Findings Of Fact On January 23, 1985, following the filing of the and its on-site inspection, DER issued its notice of intent to grant the air construction permit, pursuant to Chapter 403, Florida Statutes (F.S.), and Chapters 17-2 and 17-4, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C.). The notice stated that the proposed equipment, with a cyclone primary dust collector followed by a Dustex Baghouse Model DW-14-28W dust collector, was adequate to insure compliance with DER particulate emission standards. The ambient air standards for sulfur dioxide emissions by the plant were to be controlled by the use of low sulfur fuel oil (maximum 0.5 percent sulfur). Subsequent to the issuance of the notice of intent, DER received a Petition for Administrative Hearing regarding the issuance of the permit. The petition alleged, inter alia, that the plant would emit particulates and gases in contravention of Chapter 17-2, F.A.C., and that stormwater run-off from the plant would be contaminated with oil, scum and debris. The petition further asserted that this run-off would cause water pollution in contravention of Chapters 17-3 and 17-25, F.A.C., and would introduce pollution into Dry Branch and Bayou George, a Class I Water. The permit application covers only the proposed batch plant site and the immediately adjacent property consisting of 2.15 acres. The location of the building would be at the northern end of the parcel, approximately 0.10 miles from both Star Avenue and U.S. Highway 231. There is no residential use of property immediately adjacent to the project site. However, Petitioners all reside in the immediate area, and will be affected to some extent by this facility. Dust from construction activity has already been experienced. In this regard, it must be recognized that the area has no zoning restrictions and is therefore subject to industrial uses such as that proposed here. The Applicant owns several acres of property surrounding the location of the proposed batch plant. The permit application at issue covers only the request to construct the facility on a 2.15 acre portion of the larger parcel. Anticipated environmental problems caused by activity not on the immediate parcel are not related to this permit application and thus are not germane to a determination whether the permit should be issued or denied. Further, the construction permit will only allow the applicant to build the proposed air pollution source. Before such a source can actually be operated, a separate operation permit application must be made, and testing for compliance with standards by the facility must be satisfactorily completed. Petitioners demonstrated that the individuals who own Triangle Construction Company, Inc. were previously employed by Gulf Asphalt Company, which was occasionally out of compliance with state air emission standards. Petitioners asserted that these individuals would likely fail to operate the proposed facility in compliance with DER standards. Although these individuals did have managerial responsibility at Gulf Asphalt, final decisions concerning financial expenditures for repairs and maintenance were made by the owner of the plant, rather than the Applicant's owners. It was also established that the Gulf Asphalt Plant continued to have emission problems after such individuals left as employees. Petitioners contend the Applicant's unrelated dredging activities in an adjacent borrow pit area caused turbidity in Dry Branch Creek, and characterized the Applicant as a habitual violator who could not be expected to comply with state pollution control regulations in the operation of the proposed facility. Testimony revealed that the Applicant constructed a culvert in Dry Branch, which flows through a borrow pit area and did some other incidental dredging in areas within the landward extent of waters of the state. However, when the Applicant became aware that activities in the proposed borrow pit area were potentially in violation of DER rules, it ceased activities and applied for the appropriate permits. An asphalt concrete batch plant is a relatively simple operation in which sand and aggregate are dried, then mixed with hot liquid asphalt and loaded directly into trucks. It is the drying process which emits the particulates which the cyclone and the baghouse are designed to control. Baghouse operations are similar to those of a vacuum cleaner. Particulate-laden air from the drying process is vented into the baghouse, where it is filtered through a number of cloth bags. The bags trap the particulates, and pass the filtered air through the bag cloth and out of the building. When enough air has been filtered to cause a build-up of trapped particulates, a portion of the baghouse is taken off cycle and reverse air is blown through the bags. The reverse air causes the trapped particulates to fall into a hopper where they are removed for disposal. The baghouse was designed to function efficiently in conjunction with a plant producing up to 120 tons per hour of asphalt concrete. Applicants's plant will produce only 80-85 tons of asphalt concrete per hour due to the limited size of the dryer. The estimated air to cloth ratio in the amended permit application is 6:1, which will result in emissions substantially lower than DER standards. Air to cloth ratio is not a specific standard or requirement, but is a figure which is used by engineers to determine projected emissions which may reasonably be anticipated from facilities which use an air pollution control mechanism. A projected air to cloth ratio of 6:1 for this baghouse may be reasonably expected to yield emissions of approximately 0.014 micrograms per dry cubic foot, which is approximately one-third of the DER standard of 0.04 mg. per dry cubic foot. The equipment to be installed is used and in need of minor repairs. The testimony established that necessary repairs will be accomplished prior to plant activation, and that operations will not be adversely affected when such repairs are complete.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Regulation issue a final order granting Triangle Construction Company an air construction permit. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of June, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of June, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Lynn C. Higby, Esquire BRYANT, HIGBY & WILLIAMS, P.A. Post Office Box 124 Panama City, Florida 32402 E. Gary Early, Esquire and Clare E. Gray, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blairstone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard Smoak, Esquire SALE, BROWN & SMOAK Post Office Box 1579 Panama City, Florida 32402 Victoria Tschinkel, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blairstone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Conclusions UPON CONSIDERATION of the Administrative Complaint attached hereto as Exhibit “A”, the transcript of the corresponding Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) case, the exhibits received into evidence, ‘the Proposed Recommended Order filed by the Administrative Law Judge in this matter and attached hereto as Exhibit “B’, any exceptions to the Recommended Order filed by either party, and being otherwise fully advised of the premises, it is hereby, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: 1. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and recommended penalty as _ detailed in the Recommended Order are hereby adopted. 2. Respondent is not guilty of engaging in the unlicensed practice of landscape architecture and electrical contracting. . 3. This Final Order shall become effective on the date of filing with the Agency Clerk of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation. DONE AND ORDERED this ogee, of (Octien. 2008. W. Drago, Secretary Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Center 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0750
Appeal For This Case Unless expressly waived, any party adversely affected by this Final Order may seek judicial review by filing an original Notice of Appeal with the Clerk of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, and a copy of the notice, accompanied by the filing fees prescribed by law, with the clerk of the appropriate District Court of Appeal within 30 days of the effective date of this order, in accordance with Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Section 120.68, Florida Statutes. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE | hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Final Order has been provided via U.S. Mail to Respondent, Todd Boetzel and Boetzel Landscaping, Inc., c/o Gregory T. Elliott, Esquire, Elliott-Berger, P.A., 7310 Gulf Boulevard, St. Petersburg, Florida 33706, wie ny of CC 2008. SARAH WACHMAN, AGENCY CLERK By: Mush Ah Min Brandy Nichols, Deputy Clerk Copies furnished to: Reginald D. Dixon, Informal Hearing Officer Sorin Ardelean, Assistant General Counsel Division of Regulation, Bureau of Unlicensed Activity Daniel Manry, Administrative Law Judge, Division of Administrative Hearings, 1230 Apalachee Parkway, Tallahassee, FL 32399-3060 Steven Petrozak, d/b/a Southern Cross Construction, 6435 92" Place #901, Pinellas Park, Florida 33782
The Issue Whether Petitioner's applications for two outdoor advertising signs in Sumter County, Florida, should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this permitting dispute, Petitioner, Rite Media Enterprises, Inc., seeks the issuance of two state sign permits from Respondent, Department of Transportation (DOT). In preliminary decisions dated August 24, 1998, DOT denied the applications on the ground the land owners had not given Petitioner permission to place the signs on their property. As an additional ground, DOT alleged that one sign violated the spacing requirements by being "[i]n conflict with a[n] existing permitted sign." Petitioner contends, however, that it has two legally enforceable leases with the property owners, and that its applications should be approved. If the applications are approved, the signs would be placed on two parcels of property near Interstate 75 in Sumter County, Florida, one on the east side and one on the west side of the highway. Both parcels are owned by Intervenors, William and Debra Farkus. On July 29, 1998, Dan Hucke, a real estate representative for Petitioner, was "scouting" for suitable billboard locations and decided that Intervenors' property would be a desirable location. After Hucke discussed the matter with Intervenors, the parties agreed to execute lease agreements that day for the two parcels of property in question. A copy of the lease agreements is found in Petitioner's Exhibits 1 and 2 received in evidence. In Hucke's presence, both Debra and William Farkus executed each lease agreement and a Notice of Lease. The documents reflect that only one person, Hucke, served as a witness. Hucke then carried the agreements to Petitioner's president, who executed the agreements on behalf of the corporation. In addition, Hucke's wife, a notary public, placed her seal on the Notice of Lease indicating that the signatures had been signed in her presence after an oath was administered to the lessors. Intervenors were not present when the documents were notarized. The day after the documents were executed, Debra Farkus contacted Hucke by telephone. Hucke told her he would be in the area the following Monday (August 2) and they could "work out" any problems she might have with the agreements. The same day (July 30), Debra Farkus faxed a handwritten letter to Hucke advising him to "[c]ancel the lease as per our conversation immediately," and to not "record them as per our conversation." After receiving the cancellation notice, Hucke met briefly with the Intervenors, but contended at hearing that he could not recall the substance of that conversation. On the other hand, William Farkus testified that in that meeting he again reiterated his desire for the agreements to be cancelled. In any event, Hucke acknowledged that he left the meeting with the impression that the Intervenors objected to the agreements. Despite receiving the foregoing notice and oral advice from Intervenors, Hucke nonetheless believed he had valid leases. Whether he recorded the leases is not of record. However, he promptly filed two applications for sign permits with the DOT, and he enclosed a copy of the lease agreements to evidence the fact that he had the permission of the property owners. When a DOT inspector conducted a preliminary investigation of the applications, he learned that Intervenors did not consent to having the signs on their property. Under long-standing DOT policy (since at least 1992), when this type of dispute occurs, which the inspector says happens "[a]ll the time," it requires that the applicant either submit an affidavit (or present testimony at a hearing) evidencing the fact that the property owners have consented to the placement of a sign on their property, or submit an order of a circuit court reflecting that the lease agreement is enforceable. Where a dispute such as this occurs, in no circumstance does DOT attempt to construe the legal sufficiency of a lease agreement or adjudicate the rights of a party under a lease agreement. The foregoing policy is applied by the agency on a statewide basis, without discretion, and it has a logical and rational basis, particularly since an administrative agency lacks jurisdiction to construe contracts or make property-right determinations. At the hearing, Intervenors again stated that they did not authorize Petitioner to place its signs on their property. In addition, Petitioner did not submit a court order indicating that enforceable leases between the parties existed. DOT presented testimony which established that the proposed sign location in Case No. 98-4459T would violate statutory spacing requirements because the location conflicted with an existing nearby sign. There was no evidence to contradict this assertion.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order denying the applications for state sign permits filed by Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of September, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675, SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of September, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Department of Transportation ATTN: James C. Myers, Clerk of Agency Proceedings 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Andrew B. Thomas, Esquire Post Office Box 4961 Orlando, Florida 32802-4961 Kelly A. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802-2151 Pamela S. Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue As stated by the Administrative Law Judge in her Recommended Order, the issue presented is: "should certain outdoor advertising signs owned by Respondent, Universal Outdoor Atlantic Coast (Universal) be removed as a result of notices of violations brought by Petitioner, Department of Transportation (the Department) against Universal?"
Findings Of Fact After review of the record in its entirety, it is determined that the Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact contained in paragraphs 1-3, 5-17, and 19-20 of the Recommended Order are supported by the record and are accepted and incorporated as if fully set forth herein. Finding of Fact No. 4 is modified and references therein to the lack of competent evidence regarding Volusia County's land use regulations are rejected and deleted as such findings are not supported by the competent substantial evidence in the record and are not in accordance with applicable law. Finding of Fact No. 4 as herein modified is accepted and incorporated as if fully set forth herein. Finding of Fact No. 18 as corrected hereinabove is supported by the record and is accepted as corrected and incorporated as if fully set forth herein.
Conclusions This proceeding was initiated by Requests for Formal Administrative Hearing filed by Respondent, UNIVERSAL OUTDOOR ATLANTIC COAST (hereinafter UNIVERSAL), on January 14, 1999. The requests for an administrative hearing were filed in response to Notices of Violation issued by Petitioner, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (hereinafter DEPARTMENT), on January 7, 1999, for UNIVERSAL'S sign structures located adjacent to US 1 and Interstate 95, in Volusia County, Florida. The Notices were issued because UNIVERSAL unlawfully reerected its nonconforming outdoor advertising signs which were destroyed by fire. The matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings (hereinafter "DOAH"), and DOAH issued its Initial Orders assigning the cases to Suzanne F. Hood, a duly appointed Administrative Law Judge, and setting forth the responsibilities of the parties. On March 4, 1999, the Administrative Law Judge issued an order consolidating the cases. The hearing was conducted in Daytona Beach, Florida, on August 19, 1999, before Suzanne F. Hood, Administrative Law Judge. Appearances on behalf of the parties were as follows: For Petitioner: Robert M. Burdick, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 For Respondent: Aileen M. Reilly, Esquire Livingston & Reilly, P.A. Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802-2151 At the hearing, UNIVERSAL introduced and had accepted into evidence UNIVERSAL'S Exhibit 1, and presented the testimony of one witness. The Administrative Law Judge reserved ruling on the admissibility of UNIVERSAL'S Exhibit 2, which was later accepted in the Administrative Law Judge's Recommended Order. The DEPARTMENT introduced the DEPARTMENT'S Exhibits 1 through 4; Exhibits 1 through 3 were admitted into evidence and Exhibit 4 was denied as irrelevant and inadmissible hearsay. The DEPARTMENT also introduced the trial testimony and portions of the deposition testimony of Michael Kuypers presented in cases consolidated under DOAH Case No. 99-0486T, as the DEPARTMENT'S Exhibit 5. The testimony of two additional witnesses was presented by the DEPARTMENT. A transcript was prepared and filed subsequent to the hearing. On October 27, 1999, the Administrative Law Judge issued her Recommended Order. Exceptions to the Recommended Order were filed by UNIVERSAL on November 10, 1999, and the DEPARTMENT filed its response to UNIVERSAL'S exceptions on November 18, 1999. The DEPARTMENT filed exceptions to the Recommended Order on November 4, 1999, and UNIVERSAL filed its response to the DEPARTMENT'S exceptions on November 15, 1999.
Appeal For This Case THIS ORDER CONSTITUTES FINAL AGENCY ACTION AND MAY BE APPEALED BY ANY PARTY PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.68, FLORIDA STATUTES, AND RULES 9.110 AND 9.190, FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, BY FILING A NOTICE OF APPEAL CONFORMING TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 9.110(d), FLORIDA RULED OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, BOTH WITH THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, ACCOMPANIED BY THE APPROPRIATE FILING FEE, AND WITH THE DEPARTMENT'S CLERK OF AGENCY PROCEEDINGS, HAYDON BURNS BUILDING, 605 SUWANNEE STREET, M.S. 58, TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 323990458, WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS OF RENDITION OF THIS ORDER. Copies furnished to: Robert M. Burdick, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Peter Wright District Five ODA Administrator 719 South Woodland Boulevard DeLand, Florida 32721-0057 Juanice Hagan Assistant State Right of Way Manager for Operations Department of Transportation Haydon Bums Building 605 Suwannee Street, MS 22 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Aileen M. Reilly, Esquire Livingston & Reilly, P.A. Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802-2151 Suzanne F. Hood Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060
The Issue The issue is whether appellant's application for a conditional use permit should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the entire record, the following findings of fact are determined: Appellant, Nostimo, Inc. (appellant, applicant or Nostimo), is the owner of Lots 8, 9, 10 and 11, Block 8, Revised Plat of Clearwater Beach Subdivision, located at 32 Bay Esplanade, Clearwater Beach, Florida. The property is subject to the land use requirements codified in the City of Clearwater Code of Ordinances (code or city code). By application filed on April 25, 1989 appellant sought the issuance of a conditional use permit from appellee, City of Clearwater (City or appellee). If approved, the permit would authorize the sale of beer and wine for off-premises consumption by a Pick Kwik Food Store to be constructed on the property under a lease agreement between appellant and Pick Kwik, Inc. Appellant's property is properly zoned for a retail establishment (CB or Beach Commerical), and it needs no further zoning permits from the City in order to convert the existing structures on the property to a convenience store. Indeed, appellant has already received approval for the construction and operation of the store. However, under subsection 137.024(b) of the city code, appellant is required to obtain a conditional use permit because it intends to engage in the sale of packaged beer and wine for off-premises consumption. In order to obtain such a permit the applicant must satisfy a number of criteria embodied in the code. The parties have stipulated that, with the exception of one standard, all other relevant criteria have been met. The disputed standard requires that "the use shall be compatible with the surrounding area and not impose an excessive burden or have a substantial negative impact on surrounding or adjacent uses or on community facilities or services." It is noted that appellant must secure the necessary land use permit from the City before it can obtain the alcoholic beverage license from the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. The application was considered by the Clearwater Planning and Zoning Board (Board) on June 13, 1989 and denied by a 5-0 vote with one member abstaining. As a basis for the denial, the Board adopted a staff report that concluded that "due to the beach area being saturated with this use (sale of alcoholic beverages), public nuisances requiring police action are taxing community services." It further concluded that the proliferation of this activity "has a substantial negative impact on surrounding or adjacent uses or on community facilities and services, specifically police services in handling nuisances related to alcoholic beverage establishments." Members of the public who testified in opposition to the application expressed concern over increased traffic in the area, the glare of lights from a 24 hours per day establishment, and potential problems arising from customers who will consume the beer and wine during the evening hours. In addition, two letters in opposition to the application were considered by the Board. Finally, besides a presentation by applicant's attorney, two witnesses appeared on behalf of the applicant and established that Pick Wick, Inc. provides security services at its stores, if needed, and training for employees to prevent the sale of alcoholic beverages to minors. The subject property is located on the western side of the intersection of Bay Esplanade and Mandalay Avenue in Clearwater Beach, an elongated strip of land to the west of the mainland portion of the City and separated from the mainland by Clearwater Harbor. Mandalay Avenue runs north and south through the heart of Clearwater Beach and is a principal traffic artery in that part of the community. The avenue narrows from four to two lanes just south of where the store is to be located. Bay Esplanade is a much shorter street and runs in an east-west direction between the Gulf of Mexico and Clearwater Harbor. In general terms, the property is surrounded by mixed uses and include a 7-11 convenience store immediately across the street to the east, motels and rental apartments, a restaurant, retail businesses and resort facilities, residences, public areas and a city fire station. Maps received in evidence more definitively depict the nature of the uses surrounding Nostimo's property. In addition to a number of commercial establishments within the immediate area, there are also tennis courts, a parking area, community boat ramp, soccer field, playground and public park. Finally, the area is replete with apartments, rental units and condominiums, including some directly behind the proposed establishment. Although there are presently no active businesses located on the subject property, the premises were once occupied by a hotel, apartments, hot dog shop and a small lounge that offered both on and off premises consumption of alcohol. The applicant contends that the proposed use is compatible with both the property's former use and the present surrounding area, particularly since a 7-11 convenience store directly across the street has been in business selling beer and wine for the last twenty-five years, and there are several restaurants or motels within a block that sell alcoholic beverages. The applicant added that, in all, there are approximately fifty-three active alcoholic beverage licenses within two miles of the proposed convenience store. At both the Board hearing and final hearing in this cause, the City Police Department offered testimony in opposition to the issuance of the requested permit. According to the uncontradicted testimony of Lt. Frank Palumbo, who is the Clearwater Beach police department district commander, additional noise, vandalism, traffic congestion and congregation of younger people are expected if the permit is issued. This opinion was based upon his law enforcement experience with other convenience stores on the Beach side that sell beer and wine, including another Pick Wick convenience store. Further, Mandalay Avenue is an important north-south traffic artery in Clearwater Beach, and there are no alternative streets for residents and visitors to use to avoid the traffic build-up that will occur around the store. Lieutenant Palumbo disputed the assertion that the lounge that once occupied a portion of the subject property generated substantial numbers of customers and associated traffic and that the new enterprise is actually a downgrade in use. He pointed out that the former lounge was very small, and a congregation of four or five customers at any one time was a "large crowd." In contrast, the police officer distinguished that situation from the proposed store where the sale of beer and wine around the clock is expected to generate larger volumes of traffic and customers, particularly during the evening hours. Finally, it has been Lt. Palumbo's experience that convenience stores that sell beer and wine attract the younger crowd, including minors, during the late hours of the night, and they create noise and sanitation problems for the adjacent property owners. The witness concluded that all of these factors collectively would have a negative impact on "community services" by placing a greater demand on police resources. This testimony was echoed by a city planner who gave deposition testimony in this cause. The nexus between the sale of alcoholic beverages and increased traffic and noise was corroborated by Daniel Baker, the manager of another Pick Wick store and a former employee of the 7-11 store across the street, who recalled that when beer sales stopped at that store at midnight, the noise and traffic also came to a halt. In this regard, it is noted the proposed store will operate twenty-four hours per day. To the above extent, then, the proposed use is incompatible with the requirements of section 137.011(d)(6). Two other witnesses testified at final hearing in opposition to the application. One, who is a member of a church that lies a block from the proposed store, pointed out without contradiction that a playground sits next to the church and is used by area young people, many of whom use bicycles as their means of transportation. She was concerned that if more traffic is generated by the store, it would make access to the playground more hazardous and discourage the children from using the facility. The second member of the public is concerned that the store will be incompatible with the surrounding area. This is because much of the neighboring area is made up of public areas, apartments, rental units or condominiums, and he contended an establishment selling alcoholic beverages would be inconsistent with those uses.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Larry C. Griggs, is licensed as a certified general contractor, holding license number CG C001910. During the years 1979, 1980 and 1981 the Respondent was president of Kramer Homes, Inc., and in this capacity he acted as contractor for the construction of a project in Dade County known as Woods Landing. Kramer Homes, Inc., entered into subcontracts in connection with the Woods Landing project, and listed itself as contractor on these subcontracts. Kramer Homes, Inc., also caused the notice of commencement to be published, and it obtained the construction loan and paid some of the bills incurred. The Respondent, however, failed to qualify Kramer Homes, Inc., with the Construction Industry Licensing Board. The Respondent admitted the above facts, but explained that he had no intent to violate the construction industry licensing law. He asserts that he was confused as to the proper practice because he owned and operated both Kramer Homes, Inc., and his other corporation, Larry C. Griggs, Inc., which he did qualify. During the course of the Woods Landing project, funding problems developed which resulted in the failure of the Respondent to pay 16 creditors for materials furnished or services performed at Woods Landing when payment was due. Subsequently however, the Respondent has caused payment to be made, or has made arrangements for payment, to all such creditors except for five. The creditors remaining unpaid are Miami Comfort Air, Style Light, Inc., Gem Cabinet Company of Miami, Inc., World Tile Company, and Dixie Clamp and Scaffold, Inc. On approximately September 11, 1981, the Respondent issued a check on a Woods Landing account, payable to Miami Comfort Air, in the amount of $5,000. Previously, on July 31, 1981, the Respondent had acknowledged the debt due Miami Comfort Air, and had made arrangements to pay $8,000 by September 1, 1981. The check for $5,000 was in partial payment of the total debt. The check for $5,000 issued by the Respondent on September 11, 1981, to Miami Comfort Air was returned unpaid by the bank marked not sufficient funds. When the Respondent learned that this check had not been paid, he failed to make it good or to make suitable arrangements for payment of the amount due Miami Comfort Air. The Respondent contends that be believed that there were sufficient funds in his account when he issued the $5,000 check to Miami Comfort Air. He explained that his bank, County National Bank of South Florida, became insecure with the financial aspects connected with the Woods Landing project, and withdrew interest from his account without advising the Respondent, at or about the time he issued the check to Miami Comfort Air. He asserts that it is his intention to pay all of the creditors of this project, and he established his payment record of the creditors who had been paid as of the date of the hearing. Miami Comfort Air has reduced its claim against the Respondent to judgment which the Respondent has not paid, but has elected to appeal, although he did not appear in court to defend the claim when suit was filed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent, Larry C. Griggs, be found guilty of violating Sections 489.129(1)(d), (g), (j) and Section 489.129(1)(c) to wit Section 455.227(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and that he be assessed an administrative fine of $250 on Count 1, $100 on Count 11 and $1,000 on Count 111, for a total fine of $1,350. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered on this the 24th day of January, 1983. WILLIAM B. THOMAS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of January, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Cohen, Esquire Suite 101 Kristin Building 2715 East Oakland Park Blvd. Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33306 James L. Wall, Jr., Esquire 407 Lincoln Road Miami Beach, Florida 33139 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James Linnan, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32202
Findings Of Fact 1. Emmons was a Residential Services Supervisor who had a predetermination/liberty interest (name clearing) hearing held on August 24, 2012. After that hearing, he was terminated effective at the close of business on August 24, 2012 and notified of that fact via correspondence dated August 27, 2012. (See, e.g., Exhibit 4). 2. On September 4, 2012, Emmons submitted a written request to ECUA’s Director of Human Resources and Administrative Services (hereinafter “HR Director”) appealing disciplinary action taken against him in his employment with ECUA. 3. That same date, ECUA requested the services of an Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter “ALJ”) from the Florida Division of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”) to conduct an evidentiary hearing and issue a Recommended Order to ECUA’s Executive Director pursuant to the Administrative Law Judge Services Contract previously entered into between ECUA and DOAH. 4. DOAH assigned an ALJ to preside over the matter, who in turn issued a Notice of Hearing scheduling an evidentiary hearing to take place beginning at 10:00 a.m. on October 15, 2012 in ECUA’s Board Room. 5. ECUA was present and ready to proceed with the evidentiary hearing at the appointed time and place, yet neither Emmons nor anyone acting on his behalf appeared. Furthermore, no one had heard from Emmons. 6. After waiting fifteen (15) minutes after the designated start-time for the hearing, neither Emmons nor anyone acting on his behalf had been heard from. 7. Thereafter, the ALJ called the hearing to order, and ECUA proffered witness testimony and admitted exhibits into the record. The record established the following: a. Emmons was a Residential Services Supervisor in ECUA’s Sanitation Department. b. On March 28, 2012 Emmons was notified by a Sanitation Equipment Operator under his supervision that his truck (Truck #43B), had broken down. After Emmons arrived on the scene in ECUA Truck #11C, he went to sleep while on duty. c. Emmons slept for approximately twenty to thirty minutes, and his vehicle, Vehicle #11C, was idling with the air conditioner on throughout this time. d. While Emmons slept, an ECUA employee photographed him. e. This was not the first time Emmons had slept while on duty; instead, in the Summer of 2011 Emmons was observed sleeping in his ECUA-assigned vehicle by another ECUA employee. f. Furthermore, within the past twelve months Emmons was observed by ECUA employees reclined with his eyes closed for an extended period of time on two other occasions during the past twelve months. g. Additionally, in 2010 a photograph of Emmons apparently sleeping on duty was brought to one of his superiors’ attention. In this instance, Emmons was cautioned that it was completely unacceptable for a supervisor to be sleeping anywhere 3 at any time while on duty and that if this were to happen again disciplinary action would be imposed. h. ECUA issued a written notice of predetermination hearing to Emmons on August 21, 2012 regarding contemplated disciplinary action for violations of Section B-13A(4), [Conduct Unbecoming an ECUA Employee], Section B-13A(18) [Loafing], Section B-13A(21) [Neglect of Duty], Section B-13A(25) [Sleeping on Duty], and Section B-13A(33) [Violation of ECUA rules or policies] of ECUA’s Human Resources Manual. i. Section B-37(A) of ECUA’s Human Resources Manual additionally provides that ECUA employees shall avoid unnecessary vehicle idling and prohibits allowing a vehicle to idle solely to operate the air conditioner for the comfort of the vehicle’s occupants. j.._ Emmons knew of the above-referenced provisions of ECUA’s Human Resources Manual by virtue of the fact that he had received it, as well as the fact that the substantive provisions of it applicable to his sleeping on duty had been previously discussed with at least one of his superiors. k. Upon proper notice a predetermination hearing was held on August 24, 2012, and thereafter a written notice of disciplinary action was issued to Emmons on August 27, 2012 notifying him that his conduct violated Sections B-13A(4), (18), (21), (25), and (33) of ECUA’s Human Resources Manual. 8. The hearing was closed at approximately 10:27 a.m. 9. Based upon a review of the record, the evidence shows that Emmons’ conduct was violative of Sections B-13A(4) [conduct unbecoming an ECUA employee], 4 Section B-13A(8) [loafing], Section B-13A(21) [neglect of duty], Section B-13A(25) (sleeping while on duty], Section B-13A(33) [violation of ECUA rules or policies], and Section B-37 [vehicle and equipment idle reduction] of ECUA’s Human Resources Manual. (See ECUA ex. 5, 6). The evidence further shows that you were aware of these provisions within the Human Resources Manual. (See ECUA ex. 7). 10. Two days later, on September 17, 2012, R. John Westberry, Esq., entered an appearance on behalf of Emmons and filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal on his behalf. In neither of these filings was any justification proffered for Emmons’ having failed to appear at the scheduled evidentiary hearing. Additionally, good cause was not shown for Emmons’ attorney having failed to appear at the hearing (although it is unclear whether the attorney had been retained at that time). 1. Nevertheless, on October 18, 2012 the ALJ rendered an Order Closing File ostensibly dismissing the matter.
Conclusions Petitioner, Emerald Coast Utilities Authority (hereinafter either "ECUA" or “Petitioner”), terminated Respondent, Michael A. Emmons (hereinafter either "Emmons" or “Respondent”), from his employment with ECUA effective at the close of business on August 24, 2012. Emmons timely requested a hearing in order to appeal his termination, and his case was forwarded to Florida Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct a hearing and issue findings of fact and recommended conclusions of law. After being properly noticed, a formal hearing was held in this cause on October 15, 2012 in Pensacola, Florida, before Diane Cleavinger, Administrative Law Judge with the Florida Division of Administrative Hearings, which Emmons elected not to attend. . Three days later, on October 18, 2012, Judge Diane Cleavinger submitted an Order Closing File, which for reasons set forth below is deemed a Recommended Order. Pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(10, Florida Statutes, the Parties had 15 days within which to submit written exceptions to the Recommended Order. That time-frame has expired, with only Petitioner’s having filed a submission. Emmons also filed no response to Petitioner’s exceptions. See Rule 28-106.217(3), Florida Administrative Code (affording a party 10 days from the filing of the other party’s exceptions to respond to those exceptions).
