Findings Of Fact Petitioners are Dennis Coulter; J. Larry Hooper; L.C. Dairy, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "L.C. Dairy"); and Wabasso Road Dairy, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Wabasso"). L.C. Dairy is a closely held Florida corporation. Mr. Coulter owns 50 percent of the stock of L.C. Dairy. Mr. Coulter also serves as L.C. Dairy's President. Wabasso is a closely held Florida corporation. Mr. Coulter and Mr. Hooper are officers and directors of Wabasso. Mr. Coulter and Mr. Hooper are, together, the majority stockholders of Wabasso. Between 1988 and 1997, Petitioners operated a dairy known as Willowbrook Farms Dairy, which consisted of approximately 2,000 cattle (hereinafter referred to as the "Dairy"). The Dairy was operated on property owned by Willowbrook Coal Company, d/b/a Willowbrook Farms (hereinafter referred to as "Willowbrook"). Willowbrook is a Pennsylvania general partnership. Mr. James Sartori is the general partner of Willowbrook. Willowbrook owned two adjacent parcels of property located in Brevard County, Florida. One parcel was used by Petitioners for the Dairy (hereinafter referred to as the "Dairy Parcel"). The other parcel, located to the west of the Dairy Parcel, was not directly used for grazing dairy cattle (hereinafter referred to as the "Non-Diary Parcel"). Respondent, St. Johns River Water Management District (hereinafter referred to as the "District"), is a public corporation with regulatory jurisdiction over the administration and enforcement of surface water management systems. On August 13, 1997, the District entered into an Agreement of Purchase and Sale with Willowbrook whereby the District acquired a conservation easement over the Dairy Parcel and acquired the Non-Dairy Parcel in fee (hereinafter referred to as the "Sales Agreement"). The Sales Agreement specifically provided that all cattle on the Dairy Parcel and the Non-Dairy Parcel had to be removed prior to closing. The terms of the Diary Parcel conservation easement also provided that concentrated animal feeding operations, including dairy operations, were prohibited. The total agreed purchase price for the fee interest in the Non-Dairy Parcel and the easement over the Dairy Parcel was $11,500,000.00. While the Sales Agreement was being negotiated by the District, the District was also negotiating with the National Resource Conservation Service (hereinafter referred to as the "NRCS") of the United States Department of Agriculture (hereinafter referred to as the "USDA") to sell a 30-year conservation easement over the Non-Dairy Parcel to the USDA. USDA was interested in purchasing the easement as part of a federally funded program known as the Wetlands Reserve Program. The USDA ultimately agreed to purchase a conservation easement over the Non-Dairy Parcel from the District for $4,200,000.00. This agreement was reached before closing on the Sales Agreement. No agreement was made between the District and the USDA specifying that the District would provide relocation assistance to any persons displaced as a result of the USDA's purchase of a conservation easement over the Non-Dairy Parcel. The Sales Agreement contained the following contingency: (B) This Agreement is contingent on Buyer entering into an Agreement with the United States of America for funding of a portion of the purchase price of the Conservation Easement for the Restrictions Parcel [the Non-Dairy Parcel] through the Wetlands Reserve Program of the Commodity Credit Corporation. On March 26, 1998, the USDA wired $4,200,000.00 to the District's Land Acquisition Revenue Bonds Project Funds Account. These funds were intended to be used for USDA's purchase of the conservation easement over the Non-Dairy Parcel. Closing on the Sales Agreement took place on March 30, 1998. Closing was initially held for the District's purchase of the fee interest in the Non-Dairy Parcel and the purchase of the conservation easement over the Dairy Parcel. Immediately after the completion of District's closing, a second closing was held on the purchase of the conservation easement over the Non-Dairy Parcel by the USDA. Disbursement of all purchase funds, including the $4,200,000.00 remitted by the USDA to the District and $7,300,000.00 in District funds, took place on March 31, 1998. The net result of the closings on the Sales Agreement was that the District purchased a conservation easement over the Dairy Parcel and the underlying fee interest in the Non-Dairy Parcel for $7,300,000.00 and the USDA purchased a conservation easement over the Non-Dairy Parcel from the District for $4,200,000.00. Pursuant to the terms of the Sales Agreement Petitioners were required to relocate their dairy operations. They incurred substantial costs in doing so. On or about April 9, 1998, Petitioners requested relocation assistance under the "Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act" 42 U.S.C. Sections 4601 et seq. (hereinafter referred to as the "Relocation Assistance Act"), and Section 421.55, Florida Statutes, from the District. By letter dated May 8, 1998, the District informed Petitioners that their request for relocation assistance was denied. On or about June 22, 1998, Petitioners filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing with the District challenging the denial of their request for relocation assistance. The Petition was filed by the District with the Division of Administrative Hearings by Notice filed July 14, 1998.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the St. Johns River Water Management District denying Petitioners request for relocation assistance pursuant to the Relocation Assistance Act and Section 421.55, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of September, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth G. Oertel, Esquire Oertel, Hoffman, Fernandez & Cole, P.A. Post Office Box 1110 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1110 John W. Williams, Esquire Stanley J. Niego, Esquire St. Johns River Water Management District Post Office Box 1429 Palatka, Florida 32178-1429 Dykes C. Everett, Esquire Robert P. Major, Esquire Winderweedle, Haines, Ward and Woodman, P.A. 1500 NationsBank Center 390 North Orange Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Henry Dean, Executive Director St. Johns Water River Management District Highway 100, West Post Office Box 1429 Palatka, Florida 32178-1429
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a recipient of benefits disbursed by the Respondent and herein challenges the department's practice with the administering of "shelter" payments in the Respondent's Program of Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC). The Petitioner is a mother who presently receives full AFDC shelter assistance payments through this program. In March of 1977 she applied for these benefits and was initially determined to be ineligible. The basis of this ineligibility was the interpretation, by the department, of its rules that shelter payments were available only to recipients who had a payments obligation on the dwelling in which they lived. In other words, the Petitioner was determined to be ineligible for payments because she did not live in the same house for which she had a mortgage obligation. The department construes its rules in its Assistance Payments Manual to restrict shelter payments only to recipients who actually live in the dwelling for which they are obligated to make payments. The Petitioner later moved into the dwelling for which she makes a mortgage payment. At that time she was ruled eligible for payments and received monthly assistance payments. In addition, the Petitioner was granted retroactive sustenance payments from the date of her initial application. The Petitioner alleges that the Assistance Payments Manual promulgated by the department and used by its staff members is an invalid rule in that it fits the definition of a rule in Section 120.52(14), F.S., and has not been formally adopted through rulemaking proceedings as required by Chapter 120, F.S. The department acknowledges that the Assistance Payments Manual has not been adopted as a rule pursuant to Chapter 120, F.S., the Administrative Procedure Act. This case went to final hearing on December 21 , 1977, at Orlando, Florida. The Petitioner did not appear at that proceeding. Testimony was taken from Cheri Beck, a payments supervisor for the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. Also, the deposition of Ms. Beck taken on December 19, 1977, was received into evidence. An additional deposition, that of Sylvia McElroy, another employee of the Respondent, was also received. After reviewing the submissions and the testimony received, it is the determination of the undersigned that the Petitioner has not demonstrated that she is substantially affected by the alleged rule and has inadequate standing to maintain this proceeding. The crucial aspect of the Petitioner's circumstance is that although she was initially determined to be ineligible for assistance payments because of the restrictions in the Assistance Payments Manual, she was later granted eligibility and issued retroactive payments. Therefore at the time this matter went to hearing the Petitioner was not adversely affected by any determination of the Respondent based upon the use of their Assistance Payments Manual. The Petitioner has suffered no loss which can be attributed to the alleged rule. Without having adequately demonstrated that she is Substantially affected by the alleged rule, Petitioner is not entitled to a determination of its validity. The First District Court of Appeal considered this identical question in the case of Florida Department of Offender Rehabilitation v. Leroy Jerry, So.2d , (Case No. FF-303, Jan. 10, 1978). In that opinion the court determined that a Prisoner incarcerated in a State institution was not entitled to a determination of the validity of an alleged rule Since he had not demonstrated he had suffered any hardship because of the operation of the rule. In a similar fashion the Petitioner here has had any possible loss of benefits restored to her by the Respondent. She no longer has cause to receive a resolution of this Petition Pursuant to Section 120.56, F.S. It is, therefore, ORDERED: That the Petition is dismissed. Further, since the Petitioner has no standing to receive a determination of her Petition, no ruling is made on the Proposed findings submitted at the final hearing. DONE and ORDERED this 20th day of January, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. KENNETH G. OERTEL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of January, 1978. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles L. Colbrunn, Esquire Greater Orlando Area Legal Services, Inc. 128 W. Central Boulevard Orlando, Florida 32802 James Mahorner, Esquire Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Carroll Webb, Executive Director Administrative Procedure Committee 120 Holland Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Ms. Liz Cloud Department of State 403 E. Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is entitled to an "in lieu" payment under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (42 U.S.C. 4622) as implemented by I. M. 80-1-71 and amended by P. M. 81-1.2.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Florida department of Transportation, because of the proposed widening of State Road 61, Thomasville Road in Tallahassee, Florida, notified Petitioner in the spring of 1974 that the property on which the business was located was to be taken by the Respondent for road purposes. Petitioner was offered, but did not accept, relocation assistance to move his business to another location or to reimburse him in the amount that a never would charge. Other relocation assistance by the Respondent to find sites which would be appropriate for Petitioner's business was offered and four such sites were presented to Petitioner. Petitioner found the sites undesirable and has located a site at which he intends to move his business. Petitioner contends that the location on Thomasville Road is a good location; that he acquires "walk-in" business from time to time; that the sign on the building is of a type consistent with the limited type of advertising available to members of his profession and is beneficial to him; that the building he rents on Thomasville Road has additional space in which he at one time did rent to other interests, but which rental possibilities were foreclosed upon the general public knowledge that the Respondent would widen Thomasville Road and in the process remove the rental building. Petitioner operates his business from the location and shows that the operation of his consultant service is his sole business. The Petitioner filed for in lieu payments after refusing to accept relocation assistance for the moving of his business Petitioner contends: that nothing in the Act states or implies that a displaced person is required to accept relocation assistance if it is economically unsound; that the Respondent failed to sustain the burden of proof that Petitioner is not entitled to "in lieu" payment under the Act. Respondent contends: that the Petitioner failed to show he is entitled to "in lieu" payments under the Act; that the losses such as production costs, rental income, and advertising possibilities are not within the contemplation of the Act.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Whitehall Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Villas Des Chenes, discriminated against Matthew Les Foris, deceased, on the basis of his race in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 3604(a) and/or (b), and Sections 70-77 and 70-176, Pinellas County Code, by not renewing Les Foris’ lease when it expired.
Findings Of Fact Matthew Les Foris, the complainant in this case, was an African-American male and a member of a protected class. Following initiation of the proceedings before the Commission, he passed away on August 23, 2003. Les Foris' granddaughter, Crisella Winder, was appointed as personal representative of his estate, and she was substituted as Petitioner in this matter. Respondent, Whitehall Enterprises, Inc. ("Whitehall or Respondent"), rents dwelling units to the public at various apartment communities in the Clearwater, Florida, area. Among others, Whitehall operates a 38-unit apartment community commonly known by the name Villas Des Chenes Apartments ("Villas Des Chenes"). These units are rented to adults over the age of 55 on a yearly lease basis. Maxine Chartier is general manager and vice-president of Whitehall. She has held this position since 1998, and prior to this position, worked as an assistant to Whitehall’s general manager. James Yopp is the property manager at Villas Des Chenes, as well as at four of the other Whitehall properties in the Clearwater area. He has held this position for about six years, and prior to this position, worked as a maintenance man for the Whitehall properties. He has attended fair housing training. Whitehall does not have a written policy regarding renewals or non-renewal of leases. It does not keep records of incidents at its properties. However, there were regular practices regarding renewals. At Villas Des Chenes, there are fair housing posters in the office and the laundry room describing fair housing practices. They were present when Les Foris lived there and are presently still on display. It was Yopp’s practice to visit Villas Des Chenes on an almost daily basis. He would talk with Chartier nearly every day, reporting events and problems, as needed. The two would discuss what problems there were and, where possible, reach resolutions. Chartier had a process she used in determining when to non-renew a tenancy. She would consider whether there had been problems in the previous year and consider what would work best for the property. Factors considered by Chartier included whether the tenant was unhappy and "bad-mouthing" the company, mistreating staff, getting along with others, doing damage, paying rent late, or an accumulation of those factors. She would rely on what was reported to her by the property manager and her own observations, if any. The ultimate decision to non- renew a tenancy rested with her. On November 13, 2000, Les Foris applied for an apartment at Villas Des Chenes. Yopp accepted the application, along with Les Foris’ advance payment of $200.00. The application was approved, and Les Foris and Respondent entered into a lease for a one-year term commencing December 1, 2000, and ending November 30, 2001. The leasing procedure for Les Foris was the same as that used for other tenants. Approximately 30 days prior to the end of the initial lease’s term, Yopp offered to renew the lease for another one- year term. Yopp and Les Foris signed a renewal on November 30, 2001. Under the terms of the renewal, the lease term was to end on November 30, 2002. Neither the lease nor the renewal provides for an automatic renewal of its terms. Beginning sometime in May 2002, management noticed problems involving Les Foris’ tenancy. In May 2002, Yopp received a call from a tenant who reported that Les Foris was upset with another resident. Yopp subsequently talked with Les Foris, and he complained about an upstairs neighbor on two occasions. Yopp could see no evidence of the causes for the complaints by Les Foris. A couple of days later, Les Foris complained again about the same neighbor. This time, Les Foris threatened to harm the neighbor. Yopp told Les Foris that such conduct by Les Foris would be inappropriate. Although Yopp had handled numerous tenant squabbles during his career as property manager, in none of them had a tenant threatened to harm someone. However, after this incident, Les Foris and the neighbor had no further problems. Subsequently, the neighbor moved out of the complex for unrelated reasons. In addition, Les Foris repeatedly parked his car in spaces not reserved for him. On an almost daily basis when he was not working, Les Foris would park his car in spaces reserved for other tenants. The tenants would call Yopp, who would then ask Les Foris to move the car. Les Foris would then return his car to his proper parking space. The next day, the scenario would repeat itself. Les Foris would explain that he was moving his car so that it could be in the shade. Yopp told Les Foris that such conduct was inappropriate. Yopp testified that he received complaints from two residents about Les Foris. The complaints were from Ruth Poetter and Carmella Eichen. Each of the women complained that Les Foris made them feel uncomfortable, without offering greater explanation. It was a customary practice for many of the residents at Villas Des Chenes to sit outside their units at tables and chairs. Poetter followed this custom. About the time of her complaint to Yopp, Yopp observed that Poetter ceased sitting outside. When Yopp visited the property, Les Foris would complain about Whitehall. Ralph Agliano, a former tenant of Villas Des Chenes, testified that Les Foris would routinely complain about things, and Agliano would attempt to explain them. Yopp reported all problems, including those involving Les Foris, to Chartier. On or about September 15, 2002, Yopp delivered a notice to all tenants, including Les Foris, regarding proposed rent increases that management intended to implement beginning in December 2002. The delivery of that notice was not triggered by the end date of any tenant’s lease and was not an offer to renew. As of September 15, 2002, when the notice about proposed rent increases was delivered to all tenants, no decision had yet been made to renew or not renew Les Foris’ lease. Yopp and Chartier subsequently discussed whether to renew Les Foris’ lease. Chartier decided that, based on the complaints relayed to her about Les Foris in the preceding months, Les Foris' lease would not be renewed when it expired at the end of November 2002. Chartier felt that it was not in the best interest of Whitehall to continue with a tenant who was unhappy with the company, made a threat to harm another tenant, and who made other residents uncomfortable. She did not want the residents of Villas Des Chenes to be afraid. It was an accumulation of things that formed her decision. This process by Chartier, as applied to Les Foris, was the same as that which she used for others. Yopp prepared and issued a notice of non-renewal to the tenant. The notice did not set forth a reason for the non- renewal. Yopp admitted that other tenants also parked in parking spaces other than those assigned to the tenant. In addition, it is anticipated that other tenants have disputes with their neighbors. In the six years Yopp had been property manager at the complex, no residents were non-renewed specifically for either reason. When Les Foris received the notice, he became upset. He asked Yopp to explain the reason for the decision. Yopp declined to give an explanation. In the year that Les Foris received his notice of non-renewal, Yopp delivered notices of non-renewal to three other tenants. In none of them did Yopp give a reason for the non-renewal. The notice of non-renewal given to Les Foris did not differ in form or substance from that used for other tenants. Les Foris spoke with Chartier by phone about the non-renewal. Les Foris asked Chartier the reason for the non-renewal. Chartier also declined to give one stating that she was not required to give a reason. At the hearing, Chartier explained that it was her practice not to explain the reasons for non-renewals. Because the lease did not require a reason, she did not offer one. Discussions about the reasons for non- renewal often lead to arguments and to Chartier, they serve no purpose. During the phone conversation, Les Foris requested reconsideration and, if that failed, then additional time to find a new place to live. He explained to Chartier that he lacked funds and had no one to help him move. Chartier offered to allow some extra time to remain on the premises and to make an early refund of the security deposit. Chartier returned the security deposit to Les Foris by way of a letter dated November 15, 2002. Les Foris filed his complaint of housing discrimination on November 7, 2002. Chartier learned of it after sending him the November 15, 2002, letter. Les Foris moved out of Villas Des Chenes in November 2002. Winder had lost touch with her grandfather for sometime and had "found" him only about two years prior to his death. At the time she formed a bond with Les Foris, he was a tenant at Villas Des Chenes. Les Foris was happy there because he resided close to Winder and her children and was within walking distance of the grocery store where he worked part-time. Winder testified that when Les Foris was informed of the non-renewal, he became upset. He expressed to her his distress at being made to move. However, she helped him find a new apartment and helped him move. Winder found movers and paid them on Les Foris' behalf. She also arranged for storing his property in a commercial facility. The move cost less than $400.00. The rent was higher at the new complex, where Les Foris lived for just a few months before becoming ill. Winder saw her grandfather regularly after he received the non-renewal notice. He frequently called her after having anxiety problems at his new apartment. Les Foris was disoriented about the location of items in his new apartment. He was definitely inconvenienced by the move. He was also humiliated and ashamed in front of his neighbors for being forced to move out. His daily routine was disrupted, and he was unable to make friends at the new complex.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Law Judge will enter a final order dismissing Petitioner, Crisella Winder, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Matthew Les Foris’ Petition for Relief for failure to prove a case of housing discrimination against Respondent, Whitehall Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Villas Des Chenes, after the period for submission of exceptions has expired. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of December, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Leon W. Russell, Human Rights/EEO Officer Pinellas County Office of Human Rights 400 South Fort Harrison Avenue Fifth Floor Clearwater, Florida 33756 W. Oliver Melvin, Compliance Officer Pinellas County Office of Human Rights 400 South Fort Harrison Avenue Fifth Floor Clearwater, Florida 33756 Matthew P. Farmer, Esquire Farmer & Fitzgerald, P.A. 708 East Jackson Street Tampa, Florida 33602 Lynn Hanshaw, Esquire Gulfcoast Legal Services 314 South Missouri Avenue, Suite 109 Clearwater, Florida 32756 Cathy L. Lucrezi, Esquire Law Offices of Heist, Weisse & Lucrezi, P.A. 1661 Estero Boulevard, Suite 20 Post Office Box 2514 Fort Myers Beach, Florida 33932
Findings Of Fact Petitioners are husband and wife. They were required to locate to another home due to the acquisition of right-of-way by Respondent for construction of Interstate Highway 75 in Collier County, Florida. It is undisputed that Petitioners are eligible displacees under the federal government's Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, and are displaced persons entitled to relocation assistance within the definition of 49 Code of Federal Regulations, Subtitle A, Section 25.2(f). Petitioners and their children resided in two of three travel trailers which they owned on a five acre tract of land in a rural, wet area of Collier County, Florida. Both Petitioners were employed. He drove daily approximately 80 miles each way to his job as a taxi cab operator in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. She worked part time as a store clerk in a business near their home. On February 23, 1986, an employee of Respondent completed a household survey questionnaire regarding Petitioners' residence. The purpose of the questionnaire was to decide requirements governing assistance to be provided them in view of their future relocation to other housing as a result of their displacement by the interstate highway construction. The survey establishes that Petitioners owed $2,000 on their property, and that replacement housing was required for the husband, wife and two children of opposite sexes. The husband signed the survey instrument. Petitioners' property had an appraised value of $25,950. Of this amount, $17,550 reflected land value and $8,400 was the value of improvements. Petitioners initially received $25,950 when their property was acquired by Respondent through eminent domain proceedings. In the absence of comparable, utility equipped acreage in Collier County where applicable zoning restrictions would permit the placement of mobile homes, Respondent upgraded the type of replacement housing used to determine the amount of relocation assistance due to Petitioners. The effect of such an upgrade, termed "last resort housing," is to permit a higher limit on the payment to be made by Respondent to Petitioners for replacement housing. In this case, the upgrade consisted of Respondent's use of home sites with permanent houses on them in the calculation of the payment to be made to Petitioners. Respondent used three comparable parcels of property in the Golden Gate subdivision near Naples, Florida. The highest priced property was $53,900. This area is approximately 30 miles West of the site of the land previously occupied by Petitioners. A determination of comparable property is generally limited to a 50 mile radius of the dislocatee's property and, when possible, closer to the job of the primary income producer in the family. In this instance, no properties were available in the 50 mile radius to the East of Petitioners' property in the direction of Fort Lauderdale due to the immediate proximity of the Florida Everglades. On April 21, 1986, the comparable properties were selected, approved and determined by Respondent's staff to comply with the relocation program's requirements that comparable housing parcels used to compute the replacement housing payment meet decent, safe and sanitary living standards. Those standards require that comparable properties provide a minimum living area for the number of affected inhabitants, as well as appropriate utilities. The process of computing a replacement housing payment requires that the property appraisal of the dislocatee's property, including improvements less depreciation, be subtracted from the highest priced comparable to provide the amount due to the displaced property owner. Due to the condition of Petitioners' travel trailers, septic tank and well, those items were depreciated 40 per cent which resulted in a value of $4,279. Respondent rounded this amount off to $4,300. This final amount plus the land value of Petitioners' property of $17,500 came to a total of $21,800 for purpose of determining an amount to be subtracted from the highest priced comparable property value of $53,900. The result of this subtraction, or $32,100, reflected the amount of the replacement housing payment which Respondent determined to be due to Petitioners. The net effect of Respondent's depreciation of Petitioners' property improvements resulted in a reduction of the amount to be subtracted from the highest priced comparable property value which, in turn, increased the amount of the replacement housing payment. Dislocatees may acquire new property wherever they wish without regard to the location of comparable properties used to calculate their relocation assistance payment, although such comparable properties must be available to dislocatees who desire to purchase them. Petitioners contracted with a builder to construct a home in Palm Beach County. After payment by them of $4,000 to this individual, he vanished with their money. Subsequent to the experience with the unreliable West Palm Beach builder, Petitioners indicated to Respondent a desire to have their relocation payment computed again, this time on the basis of replacement housing in Broward County, Florida. Three new comparables were selected by Respondent's staff in that county. As had occurred in Collier County, Respondent's staff encountered difficulty finding comparable acreage property due to the lack of availability of such property which would meet restrictions imposed on such acreage with mobile homes. The result was that Respondent's staff determined no comparable acreage to be available in Broward County, Florida. Palm Beach County, Florida, was also searched by Respondent staff for comparable properties, but this effort was abandoned as a result of Petitioners expressed greater desire to relocate in Broward County. On June 26, 1987, three residences were selected by Respondent from the Pembroke Pines area Broward County to serve as comparables in the computation of the amount of the relocation housing payment. The evidence establishes that these homes were either "double wide" trailers or permanently affixed modular homes. These properties were selected because the comparables used in Collier County were no longer available. These residences were an "up grade" from the small travel trailers inhabited by Petitioners. Since the selling value of the highest priced Broward County comparable was only $49,500, the result, after subtraction of the estimated value of $21,800 for Petitioners' property, was a housing payment of $27,700. Since this payment amount is less than the amount originally computed by Respondent's staff, its use is prohibited by relocation program guidelines. Therefore, the previously computed greater amount of $32,100 for the area near Naples, Florida, became the final replacement housing payment. The evidence establishes that Petitioners filed an application and claim for replacement housing payment on March 23, 1987, and were paid $32,100 by state warrant dated April 28, 1987. Advanced moving expenses of $400 were paid to them by state warrant dated September 9, 1987. A state warrant for $1,497.26 to reimburse incidental expenses was issued to Petitioners on December 1, 1987. In total, it is found that Petitioners received $59,947.26 when the complete amount of relocation expense payments is added to the $25,950 amount also paid to them by the State of Florida in initially acquiring their property. Petitioners moved from their property in Collier County during July or August 1987. Petitioners located a house in West Palm Beach, Florida, but were unable to meet mortgage qualifications. However, after a high down payment with approximately half of the funds received from Respondent, they purchased the home. The amount of indebtedness remaining on the home is slightly less than $60,000 and has created a financial problem for Petitioners. Their desire is for Respondent to pay off the remaining mortgage amount or provide an acre of land with trailers in which to live. Respondent is authorized to administer the federal government's Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970. Respondent also administers a corresponding relocation aid program established by state law. Rules governing the state program are almost a verbatim duplicate of the federal program. Respondent's right-of-way procedures manual, comprised of state rules governing nonfederal relocation assistance, and federal regulations are used in administration of federal relocation aid projects.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying Petitioners' claim for further payment. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of January, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of January, 1989. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1. 2. Unnecessary to result reached. Addressed. Unnecessary to result reached. Not supported by weight of the evidence. 5-6. Unnecessary to result reached. Self-serving assertion; not supported by the weight of the evidence. Addressed. Unnecessary to result reached. 10-14. Addressed. Adopted by reference. Addressed. Unnecessary to result reached. Addressed. Rejected, not supported by weight of the evidence. Rejected as a conclusion or recommendation, not a factual finding. Respondent's Proposed Findings 1-5. Addressed in part; remainder unnecessary to result. COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Ann Porath, Esquire 12773 West Forest Hill Boulevard Suite 209 West Palm Beach, Florida 33414 Thomas H. Bateman, 111, Esquire General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Honorable Kaye N. Henderson Secretary Haydon Burns Building Attn: Eleanor F. Turner, M.S. 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her race in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act (FFHA).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female. Her Housing Discrimination Complaint alleges that Respondent “charged her $300 more than her White neighbor who has the same disability and the same income”; “she did not have a washer/dryer upon moving into the unit, but her white neighbor had a washer/dryer when she moved in[to] her unit”; “she was required to pay her utilities herself while her white neighbor was given a grant to cover her utilities”; and “she was given a fifteen day notice to vacate on March 9, 2017 that required her to vacate the property by March 31, 2017.” To resolve these allegations, the undersigned has relied on a record that consists only of brief testimony by Petitioner, limited cross-examination by counsel, and documentary evidence submitted by the parties. From November 2014 until she was evicted in March 2017 for non-payment of rent, Petitioner rented a two-bedroom unit owned and managed by Respondent. The property is located at 2418 Santa Barbara Boulevard, Naples, Florida. Petitioner’s final lease agreement was executed on March 1, 2016, on a month-to-month basis, and provided that Respondent could terminate the lease with a 15-day written notice prior to the end of the monthly period. It also provided that the agreement could be terminated for a failure to timely pay the rent. Two-bedroom units are normally shared by two residents, who split the monthly rent. Petitioner has two service animals who reside with her, and she testified that a housemate might not wish to share a unit with two service animals. Accordingly, she agreed to pay $800.00 per month for single occupancy of the unit. The lease agreement required Petitioner to pay her rent the first day of each month. Petitioner testified that she had an oral agreement with management to pay the rent on the third Wednesday of each month, when she received her Social Security disability check. There is no written agreement to confirm this arrangement, and even if an oral modification was agreed to by the parties, Respondent’s accounts receivable ledger reflects that Petitioner frequently did not pay her rent until the end of the month. According to the lease, the monthly rent includes a $75.00 allowance for utilities. Presumably, any charges in excess of that amount are the responsibility of the tenant. Petitioner testified that her next door neighbor is not a member of a protected class and was given more preferential treatment than she was. As an example, Petitioner points out that she paid her own electric bills from November 2014 until February 2016, while her neighbor received a utility subsidy. However, there is no competent evidence in the record to establish what type of arrangement the neighbor had for paying electric bills or whether the neighbor received some type of assistance for this expense. In any event, this allegation is based on events that occurred more than a year before the Complaint was filed and is time-barred. § 760.34(2), Fla. Stat. Petitioner also contends she was charged $300 more per month than her neighbor. Records submitted by Respondent show that the next door neighbor was also in a two-bedroom unit, but was assigned a housemate and paid $495.00 per month during the 12 months preceding the filing of the Complaint. Therefore, both the neighbor and Petitioner were charged the correct amount for their units.2/ Petitioner alleges her next door neighbor’s unit had a washer/dryer when the neighbor moved in, but Petitioner’s unit did not receive these appliances until February 2016. No evidence regarding this issue was presented, and a claim based on acts that occurred more than a year before the Complaint was filed is time-barred. Id. Throughout her tenancy, Petitioner consistently paid her rent late and failed to pay any rent during certain months. As of January 17, 2017, Petitioner was $1,521.00 in arrears on rent. Accordingly, that day, a three-day notice for nonpayment of rent and demand for rent or possession within three days was posted on the premises. On February 22, 2017, a second three-day notice for nonpayment of rent in the amount of $800.00 (presumably based on non-payment of the February rent) and demand for rent or possession within three days was hand-delivered to Petitioner. On March 8, 2017, a 15-day notice of termination of tenancy pursuant to section 83.58, Florida Statutes, was posted at the unit. The notice informed Petitioner that she must vacate the premises by the end of the month. On March 31, 2017, Petitioner vacated the premises, without paying the March rent. Petitioner’s Complaint was filed with FCHR on May 22, 2017. The eviction action was taken only because Petitioner failed to pay the rent, and not because of her race. In her Petition for Relief, Petitioner added an allegation that “FCHR’s Determination: No Cause” was based in part on the erroneous assumption that Respondent does not receive federal housing assistance. Petitioner testified that Respondent receives federal funds and is subject to eviction regulations promulgated by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). She points out that a 30-day eviction notice is required under HUD regulations, but she was only given 15 days’ notice pursuant to state law. Even if this is true, it does not support a charge of discrimination, as the eviction here was based on a non-discriminatory reason, a failure to pay rent, and not because of her race. Finally, Petitioner alleges that Respondent “made housing unavailable to her based on her race,” and that other persons similarly situated to her, but outside her protected class, were treated more favorably. The evidence shows that at least ten other tenants, including white tenants, were evicted for non-payment of rent during the same time period. See Resp. Ex. 14. There is no evidence, direct or indirect, to support a claim of housing discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief, with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of June, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 2018.
The Issue Whether applicant is eligible for relocation assistance monetary benefits pursuant to Public Law 91-646 and Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970. Although notice of hearing was provided to Mr. and Mrs. Limegrover on March 26, 1976, they did not appear at the time of hearing. Upon telephonic inquiry on June 8th by a representative of the Department of Transportation, Mr. Limegrover advised that he had received the notice and although he had intended to call the Department of Transportation concerning the matter, he had forgotten to do so. He stated that he desired a continuance of the case. His request was objected to by counsel for the Department of Transportation. The request for continuance was denied as being untimely and good cause not having been shown therefor. The hearing was conducted as an uncontested proceeding.
Findings Of Fact By letter of October 20, 1975, Mr. and Mrs. Richard Limegrover of Courtly Manors Mobile Home Park, Hialeah Gardens, Florida, were advised by the Florida Department of Transportation that it was in the process of acquiring right-of-way for State Road #25 (U.S. 27) in their area, and that the mobile home lot the Limegrovers occupied as tenants would be required for construction of the facility. The letter provided the Department's assurance that they would not be required to move until at least 90 days had elapsed from the date of receipt of the letter, and that they would receive a further notice specifying the actual date by which the property must be vacated at least 30 days prior to the date specified. The letter concluded by an expression of the Department's desire to assist in relocation and to answer any questions concerning such matters. On December 8, 1975, a further letter was sent to the Limegrovers by the Department of Transportation assuring the addressees that the prior letter had not been a notice to move and that no one at the Courtly Manors Mobile Home Park would be required to move until negotiations with the owner had been completed or monies placed with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Dade County by court order. It further stated that in the interim period relocatees living within Courtly Manors who were eligible and decided to move on their own initiative would be assisted by the Department in their relocation. Limegrover called Mr. Carl Moon, Right-of-Way Agent, Department of Transportation, Ft. Lauderdale, on December 11, requesting assistance in arrangements for moving his mobile home. Moon discovered that Limegrover wanted to move before January 1, 1976, as he had reserved a lot in another mobile home park. However, Limegrover told him that when he advised his current landlord on December 11 of the projected move on December 30, the landlord stated that in the absence of 30 days notice, Limegrover must forfeit his $90.00 security deposit. Limegrover told Moon that he felt the Department of Transportation should pay the $90.00 security deposit since he was being forced to move by that agency. Moon told him that he was not required to move that soon, but Limegrover was unwilling to wait, fearing that he would not be able to find a satisfactory place later on. Accordingly, Moon assisted him in his moving arrangements and Limegrover was paid for his moving expenses in the amount of $640.00 and smaller sums for reinstallation of his telephone and disconnection and reconnection of his gas equipment. Inasmuch as the Department of transportation declined to pay the $90.00 representing alleged forfeiture of the security deposit, Limegrover filed this relocation appeal. (Testimony of Moon, Exhibits 1 & 2).
Recommendation That the appeal of Richard and Jane Limegrover, in the amount of $90.00, be denied. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of July, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Phillip Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Room 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida Richard S. and Jane E. Limegrover Lot F4, Haven Lakes Mobile Home Park 11201 S.W. 55th Street Miramar, Florida 33025
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioners are entitled to replacement housing payments in connection with Respondent's acquisition of their mother's home, at which both Petitioners also reside, and whether Petitioner Pedro Bofill is entitled to business moving expenses for the business that he operates from his mother's former home.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners are siblings. By permission of Respondent, Petitioners presently reside in a single-family home at 540 Northwest Boulevard in Miami. Once part of a larger neighborhood, Petitioners' home now stands alone, as the other homes have been cleared in preparation for the construction of improvements to the nearby Dolphin and Palmetto Expressways. Until purchased by Respondent, the home at 540 Northwest Boulevard was owned by Petitioners' mother. For at least 20 years, Petitioner Pedro Bofill (Mr. Bofill) has resided in the home, which was divided so that he could live in one section and operate a small retail perfume business, and his mother and one or two sisters could live in the other section of the home. Petitioner Martha S. Bofill (Ms. Bofill) lived in the home up until the early 1990s, when she moved out after becoming married, but she returned a few years later after a divorce. The side occupied by Mr. Bofill has its own exterior entrance, kitchen, and bathroom, and the side occupied by Petitioners' mother and her two daughters has its own exterior entrance, kitchen, and bathrooms. One of Respondent's agents, an employee of Post, Buckley, Schuh, and Jernigan, Inc. (Post Buckley), first observed the home in 1988, as she was preparing the initial public information campaign for the Palmetto Expressway Improvements Project. Respondent identified nearly 40 residences to be demolished and over 80 families to be displaced by the project. On June 25, 2004, the Post Buckley representative knocked on the door of the residence located at 540 Northwest Boulevard. She was met by Mr. Bofill. The representative explained that Respondent would be purchasing this and surrounding homes and asked if they could speak. During their conversation, the representative told Mr. Bofill that the purpose of her visit was to determine the needs of the persons who would be displaced by the road project. Mr. Bofill informed the representative that the residence comprised two separate dwellings: his and that of his mother and sisters. The Post Buckley representative asked Mr. Bofill to complete a survey, and he agreed to do so. As reflected by the completed survey, which was filled out by the representative, pursuant to Mr. Bofill's responses, and signed by Mr. Bofill, Mr. Bofill stated that he paid $150- $250 monthly in utilities and $1200 monthly in "contract rent." He added that he "wants to move into same setting w/mother and continue to have home office." The Post Buckley representative asked to speak with Mr. Bofill's mother, but she was unprepared to receive a visitor. Mr. Bofill did not offer to take the representative to the other side of the house. However, he provided the information to the representative so she could complete a survey for Mr. Bofill's mother. This survey discloses that Ms. Bofill lives with her mother, the mother is retired, and Ms. Bofill is unemployed, as she is a student. This form indicates that Mr. Bofill pays for the utilities for both sides of the house. From this information, Post Buckley prepared a Needs Assessment Survey Report. This document helped Respondent determine the number of impacted families, the existence of any special needs, and whether sufficient properties in the market were available to accommodate the displaced persons. In September 2004, Post Buckley notified Petitioners' mother of the acquisition and relocation program that was now underway. The notification informs the homeowner of the right to obtain an independent appraisal, at Respondent's expense. On the same date, Respondent sent a letter to Petitioners' mother informing her of the process, including her entitlement to full compensation for the property acquired by Respondent and relocation assistance benefits. Although Petitioners are bilingual, their mother speaks only Spanish. The Post Buckley representative is bilingual, and the two letters sent to Petitioners' mother in September were sent in English and Spanish. By letter dated July 14, 2005 (English only), Respondent conveyed an offer to purchase the fee simple interest in the property owned by Petitioners' mother for $340,000. This is the acquisition payment and does not include relocation assistance, such as a replacement housing payment, which is described in greater detail below. A separate letter in English bearing the same date informed Petitioners' mother of her right to receive a replacement housing payment, if, among other things, "a comparable replacement dwelling costs more than the amount you are paid for your current dwelling." On August 11, 2005, the Post Buckley representative updated the surveys by forwarding them to the attorney of Petitioners' mother, as the attorney had asked the representative not to contact his client. The information did not change from the earlier surveys. On October 6, 2005, the Post Buckley representative and two representatives of Respondent met at the attorney's office with Mr. Bofill's sister. The meeting lasted 30-45 minutes and addressed the special needs of Petitioners' mother, such as that she required an outside walkway to reduce the risk of falling in the yard and needed to live near a hospital due to her age and medical condition. At this point, Post Buckley and Respondent assessed the information available and determined that Respondent should pay a single housing replacement payment to Petitioners' mother and no housing replacement payments to Petitioners. The available information was not limited to Mr. Bofill's survey response concerning his intent to relocate with his mother. Post Buckley and Respondent were aware that Petitioners, as adult children, had lived with their mother for many years, their mother was in poor health and living on a fixed income, Ms. Bofill has not been employed at anytime during this matter, and Mr. Bofill pays all of the utilities at the residence. Concluding from these circumstances that it was unlikely that Petitioners would establish separate residences from their mother, Respondent justifiably interpreted the absence of a request for separate residential housing payments from either Petitioner as evidence that they would continue to live with their aged mother. The decision of Respondent to proceed with a single housing relocation payment was further justified by later events. On November 15, 2005, a representative of Respondent spoke with Mr. Bofill by telephone about the effect of the payment of a separate housing relocation payment to him and his sisters, in terms of reducing the payment to their mother. Mr. Bofill said that he and his sisters would not pursue separate housing relocation payments. On December 1, 2005, Respondent signed a Statement of Eligibility for Supplementary Replacement Housing Payment for Owner (Statement of Eligibility). The Statement of Eligibility states that Petitioners' mother is eligible for a replacement housing payment of $120,000, based on the difference between the $460,000 cost of comparable replacement housing and the $340,000 acquisition price. By letter dated December 16, 2005, Petitioners' mother rejected the comparable replacement housing used in the December 1 letter, noting, among other things, that she lived solely on her Social Security payments of $550 per month and suggesting that comparable replacement housing would need to be in the range of $600,000 to $750,000. The clear implication of this letter, given the disparity between the mother's annual income of about $6000, and the substantial costs of maintaining a house in this price range, in terms of property taxes and utilities, for instance, was that she would continue to receive assistance from her children, who had lived with her, paid some rent, and helped her with the activities of daily living. By Revised Offer and Purchase Agreement, signed by Post Buckley and Petitioners' mother on December 22, 2005, and accepted by Respondent on March 8, 2006, Respondent agreed to acquire the home for $411,400. By Replacement Housing Payment Computation Explanation of the same date, Respondent's Relocation Project Manager stated to Respondent's Relocation Administrator that the home contained only one residential dwelling, the acquisition price would be $411,400, the selection of the proper comparable--with similar square footage and number of rooms to the acquired property--resulted in a replacement housing payment of $123,600, so that Respondent would pay Petitioners' mother an additional $123,600 in the form of a replacement housing payment. Petitioners' mother signed a new Statement of Eligibility--in both English and Spanish--on the same date, reflecting these new figures. The closing eventually took place on March 13, 2006. According to a letter written by Ms. Bofill, in February 2006, she learned that Respondent would pay a single housing relocation payment to her mother. She retained an attorney. Four days prior to the closing, she met with two representatives of Respondent and complained about not receiving any housing relocation payments. At the closing, the attorney sat with Ms. Bofill and her mother and explained each of the documents that she was signing, and at no time did Petitioners' mother indicate an intent not to proceed with a single housing relocation payment, payable to her. Respondent's finding of a single household is probably based on the extent to which Petitioners' mother and Petitioners necessarily pooled their resources to pay for basic necessities. However, the configuration of the home suggests separate households, so this Recommended Order will treat the home as comprising two households (although the ultimate result is the same under either analysis). One household was occupied by Mr. Bofill and the other was occupied by Petitioners' mother and her two daughters. However, neither Petitioner was entitled to a separate replacement housing payment under the present facts. As noted above, Mr. Bofill affirmatively stated his intent to relocate with his mother, and Respondent reasonably inferred the same intent by Ms. Bofill, based on the financial circumstances of her and her mother, their prior history of living together, and Ms. Bofill's failure to take affirmative action to claim a separate housing replacement payment until after the closing, at which Respondent obligated itself to pay a single such payment to Petitioners' mother. For the reasons explained below, Respondent's failure to pay a separate housing relocation payment to Mr. and Ms. Bofill was thus proper.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order denying the requests of Petitioners for housing relocation payments and business moving expenses. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: James C. Meyers, Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Alexis M. Yarbrough, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Stephanie Kopelousos, Interim Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Susan Schwartz Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Martha S. and Pedro Bofill 540 Northwest Boulevard Miami, Florida 33126
The Issue The issue in this supplemental proceeding is whether Respondents Soo Y. and Myung S. Chung, separately or together, retaliated against Petitioners as a result of Petitioners' exercise, or attempted exercise, of a protected housing right.
Findings Of Fact From August 2012 through January 2015, Petitioners Verdell Carter ("V. Carter") and her daughter Courtney Carter ("C. Carter"), who are African-Americans, rented and occupied a residential unit in Cité Condominiums ("Cité") in Miami, Florida, which served as their principal residence. At all relevant times, the owners of this unit were Soo Y. Chung and Myung S. Chung (collectively, the "Lessor"). Respondent Cité Condominium Association, Inc. (the "Association"), oversees the operation of the property. The Association's Board of Directors (the "Board") is its governing body. At all relevant times, a third-party property management company, FirstService Residential Florida, Inc. ("Management"), performed on-site management services at Cité. V. Carter and the Lessor entered into a lease agreement concerning Unit No. 3206 at Cité in July 2012. Pursuant to the applicable declaration of condominium, this lease (like all such leases of units at Cité) was subject to Board approval as a condition precedent of V. Carter's taking possession of the leased premises. To obtain Board approval, V. Carter and the Lessor were required (as were all persons entering into such leases) to execute an Addendum to Lease, which made the Association a third-party beneficiary of the lease and, among other things, bound the lessee to all of the rules and conditions applicable to unit owners. There is some dispute concerning the term of the subject lease. It commenced on or around August 15, 2012——that much is certain. The Carters assert that the lease was for three years, until August 15, 2015. The Association contends that the lease had a one-year term with options to renew annually for up to two additional years. The Association maintains——and acted on the belief——that it had the right to veto any attempt to renew the lease. This particular dispute is immaterial, however, for whether or not the Association could veto a renewal attempt, it clearly had the right to dispossess the Carters if they disobeyed the Association's rules. The Addendum to Lease provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Lessee agrees to abide by this Addendum, the [provisions of the Association's Declaration, By-Laws, Articles of Incorporation, Rules and Regulations, as same may be amended from time to time,] and all applicable laws, ordinances and regulations. If Lessee fails to comply with [any of these], Lessor shall promptly commence action to evict Lessee. If Lessor fails to promptly commence action to evict Lessee, Lessor hereby authorizes the Association . . . to commence eviction proceedings [on Lessor's behalf.] Unfortunately for everyone concerned, the Carters repeatedly violated the rules. Early in the lease term, V. Carter brought her dog into the unit without first registering the pet with the Association as required. After Management became aware in November 2012 that V. Carter had an unregistered pet on the premises, it provided her the form for curing the violation, but she failed timely to return the paperwork. As a result, on November 26, 2012, the Association assessed a charge of $56 against the Lessor's account.3/ Meanwhile, C. Carter moved into Unit No. 3206 without informing the Association, which gave rise to a series of violations. Although C. Carter initially occupied the premises as a guest, before long she decided to remain as a resident. In time, Management noticed that C. Carter's stay had exceeded 30 days, making her an "unregistered visitor." Additionally, C. Carter parked her car——which was an "unregistered vehicle"—— in spaces reserved for Cité's owners and tenants (both residential and commercial). This resulted in several $56 charges being posted to the Lessor's account in November 2012 for unauthorized parking and for parking an unregistered vehicle in an unauthorized area. In January 2013, the Lessor was again assessed a $56 charge because C. Carter had parked her unregistered vehicle in an unauthorized area, along with a separate $56 charge for the presence an unregistered visitor (namely C. Carter). By letter dated January 23, 2013, the Association notified the Lessor that it intended to take steps to terminate the lease between the Lessor and V. Carter due to the Carters' failure to comply with the Association's rules. Before that could happen, however, V. Carter registered her dog, C. Carter became a registered tenant, and C. Carter rented an additional parking space from the Association for her car. The Carters assured the Lessor and the Association that, in the future, they would comply with all of the Association's rules. In due course, the Board agreed to acquiesce to the continuation of the lease, and——with the exception of a few relatively minor issues too trivial to recount——relations between the Carters, Management, the Association, and the Lessor calmed down to a reasonably peaceful state of affairs. This détente ended on Sunday, June 22, 2014. On or around that date, the commercial tenant directly below Unit No. 3206 experienced damage from water intrusion at the ceiling. Minor dampness was observed on the carpet outside the front of Unit No. 3206. Management contacted V. Carter and notified her that maintenance personnel needed to enter her unit immediately to locate the source of the leak, which there were grounds to believe was inside. Management's authority to enter the unit was clear and is not disputed. The Addendum to Lease provides: The Association and/or its authorized agent(s) shall have the irrevocable right to have access to the Unit as may be necessary for inspection, maintenance, repair or replacement of any Common Elements accessible therefrom, or for making emergency repairs necessary to prevent damages to the Common Elements or other units. Claiming that she was in the process of showering and in a state of partial undress, V. Carter refused to admit the maintenance men that Sunday morning. They left, so that V. Carter could finish getting ready. When the repair crew returned a short while later, however, V. Carter turned them away again, explaining that she was leaving for church. First thing the next day, June 23, Management notified the Lessor that V. Carter had refused to let maintenance personnel into the unit so that they could identify and repair the source of a suspected leak. The Lessor authorized Management to access the unit that morning. V. Carter, however, again refused to allow the maintenance men to enter the unit. This obstinacy violated the Association's rules and resulted in the imposition of charges totaling $126, for which the Association billed the Lessor. Eventually, Management gained access to the unit and fixed the problem in the bathroom which had caused the leak. Because V. Carter had refused access to the unit in violation of the Association's rules, the Association notified the Lessor and the Carters that it would not approve an extension of the lease beyond August 15, 2014. On June 25, 2014, V. Carter requested a meeting with the Board to discuss this decision. Her request was denied. By letter dated July 11, 2014, the Lessor notified the Carters that the lease would terminate on August 15, 2014. The Lessor also demanded payment of past due rent for April ($500) and July ($1,500) plus reimbursement of a returned-check charge of $30 that the Lessors had incurred when the Carters' June rent check bounced. A few weeks later, a heavy rainstorm, which took place late at night on Sunday, August 3, 2014, and during the early morning hours of August 4, caused Unit No. 3206 to flood. Other units flooded as well, causing an emergency situation for Management, which by all accounts responded promptly. The Carters claim to have been out of town at the time of this incident. Regardless, V. Carter acknowledges that Management contacted her by phone and requested permission——which she gave——to enter her unit to take remedial measures. Maintenance personnel entered the unit and extracted the water. In doing so, they discovered that the patio drain had been plugged with a flower pot, which likely had allowed water to pool on the patio and ultimately flood into the unit through the patio door. The Carters allege that the maintenance men discriminated against them on the basis or race or color by entering other units before taking care of Unit No. 3206. There is no persuasive evidence, however, of any sort of delay (discriminatory or otherwise) on the part of the maintenance crew, which as mentioned responded quickly and reasonably to an overnight situation affecting multiple units in addition to the Carters'. The Carters did not vacate Unit No. 3206 on or before August 15, 2014. As it happened, however, there was another rainstorm on that day which caused further flooding in the unit. C. Carter was present at the time, and she contacted Management, which addressed the immediate problem. After that, a months-long struggle ensued, during which Management and the Lessor attempted to arrange for repairs to be made to fix the damages that had resulted from the August floods and the earlier, June leak, and the Carters, while demanding that the repairs be made, refused access to repairmen and generally failed reasonably to cooperate. Around this time, as well, the Carters——who in the Lessor's eyes had become holdover tenants as of August 15——stopped paying rent to the Lessor. On August 19, 2014, the Lessor gave the Carters a statutory three-day notice to pay rent or vacate the premises on or before August 22, 2014. The Carters did not leave. On September 12, 2014, the Lessor gave the Carters another statutory three-day notice. The Carters, however, did not quit the premises. On or around September 19, 2014, the Lessor commenced an action for eviction in the Miami-Dade County Court. Several months later, the county court entered a judgment of eviction against the Carters, and, on January 20, 2015, a writ of possession was issued. The Carters moved out of Unit No. 3206 on January 23, 2015, but not without incident. Association rules prohibit the use of the stairways when moving furniture and other household goods. Residents who are moving in or out of Cité must reserve (and pay a fee for the use of) the freight elevator and loading dock. The Carters had not arranged to use the freight elevator, preferring instead to use the stairs. Management saw this violation in progress and sought to stop the Carters from moving their belongings down the stairs. The Carters would not be deterred. Management called the police, an officer arrived, and the unauthorized transport of goods through the stairwell was arrested. Meantime, V. Carter's dog urinated on the hallway carpet and on the wall. As a result of this memorable departure, the Association imposed charges against the Lessor's account totaling $950. V. Carter claims to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, which she characterizes as a "non-visible" disability. C. Carter claims to suffer from attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, which she characterizes as a "non- visible" disability. Determinations of Ultimate Fact There is no persuasive evidence that any of the Association's decisions concerning, or actions affecting, the Carters, or either of them, directly or indirectly, were motivated in any way by discriminatory animus directed toward V. Carter or C. Carter. There is no persuasive evidence that the Association refused, upon request, to make a reasonable accommodation for either V. Carter or C. Carter. There is likewise no persuasive evidence that any of the Lessor's actions, including bringing suit to evict the Carters, were motivated by discriminatory animus or were taken to retaliate against the Carters for their exercise of a protected housing right. In sum, there is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of any sort of unlawful housing discrimination or retaliation could be made. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that the Association did not commit any prohibited act.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order finding the Association not liable for housing discrimination and awarding the Carters no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of April, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 2015.
