodate HVAC ductwork large enough to meet current ventilation requirements. In addition, there is inadequate space to expand any department within the confines of the existing hospital without cannibalizing adjacent areas, and vertical expansion is not an option. Community Hospital's application includes a lengthy Facility Condition Assessment which factually details the architectural, mechanical, and electrical deficiencies of the hospital's existing physical plant. The assessment is accurate and reasonable. Community Hospital's Proposed Replacement Community Hospital proposes to construct a six- story, 320 licensed beds, acute care replacement facility. The hospital will consist of 548,995 gross square feet and include a 56-bed adult psychiatric unit connected by a hallway to the first floor of the main hospital building. The proposal also includes the construction of an adjacent medical office building to centralize the outpatient offices and staff physicians. The evidence establishes that the deficiencies inherent in Community Hospital's existing hospital will be cured by its replacement hospital. All patients will be provided large private rooms. The emergency department will double in size, and contain private examination rooms. All building code requirements will be met or exceeded. Patients and staff will have separate elevators from the public. In addition, the surgical department will have large operating rooms, and adequate storage. The MICU and SICU will be adjacent to each other on the second floor to avoid unnecessary traffic within the hospital. Surgical patients will be transported to the ICU via a private elevator dedicated to that purpose. Medical-surgical patient rooms will be efficiently located on the third through sixth floors, in "double-T" configuration. Community Hospital's Existing and Proposed Sites Community Hospital is currently located on a 23-acre site inside the southern boundary of New Port Richey. Single- family homes and offices occupy the two-lane residential streets that surround the site on all sides. The hospital buildings are situated on the northern half of the site, with the main parking lot located to the south, in front of the main entrance to the hospital. Marine Parkway cuts through the southern half of the site from the west, and enters the main parking lot. A private medical mall sits immediately to the west of the main parking lot and a one-acre storm-water retention pond sits to the west of the mall. A private medical office building occupies the south end of the main parking lot and a four-acre drainage easement is located in the southwest corner of the site. Community Hospital's administration has actively analyzed its existing site, aging facility, and adjacent areas. It has commissioned studies by civil engineers, health care consultants, and architects. The collective evidence demonstrates that, although on-site relocation is potentially an option, on balance, it is not a reasonable option. Replacing Community Hospital on its existing site is not practical for several reasons. First, the hospital will experience significant disruption and may be required to completely close down for a period of time. Second, the site's southwestern large four-acre parcel is necessary for storm-water retention and is unavailable for expansion. Third, a reliable cost differential is unknown given Community Hospital's inability to successfully negotiate with the city and owners of the adjacent medical office complexes to acquire additional parcels. Fourth, acquiring other adjacent properties is not a viable option since they consist of individually owned residential lots. In addition to the site's physical restrictions, the site is hindered by its location. The hospital is situated in a neighborhood between small streets and a local school. From the north and south, motorists utilize either U.S. 19, a congested corridor that accommodates approximately 50,000 vehicles per day, or Grand and Madison Streets, two-lane streets within a school zone. From the east and west, motorists utilize similar two-lane neighborhood streets including Marine Parkway, which often floods in heavy rains. Community Hospital's proposed site, on the other hand, is a 53-acre tract positioned five miles from its current facility, at the intersection of two major thoroughfares in southwestern Pasco County. The proposed site offers ample space for all facilities, parking, outpatient care, and future expansion. In addition, Community Hospital's proposed site provides reasonable access to all patients within its existing primary service area made up of zip codes 34652, 34653, 34668, 34655, 34690, and 34691. For example, the average drive times from the population centers of each zip code to the existing site of the hospital and the proposed site are as follows: Zip code Difference Existing site Proposed site 34652 3 minutes 14 minutes 11 minutes 34653 8 minutes 11 minutes 3 minutes 34668 15 minutes 21 minutes 6 minutes 34655 11 minutes 4 minutes -7 minutes 34690 11 minutes 13 minutes 2 minutes 34691 11 minutes 17 minutes 6 minutes While the average drive time from the population centroids of zip codes 34653, 34668, 34690, and 34691 to the proposed site slightly increases, it decreases from the Trinity area, where population growth has been most significant in southwestern Pasco County. In addition, a motorist's average drive time from Community Hospital's existing location to its proposed site is only 10 to 11 minutes, and patients utilizing public transportation will be able to access the new hospital via a bus stop located adjacent to the proposed site. The Condition of North Bay Facility North Bay Hospital is also an aging facility. Its original structure and portions of its physical plant are approximately 30 years old. Portions of its major mechanical systems will soon require replacement including its boilers, air handlers, and chillers. In addition, the hospital is undersized and awkwardly configured. Despite its shortcomings, however, North Bay is generally in good condition. The hospital has been consistently renovated and updated over time and is aesthetically pleasing. Moreover, its second and third floors were added in 1986, are in good shape, and structurally capable of vertical expansion. Medical Surgical Beds and ICU Units By-in-large, North Bay is comprised of undersized, semi-private rooms containing toilet and shower facilities. The hospital does not have any three-bed wards. North Bay's first floor houses all ancillary and support services including lab, radiology, pharmacy, surgery, pre-op, post-anesthesia recovery, central sterile processing and supply, kitchen and cafeteria, housekeeping and administration, as well as the mechanical, electrical, and facilities maintenance and engineering. The first floor also contains a 20-bed CMR unit and a 15-bed acute care unit. North Bay's second and third floors are mostly comprised of semi-private rooms and supporting nursing stations. Although the rooms and stations are not ideally sized, they are in relatively good shape. North Bay utilizes a single ICU with ten critical care beds. The ICU rooms and nursing stations are also undersized. A four-bed ICU ward and former nursery are routinely used to serve overflow patients. Surgery Department and Recovery North Bay utilizes a single pre-operative surgical room for all of its surgery patients. The room accommodates up to five patient beds, but has limited space for storage and pre-operative procedures. Its operating rooms are sufficiently sized. While carts and large equipment are routinely stored in hallways throughout the surgical suite, North Bay has converted the former obstetrics recovery room to surgical storage and has made efficient use of other available space. North Bay operates a small six-bed Post Anesthesia Care Unit. Nurses routinely prepare patient medications in the unit which is often crowded with staff and patients. The Emergency Department North Bay has recently expanded its emergency department. The evidence demonstrates that this department is sufficient and meets current and future expected patient volumes. Replacement Issues Relating to North Bay While it is clear that areas of North Bay's physical plant are aging, the facility is in relatively good condition. It is apparent that North Bay must soon replace significant equipment, including cast-iron sewer pipes, plumbing, boilers, and chillers which will cause some interruption to hospital operations. However, North Bay's four-page written assessment of the facility and its argument citing the need for total replacement is, on balance, not persuasive. North Bay's Proposed Replacement North Bay proposes to construct a new, state-of-the- art, hospital approximately eight miles southeast of its existing facility and intends to offer the identical array of services the hospital currently provides. North Bay's Existing and Proposed Sites North Bay's existing hospital is located on an eight-acre site with limited storm-water drainage capacity. Consequently, much of its parking area is covered by deep, porous, gravel instead of asphalt. North Bay's existing site is generally surrounded by residential properties. While the city has committed, in writing, it willingness to assist both applicants with on-site expansion, it is unknown whether North Bay can acquire additional adjacent property. North Bay's proposed site is located at the intersection of Trinity Oaks Boulevard and Mitchell Boulevard, south of Community Hospital's proposed site, and is quite spacious. It contains sufficient land for the facilities, parking, and future growth, and has all necessary infrastructure in place, including utility systems, storm- water structures, and roadways. Currently however, there is no public transportation service available to North Bay's proposed site. Projected Utilization by Applicants The evidence presented at hearing indicates that, statewide, replacement hospitals often increase a provider's acute care bed utilization. For example, Bartow Memorial Hospital, Heart of Florida Regional Medical Center, Lake City Medical Center, Florida Hospital Heartland Medical Center, South Lake Hospital, and Florida Hospital-Fish Memorial each experienced significant increases in utilization following the opening of their new hospital. The applicants in this case each project an increase in utilization following the construction of their new facility. Specifically, Community Hospital's application projects 82,685 total hospital patient days (64,427 acute care patient days) in year one (2006) of the operation of its proposed replacement facility, and 86,201 total hospital patient days (67,648 acute care patient days) in year two (2007). Using projected 2006 and 2007 population estimates, applying 2002 acute care hospital use rates which are below 50 percent, and keeping Community Hospital's acute care market share constant at its 2002 level, it is reasonably estimated that Community Hospital's existing hospital will experience 52,623 acute care patient days in 2006, and 53,451 acute care patient days in 2007. Consequently, Community Hospital's proposed facility must attain 11,804 additional acute care patient days in 2006, and 14,197 more acute care patient days in 2007, in order to achieve its projected acute care utilization. Although Community Hospital lost eight percent of the acute care market in its service area between 1995 and 2002, two-thirds of that loss was due to residents of Sub- District 5-1 acquiring services in another area. While Community Hospital experienced 78,444 acute care patient days in 1995, it projects only 64,427 acute care patient days in year one. Given the new facility and population factors, it is reasonable that the hospital will recapture half of its lost acute care market share and achieve its projections. With respect to its psychiatric unit, Community Hospital projects 16,615 adult psychiatric inpatient days in year one (2006) and 17,069 adult inpatient days in year two (2007) of the proposed replacement hospital. The evidence indicates that these projections are reasonable. Similarly, North Bay's acute care utilization rate has been consistently below 50 percent. Since 1999, the hospital has experienced declining utilization. In its application, North Bay states that it achieved total actual acute care patient days of 21,925 in 2000 and 19,824 in 2001 and the evidence at hearing indicates that North Bay experienced 17,693 total acute care patient days in 2002. North Bay projects 25,909 acute care patient days in the first year of operation of its proposed replacement hospital, and 27,334 acute care patient days in the second year of operation. Despite each applicant's current facility utilization rate, Community Hospital must increase its current acute care patient days by 20 percent to reach its projected utilization, and North Bay must increase its patient days by at least 50 percent. Given the population trends, service mix and existing competition, the evidence demonstrates that it is not possible for both applicants to simultaneously achieve their projections. In fact, it is strongly noted that the applicants' own projections are predicated upon only one applicant being approved and cannot be supported with the approval of two facilities. Local Health Plan Preferences In its local health plan for District 5, the Suncoast Health Council, Inc., adopted acute care preferences in October, 2000. The replacement of an existing hospital is not specifically addressed by any of the preferences. However, certain acute care preferences and specialty care preferences are applicable. The first applicable preference provides that preference "shall be given to an applicant who proposes to locate a new facility in an area that will improve access for Medicaid and indigent patients." It is clear that the majority of Medicaid and indigent patients live closer to the existing hospitals. However, Community Hospital proposes to move 5.5 miles from its current location, whereas North Bay proposes to move eight miles from its current location. While the short distances alone are less than significant, North Bay's proposed location is further removed from New Port Richey, is not located on a major highway or bus-route, and would therefore be less accessible to the medically indigent residents. Community Hospital's proposed site will be accessible using public transportation. Furthermore, Community Hospital has consistently provided excellent service to the medically indigent and its proposal would better serve that population. In 2000, Community Hospital provided 7.4 percent of its total patient days to Medicaid patients and 0.8 percent of its total patient days to charity patients. Community Hospital provided the highest percentage and greatest number of Medicaid patient days in Sub-District 5-1. By comparison, North Bay provided 5.8 percent of its total patient days to Medicaid patients and 0.9 percent of its total patient days to charity patients. In 2002, North Bay's Medicaid patients days declined to 3.56 percent. Finally, given the closeness and available bed space of the existing providers and the increasing population in the Trinity area, access will be improved by Community Hospital's relocation. The second local health plan preference provides that "[i]n cases where an applicant is a corporation with previously awarded certificates of need, preference shall be given to those which follow through in a timely manner to construct and operate the additional facilities or beds and do not use them for later negotiations with other organizations seeking to enter or expand the number of beds they own or control." Both applicants meet this preference. The third local health plan preference recognizes "Certificate of Need applications that provide AHCA with documentation that they provide, or propose to provide, the largest percentage of Medicaid and charity care patient days in relation to other hospitals in the sub-district." Community Hospital provides the largest percentage of Medicaid and charity care patient days in relation to other hospitals in Sub-District 5-1, and therefore meets this preference. The fourth local health plan preference applies to "Certificate of Need applications that demonstrate intent to serve HIV/AIDS infected persons." Both applicants accept and treat HIV/AIDS infected persons, and would continue to do so in their proposed replacement hospitals. The fifth local health plan preference recognizes "Certificate of Need applications that commit to provide a full array of acute care services including medical-surgical, intensive care, pediatric, and obstetrical services within the sub-district for which they are applying." Community Hospital qualifies since it will continue to provide its current services, including obstetrical care and psychiatric care, in its proposed replacement hospital. North Bay discontinued its pediatric and obstetrical programs in 2001, does not intend to provide them in its proposed replacement hospital, and will not provide psychiatric care. Agency Rule Preferences Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.038(6) provides an applicable preference to a facility proposing "new acute care services and capital expenditures" that has "a documented history of providing services to medically indigent patients or a commitment to do so." As the largest Medicaid provider in Sub-District 5-1, Community Hospital meets this preference better than does North Bay. North Bay's history demonstrates a declining rate of service to the medically indigent. Statutory Review Criteria Section 408.035(1), Florida Statutes: The need for the health care facilities and health services being proposed in relation to the applicable district health plan District 5 includes Pasco and Pinellas County. Pasco County is rapidly developing, whereas Pinellas County is the most densely populated county in Florida. Given the population trends, service mix, and utilization rates of the existing providers, on balance, there is a need for a replacement hospital in the Trinity area. Section 408.035(2), Florida Statutes: The availability, quality of care, accessibility, and extent of utilization of existing health care facilities and health services in the service district of the applicant Community Hospital and North Bay are both located in Sub-District 5-1. Each proposes to relocate to an area of southwestern Pasco County which is experiencing explosive population growth. The other general acute care hospital located in Sub-District 5-1 is Regional Medical Center Bayonet Point, which is located further north, in the Hudson area of western Pasco County. The only other acute care hospitals in Pasco County are East Pasco Medical Center, in Zephyrhills, and Pasco Community Hospital, in Dade City. Those hospitals are located in Sub-District 5-2, east Pasco County, far from the area proposed to be served by either Community Hospital or North Bay. District 5 includes Pinellas County as well as Pasco County. Helen Ellis and Mease are existing hospital providers located in Pinellas County. Helen Ellis has 168 licensed beds, consisting of 150 acute care beds and an 18-bed skilled nursing unit, and is located 7.9 miles from Community Hospital's existing location and 10.8 miles from Community Hospital's proposed location. Access to Helen Ellis for patients originating from southwestern Pasco County requires those patients to travel congested U.S. 19 south to Tarpon Springs. As a result, the average drive time from Community Hospital's existing and proposed site to Helen Ellis is approximately 22 minutes. Helen Ellis is not a reasonable alternative to Community Hospital's proposal. The applicants' proposals are specifically designed for the current and future health care needs of southwestern Pasco County. Given its financial history, it is unknown whether Helen Ellis will be financially capable of providing the necessary care to the residents of southwestern Pasco. Mease Countryside Hospital has 189 licensed acute care beds. It is located 16.0 miles from Community Hospital's existing location and 13.8 miles from Community Hospital's proposed location. The average drive time to Mease Countryside is 32 minutes from Community Hospital's existing site and 24 minutes from its proposed site. In addition, Mease Countryside Hospital has experienced extremely high utilization over the past several years, in excess of 90 percent for calendar years 2000 and 2001. Utilization at Mease Countryside Hospital has remained over 80 percent despite the addition of 45 acute care beds in April 2002. Given the growth and demand, it is unknown whether Mease can accommodate the residents in southwest Pasco County. Mease Dunedin Hospital has 189 licensed beds, consisting of 149 acute care beds, a 30-bed skilled nursing unit, five Level 2 neonatal intensive care beds, and five Level 3 neonatal intensive care beds. Its former 15-bed adult psychiatric unit has been converted into acute care beds. It is transferring its entire obstetrics program at Mease Dunedin Hospital to Mease Countryside Hospital. Mease Dunedin Hospital is located approximately 18 to 20 miles from the applicants' existing and proposed locations with an average drive time of 35-38 minutes. With their remote location, and the exceedingly high utilization at Mease Countryside Hospital, neither of the two Mease hospitals is a viable alternative to the applicants' proposals. In addition, the construction of a replacement hospital would positively impact economic development and further attract medical professionals to Sub-District 5-1. On balance, given the proximity, utilization, service array, and accessibility of the existing providers, including the applicants, the relocation of Community Hospital will enhance access to health care to the residents. Section 408.035(3), Florida Statutes: The ability of the applicant to provide quality of care and the applicant's record of providing quality of care As stipulated, both applicants provide excellent quality of care. However, Community Hospital's proposal will better enhance its ability to provide quality care. Community is currently undersized, non-compliant with today's standards, and located on a site that does not allow for reasonable expansion. Its emergency department is inadequate for patient volume, and the configuration of the first floor leads to inefficiencies in the diagnosis and treatment of emergency patients. Again, most inpatients are placed in semi-private rooms and three-bed wards, with no showers or tubs, little privacy, and an increased risk of infection. The hospital's waiting areas for families of patients are antiquated and undersized, its nursing stations are small and cramped and the operating rooms and storage facilities are undersized. Community Hospital's deficiencies will be effectively eliminated by its proposed replacement hospital. As a result, patients will experience qualitatively better care by the staff who serve them. Conversely, North Bay is in better physical condition and not in need of replacement. It has more reasonable options to expand or relocate its facility on site. Quality of care at North Bay will not be markedly enhanced by the construction of a new hospital. Sections 408.035(4)and(5), Florida Statutes, have been stipulated as not applicable in this case. Section 408.035(6), Florida Statutes: The availability of resources, including health personnel, management personnel, and funds available for capital and operating expenditures, for project accomplishment and operation The parties stipulated that both Community Hospital and North Bay have available health personnel and management personnel for project accomplishment and operation. In addition, the evidence proves that both applicants have sufficient funds for capital and operating expenditures. Community Hospital proposes to rely on its parent company to finance the project. Keith Giger, Vice-President of Finance for HCA, Inc., Community Hospital's parent organization, provided credible deposition testimony that HCA, Inc., will finance 100 percent of the total project cost by an inter-company loan at eight percent interest. Moreover, it is noted that the amount to be financed is actually $20 million less than the $196,849,328 stated in the CON Application, since Community Hospital previously purchased the proposed site in June 2003 with existing funds and does not need to finance the land acquisition. Community Hospital has sufficient working capital for operating expenditures of the proposed replacement hospital. North Bay, on the other hand, proposes to acquire financing from BayCare Obligated Group which includes Morton Plant Hospital Association, Inc.; Mease; and several other hospital entities. Its proposal, while feasible, is less certain since member hospitals must approve the indebtedness, thereby providing Mease with the ability to derail North Bay's proposed bond financing. Section 408.035(7), Florida Statutes: The extent to which the proposed services will enhance access to health care for residents of the service district The evidence proves that either proposal will enhance geographical access to the growing population in the service district. However, with its provision of obstetrical services, Community Hospital is better suited to address the needs of the younger community. With respect to financial access, both proposed relocation sites are slightly farther away from the higher elderly and indigent population centers. Since the evidence demonstrates that it is unreasonable to relocate both facilities away from the down-town area, Community Hospital's proposal, on balance, provides better access to poor patients. First, public transportation will be available to Community Hospital's site. Second, Community Hospital has an excellent record of providing care to the poor and indigent and has accepted the agency's condition to provide ten percent of its total annual patient days to Medicaid recipients To the contrary, North Bay's site will not be accessible by public transportation. In addition, North Bay has a less impressive record of providing care to the poor and indigent. Although AHCA conditioned North Bay's approval upon it providing 9.7 percent of total annual patient days to Medicaid and charity patients, instead of the 9.7 percent of gross annual revenue proposed in its application, North Bay has consistently provided Medicaid and charity patients less than seven percent of its total annual patient days. Section 408.035(8), Florida Statutes: The immediate and long-term financial feasibility of the proposal Immediate financial feasibility refers to the availability of funds to capitalize and operate the proposal. See Memorial Healthcare Group, Ltd. d/b/a Memorial Hospital Jacksonville vs. AHCA et al., Case No. 02-0447 et seq. Community Hospital has acquired reliable financing for the project and has sufficiently demonstrated that its project is immediately financially feasible. North Bay's short-term financial proposal is less secure. As noted, North Bay intends to acquire financing from BayCare Obligated Group. As a member of the group, Mease, the parent company of two hospitals that oppose North Bay's application, must approve the plan. Long-term financial feasibility is the ability of the project to reach a break-even point within a reasonable period of time and at a reasonable achievable point in the future. Big Bend Hospice, Inc. vs. AHCA and Covenant Hospice, Inc., Case No. 02-0455. Although CON pro forma financial schedules typically show profitability within two to three years of operation, it is not a requirement. In fact, in some circumstances, such as the case of a replacement hospital, it may be unrealistic for the proposal to project profitability before the third or fourth year of operation. In this case, Community Hospital's utilization projections, gross and net revenues, and expense figures are reasonable. The evidence reliably demonstrates that its replacement hospital will be profitable by the fourth year of operation. The hospital's financial projections are further supported by credible evidence, including the fact that the hospital experienced financial improvement in 2002 despite its poor physical condition, declining utilization, and lost market share to providers outside of its district. In addition, the development and population trends in the Trinity area support the need for a replacement hospital in the area. Also, Community Hospital has benefited from increases in its Medicaid per diem and renegotiated managed care contracts. North Bay's long-term financial feasibility of its proposal is less certain. In calendar year 2001, North Bay incurred an operating loss of $306,000. In calendar year 2002, it incurred a loss of $1,160,000. In its CON application, however, North Bay projects operating income of $1,538,827 in 2007, yet omitted the ongoing expenses of interest ($1,600,000) and depreciation ($3,000,000) from its existing facility that North Bay intends to continue operating. Since North Bay's proposal does not project beyond year two, it is less certain whether it is financially feasible in the third or fourth year. In addition to the interest and depreciation issues, North Bay's utilization projections are less reasonable than Community Hospital's proposal. While possible, North Bay will have a difficult task achieving its projected 55 percent increase in acute care patient days in its second year of operation given its declining utilization, loss of obstetric/pediatric services and termination of two exclusive managed care contracts. Section 408.035(9), Florida Statutes: The extent to which the proposal will foster competition that promotes quality and cost-effectiveness Both applicants have substantial unused capacity. However, Community Hospital's existing facility is at a distinct competitive disadvantage in the market place. In fact, from 1994 to 1998, Community Hospital's overall market share in its service area declined from 40.3 percent to 35.3 percent. During that same period, Helen Ellis' overall market share in Community Hospital's service area increased from 7.2 percent to 9.2 percent. From 1995 to the 12-month period ending June 30, 2002, Community Hospital's acute care market share in its service area declined from 34.0 percent to 25.9 percent. During that same period, Helen Ellis' acute care market share in Community Hospital's service area increased from 11.7 percent to 12.0 percent. In addition, acute care average occupancy rates at Mease Dunedin Hospital increased each year from 1999 through 2002. Acute care average occupancy at Mease Countryside Hospital exceeded 90 percent in 2000 and 2001, and was approximately 85 percent for the period ending June 30, 2002. Some of the loss in Community Hospital's market share is due to an out-migration of patients from its service area to hospitals in northern Pinellas and Hillsborough Counties. Market share in Community's service area by out-of- market providers increased from 33 percent in 1995 to 40 percent in 2002. Community Hospital's outdated hospital has hampered its ability to compete for patients in its service area. Mease is increasing its efforts to attract patients and currently completing a $92 million expansion of Mease Countryside Hospital. The project includes the development of 1,134 parking spaces on 30 acres of raw land north of the Mease Countryside Hospital campus and the addition of two floors to the hospital. It also involves the relocation of 51 acute care beds, the obstetrics program and the Neonatal Intensive Care Units from Mease Dunedin Hosptial to Mease Countryside Hospital. Mease is also seeking to more than double the size of the Countryside emergency department to handle its 62,000 emergency visits. With the transfer of licensed beds from Mease Dunedin Hospital to Mease Countryside Hospital, Mease will also convert formerly semi-private patient rooms to private rooms at Mease Dunedin Hospital. The approval of Community Hospital's relocated facility will enable it to better compete with the hospitals in the area and promote quality and cost- effectiveness. North Bay, on the other hand, is not operating at a distinct disadvantage, yet is still experiencing declining utilization. North Bay is the only community-owned, not-for- profit provider in western Pasco County and is a valuable asset to the city. Section 408.035(10), Florida Statutes: The costs and methods of the proposed construction, including the costs and methods or energy provision and the availability of alternative, less costly, or more effective methods of construction The parties stipulated that the project costs in both applications are reasonable to construct the replacement hospitals. Community Hospital's proposed construction cost per square foot is $175, and slightly less than North Bay's $178 proposal. The costs and methods of proposed construction for each proposal is reasonable. Given Community Hospital's severe site and facility problems, the evidence demonstrates that there is no reasonable, less costly, or more effective methods of construction available for its proposed replacement hospital. Additional "band-aide" approaches are not financially reasonable and will not enable Community Hospital to effectively compete. The facility is currently licensed for 401 beds, operates approximately 311 beds and is still undersized. The proposed replacement hospital will meet the standards in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59A-3.081, and will meet current building codes, including the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Guidelines for Design and Construction of Hospitals and Health Care Facilities, developed by the American Institute of Architects. The opponents' argue that Community Hospital will not utilize the 320 acute care beds proposed in its CON application, and therefore, a smaller facility is a less- costly alternative. In addition, Helen Ellis' architectural expert witness provided schematic design alternatives for Community Hospital to be expanded and replaced on-site, without providing a detailed and credible cost accounting of the alternatives. Given the evidence and the law, their arguments are not persuasive. While North Bay's replacement cost figures are reasonable, given the aforementioned reasons, including the fact that the facility is in reasonably good condition and can expand vertically, on balance, it is unreasonable for North Bay to construct a replacement facility in the Trinity area. Section 408.035(11), Florida Statutes: The applicant's past and proposed provision of health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent Community Hospital has consistently provided the most health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent in Sub-District 5-1. Community Hospital agreed to provide at least ten percent of its patient days to Medicaid recipients. Similarly, North Bay agreed to provide 9.7 percent of its total annual patient days to Medicaid and charity patients combined. North Bay, by contrast, provided only 3.56 percent of its total patient days to Medicaid patients in 2002, and would have to significantly reverse a declining trend in its Medicaid provision to comply with the imposed condition. Community Hospital better satisfies the criterion. Section 408.035(12) has been stipulated as not applicable in this case. Adverse Impact on Existing Providers Historical figures demonstrate that hospital market shares are not static, but fluctuate with competition. No hospital is entitled to a specific or historic market share free from competition. While the applicants are located in health planning Sub-District 5-1 and Helen Ellis and the two Mease hospitals are located in health planning Sub-District 5- 2, they compete for business. None of the opponents is a disproportionate share, safety net, Medicaid provider. As a result, AHCA gives less consideration to any potential adverse financial impact upon them resulting from the approval of either application as a low priority. The opponents, however, argue that the approval of either replacement hospital would severely affect each of them. While the precise distance from the existing facilities to the relocation sites is relevant, it is clear that neither applicants' proposed site is unreasonably close to any of the existing providers. In fact, Community Hospital intends to locate its replacement facility three miles farther away from Helen Ellis and 1.5 miles farther away from Mease Dunedin Hospital. While Helen Ellis' primary service area is seemingly fluid, as noted by its chief operating officer's hearing and deposition testimony, and the Mease hospitals are located 15 to 20 miles south, they overlap parts of the applicants' primary service areas. Accordingly, each applicant concedes that the proposed increase in their patient volume would be derived from the growing population as well as existing providers. Although it is clear that the existing providers may be more affected by the approval of Community Hosptial's proposal, the exact degree to which they will be adversely impacted by either applicant is unknown. All parties agree, however, that the existing providers will experience less adverse affects by the approval of only one applicant, as opposed to two. Furthermore, Mease concedes that its hospitals will continue to aggressively compete and will remain profitable. In fact, Mease's adverse impact analysis does not show any credible reduction in loss of acute care admissions at Mease Countryside Hospital or Mease Dunedin Hospital until 2010. Even then, the reliable evidence demonstrates that the impact is negligible. Helen Ellis, on the other hand, will likely experience a greater loss of patient volume. To achieve its utilization projections, Community Hospital will aggressively compete for and increase market share in Pinellas County zip code 34689, which borders Pasco County. While that increase does not facially prove that Helen Ellis will be materially affected by Community Hospital's replacement hospital, Helen Ellis will confront targeted competition. To minimize the potential adverse affect, Helen Ellis will aggressively compete to expand its market share in the Pinellas County zip codes south of 34689, which is experiencing population growth. In addition, Helen Ellis is targeting broader service markets, and has filed an application to establish an open- heart surgery program. While Helen Ellis will experience greater competition and financial loss, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that it will experience material financial adverse impact as a result of Community Hospital's proposed relocation. In fact, Helen Ellis' impact analysis is less than reliable. In its contribution-margin analysis, Helen Ellis utilized its actual hospital financial data as filed with AHCA for the fiscal year October 1, 2001, to September 30, 2002. The analysis included total inpatient and total outpatient service revenues found in the filed financial data, including ambulatory services and ancillary services, yet it did not include the expenses incurred in generating ambulatory or ancillary services revenue. As a result, the overstated net revenue per patient day was applied to its speculative lost number of patient days which resulted in an inflated loss of net patient service revenue. Moreover, the evidence indicates that Helen Ellis' analysis incorrectly included operational revenue and excluded expenses related to its 18-bed skilled nursing unit since neither applicant intends to operate a skilled nursing unit. While including the skilled nursing unit revenues, the analysis failed to include the sub-acute inpatient days that produced those revenues, and thereby over inflated the projected total lost net patient service revenue by over one million dollars.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Community Hospital's CON Application No. 9539, to establish a 376-bed replacement hospital in Pasco County, Sub- District 5-1, be granted; and North Bay's CON Application No. 9538, to establish a 122-bed replacement hospital in Pasco County, Sub-District 5- 1, be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of March, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM R. PFEIFFER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of March, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: James C. Hauser, Esquire R. Terry Rigsby, Esquire Metz, Hauser & Husband, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 505 Post Office Box 10909 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Stephen A. Ecenia, Esquire R. David Prescott, Esquire Richard M. Ellis, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 420 Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0551 Richard J. Saliba, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Station 3 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Robert A. Weiss, Esquire Karen A. Putnal, Esquire Parker, Hudson, Rainer & Dobbs, LLP The Perkins House, Suite 200 118 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Darrell White, Esquire William B. Wiley, Esquire McFarlain & Cassedy, P.A. 305 South Gadsden Street, Suite 600 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Lealand McCharen, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Valda Clark Christian, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Rhonda M. Medows, M.D., Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
Findings Of Fact Donald Davis is the promoter behind the formation of Community Hospital of Collier, Inc. He is a health care management consultant and a principal of the firm Health Research and Planning Associates, Inc. In his profession he concentrates on the promotion and development of health care facilities. He has engaged previously in the business of forming corporations for the purpose of submitting applications and obtaining Certificates of Need. He also provides consulting services to health service corporations. Neither Davis nor the other principals of the applicant corporation, including his wife, have any experience or expertise in constructing or operating hospitals, and Davis admitted that the sole purpose for forming the entity known as Community Hospital of Collier, Inc. was for the purpose of submitting an application and prosecuting it in order to obtain a Certificate of Need for an acute care hospital for District VIII. Mr. Davis' own company, Health Research and Planning Management Associates, Inc. was paid $15,000 by Community Hospital of Collier, Inc. to develop the Certificate of Need application at issue. Community has "a couple of thousand dollars" in its own bank account. The officers and directors of Health, Research and Planning Management Associates, Inc. are the same as those of Community Hospital of Collier, Inc. On June 15, 1983, after having previously filed a letter of intent, Mr. Davis filed an application for a Certificate of Need for a 152-bed acute care hospital on behalf of Community Hospital of Collier, Inc. Mr. Davis is an officer and director of that corporation. The articles of incorporation for Community Hospital of Collier, Inc. which gave it its de jure status were not signed until July 29, 1983 and were not filed with the Secretary of State until August 19, 1983. Be that as it may, Mr. Davis maintains that the Board of Directors of Community ratified the filing of the application. That authorization found at page 44 of the application, however, refers to the Board of Directors of Community Health Care of Okaloosa/Walton. The resolution was dated June 7, 1983 and Mr. Davis testified that the use of the name Community Health Care of Okaloosa/Walton in the caption of that Board of Director's resolution was a "typographical error." In any event, the applicant corporation had no legal existence at the time the application was filed on June 15, 1983, however, by its later acts in filing and prosecuting the application it implicitly, at least, ratified the action of its promoter, Mr. Davis, in filing the application since the officers and directors consisted of Mr. Davis, his wife and a third individual. Be that as it may, Community negotiated a stock purchase agreement with National Medical Enterprises (NME) on August 15, 1984. Pursuant to this agreement, NME is obligated to purchase all capital stock of Community if a Certificate of Need for 100 beds or more is awarded. In return for the sale of the stock of the applicant corporation to NME, Mr. Davis and the other two board members of Community will receive a total of $600,000 in addition to the $15,000 Mr. Davis has already received for his efforts in preparing and prosecuting the Certificate of Need application. The only asset of Collier is the inchoate Certificate of Need. Upon consummation of the stock purchase agreement, Mr. Davis will resign from the Board of Directors and presumably NME will appoint its own board. Community has given full authority to NME to prosecute the application as it sees fit, including making certain changes NME deemed appropriate to the application, including seeking 150 beds instead of 152 and changing the method and means of financing the project (mostly equity instead of debt). Additional changes in NME's approach to prosecution of the application include the proposed method of recruitment of personnel and management of the hospital. Community has no agreements with any other group, entities or individuals to provide financial, personnel and other resources necessary to construct, manage and operate an acute care hospital and did not demonstrate that it has any such resources in its own right. Mr. Frank Tidikis, Vice-President for Operations for the eastern region for National Medical Enterprises, testified concerning the financial and management resources and staffing arrangement NME proposes for the new hospital should it be authorized. He enumerated many medical specialties that NME intends to place on the staff of the hospital, but neither Community nor NME have done any studies revealing what types of medical specialties are presently available in the Collier County area, how many physicians in those specialties are available and what ratio exists or is appropriate for various types of physicians to the community population. The proposed staffing pattern, sources and method of recruitment was predicated solely on NME's past experience in obtaining hospital staff in other areas of the nation, and not upon any study or other investigation showing the availability of appropriate types of trained staff people in reasonable commuting distances of the proposed hospital, which would be located in northern Collier County. If NME consummates the purchase agreement, the hospital would be locally managed by a board of directors consisting of 51 per cent of the hospital's own medical staff and 49 per cent lay members chosen from the community at large. FINANCING Mr. Michael Gallo was Community/NME's expert in the area of health care finance, being NME's Vice-President for Finance. It was thus established that the total cost of the project, if approved, would be approximately $23,600,000. This amount would be financed by NME which proposes to make a 35 per cent equity contribution in the amount of approximately $8,500,000 and which will finance the balance of the project cost at a rate of approximately 13 per cent interest for 20 years. NME projects that an average daily patient census of 45 would be necessary to "break even." A daily census of 45 would yield 6,425 patient days per year, with the facility projected to break even in its first year of operation. NME projects that by the third year of operation, a return on investment of 10 to 12 per cent would be achieved. NME's projections are based on an assumed average length of stay per patient of 5.6 days. NME allocated two and sone-half per cent of its projected gross revenues for indigent patient care, and four per cent of projected gross revenues allocated to bad debt, that is, uncollectible hospital bills, not necessarily related to indigent patients. The $600,000 which NME must pay Community Hospital of Collier and Mr. Davis in order to acquire the assets of that corporation (i.e. the CON) will be treated as a project cost and will be depreciated as though it were a part of the buildings. Community/NME projects its total revenue per adjusted patient admission to amount to $4,843, with projected total revenue per adjusted patient day at $865. It predicts these figures will increase by about five per cent for successive years as a factor of inflation. The proposed hospital site consists of approximately 12 acres, available at a price of $30,000 to $50,000 per acre. The application itself originally proposed a location in the central or southern portion of Collier County. However, after NME entered into the agreement with the applicant corporation for the stock purchase and became involved in the prosecution of the application, the location was changed. Thus, it was discovered at the outset of the hearing that indeed, the proposed location of Community of Collier's hospital would be in the northern portion of Collier County in close proximity to Lee County. 1/ The proposed $360,000 to $600,000 land cost would of course, be added to the total cost of Community's proposed project. It has not been demonstrated what use would be made of the entire 12 acres, nor that the entire 12 acres is required for the hospital, its grounds, parking and ancillary facilities. STAFFING One of the reputed benefits of Community's proposed project is that it would afford a competitive hospital in the Collier County health services market to counter what Community contends is a virtual monopoly held by Naples Community Hospital, as well as to promote the attraction of more qualified medical staff to that "market". In this context, Community contends that its facility, by being built and operating as an alternative acute care hospital, would attract more physicians to the Collier County area and thus, arguably, render health services more readily available. Community thus decries the supposed "closed staff" plan of Naples, contending that Community offers an "open" staffing plan, which would serve to attract more physicians to the geographical area involved and enhance Community's ability to appropriately staff its hospital. Naples Community Hospital, on the other hand, experiences numerous physicians vacationing in the area requesting staff privileges. Many of these physicians apparently do not have any intention of permanently locating in the Naples/Collier County area, however, and therefore in order to determine which physicians are seriously interested in locating there, Naples has a screening procedure which includes an interview with the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Director for Staff Development, and the chief of the service for which a physician is applying for privileges. This preliminary screening procedure is not tantamount to a closed staffing situation, which only exists where a fixed number of physicians are permitted on a hospital staff, with others waiting until an opening occurs. In the open staff situation, as exists at Naples, no matter how rigorous the screening process, there is not a finite number of staff physicians available. Any physician who qualifies under the hospital bylaws and assures the screening committee of his intention to locate in the area served by the hospital is admitted to the staff. Thus, the staffing pattern for physicians at Naples Community Hospital augurs just as well for the attraction of physicians to the Collier County vicinity as does the staffing method proposed by Community. In that vein Naples has granted privileges to 13 new physicians in the preceding calendar year and had 8 applications pending at the time of hearing. Only one applicant was denied privileges during that year. Additional factors which must be considered in the context of staffing such a hospital concern the ability of the applicant to provide quality of care and appropriate, available resources including health care and management personnel to operate the facility. Aside from demonstrating that NME, through the stock purchase agreement, may obligate itself to provide ample funds and other resources to fund, staff and operate the project, and that it has successfully staffed and operated hospitals in numerous locales, Community did not demonstrate what likely sources would be drawn upon for nurses and other staff members to staff its hospital in order to avoid recruiting most of them from nearby facilities, including Naples Community, which could precipitate a diminution in the quality of health care at these other facilities. In short, other than showing that NME's management has the financial resources and experience to accomplish the staffing and operation of the hospital, there was no demonstration by Community which would establish the availability of sufficient health care personnel to operate and manage its hospital at adequate levels of care. COMPETITION Community contends that its facility should be built in order to foster competition in the provision of health care services in Collier County. It took the position, through its expert witness, Dr. Charles Phelps, that the Naples hospital holds a monopolistic position in Collier County inasmuch as it is the only hospital in the county. It should be pointed out somewhat parenthetically, however, that this "County market area" theme ignores the fact that this application is for an acute care hospital in District VIII, which is not subdivided by rule into County sub-districts for health care planning purposes. Further, Community originally proposed locating its hospital in the central or southerly portion of Collier County, but as of the time of the hearing, proposed to locate its hospital in the northerly portion of Collier County with a service area it itself proposed which will include the southerly portion of Lee County. This area is also within the service areas of Naples Community Hospital, Lee Memorial Hospital, Fort Myers Community Hospital and the soon to be constructed Gulf Coast Osteopathic Acute Care Hospital. Thus, in its attempt to establish Naples Community Hospital as occupying a monopolistic position in the "Collier County health care market", Community did not establish that Collier County either legally or practically is a separate health care market demarcated by the county boundary with Lee and Hendry Counties, such that Naples' status as the sole acute care hospital within the legal boundaries of Collier County is monopolistic. Indeed, it competes for patients with the Lee County hospitals named above in the northern Collier-southern Lee County market area involved. Community attempted to demonstrate a monopolistic situation in favor of Naples Community Hospital by comparing its relative increase in costs per day and costs per patient stay with Fort Myers Community Hospital and Lee Memorial Hospital. Naples Community Hospital did indeed exhibit the largest rate of cost increase in both those categories. Community's expert, Dr. Phelps, opined that lack of competition in the Naples area caused the disparity in rate of increase in costs between Lee County hospitals and the Collier County hospital. Naples called Ed Morton, who was accepted as an expert witness in hospital financial analysis, reimbursement, hospital auditing and accounting, financial feasibility and corporate finance. It was thus established that Naples does not occupy a monopoly position and provides health care at lower costs than would be the case should the Community Hospital facility be constructed. Mr. Morton demonstrated that analyzing total costs per adjusted patient day does not reliably indicate the efficiency of a hospital, since such daily costs fluctuate with the average length of stay. A better indicator for determining hospital efficiency is to analyze total revenue per adjusted admission. A comparison of Lee Memorial, Naples Community Hospital, Fort Myers Community Hospital and NME's six Florida hospitals was employed based on data provided to the hospital cost containment board for the years 1980 through 1983, in order to show which hospital operated more efficiently and tended less toward monopolistic market positions. In making this comparison, Mr. Morton employed the "total revenue per adjusted admission" and "total revenue per adjusted patient day" methods of comparing the hospitals. He used this approach because it reduces to a common denominator the various values and statistics utilized in the hospital cost containment board formulas. It was thus established that Naples has the lowest total revenue per adjusted admission and lowest total revenue per adjusted patient day of all the hospitals depicted in the comparison study (Naples Exhibit 23). Naples total revenue per adjusted admission is $400 to $1,900 less than each of the other hospitals. One reason Naples experiences less total revenue is because its charges are lower, since it employs some 1,600 volunteer workers. If these workers were paid at a minimum wage they would reflect a cost of approximately $600,000 per year. Further, the hospital over the years has obtained large donations of money and labor through funding drives, all of which have enabled it to keep charges down for its patients and to continue to operate certain services at a deficit. For instance, Naples has a discreet pediatric unit, which means a physically separate, self-contained pediatric care unit, with specialized staff, who perform no other services than those they are designated to perform in pediatrics. That unit operates at a deficit repeatedly since 40 per cent of the Naples pediatric patients originate from the Immokalee area, which is characterized by an extremely high percentage of indigent persons. Naples' witness Morton performed a patient origin study which shows that approximately 84 per cent of Naples' patients originate in Collier County, 12 per cent originate in Lee County, particularly southern Lee County, and two per cent originate from unrelated areas. The Naples Community Hospital is located in Naples, approximately in the mid-section of Collier County and a significantly greater distance from the northern Collier/Lee County line than will be the Community facility, if built. Community expects to draw approximately one-half, or six per cent, of the 12 per cent of Naples' patient load which is derived from Lee County. NCH however, at the present time, competes with Fort Myers Community Hospital and Lee Memorial Hospital, in particular, for patients from both southern Lee County and northern Collier County, Community's proposed service area. Thus, NCH does not maintain a monopoly serving Collier County or Community's proposed service area to the exclusion of these other hospitals. The placement of Community's facility at a point much closer to the Lee County border than is Naples' present facility would result in the injection of a fourth or fifth strong competitor into the Collier County-southern Lee County patient origin and health service market area, rather than merely the addition of a second competitor for Naples Community Hospital. ADVERSE COMPETITIVE EFFECTS Both Lee Memorial Hospital and Fort Myers Community Hospital already draw a substantial number of patients from southern Lee County, as well as northern Collier County. Gulf Coast Osteopathic Hospital, after protracted litigation, has secured approval of a Certificate of Need to build an osteopathic acute care hospital in the southerly portion of Lee County. That Final Order authorizes 60 beds. It is fair to assume, inasmuch as these hospitals are already drawing from southerly Lee County, that the capture of the patient market in southern Lee County will be made much more pervasive with the addition of the Gulf Coast Osteopathic acute care facility. That being the case, insofar as the 1989 horizon year is concerned, far less than 12 per cent of the Lee County origin patient days now available to hospitals located in Collier County will actually be available. Community will thus draw even less than its own projected six per cent of its patient days from Lee County. In any event, it is logical to conclude that substantially all the patient days resultantly available to a Collier County situated facility will be derived from Collier County upon the advent of the Gulf Coast Hospital. Thus, any patients drawn to Community, if its facility were built, would be at the direct expense of NCH. That being the case, it is reasonable to conclude that the analyses performed by Mr. Morton, Naples' expert, which reveal that Community Hospital will potentially siphon off as many as 80 patient days per day from Naples Community Hospital, is accurate. If this occurs, it would mean that approximately 29,200 annual patient days would be garnered by Community. Mr. Morton's analysis established that a resultant raising of rates by Naples would have to occur in the amount of $240 per patient day. Failure of Naples to so raise its rates to patients, would cause an annual revenue deficiency of 6.5 million dollars. This increase of $240 per patient day would result in a $1,536 increase in the average charge per adjusted admission, based upon the average length of stay at Naples which is 6.2 days. Even if Community obtained only half its patients from the Naples Community Hospital, (a likely understatement of its patient market impact), the resulting loss to Naples per patient day would be $220 with a concomitant necessary increase, in average patient charges per admission in the amount of $768, in order for NCH to remain financially viable. If Naples were unable to raise its charges to compensate for this loss of patients to the Community facility, then it would have to curtail services currently rendered on a deficit basis, such as its discrete pediatric unit, which experiences a 40 per cent indigent patient utilization. Community's own projections show that it expects to garner 27,790 patient days, which for the above reason, are likely to all be gained at the expense of NCH. This will result in the loss to NCH of at least 76 patient days per day with a resultant revenue shortfall nearly as high as that postulated by Morton as a result of his patient origin study and adverse impact analysis. Thus, in terms of lost patient days and lost revenue, both the figures advanced by Naples and those advanced by Community reveal that a substantial adverse impact will be occasioned to Naples by the installation of Community's hospital, especially in view of its location at approximately the midpoint between the Lee County boundary and NCH's facility in Naples. Naples derives approximately 54 per cent of its gross patient revenues from Medicare reimbursement. Four per cent of its revenues are represented by Medicaid patient reimbursement. Eight to nine per cent of its billings are not collected because of non-reimbursable, indigent patient care and bad debts. Community will obtain from 76 to 80 patient days per day case load now enjoyed by Naples Community Hospital. Community projects that its billable case load will be characterized by four per cent Medicaid reimbursable billings, and six and one- half per cent of its annual case load will be represented by indigent and bad debt uncollectible billings. Forty-six per cent of NCH's indigent and bad debt cases come from the Immokalee area lying east of State Road 887 and north of State Road 846, and the Community Hospital would be built approximately midway between that area and the location of NCH. Therefore, based upon Community's own projection of total billings for 27,790 patient days, or at most, 29,200 days per year, (according to NCH's figures which depict the loss to NCH of 80 patient days instead of 76) it becomes obvious that Community's bad debt, indigent case billings would actually be in the neighborhood of 17 per cent of its total, billable case load, rather than the six and one-half per cent it projects in its application and evidence. This would render the bad debt, indigent patient-based uncollectibles of Community to be on the order of four million dollars per year. Such a high magnitude of bad debt, uncollectible billing experience can reasonably be expected since Community's Hospital would be constructed between the source of most of the indigent bad debt case load and NCH's location. This location is also in the center of the most affluent, rapidly developing residential area of Collier County. Given the fact that Community-NME's proposed location is likely to attract a high indigent, bad debt case load from the economically depressed Immokalee area, approaching the magnitude of 17 per cent of total case load, if a policy of freely accepting indigent, uncollectible cases were followed by Community-NME, but considering also the fact that Community proposes to locate its hospital in the service area it has delineated to include the most concentrated source of more affluent, privately paying patients available to these competing hospitals, it cannot be concluded that Community-NME plans to incur such a high financial risk by free acceptance of indigent, charity cases. Rather it seeks to largely serve the collectible, private-paying patient source of northwestern Collier County, hence its recently altered proposed location. This determination is borne out by the experience of NME's other Florida hospitals, which are characterized by a very low percentage acceptance of indigent, bad debt, patient service. Thus, it is quite likely that NCH would be relegated to continued service of this large number of indigent, nonpaying patients while Community/NME would serve a patient base composed of largely private-paying and Medicare reimbursed patients drawn primarily from NCH, a significant financial detriment to that entity, which at present experiences a rather precarious operating ratio, characterized by, at best, a three per cent profit margin. Such an eventuality would force upon NCH the choice of raising its rates substantially or curtailing services, or both, with the probable alternative of seeking taxpayer subsidization of such an increased charity case load. NCH effectively competes with the pertinent hospitals in Lee County for the same patient base, due to its lower charges, as shown by the fact that Naples has the lowest revenue per adjusted admission and per adjusted patient day of the hospitals in Collier and Lee Counties. Thus, any increase in charges at Naples necessitated by the adverse effect of the installation of Community's hospital would put it at a distinct additional disadvantage in competing with the Lee County hospitals. A similar financial resultant adverse impact would be imposed on Lee Memorial, Fort Myers Community and Gulf Coast in terms of declining utilization and revenues. It is further noteworthy that Community's own projection of annual patient days reveals that it will experience an occupancy rate of approximately 50 per cent. It has not been established how 27 to 29 thousand patient days with a concomitant occupancy rate of only SO to 51 per cent can support a 150-bed free standing, acute care hospital with a full complement of ancillary services, which fact renders the financial feasibility of Community's proposed hospital substantially in doubt. In terms of the relationship of adverse impacts on existing hospitals to the legislative goals of hospital cost and rate containment, it should be pointed out that the current utilization rate of all hospitals in this area District VIII are declining, partly as a result of the impact of the "diagnostic related groups" (DRG) method of reimbursement. The utilization at NCH for the first six months of 1984 has dropped to 62.3 per cent. The utilization rate of the Lee County hospitals has been reduced to approximately 65.4 per cent. The addition of another acute care hospital to this area, which is established to likely experience a utilization of only 50 to 51 per cent itself, would only cause the current low utilization rates to plummet more drastically. This situation would substantially impair the financial viability of all existing hospitals in the relevant area of District VIII, and Community, as well. Thus, if the proposed Community Hospital were added to this area, it would only aggravate the problem the CON approval process is designed to prevent, that of avoiding escalating health care rates and costs, concomitant decline in adequate levels of service and unnecessary duplication of services. GEOGRAPHIC ACCESSIBILITY In support of its assertion that by 1989 a portion of its service area will not be accessible within 30 minutes driving time of an existing hospital, Community adduced the testimony of Mr. Michael Dudek, accepted as an expert traffic engineer. Mr. Dudek plotted the time and distance of travel from NCH, Cape Coral Hospital, Lee Memorial Hospitals Fort Myers Community Hospital, Eastpoint Hospital, the future Gulf Coast Hospital and proposed Lee Memorial 100-bed satellite facility. He employed the "floating car method" in determining travel times from each hospital to points 30 minutes from the hospital. He projected future travel times along the same routes with a view toward growth in traffic volume based upon population growth. Mr. Dudek opined that in 1989 there will be, under average traffic conditions, a portion of northern Collier and southern Lee Counties which will not be within 30 minutes average travel time of any existing hospital. In his own opinion, in peak travel seasons, coextensive with seasonal, winter population peaks in this geographic area, the situation will be aggravated such that the territory where residents are more than 30 minutes driving time from existing hospitals will expand. Mr. Dudek conceded that vehicles on roads adjacent to main artery roads would reach various main arteries at different times, depending on the density of the population in the residential neighborhoods between those main traffic arteries. He did not map his proposed 30-minute driving time contour lines to indicate these variables. Further, he acknowledged that even during the 1989 projected peak traffic season, the geographical triangle in which Community-NME will locate its proposed hospital, was not outside the driving time projected for Naples Community Hospital. He apparently based his conclusions on the premise that road and traffic improvements would not occur so as to significantly compensate for the population and traffic growth posed by various real estate developments of regional impact which have been filed and proposed for north Collier and south Lee Counties. Naples, presented the testimony of Mr. Jack Barr, also accepted as an expert traffic engineer. Mr. Barr used the "average car method" in conducting a travel-time study to determine the points on arterial roads 30-minutes distance from all existing hospitals in Lee and Collier Counties as well as from the proposed Lee Memorial Satellite Hospital. (Naples Exhibit 76). The distances between those points are interpolated and plotted on the basis of estimated average speeds on the non- arterial segments of the roadways that would be traversed by people making their way to the arterial roads. Mr. Barr also surveyed proposed road improvements in the Collier and Lee County areas (Naples Exhibit 7C). He predicated this survey on the most recent Department of Transportation traffic maps. He performed his original field study during a four-week period in December and January, 1982. The travel times for Collier County were then revised and updated on October 24, 1984 with a field survey and for Lee County on August 14 through 23, 1984. Mr. Barr was unable to determine any significant statistical difference between the contours he plotted in his 1982-83 survey and those plotted in the 1984 updated survey. Mr. Barr employed information obtained from the Southwest Florida Regional Planning Council, the Lee County Planning Department and the Collier County Traffic Planner, as well as information from his own files on proposed residential building projects with which he has been associated professionally or become aware of in the area. It was thus established that that portion of north Collier County and southern Lee County, where most of the proposed residential development will occur, and which is in Community's proposed service area, is currently partially or totally within 30-minutes driving time of three existing and one approved hospital. All the proposed major residential developments in the north Collier/south Lee County area are within 30 minutes travel time of at least one existing hospital and most lie within the 3 minute contour lines for the proposed Lee Memorial Satellite Hospital. The travel time contours will remain substantially unchanged for the next ten years based upon major road improvements planned in the next ten years. Information as to road improvements was obtained from the approved Collier County Comprehensive Plan, from average daily traffic counts on U.S. 41 conducted by the Department of Transportation and Collier County, from the Lee County Transportation and Improvement Program which shows the status of road improvements for 1985 through 1989, and from the Department of Transportation Road Improvement Program extending through the fiscal year 1989 for Lee and Collier Counties. All the roads included in the DOT projection for the next five years are committed and will be built. Although there will not be a decrease in traffic along U.S. 41, rather the increase in traffic that would normally occur on U.S. 41 will be largely offset by traffic shifting over to parallel routes which are to be developed through the road improvement programs established by Mr. Barr. There has been a steady decrease in use of the formerly highly congested U.S. 41 artery because of the development of parallel highways such as Airport Road. Mr. Barr established that the road improvements upon which his opinion is partly based are being implemented, and since most are funded by gasoline tax monies earmarked for that purpose, it is reasonable to assume that the DOT sponsored improvements will continue to be made. Further, although Community sought to show that a portion of the population of its service area is beyond a 30- minute travel time from existing acute care hospitals, it did not demonstrate that that population now or in 1989 amounts to more than 10 per cent of the Collier County population. In his capacity as a traffic-engineer, Mr. Barr has worked in Lee and Collier Counties for approximately seven years, representing public and private clients. He has monitored the implementation of the Collier Comprehensive Plan as it relates to roadways and real estate development and established that road improvements are indeed being implemented. His testimony and opinion, predicated on more accurate surveying techniques, supported by local planning and Department of Transportation documentation, is better corroborated and more competent than that of Mr. Dudek and is accepted. Thus, it has not been shown that the 30 minute travel time points and distances attributable to existing hospitals will recede sufficiently to create the new service area contemplated by Community. EXISTING SERVICE - AVAILABILITY, QUALITY, ADEQUACY OF CARE, ACCESSIBILITY To ALL, INCLUDING INDIGENTS NCH affords adequate availability and access to acute care services for patients in Collier and southern Lee Counties, including indigent patients. Community's proposed facility would not have a level 2 or 3 nursery, and would not have a discreet pediatric unit, both of which Naples has. Thus, access to pediatric, as well as obstetric services, would not be enhanced by the advent of Community's hospital, for indigent or other patients originating in Community's proposed service area. Additionally, inasmuch as NCH's pediatric unit operates at a deficits the addition of such services, even of their limited scope, by Community may, for financial reasons, result in the curtailment of such services, especially for indigent, in view of the considerations expressed above. The physician-director of the Collier County Health Department, Dr. Polkowski was called and accepted as an expert witness on behalf of Naples in the area of public health, for the purpose of discussing the distribution of medically indigent persons and availability of services in Collier County. Her work requires her to routinely review U.S. Bureau of Census data on age and health characteristics of the population of Collier County and to travel throughout the county to acquire knowledge of the health characteristics of the population. It was thus established that the highest concentration of poverty level patients occurs in Census Tracts 112, 113, 114 and 104, with a particularly high concentration in Census Tract 112 which comprises the Immokalee area in northeastern Collier County. A particular health problem in that area is teenage pregnancy, with 90 births to females under 19 years of age in 1983 out of a county-wide statistic for such births of 172. Eleven per cent of the babies born to women under 19 years of age in Collier County are low birth weight babies, which typically necessitate higher levels of neonatal, specialized care because of the increased chances of serious health problems occasioned by low birth weight. There are three recognized levels of care for newborn babies in Florida. Naples Community Hospital has a Level 1 and 2 nursery. Level 1 represents babies who have no exceptional conditions. Level 2 is for those babies with respiratory and other serious problems requiring enhanced levels of care and is characterized by such special equipment as isolettes, intensive care bassinets with respirators, cardiac monitors, apnea monitors, resuscitation and cardiac resuscitation equipment. The staffing level of the Level 2 nursery is at a ratio of one neonatal specialized nurse to three babies rather than the one nurse per six babies of the Level 1 nursery. The Level 2 and 3 babies have serious and frequently chronic health conditions for the short, and sometimes the long-term, often characterized by quite high patient costs. The Immokalee area has the highest poor as well as non white concentration in the bounty. There are approximately 14,000 permanent residents, but during the wintertime the population swells to over 20,000 when predominantly Mexican American migrant farm workers arrive in the area. The poor population has a higher mortality rate for infants and manifests more serious medical problems on a greater per capita basis than does the more affluent population lying to the west and southwest. The Immokalee area population has a high rate of tuberculosis, venereal disease, parasites and hepatitis. The current level of services provided to the indigent population by Naples Community Hospital however, is of a high quality. Richard Akin is the Director of the Collier Health Services, a private, nonprofit primary health care organization which offers primary medical and dental care services to the rural, poor population of northeast Collier County. Most of these patients are migrant farm workers who have absolutely no means of paying their own medical bills. Collier Health Services provides primary medical care at three locations in the county with the largest center being at Immokalee. The Immokalee facility has seven staff positions which include such specialties as pediatrics, family practice, internal medicine and obstetrics. The Immokalee facility records approximately 60-thousand patient visits per year. Seventy-five per cent of these are represented by Mexican- American farm workers who are employed in the area seasonally. Another 10 to 12 per cent per year are Haitian immigrants employed in agriculture. Between 60 and 80 per cent of all patient visits are not paid for by the patient. The Immokalee primary care facility refers 4,000 to 4,500 patients to a hospital annually, with about 12 to 15 such referrals per day. These are for normal, non-emergency care situations. Additionally, between 400 and 450 patients are referred to a hospital for emergency care per year. All the primary care center's emergency and non emergency patients are referred to NCH. Mr. Akin has attempted to refer patients from the Immokalee facility to other area hospitals such as in Lee County, but without success. NCH is located in fairly close proximity to the Immokalee Primary Care Center, and, even though most patients have no means of paying for medical care, NCH treats and admits them without questioning them in advance concerning their ability to pay, insurance, Medicaid and the like. Mr. Akin has previously attempted to refer his indigent patients to the Fort Myers area hospitals with little success in having them admitted. LeHigh Acres Hospital is considerably closer, being 24 miles away, but Mr. Akins has had little success in having the indigent patients he serves admitted there. Instead, he refers to Naples since the patients are treated with the same dignity and decency as paying patients at that hospital. In excess of 50 per cent of the patients he refers from the primary health center to Naples never pay anything for the services received. Approximately 30 per cent of the non-emergency patients referred to Naples annually are pediatric referrals. About 30 per cent of the emergency referrals are also pediatric patients. Four hundred to four-hundred fifty non- emergency patients annually are obstetric patients who come to full term and are delivered. It is unlikely that any of the pediatric patients would be referred to a hospital, such as the proposed Community facility, which does not have a discreet pediatric unit with a specialized staff and equipment, since the primary care center in Immokalee has the capability of treating any overnight, routine pediatric problem itself, and any pediatric patient that cannot be handled on a one-day admission at the facility, can be sent to the discreet, specialized pediatric unit at Naples Community Hospitals which Community of Collier will not offer. The standard procedure at Naples Community Hospital for admitting patients who do not have a private physician or a private physician referral, is nondiscriminatory. That is, in the triage process, when a patient arrives at the emergency room, for instance, only the patient's name, address, age, date of birth and questions eliciting his medical status are asked upon his arrival. Depending on the nature of the injury involved, the on-call medical specialist for that type of injury is then summoned to the emergency room. If it appears necessary to admit the patient to the hospital, the on-call specialist authorizes the admission. When the admission determination is made, there is no information available on the admitting documents and no questions are asked to indicate whether the patient is a paying patient, a nonpaying migrant worker, an insured patient, or a Medicare patient. Naples presently has a labor and delivery area with a birthing room and a three-stage cohort type of nursery. Infants move through three different stages in the nursery depending on age, so as to reduce infections. Seventeen of the 24 beds on the floor are designated as OB beds. Whenever more than 17 patients must use that floor, they are able to expand to gynecological medical surgical beds on the same floor which thus gives a total capacity for OB patients of 24 beds. The OB services as proposed by Community are essentially duplicative of the services in existence at Naples Community Hospital, although with a less intensive level of care for 08 and pediatric patients. Essentially all the other services proposed by Community duplicate these services already available to area residents at NCH and the other pertinent hospitals. Thus, it is apparent that if Community's facility is located where proposed, it will actually serve an area that is more elongated north to south rather than east to west, and will in reality serve the more affluent, private- paying patient origin areas lying in west-central and northwest Collier County. The reason for this is that most of the indigent patient population will bypass Community of Collier's Hospital and go to Naples for the above delineated reasons, and Community would then tend to draw patients from the more populated, wealthier areas on a north-south line from the Naples area up to and across the Lee County line rather than on an east-west axis. The fact that Community/NME would serve primarily privately-paying patients is exemplified by the fact that NME's other Florida hospitals typically have no (or very minimal) Medicaid patient days, such that that parent company's policy is not one of encouraging service to Medicaid or indigent patients. It is thus apparent that with the advent of Community/NME's hospital that there would be created two different patient bases or patient markets, with Naples continuing to serve the vast majority of the indigent, Medicaid, or bad- debt patient base. Community/NME would garner its patient base largely from private-paying, more affluent patients with substantially less bad debt ratio. This would siphon off much of Naples's private paying base, such that, with its already slim or sometimes nonexistent profit margin, its financial viability would become more and more in doubt. This would raise the alternative mentioned above of either raising its rates substantially, causing health care costs for the consuming public to rise significantly, seeking relief from the taxpayers of Collier County, or curtailment of available services to indigents and all other patients, especially GE and pediatrics; possibly even all three cost coverage alternatives. Such an eventuality would ultimately result in a reduction in the quality of health care afforded the patient public. NAPLES AVAILABLE AND PROPOSED SERVICES Mr. Mike Jernigan was tendered by NCH and accepted as an expert in health care planning and hospital financial management. Mr. Jernigan is employed as Director of Planning at Naples and prepared the instant Certificate of Need application seeking 30 beds. Naples has recently added 43 psychiatric beds under previously issued Certificates of Need. The instant application contemplates relocation of the 43 psychiatric beds to the fourth floor of a support building, there creating a discrete psychiatric care unit. Naples amended its request at hearing so as to seek 20 instead of 30 medical/surgical beds to be added to the space to be vacated by the 43 psychiatric beds. No significant construction will be required in the vacated space, rather semiprivate rooms will be converted to private rooms. The 1.7 million dollar project cost is chiefly attributable to the construction of the facility which will house the licensed 43 psychiatric beds. Thus, the reduction in the number of acute care beds sought from 30 to 20 will not significantly alter the 1.7 million dollar project cost. Naturally, the minor project costs attributable to installation of 10 acute care beds in the vacated, former psychiatric bed space will be lessened by an amount attributable to 10 beds. In any event, NCH has been demonstrated to have adequate financial resources to undertake the project outlined in its application and has those funds committed. Naples can add these 20 proposed beds and successfully operate them as a minor addition to its now feasibly operating acute care hospital. Naples has recently opened a free standing, primary care center called North Collier Health Center, in the vicinity of the proposed site of Community/NME's hospital. That facility includes a radiology room, laboratory and emergency medical service station, in addition to offering normal, primary care services. It is staffed 24 hours a day, seven days a week with a physician, but does not have inpatient beds. A similar primary care center has been constructed on Marco Island. Both of these centers have been added to Naples complement of facilities and services in implementation of a long-range health care expansion plan designed to make Naples' services more accessible and available to the public throughout its Collier County, southern Lee County service area. Given Naples low and sometimes non existent margin of revenue over expenses, the construction of these two facilities was rendered largely financially feasible through the donation of the land for both of them through community fund raising efforts, and the construction of the Marco Island facility was accomplished with entirely donated funds. The EMS substation at the North Collier Primary Care Center is operated and financed by the county, and the sleeping quarters at that sub station and at the Naples main campus facility for EMS personnel are provided free of charge at some financial loss to the hospital. Such an arrangement constitutes good health care planning, even though it results in some financial detriment to Naples, since it makes the emergency medical technicians immediately available to assist emergency patients who are transported to the primary care centers by their own means, and shortens the reaction time for emergency personnel since they are not located at separate locations from the hospital or primary care centers. These arrangements further Naples' long range goal in making its emergency primary care and primary care services more available and accessible to the public in its service area, which goal receives strong public support as evidenced by the large public donations which largely made the installation and operation of these facilities possible. Since Naples is a not-for-profit hospital, any excess of revenue over expenses it experiences is used to acquire new and needed equipment or expand facilities, including facilities and services such as these. The installation of Community/NME's hospital at its proposed locations especially, would duplicate the services offered at North Collier Primary Care Center and to a great extent those offered at the main campus of NCH in Naples. It was established through the testimony of Miles Price, an architect specializing in hospital design, that the construction costs, architectural costs and related inflation factors depicted in Naples' application are reasonable and accurate with regard to the relocation and construction for the psychiatric beds, which are to be moved, and the installation of the 20 acute care beds proposed. Acquisition of equipment necessary for the operation of the 20 proposed beds will be financially assisted by its present shared purchasing arrangements, whereby it is able to obtain resultant discounts in acquisition of the necessary equipment needed for installation and operation of the new beds. BED NEED AND BED ALLOCATION Thomas Porter was tendered and accepted as an expert in health care planning in Florida. Subpart (23) of Rule 10-5.11, F.A.C. is the acute care bed need determination methodology. It is the policy of HRS in accordance with the legal mandate referenced herein to facilitate the use of subpart (23) of the rule by regularly compiling and disseminating district bed need information, including that depicted in Community's Exhibit 16, which includes a memorandum from Phil Rond, the Administrator of the Office of Comprehensive Health Planning of HRS. If the formula at subpart (23) of the above rule is employed using historical utilization data from the years 1981 through 1982, a net bed need of 375 for all of District VIII results and that is the current bed need status of the district advocated by Community. However, as established by the memorandum from Mr. Rond incorporated in Exhibit 16, the most recent utilization data includes that for the year 1983, which is the most recent hospital reporting period envisioned by the formula and above rule. When the 1983 utilization data is added to the 1981-1982 information, a drop in total bed need for District VIII occurs from a figure of 4,147 beds to 3,654 beds. When licensed and approved beds are subtracted from that figure, a minus bed need results and District VIII has an excess of 118 beds. The rule formula at subpart (23)(g) dictates that the three most recent annual hospital licensure reporting periods must be used for the utilization data necessary to operate the need determination formula. 2/ The use of the most recent utilization data, including 1983, for District VIII causes the overall projected occupancy level contemplated in the methodology (at 10.5.11(23)(g)(2)) to fall below 75 per cent, when the bed need calculation is carried out to its conclusion. Given the projected occupancy falling below 75 per cent, the end result is that gross bed need in District VIII is 3,654 beds, rather than 4,147 beds as postulated by Community. Community contends that the 1983 utilization data should not be used since it was not available for Districts I and II and should not be used for any district until it is available and disseminated for all districts 3/ The reason the department promulgated Mr. Rond's special memorandum with regard to the bed need projections for District VIII, was to alert users of that information that in that particular district the drop in the most recent utilization data triggered the rule mechanism of subpart (23)(g)(2) because it revealed that the overall projected occupancy levels would fall below 75 per cent, all of which showed on a district-wide basis an over-bedding of 118 acute care beds. Mr. Larry Bebe is Acting Executive Director and Planner for the District VIII Health Council. He was accepted as an expert witness in health care planning and public health administration. Mr. Bebe considers the local health council plan to be a valuable planning tool for purposes of allocating beds in District VIII on a less than district-wide basis. The plan was adopted in March, 1984, but has not yet been adopted as a rule by HRS. According to the District VIII Health Council Plan, that district is sub-districted by counties, except for Glades and Hendry Counties which are combined in a two-county sub- district. This form of sub-districting has been done for approximately seven years. District VIII is sub-districted on a county basis rather than on other geographical boundaries, because population data, useful in planning allocation of beds, is only available in the form of county-based population projections by age-specific cohorts from the Bureau of Economic and Business Research at the University of Florida (BEBR). Further, in considering the location of existing hospitals, the greatest proportion of people in the seven county area of District VIII can be located within a reasonable time and access to health care services by allocating the beds on a county sub-district basis. The population data promulgated by the BEBR is employed by HRS, is generally accepted as authoritative in Certificate of Need proceedings, and is herein. It is not available by age-specific cohort in the census tract geographical subdivisions attempted to be used by Community in 4 in delineating its purported service area. 4/ Performance of population based health care planning must be done consistently and future need must be projected based upon preparing utilization rates predicated on the same population geographical area each time. A common geographical basis for allocation of beds, such as counties, is most appropriate since that is the basis on which the most accurate population data is available. The bed allocation methodology used by the local health council to allocate beds by county sub-districts is contained in Naples Exhibit No. 35. Bed allocation on a county sub-district basis is determined by taking the overall bed number available from the state methodology rule formula and breaking it down into county sub-districts according to the District VIII health plan methodology. This methodology takes into account existing hospital utilization and location, changes in population, and projected patient days. All items of information to operate the allocation formula are obtained on a county basis. Under the District VIII health plan methodology, when existing beds are subtracted from needed beds, a projected need for 20 medical/surgical beds in Collier County results with an excess of 41 existing beds in Lee County for the horizon year of 1989. Mr. Porter corroborated Mr. Bebe's testimony and established that, although not adopted by HRS rule, the sub-districting of District VIII by county for health planning purposes conforms with HRS policy in terms of population and geographical criteria and constitutes a reasonable and rational health planning tool. The methodology used by the local health councils to allocate beds to the counties incorporates standard, accepted health planning practices and HRS' policy is not to interfere with that allocation of beds on a sub-district basis, so long as the subdistricting allocation does not exceed the bed need number for the district as a whole. Mr. Porter demonstrated that it is possible under the state Subpart (23) methodology to find no need or excessive beds at a district level, however, by applying the local health council methodology a positive mathematical need might be shown in one or more county sub-districts. Thus, it has been shown that the local health council allocation method which reveals a 20-bed need for Collier County is the result of a rational, standard, accepted health planning practice with regard to determining projected bed need on a less than district- wide basis. However, although that methodology shows a formula-based "need" in Collier County, the above findings reflecting the severely declining utilization experience in Collier County at NCH, together with its already scant operating ratio, when considered with the future effect on its utilization rate caused by the advent of Gulf Coast Hospital, show that no true need for any beds exists. Bed need projections are not the only pivotal considerations in determining entitlement to a CON. Brown and Kendall Lakes Hospital, Inc., Humana, Inc. d/b/a Kendall Community Hospital v. HRS, 4 FALR 2452A, (Final Order entered October 6, 1982).
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED: That the application for a Certificate of Need submitted by Community Hospital of Collier, Inc. for 150-beds for northern Collier County be DENIED, and that the application for a Certificate of Need submitted by Naples Community Hospital, Inc. for the addition, as amended, for 20 beds be DENIED, and that, in view of the application involved in Case No. 84-0909 having been withdrawn, that that case be CLOSED. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of August, 1985 in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of August, 1985.
The Issue Whether Certificate of Need (CON) Application No. 9992, filed by Sun City Hospital, Inc., d/b/a South Bay Hospital to establish a 112-bed replacement hospital in Riverview, Hillsborough County, Florida, satisfies, on balance, the applicable statutory and rule review criteria for approval.
Findings Of Fact The Parties A. South Bay South Bay is a 112-bed general acute care hospital located at 4016 Sun City Center Boulevard, Sun City Center, Florida. It has served south Hillsborough County from that location since its original construction in 1982. South Bay is a wholly-owned for-profit subsidiary of Hospital Corporation of America, Inc. (HCA), a for-profit corporation. South Bay's service area includes the immediate vicinity of Sun City Center, the communities of Ruskin and Wimauma (to the west and east of Sun City Center, respectively), and the communities of Riverview, Gibsonton, and Apollo Beach to the north. See FOF 68-72. South Bay is located on the western edge of Sun City Center. The Sun City Center area is comprised of the age- restricted communities of Sun City Center, Kings Point, Freedom Plaza, and numerous nearby senior living complexes, assisted- living facilities, and nursing homes. This area geographically comprises the developed area along the north side of State Road (SR) 674 between I–75 and U.S. Highway 301, north to 19th Avenue and south to the Little Manatee River. South Bay predominantly serves the residents of the Sun City Center area. In 2009, Sun City Center residents comprised approximately 57% of all discharges from SB. South Bay had approximately 72% market share in Sun City Center zip code 33573. (Approximately 32% of all market service area discharges came from zip code 33573.) South Bay provides educational programs at the hospital that are well–attended by community residents. South Bay provides comprehensive acute care services typical of a small to mid-sized community hospital, including emergency services, surgery, diagnostic imaging, non-invasive cardiology services, and endoscopy. It does not provide diagnostic or therapeutic cardiac catheterization or open-heart surgery. Patients requiring interventional cardiology services or open-heart surgery are taken directly by Hillsborough County Fire Rescue or other transport to a hospital providing those services, such as Brandon Regional Hospital (Brandon) or SJH, or are transferred from SB to one of those hospitals. South Bay has received a number of specialty accreditations, which include accreditation by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), specialty accreditation as an advanced primary stroke center, and specialty accreditation by the Society for Chest Pain. South Bay has also received recognition for its quality of care and, in particular, for surgical infection prevention and outstanding services relating to heart attack, heart failure, and pneumonia. South Bay's 112 licensed beds comprise 104 general medical-surgical beds and eight Intensive Care Unit (ICU) beds. Of the general medical-surgical beds, 64 are in semi-private rooms, where two patient beds are situated side-by-side, separated by a curtain. Forty-eight are in private rooms. Semi- private rooms present challenges in terms of infection control and patient privacy, and are no longer the standard of care in hospital design and construction. Over the years, SB has upgraded its hospital physical plant to accommodate new medical technology, including an MRI suite and state-of-the-art telemetry equipment. South Bay is implementing automated dispensing cabinets on patient floors for storage of medications and an electronic medication administration record system that provides an extra safety measure for dispensing medications. Since 2009, SB has implemented numerous programmatic initiatives that have improved the quality of care. South Bay is converting one wing of the hospital to an orthopedic unit. In 2001, South Bay completed a major expansion of its ED and support spaces, but has not added new beds. Patients presenting to the ED have received high quality of care and timely care. Since 2009, SB has improved its systems of care and triage of patients in the ED to improve patient flow and reduce ED wait times. Overall, South Bay has a reputation of providing high- quality care in a timely manner, notwithstanding problems with its physical plant and location. South Bay's utilization has been high historically. From 2006 to 2009, SB's average occupancy has been 79.5%, 80.3%, 77.2%, and 77.7%, respectively. Its number of patient discharges also increased in that time, from 6,190 in 2006 to 6,540 in 2009, at an average annual rate increase of 1.9%. (From late November until May, the seasonal months, utilization is very high, sometimes at 100% or greater.) Despite its relatively high utilization, SB has also had marginal financial results historically. It lost money in 2005 and 2007, with operating losses of $644,259 in 2005 and $1,151,496 in 2007 and bottom-line net losses of $447,957 (2005) and $698,305 (2007). The hospital had a significantly better year in 2009, with an operating gain of $3,365,113 and a bottom- line net profit of $2,144,292. However, this was achieved largely due to a reduction in bad debt from $11,927,320 in 2008 to $7,772,889 in 2009, an event the hospital does not expect to repeat, and a coincidence of high surgical volume. Its 2010 financial results were lagging behind those of 2009 at the time of the hearing. South Bay's 2009 results amount to an aberration, and it is likely that 2010 would be considerably less profitable. South Bay's marginal financial performance is due, in part, to its disproportionate share of Medicare patients and a disproportionate percentage of Medicare reimbursement in its payor mix. Medicare reimburses hospitals at a significantly lower rate than managed care payors. As noted, SB is organizationally a part of HCA's West Florida Division, and is one of two HCA-affiliated hospitals in Hillsborough County; Brandon is the other. (There are approximately 16 hospitals in this division.) Brandon has been able to add beds over the past several years, and its services include interventional cardiology and open-heart surgery. However, SB and Brandon combined still have fewer licensed beds than either St. Joseph's Hospital or Tampa General Hospital, and fewer than the BayCare Health System- affiliated hospitals in Hillsborough in total. South Bay's existing physical plant is undersized and outdated. See discussion below. Whether it has a meaningful opportunity for expansion and renovation at its 17.5-acre site is a question for this proceeding to resolve. South Bay proposes the replacement and relocation of its facility to the community of Riverview. In 2005, SB planned to establish an 80-bed satellite hospital in Riverview, on a parcel owned by HCA and located on the north side of Big Bend Road between I-75 and U.S. Highway 301. SB filed CON Application No. 9834 in the February 2005 batching cycle. The application was preliminarily denied by AHCA, and SB initially contested AHCA's determination. South Bay pursued the satellite hospital CON at that time because of limited availability of intercompany financing from HCA. By the time of the August 2007 batching cycle, intercompany financing had improved, allowing SB to pursue the bigger project of replacing and relocating the hospital. South Bay dismissed its petition for formal administrative hearing, allowing AHCA's preliminary denial of CON Application No. 9834 to become final, and filed CON Application No. 9992 to establish a replacement hospital facility on Big Bend Road in Riverview. St. Joseph's Hospital St. Joseph's Hospital was founded by the Franciscan Sisters of Allegany, New York, as a small hospital in a converted house in downtown Tampa in 1934. In 1967, SJH opened its existing main hospital facility on Martin Luther King Avenue in Tampa, Florida. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., a not-for-profit entity, is the licensee of St. Joseph's Hospital, an acute care hospital located at 3001 West Martin Luther King, Jr., Boulevard, Tampa, Florida. As a not-for-profit organization, SJH's mission is to improve the health care of the community by providing high- quality compassionate care. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., is a Medicaid disproportionate share provider and provided $145 million in charity and uncompensated care in 2009. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., is licensed to operate approximately 883 beds, including acute care beds; Level II and Level III neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) beds; and adult and child-adolescent psychiatric beds. The majority of beds are semi-private. Services include Level II and pediatric trauma services, angioplasty, and open-heart surgery. These beds and services are distributed among SJH's main campus; St. Joseph's Women's Hospital; St. Joseph's Hospital North, a newer satellite hospital in north Tampa; and St. Joseph's Children's Hospital. Except for St. Joseph's Hospital North, these facilities are land-locked. Nevertheless, SJH has continued to invest in its physical plant and to upgrade its medical technology and equipment. In February 2010, SJH opened St. Joseph's Hospital North, a state-of-the-art, 76-bed satellite hospital in Lutz, north Hillsborough County, at a cost of approximately $225 million. This facility is approximately 14 miles away from the main campus. This followed the award of CON No. 9610 to SJH for the establishment of St. Joseph's Hospital North, which was unsuccessfully opposed by University Community Hospital and Tampa General Hospital, two existing hospital providers in Tampa. Univ. Cmty. Hosp., Inc., d/b/a Univ. Cmty. Hosp. v. Agency for Health Care Admin., Case Nos. 03-0337CON and 03-0338CON. St. Joseph's Hospital North operates under the same license and under common management. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., is also the holder of CON No. 9833 for the establishment of a 90-bed state-of-the-art satellite hospital on Big Bend Road, Riverview, Hillsborough County. These all private beds include general medical-surgical beds, an ICU, and a 10-bed obstetrical unit. On October 21, 2009, the Agency revised CON No. 9833 with a termination date of October 21, 2012. This project was unsuccessfully opposed by TG, SB, and Brandon. St. Joseph's Hosp., Inc. v. Agency for Health Care Admin., Case No. 05-2754CON, supra. St. Joseph's Hospital anticipates construction beginning in October 2012 and opening the satellite hospital, to be known as St. Joseph's Hospital South, in early 2015. This hospital will be operating under SJH's existing license and Medicare and Medicaid provider numbers and will in all respects be an integral component of SJH. The implementation of St. Joseph's Hospital South is underway. SJH has contracted with consultants, engineers, architects, and contractors and has funded the first phase of the project with $6 million, a portion of which has been spent. The application for CON No. 9833 refers to "evidence- based design" and the construction of a state-of-the-art facility. (The design of St. Joseph's Hospital North also uses "evidence-based design.") St. Joseph's Hospital South will have all private rooms, general surgery operating rooms as well as endoscopy, and a 10-bed obstetrics unit. Although CON No. 9833 is for a project involving 228,810 square feet of new construction, SJH intends to build a much larger facility, approximately 400,000 square feet on approximately 70 acres. St. Joseph's Hospital Main's physical plant is 43 years old. The majority of the patient rooms are semi–private and about 35% of patients admitted at this hospital received private rooms. Notwithstanding the age of its physical plant and its semi–private bed configuration, SJH has a reputation of providing high quality of care and is a strong competitor in its market. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., has two facility expansions currently in progress at its main location in Tampa: a new five-story building that will house SJH neonatal intensive care unit, obstetrical, and gynecology services; and a separate, two-story addition with 52 private patient rooms. Of the 52 private patient rooms, 26 will be dedicated to patients recovering from orthopedic surgery, and will be large enough to allow physical therapy to be done in the patient room itself. The other 26 rooms will be new medical-surgical ICU beds at the hospital. At the same time that SJH expands its main location, it is pursuing a strategic plan whereby the main location is the "hub" of its system, with community hospitals and health facilities located in outlying communities. As proposed in CON Application No. 9610, St. Joseph's Hospital North was to be 240,000 square feet in size. Following the award of CON No. 9610, SJH requested that AHCA modify the CON to provide for construction of a larger facility. In its modification request, SJH requested to establish a large, state- of-the-art facility with all private patient rooms, and the desirability of private patient rooms as a matter of infection control and patient preference. AHCA granted the modification. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., thereafter planned to construct St. Joseph's Hospital North to be four stories in height. The plan was opposed. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., offered to construct a three-story building, large enough horizontally to accommodate the CON square footage modification. The offer was accepted. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., markets St. Joseph's Hospital North as "The Hospital of the Future, Today." The hospital was constructed using "evidence-based design" to maximize operational efficiencies and enhance the healing process of its residents –- recognizing, among other things, the role of the patient's family and friends. The facility's patient care units are all state-of-the-art and include, for example, obstetrical suites in which a visiting family member can spend the night. A spacious, sunlit atrium and a "healing garden" are also provided. The hospital's dining facility is frequented by community residents. In addition, SJH owns a physician group practice under HealthPoint Medical Group, a subsidiary of St. Joseph's Health Care Center, Inc. The group practice has approximately 19 different office locations, including several within the service area for the proposed hospital. The group includes approximately 106 physicians. However, most of the office locations are in Tampa, and the group does not have an office in Riverview, although there are plans to expand locations to include the Big Bend Road site. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., anticipates having to establish a new medical staff for St. Joseph's Hospital South, and will build a medical office building at the site for the purpose of attracting physicians. It further anticipates that some number of physicians on SB's existing medical staff will apply for privileges at St. Joseph's Hospital South. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., is the market leader among Hillsborough County hospitals and is currently doing well financially, as it has historically. For 2010, St. Joseph's Hospital Main's operating income was approximately $78 million. Organizationally, SJH has a parent organization, St. Joseph's Health Care Center, Inc., and is one of eight hospitals in the greater Tampa Bay area affiliated with BayCare. On behalf of its member hospitals, BayCare arranges financing for capital projects, provides support for various administrative functions, and negotiates managed care contracts that cover its members as a group. St. Joseph's Hospital characterizes fees paid for BayCare services as an allocation of expenses rather than a management fee for its services. In 2009, SJH paid BayCare approximately $42 million for services. St. Joseph's Hospital is one of three BayCare affiliates in Hillsborough County. The other two are St. Joseph's Hospital North and South Florida Baptist Hospital, a community hospital in Plant City. St. Joseph's Hospital South would be the fourth BayCare hospital in the county. Tampa General The Hillsborough County Hospital Authority, a public body appointed by the county, operated Tampa General Hospital until 1997. In that year, TG was leased to Florida Health Sciences Center, Inc., a non-profit corporation and the current hospital licensee. Tampa General is a 1,018-bed acute care hospital located at 2 Columbia Drive, Davis Island, Tampa, Florida. In addition to trauma surgery services, TG provides tertiary services, such as angioplasty, open-heart surgery, and organ transplantation. Tampa General operates the only burn center in the area. A rehabilitation hospital is connected to the main hospital, but there are plans to relocate this facility. Tampa General owns a medical office building. Tampa General is JCAHO accredited and has received numerous honors. Tampa General provides high-quality of care. Approximately half of the beds at TG are private rooms. Tampa General's service area for non-tertiary services includes all of Hillsborough County. Tampa General is also the teaching hospital for the University of South Florida's College of Medicine. As a statutory teaching hospital, TG has 550 residents and funds over 300 postgraduate physicians in training. Tampa General is the predominant provider of services to Medicaid recipients and the medically indigent of Hillsborough County. It is considered the only safety-net hospital in Hillsborough County. (A safety net hospital provides a disproportionate amount of care to indigent and underinsured patients in comparison to other hospitals.) A high volume of indigent (Medicaid and charity) patients are discharged from TG. In 2009, the costs TG incurred treating indigent patients exceeded reimbursement by $56.5 million. Approximately 33% of Tampa General's patients are Medicare patients and 25% commercial. Tampa General has grown in the past 10 years. It added 31 licensed acute care beds in 2004 and 82 more since SB's application was filed in 2007. In addition, the Bayshore Pavilion, a $300-million project, was recently completed. The project enlarged TG's ED, and added a new cardiovascular unit, a new neurosciences and trauma center, a new OB-GYN floor, and a new gastrointestinal unit. Facility improvements are generally ongoing. Tampa General's capital budget for 2011 is approximately $100 million. In 2010, TG's operating margin was approximately $43 million and a small operating margin in 2011. AHCA AHCA is the state agency that administers the CON law. Jeff Gregg testified that during his tenure, AHCA has never preliminarily denied a replacement hospital CON application or required consideration of alternatives to a replacement hospital. Mr. Gregg opined that the lack of alternatives or options is a relevant consideration when reviewing a replacement hospital CON application. T 468. The Agency's State Agency Action Report (SAAR) provides reasons for preliminarily approving SB's CON application. During the hearing, Mr. Gregg testified, in part, that the primary reasons for preliminary approval were issues related to quality of care "because the facility represents itself as being unable to expand or adapt significantly to the rapidly changing world of acute care. This is consistent with what [he has] heard about other replacement hospitals." T 413. Mr. Gregg also noted that SB focused on improving access "[a]nd as the years go by, it is reasonable to expect that the population outside of Sun City Center, the immediate Sun City Center area, will steadily increase and improve access for more people, and that's particularly true because this application includes both a freestanding emergency department and a shuttle service for the people in the immediate area. And that was intended to address their concerns based upon the fact that they have had this facility very conveniently located for them in the past at a time when there was little development in the general south Hillsborough area. But the applicant wants to position itself for the expected growth in the future, and we think has made an excellent effort to accommodate the immediate interests of Sun City Center residents with their promises to do the emergency, freestanding emergency department and the shuttle service so that the people will continue to have very comfortable access to the hospital." T 413-14. Mr. Gregg reiterated "that the improvements in quality outweigh any concerns that [the Agency] should have about the replacement and relocation of this facility; that if this facility were to be forced to remain where it is, over time it would be reasonable to expect that quality would diminish." T 435. For AHCA, replacement hospital applications receive the same level of scrutiny as any other acute care hospital applications. T 439-40. South Bay's existing facility and site South Bay is located on the north side of SR 674, an east-west thoroughfare in south Hillsborough County. The area around the hospital is "built out" with predominantly residential development. Sun City Center, an age-restricted (55 and older) retirement community, is located directly across SR 674 from the hospital as well as on the north side of SR 674 to the east of the hospital. Other residential development is immediately to the west of the hospital on the north side of SR 674. See FOF 3-6. Sun City Center is flanked by two north-south arterial roadways, I-75 to the west and U.S. Highway 301 to the east, both of which intersect with SR 674. The community of Ruskin is situated generally around the intersection of SR 674 and U.S. 41, west of I-75. The community of Wimauma is situated along SR 674 just east of U.S. Highway 301. South Bay is located in a three-story building that is well–maintained and in relatively good repair. The facility is well laid out in terms of design as a community hospital. Patients and staff at SB are satisfied with the quality of care and scope of acute care services provided at the hospital. Notwithstanding current space limitations, and problems in the ICU, see FOF 77-82, patients receive a high quality of care. One of the stated reasons for replacement is with respect to SB's request to have all private patient rooms in order to be more competitive with St. Joseph's Hospital South. South Bay's inpatient rooms are located within the original construction. The hospital is approximately 115,800 square feet, or a little over 1,000 square feet per inpatient bed. By comparison, small to mid-sized community hospitals built today are commonly 2,400 square feet per inpatient bed on average. All of SB's patient care units are undersized by today's standards, with the exception of the ED. ICU patients, often not ambulatory, require a higher level of care than other hospital patients. The ICU at SB is not adequate to meet the level of care required by the ICU patient. SB's ICU comprises eight rooms with one bed apiece. Eight beds are not enough. As Dr. Ksaibati put it at hearing: "Right now we have eight and we are always short . . . double . . . the number of beds, that's at least [the] minimum [t]hat I expect we are going to have if we go to a new facility." T 198-99 (emphasis added). The shortage of beds is not the only problem. The size of SB's ICU rooms is too small. (Problems with the ICU have existed at least since 2006.) Inadequate size prohibits separate, adjoining bathrooms. For patients able to leave their beds, therefore, portable bathroom equipment in the ICU room is required. Inadequate size, the presence of furniture, and the presence of equipment in the ICU room creates serious quality of care issues. When an EKG is conducted, the nurse cannot be present in the room. Otherwise, there would be no space for the EKG equipment. It is difficult to intubate a patient and, at times, "extremely dangerous." T 170. A major concern is when a life-threatening problem occurs that requires emergency treatment at the ICU patient's bedside. For example, when a cardiac arrest "code" is called, furniture and the portable bathroom equipment must be removed before emergency cardiac staff and equipment necessary to restore the function of the patient's heart can reach the patient for the commencement of treatment. Comparison to ICU rooms at other facilities underscores the inadequate size of SB's ICU rooms. Many of the ICU rooms at Brandon are much larger -- more than twice the size of SB's ICU rooms. Support spaces are inadequate in most areas, resulting in corridors (at times) being used for inappropriate storage. In addition, the hospital's general storage is inadequate, resulting in movable equipment being stored in mechanical and electrical rooms. Of the medical-surgical beds at SB, 48 are private and 64 are semi-private. The current standard in hospital design is for acute care hospitals to have private rooms exclusively. Private patient rooms are superior to semi-private rooms for infection control and patient well-being in general. The patient is spared the disruption and occasional unpleasantness that accompanies sharing a patient room –- for example, another patient's persistent cough or inability to use the toilet (many of SB's semi-private rooms have bedside commodes). Private rooms are generally recognized as promoting quality of care. South Bay's site is approximately 17.5 acres, bordered on all sides by parcels not owned by either SB or by HCA- affiliated entities. The facility is set back from SR 674 by a visitor parking lot. Proceeding clockwise around the facility from the visitor parking lot, there is a small service road on the western edge of the site; two large, adjacent ponds for stormwater retention; the rear parking lot for ED visitors and patients; and another small service road which connects the east side of the site to SR 674, and which is used by ambulances to access the ED. Dedicated parking for SB's employees is absent. A medical office building (MOB), which is not owned by SB, is located to the north of the ED parking lot. The MOB houses SB's Human Resources Department as well as medical offices. Most of SB's specialty physicians have either full or part-time offices in close proximity to SB. Employee parking is not available in the MOB parking lot. Some of SB's employees park in a hospital-owned parking lot to the north of the MOB, and then walk around the MOB to enter the hospital. South Bay's CEO and management employees park on a strip of a gravel lot, which is rented from the Methodist church to the northeast of the hospital's site. In 2007, as part of the CON application to relocate, SB commissioned a site and facility assessment (SFA) of the hospital. The SFA was prepared for the purpose of supporting SB's replacement hospital application and has not been updated since its preparation in 2007. The architects or engineers who prepared the SFA were not asked to evaluate proposed options for expansion or upgrade of SB on-site. However, the SFA concludes that the SB site has been built out to its maximum capacity. On the other hand, the SFA concluded that the existing building systems at SB met codes and standards in force when constructed and are in adequate condition and have the capacity to meet the current needs of the hospital. The report also stated that if SB wanted to substantially expand its physical plant to accommodate future growth, upgrades to some of the existing building systems likely would be required. Notwithstanding these reports and relative costs, expansion of SB at its existing site is not realistic or cost- effective as compared to a replacement hospital. Vertical expansion is complicated by two factors. First, the hospital's original construction in 1982 was done under the former Southern Standard Building Code, which did not contain the "wind-loading" requirements of the present-day Florida Building Code. Any vertical expansion of SB would not only require the new construction to meet current wind-loading requirements, but would also require the original construction to be retrofitted to meet current wind-loading requirements (assuming this was even possible as a structural matter). Second, if vertical expansion were to meet current standards for hospital square footage, the new floor or floors would "overhang" the smaller existing construction, complicating utility connections from the lower floor as well as the placement of structural columns to support the additional load. The alternative (assuming feasibility due to current wind-loading requirements) would be to vertically stack patient care units identical to SB's existing patient care units, thereby perpetuating its undersized and outdated design. Vertical expansion at SB has not been proposed by the Gould Turner Group (Gould Turner), which did a Master Facility Plan for SB in May 2010, but included a new patient bed tower, or by HBE Corporation (HBE). Horizontal expansion of SB is no less complicated. The hospital would more than double in size to meet the modern-day standard of 2,400 square feet per bed, and its site is too small for such expansion. It is apparent that such expansion would displace the visitor parking lot if located to the south of the existing building, and likely have to extend into SR 674 itself. South Bay's architectural consultant expert witness substantiated that replacing SB is justified as an architectural matter, and that the facility cannot be brought up to present-day standards at its existing location. According to Mr. Siconolfi, the overall building at SB is approximately half of the total size that would normally be in place for a new hospital meeting modern codes and industry standards. The more modest expansions offered by Gould Turner and HBE are still problematic, if feasible at all. Moreover, with either proposal, SB would ultimately remain on its existing 17.5-acre site, with few opportunities to expand further. Gould Turner's study was requested by SB's CEO in May 2010, to determine whether and to what extent SB would be able to expand on-site. (Gould Turner was involved with SB's recent ED expansion project area.) The resulting Master Facility Plan essentially proposes building a new patient tower in SB's existing visitor parking lot, to the left and right of the existing main entrance to SB. This would require construction of a new visitor parking lot in whatever space remained in between the new construction and SR 674. The Master Facility Plan contains no discussion of the new impervious area that would be added to the site and the consequential requirement of additional stormwater capacity, assuming the site can even accommodate additional stormwater capacity. This study also included a new 12-bed ICU and the existing ICU would be renovated into private patient rooms. For example, "[t]he second floor would be all telemetry beds while the third floor would be a combination of medical/surgical, PCU, and telemetry beds." In Gould Turner's drawings, the construction itself would be to the left and to the right of the hospital's existing main entrance. Two scenarios are proposed: in the first, the hospital's existing semi-private rooms would become private rooms and, with the new construction, the hospital would have 114 licensed beds (including two new beds), all private; in the second, some of the hospital's existing semi-private rooms would become private rooms and, with the new construction, the hospital would have 146 licensed beds (adding 34 beds), of which 32 would be semi-private. South Bay did not consider Gould Turner's alternative further or request additional, more detailed drawings or analysis, and instead determined to pursue the replacement hospital project, in part, because it was better not to "piecemeal" the hospital together. Mr. Miller, who is responsible for strategic decisions regarding SB, was aware of, but did not review the Master Facility Plan and believes that it is not economically feasible to expand the hospital. St. Joseph's Hospital presented testimony of an architect representing the hospital design/build firm of HBE, to evaluate SB's current condition, to provide options for expansion and upgrading on-site, and to provide a professional cost estimate for the expansion. Mr. Oliver personally inspected SB's site and facility in October 2010 and reviewed numerous reports regarding the facility and other documents. Mr. Oliver performed an analysis of SB's existing physical plant and land surrounding the hospital. HBE's analysis concluded that SB has the option to expand and upgrade on-site, including the construction of a modern surgical suite, a modern 10-bed ICU, additional elevators, and expansion and upgrading of the ancillary support spaces identified by SB as less than ideal. HBE's proposal involves the addition of 50,000 square feet of space to the hospital through the construction of a three-story patient tower at the south side of the hospital. The additional square footage included in the HBE proposal would allow the hospital to convert to an all-private bed configuration with either 126 private beds by building out both second and third floors of a new patient tower, or to 126 private beds if the hospital chose to "shell in" the third floor for future expansion. Under the HBE proposal, SB would have the option to increase its licensed bed capacity 158 beds by completing the second and third floors of the new patient tower (all private rooms) while maintaining the mix of semi-private and private patient rooms in the existing bed tower. The HBE proposal also provides for a phased renovation of the interior of SB to allow for an expanded post-anesthesia care unit, expanded laboratory, pharmacy, endoscopy, women's center, prep/hold/recovery areas, central sterile supply and distribution, expanded dining, and a new covered lobby entrance to the left side of the hospital. Phasing of the expansion would permit the hospital to remain in operation during expansion and renovation with minimal disruption. During construction the north entrance of the hospital would provide access through the waiting rooms that are currently part of the 2001 renovated area of the hospital with direct access to the circulation patterns of the hospital. The HBE proposal also provides for the addition of parking to bring the number of parking spaces on-site to 400. The HBE proposal includes additional stormwater retention/detention areas that could serve as attractive water features and, similar to the earlier civil engineering reports obtained by SB, proposes the construction of a parking garage at the rear of the facility should additional parking be needed in the future. However, HBE essentially proposes the alternative already rejected by SB: construction of a new patient tower in front of the existing hospital. Similar to Gould Turner, HBE proposes new construction to the left and right of the hospital's existing lobby entrance and the other changes described above. HBE's proposal recognizes the need for additional stormwater retention: the stand of trees that sets off the existing visitor parking lot from SR 674 would be uprooted; in their place, a retention pond would be constructed. Approval of the Southwest Florida Water Management District (SWFWMD) would be required for the proposal to be feasible. Assuming the SWFWMD approved the proposal, the retention pond would have to be enclosed by a fence. This would then be the "face" of the hospital to the public on SR 674. HBE's proposal poses significant problems. The first floor of the three-story component would be flush against the exterior wall of the hospital's administrative offices, where the CEO and others currently have windows with a vista of the front parking lot and SR 674. Since the three-story component would be constructed first in the "phased" construction, and since the hospital's administration has no other place to work in the existing facility, the CEO and other management team would have to work off-site until the new administrative offices (to the left of the existing hospital lobby entrance) were constructed. The existing main entrance to the hospital, which faces SR 674, would be relocated to the west side of the hospital once construction was completed in its entirety. In the interim, patients and visitors would have to enter the facility from the rear, as the existing main entrance would be inaccessible. This would be for a period of months, if not longer. For the second and third floors, HBE's proposal poses two scenarios. Under the first, SB would build the 24 general medical-surgical beds on the tower's second floor, but leave the third floor as "shelled" space. This would leave SB with a total of 106 licensed beds, six fewer than it has at present. Further, since HBE's proposal involves a second ICU at SB, 18 of the 106 beds are ICU beds, leaving 88 general medical-surgical beds. By comparison, SB currently has 104 general medical- surgical beds, meaning that it loses 16 general medical-surgical beds under HBE's first scenario. In the second scenario, SB would build 24 general medical-surgical beds on the third floor as well, and would have a total of 126 licensed beds. Since 18 of those beds would be ICU beds, SB would have 108 general medical-surgical beds, or only four more than it has at present. Further, the proposal does not make SB appreciably bigger. The second and third floors in HBE's proposal are designed in "elongated" fashion such that several rooms may be obscured from the nursing station's line of sight by a new elevator, which is undesirable as a matter of patient safety and security. Further, construction of the second and third floors would be against the existing second and third floors above the lobby entrance's east side. This would require 12 existing private patient rooms to be taken out of service due to loss of their vista windows. At the same time, the new second and third floors would be parallel to, but set back from, existing semi- private patient rooms and their vista windows along the southeast side of the hospital. This means that patients and visitors in the existing semi-private patient rooms and patients and visitors in the new private patient rooms on the north side of the new construction may be looking into each other's rooms. HBE's proposal also involves reorganization and renovation of SB's existing facility, and the demolition and disruption that goes with it. To accommodate patient circulation within the existing facility from the ED (at the north side of the hospital) to the new patient tower (at the south side of the hospital), two new corridors are proposed to be routed through and displace the existing departments of Data Processing and Medical Records. Thus, until the new administrative office space would be constructed, Data Processing and Medical Records (along with the management team) would have to be relocated off-site. Once the new first floor of the three-story component is completed, the hospital's four ORs and six PACU beds will be relocated there. In the existing vacated surgical space, HBE proposes to relocate SB's existing cardiology unit, thus requiring the vacated surgical space to be completely reconfigured (building a nursing station and support spaces that do not currently exist in that location). In the space vacated by the existing cardiology unit, HBE proposed expanding the hospital's clinical laboratory, meaning extensive demolition and reconfiguration in that area. The pharmacy is proposed to be relocated to where the existing PACU is located, requiring the building of a new pharmacy with a secure area for controlled substances, cabinets for other medications, and the like. The vacated existing pharmacy is in turn proposed to be dedicated to general storage, which involves still more construction and demolition, tearing out the old pharmacy to make the space suitable for general storage. HBE's proposal is described as a "substantial upgrade" of SB, but it was stated that a substantial upgrade could likewise be achieved by replacing the facility outright. This is SB's preference, which is not unreasonable. There have been documented problems with other hospital expansions, including patient infection due to construction dust. South Bay's proposal South Bay proposes to establish a 112-bed replacement hospital on a 39-acre parcel (acquired in 2005) located in the Riverview community, on the north side of Big Bend Road between I-75 and U.S. Highway 301. The hospital is designed to include 32 observation beds built to acute care occupancy standards, to be available for conversion to licensed acute care beds should the need arise. The original total project cost of $215,641,934, calculated when the application was filed in October 2007 has been revised to $192,967,399. The decrease in total project cost is largely due to the decrease in construction costs since 2007. The parties stipulated that SB's estimated construction costs are reasonable. The remainder of the project budget is likewise reasonable. The budgeted number for land, $9,400,000, is more than SB needs: the 39-acre parcel is held in its behalf by HCA Services of Florida, Inc., and was acquired in March 2005 for $7,823,100. An environmental study has been done, and the site has no environmental development issues. The original site preparation budgeted number of $5 million has been increased to $7 million to allow for possible impact fees, based on HCA's experience with similar projects. Building costs, other than construction cost, flow from the construction cost number as a matter of percentages and are reasonable. The equipment costs are reasonable. Construction period interest as revised from the original project budget is approximately $4 million less, commensurate with the revised project cost. Other smaller numbers in the budget, such as contingencies and start-up costs, were calculated in the usual and accepted manner for estimated project costs and are reasonable. South Bay's proposed service area (PSA) comprises six zip codes (33573 (Sun City Center), 33570 (Ruskin), 33569 (Riverview), 33598 (Wimauma), 33572 (Apollo Beach), and 33534 (Gibsonton)) in South Hillsborough County. These six zip codes accounted for 92.2% of SB's discharges in 2006. The first three zip codes, which include Riverview (33569), accounted for 76.1% of the discharges. Following the filing of the application in 2007, the U.S. Postal Service subdivided the former zip code 33569 into three zip codes: 33569, 33578, and 33579. (The proposed service area consists of eight zip codes.) The same geographic area comprises the three Riverview zip codes taken together as the former zip code 33569. In 2009, the three Riverview zip codes combined accounted for approximately 504 to 511/514 of SB's discharges, with 589 discharges in 2006 from the zip code 33569. Of SB's total discharges in 2009, approximately 8 to 9% originated from these three zip codes. In 2009, approximately 7,398 out of 14,424 market/service-area discharges, or approximately 51% of the total market discharges came from the three southern zip codes, 33573 (Sun City Center), 33570 (Ruskin), and 33598 (Wimauma). Also, approximately 81% of SB's discharges in 2009 originated from the same three zip codes. (The discharge numbers for SB for 2009 presented by St. Joseph's Hospital and SB are similar. See SB Ex. 9 at 11 and SJH Ex. 4 at 8-9. See also TG Ex. 4 at 3-4.) In 2009, SB and Brandon had an approximate 68% market share for the eight zip codes. See FOF 152-54 and 162-65 for additional demographic data. St. Joseph's Hospital had an approximate 5% market share within the service area and using 2009-2010 data, TG had approximately 6% market share in zip code 33573 and an overall market share in the three Riverview zip codes of approximately 19% and a market share of approximately 23% in zip code 33579. South Bay's application projects 37,292 patient days in year 1; 39,581 patient days in year 2; and 41,563 patient days in year 3 for the proposed replacement hospital. The projection was based on the January 2007 population for the service area as reflected in the application, and what was then a projected population growth rate of 20.8% for the five-year period 2007 to 2012. These projections were updated for the purposes of hearing. See FOF 246-7. The application also noted a downturn in the housing market, which began in 2007 and has continued since then. The application projected a five-year (2007-2012) change of 20.8% for the original five zip codes. At hearing, SB introduced updated utilization projections for 2010-2015, which show the service area population growing at 15.3% for that five-year period. South Bay's revised utilization projections for 2015- 2017 (projected years 1-3 of the replacement hospital) are 28,168 patient days in year 1; 28,569 patient days in year 2; and 29,582 patient days in year 3. The lesser utilization as compared with SB's original projections is partly due to slowed population growth, but predominantly due to SB's assumption that St. Joseph's Hospital will build its proposed satellite hospital in Riverview, and that SB will accordingly lose 20% of its market share. The revised utilization projections are conservative, reasonable, and achievable. With the relocation, SB will be more proximate to the entirety of its service area, and will be toward the center of population growth in south Hillsborough County. In addition, it will have a more viable and more sustainable hospital operation even with the reduced market share. Its financial projections reflect a better payor mix and profitability in the proposed location despite the projection of fewer patient days. Conversely, if SB remains in Sun City Center, it is subject to material operating losses even if its lost market share in that location is the same 20%, as compared to the 30 to 40% it estimates that it would lose in competition with St. Joseph's Hospital South. South Bay's medical staff and employees support the replacement facility, notwithstanding that their satisfaction with SB is very high. The proposal is also supported by various business organizations, including the Riverview Chamber of Commerce and Ruskin Chamber of Commerce. However, many of the residents of Sun City Center who testified opposed relocation of SB. See FOF 210-11. South Bay will accept several preconditions on approval of its CON application: (1) the location of SB on Big Bend Road in Riverview; (2) combined Medicaid and charity care equal to 7.0% of gross revenues; and (3) operating a free- standing ED at the Sun City location and providing a shuttle service between the Sun City location and the new hospital campus ("for patients and visitors"). SB Ex. 46, Schedule C. In its SAAR, the Agency preliminarily approved the application including the following: This approval includes, as a component of the proposal: the operation of a freestanding emergency department on a 24-hour, seven-day per week basis at the current Sun City location, the provision of extended hours shuttle service between the existing Sun City Center and the new campuses to transport patients and visitors between the facilities to locations; and the offering of primary care and diagnostic testing at the Sun City Center location. These components are required services to be provided by the replacement hospital as approved by the Agency. Mr. Gregg explained that the requirement for transport of patients and visitors was included based on his understanding of the concerns of the Sun City Center community for emergency as well as routine access to hospital services. Notwithstanding the Agency statement that the foregoing elements are required, the Agency did not condition approval on the described elements. See SB Ex. 12 at 39 and 67. Instead, the Agency only required SB, as a condition of approval, to provide a minimum of 7.0% of the hospital's patient days to Medicaid and charity care patients. (As noted above, SB's proposed condition says 7.0% of gross revenues.) Because conditions on approval of the CON are generally subject to modification, there would be no legal mechanism for monitoring or enforcement of the aspects of the project not made a condition of approval. If the Agency approves SB's CON application, the Agency should condition any approval based on the conditions referenced above, which SB set forth in its CON application. SB Ex. 12 at 39 and 67. See also T 450 ("[The Agency] can take any statement made in the application and turn that into a condition," although conditions may be modified.1 St. Joseph's Hospital and Tampa General are critical of SB's offer of a freestanding ED and proposed shuttle transportation services. Other than agreeing to condition its CON application by offering these services, SB has not evaluated the manner in which these services would be offered. South Bay envisions that the shuttle service (provided without charge) would be more for visitors than it would be for patients and for outpatients or patients that are ambulatory and able to ride by shuttle. Other patients would be expected to be transported by EMS or other medical transport. As of the date of hearing, Hillsborough County does not have a protocol to address the transport of patients to a freestanding ED. South Bay contacted Hillsborough County Fire Rescue prior to filing its CON application and was advised that they would support SB's establishment of a satellite hospital on Big Bend Road, but did not support the closure and relocation of SB, even with a freestanding ED left behind. See FOF 195-207. At hearing, SB representatives stated that SB would not be closed if the project is denied. Compliance with applicable statutory and rule criteria Section 408.035(1): The need for the health care facilities and health services being proposed The need for SB itself and at its current location is not an issue in this case. That need was demonstrated years ago, when SB was initially approved. For the Agency, consideration of a replacement hospital application "diminishes the concept of need in [the Agency's] weighing and balancing of criteria in this case." There is no express language in the CON law, as amended, which indicates that CON review of a replacement hospital application does not require consideration of other statutory review criteria, including "need," unless otherwise stipulated. Replacement hospital applicants, like SB, may advocate the need for replacement rather than expansion or renovation of the existing hospital, but a showing of "need" is still required. Nevertheless, institution-specific factors may be relevant when "need" is considered. The determination of "need" for SB's relocation involves an analysis of whether the relocation of the hospital as proposed will enhance access or quality of care, and whether the relocation may result in changes in the health care delivery system that may adversely impact the community, as well as options SB may have for expansion or upgrading on-site. In this case, the overall "need" for the project is resolved, in part, by considering, in conjunction with weighing and balancing other statutory criteria, including quality of care, whether the institution-specific needs of SB to replace the existing hospital are more reasonable than other alternatives, including renovation and whether, if replacement is recommended, the residents of the service area, including the Sun City Center area, will retain reasonable access to general acute care hospital services. The overall need for the project has not been proven. See COL 360-70 for ultimate conclusions of law regarding the need for this project. Section 408.035(2): The availability, quality of care, accessibility, and extent of utilization of existing health care facilities and health services in the service district of the applicant The "service district" in this case is acute care subdistrict 6-1, Hillsborough County. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C-2.100. The acute care hospital services SB proposes to relocate to Big Bend Road are available to residents of SB's service area. Except as otherwise noted herein with respect to constraints at SB, there are no capacity constraints limiting access to acute care hospital services in the subdistrict. The availability of acute care services for residents of the service area, and specifically the Riverview area, will increase with the opening of St. Joseph's Hospital South. All existing providers serving the service area provide high quality of care. Within the service district as a whole, SB proposes to relocate the existing hospital approximately 5.7 linear miles north of its current location and approximately 7.7 miles using I-75, one exit north. South Bay would remain in south Hillsborough County, as well as the southernmost existing health care facility in Hillsborough County, along with St. Joseph's Hospital South when it is constructed. The eight zip codes of SB's proposed service area occupy a large area of south Hillsborough County south of Tampa (to the northwest) and Brandon (to the northeast). Included are the communities of Gibsonton, Riverview, Apollo Beach, Ruskin, Sun City Center, and Wimauma. The service area is still growing despite the housing downturn, with a forecast of 15.3% growth for the five-year period 2010 to 2015. The service area's population is projected to be 168,344 in 2015, increasing from 145,986 in 2010. The service area is currently served primarily by SB, which is the only existing provider in the service area, and Brandon. For non-tertiary, non-specialty discharges from the service area in 2009, SB had approximately 40% market share, including market share in the three Riverview zip codes of approximately 10% (33569), 6% (33578), and 16% (33579). Brandon had approximately 28% of the market in the service area, and a market share in the three Riverview zip codes of approximately 58% (33569), 46% (33578), and 40% (33579). Thus, SB and Brandon have approximately a 61% market share in the Riverview zip codes and approximately a 68% market share service area-wide. The persuasive evidence indicates that Riverview is the center of present and future population in the service area. It is the fastest-growing part of the service area overall and the fastest-growing part of the service area for patients age 65 and over. Of the projected 168,334 residents in 2015, the three Riverview zip codes account for 80,779 or nearly half the total population. With its proposed relocation to Riverview, SB will be situated in the most populous and fastest-growing part of south Hillsborough County. At the same time, it will be between seven and eight minutes farther away from Sun City Center. In conjunction with St. Joseph's Hospital South when constructed, SB's proposed relocation will enhance the availability and accessibility of existing health care facilities and health services in south Hillsborough County, especially for the Riverview-area residents. However, it is likely that access will be reduced for the elderly residents of the Sun City Center area needing general acute care hospital services. St. Joseph's Hospital and Tampa General contend that: (1) it would be problematic to locate two hospitals in close proximity in Riverview (those being St. Joseph's Hospital South and the relocated SB hospital) and (2) SB's relocation would deprive Sun City Center's elderly of reasonable access to hospital services. St. Joseph's Hospital seems to agree that the utilization projections for SB's replacement hospital are reasonable. Also, St. Joseph's Hospital expects St. Joseph's Hospital South to reach its utilization as projected in CON Application No. 9833, notwithstanding the decline in population growth and the proposed establishment of SB's proposed replacement hospital, although the achievement of projected utilization may be extended. There are examples of Florida hospitals operating successfully in close proximity. The evidence at hearing included examples where existing unaffiliated acute care hospitals in Florida operate within three miles of each another; in two of those, the two hospitals are less than one-half mile apart. These hospitals have been in operation for years. However, some or all of the examples preceded CON review. There are also demographic differences and other unique factors in the service areas in the five examples that could explain the close proximity of the hospitals. Also, in three of the five examples, at least one of the hospitals had an operating loss and most appeared underutilized. One such example, however, is pertinent in this case: Tallahassee Memorial Hospital and Capital Regional Medical Center (CRMC) in Tallahassee, which are approximately six minutes apart by car. CRMC was formerly Tallahassee Community Hospital (TCH), a struggling, older facility with a majority of semi-private patient rooms, similar to South Bay. Sharon Roush, SB's current CEO, became CEO at TCH in 1999. As she explained at hearing, HCA was able to successfully replace the facility outright on the same parcel of land. TCH was renamed CRMC and re-opened as a state-of-the-art hospital facility with all private rooms. The transformation improved the hospital's quality of care and its attractiveness to patients, better enabling it to compete with Tallahassee Memorial Hospital. St. Joseph's Hospital and Tampa General also contend that SB's relocation would deprive Sun City Center's elderly of reasonable access to hospital services. When the application was filed in 2007, Sun City Center residents in zip code 33573 accounted for approximately 52% of all acute care discharges to SB and SB had a 69% market share. By 2009, Sun City Center residents accounted for approximately 57% of all SB discharges and SB had approximately 72% market share. Approximately half of the age 65-plus residents in the service area reside within the Sun City Center area. This was true in 2010 and will continue to be true in 2015. The projected percentage of the total population in the Sun City Center zip code over 65 for 2009-2010 is approximately 87%. This percentage is expected to grow to approximately 91% by 2015. Sun City Center also has a high percentage of residents who are over the age of 75. Demand for acute care hospital services is largely driven by the age of the population. The age 65-plus population utilizes acute-care hospital services at a rate that is approximately two to three times that of the age 64 and younger population. South Bay plans to relocate its hospital from the Sun City Center zip code 33573 much closer to an area (Riverview covering three zip codes) that has a less elderly population. Elderly patients are known to have more transportation difficulties than other segments of the population, particularly with respect to night driving and congested traffic in busy areas. Appropriate transportation services for individuals who are transportation disadvantaged typically require door-to- door pickup, but may vary from community to community. At the time of preliminary approval of SB's proposed relocation, the Agency was not provided and did not take into consideration data reflecting the percentage of persons in Sun City Center area who are aged 65 or older or aged 75 and older. The Agency was not provided data reflecting the number of residents within the Sun City Center area who reside in nursing homes or assisted living facilities. In general, the 2010 median household incomes and median home values for the residents of Sun City Center, Ruskin, and Gibsonton are materially less than the income and home values for the residents from the other service areas. Freedom Village is located near Sun City Center and within walking distance to SB. Freedom Village is comprises a nursing home, assisted living, and senior independent living facilities, and includes approximately 120 skilled nursing facility beds, 90 assisted living beds, and 30 Alzheimer's beds. Freedom Village is home to approximately 1,500 people. There are additional skilled nursing and assisted living facilities within one to two miles of SB comprising approximately an additional 400 to 500 skilled nursing facility beds and approximately 1,500 to 2,000 residents in assistant or independent living facilities. Residents in skilled nursing facilities and assisted living facilities generally require a substantial level of acute- care services on an ongoing basis. Many patients 65 and older requiring admission to an acute-care facility have complex medical conditions and co-morbidities such that immediate access to inpatient acute care services is of prime importance. Area patients and caregivers travel to SB via a golf cart to access outpatient health care services and to obtain post-discharge follow-up care. Although there are some crossing points along SR 674, golf carts are not allowed on SR 674 itself, and the majority of Sun City Center residents who utilize SB in its existing location do not arrive by golf cart -– rather, they travel by automobile. The Sun City Center area has a long–established culture of volunteerism. Residents of Sun City Center provide a substantial number of man-hours of volunteer services to community organizations, including SB. Among the many services provided by community volunteers is the Sun City Center Emergency Squad, an emergency medical transport service that operates three ambulances and provides EMT and basic life support transport services in Sun City Center 24-hours a day, seven days a week. The Emergency Squad provides emergency services free of charge, but charges patients for transport which is deemed a non-emergency. Most patients transported by the Emergency Squad are taken to the SB ED. It is customary for specialists to locate their offices adjacent to an acute-care hospital. Most of the specialty physicians on the medical staff of SB have full-time or part-time offices adjacent to SB. The location of physician offices adjacent to the hospital facilitates access to care by patients in the provision of care on a timely basis by physicians. The relocation of SB may result in the relocation of physician offices currently operating adjacent to SB in Sun City Center, which may cause additional access problems for local residents. In 2009, the SB ED had approximately 22,000 patient visits. Approximately 25% of the patients that visit the South Bay ED are admitted for inpatient care. South Bay recently expanded its ED to accommodate approximately 34,000 patient visits annually. The average age of patients who visit the South Bay ED is approximately 70. Patients who travel by ambulance may or may not experience undue transportation difficulties as a result of the proposed relocation of SB; however, patients also arrive at the South Bay ED by private transportation. But, most patients are transported to the ED by automobile or emergency transport. In October 2010, the Board of Directors of the Sun City Center Association adopted a resolution on behalf of its 11,000 members opposing the closure of SB. The Board of Directors and membership of Federation of Kings Point passed a similar resolution on behalf of its members. Residents of the Sun City Center area currently enjoy easy access to SB in part because the roadways are low-volume, low-speed, accessible residential streets. SR 674 is the only east-west roadway connecting residents of the Sun City Center area to I-75 and U.S. Highway 301. The section of SR 674 between I-75 and U.S. Highway 301 is a four-lane divided roadway with a speed limit of 40-45 mph. To access Big Bend Road from the Sun City Center area, residents travel east on SR 674 then north on U.S. Highway 301 or west on SR 674 then north on I-75. U.S. Highway 301 is a two-lane undivided roadway from SR 674 north to Balm Road, with a speed limit of 55 mph and a number of driveways and intersections accessing the roadway. (Two lanes from Balm Road South, then widened to six lanes from Balm Road North.) U.S. Highway 301 is a busy and congested roadway, and there is a significant backup of traffic turning left from U.S. Highway 301 onto Big Bend Road. A portion of U.S. Highway 301 is being widened to six lanes, from Balm Road to Big Bend Road. The widening of this portion of U.S. Highway 301 is not likely to alleviate the backup of traffic at Big Bend Road. I-75 is the only other north-south alternative for residents of the Sun City Center area seeking access to Big Bend Road. I-75 is a busy four-lane interstate with a 70 mph speed limit. The exchange on I-75 and Big Bend Road is problematic not only because of traffic volume, but also because of the unusual design of the interchange, which offloads all traffic on the south side of Big Bend Road, rather than divide traffic to the north and south as is typically done in freeway design. The design of the interchange at I-75 in Big Bend Road creates additional backup and delays for traffic seeking to exit onto Big Bend Road. St. Joseph's Hospital commissioned a travel (drive) time study that compared travel times to SB's existing location and to its proposed location from three intersections within Sun City Center. This showed an increase of between seven and eight minutes' average travel time to get to the proposed location as compared to the existing location of SB. The study corroborated SB's travel time analysis, included in its CON application, which shows four minutes to get to SB from the "centroid" of zip code 33573 (Sun City Center) and 11 minutes to get to SB's proposed location from that centroid, or a difference of seven minutes. The St. Joseph's Hospital travel time study also sets forth the average travel times from the three Sun City Center intersections to Big Bend Road and Simmons Loop, as follows: Intersection Using I-75 Using U.S. 301 South Pebble Beach Blvd. and Weatherford Drive 12 min. 17 secs. 14 min. 19 secs. Kings Blvd. and Manchester Woods Drive 15 min. 44 secs. 20 min. 39 secs. North Pebble Beach Blvd. and Ft. Dusquesna Drive 13 min. 15 secs. 15 min. 41 secs. The average travel time from Wimauma (Center Street and Delia Street) to Big Bend Road and Simmons Loop was 15 minutes and 16 seconds using I-75 and 13 minutes and 52 seconds using U.S. Highway 301, an increase of more than six minutes to the proposed site. The average travel time from Ruskin (7th Street and 4th Avenue SW) to Big Bend Road and Simmons Loop was 15 minutes and 22 seconds using U.S. 41 and 14 minutes and 15 seconds using I-75, an increase of more than five minutes to the proposed site. Currently, the average travel time from Sun City Center to Big Bend Road using U.S. Highway 301 is approximately to 16 minutes. The average travel time to Big Bend Road via I-75 assuming travel with the flow of traffic is approximately 13 minutes. The incremental increase in travel time to the proposed site for SB for residents of the Sun City Center area, assuming travel with the flow of traffic, ranges from nine to 11 minutes. For residents who currently access SB in approximately five to 10 minutes, travel time to Big Bend Road is approximately 15 to 20 minutes. As the area develops, traffic is likely to continue to increase. There are no funded roadway improvements beyond the current widening of U.S. Highway 301 north of Balm Road. Most of the roadways serving Sun City Center, Ruskin, and Wimauma have a county-adopted Level of Service (LOS) of "D." LOS designations range from "A" to "F", with "F" considered gridlock. Currently, Big Bend Road from Simmons Loop Road (the approximate location of SB's propose replacement hospital) to I-75 is at LOS "F" with an average travel speed of less than mph. Based on a conservative analysis of the projected growth in traffic volume, SR 674 east of U.S. Highway 301 is projected to degrade from LOS "C" to "F" by 2015. By 2020, several additional links on SR 674 will have degraded to LOS "F." The LOS of I-75 is expected to drop to "D" in the entirety of Big Bend Road between U.S. Highway 301 and I-75 is projected to degrade to LOS "F" by 2020. The Hillsborough County Fire Rescue Department (Rescue Department) opposes the relocation of SB to Big Bend Road. The Rescue Department supports SB's establishment of a satellite hospital on Big Bend Road, but does not support the closure of SB in Sun City Center. The Rescue Department anticipates that the relocation of SB will result in a reduction in access to emergency services for patients and increased incident response times for the Rescue Department. The Rescue Department would support a freestanding ED should SB relocate. David Travis, formerly (until February 2010) the rescue division chief of the Rescue Department, testified against SB's proposal. The basis of his opposition is his concern that relocating the hospital from Sun City Center to Riverview would tend to increase response times for rescue units operating out of the Sun City Center Fire Station. The term response time refers to the time from dispatch of the rescue unit to its arrival on the scene for a given call. Mr. Travis noted that rescue units responding from the Sun City Center Fire Station would make a longer drive (perhaps seven to eight minutes) to the new location in Riverview to the extent that hospital services are needed, and during the time of transportation would necessarily be unavailable to respond to another call. However, Mr. Travis had not specifically quantified increases in response times for Sun City Center's rescue units in the event that SB relocates. Further, SB is not the sole destination for the Rescue Department's Sun City Center rescue units. While a majority of the patients were transported to SB, out of the total patient transports from the greater Sun City Center area in 2009, approximately one-third went to other hospitals other than SB, including St. Joseph's Hospital, Tampa General, and Brandon. The Rescue Department is the only advanced life support (ALS) ground transport service in the unincorporated areas of Hillsborough County responding to 911 calls. The ALS vehicles provide at least one certified paramedic on the vehicle, cardiac monitors, IV medications, advanced air way equipment, and other services. The Rescue Department has two rescue units in south Hillsborough County - Station 17 in Ruskin and Station 28 in Sun City Center. (Station 22 is in Wimauma, but does not have a rescue unit.) Stations 17 and 28 run the majority of their calls in and around the Sun City Center area, with the majority of transports to the South Bay ED. The Rescue Department had 3,643 transports from the Sun City Center area in 2009, with 54.5% transports to SB. If SB is relocated to Big Bend Road, the rescue units for Stations 17 and 28 are likely to experience longer out-of- service intervals and may not be as readily available for responding to calls in their primary service area. The Rescue Department seeks to place an individual on the scene within approximately seven minutes, 90% of the time (an ALS personnel goal) in the Sun City Center area. Relocation of SB out of Sun City Center may make it difficult for the Rescue Department to meet this response time, notwithstanding the proximity of I-75. A rapid response time is critical to providing quality care. The establishment of a freestanding ED in Sun City Center would not completely alleviate the Rescue Department's concerns, including a subset of patients who may need to be transported to a general acute care facility. There are other licensed emergency medical service providers in Hillsborough County, with at least one basic life support EMS provider in Sun City Center. The shuttle service proposed by SB may not alleviate the transportation difficulties experienced by the patients and caregivers of Sun City Center. Also, SB has not provided a plan for the scope or method of the provisional shuttle services. Six residents of Sun City Center testified against SB's proposed relocation to Riverview, including Ed Barnes, president of the Sun City Center Community Association. Mr. Barnes and two other Sun City Center residents (including Donald Schings, president of the Handicapped Club, Sun City Center) spoke in favor of St. Joseph's Hospital's proposed hospital in Riverview at a public land-use meeting in July 2010, thus demonstrating their willingness to travel to Riverview for hospital services. Mr. Barnes supported St. Joseph's Hospital's proposal for a hospital in Riverview since its inception in 2005, when St. Joseph's Hospital filed CON Application No. 9833 and thought that St. Joseph's Hospital South would serve the Sun City Center area. There are no public transportation services per se available within the Sun City Center area. Volunteer transportation services are provided. In part, the door-to-door services are provided under the auspices of the Samaritan Services, a non-profit organization supported by donations and staffed by Sun City Center volunteers. It is in doubt whether these services would continue if SB is relocated. There is a volunteer emergency squad using a few vehicles that responds to emergency calls within the Sun City Center area, with SB as the most frequent destination. Approval of SB's project will not necessarily enhance financial access to acute care services. The relocation of SB is more likely than not to create some access barriers for low- income residents of the service area. The relocation would also be farther away from communities such as Ruskin and Wimauma as there are no buses or other forms of public transportation available in Ruskin, Sun City Center, or Wimauma. However, it appears that the Sun City Center residents would travel not only to Riverview, but north of Riverview for hospital services following SB's relocation, notwithstanding the fact that Sun City Center residents are transportation- disadvantaged. The Hillsborough County Board of County Commissioners recently amended the Comprehensive Land-Use Plan and adopted the Greater Sun City Center Community Plan, which, in part, lists the retention of an acute care hospital in the Sun City Center area as the highest health care planning priority. For Sun City Center residents who may not want to drive to SB's new location, SB will provide a shuttle bus, which can convey both non-emergency patients and visitors. South Bay has made the provision of the shuttle bus a condition of its CON. As noted herein, the CON's other conditions are the establishment of the replacement hospital at the site in Riverview; combined Medicaid and charity care in the amount of 7.0% of gross revenues; and maintaining a freestanding ED at SB. SB Ex. 46, Schedule C. Section 408.035(3): The ability of the applicant to provide quality of care and the applicant's record of providing quality of care South Bay has a record of providing high quality of care at its existing hospital. It is accredited by JCAHO, and also accredited as a primary stroke center and chest pain center. In the first quarter of 2010, SB scored well on "core measures" used by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) as an indicator of the quality of patient safety. South Bay received recognition for its infection control programs and successfully implemented numerous other quality initiatives. Patient satisfaction is high at SB. AHCA's view of the need for a replacement hospital is not limited according to whether or not the existing hospital meets broad quality indicators, such as JCAHO accreditation. Rather, AHCA recognizes the degree to which quality would be improved by the proposed replacement hospital -– and largely on that basis has consistently approved CON applications for replacement hospitals since at least 1991. See FOF 64-66. South Bay would have a greater ability to provide quality of care in its proposed replacement hospital. Private patient rooms are superior in terms of infection control and the patient's general well-being. The conceptual design for the hospital, included in the CON application, is the same evidence- based design that HCA used for Methodist Stone Oak Hospital, an award-winning, state-of-the-art hospital in San Antonio, Texas. Some rooms at SB are small, but SB staff and physicians are able, for the most part, to function appropriately and provide high quality of care notwithstanding. (The ICU is the exception, although it was said that patients receive quality of care in the ICU. See FOF 77-82.) Most of the rooms in the ED "are good size." Some residents are willing to give up a private room in order to have better access of care and the convenience of care to family members at SB's existing facility. By comparison, the alternative suggested by St. Joseph's Hospital does not use evidence-based design and involves gutting and rearranging roughly one-third of SB's existing interior; depends upon erecting a new patient tower that would require parking and stormwater capacity that SB currently does not have; requires SB's administration to relocate off-site during an indeterminate construction period; and involves estimated project costs that its witnesses did not disclose the basis of, claiming that the information was proprietary. South Bay's physicians are likely to apply for privileges at St. Joseph's Hospital South. Moreover, if SB remains at its current site, it is reasonable to expect that some number of those physicians would do less business at SB or leave the medical staff. Many of SB's physicians have their primary medical offices in Brandon, or otherwise north of Sun City Center. Further, many of the specialists at SB are also on staff at Brandon. St. Joseph's Hospital South would be more convenient for those physicians, in addition to having the allure of a new, state-of-the-art hospital. South Bay is struggling with its nursing vacancy rate, which was 12.3% for 2010 at the time of the hearing and had increased from 9.9% in 2009. The jump in nursing vacancies in 2010 substantially returned the hospital to its 2008 rate, which was 12.4%. As with its physicians, SB's nurses generally do not reside in the Sun City Center area giving its age restrictions as a retirement community; instead, they live further north in south Hillsborough County. In October 2007 when the application was filed, SB had approximately 105 employees who lived in Riverview. It is reasonable to expect that SB's nurses will be attracted to St. Joseph's Hospital South, a new, state-of-the-art hospital closer to where they live. Thus, if it is denied the opportunity to replace and relocate its hospital, SB could also expect to lose nursing staff to St. Joseph's Hospital South, increasing its nursing vacancy rate. Section 408.035(4): The availability of resources, including health personnel, management personnel, and funds for capital and operating expenditures, for project accomplishment and operation The parties stipulated that Schedule 2 of SB's CON application was complete and required no proof at hearing. South Bay will not have to recruit nursing or physician staff for its proposed replacement hospital. Its existing medical and nursing staff would not change, and would effectively "travel" with the hospital to its new location. Conversely, the replacement hospital should enhance SB's ability to recruit specialty physicians, which is currently a challenge for SB in its existing facility. The parties stipulated to the reasonableness of SB's proposed staffing for the replacement hospital as set out in Schedule 6A, but SJH and TG contend that the staffing schedule should also include full-time equivalent positions (FTEs) for the freestanding ED that SB proposes to maintain at its existing hospital. This contention is addressed in the Conclusions of Law, concerning application completeness under section 408.037, at COL 356-57. South Bay has sufficient funds for capital and operating expenditures for project accomplishment and operation. The project cost will be underwritten by HCA, which has adequate cash flow and credit opportunities. It is reasonable that SB's project will be adequately funded if the CON is approved. Section 408.035(5): The extent to which the proposed services will enhance access to health care for residents of the service district The specific area that SB primarily serves, and would continue to serve, is the service area in south Hillsborough County as identified in its application and exhibits. The discussion in section IV.B., supra, is applicable to this criterion and incorporated herein. With its proposed relocation to Riverview, SB will be situated in the most populous and fastest-growing part of south Hillsborough County; will be available to serve Sun City Center, Ruskin, and Wimauma; and will be between seven and eight minutes farther away from Sun City Center than it is at present. However, while the relocated facility will be available to the elderly residents of the Sun City Center area, access for these future patients will be reduced from current levels given the increase in transportation time, whether it be by emergency vehicle or otherwise. Section 408.035(6): The immediate and long-term financial feasibility of the proposal Immediate or "short-term" financial feasibility is the ability of the applicant to secure the funds necessary to capitalize and operate the proposed project. The project cost for SB's proposed replacement hospital is approximately $200 million. The costs associated with the establishment and operation of the freestanding ED and other services were not included in the application, but for the reasons stated herein, were not required to be projected in SB's CON application. South Bay demonstrated the short-term financial feasibility of the proposal. The estimated project cost has declined since the filing of the application in 2007, meaning that SB will require less capital than originally forecast. While Mr. Miller stated that he does not have authority to bind HCA to a $200 million capital project, HCA has indicated that it will provide full financing for the project, and that it will go forward with the project if awarded the CON. Long-term financial feasibility refers to the ability of a proposed project to generate a profit in a reasonable period of time. AHCA has previously approved hospital proposals that showed a net profit in the third year of pro forma operation or later. See generally Cent. Fla. Reg. Hosp., Inc. v. Agency for Health Care Admin. & Oviedo HMA, Inc., Case No. 05-0296CON (Fla. DOAH Aug. 23, 2006; Fla. AHCA Jan. 1, 2007), aff'd, 973 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). To be conservative, SB's projections, updated for purposes of hearing, take into account the slower population growth in south Hillsborough County since the application was originally filed. South Bay also assumed that St. Joseph's Hospital South will be built and operational by 2015. The net effect, as accounted for in the updated projections, is that SB's replacement hospital will have 28,168 patient days in year 1 (2015); 28,569 patient days in year 2 (2016); and 29,582 patient days in year 3 (2017). That patient volume is reasonable and achievable. With the updated utilization forecast, SB projects a net profit for the replacement hospital of $711,610 in 2015; $960,693 in 2016; and $1,658,757 in 2017. The financial forecast was done, using revenue and expense projections appropriately based upon SB's own most recent (2009) financial data. Adjustments made were to the payor mix and the degree of outpatient services, each of which would change due to the relocation to Riverview. The revenue projections for the replacement hospital were tested for reasonableness against existing hospitals in SB's peer group, using actual financial data as reported to AHCA. St. Joseph's Hospital opposed SB's financial projections. St. Joseph's Hospital's expert did not take issue with SB's forecasted market growth. Rather, it was suggested that there was insufficient market growth to support the future patient utilization projections for St. Joseph's Hospital South and SB at its new location and, as a result, they would have a difficult time achieving their volume forecasts and/or they would need to draw patients from other hospitals, such as Brandon, in order to meet utilization projections. St. Joseph's Hospital's expert criticized the increase in SB's projected revenues in its proposed new location as compared to its revenues in its existing location. However, it appears that SB's payor mix is projected to change in the new location, with a greater percentage of commercial managed care, thus generating the greater revenue. South Bay's projected revenue in the commercial indemnity insurance classification was also criticized because SB's projected commercial indemnity revenues were materially overstated. That criticism was based upon the commercial indemnity insurance revenues of St. Joseph's Hospital and Tampa General, which were used as a basis to "adjust" SB's projected revenue downward. St. Joseph's Hospital and Tampa General's fiscal-year 2009 commercial indemnity net revenue was divided by their inpatient days, added an inflation factor, and then multiplied the result by SB's year 1 (2015) inpatient days to recast SB's projected commercial indemnity net revenue. The contention is effectively that SB's commercial indemnity net revenue would be the same as that of St. Joseph's Hospital and Tampa General. There is no similarity between the three hospitals in the commercial indemnity classification. The majority of SJH's and TG's commercial indemnity net revenue comes from inpatients rather than outpatient cases; whereas the majority of SB's commercial indemnity net revenue comes from outpatient cases rather than inpatients. This may explain why SB's total commercial indemnity net revenue is higher than SJH or TG, when divided by inpatient days. The application of the lower St. Joseph's Hospital-Tampa General per-patient-day number to project SB's experience does not appear justified. It is likely that SB's project will be financially feasible in the short and long-term. Section 408.035(7): The extent to which the proposal will foster competition that promotes quality and cost-effectiveness South Bay and Brandon are the dominant providers of health care services in SB's service area. This dominance is likely to be eroded once St. Joseph's Hospital South is operational in and around 2015 (on Big Bend Road) if SB's relocation project is not approved. The proposed relocation of SB's facility will not change the geography of SB's service area. However, it will change SB's draw of patients from within the zip codes in the service area. The relocation of SB is expected to increase SB's market share in the three northern Riverview zip codes. This increase can be expected to come at the expense of other providers in the market, including TG and SJH, and St. Joseph's Hospital South when operational. The potential impact to St. Joseph's Hospital may be approximately $1.6 million based on the projected redirection of patients from St. Joseph's Hospital Main to St. Joseph's Hospital South, population growth in the area, and the relocation of SB. Economic impacts to TG are of record. Tampa General estimates a material impact of $6.4 million if relocation is approved. Notwithstanding, addressing "provider-based competition," AHCA in its SAAR noted: Considering the current location is effectively built out at 112 beds (according to the applicant), this project will allow the applicant to increase its bed size as needed along with the growth in population (the applicant's schedules begin with 144 beds in year one of the project). This will shield the applicant from a loss in market share caused by capacity issues and allow the applicant and its affiliates the opportunity to maintain and/or increase its dominant market share. SB Ex. 12 at 55. AHCA's observation that replacement and relocation of SB "will shield the applicant from a loss in market share caused by capacity issues" has taken on a new dimension since the issuance of the SAAR. At that time, St. Joseph's Hospital did not have final approval of CON No. 9833 for the establishment of St. Joseph's Hospital South. It is likely that St. Joseph's Hospital South will be operational on Big Bend Road, and as a result, SB, at its existing location, will experience a diminished market share, especially from the Riverview zip codes. In 2015 (when St. Joseph's Hospital proposes to open St. Joseph's Hospital South), SB projects losing $2,669,335 if SB remains in Sun City Center with a 20% loss in market share. The losses are projected to increase to $3,434,113 in 2016 and $4,255,573 in 2017. It follows that the losses would be commensurately more severe at the 30% to 40% loss of market share that SB expects if it remains in Sun City Center. St. Joseph's Hospital criticized SB's projections for its existing hospital if it remains in Sun City Center with a 20% loss in market share; however, the criticism was not persuasively proven. It was assumed that SB's expenses would decrease commensurately with its projected fewer patient days, thus enabling it to turn a profit in calendar year 2015 despite substantially reduced patient service revenue. However, it was also stated that expenses such as hospital administration, pharmacy administration, and nursing administration, which the analysis assumed to be variable, in fact have a substantial "fixed" component that does not vary regardless of patient census. South Bay would not, therefore, pay roughly $5 million less in "Administration and Overhead" expenses in 2015 as calculated. To the contrary, its expenses for "Administration and Overhead" would most likely remain substantially the same, as calculated by Mr. Weiner, and would have to be paid, notwithstanding SB's reduced revenue. The only expenses that were recognized as fixed by SJH's expert, and held constant, were SB's calendar year 2009 depreciation ($3,410,001) and short-term interest ($762,738), shown in the exhibit as $4,172,739 both in 2009 and 2015. Other expenses in SJH's analysis are fixed, but were inappropriately assumed to be variable: for example, "Rent, Insurance, Other," which is shown as $1,865,839 in 2009, appears to decrease to $1,462,059 in 2015. The justification offered at hearing, that such expenses can be re-negotiated by a hospital in the middle of a binding contract, is not reasonable. St. Joseph's Hospital's expert opined that SB's estimate of a 30 to 40% loss of market share (if SB remained in Sun City Center concurrent with the operation of St. Joseph's Hospital South) was "much higher than it should be," asserting that the loss would not be that great even if all of SB's Riverview discharges went to St. Joseph's Hospital South. (Mr. Richardson believes the "10 to 20 percent level is likely reasonable," although he opines that a 5 to 10% impact will likely occur.) However, this criticism assumes that a majority of the patients that currently choose SB would remain at SB at its existing location. The record reflects that Sun City Center area residents actively supported the establishment of St. Joseph's Hospital South, thus suggesting that they might use the new facility. Further, SB's physicians are likely to join the medical staff of St. Joseph's Hospital South to facilitate that utilization or to potentially lose their patients to physicians with admitting privileges at St. Joseph's Hospital South. Tampa General's expert also asserted that SB would remain profitable if it remained in its current location, notwithstanding the establishment of St. Joseph's Hospital South. It was contended that SB's net operating revenues per adjusted patient day increased at an annual rate of 5.3% from 2005 to 2009, whereas the average annual increase from 2009 to 2017 in SB's existing hospital projections amounts to 1.8%. On that basis, he opined that SB should be profitable in 2017 at its existing location, notwithstanding a loss in market share to St. Joseph's Hospital South. However, the 5.3% average annual increase from 2005 to 2009 is not necessarily predictive of SB's future performance, and the evidence indicated the opposite. Tampa General's expert did not examine SB's performance year-by-year from 2005 to 2009, but rather compared 2005 and 2009 data to calculate the 5.3% average annual increase over the five-year period. This analysis overlooks the hospital's uneven performance during that time, which included operating losses (and overall net losses) in 2005 and 2007. Further, the evidence showed that the biggest increase in SB's net revenue during that five-year period took place from 2008 to 2009, and was largely due to a significant decrease in bad debt in 2009. SB Ex. 16 at 64. (Bad debt is accounted for as a deduction from gross revenue: thus, the greater the amount of bad debt, the less net revenue all else being equal; the lesser the amount of bad debt, the greater the amount of net revenue all else being equal.) The evidence further showed that the 2009 reduction in bad debt and the hospital's profitability that year, is unlikely to be repeated. Overall, approval of the project is more likely to increase competition in the service area between the three health care providers/systems. Denial of the project is more likely to have a negative effect on competition in the service area, although it will continue to make general acute care services available and accessible to the Sun City Center area elderly (and family and volunteer support). Approval of the project is likely to improve the quality of care and cost-effectiveness of the services provided by SB, but will reduce access for the elderly residents of the Sun City Center area needing general acute care hospital services who will be required to be transported by emergency vehicle or otherwise to one of the two Big Bend Road hospitals, unless needed services, such as open heart surgery, are only available elsewhere. For example, if a patient presents to SB needing balloon angioplasty or open heart surgery, the patient is transferred to an appropriate facility such as Brandon. The presence of an ED on the current SB site may alleviate the reduction in access somewhat for some acute care services, although the precise nature and extent of the proposed services were not explained with precision. If its application is denied, SB expects to remain operational so long as it remains financially viable. Section 408.035(8): The costs and methods of the proposed construction, including the costs and methods of energy provision and the availability of alternative, less costly, or more effective methods of construction The parties stipulated that the costs and methods of the proposed construction, including the costs and methods of energy provision, were reasonable. St. Joseph's Hospital and Tampa General did not stipulate concerning the availability of alternative, less costly, or more effective methods of construction, and take the position that SB should renovate and expand its existing facility rather than replace and relocate the facility. Whether section 408.035(8) requires consideration (weighing and balancing with other statutory criteria) of potential renovation costs as alternatives to relocation was hotly debated in this case. For the reasons stated herein, it is determined that this subsection, in conjunction with other statutory criteria, requires consideration of potential renovation versus replacement of an existing facility. St. Joseph's Hospital offered expert opinion that SB could expand and upgrade its existing facility for approximately $25 million. These projected costs include site work; site utilities; all construction, architectural, and engineering services; chiller; air handlers; interior design; retention basins; and required movable equipment. This cost is substantially less than the approximate $200 million cost of the proposed relocation. It was proven that there are alternatives to replacing SB. There is testimony that if SB were to undertake renovation and expansion as proposed by SJH, such upgrades would improve SB's competitive and financial position. But, the alternatives proposed by SJH and TG are disfavored by SB and are determined, on this record, not to be reasonable based on the institutional- specific needs of SB. Section 408.035(9): The applicant's past and proposed provision of health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent Approval of SB's application will not significantly enhance access to Medicaid, charity, or underserved population groups. South Bay currently provides approximately 4% of its patient days to Medicaid beneficiaries and about 1% to charity care. South Bay's historic provision of services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent is reasonable in view of its location in Sun City Center, which results in a disproportionate share of Medicare in its current payor mix. South Bay also does not offer obstetrics, a service which accounts for a significant degree of Medicaid patient days. South Bay proposes to provide 7% of its "gross patient revenue" to Medicaid and charity patients as part of its relocation. South Bay's proposed service percentage is reasonable. Section 408.035(10): The applicant's designation as a Gold Seal Program nursing facility pursuant to s. 400.235, when the applicant is requesting additional nursing home beds at that facility The parties stipulated that this criterion is not applicable.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying CON Application No. 9992. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of August, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES A. STAMPELOS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of August, 2011.
Findings Of Fact Introduction Petitioner, Leesburg Regional Medical Center ("Leesburg"), is a 132-bed acute care private, not-for-profit hospital located at 600 East Dixie Highway, Leesburg, Florida. It offers a full range of general medical services. The hospital sits on land owned by the City of Leesburg. It is operated by the Leesburg hospital Association, an organization made up of individuals who reside within the Northwest Taxing District. By application dated August 13, 1982 petitioner sought a certificate of need (CON) from respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), to construct the following described project: This project includes the addition of 36 medical/surgical beds and 7 SICU beds in existing space and the leasing of a CT scanner (replacement). The addition of the medical/surgical beds is a cost effective way to add needed capacity to the hospital. Twenty-four (24) beds on the third floor will be established in space vacated by surgery and ancillary departments moving into newly constructed space in the current renovation project. A significant portion of this area used to be an obstetric unit in the past; and therefore, is already set up for patient care. The 7 bed SICU unit will be set up on the second floor, also in space vacated as a result of the renovation project. Twelve additional beds will be available on the third and fourth floors as a result of changing single rooms into double rooms. No renovation will be necessary to convert these rooms into double rooms. It is also proposed to replace the current TechniCare head scanner with GE8800 body scanner. Based on the high demand for head and body scans and the excessive amount of maintenance problems and downtime associated with the current scanner, Leesburg Regional needs a reliable, state-of-the-art CT scanner. The cost of the project was broken down as follows: The total project cost is $1,535,000. The construction/renovation portion of the project (24 medical/surgical and 7 SICU beds) is $533,000. Equipment costs will be approximately $200,000. Architectural fees and project development costs total $52,000. The CT scanner will be leased at a monthly cost of $16,222 per month for 5 years. The purchase price of the scanner is $750,000 and that amount is included in the total project cost. The receipt of the application was acknowledged by HRS by letter dated August 27, 1982. That letter requested Leesburg to submit additional information no later than October 10, 1982 in order to cure certain omissions. Such additional information was submitted by Leesburg on October 5, 1982. On November 29, 1982, the administrator for HRS's office of health planning and development issued proposed agency action in the form of a letter advising Leesburg its request to replace a head CT scanner (whole body) at a cost of $750,000 had been approved, but that the remainder of the application had been denied. The basis for the denial was as follows: There are currently 493 medical/surgical beds in the Lake/Sumter sub-district of HSA II. Based upon the HSP for HSA II, there was an actual utilization ratio of existing beds equivalent to 2.98/1,000 population. When this utilization ratio is applied to the 1987 projected population of 156,140 for Lake/Sumter counties, there is a need for 465 medical/surgical beds by 1987. Thus, there is an excess of 28 medical/surgical beds in the Lake/Sumter sub-district currently. This action prompted the instant proceeding. At the same time Leesburg's application was being partially denied, an application for a CON by intervenor-respondent, Lake Community Hospital (Lake), was being approved. That proposal involved an outlay of 4.1 million dollars and was generally described in the application as follows: The proposed project includes the renovations and upgrading of patient care areas. This will include improving the hospital's occupancy and staffing efficiencies by reducing Med-Surg Unit-A to 34 beds and eliminating all 3-bed wards. Also reducing Med-Surg Units B and C to 34 beds each and eliminating all 3-bed wards. This will necessitate the construction of a third floor on the A wing to house the present beds in private and semi-private rooms for a total of 34 beds. There is also an immediate need to develop back-to-back six bed ICU and a six-bed CCU for shared support services. This is being done to fulfill JCAH requirements and upgrade patient care by disease entity, patient and M.D. requests. Another need that is presented for consideration is the upgrading of Administrative areas to include a conference room and more Administrative and Business office space. However, the merits of HRS's decision on Lake's application are not at issue in this proceeding. In addition to Lake, there are two other hospitals located in Lake County which provide acute and general hospital service. They are South Lake Memorial Hospital, a 68-bed tax district facility in Clermont, Florida, and Waterman Memorial Hospital, which operates a 154-bed private, not-for-profit facility in Eustis, Florida. There are no hospitals in Sumter County, which lies adjacent to Lake County, and which also shares a subdistrict with that county. The facilities of Lake and Leesburg are less than two miles apart while the Waterman facility is approximately 12 to 14 miles away. South Lake Memorial is around 25 miles from petitioner's facility. Therefore, all three are no more than a 30 minute drive from Leesburg's facility. At the present time, there are 515 acute care beds licensed for Lake County. Of these, 493 are medical/surgical beds and 22 are obstetrical beds. None are designated as pediatric beds. The Proposed Rules Rules 10-16.001 through 10-16.012, Florida Administrative Code, were first noticed by HRS in the Florida Administrative Weekly on August 12, 1983. Notices of changes in these rules were published on September 23, 1983. Thereafter, they were filed with the Department of State on September 26, 1983 and became effective on October 16, 1983. Under new Rule 10-16.004 (1)(a), Florida Administrative Code, subdistrict 7 of district 3 consists of Lake and Sumter Counties. The rule also identifies a total acute care bed need for subdistrict 7 of 523 beds. When the final hearing was held, and evidence heard in this matter, the rules were merely recommendations of the various local health councils forwarded to HRS on June 27, 1983 for its consideration. They had not been adopted or even proposed for adoption at that point in time. Petitioner's Case In health care planning it is appropriate to use five year planning horizons with an overall occupancy rate of 80 percent. In this regard, Leesburg has sought to ascertain the projected acute care bed need in Lake County for the year 1988. Through various witnesses, it has projected this need using three different methodologies. The first methodology used by Leesburg may be characterized as the subdistrict need theory methodology. It employs the "guidelines for hospital care" adopted by the District III Local Health Council on June 27, 1983 and forwarded to HRS for promulgation as formal rules. Such suggestions were ultimately adopted by HRS as a part of Chapter 10-16 effective October 16, 1983. Under this approach, the overall acute care bed need for the entire sixteen county District III was found to be 44 additional beds in the year 1988 while the need within Subdistrict VII (Lake and Sumter Counties) was eight additional beds. 2/ The second approach utilized by Leesburg is the peak occupancy theory methodology. It is based upon the seasonal fluctuation in a hospital's occupancy rates, and used Leesburg's peak season bed need during the months of February and March to project future need. Instead of using the state suggested occupancy rate standard of 80 percent, the sponsoring witness used an 85 percent occupancy rate which produced distorted results. Under this approach, Leesburg calculated a need of 43 additional beds in 1988 in Subdistrict VII. However, this approach is inconsistent with the state-adopted methodology in Rule 10- 5.11(23), Florida Administrative Code, and used assumptions not contained in the rule. It also ignores the fact that HRS's rule already gives appropriate consideration to peak demand in determining bed need. The final methodology employed by Leesburg was characterized by Leesburg as the "alternative need methodology based on state need methodology" and was predicated upon the HRS adopted bed need approach in Rule 10-5.11(23) with certain variations. First, Leesburg made non-rule assumptions as to the inflow and outflow of patients. Secondly, it substituted the population by age group for Lake and Sumter Counties for the District population. With these variations, the methodology produced an acute care bed need of 103 additional beds within Lake and Sumter Counties. However, this calculation is inconsistent with the applicable HRS rule, makes assumptions not authorized under the rule, and is accordingly not recognized by HRS as a proper methodology. Leesburg experienced occupancy rates of 91 percent, 80 percent and 73 percent for the months of January, February and March, 1981, respectively. These rates changed to 86 percent, 95 percent and 98 percent during the same period in 1982, and in 1983 they increased to 101.6 percent, 100.1 percent and 95.1 percent. Leesburg's health service area is primarily Lake and Sumter Counties. This is established by the fact that 94.4 percent and 93.9 percent of its admissions in 1980 and 1981, respectively, were from Lake and Sumter Counties. Although South Lake Memorial and Waterman Memorial are acute care facilities, they do not compete with Leesburg for patients. The staff doctors of the three are not the same, and there is very little crossover, if any, of patients between Leesburg and the other two facilities. However, Lake and Leesburg serve the same patient base, and in 1982 more than 70 percent of their patients came from Lake County. The two compete with one another, and have comparable facilities. Leesburg has an established, well-publicized program for providing medical care to indigents. In this regard, it is a recipient of federal funds for such care, and, unlike Lake, accounts for such care by separate entry on its books. The evidence establishes that Leesburg has the ability to finance the proposed renovation. HRS's Case HRS's testimony was predicated on the assumption that Rule 10-16.004 was not in effect and had no application to this proceeding. Using the bed need methodology enunciated in Rule 10-5.11(23), its expert concluded the overall bed need for the entire District III to be 26 additional beds by the year 1988. This calculation was based upon and is consistent with the formula in the rule. Because there was no existing rule at the time of the final hearing concerning subdistrict need, the witness had no way to determine the bed need, if any, within Subdistrict VII alone. Lake's Case Lake is a 162-bed private for profit acute care facility owned by U.S. Health Corporation. It is located at 700 North Palmetto, Leesburg, Florida. Lake was recently granted a CON which authorized a 4.1 million dollar renovation project. After the renovation is completed all existing three-bed wards will be eliminated. These will be replaced with private and semi-private rooms with no change in overall bed capacity. This will improve the facility's patient utilization rate. The expansion program is currently underway. Like Leesburg, the expert from Lake utilized a methodology different from that adopted for use by HRS. Under this approach, the expert determined total admissions projected for the population, applied an average length of stay to that figure, and arrived at a projected patient day total for each hospital. That figure was then divided by bed complement and 365 days to arrive at a 1988 occupancy percentage. For Subdistrict VII, the 1988 occupancy percentage was 78.2, which, according to the expert, indicated a zero acute care bed need for that year. Lake also presented the testimony of the HRS administrator of the office of community affairs, an expert in health care planning. He corroborated the testimony of HRS's expert witness and concluded that only 26 additional acute care beds would be needed district-wide by the year 1988. This result was arrived at after using the state-adopted formula for determining bed need. During 1981, Lake's actual total dollar write-off for bad debt was around $700,000. This amount includes an undisclosed amount for charity or uncompensated care for indigent patients. Unlike Leesburg, Lake receives no federal funds for charity cases. Therefore, it has no specific accounting entry on its books for charity or indigent care. Although Leesburg rendered $276,484 in charity/uncompensated care during 1981, it is impossible to determine which facility rendered the most services for indigents due to the manner in which Lake maintains its books and records. In any event, there is no evidence that indigents in the Subdistrict have been denied access to hospital care at Lake or any other facility within the county. Lake opines that it will loose 2.6 million dollars in net revenues in the event the application is granted. If true, this in turn would cause an increase in patient charges and a falling behind in technological advances. For the year 1981, the average percent occupancy based on licensed beds for Leesburg, Lake, South Lake Memorial and Waterman Memorial was as follows: 71.5 percent, 58.7 percent, 63.8 percent and 65.7 percent. The highest utilization occurred in January (81 percent) while the low was in August (58 percent). In 1982, the utilization rate during the peak months for all four facilities was 78 percent. This figure dropped to 66.5 percent for the entire year. Therefore, there is ample excess capacity within the County even during the peak demand months.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of Leesburg Regional Medical Center for a certificate of need to add 43 acute care beds, and renovate certain areas of its facility to accommodate this addition, be DENIED. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of December, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 1983.
