Conclusions UPON CONSIDERATION of the Administrative Complaint attached hereto as Exhibit “A”, the transcript of the corresponding Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) case, the exhibits received into evidence, ‘the Proposed Recommended Order filed by the Administrative Law Judge in this matter and attached hereto as Exhibit “B’, any exceptions to the Recommended Order filed by either party, and being otherwise fully advised of the premises, it is hereby, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: 1. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and recommended penalty as _ detailed in the Recommended Order are hereby adopted. 2. Respondent is not guilty of engaging in the unlicensed practice of landscape architecture and electrical contracting. . 3. This Final Order shall become effective on the date of filing with the Agency Clerk of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation. DONE AND ORDERED this ogee, of (Octien. 2008. W. Drago, Secretary Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Center 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0750
Appeal For This Case Unless expressly waived, any party adversely affected by this Final Order may seek judicial review by filing an original Notice of Appeal with the Clerk of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, and a copy of the notice, accompanied by the filing fees prescribed by law, with the clerk of the appropriate District Court of Appeal within 30 days of the effective date of this order, in accordance with Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Section 120.68, Florida Statutes. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE | hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Final Order has been provided via U.S. Mail to Respondent, Todd Boetzel and Boetzel Landscaping, Inc., c/o Gregory T. Elliott, Esquire, Elliott-Berger, P.A., 7310 Gulf Boulevard, St. Petersburg, Florida 33706, wie ny of CC 2008. SARAH WACHMAN, AGENCY CLERK By: Mush Ah Min Brandy Nichols, Deputy Clerk Copies furnished to: Reginald D. Dixon, Informal Hearing Officer Sorin Ardelean, Assistant General Counsel Division of Regulation, Bureau of Unlicensed Activity Daniel Manry, Administrative Law Judge, Division of Administrative Hearings, 1230 Apalachee Parkway, Tallahassee, FL 32399-3060 Steven Petrozak, d/b/a Southern Cross Construction, 6435 92" Place #901, Pinellas Park, Florida 33782
The Issue Whether Petitioner's applications for two outdoor advertising signs in Sumter County, Florida, should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this permitting dispute, Petitioner, Rite Media Enterprises, Inc., seeks the issuance of two state sign permits from Respondent, Department of Transportation (DOT). In preliminary decisions dated August 24, 1998, DOT denied the applications on the ground the land owners had not given Petitioner permission to place the signs on their property. As an additional ground, DOT alleged that one sign violated the spacing requirements by being "[i]n conflict with a[n] existing permitted sign." Petitioner contends, however, that it has two legally enforceable leases with the property owners, and that its applications should be approved. If the applications are approved, the signs would be placed on two parcels of property near Interstate 75 in Sumter County, Florida, one on the east side and one on the west side of the highway. Both parcels are owned by Intervenors, William and Debra Farkus. On July 29, 1998, Dan Hucke, a real estate representative for Petitioner, was "scouting" for suitable billboard locations and decided that Intervenors' property would be a desirable location. After Hucke discussed the matter with Intervenors, the parties agreed to execute lease agreements that day for the two parcels of property in question. A copy of the lease agreements is found in Petitioner's Exhibits 1 and 2 received in evidence. In Hucke's presence, both Debra and William Farkus executed each lease agreement and a Notice of Lease. The documents reflect that only one person, Hucke, served as a witness. Hucke then carried the agreements to Petitioner's president, who executed the agreements on behalf of the corporation. In addition, Hucke's wife, a notary public, placed her seal on the Notice of Lease indicating that the signatures had been signed in her presence after an oath was administered to the lessors. Intervenors were not present when the documents were notarized. The day after the documents were executed, Debra Farkus contacted Hucke by telephone. Hucke told her he would be in the area the following Monday (August 2) and they could "work out" any problems she might have with the agreements. The same day (July 30), Debra Farkus faxed a handwritten letter to Hucke advising him to "[c]ancel the lease as per our conversation immediately," and to not "record them as per our conversation." After receiving the cancellation notice, Hucke met briefly with the Intervenors, but contended at hearing that he could not recall the substance of that conversation. On the other hand, William Farkus testified that in that meeting he again reiterated his desire for the agreements to be cancelled. In any event, Hucke acknowledged that he left the meeting with the impression that the Intervenors objected to the agreements. Despite receiving the foregoing notice and oral advice from Intervenors, Hucke nonetheless believed he had valid leases. Whether he recorded the leases is not of record. However, he promptly filed two applications for sign permits with the DOT, and he enclosed a copy of the lease agreements to evidence the fact that he had the permission of the property owners. When a DOT inspector conducted a preliminary investigation of the applications, he learned that Intervenors did not consent to having the signs on their property. Under long-standing DOT policy (since at least 1992), when this type of dispute occurs, which the inspector says happens "[a]ll the time," it requires that the applicant either submit an affidavit (or present testimony at a hearing) evidencing the fact that the property owners have consented to the placement of a sign on their property, or submit an order of a circuit court reflecting that the lease agreement is enforceable. Where a dispute such as this occurs, in no circumstance does DOT attempt to construe the legal sufficiency of a lease agreement or adjudicate the rights of a party under a lease agreement. The foregoing policy is applied by the agency on a statewide basis, without discretion, and it has a logical and rational basis, particularly since an administrative agency lacks jurisdiction to construe contracts or make property-right determinations. At the hearing, Intervenors again stated that they did not authorize Petitioner to place its signs on their property. In addition, Petitioner did not submit a court order indicating that enforceable leases between the parties existed. DOT presented testimony which established that the proposed sign location in Case No. 98-4459T would violate statutory spacing requirements because the location conflicted with an existing nearby sign. There was no evidence to contradict this assertion.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order denying the applications for state sign permits filed by Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of September, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675, SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of September, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Department of Transportation ATTN: James C. Myers, Clerk of Agency Proceedings 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Andrew B. Thomas, Esquire Post Office Box 4961 Orlando, Florida 32802-4961 Kelly A. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802-2151 Pamela S. Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact On January 23, 1985, following the filing of the and its on-site inspection, DER issued its notice of intent to grant the air construction permit, pursuant to Chapter 403, Florida Statutes (F.S.), and Chapters 17-2 and 17-4, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C.). The notice stated that the proposed equipment, with a cyclone primary dust collector followed by a Dustex Baghouse Model DW-14-28W dust collector, was adequate to insure compliance with DER particulate emission standards. The ambient air standards for sulfur dioxide emissions by the plant were to be controlled by the use of low sulfur fuel oil (maximum 0.5 percent sulfur). Subsequent to the issuance of the notice of intent, DER received a Petition for Administrative Hearing regarding the issuance of the permit. The petition alleged, inter alia, that the plant would emit particulates and gases in contravention of Chapter 17-2, F.A.C., and that stormwater run-off from the plant would be contaminated with oil, scum and debris. The petition further asserted that this run-off would cause water pollution in contravention of Chapters 17-3 and 17-25, F.A.C., and would introduce pollution into Dry Branch and Bayou George, a Class I Water. The permit application covers only the proposed batch plant site and the immediately adjacent property consisting of 2.15 acres. The location of the building would be at the northern end of the parcel, approximately 0.10 miles from both Star Avenue and U.S. Highway 231. There is no residential use of property immediately adjacent to the project site. However, Petitioners all reside in the immediate area, and will be affected to some extent by this facility. Dust from construction activity has already been experienced. In this regard, it must be recognized that the area has no zoning restrictions and is therefore subject to industrial uses such as that proposed here. The Applicant owns several acres of property surrounding the location of the proposed batch plant. The permit application at issue covers only the request to construct the facility on a 2.15 acre portion of the larger parcel. Anticipated environmental problems caused by activity not on the immediate parcel are not related to this permit application and thus are not germane to a determination whether the permit should be issued or denied. Further, the construction permit will only allow the applicant to build the proposed air pollution source. Before such a source can actually be operated, a separate operation permit application must be made, and testing for compliance with standards by the facility must be satisfactorily completed. Petitioners demonstrated that the individuals who own Triangle Construction Company, Inc. were previously employed by Gulf Asphalt Company, which was occasionally out of compliance with state air emission standards. Petitioners asserted that these individuals would likely fail to operate the proposed facility in compliance with DER standards. Although these individuals did have managerial responsibility at Gulf Asphalt, final decisions concerning financial expenditures for repairs and maintenance were made by the owner of the plant, rather than the Applicant's owners. It was also established that the Gulf Asphalt Plant continued to have emission problems after such individuals left as employees. Petitioners contend the Applicant's unrelated dredging activities in an adjacent borrow pit area caused turbidity in Dry Branch Creek, and characterized the Applicant as a habitual violator who could not be expected to comply with state pollution control regulations in the operation of the proposed facility. Testimony revealed that the Applicant constructed a culvert in Dry Branch, which flows through a borrow pit area and did some other incidental dredging in areas within the landward extent of waters of the state. However, when the Applicant became aware that activities in the proposed borrow pit area were potentially in violation of DER rules, it ceased activities and applied for the appropriate permits. An asphalt concrete batch plant is a relatively simple operation in which sand and aggregate are dried, then mixed with hot liquid asphalt and loaded directly into trucks. It is the drying process which emits the particulates which the cyclone and the baghouse are designed to control. Baghouse operations are similar to those of a vacuum cleaner. Particulate-laden air from the drying process is vented into the baghouse, where it is filtered through a number of cloth bags. The bags trap the particulates, and pass the filtered air through the bag cloth and out of the building. When enough air has been filtered to cause a build-up of trapped particulates, a portion of the baghouse is taken off cycle and reverse air is blown through the bags. The reverse air causes the trapped particulates to fall into a hopper where they are removed for disposal. The baghouse was designed to function efficiently in conjunction with a plant producing up to 120 tons per hour of asphalt concrete. Applicants's plant will produce only 80-85 tons of asphalt concrete per hour due to the limited size of the dryer. The estimated air to cloth ratio in the amended permit application is 6:1, which will result in emissions substantially lower than DER standards. Air to cloth ratio is not a specific standard or requirement, but is a figure which is used by engineers to determine projected emissions which may reasonably be anticipated from facilities which use an air pollution control mechanism. A projected air to cloth ratio of 6:1 for this baghouse may be reasonably expected to yield emissions of approximately 0.014 micrograms per dry cubic foot, which is approximately one-third of the DER standard of 0.04 mg. per dry cubic foot. The equipment to be installed is used and in need of minor repairs. The testimony established that necessary repairs will be accomplished prior to plant activation, and that operations will not be adversely affected when such repairs are complete.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Regulation issue a final order granting Triangle Construction Company an air construction permit. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of June, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of June, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Lynn C. Higby, Esquire BRYANT, HIGBY & WILLIAMS, P.A. Post Office Box 124 Panama City, Florida 32402 E. Gary Early, Esquire and Clare E. Gray, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blairstone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard Smoak, Esquire SALE, BROWN & SMOAK Post Office Box 1579 Panama City, Florida 32402 Victoria Tschinkel, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blairstone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether a reasonable attorney's fee should be assessed against Respondents, Paul and Barbara Corbiey, and their attorneys, and awarded to Petitioner, Action Instant Concrete, LLC (AIC), under Section 57.105, Florida Statutes,2 after the Corbieys unsuccessfully challenged AIC's use the Concrete Batching Plant Air General Permit promulgated by the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) in Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-210.300(4)(a)2.3
Findings Of Fact No Service Without Filing AIC made no motion or request for attorney's fees under Section 57.105, Florida Statutes, prior to the filing of proposed recommended orders (PROs) in DOAH Case 05-2891. The joint PRO filed by DEP and AIC in DOAH Case 05-2891 proposed a reservation of jurisdiction to enter an award of costs and attorney fees to DEP and AIC pursuant to Section 57.105(1) and (5), Florida Statutes. The Recommended Order in DOAH Case 05-2891 granted the request and retained jurisdiction to consider a motion for costs and attorney fees under Section 57.105, Florida Statutes, if filed within 30 days after issuance of the Final Order. AIC did not serve a motion seeking sanctions under Section 57.105, Florida Statutes, without filing it, prior to either its PRO in Case 05-2891 or its Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees, which was filed within 30 days of the Final Order in Case 05-2891 and initiated this Case 06-1552F. Failure to Present Evidentiary Record Under a pre-hearing Order entered in this case, AIC was required to present the evidentiary record from DOAH Case 05- 2891, which had been transmitted to DEP, for use in this case. AIC failed to present the evidentiary record. But no findings made in this Final Order require the evidentiary record (i.e., the exhibits) from Case 05-2891, and AIC was not required to present a transcript of the final hearing in that case since the hearing had not been transcribed. Unsupported Claims AIC proved that some claims raised by the Corbieys in DOAH Case 05-2891 were not supported by the material facts necessary to establish the claims. The Corbieys had and presented no evidence to prove that visual emissions (VE) in excess of five percent opacity occurred during cement loading of the silo, which is the demonstration clearly established by Rule 62-296.414(1) for determining compliance of stack emissions. Their entire case on that issue was based on two claims: questioning the veracity of the VE Observations Report, primarily by speculating that the certified technician who performed the test may have fabricated the observations, either with or without his employer's knowledge; and questioning the consistent and reasonable testimony of all the experts that valid, authorized VE observations could not be performed using Petitioners' videotapes. The first claim was speculation and was rejected as unfounded; and, besides having no evidence to counter the expert testimony on the inability to use videotapes for the stack emission demonstration, the videotape presented in evidence by the Corbieys did not even show loading of the silo. As a result, Petitioners presented no evidence that VE in excess of five percent opacity occurred during cement loading of the silo, or that AIC's stack emission demonstration was invalid. AIC proved that some claims raised by the Corbieys in Case 05-2891--specifically, claims relating to zoning, the location and hours of operation of AIC's facility, local construction permitting and licensing, roadway debris, diesel truck emissions, noise, and bright lights on trucks and on a billboard on the property--were not supported by the application of then-existing law to the material facts necessary to establish the claims, and were not presented as a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law, as it applied to the material facts, with a reasonable expectation of success were stricken as irrelevant. The other claims made by the Corbieys in DOAH Case 05-2891 either were supported by the application of then-existing law to the material facts necessary to establish the claims, or were presented as a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law, as it applied to the material facts, with a reasonable expectation of success.
The Issue The issue is whether appellant's application for a conditional use permit should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the entire record, the following findings of fact are determined: Appellant, Nostimo, Inc. (appellant, applicant or Nostimo), is the owner of Lots 8, 9, 10 and 11, Block 8, Revised Plat of Clearwater Beach Subdivision, located at 32 Bay Esplanade, Clearwater Beach, Florida. The property is subject to the land use requirements codified in the City of Clearwater Code of Ordinances (code or city code). By application filed on April 25, 1989 appellant sought the issuance of a conditional use permit from appellee, City of Clearwater (City or appellee). If approved, the permit would authorize the sale of beer and wine for off-premises consumption by a Pick Kwik Food Store to be constructed on the property under a lease agreement between appellant and Pick Kwik, Inc. Appellant's property is properly zoned for a retail establishment (CB or Beach Commerical), and it needs no further zoning permits from the City in order to convert the existing structures on the property to a convenience store. Indeed, appellant has already received approval for the construction and operation of the store. However, under subsection 137.024(b) of the city code, appellant is required to obtain a conditional use permit because it intends to engage in the sale of packaged beer and wine for off-premises consumption. In order to obtain such a permit the applicant must satisfy a number of criteria embodied in the code. The parties have stipulated that, with the exception of one standard, all other relevant criteria have been met. The disputed standard requires that "the use shall be compatible with the surrounding area and not impose an excessive burden or have a substantial negative impact on surrounding or adjacent uses or on community facilities or services." It is noted that appellant must secure the necessary land use permit from the City before it can obtain the alcoholic beverage license from the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. The application was considered by the Clearwater Planning and Zoning Board (Board) on June 13, 1989 and denied by a 5-0 vote with one member abstaining. As a basis for the denial, the Board adopted a staff report that concluded that "due to the beach area being saturated with this use (sale of alcoholic beverages), public nuisances requiring police action are taxing community services." It further concluded that the proliferation of this activity "has a substantial negative impact on surrounding or adjacent uses or on community facilities and services, specifically police services in handling nuisances related to alcoholic beverage establishments." Members of the public who testified in opposition to the application expressed concern over increased traffic in the area, the glare of lights from a 24 hours per day establishment, and potential problems arising from customers who will consume the beer and wine during the evening hours. In addition, two letters in opposition to the application were considered by the Board. Finally, besides a presentation by applicant's attorney, two witnesses appeared on behalf of the applicant and established that Pick Wick, Inc. provides security services at its stores, if needed, and training for employees to prevent the sale of alcoholic beverages to minors. The subject property is located on the western side of the intersection of Bay Esplanade and Mandalay Avenue in Clearwater Beach, an elongated strip of land to the west of the mainland portion of the City and separated from the mainland by Clearwater Harbor. Mandalay Avenue runs north and south through the heart of Clearwater Beach and is a principal traffic artery in that part of the community. The avenue narrows from four to two lanes just south of where the store is to be located. Bay Esplanade is a much shorter street and runs in an east-west direction between the Gulf of Mexico and Clearwater Harbor. In general terms, the property is surrounded by mixed uses and include a 7-11 convenience store immediately across the street to the east, motels and rental apartments, a restaurant, retail businesses and resort facilities, residences, public areas and a city fire station. Maps received in evidence more definitively depict the nature of the uses surrounding Nostimo's property. In addition to a number of commercial establishments within the immediate area, there are also tennis courts, a parking area, community boat ramp, soccer field, playground and public park. Finally, the area is replete with apartments, rental units and condominiums, including some directly behind the proposed establishment. Although there are presently no active businesses located on the subject property, the premises were once occupied by a hotel, apartments, hot dog shop and a small lounge that offered both on and off premises consumption of alcohol. The applicant contends that the proposed use is compatible with both the property's former use and the present surrounding area, particularly since a 7-11 convenience store directly across the street has been in business selling beer and wine for the last twenty-five years, and there are several restaurants or motels within a block that sell alcoholic beverages. The applicant added that, in all, there are approximately fifty-three active alcoholic beverage licenses within two miles of the proposed convenience store. At both the Board hearing and final hearing in this cause, the City Police Department offered testimony in opposition to the issuance of the requested permit. According to the uncontradicted testimony of Lt. Frank Palumbo, who is the Clearwater Beach police department district commander, additional noise, vandalism, traffic congestion and congregation of younger people are expected if the permit is issued. This opinion was based upon his law enforcement experience with other convenience stores on the Beach side that sell beer and wine, including another Pick Wick convenience store. Further, Mandalay Avenue is an important north-south traffic artery in Clearwater Beach, and there are no alternative streets for residents and visitors to use to avoid the traffic build-up that will occur around the store. Lieutenant Palumbo disputed the assertion that the lounge that once occupied a portion of the subject property generated substantial numbers of customers and associated traffic and that the new enterprise is actually a downgrade in use. He pointed out that the former lounge was very small, and a congregation of four or five customers at any one time was a "large crowd." In contrast, the police officer distinguished that situation from the proposed store where the sale of beer and wine around the clock is expected to generate larger volumes of traffic and customers, particularly during the evening hours. Finally, it has been Lt. Palumbo's experience that convenience stores that sell beer and wine attract the younger crowd, including minors, during the late hours of the night, and they create noise and sanitation problems for the adjacent property owners. The witness concluded that all of these factors collectively would have a negative impact on "community services" by placing a greater demand on police resources. This testimony was echoed by a city planner who gave deposition testimony in this cause. The nexus between the sale of alcoholic beverages and increased traffic and noise was corroborated by Daniel Baker, the manager of another Pick Wick store and a former employee of the 7-11 store across the street, who recalled that when beer sales stopped at that store at midnight, the noise and traffic also came to a halt. In this regard, it is noted the proposed store will operate twenty-four hours per day. To the above extent, then, the proposed use is incompatible with the requirements of section 137.011(d)(6). Two other witnesses testified at final hearing in opposition to the application. One, who is a member of a church that lies a block from the proposed store, pointed out without contradiction that a playground sits next to the church and is used by area young people, many of whom use bicycles as their means of transportation. She was concerned that if more traffic is generated by the store, it would make access to the playground more hazardous and discourage the children from using the facility. The second member of the public is concerned that the store will be incompatible with the surrounding area. This is because much of the neighboring area is made up of public areas, apartments, rental units or condominiums, and he contended an establishment selling alcoholic beverages would be inconsistent with those uses.
The Issue As stated by the Administrative Law Judge in her Recommended Order, the issue presented is: "should certain outdoor advertising signs owned by Respondent, Universal Outdoor Atlantic Coast (Universal) be removed as a result of notices of violations brought by Petitioner, Department of Transportation (the Department) against Universal?"
Findings Of Fact After review of the record in its entirety, it is determined that the Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact contained in paragraphs 1-3, 5-17, and 19-20 of the Recommended Order are supported by the record and are accepted and incorporated as if fully set forth herein. Finding of Fact No. 4 is modified and references therein to the lack of competent evidence regarding Volusia County's land use regulations are rejected and deleted as such findings are not supported by the competent substantial evidence in the record and are not in accordance with applicable law. Finding of Fact No. 4 as herein modified is accepted and incorporated as if fully set forth herein. Finding of Fact No. 18 as corrected hereinabove is supported by the record and is accepted as corrected and incorporated as if fully set forth herein.
Conclusions This proceeding was initiated by Requests for Formal Administrative Hearing filed by Respondent, UNIVERSAL OUTDOOR ATLANTIC COAST (hereinafter UNIVERSAL), on January 14, 1999. The requests for an administrative hearing were filed in response to Notices of Violation issued by Petitioner, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (hereinafter DEPARTMENT), on January 7, 1999, for UNIVERSAL'S sign structures located adjacent to US 1 and Interstate 95, in Volusia County, Florida. The Notices were issued because UNIVERSAL unlawfully reerected its nonconforming outdoor advertising signs which were destroyed by fire. The matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings (hereinafter "DOAH"), and DOAH issued its Initial Orders assigning the cases to Suzanne F. Hood, a duly appointed Administrative Law Judge, and setting forth the responsibilities of the parties. On March 4, 1999, the Administrative Law Judge issued an order consolidating the cases. The hearing was conducted in Daytona Beach, Florida, on August 19, 1999, before Suzanne F. Hood, Administrative Law Judge. Appearances on behalf of the parties were as follows: For Petitioner: Robert M. Burdick, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 For Respondent: Aileen M. Reilly, Esquire Livingston & Reilly, P.A. Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802-2151 At the hearing, UNIVERSAL introduced and had accepted into evidence UNIVERSAL'S Exhibit 1, and presented the testimony of one witness. The Administrative Law Judge reserved ruling on the admissibility of UNIVERSAL'S Exhibit 2, which was later accepted in the Administrative Law Judge's Recommended Order. The DEPARTMENT introduced the DEPARTMENT'S Exhibits 1 through 4; Exhibits 1 through 3 were admitted into evidence and Exhibit 4 was denied as irrelevant and inadmissible hearsay. The DEPARTMENT also introduced the trial testimony and portions of the deposition testimony of Michael Kuypers presented in cases consolidated under DOAH Case No. 99-0486T, as the DEPARTMENT'S Exhibit 5. The testimony of two additional witnesses was presented by the DEPARTMENT. A transcript was prepared and filed subsequent to the hearing. On October 27, 1999, the Administrative Law Judge issued her Recommended Order. Exceptions to the Recommended Order were filed by UNIVERSAL on November 10, 1999, and the DEPARTMENT filed its response to UNIVERSAL'S exceptions on November 18, 1999. The DEPARTMENT filed exceptions to the Recommended Order on November 4, 1999, and UNIVERSAL filed its response to the DEPARTMENT'S exceptions on November 15, 1999.
Appeal For This Case THIS ORDER CONSTITUTES FINAL AGENCY ACTION AND MAY BE APPEALED BY ANY PARTY PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.68, FLORIDA STATUTES, AND RULES 9.110 AND 9.190, FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, BY FILING A NOTICE OF APPEAL CONFORMING TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 9.110(d), FLORIDA RULED OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, BOTH WITH THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, ACCOMPANIED BY THE APPROPRIATE FILING FEE, AND WITH THE DEPARTMENT'S CLERK OF AGENCY PROCEEDINGS, HAYDON BURNS BUILDING, 605 SUWANNEE STREET, M.S. 58, TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 323990458, WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS OF RENDITION OF THIS ORDER. Copies furnished to: Robert M. Burdick, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Peter Wright District Five ODA Administrator 719 South Woodland Boulevard DeLand, Florida 32721-0057 Juanice Hagan Assistant State Right of Way Manager for Operations Department of Transportation Haydon Bums Building 605 Suwannee Street, MS 22 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Aileen M. Reilly, Esquire Livingston & Reilly, P.A. Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802-2151 Suzanne F. Hood Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060
The Issue Whether the State of Florida, Department of Transportation (“Department”), properly denied Wilton Manors Street Systems, Inc.’s (“Wilton Manors”), applications for outdoor advertising sign permits.
Findings Of Fact Wilton Manors is a for-profit corporation authorized to engage in the business of outdoor advertising in the state of Florida. The Department is the agency vested with the responsibility to administer and enforce the provisions of chapter 479, Florida Statutes, including the approval and denial of applications for permits for outdoor advertising signs that are located within 660 feet of the State Highway system, interstate, or federal-aid primary system. In July 2012, Wilton Manors entered into a lease agreement with the City of Boynton Beach (“City”) for the construction of a two-sided billboard on a portion of real estate owned by the City on the east side of Interstate 95, located at 510 Northwest 14th Court, Boynton Beach, Florida. The site is located in an area commonly known as the City of Boynton Beach Public Works Site. The Public Works Site consists of two parcels bordered by Interstate 95 to its west. The north and south portions of the property totals approximately nine acres. The two parcels are contiguous and have the same zoning and future land use classification. Each parcel consists of approximately four and one-half acres. The subject sign is proposed to be placed on the far northwest section of the southern parcel near the border of the northern and southern parcels. On August 9, 2012, Wilton Manors submitted two applications (application numbers 58994 and 58995) to the Department for a double-faced outdoor advertising sign to be located on the east side of Interstate 95, 0.75 miles north of Boynton Beach Boulevard. The applications were assigned file numbers 58994 and 58995. The applications were complete and the appropriate fee was provided. The proposed sign structures met the size, height, and spacing requirements of section 479.07, Florida Statutes. The proposed sign would be visible and within 660 feet of an interstate. On September 6, 2012, the Department issued Wilton Manors a Notice of Denied Outdoor Advertising Permit Application, advising that Wilton Manors’ applications for double-faced outdoor advertising sign permits were not approved because of the following reasons: Location is not permittable under land use designations of site. [s.479.111(2), FS] Location does not qualify as unzoned commercial/industrial area. [s.479.01(26), FS] On December 14, 2012, Wilton Manors filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing to challenge the Department’s denial of its applications. By agreement of the parties, referral of the petition to the DOAH was deferred. In 2014, while the petition remained pending before the Department, statutory changes were made to chapter 479, to include a new section 479.024, effective July 1, 2014. After the new law became effective, Wilton Manors supplemented its permit applications and submitted additional information to the Department. The supplemental information provided by Wilton Manors to the Department in response to the statutory changes included a certification from Michael Rumpf, the City’s Planning and Zoning Director since 1999. Mr. Rumpf completed the portion of the Department’s application regarding land use, certifying the designation of the Future Land Use Map for the parcel as Public, Private Governmental and Institutional (“P, PG & I”), and the current zoning of the parcel as Public Usage (“PU”). Mr. Rumpf confirmed that the parcel is in an industrial zone or commercial zone in accordance with the new statute. Mr. Rumpf certified and checked the box “yes” under the question: “Does the referenced property qualify as a commercial or industrial parcel as defined in section 479.024, F.S. and section 14-10.0052, F.A.C.” Prior to executing the verification form, Mr. Rumpf reviewed the new statute and definitions of industrial use and commercial use in the statute. The Department requested that its expert in the area of land use and comprehensive zoning, David Depew, review the supplemental application and information submitted by Wilton Manors to the Department and determine whether the proposed parcel is in an industrial zone or commercial zone as defined in the new section 479.024. Mr. Depew concluded that it is not, and therefore, the Department did not alter its initial decision to deny Wilton Manors’ permit application based on the changes to chapter 479. The central factual issue to be determined in this case by the undersigned is whether the subject parcel is located within a commercial or industrial zone as defined in section 479.024. The City determined that the parcel is located within a commercial or industrial zone, in compliance with chapter 163, Florida Statutes. The parcel is appropriate for commerce, industry, or trade. The parcel is comprehensively zoned PU, and the City’s land development regulations include commercial or industrial uses as allowable uses. The parcels were previously used by the City for its wastewater treatment plant. The parcels continue to be actively used by the City for industrial uses and as an industrial site for the staging of waste collection, vegetative debris, recycling activities, and the storage of equipment, materials, and supplies in connection with the City’s solid waste management system and public works. Many large industrial waste-type dumpsters and recycling bins are located on the parcels. The storage of the recycling bins is part of the City’s recycling service which generates revenue for the City. Large trucks access the property on a regular basis. An existing cell tower on the northern parcel services both public and private users. The parcel can reasonably accommodate a commercial or industrial use under the future land use map of the City’s comprehensive plan and land development regulations. Sufficient utilities are available to support commercial or industrial development. The public access to the parcel is sufficient to accommodate a commercial or industrial use. Currently, the City utilizes large commercial trucks in its conduct of the aforementioned industrial operations. The parcel is not being used exclusively for noncommercial or nonindustrial uses. In sum, the persuasive evidence establishes that the parcel is located within a commercial or industrial zone.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order granting Wilton Manors’ applications for outdoor advertising sign permits (application numbers 58994 and 58995) and issue the requested outdoor advertising permits. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of January, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of January, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: J. Stephen Menton, Esquire Rutledge Ecenia, P.A. Suite 202 119 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Susan Schwartz, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Mail Stop 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 (eServed) Andrea Shulthiess, Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Mail Stop 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 (eServed) Tom Thomas, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Mail Stop 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 (eServed) James C. Boxold, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Mail Stop 57 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 (eServed)
The Issue Whether the Ochlocknee Management Corporation has demonstrated that development rights in certain real property it owns have vested against the provisions of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan?
Findings Of Fact The Initial Purchase. In January, 1986, Ochlocknee Management Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "Ochlocknee"), began negotiations for the purchase and development of land located on Buck Lake Road (hereinafter referred to as the "Buck Lake Property"). On January 25, 1986, a document indicating an intent to sell 100 acres of the Buck Lake Property to Ochlocknee was executed. On October 31, 1986, a Contract for Sale was entered into between Ochlocknee and the owners of the Buck Lake Property. Pursuant to the Contract for Sale, Ochlocknee agreed to purchase 100 acres of the Buck Lake Property (hereinafter referred to as the "100 Acres"). The 100 Acres were to be developed in three phases by Ochlocknee. The development was named Avondale. In February of 1987, the 100 Acres were rezoned and platted. The Development of Units I, II and III. Development of Avondale Unit I began in March, 1987. In August, 1987, the Unit I plat was recorded. All roads, utilities and storm water for Unit I were complete. In April, 1988, development of Avondale Unit II began. The development of Unit II began approximately 8 months after the Unit I plat was recorded. In October, 1988, the Unit II plat was recorded. All roads, utilities and storm water for Unit II were complete. In May, 1989, development of Avondale Unit III began. The development of Unit III began approximately 7 months after the Unit II plat was recorded. In November, 1989, the Unit III plat was recorded. All roads, utilities and storm water for Unit III were complete. During the construction of Unit III Ochlocknee intended to purchase an additional parcel of the Buck Lake Property. This property was to be developed as additional phases or units of the Avondale development, including Avondale Unit IV, the development which is the subject of this proceeding. When constructed, the main road running through Units I, II and III was intended to continue through, and serve, Avondale Unit IV. The road is the only road providing access between Unit IV and Buck Lake Road. Utilities for Unit III were designed and stubbed to serve Unit IV. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that any action which Leon County took in approving the development of Units I, II, or III could have been reasonably relied upon by Ochlocknee in its development of Unit IV. Most of Leon County's actions in approving the development of Avondale were taken before the Unit IV property was even purchased. Additionally, the evidence failed to prove that Leon County specifically reviewed any plans concerning Ochlocknee's plans to develop Unit IV until after the preliminary plat for Unit IV was filed for approval. The Second Purchase. In November, 1988, Ochlocknee began negotiations for the purchase of the additional parcel of the Buck Lake Property to be developed as Unit IV. The property consisted of 40.5 acres and was to be developed as Unit IV, the development at issue in this proceeding, and Unit V. In March, 1989, the owners of the 40.5 acres applied for rezoning of the 40.5 acre parcel from A-2 (agricultural use) to R-1 (residential use). In March, 1989, Ochlocknee entered into a Contract for Sale and Option, pursuant to which Ochlocknee was to purchase the 40.5 acres. Unit IV was to consist of 10 acres of the parcel. The 10 acres abut Unit III. The remaining 30.5 acres of the parcel were to be developed as Unit V. In May, 1989, the 40.5 acre parcel was rezoned as R-1, limited use. The zoning limited septic tanks on the property to 2.2 units per acre. On June 27, 1989, Ochlocknee purchased the 10 acres to be developed as Unit IV. The Regional Stormwater Facility. In April, 1988, Poole & Associates, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Poole"), prepared plans and designs for a regional stormwater facility for 126 acres of the Buck Lake Property. Poole provided the engineers for Avondale. The plan developed by Poole was intended to handle stormwater for all of Units II and III, all of what was to be Unit IV, part of what was to be Unit V and part of the Buck Lake Property which was not to be developed by Ochlocknee. This regional stormwater facility will hereinafter be referred to as the "Stormwater Facility". The plans and designs for the Stormwater Facility were completed before Unit IV was purchased by Ochlocknee and before Unit IV was rezoned from A-2 to R-1. In July, 1989, Ochlocknee began construction of the Stormwater Facility. Ponds used in the Stormwater Facility are located on Unit III. In November, 1989, when the Unit III plat was recorded, the Stormwater Facility was substantially completed. The Stormwater Facility was generally approved upon the recording of the Unit III plat. Recording of the Unit III plat and the approval of the Stormwater Facility only applied to the use of the Stormwater Facility for Unit III. The use of the Stormwater Facility for Unit IV was not approved or even reviewed by Leon County in November, 1989. Ochlocknee was required to maintain the Stormwater Facility for an additional year after it was approved for Unit III. After approval of the Stormwater Facility for Unit III, problems arose with the Stormwater Facility. These problems began as early as August, 1989 based upon an August 31, 1989, letter from Broward Davis & Assoc., Inc., to Ochlocknee. In a letter dated November 22, 1989, from the Respondent's engineering inspectors, Poole was provided with a "punch list" of problems associated with Units I, II and III, including problems associated with the Stormwater Facility. The punch list was developed during a meeting held on November 21, 1989. Ochlocknee informed Leon County that the problems raised in the letter referred to in finding of fact 29 would be resolved in 30 days. The problems continued, however, into 1990. Efforts continued during the remainder of 1989 and early 1990 to resolve the problems. On January 17, 1990, a new Environmental Management Act became effective in Leon County. Ochlocknee was required to insure that its proposed use of the Stormwater Facility for Unit IV complied with the Act. In a letter dated February 22, 1990, Leon County notified Poole that preliminary plans for the development of Unit IV which had been submitted to Leon County had been reviewed. Poole was informed that additional information concerning the preliminary site plans was needed before Unit IV could be approved for development. Among other things, Leon County informed Poole that additional information concerning the use of the Stormwater Facility for Unit IV would have to be submitted. Unit IV Development. In October, 1988, Poole prepared a preliminary site plan for the development of Unit IV. These plans were prepared before the property which constitutes Unit IV was purchased or rezoned from A-2 to R-1. On June 27, 1989, Ochlocknee purchased the 10 acres of Unit IV for $104,956.50. In November, 1989, Ochlocknee entered into an agreement with Poole to design roadways, utilities and obtain construction approvals for Unit IV. On December 1, 1989, preliminary plat approval for Unit IV was applied for. The preliminary plat was approved by the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department on January 10, 1990. On January 17, 1990, the City of Tallahassee approved the water distribution plans for Unit IV. On January 12, 1990, the City of Tallahassee agreed to provide water and electrical service for Unit IV. On February 2, 1990, a commitment for a construction loan for Unit IV was received by Ochlocknee. The Leon County comprehensive plan was submitted to the Department of Community Affairs on February 1, 1990. Ochlocknee should have been aware of the drafting of the comprehensive plan and the fact that it had been provided to the Department of Community Affairs for approval. 41 In March, 1990, Poole completed final construction drawings for the Unit IV roadways. In April, 1990, Ochlocknee received contracts for the construction of roadways and utilities for Unit IV. In May, 1990, Poole held an onsite pre-construction conference with Leon County officials, utility providers and construction personnel. Poole placed stakes for clearing limits on Unit IV during May, 1990. On June 29, 1990, Leon County approved roadway construction plans for Unit IV. At the time that the preliminary plat for Unit IV was filed by Ochlocknee for approval, Ochlocknee knew that the Stormwater Facility needed to be modified before development of Unit IV would be approved. Despite this knowledge, Ochlocknee chose to continue to propose that the Stormwater Facility be used for Unit IV. These problems continued throughout the time after the preliminary plat for Unit IV was filed. In May, 1990, Leon County informed Ochlocknee that a permit for clearing and grading, the last permit needed to begin construction, would not be issued until the Stormwater Facility proposed for Unit IV was modified and the problems previously identified by Leon County with the Stormwater Facility in 1989, were corrected. Construction on Unit IV has not commenced. Costs Associated with Unit IV. The cost of rezoning the 10 acres of Unit IV was $2,911.25 plus a $300.00 fee. The $300.00 fee was incurred in March, 1989, before the Unit IV property was purchased or the rezoning had taken place. Therefore, the fee was not incurred in reliance upon any representation from Leon County. The $2,911.25 cost was incurred between October, 1988 and May, 1989. This amount was incurred before the purchase of the Unit IV property or the approval of the rezoning. Therefore, this cost was not incurred in reliance upon any representation from Leon County. The cost of purchasing the 10 acres which are to be developed as Unit IV was $104,956.50. This cost was incurred in June of 1989. The only action taken by Leon County concerning any possible development of Unit IV prior to the time this cost was incurred was to approve rezoning Unit IV from A-2 to R-1. The cost of purchasing the 10 acres of Unit IV was not, therefore, incurred in reliance upon any action of Leon County other than approval of the rezoning of Unit IV. The cost of constructing the Stormwater Facility attributable to Unit IV was approximately $8,000.00. This cost was incurred between July, 1989, and November, 1989. Therefore, the cost was incurred after the Unit IV property was rezoned but before the preliminary plat and the development plans for Unit IV were approved by Leon County. Therefore, the cost of the Stormwater Facility attributable to the Unit IV property was not incurred in reliance upon any action of Leon County other than approval of the rezoning of Unit IV. Ochlocknee failed to present sufficient evidence to conclude what expenses were incurred by it in stubbing the road and utilities that run through Units I, II, and III are attributable to Unit IV. The weight of the evidence also failed to prove when any such expenses were incurred. These expenses were incurred sometime after the development of Unit I began (before the Unit IV property was acquired or rezoned) and sometime before Unit III was completed (before the preliminary plat for Unit IV was approved). Therefore, any expenses attributable to Unit IV for the road and utilities were incurred before Leon County took any action with regard to the development of Unit IV or were incurred only in reliance upon the rezoning of the Unit IV property. Engineering, surveying and permitting costs associated with Unit IV totalled $13,384.49. These costs were incurred between January, 1990 and May, 1990. Prior to the expenditure of these funds Leon County had approved the rezoning of Unit IV, the preliminary plat and some of the other plans for the development of Unit IV. All of these costs were incurred after Ochlocknee had been informed that there was a problem with the Stormwater Facility. All of the engineering costs were incurred before Leon County had indicated that it would approve the development of Unit IV. On April 25, 1990, Ochlocknee refinanced the note for the 10 acres of Unit IV. The new note was for $219,750.00. This amount was borrowed to refinance the cost of purchasing the 10 acres and to pay construction costs for the development of Unit IV. The funds intended for construction costs for Unit IV have not, however, been expended. The weight of the evidence failed to prove what costs Ochlocknee incurred in obtaining the $219,750.00 note. All of the costs incurred by Ochlocknee relating to the development of Unit IV were incurred in an effort to obtain approval from Leon County for the development of Unit IV. The costs were incurred before any representation from Leon County that development of Unit IV would be allowed to proceed. Some of the costs were incurred before the Unit IV property was rezoned from an agricultural use to R-1. Leon County had taken no action before approval of the rezoning. Some of the costs were incurred only in reliance upon the rezoning of the Unit IV property. Finally, all of the costs were incurred in an effort to obtain approval to develop Unit IV and before Leon County indicated through any action that development of the property would be allowed to proceed. These costs were incurred at a time when Ochlocknee should have known that the development of Unit IV would probably have to be consistent with the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Procedure. On or about August 1, 1990, Ochlocknee filed an Application for Vested Rights Determination (hereinafter referred to as the "Application"), with Leon County. The following information concerning the development of Unit IV was contained on the Application: "Ochlocknee Management" is listed as the "Owner/Agent." Question 3 of the Application requests the name of the project, including the name and address of each owner of, and interested party in, the project or property. "AVONDALE UNIT IV" was included as the response to question 3. The project is described as "22 Residential Lots on 10 acres, Proposed with Public Road, Water, and Recorded Plat." The project location is described as "AVONDALE WAY, SOUTH OF AVONDALE III." Total project costs are estimated at "$226,205.95" and it is estimated that "$126,952,24 " have been expended to date. "Progress . . . Towards Completion" is described as: (1) all utility site, drainage plans completed as of May 4, 1990; (2) preliminary plat approval 1/10/90, water plans approved 2/1/90 and environmental permit 6/27/90; and (3) the drainage facility located in Unit III is complete. "Preliminary Plat, Water Plan Approval, Environm. Permits" are included as forms of "government approval." The response to question 10 of the Application, which requests information concerning government action relied upon prior to committing funds towards completing the project, was "[s]ubdivision Ordinance for Preliminary Plat, The Letter of Agreement, Policy & Procedures Manual for Utilities and the Environmental Management Act for the Stormwater Permits." In a letter dated August 7, 1990, Ochlocknee was informed that its Application was being referred to a Staff Committee comprised of Jim English, Mark Gumula, Howard Pardue, Buddie Holshouser and Herb Thiele. By letter dated August 24, 1990, Ochlocknee provided additional information for the Staff Committee to consider. On August 27, 1990, a hearing was held to consider the Application before the Staff Committee. Barry Poole, of Poole, and Jody Elliott, of Ochlocknee, testified. By letter dated August 27, 1990, Mark Gumula, Director of Planning of the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department informed Ochlocknee that the Application had been denied. By letter dated September 5, 1990, to Mr. Gumula, counsel for Ochlocknee appealed the decision to deny the Application. By letter dated October 5, 1990, the Division of Administrative Hearings was requested to provide a Hearing Officer to review this matter. By agreement of the parties, the undersigned allowed the parties to supplement the record in this matter on October 25, 1990. During the hearing before the undersigned Ochlocknee stipulated that it had sought approval of its Application based upon "common law vesting" and not "statutory vesting" as those terms are defined in Leon County Ordinance 90- 31.
