Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Mary Anna Cline (Ms. Cline), is a fifty-two year old female who was employed by USBI Company (USBI) from 1985 until November 15, 1994. USBI refurbishes the solid rocket boosters for the space shuttle program at the Kennedy Space Center, Brevard County, Florida. It employs substantially more than fifteen full-time employees. Ms. Cline was hired for the position of technical illustrator, which position is responsible for drawing mechanical components, doing illustration and charts, and preparing manuals and documents that apply to the day-to-day work of the company. She was a good employee and had excellent technical skills, as reflected in her performance evaluations and numerous commendations. At the time that she left the company, she was in a position titled "senior technical illustrator." In early 1992 the company had some internal reorganization, and Ms. Cline and a group of employees were transferred from Management Services to Documentation Support. The job duties remained substantially the same, but the new group also had responsibility for the Routing of Documents (RODS) program, which involved the tracing of detailed technical drawings, to be used on a computer mainframe by the "techs" (engineers). Documentation Support generated technical documentation for the rockets, all technical manuals, standard procedures, testing, fliers and presentations - generally all of the paperwork used by the company, including verbiage and graphics. The supervisor of Documentation Support, then and now, is a woman, Monica Teran. Approximately seventy-five percent of Ms. Cline's work group were women. In June 1992, Richard Bowen was hired by USBI as a technical illustrator and was assigned to Documentation Support. He became a coworker of Ms. Cline and their assigned work stations were side-by-side without a partition. Richard Bowen's two main hobbies are photography and computers. He was generally accepted as the computer expert in the work group; when there were problems with the computers, Richard Bowen could often work them out. Bowen's interest in photography is also more than a casual avocation. He attended photography school in Chicago when he was younger and worked with a modeling agency. He holds an occupational license to conduct a photography business and performs commercial photography services that do not conflict with his 9-5 job: weddings, portraits, some modeling photographs and some work with a theme park in Orlando. He is a member of the Audubon Society and takes wildlife photographs and does computer work for the organization. The Photograph Incident Staff in the work group were interested in Bowen's photographs. He brought samples of his pictures to work to show off. He usually left the pictures on his desk, face up, so that people could come to his work area and look at them. Some time in the latter months of 1992, Bowen purchased an expensive special soft-focus lens that gives the subject a soft, romantic, mystical look and deletes the wrinkles or blemishes. He discussed the lens with a fellow photographer at work and brought in a sample of photographs he had taken with the lens. Most of the pictures among the twelve to fifteen which he brought on this occasion were wildlife; there also were a few photographs of a model. She was bare-breasted, but was not exposed from the waist down. While there is no clear description of her pose in the record, she was described by some as nude and others as partially nude. None described the photographs as sexually suggestive or pornographic. In the early morning before work started, some female staff members were shuffling through the photographs. Ms. Cline was part of the group looking on. Bowen said something semi-jokingly like, "You might not want to look at these; there's a bare-breasted model." One of the women replied that it was nothing that she had not seen before, and continued shuffling through the photographs. Ms. Cline saw the model's photograph, remarked that the girl had pretty eyes, and returned to her own work station. Several months later, after a workshop that management had initiated to deal with problems in the workplace, Ms. Cline reported the photographs to Carol DuBray, Director of Human Resources and Darryl LeCanne, the immediate supervisor of Monica Teran. Ms. Cline was embarrassed by the photographs. Management's Response As soon as Ms. Cline left Darryl LaCanne's office, he called Monica Teran, and the two supervisors met with Richard Bowen. They informed him that USBI had a policy of not tolerating nude photography or pin-up calendars in the workplace and that his bringing the photographs to work was unacceptable behavior. Darryl LaCanne told Richard Bowen that the next time severe disciplinary action would be taken. Richard Bowen was also called in to speak with USBI's director of security, Barry Wysocki. Mr. Wysocki informed him that nude pictures were prohibited by USBI's regulations. Mr. Bowen received the message in clear terms that the matter was very serious. Bowen never again brought nude or semi-nude photographs to work and Ms. Cline never again saw such photographs at work. Offensive Shop Talk Work stations in the Documentation Support unit were divided into cubicles, some separated by dividers, some (Richard Bowen's and Ms. Cline's) were side by side, facing a partition with two other workers on the opposite side. Workers interacted within a small space and moved about to use different computer equipment, printers, files, and similar work tools. Among some of the workers there was occasional bawdy banter and comment about boyfriends, weekends and vacations, and the like. It was sexually oriented in a sophomoric, adolescent schoolyard manner. It included terms like "shit" and "fuck" and included conversation about "blow jobs" or "hard-ons," and other slang words involving male genitalia. With one exception, the language was not directed to Ms. Cline. That exception was one occasion when Richard Bowen responded to her criticism of some work with the expletive "fuck." Both male and female workers engaged in the banter, which was overheard by Ms. Cline and others. Ms. Cline was particularly offended by banter between Bowen and a female worker, Anna Silvestri, who occupied a workstation on the other side of the partition in front of Ms. Cline and Mr. Bowen. Ms. Silvestri sometimes initiated this banter. In May or June of 1993 Ms. Cline reported to her supervisor, Monica Teran, that Richard Bowen and Anna Silvestri used the word "fuck" and engaged in sexually explicit conversations. Ms. Teran went to her supervisor to see what to do about the complaint and Carol DuBray requested that Barry Wysocki conduct an investigation. Barry Wysocki interviewed and took statements from employees in the Document Support Unit, including Ms. Cline. She complained that Richard Bowen created a hostile environment; that she heard him say "fuck" on one occasion in the past two months and that she heard Anna Silvestri say the word on two occasions. Ms. Cline said that Bowen and Silvestri discussed Ms. Silvestri's sex life and that on one occasion Ms. Silvestri tried to discuss her sex life with Ms. Cline, but she cut her off with a comment that it was improper. Ms. Cline reported hearing Monica Teran and Beth Seaman use the word "fuck" in the work area. Bowen and Silvestri did not deny mild profanity and mildly sexual conversations. Other employees reported hearing some profanity, primarily "shit," "damn" and "bullshit." Richard Bowen and Anna Silvestri were seriously reprimanded by Barry Wysocki, by Barry Smoyer, by Darryl LaCanne and by Monica Teran. Each supervisor impressed on the two employees that the use of foul language was not tolerated and was against company policy. Barry Smoyer gave the two employees a letter "for the record," documenting the counselling session and reprimand. Monica Teran moved Ms. Cline to Anna Silvestri's workstation on the other side of the partition from Richard Bowen. She moved Anna Silvestri two cubicles away, with several partitions between her and Mr. Bowen. And George Roberts was placed next to Richard Bowen in Ms. Cline's former workstation. The intent by the supervisor was to accommodate Ms. Cline's concerns and to separate the two prime offenders. In the two years that he worked for USBI, including the time that he worked next to Richard Bowen, George Roberts heard nothing more than "hell" or "damn" from Bowen. Nevertheless, around August 1994, during her performance review, Ms. Cline informed Monica Teran that the sexual conversations were continuing. Ms. Teran informed her supervisors and another investigation commenced, this time by USBI's new security director, Al Eastlack. Mr. Eastlack conducted an interview with Ms. Cline, among others, and took her formal statement in September 1994. Barry Smoyer reviewed a draft report of Mr. Eastlack's investigation and although he understood the results were "inconclusive," Mr. Smoyer renewed his admonishments to Richard Bowen and Anna Silvestri in separate memoranda to the two, reminding them of USBI's intolerance of sexual harassment in any form and warning them that inappropriate language would result in disciplinary action. Alleged Threats After the photograph incident, but before she complained, Richard Bowen and Mary Anna Cline had a conflict over the use of some computer graphics software. Bowen was advocating one type of software that Ms. Cline opposed. Monica Teran had to intervene and instructed Ms. Cline to install the program and learn how to use it. After she complained about the photographs, Ms. Cline became convinced that Richard Bowen was going to retaliate. She complained to Monica Teran that she was afraid of Bowen but her complaints were non-specific. She began to complain of stress and sleep problems. Ms. Teran recommended that she go to the Employee Assistance Program (EAP) counsellor or to see her own counsellor or doctor. This was around the same time that Ms. Cline complained about the offensive language and conversations, and Ms. Cline took the recommendation to mean that Ms. Teran did not believe her, or that Ms. Teran felt Ms. Cline was at fault. Ms. Teran also commented to Ms. Cline that she should simply tell Bowen to stop talking like that. Another employee, Dorothy Stokey, who was offended by Bowen's use of "fuck" had told him to stop. Ms. Cline was too intimidated by him to confront him directly. Some time in the latter months of 1993, Monica Teran found Ms. Cline in the ladies' room crying and upset to the point of incoherence. Ms. Cline had overheard a conversation between Richard Bowen and Anna Silvestri involving a gun and made a connection between that and incidents of violence in the workplace and coworkers being shot. With the help of Barry Smoyer, Ms. Teran was able to get Ms. Cline out of the ladies' room and calmed down. Then, at Mr. Smoyer's direction, Ms. Teran called Ms. Silvestri and Mr. Bowen into her office to find out what had happened. Mr. Bowen did not have a gun at work and he had been discussing a gun show early that morning. Ms. Teran was satisfied that the discussion had been innocuous and reported her findings to Barry Smoyer. No other employee reported that Bowen had a gun or saw him with a gun. None, including Ms. Cline, ever complained that Bowen had threatened them with a gun. Alleged Retaliation Ms. Cline contends that USBI retaliated against her for reporting sexual harassment. Specifically she claims that her job duties were shifted from work on RODS, which she liked, to word processing, which she disliked and with which she had difficulty, due to some dyslexia. It is undisputed that Ms. Cline was a very competent graphics illustrator. She and Mr. Bowen and a couple of other employees in the unit were considered the core of the illustration function, and other employees in the unit preferred and were more skilled in the word processing and language component of the unit's responsibilities. However, the work assignments were not so clearly divided between "illustration" and "word processing." The production and modification of company manuals required both types of work. Monica Teran was interested in cross-training her staff to do a variety of tasks. There was a time, after mid-1993, when Ms. Cline's assignments involved word processing. She also continued to do a substantial amount of RODS work, as evidenced by handwritten logs maintained by the employees. Monica Teran never instructed the staffperson responsible for making assignments to remove Ms. Cline from RODS or other graphics work. RODS was not considered high profile or creative work since it primarily involved tracing technical components repetitively. There was a period when RODS work was put on hold. There was another period when temporary employees, such as George Roberts, were taken in to work exclusively on RODS. At no time during her employment with USBI was Ms. Cline demoted in job title or pay. In 1993 and 1994 her employment evaluations reflected a need to improve communications and attendance, but she was still rated "excellent," "good" and "acceptable" in all categories, and overall "excellent" and "good." There is no evidence to indicate that anyone tampered with Ms. Cline's computer or sabotaged her computer, as she claimed. On occasion it was necessary for Monica Teran or other staff to work at Ms. Cline's and other stations, to see if programs were loaded or the machine was set up properly. Although certain equipment, such as a printer, was located at an individual workstation, other staff needed access to that equipment. Job-Related Stress Ms. Cline's attendance did suffer and she did experience job-related stress. She went to an EAP counsellor and to a psychiatrist. She was on medication and there were problems with adjusting the type and amount of medication. Ms. Cline experienced sleep disorders; she reported falling asleep at the wheel of her car and had a minor accident. She also experienced other physical phenomena such as pains in her chest and arms, or numbness. Her psychiatrist diagnosed her medical condition as "adjustment reaction of adult life with mixed emotions, basically depression and anxiety." (T-415) Accommodation and Resignation Monica Teran's staff was located in two buildings: the modular unit occupied by Ms. Cline, Mr. Bowen, Ms. Silvestri and others; and another separate building which also included other USBI employees. Ms. Teran's staff was moved around routinely, as new employees were added or other work space needs arose. In Fall 1993 USBI offered to move Ms. Cline to the other building, allowing her to retain her same position and duties; she declined, and the company did not insist that she move. Later, Ms. Cline was offered a lateral position at the same pay and position level. Carol DuBray met with Ms. Cline to discuss this attempt to accommodate her. Ms. Cline also rejected that offer. She explained at hearing that she was afraid she would have been in line for a layoff, if she transferred. However, there is no competent evidence to support that fear. Ms. DuBray explained to Ms. Cline in their meeting that she would retain all benefits, including seniority. In fact, USBI has no departmental seniority policy. Seniority is based on the date an individual is hired by the company, rather than time within a department in the company. On November 15, 1994, Ms. Cline voluntarily resigned, citing "continuing stress brought on by sexual harassment, discrimination, retaliation and the flagrant disregard by USBI and its management in the handling of this problem. . . ." (Petitioner's exhibit no. 31) The Formal Complaints At the time she resigned Ms. Cline had already filed her complaint of discrimination with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). That charge is dated December 6, 1993. The charge of discrimination alleges violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, by sexual harassment and retaliation. It does not cite the Florida Civil Rights Act, Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. Pursuant to a worksharing agreement between EEOC and FCHR, the charge was sent to the Florida agency for initial investigation. That workshare agreement, which refers to the FCHR as the "FEPA," provides, in pertinent part: FILING OF CHARGES OF DISCRIMINATION In order to facilitate the filing of charges of employment discrimination, the EEOC and the FEPA each designate the other as its agent for the purpose of receiving and drafting charges. The FEPA shall take all charges alleging a violation of Title VII, ADEA, EPA, or the ADA where the parties have mutual juris- diction and refer them to the EEOC for dual filing, so long as the allegations meet the minimum requirements of those Acts. Each Agency will inform individuals of their rights to file charges with the other Agency and to assist any person alleging employment discrimination to draft a charge in a manner which will satisfy the require- ments of both agencies to the extent of their common jurisdiction. As part of the intake duties, investigators are to verify with the charging parties if they have filed a charge of discrimination with other agencies prior to filing the charge. For charges that are to be dual-filed, each Agency will use EEOC Charge Form 5 (or alternatively, an employment discrim- ination charge form which within statutory limitations, is acceptable in form and content to EEOC and the FEPA) to draft charges. When a charge is taken based on disability, the nature of the disability shall not be disclosed on the face of the charge. * * * H. The delegation of authority to receive charges contained in Paragraph II. a. does not include the right of one Agency to determine the jurisdiction of the other Agency over a charge. * * * DIVISION OF INITIAL CHARGE-PROCESSING RESPONSIBILITIES * * * D. EEOC will not defer or refer any charge for the FEPA to process that is not jurisdictional on its face with both Agencies. If it is apparent that one Agency might have jurisdiction when another does not, then the Charging Party will be referred to the appropriate Agency. * * * (Petitioner's exhibit no. 41) (emphasis added) A notice dated December 20, 1993, on EEOC form 212, states that the FCHR has received the charge and will initially investigate the charge. The FCHR did investigate the charge and the FCHR investigator's report is dated July 13, 1994. A document styled "Determination: No Cause" is dated August 25, 1994 and has the apparent signature of FCHR's Executive Director. An accompanying document, with the same date, is styled "Notice of Determination: No Cause" and informs Ms. Cline as complainant of her right to file her petition for relief within 35 days. The petition for relief dated September 27, 1994, was filed with FCHR, and cites the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as well as Title VII. The petition alleges sexual harassment and retaliation. FCHR transmitted the petition to the Division of Administrative Hearings on October 6, 1994. The amended petition for relief, filed on April 10, 1995, and referenced in the order and notice of hearing dated May 16, 1995 deletes any reference to Title VII and recites instead that the claims for relief are based on Section 760.10, Florida Statutes. The amended petition does not claim constructive discharge nor does it mention that Ms. Cline left the company approximately five months earlier. Sexual Harassment Policy and Summary of Findings USBI has, and during the relevant period had a sexual harassment policy which provides: The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's amended "Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex" include a section prohibiting sexual harassment as "unwelcome sexual advances, request for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of sexual nature when: submission to such conduct is either an explicit or implicit term or condition of employment, or submission to or rejection of such conduct is used as a basis for an employment decision affecting the person rejecting or submitting the conduct, or such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an affected person's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment. Sexual harassment is unacceptable behavior by any USBI employee or outside vendor. Any form of harassment, like any conduct contrary to common decency or morality, cannot and will not be tolerated. The company will take whatever corrective action necessary to prevent or deal with acts of sexual harassment in the work place. (Respondent's exhibit no. 61) The policy provides names and phone numbers for persons to report sexual harassment and states that reports at that point will be confidential. Employees are informed of the policy through annual letters from the company head, through posters on the facility walls and through mandatory workshops for managers and their staff. USBI responded appropriately to Ms. Cline's complaints. Its response as to the photographs was effective; the sexually-themed banter, however, continued. The banter did not constitute sexual harassment of Ms. Cline, nor did it create a sexually hostile work environment. No one at USBI ever made a sexual advance towards Ms. Cline; no one suggested or requested sex from her or asked her for a date. No one touched her inappropriately. The sexual banter was never directed to or about her. The banter overheard by Ms. Cline, and the use of the "f word," were occasional, not daily or even weekly. The banter was not directed solely to, or about women; it was engaged in, and was overheard, by men and women, alike. The work quarters were close; the unit which included Ms. Cline was in a small "modular" building with work stations divided by movable partitions. By necessity, workers moved around the office to use various equipment. Coworkers of Ms. Cline did not find the environment sexually hostile, offensive or intimidating. No one else of the primarily female group complained about a sexually hostile or intimidating work environment. According to both a friend and her psychiatrist, Ms. Cline was more sensitive than most to profanity and off-color language. Without question, Ms. Cline suffered from stress at work. The stress was manifest in the myriad physical symptoms which caused absenteeism and loss of performance. USBI appropriately offered to Ms. Cline accommodations which would have allowed her to continue working at the same job level and salary but outside of the environment she found intolerable. She rejected the offers and voluntarily resigned. The resignation was not urged, directly or indirectly, by the company.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Ms. Cline's complaint and petitions for relief in this cause. DONE and ENTERED this 25th day of March, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-5634 The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Adopted in paragraph 2. Adopted in paragraph 1. Adopted in paragraph 3. Adopted in paragraph 4. Adopted in part in paragraph 33; otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 60. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted by implication in paragraph 60. Adopted in substance in paragraph 48. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 50. Adopted in paragraph 52. Adopted in paragraph 53. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Subparagraphs are addressed as follows: Adopted in substance: a (but not the date), b, c, h, i, m, n. Rejected as unnecessary, immaterial or misleading: d, e, f, g, j, k, l. Rejected, as to the "escalation," as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence; adopted generally in summary in paragraph 17; but some of the specifics alleged were not established (for example, the "sucking" statement). Rejected as a mischaracterization of the incident, although use of the word, "fuck," was proven. 19.-22. Rejected as not credible. 23.-24. Adopted in substance in paragraph 17. 25.-28. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Adopted in part in paragraphs 39-41, but it was not proven that the stress was the result of a "hostile work environment," within the scope of gender-based discrimination. Rejected as unnecessary. 31.-32. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. 33.-34. Accepted that she complained, but the dates and frequency were not established with competent evidence 35. Conclusion that the steps were "inadequate" is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. 36.-41. Rejected as unnecessary, immaterial, or misleading. 42. Rejected (as to characterization of "retaliation") as contrary to the weight of evidence and the law. 43.-46. Rejected as unnecessary, given the recommended disposition. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-4. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 48 and 49. 5.-6. Adopted in substance in paragraph 54. 7. Adopted in paragraph 1. 8. Adopted in paragraph 55. 9. Adopted in paragraph 3. 10. Adopted in paragraph 4. 11. Adopted in paragraph 5. 12.-13. Adopted in paragraph 4. 14.-15. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 34. Adopted in paragraph 6. 18.-21. Adopted in paragraphs 7 and 8. 22. Adopted in paragraph 9. 23. Adopted in substance in paragraph 59. 24. Adopted in paragraph 61. 25. Adopted in paragraph 10. 26. Adopted in paragraph 12. 27.-28. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 11 and 12. 29. Adopted in paragraph 13. 30. Adopted in paragraph 27. 31. Rejected as unnecessary. 32.-35. Adopted in paragraphs 14 and 15. 36.-38. Adopted in paragraph 19. 39.-43. Adopted in paragraphs 20 and 21. 44. Adopted in paragraph 22. 45. Rejected as unnecessary. 46. Adopted in paragraph 23. 47.-48. Rejected as unnecessary. 49. Adopted in substance in paragraph 25. 50. Adopted in paragraph 24. 51. Adopted in paragraph 26. 52. Adopted in paragraph 28. 53. Adopted in paragraph 29. 54. Adopted in paragraph 31. 55. Adopted in paragraph 30. 56. Rejected as unnecessary. 57.-62. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 43 through 46. 63.-64. Adopted in part in paragraph 47; otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 65.-72. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 32 through 38. COPIES FURNISHED: Patricia E. Lowrey, Esquire Mark B. Roberts, Esquire STEEL HECTOR and DAVIS 1900 Phillips Point West 777 South Flagler Drive West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Wayne L. Allen, Esquire 700 North Wickham Road, Suite 107 Melbourne, Florida 32935 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue is whether respondent's law enforcement certification should be disciplined for the reasons stated in the administrative complaint.
Findings Of Fact Base upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Lloyd H. Sisk, held law enforcement certificate number 2252 issued by petitioner, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (Commission). Respondent has held his license since April 3, 1971. When the events herein occurred, Sisk was employed as a detective with the Charlotte County Sheriff's Department. The charges against respondent are based upon an allegation of sexual abuse lodged against him by his niece, S. C., who is now seventeen years of age. The abuse allegedly occurred between December 1986 and February 1988. To place this controversy in proper perspective, a brief discussion of the living arrangements in the Sisk household is appropriate. In 1983 respondent, his wife, Brenda, and Brenda's mother (grandmother) decided to jointly purchase a home in Port Charlotte, Florida. Also residing with the Sisks were their teen-age son, Jeffrey, and the alleged victim. The grandmother had been given legal custody over the alleged victim, who was the daughter of Janis, Brenda's sister. Janis lived in Pinellas County, but because of various legal and personal problems, she had relinquished custody of her daughter to the grandmother shortly after S. C.'s birth. In late 1986, and over the objections of the grandmother and alleged victim, the Sisks decided to sell the home. This in turn engendered antagonism and animosity between the members of the family component and eventually culminated in the sexual abuse charges being made. The home was finally sold in February 1988, or more than a year later. Before the sale occurred, the Sisks advised the grandmother and alleged victim that, because of constant friction, the grandmother and S. C. would not live with the Sisks and their son when they relocated to a new home. At almost the same time the sale took place, S. C. began making sexual abuse allegations against respondent. In this regard, the testimony is sharply conflicting. In resolving these conflicts, the undersigned has accepted the more credible and persuasive evidence. The allegations first surfaced on an undisclosed date in February 1988 when S. C. told her sixteen year old boyfriend, James, that respondent had touched her breasts, buttocks and vaginal area while giving her back massages and had put a condom on his penis while in her presence. On February 17, 1988, S. C. telephoned her mother in Pinellas County and said respondent had been coming home in the afternoon and asking to give her backrubs. The alleged victim further complained that, during those backrubs, respondent was "rubbing her butt and in between her legs". That same day, S. C. told her grandmother that respondent had touched her breasts, buttocks and vaginal area while giving her backrubs. Three days later, S. C.'s mother, while in an intoxicated state, telephoned the Largo Police Department and relate the abuse allegations to a detective. That led to an investigation by the Charlotte County Sheriff's Office and the eventual filing of criminal charges by the state attorney and sexual abuse charges by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). 1/ At final hearing, the former boyfriend, grandmother and natural mother related the allegations described in the previous finding of fact. In addition, statements made by S. C. to an HRS counselor were offered into evidence. Finally, the alleged victim gave her version of what transpired. This included a rather graphic account of respondent, while in the presence of S. C., placing a condom on his penis and masturbating, and after attaining an erection a few minutes later, positioning his body next to S. C. and demonstrating various coital positions to his niece. The testimony of the alleged victim is not accepted as being credible for a number of reasons. To begin with, S. C. was extremely upset with respondent because the family home was being sold and she had been told that she could not remain with the Sisks. Her animosity towards respondent is also evidenced by the fact that, just prior to final hearing, she encouraged her mother (Janis) to "slam him (respondent)" with her testimony. It is also noted that the alleged victim's testimony at hearing differed in several material respects with the complaints she made to the Commission, HRS and in prior court testimony. Finally, the testimony of Lloyd, Brenda and Jeffrey Sisk, which is accepted as being credible, demonstrated numerous inconsistencies in S. C.'s testimony. Accordingly, it is found that respondent did not commit a lewd and lascivious act in the presence of his niece by exposing his penis and masturbating, and he did not handle her breasts, buttocks and vaginal area as alleged in the administrative complaint.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusion of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the administrative complaint be DISMISSED, with prejudice. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of August, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Heading Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of August, 1990.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint; and, if so, the appropriate penalty therefor.
Findings Of Fact Parties and Investigation Leading to Issuance of the Amended Complaint The Department is the state agency responsible for regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to section 20.43, Florida Statutes, and chapters 456 and 458, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Aunali Salim Khaku, M.D., is a neurologist and sleep medicine specialist licensed (ME 114611) in Florida. Respondent completed a neurology residency in 2013 and a sleep medicine fellowship in 2014. He practiced at the VA from 2014 until 2020, initially at the Lake Baldwin facility and then at the Lake Nona facility. From 2020 until early 2021, Respondent practiced at Orlando Health. Other than the allegations herein, the Department has never sought to discipline Respondent. The Department seeks to revoke Respondent’s license based on allegations that he engaged in sexual misconduct during office visits with three female patients—S.R., M.H., and M.V.S. The parties stipulated that the factual allegations, if proven by clear and convincing evidence, constitute sexual misconduct under Florida law. On or around December 6, 2020, M.V.S. reported to both the LMPD and the Department that Respondent acted inappropriately during an office visit on November 30, 2020. The Department investigated further, interviewed M.V.S. and Respondent, and obtained medical records from Orlando Health. On February 17, 2021, the Department issued an Order of Emergency Restriction of License (“ERO”) that restricted Respondent from practicing on female patients based on findings of sexual misconduct with M.V.S. On February 22, 2021, Respondent requested an expedited hearing under sections 120.569 and 120.57. The Department properly did not transmit the case to DOAH at that time, as judicial review of the ERO is via petition in the appellate court. §§ 120.60(6)(c) and 120.68, Fla. Stat. Respondent filed such a petition, but the First District Court of Appeal ultimately denied it on the merits. On March 9, 2021, the Department presented its disciplinary case to a probable cause panel of the Board. After hearing argument from both parties, the panel unanimously found probable cause to issue a three-count Administrative Complaint (“Complaint”) seeking to discipline Respondent for engaging in sexual misconduct with M.V.S. On March 10, 2021, the Department issued the Complaint. On March 16, 2021, Respondent requested an expedited formal hearing under chapter 120. However, the Department did not immediately transmit the Complaint to DOAH because it had just received notification that the VA investigated complaints of sexual misconduct against Respondent by two veterans, S.R. and M.H., who each saw Respondent multiple times between 2014 and 2016. The Department obtained records from the VA. As to S.R., the VA closed the matter as unsubstantiated based on S.R.’s decision not to pursue criminal charges and the VA’s finding of insufficient evidence to support the allegations. As to M.H., the VA found no conclusive evidence of misconduct based on Respondent’s testimony, which was corroborated by the testimony of his nurse and a medical student. After receipt of the VA records, the Department interviewed S.R. and M.H. Based on this additional information, the Department presented its case to another probable cause panel to amend the Complaint to include allegations relating to S.R. and M.H. After hearing from both parties, the panel voted unanimously on April 23, 2021, to find probable cause of sexual misconduct with S.R. and M.H. On April 27, 2021, the Department issued the three-count Amended Complaint seeking to discipline Respondent’s license for sexual misconduct with S.R., M.H., and M.V.S. On April 29, 2021, Respondent filed a third request for a hearing, which sought transmission of the case to DOAH for an expedited evidentiary hearing to be held within 30 days. On April 30, 2021, 45 days after Respondent’s request for a hearing on the initial Complaint, the Department transmitted the Amended Complaint to DOAH to conduct an evidentiary hearing under chapter 120.2 2 In filings prior to transmittal of the Amended Complaint to DOAH, in pleadings prior to the final hearing, and orally at the final hearing, Respondent argued that the Department improperly delayed transmitting the case to DOAH and violated his due process rights throughout the investigatory process. Even had Respondent preserved those arguments by including them in his PRO, the undersigned would have found that the Department’s investigation, the probable cause panel proceedings, and the timing of the transmittal of the case to DOAH did not render the proceedings unfair or impair the correctness of the Department’s action based on the weight of the credible evidence. For one, the Department presented its case to the probable cause panel 20 days after issuing the ERO and issued the initial Complaint the next day. It presented the new allegations to a probable cause panel 65 days after the ERO (and 44 days after filing the initial Complaint) and issued the Amended Complaint the next day. The Department then transmitted the Amended Complaint to DOAH on April 30, 2021, one day after Respondent requested a hearing on it and 45 days after requesting a hearing on the initial Complaint. Based on this timeline, the Department met its obligation to promptly institute chapter 120 proceedings. See § 120.60(6)(c), Fla. Stat. (“Summary suspension, restriction, or limitation may be ordered, but a suspension or revocation proceeding pursuant to ss. 120.569 and 120.57 shall also be promptly instituted and acted upon.”); see also § 456.073(5), Fla. Stat. (“Notwithstanding s. 120.569(2), the department shall notify the division within 45 days after receipt of a petition or request for a formal hearing.”); Fla. Admin. Code. R. 28-106.501(3) (“In the case of the emergency suspension, limitation, or restriction of a license, unless otherwise provided by law, within 20 days after emergency action taken pursuant to subsection (1) of this rule, the agency shall initiate administrative proceedings in compliance with Sections 120.569, 120.57 and 120.60, F.S., and Rule 28- 106.2015, F.A.C.”). The weight of the credible evidence also failed to establish any resulting prejudice to Respondent. He presented no evidence as to how the Department’s decision to investigate the new allegations and issue the Amended Complaint before transmitting the case to DOAH prejudiced his ability to defend against the allegations. The Department notified Respondent of M.V.S.’s complaint and allowed him to provide statements during the investigation, make arguments before both probable cause panels, conduct discovery, and adequately prepare for and defend against the allegations at a final hearing. The fact that the VA did not comply with Respondent’s discovery requests or make witnesses available is neither attributable to the Department nor a reasonable basis to argue prejudice, particularly where Respondent failed to enforce subpoenas or challenge the VA’s discovery objections in state or federal court. The undersigned simply cannot find that the Department violated Respondent’s due process rights by waiting 45 days to transmit the case to DOAH while the Department investigated new allegations involving two other female patients. At best, Respondent’s alleged prejudice is that the Department was able to prosecute him for sexual misconduct with two additional patients, which it had authority to do independently by separate complaint or by moving to amend the Complaint once it transmitted the case to DOAH. The latter option could have resulted in even more delay, as DOAH may have had to relinquish jurisdiction to allow for the new allegations to be approved by a probable cause panel if the Department had not already completed that necessary step. S.R.’s Two Appointments with Respondent in 2014 and 2015 In 2014, S.R., a 58-year-old veteran who just moved to Orlando, requested a neurology referral because she suffers from multiple sclerosis (“MS”). The VA referred her to Respondent with whom she had two office visits. On December 29, 2014, S.R. had her first appointment with Respondent at the VA Lake Baldwin facility. Respondent’s assistant took S.R.’s vitals but did not remain in the room during the examination.3 S.R. never asked for a chaperone to be present and one was not offered to her. Respondent entered the room and made introductions with S.R. They discussed the new VA facility in Lake Nona, where Respondent lived, and restaurants in that area. According to S.R., Respondent said that he hoped to see her, though she did not understand what that meant. S.R. explained that she suffered her first MS attack over 30 years earlier but only recently was diagnosed with the disease after a neurologist ordered an MRI. She discussed her current symptoms, including back pain, muscle spasms, and fatigue. Respondent told her that back problems were common for women with large breasts, which she thought was odd. But, she expressed hope that Respondent could continue to help with her symptoms much like her prior neurologists in South Carolina and South Florida. Respondent examined S.R. and tested her reflexes, vision, coordination, and physical limitations. Respondent said he wanted to listen to S.R.’s heart. Without even trying to listen over her clothes, he asked S.R. to lift her t-shirt. He began rubbing his stethoscope across both her breasts and under her bra. He then cupped the bottom of her left breast with the palm of 3 The VA advocate’s report indicated that S.R. said that Respondent instructed his assistant to leave the room prior to his examination. However, S.R. testified credibly that she never made that allegation and her handwritten statement to the VA advocate also contained no such allegation. That the VA advocate’s hearsay report says otherwise neither calls S.R.’s credibility into doubt nor undermines the clear and consistent nature of her testimony. his hand while holding the stethoscope between his fingers and touching her nipple. This portion of the examination lasted about ten seconds. At the end of the initial visit, Respondent discussed treatment plans, medication, and physical therapy with S.R. They scheduled a follow-up appointment for several months later. Respondent documented S.R.’s records based on his examination. Although S.R. testified credibly that she had a heart murmur, Respondent noted a regular heart rate and rhythm with no murmurs. He also continued S.R.’s prescription for Diazepam, though several months later he placed an addendum for that initial visit record to indicate the prescription was improperly entered under his name and that he would defer to S.R.’s primary care physician for that medication. S.R. thought Respondent’s conduct was weird because no doctor had ever listened to her heart under her clothes or touched her breasts in that manner. She felt confused and uncomfortable, but she did not report the incident then because she trusted Respondent as her doctor and thought it could have been a mistake. She also thought Respondent might be the only neurologist at the VA. She discussed the incident with her husband and decided that she would be more aware at subsequent appointments. On March 30, 2015, S.R. had her second visit with Respondent at the Lake Nona facility. She arrived early, but the office staff delayed bringing her back and then had trouble taking her vitals. S.R. did not request a chaperone for this visit because everyone seemed very busy. Respondent entered the room and they were again alone. Respondent seemed irritated because he thought S.R. arrived late, which made her defensive. She complained of left hip pain and told Respondent that she had not gone for physical therapy. He examined her hip by lifting her leg, which hurt. She then sat up and he said he needed to listen to her heart. Again, without attempting to listen over her t-shirt and bra, he told her to lift her t-shirt. Because of what occurred during the last visit, S.R. kept her arms tightly by her sides to limit Respondent’s ability to touch her breasts. He kept using his elbow to try to relax her arms while moving the stethoscope higher over her breasts, eventually cupping her breast under her bra. He grabbed at her breasts but got frustrated by her refusal to relax her arms. At that point, Respondent threw the stethoscope into the sink and became angry, which startled S.R. and made her uncomfortable. She requested that he continue her Diazepam prescription to help her sleep at night, which she said her prior neurologist prescribed for muscle spasms. Respondent told her that the drug was for anxiety, not muscle spasms, though he documented in her record that she should continue to take the medication. Respondent also documented again that S.R. had a regular heart rate and rhythm. S.R. felt uncomfortable during the entire visit. She had never had a neurologist get angry or confrontational with her, but she decided not to report the incidents at that time because she was in pain and just wanted to go home. About a month later, she awoke in the middle of the night and realized the inappropriateness of Respondent’s conduct. In August 2015, S.R. returned to the Lake Nona facility to schedule an appointment with a different neurologist. When she saw Respondent’s name on the signage, she immediately went to the patient advocate to report his misconduct in the hope of preventing him from engaging in the same behavior with other patients. She met with the patient advocate and the VA police, and she completed a written statement. Although she was supposed to testify before the VA investigative board, she had trouble finding the room that day and left without speaking to anyone. Based on S.R.’s decision not to pursue criminal charges and the VA’s finding of insufficient evidence to support the allegations, the VA closed the matter as unsubstantiated. However, the matter was referred for clinical and/or administrative follow- up, which resulted in the VA updating its chaperone policy to require signs to be posted in the offices to put patients on notice of their right to ask for a chaperone. S.R. did not report the incidents to the Department at the time because she did not realize she could do so. But, when the Department contacted her in 2021 about this case, she agreed to participate and testify. The undersigned found S.R. to be a highly credible witness who unequivocally testified about Respondent’s inappropriate sexual behavior. S.R.’s testimony was compelling, specific, clear, and materially consistent with the statements she made when the incidents first occurred. Respondent testified about his treatment of S.R., but he conceded he had no independent recollection of the visits. Instead, he based his testimony on what he documented in her medical records and his standard practice. Respondent testified that he conducted a thorough examination in the same manner that he evaluates all of his new patients. He performed a cardiac examination over S.R.’s clothing by placing a stethoscope on her chest in several areas to listen to her heart. He confirmed that he never places the stethoscope on, or allows his hand to come into contact with, a patient’s breasts and that it was impossible that such contact happened with S.R. even inadvertently. He also said that he always has a chaperone present if he needs to listen to a female patient’s heart under her clothing and that is exactly what he would have done had he needed to do so with S.R. Respondent denied engaging in any inappropriate behavior with S.R. and suggested instead that she misperceived what happened. However, he offered no credible explanation for S.R. having such a misperception, except to accuse her of being upset for his refusal to prescribe her Diazepam. S.R.’s medical records fail to document any cognitive impairment and Respondent confirmed that she did not suffer from hallucinations or ailments that would cause her to imagine things that did not happen. Although S.R. admitted that it took her a few months to fully realize what Respondent had done and to report it to the VA, the undersigned has no hesitation in finding her testimony to be a fair and accurate account of Respondent’s actual conduct. The records themselves also call the veracity of Respondent’s testimony into question. Although S.R. credibly testified that she had a heart murmur, Respondent documented the lack of such a murmur even after conducting two cardiovascular examinations of her. Had Respondent conducted a proper cardiac examination, he should have identified and documented her murmur. Further, it cannot be ignored that the treatment plan for both visits continued her prescription for Diazepam, even though Respondent—after the first visit but before the second visit—placed an addendum in the record to indicate that S.R. needed to obtain the prescription from her primary care physician. Respondent’s notes for the March 2015 visit also document that Diazepam continued to be an active prescription for S.R., undermining the suggestion that she would fabricate an allegation of sexual misconduct against Respondent on that basis. Moreover, Respondent’s expert neurologist had never heard of a patient fabricating sexual misconduct allegations against a doctor for failing to prescribe medication. Based on the weight of the credible evidence, the undersigned finds that the Department proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent engaged in sexual misconduct with S.R. During the first visit, Respondent directed S.R. to lift her shirt and inappropriately rubbed his stethoscope across her breasts and under her bra, cupped her left breast with the palm of his hand while holding the stethoscope between his fingers, and touched her nipple. During the second appointment, Respondent directed S.R. to lift her shirt again. Although S.R. kept her arms tightly against her sides to try to limit Respondent’s ability to touch her inappropriately, he inappropriately rubbed the stethoscope across her breasts, cupped her breast under her bra, and grabbed at her breasts. Respondent did so on both occasions without first attempting to listen to S.R.’s heart over her clothing, which itself was contrary to the standard of care. M.H.’s Four Appointments with Respondent in 2015 and 2016 In late 2015, the VA referred M.H., a 39-year-old veteran, to Respondent for a neurological evaluation after she had an abnormal MRI showing white matter changes in her brain following an illegal drug overdose. M.H. had four office visits with Respondent at the Lake Nona facility on August 12, 2015, November 6, 2015, June 23, 2016, and August 1, 2016. During the first three visits, Respondent discussed M.H.’s medical history, prior drug use, and symptoms, including migraines, pain, possible nerve damage, and cognitive and motor issues; he also conducted physical and neurological examinations. During the fourth visit, Respondent performed a nerve block procedure to address M.H.’s migraines. M.H. testified about the visits and her uncomfortable interactions with Respondent. During several visits, he discussed the lack of sex with his wife and that she allowed him to step outside the marriage. He either asked M.H. out on a date or to meet at a hotel, which she interpreted as an offer of sex, and he also asked if he could call her. He asked her questions about her sex life several times, including how often she had sex with her boyfriend, what positions they liked, the size of her bra, and whether sex was painful. M.H. testified that Respondent also acted inappropriately. During one visit, he either lifted her shirt or asked her to lift her shirt to look at her breasts and listen to her heart. He once blocked the door to prevent her from leaving the room and attempted to put his arms around her to hug her. He once put his hands on the bottom of her buttocks, like a lover’s caress. During the fourth visit when the nurse left the room after the procedure, he had an erection and rubbed it through his pants against her leg while trying to give her a hug. She said that she told her mother in the waiting room after that visit that Respondent had rubbed his erection on her. She also said that he told her not to say anything about their interactions at each visit. In August 2016, M.H. reported Respondent’s conduct to the VA; she did not report the conduct to the Department because she did not know she could. The VA investigative board conducted sworn interviews of M.H., Respondent, his nurse, and a medical student, and it considered numerous letters of recommendation from Respondent’s patients and colleagues. It found no conclusive evidence of sexual misconduct based on Respondent’s testimony, as corroborated by testimony from a nurse and a medical student. M.H. testified passionately about Respondent’s conduct and how it made her feel. However, her recollection of the details—as to what occurred, when, and who was present—was fuzzy and inconsistent in material ways with the testimony she gave to the VA board in 2016, her deposition testimony in this case, and the testimony of her mother. M.H. stated that her recollection in 2016 was better than now, but the inconsistencies outlined below affect the weight to be given to M.H.’s testimony. M.H. testified initially that she and Respondent were alone in the examination room at some point during each visit. M.H. testified that she asked to have her daughter present during either the third or fourth visit, but Respondent refused. M.H. also testified on cross examination that she could not recall if her mother was in the room with her during the first two visits, only to later confirm that her mother must have been present during those two visits based on the testimony she gave before the VA board in 2016. M.H.’s mother testified that she accompanied M.H. to two of the visits, though she could not recall the dates. Contrary to M.H.’s testimony, her mother said she neither came back to the examination room nor met Respondent at any visit and based her testimony solely on what M.H. said. M.H.’s mother testified that M.H. said that Respondent asked her out after one visit and rubbed his erection against her back after another visit, which contravened M.H.’s testimony that Respondent rubbed his erection against her leg while hugging her from the front. Before the VA board in 2016, and contrary to her testimony at the final hearing, M.H. said that Respondent acted professionally during the first two visits and that her mother was present in the examination room both times. M.H. testified that Respondent became unprofessional while they were alone in the room during the final two visits, at which he asked inappropriate questions about her sex life. M.H. explained that she was offered a chaperone before the third visit, but she refused because nothing unprofessional had occurred before, and that Respondent refused to allow her daughter to be in the room during the procedure on the fourth visit. M.H. said Respondent grabbed her buttocks during the third visit and, during the fourth visit, he blocked the door after the procedure, grabbed her buttocks, lifted her shirt to comment on how much he liked her breasts, and rubbed his erection through his pants on her leg. When cross-examined about the inconsistencies, M.H. testified at the final hearing that she may have been protecting Respondent by saying in 2016 that he acted professionally during the first two visits, though she now recalls him acting unprofessionally during all four visits. During her pre-hearing deposition in this case, M.H. testified that Respondent asked questions about her sex life and bra size, discussed his open marriage, and asked her out during the first visit, but he did not touch her inappropriately. M.H. testified that Respondent refused to allow her daughter to stay in the room with her during the second visit and, after the examination, he blocked the door, grabbed her and tried to hug her, rubbed his erection on her stomach and leg, and again reiterated that he was allowed to have sex outside his marriage. She testified that Respondent discussed his open marriage and asked her to date him during the third visit; M.H. said that the office refused to allow her mother to accompany her in the room. M.H. testified that the only uncomfortable thing that Respondent did during the fourth visit was ask her out repeatedly. M.H. testified that Respondent never asked if she wanted a chaperone at any of the visits, though she later acknowledged that a chaperone was present at the fourth visit. Respondent testified about his treatment of M.H. based only on what he documented in her chart, as he had no independent recollection beyond his review of her medical records. Respondent denied any inappropriate behavior with M.H. He claimed that he never allowed himself to be alone in a room with her because she was engaging in manipulative, drug-seeking behavior. He basically accused M.H. of fabricating the allegations against him because he refused to prescribe her pain medication. However, Respondent’s accusations against M.H. are questionable for several reasons. Respondent never documented in her record his concern about M.H.’s alleged drug-seeking behavior, that a chaperone needed to be present at all visits, or that she had requested pain medication. Although he documented the presence of his nurse and a medical student at the fourth visit, he failed to do the same for the first three visits. One would expect a physician—surely one as concerned about a patient’s drug-seeking history and behavior as Respondent now claims to be—to document those concerns and the presence of chaperones in the medical record to prevent any future false accusation. This is particularly so given that Respondent, at the time, had recently been accused of misconduct by S.R., which he believed was both false and based on her drug-seeking behavior. The medical records also confirm that M.H. informed Respondent at the June 2016 visit that she had been prescribed Lyrica for pain while in jail and that it was working. Respondent noted, “Renewed lyrica,” in the plan/recs section of the record for that visit. Respondent also noted Pregabalin, the generic name for Lyrica,4 in both the active and pending medication lists for both the June and August 2016 visits. The weight of the credible evidence does not support Respondent’s claim that M.H. fabricated her allegations because he refused to prescribe her pain medication, particularly given her credible testimony that she did not 4 According to WebMD, the generic name for Lyrica is Pregabalin. Available at https://www.webmd.com/drugs/2/drug-93965/lyrica-oral/details. need pain medication because Respondent continued her Lyrica prescription. It also bears repeating that Respondent’s own expert had never heard of a patient falsely accusing a doctor of sexual misconduct for refusing to prescribe medication. After evaluating the evidence, the undersigned finds M.H. generally to be a more credible witness overall than Respondent. She testified passionately and credibly about Respondent’s requests to meet her outside the office because he had an open marriage and his wife allowed such conduct. She also credibly explained how Respondent commented on the size of her breasts, grabbed her buttocks, and rubbed his erection on her. Importantly, however, the undersigned cannot ignore that the clear and convincing evidence standard applies in this case. M.H.’s recollection was too fuzzy and inconsistent to definitively find without hesitation that Respondent engaged in the exact sexual misconduct alleged by M.H. and set forth in the Amended Complaint. If the Department’s burden in this case was a mere preponderance of the evidence, the undersigned would likely find that it proved Respondent engaged in sexual misconduct with M.H. But, the clear and convincing evidence standard applies herein. And, because M.H. could not provide the type of definitive and clear testimony required in this disciplinary action, the Department failed to prove that Respondent engaged in sexual misconduct with M.H. M.V.S.’s One Appointment with Respondent in 2020 On November 30, 2020, M.V.S., a 68-year-old woman, had an initial neurology consult with Respondent at Orlando Health. M.V.S. sought a neurologist based on an abnormal MRI showing a cyst near her pituitary gland and complaints of neck pain radiating to her shoulder and arm. After filling out paperwork in the reception area, a medical assistant or nurse brought M.V.S. to an examination room. The room had an examination table, which could be lowered, a counter, and a chair. M.V.S. sat in the chair while the assistant took her vitals. Although M.V.S. has a history of blood pressure spikes, for which she has called 911 and even gone to the hospital several times, her blood pressure was within normal limits that morning. The assistant waited for M.V.S. to complete the paperwork and then left the room. Respondent entered the room a few minutes later and closed the door behind him. He wore green scrubs and a white lab coat; she wore a skirt, blouse, bra, and underwear. He and M.V.S. were alone for the remainder of the appointment. They initially discussed M.V.S.’s medical history and complaints. M.V.S. talked about her aunt, who had symptoms of Alzheimer’s disease and did not recognize her on a recent visit. She was concerned about the disease because she recently had forgotten some small details, like the name of an actor in a movie. M.V.S. did not believe she had significant memory issues, but she wanted research on the disease because it ran in her family. Respondent asked M.V.S. if she lived with anyone, which she interpreted as a question relating to her safety. She informed him that she lived alone within close proximity to a fire station. She also mentioned that her daughter lived in Orlando and her fiancé lived in Longwood. Respondent asked if she had sexual relations with her fiancé; she explained that they did not because her fiancé had prostate cancer. M.V.S. thought the question was odd given the reason for the appointment and because no other physician had ever asked that type of question before. Respondent moved on to M.V.S.’s complaints of neck pain. She explained that she experienced pain on the left side of her neck that radiated to her left shoulder and left arm. At that point, Respondent directed M.V.S. to sit on the table so he could examine her. While standing to M.V.S.’s left, Respondent rubbed and squeezed her neck and shoulders with his thumbs and fingers for a couple of minutes. No other doctor had examined her in that fashion before. He said she felt tense, but never asked if she experienced pain during the examination. She confirmed that it definitely felt like a neck and shoulder massage, which she had received many times. She noted that her cardiologist had recently palpated her neck for pain by using two fingers to poke and feel around, which was different than Respondent’s examination. Indeed, when a doctor palpates for pain, they typically use two fingertips to lightly press and prod in the trouble areas and obtain feedback from the patient about the level of pain. Respondent then examined M.V.S.’s spine while she stood in front of him. He thereafter examined her reflexes, eyes, and extremity strength while she sat on the table. He also conducted a memory test, which she passed. M.V.S. did not recall Respondent listening to her heart during the visit. At that point, Respondent directed M.V.S. to lie face-down on the table, which already was lowered. He asked if he could raise her skirt and she said, yes, because she believed it related to a muscular or skeletal examination. He raised her skirt and, over her underwear, rubbed her lower back and eventually moved down to her buttocks using both of his hands. He rubbed and squeezed both of her buttocks. She confirmed it felt like a deliberate, prolonged massage, which had never happened to her at a doctor’s office. Her mind raced, she felt frozen, and she could not believe what was happening. After one to two minutes, Respondent told her to sit up because he heard a voice. She sat on the end of the table and he began massaging and squeezing her right breast while standing on her right. He told her that he had never done this before and that she was beautiful. She thanked him in a low voice, but she was afraid and felt trapped because they were alone, there were no witnesses, and she was unsure of what he would do. Respondent asked if M.V.S. was comfortable with him massaging her breast and he stopped when she said no. He moved to her left side and explained that his wife would not have sex with him, so she permitted him to have sex outside the marriage. He asked if M.V.S. would meet him for sex and she declined. Respondent asked if that was because her fiancé would object, and she confirmed they had a commitment. At that point, Respondent pulled his lab coat back and said, “Look at this. Look what you did to me.” Respondent revealed his erect penis, which M.V.S. confirmed was clearly visible through his scrubs. Respondent told her to keep this between us, said his assistant would be in shortly with paperwork, and left the room. M.V.S. waited for about seven minutes and, when no one came, she left the room, tried to hold her composure, and checked out. She said nothing before leaving because she felt unsafe and was unsure if anyone would believe her anyway. M.V.S. turned on her car’s air conditioning and drank water to calm down. Her heart was pounding, and she feared having a blood pressure spike. As soon as she arrived home, M.V.S. called her daughter to tell her what happened. M.V.S.’s daughter, who is a nurse, told her to call the police. M.V.S. called the LMPD that afternoon. The officer with whom she spoke suggested that she file a complaint with the Department, which she did on December 6, 2020. Both the Department and the LMPD investigated the allegations, which included interviews of M.V.S. and Respondent.5 M.V.S. also reported the incident to Orlando Health risk management. The undersigned found M.V.S. to be a highly credible witness who testified passionately and definitively about Respondent’s inappropriate sexual behavior during the office visit. She immediately reported it to the LMPD and, within a week, filed complaints with both the Department and Respondent’s employer. M.V.S.’s testimony was clear, specific, detailed, compelling, and materially consistent with the interviews and statements she gave immediately following the visit. Respondent testified about his treatment of M.V.S., but—as he did with the S.R. and M.H.—he conceded he had little to no independent 5 Based on the information obtained from M.V.S. and Respondent, the LMPD placed the case into inactive status pending further evidence. recollection of her or the visit. Instead, he reviewed her medical records, which refreshed his recollection of what occurred during the visit. Respondent denied engaging in any inappropriate behavior with M.V.S. that could have been interpreted as sexual or outside the scope of a proper examination. He testified that he conducted a neurological examination, palpated her neck for pain, checked her reflexes, and conducted a memory test. He said he never massaged her neck and shoulders, touched or massaged her breasts or buttocks, discussed his marriage, solicited her to have sex, said she was beautiful, or revealed an erection through his scrubs. He also said she could not have laid face-down on the table because he never lowered the back or extended the footrest; he confirmed that he would have brought in a chaperone if he needed her to lie on the table. Respondent testified that M.V.S.’s accusations against him were the product of memory loss and cognitive impairment. Although M.V.S. reported a family history of Alzheimer’s and a fear of mild memory loss, Respondent documented that she performed well on her memory and cognitive examinations. M.V.S. and her daughter testified credibly that she did not experience significant memory loss beyond forgetting the name of an actor in a movie. Respondent himself confirmed that M.V.S. did not suffer from hallucinations or ailments that would cause her to perceive things that were not there—a point with which his expert neurologist agreed given the way Respondent documented the medical record. And, more importantly, M.V.S.’s ability to recall the specific details of the visit and do so consistently with the statements she made previously undermine Respondent’s belief that cognitive impairment caused her to fabricate her allegations. The weight of the credible evidence simply does not support the suggestion that M.V.S. misperceived, confabulated, or fabricated her allegations based on memory loss or cognitive impairment. Additionally, Respondent attempted to discredit M.V.S. by suggesting that she may have come onto him. Indeed, he testified that she was verbose and told him during their initial discussion about her history that her fiancé was older, that she was a 60s baby, and that she had not been touched in a while. Aside from M.V.S.’s credible testimony that she said no such things, it cannot be ignored that Respondent conceded that his memory of the visit was based on his review of the medical record, which contained no reference to these comments even though Respondent says they were odd. Respondent also presented evidence that M.V.S. had previously called 911 on multiple occasions relating to blood pressure spikes to undermine the veracity of her testimony. However, the recordings of the 911 calls reveal an individual who, despite being concerned about her blood pressure, is alert, aware of her surroundings, clear-headed, and in no way suffering from an illness that would raise doubts about the veracity of her testimony or her credibility overall. Based on the weight of the credible evidence, the undersigned finds that the Department proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent engaged in sexual misconduct with M.V.S. He inappropriately massaged her neck and shoulders, buttocks, and breast. He disclosed that he had an open marriage and solicited M.V.S. to meet him for sex outside the office. He also told her that she was beautiful and revealed his erection through his scrubs.
Conclusions For Petitioner: Kristen Summers, Esquire Elizabeth Tiernan, Esquire Prosecution Services Unit Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 For Respondent: Kathryn Hood, Esquire Pennington, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jon M. Pellett, Esquire Pennington, P.A. 12724 Gran Bay Parkway West, Suite 401 Jacksonville, Florida 32258
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health, Board of Medicine, issue a final order finding Respondent committed sexual misconduct prohibited by sections 458.331(1)(j), 458.329, and 456.063(1), suspending Respondent’s license for two years, and thereafter permanently restricting his license to either prohibit him from seeing female patients or, at a minimum, doing so without a chaperone present.7 DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of October, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ANDREW D. MANKO Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of October, 2021. 7 Section 456.072(4), Florida Statutes, provides that the Board, in addition to any other discipline imposed through final order, “shall assess costs related to the investigation and prosecution of the case.” Prior to the final hearing, the parties agreed to bifurcate the investigative costs issue (including Respondent’s argument that such costs should not be assessed because they are based on unpromulgated rules) pending resolution of the merits of the Amended Complaint. Upon further reflection, the undersigned concludes that resolving such an issue—even in a bifurcated proceeding—is premature because the Board has not yet issued a final order disciplining Respondent or followed the procedure in section 456.072(4), which requires it to consider an affidavit of itemized costs and any written objections thereto. It is in those written objections where Respondent may challenge the costs as being based on an unpromulgated rule. And, if Respondent’s written objections create a disputed issue of fact, the Department can transmit the investigative costs issue to DOAH to resolve that dispute, just as it did in Case No. 20-5385F. COPIES FURNISHED: Jon M. Pellett, Esquire Pennington, P.A. Suite 401 12724 Gran Bay Parkway West Jacksonville, Florida 32258 Kathryn Hood, Esquire Pennington, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Donna C. McNulty, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Paul A. Vazquez, JD, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-03 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3253 Kristen Summers, Esquire Prosecution Services Unit Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 Elizabeth Tiernan, Esquire Prosecution Services Unit Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 Edward A. Tellechea, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Louise St. Laurent, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265
The Issue The issue is whether Dr. Wise abused his position as a treating psychiatrist for five young women by using his influence over them to engage in sexual relationships with them in violation of Section 458.331(1)(k), Florida Statutes, (1979), [now codified as Section 458.331(1)(j), Florida Statutes (1987)] and whether he is therefore guilty of unprofessional or immoral conduct in violation of Section 458.1201(1), Florida Statutes, (1969) [now codified as Section 458.329, Florida Statutes, (1987)]. If Dr. Wise is guilty of any of these activities, he would also be guilty of violating Section 458.331(1)(x), Florida Statutes (1987), which proscribes the violation of any portion of Chapter 458. Sexual misconduct with patients would also constitute gross or repeated malpractice, which is forbidden by Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (1987).
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the Administrative Complaint, Dr. Wise has been a licensed medical doctor, holding license ME0008520. He has been licensed in Florida since 1957 and practices in the area of Adult and Child Psychiatry in Miami. He has been a board certified psychiatrist in since 1965. Patient L. H. From July 1969 through April 1971, Dr. Wise treated L.H, who was 21 years of age. When she began treatment, she was experiencing panic attacks and had other problems resulting from sexual molestation as a child, rape, alcoholism, and family problems. At first she had visited Dr. Wise weekly, but toward the end of her 1 1/2 years of therapy, she saw him every other week. L.H. alleges that shortly before she terminated her treatment with Dr. Wise she had a severe panic attack which caused her to telephone Dr. Wise, who then offered to provide therapy at Dr. Wise's apartment. When she arrived, she says Dr. Wise was in his bathrobe, took her to the bedroom, told her to place her hand on his penis and had sexual relations with her. She also maintains that Dr. Wise saw her on one other occasion in his office, when no sex occurred. L. H. said nothing about Dr. Wise's conduct at the time the incident was to have taken place. Fourteen years later, L.H. was seeing a psychologist in St. Louis, Missouri, Dr. Gertrude Williams. In the course of therapy with Dr. Williams, L.H. stated that she had sexual intercourse with Dr. Wise while she was his patient. This disclosure to Dr. Williams is consistent with the testimony L. H. gave at the final hearing. In October of 1985, L.H. filed a complaint against Dr. Wise with the South Florida Psychiatric Society alleging sexual misconduct, but after a two-day hearing a panel of twelve doctors found against L.H. and in favor of Dr. Wise. The testimony of L. H. was no more persuasive in this case than it was before the Psychiatric Society. In October, 1985, L.H. also filed a complaint which the Department investigated, but found the charges unsubstantiated. No disciplinary action was initiated against Dr. Wise at that time. The evidence in the instant case with respect to the allegations of misconduct by Dr. Wise with L.H. was not clearly convincing or persuasive. Patient S.P. Dr. Wise treated S.P. from July, 1980 through July, 1981 at his office in Miami. She was then approximately 19 years old and had complaints of nervousness, insomnia and hyperventilation. She saw Dr. Wise approximately two times per week (on Tuesdays and Thursdays) for therapy. Although originally seen in the morning, her appointments were changed to late in the afternoon. S.P. alleges that within two months after beginning treatment, while she was sitting on the couch during a therapy session, Dr. Wise got up from another couch, sat down next to her and began to kiss her. She also alleges that during subsequent visits Dr. Wise had sexual intercourse with her. S.P. filed a civil lawsuit for malpractice against Dr. Wise alleging the same sexual misconduct alleged here as the basis for her damage claim. After a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr. Wise. S.P.'s marriage failed while she was seeing Dr. Wise. She had often stayed out late, and told her husband that she was at therapy sessions with Dr. Wise. It is not clear whether these late night absences from home were actually the result of appointments with Dr. Wise or were the result of other appointments which she justified to her husband by claiming they were appointments with Dr. Wise. After terminating treatment with Dr. Wise, S.P. began seeing a Roman catholic priest who was also trained as a counselor. She told him that she had been seeing a local psychiatrist who, after a few sessions, had engaged in sexual intimacy with her. After moving back to her mother's home due to her breakup with her husband, S.P. also told her mother that she and Dr. Wise had been sexually intimate. These statements by S. P. were consistent with her testimony at final hearing; that the testimony is consistent, however, does not make it persuasive. Taken as a whole, the evidence that Dr. Wise may have engaged in a sexual relationship with S. P. is not clearly convincing. Patient L. M. Dr. Wise treated L.M. during the period from late 1972 through February of 1973. She was sixteen years old and was seeking to improve her relationship with her parents. She alleges that during one of her early visits Dr. Wise questioned her about the pimple on her forehead, and asked whether she had pimples on any other area of her body. She says she responded that she had a pimple on her back, and alleges that Dr. Wise then asked to see her back. When she lifted her pullover, she says Dr. Wise fondled her breasts briefly. Viewing the testimony of L.M. as a whole, the evidence is not clearly convincing that Dr. Wise ever fondled her breasts. Patient K. M. Dr. Wise treated K.M. from 1982, when she was 18 years old, until 1984. K. M. came to see Dr. Wise because of problems including an abortion she had when she was 15 years old, as well as a prior incestuous relationship with her brother. K.M. testified that she would go to Dr. Wise's office for treatment late in the evening, when they also would engage in sexual intercourse. She also testified that in 1985, after she terminated her therapeutic relation with Dr. Wise, she told her general practice physician, Dr. Peter Shea, during an office visit, that she had an affair with Dr. Wise. As with the foregoing witnesses, the statement made to Dr. Shea is consistent with K. M.'s testimony at final hearing, but that consistency does not enhance K. M.'s testimony. The testimony of K.M. concerning liaisons with Dr. Wise is not clearly convincing. Patient L. G. L.G. saw Dr. Wise beginning in April, 1974 when she was 21 years old. When she first came to Dr. Wise she complained of depression, unhappiness, and confusion. She told Dr. Wise that she was lonely and did not have a good relationship with men. Dr. Wise also treated L.G.'s sister, Joan. After about two months of seeing her on a weekly basis, L.G. alleges that Dr. Wise came over to the couch where she was sitting, embraced her, and during the course of the treatment, their physical relationship became more intimate. The intimacies were to have included oral sex which L.G. performed on Dr. Wise, which she thought was therapy for her psychological problems with sexual intimacy. L.G. terminated her relationship with Dr. Wise and began seeing a psychologist at the University of Miami, Edward Rappaport. During the course of treatment L.G. reported to Dr. Rappaport that she had been sexually involved with Dr. Wise. The testimony of L.G. at final hearing is consistent with the statement she made to Dr. Rappaport during therapy that Dr. Wise engaged in sex with her while she was seeing Dr. Wise for professional help. The consistency of the testimony does not make it persuasive. Considering the testimony of L.G. and Dr. Rappaport, the evidence offered to show that Dr. Wise had engaged in sexual intimacies with L.G. while she was seen as a patient is not clearly convincing.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a Final Order dismissing the second amended Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 22rd day of May, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22rd day of May, 1989. APPENDIX The following constitutes my rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1987). Rulings on Findings of Fact Proposed by the Department of Professional Regulation Covered in finding of fact 1. Covered in finding of fact 1. Accepted in findings of fact 2, 6, 10, 11 and 12. Covered in finding of fact 11. 6-7. Rejected for the reasons stated in finding of fact 11. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 9. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 11. 13 Covered in finding of fact 6. Covered in finding of fact 7, of the facts stated that are rejected. Rejected because the testimony of S.P. was not clearly convincing. Covered in finding of fact 9. Covered in finding of fact 9. The proposals concerning the telephone calls are rejected as unnecessary. Rejected because the testimony of S.P. was not clearly convincing. Covered in finding of fact 9. Rejected as subordinate to finding of fact 9. Rejected as subordinate to finding of fact 9. Covered in finding of fact 9. Covered in finding of fact 9. To the extent necessary, covered in finding of fact 24. The proposal concerning the telephone calls is rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. 26.-29. To the extent necessary, covered in finding of fact 10. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 12. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 13, although the proposals are rejected because L.G.'s testimony was not clearly convincing. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected because the testimony of L.G. is not clearly convincing. Rejected as unnecessary. 37.-38. To the extent necessary, covered in finding of fact 13. 39. Rejected as unnecessary. 40. Covered in finding of fact 13. 41.-42. Rejected because the testimony of L.G. was not clearly convincing. 43. Covered in finding of fact 2. Covered in finding of fact 3, although the proposed findings are rejected. Covered in finding of fact 3, although the proposed findings are rejected. Covered in finding of fact 3. Covered in finding of fact 4. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected because of the testimony of the complaining witnesses has not been clearly convincing. 50.-53. Rejected as unnecessary. 54. Rejected as unnecessary. Rulings on Findings of Fact Proposed By Dr. Wise Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 1. Covered in finding of fact 1. Covered in finding of fact 2. Covered in finding of fact 2 Covered in finding of fact 4. Covered in finding of fact 5. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 5. Covered in finding of fact 6. Covered in finding of fact 6. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 7. Covered in finding of fact 8. Covered in finding of fact 11. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 11. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 11. Covered in finding of fact 12. Covered in finding of fact 12. Covered in finding of fact 12, to the extent necessary. Covered in finding of fact 14. Covered in finding of fact 10. Covered in finding of fact 10. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 10. Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan Sewell, Esquire Law offices of Mark P. Lang 20 North Orange Avenue Suite 707 Post Office Box 2127 Orlando, FL 32802-2127 Jonathan King, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0750 Kenneth D. Easley, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0750 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0750A =================================================================
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice by discriminating against Petitioner based on her sex and by retaliating against her.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes (2008). As a Florida non-profit corporation, all of Respondent's activities are governed by its bylaws. Petitioner, a white female, has worked for Respondent off and on during the last five years. Most recently, Petitioner began working for Respondent on January 18, 2008, as a part-time food preparation (prep) worker and a part-time waitress in Respondent's restaurant. Petitioner accepted the job because she had recently left a full-time position with another employer due to the distance of that job from her house. As a prep worker, Petitioner earned a set hourly wage. Petitioner's responsibilities included assisting the chef in preparing meals and cleaning up the kitchen. The chef, Tony Mongone, directed Petitioner's kitchen work but he was not her supervisor. As a waitress, Petitioner earned $3.35 per hour plus tips. On Tuesdays and Fridays, Petitioner earned an average of $100 in tips per shift. Petitioner worked between five and six hours on Tuesday evenings and between five and eight hours on Friday evenings when Respondent served sit-down dinners to its members. On these occasions, Respondent's kitchen served an average of 200 dinners in a two-hour period of time. Petitioner also worked when Respondent catered for banquets and other special occasions. Petitioner worked a total of 41.66 hours in January 2008; 81.5 hours in February 2008; 45.13 hours in March 2008; and 71.17 hours in April 2008. She worked 10.32 hours for the first week in May 2008. Over the course of her 15.4 week term of employment, Petitioner averaged 16.23 hours per week. Although it varied according to the event, there were five to eight other servers or waitresses (all females) working along with Petitioner on any given night. There always were eight-to-10 workers in and around the kitchen, including the servers, the chef, one pizza maker, and the kitchen prep person. At all times relevant here, Linda Ferguson was the club manager and Petitioner's direct supervisor. Ms. Ferguson was responsible for day-to-day management of all club activities with the authority to enforce all club policies. Ms. Ferguson also was in charge of all aspects of hiring and terminating employees and managing volunteer personnel. Ms. Ferguson was in the restaurant on most Friday evenings. When Ms. Ferguson was not scheduled to work, the assistant manager, Carolyn Weeks, was on duty. On Petitioner’s first night as the kitchen prep worker, Chef Mongone was drinking from a pitcher of beer. Early in the evening, Chef Mongone made comments about her breasts, telling her they were nice and asking whether they were real. Later that evening, when the staff was cleaning the kitchen, Chef Mongone walked up behind Petitioner and touched her backside. Petitioner immediately turned on Chef Mongone, telling him assertively, "Don't ever do that again! How would you like it if someone did that to your wife?" Chef Mongone just stood there as Petitioner turned and walked away. Petitioner immediately informed Ms. Ferguson about the incident. Ms. Ferguson inquired whether Petitioner wanted her "to take care of it." Petitioner responded that she felt she "had already done so." Ms. Ferguson spoke to Chef Mongone about his drinking on the job and his inappropriate conduct. Chef Mongone responded in an insubordinate way, denying all allegations of improper conduct. Ms. Ferguson also spoke to Mike Mercante, Respondent's President at that time. Ms. Ferguson complained to Mr. Mercante about Chef Mongone's drinking and offensive conduct. In the following weeks, Chef Mongone sometimes raised his voice at Petitioner and she back at him. On days that Petitioner worked as a waitress, Chef Mongone held up Petitioner's food orders, causing delays in service that resulted in reduced tips for Petitioner. The delays in releasing Petitioner's food orders usually occurred after Petitioner and Chef Mongone exchanged angry words. On or about February 11, 2008, Petitioner was working as a waitress. When she placed her first food order, Chef Mongone began yelling at her for not putting her name and table number on the ticket. When Petitioner reached to retrieve the ticket, Chef Mongone told her not to touch it. At that point, Petitioner started yelling at Chef Mongone. Petitioner admits her response was not nice and describes herself as having "lost it." When Petitioner returned to the kitchen to get her next order, she overheard Chef Mongone telling the kitchen staff that she was stupid because she could not remember to put her name on a ticket. Once again Petitioner's temper got the best of her. Petitioner called Chef Mongone a drunk, triggering another argument with Chef Mongone. Despite the hard feelings between Chef Mongone and Petitioner, Chef Mongone made additional inappropriate remarks to Petitioner. On one occasion, Chef Mongone observed Petitioner wiping her hand on the seat of her pants. Chef Mongone then stated that he "would like to do that, too." On or about February 15, 2008, Petitioner was scheduled to work first as a prep worker and later as a waitress. While she was in the kitchen, she shared a bag of Valentine candy with the staff. When only one piece of candy was left, Petitioner asked Chef Mongone if he wanted it. Chef Mongone replied that he did not want the candy. However, when Petitioner put the candy in her mouth, Chef Mongone made some comment about the way Petitioner sucked the candy. Chef Mongone immediately stated that he did not mean for his comment to come out like it did. Nevertheless, Petitioner was offended and responded in a negative way. Sometime after February 15, 2008, Petitioner wrote a letter to the members of Respondent's Executive Board. The letter details Petitioner conflict with Chef Mongone. Petitioner gave the letter to Ms. Ferguson, who gave it to Mr. Mercante. February 15, 2008, was Petitioner's last day as a kitchen prep worker. From that time forward, Ms. Ferguson scheduled Petitioner to work only as a waitress in order to reduce the time Petitioner would have to spend in the kitchen. On February 20, 2008, Respondent's Executive Board had a meeting. At the meeting, the board members discussed Petitioner's letter. Chef Mongone attended the meeting and denied all allegations. At the conclusion of the meeting, the Executive Board directed one of its members to draft a letter of reprimand for Chef Mongone. In an internal memorandum dated February 22, 2008, Respondent's Executive Board advised Chef Mongone that he had been warned about his rule infractions and general behavior for the past recent months. According to the memorandum, Chef Mongone would receive no further warnings and any future infractions of club rules or Florida law would result in disciplinary action up to and including immediate termination of employment. Respondent does not have a written policy prohibiting sexual harassment. It does have a rule against drinking on duty. On or about May 6, 2008, Petitioner once again became upset at work because the kitchen was crowded and Chef Mongone yelled at her. Petitioner called her husband to complain that Chef Mongone had cursed at her, saying, "Bitch, get the f--- out of the kitchen.” Petitioner also alleged that Chef Mongone was holding up her food orders. When Petitioner's husband arrived at the restaurant, he met Petitioner, Chef Mongone, Ms. Weeks (Assistant Manager), and Lou Barletta (Respondent's Vice President) in the restaurant's parking lot. Petitioner's husband told Chef Mongone that Petitioner would show him respect if Chef Mongone demonstrated respect for Petitioner. The discussion in the parking lot was civil and ended with Chef Mongone and Petitioner's husband shaking hands. After the meeting, Chef Mongone made it clear that he could no longer work with Petitioner and that one of them had to go. Petitioner did not want to go back into the kitchen after the meeting. Ms. Weeks suggested that Petitioner go home until everything cooled down. Petitioner agreed and left the premises. Petitioner was scheduled to work the following Saturday. Before Petitioner reported to work, Ms. Ferguson talked to Mr. Mercante. After that conversation, Ms. Ferguson told Petitioner that she should not come back to work until Ms. Ferguson could replace Chef Mongone. Ms. Ferguson was actively looking for a new chef. After locating a replacement for Chef Mongone, Mr. Mercante would not approve the termination of Chef Mongone's employment. At the end of June 2008, Respondent did not renew Ms. Ferguson's contract. Ms. Weeks replaced Ms. Ferguson as Respondent's General Manager. Due to financial difficulties, Respondent did not hire an assistant manager when Ms. Weeks became the General Manager. Respondent also eliminated all table-busing positions, using volunteers to clear the tables. Respondent has not called anyone back to work after laying them off. Like Ms. Ferguson, Ms. Weeks had problems with Chef Mongone. She eventually hired a new chef and fired Chef Mongone due to his alcohol consumption at work. Petitioner initially drew unemployment compensation from Respondent's place of business. Except for a couple of days of work, Petitioner has been unemployed since May 6, 2008. She is still drawing unemployment compensation from her most recent employer. Petitioner acknowledges that the economy is the reason she has been unable to obtain a job.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss the Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of June, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of June, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: David Glasser, Esquire Glasser & Handel 116 Orange Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Mary Nelson Morgan, Esquire Cole, Stone, Stoudemire, and Morgan P.A. 201 North Hogan Street Suite 200 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether or not, on or about January 25, 1977, in the licensed premises located at 1600 North Dale Mabry Highway, Tampa, Hillsborough County, Florida, the licensed premises of the Respondent, the Respondent's employee, agent, servant, or entertainer, to wit: Linda Sue Richardson and/or Gayle Jeanette Landrum, allegedly employed at the licensed premises or employed on a contractual basis by the Respondent to entertain, perform, or work on the licensed premises known as, Tigers Den A Go Go, did commit or engage in a lewd and lascivious performance by a live person by committing obscene and indecent acts in violation of 847.011, F.S. and thereby subject the licensee to the penalty provisions of s. 561.29, F.S.
Findings Of Fact At present and at all times pertinent to this cause, to include January 25, 1977, the Respondent, Mardi Gras De Tampa, Inc., was the holder of license no. 39-0246, series 4-COP, held with the State of Florida, Division of Beverage. This license was held to trade as Tigers Den A Go Go in a premises located at 1600 North Dale Mabry Highway, Tampa, Hillsborough County, Florida. On January 25, 1977, officers of the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office entered the licensed premises. The officers were Detectives Ridgeway and Coakley. While in the licensed premises the officers observed an entertainer Linda Sue Richardson dancing. In the course of the dancing Richardson inserted a plastic straw into the g-string costume which she was wearing, and simulated masturbation. The officers also observed Richardson, in the course of the dance, take a napkin and rub it on her vagina, and then roll the napkin up and place it in her mouth and simulate oral sexual activity. At the time the officers were in the licensed premises and on the same date, they observed the dancing of a second female entertainer, one Gayle Jeanette Landrum. They saw Landrum place her hand in her g-string costume and simulate masturbation. Landrum also fondled her breasts in a provocative manner. The exact location within the licensed premises where the above described dancing took place is not specifically known, beyond the fact that one dancer was dancing on a large stage behind the bar and the other dancer was dancing on a smaller stage which was placed in the area where patrons would be seated. The dancing took place at a time that customers were in the licensed premises. The two women were arrested and charged with lewd and lascivious conduct and both were convicted of a violation of s. 847.011, F.S. On the date of the arrest of the two dancers, Carol Alcorn was in charge of the licensed premises in the capacity of manager. Alcorn was also serving as bartender on that occasion. The two female entertainers were employed on January 25, 1977 for compensation by the Respondent, Mardi Gras De Tampa, Inc. The two women were operating under the specific instructions of the Respondent on the subject of their conduct while performing. These instructions were generally to not commit acts which would be considered lewd and lascivious within the meaning of the "Florida Law". In addition the dancers were not to touch themselves or fondle themselves or let customers touch them. The women had been told these basic rules in individual conferences. Another policy which the management had, was to call the performers attention to any improper conduct, and dismiss performer if the performer failed to abide by management rules on the subject of proper conduct. In fact, the Respondent's management employees had corrected dancers before. On the occasion when the officers observed the conduct of Richardson and Landrum, it is unclear what period of time was encompassed to achieve the acts described. In the normal course of events the women would have been dancing for the duration of three records, which would be approximately nine minutes. They would have been dancing as a part of a group of six to eight dancers. The bartender would have been able to see any dancer performing on the stage behind the bar or performing on the stage in the area where the patrons were seated. The view of the two stages from the location the bartender would have behind the bar would have been unobstructed. Whether or not the bartender, Carol Alcorn, actually saw the subject dancing of Richardson and Landrum can not be determined from the facts offered in the hearing. What was shown was that the bartender went to the restroom, which was away from the bar itself, and was confronted by the two officers when leaving the restroom area. This confrontation was for the purposes of complaining about the activities the officers had observed on the apart of Richardson and Landrum. The acts which took place in the course of the dancing, by Linda Sue Richardson and Gayle Jeanette Landrum, constitute lewd and lascivious conduct within the meaning of s. 847.011, F.S. From the facts presented in the course of the hearing, it has not been shown that the Respondent, Mardi Gras De Tampa, Inc., has violated s. 561.29, F.S., as a result of the acts of their employees Linda Sue Richardson and Gayle Jeanette Landrum. The facts do not show that the Respondent is responsible for those acts of the employees either through its own negligence, intentional wrongdoing, or lack of diligence.
Recommendation It is recommended that the charge filed by the Petitioner against the license of Mardi Gras De Tampa, Inc., t/a Tigers Den a Go Go, under license no. 39-0246, series 4-COP, as set forth above, be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of July, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: William Hatch, Esquire Tom Whitaker, Esquire Division of Beverage 403 North Morgan Street 725 South Bronough Street Tampa, Florida 33602 Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue The issues in this case are, one, whether Respondent corruptly used his official positions to sexually harass female subordinates in violation of Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes; and, two, whether Respondent solicited or accepted sexual favors from female subordinates based upon any understanding that his vote, official action, or judgment would be influenced thereby, in violation of Section 112.313(2), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Rudy Maloy (“Maloy”) worked at the Florida Department of Transportation (“DOT”) from 1980 until October 21, 2001. The last seven years of his career in state government were spent in DOT’s Turnpike District Planning Office, where Maloy served as the “Public Involvement Manager.” In that capacity, Maloy conducted workshops and public hearings around the state concerning Turnpike projects. In 1992, Maloy was elected to the Leon County Commission as a Commissioner-at-Large. He was reelected twice, in 1996 and 2000. At the time of the final hearing, Maloy was a sitting Commissioner. Laurie Bradley When Maloy began working in the Turnpike District Planning Office on October 7, 1994, Laurie Bradley (“Bradley”) was already employed there in a career service position, namely, administrative assistant to the director of planning. Though she reported to the director, who was her immediate supervisor, Bradley performed secretarial functions for others in the office, including Maloy after his arrival. Maloy did not have the authority to promote Bradley, increase her salary, or let her go, but he was one of Bradley’s “bosses” in the sense that he could assign her tasks. Maloy and Bradley enjoyed a cordial relationship at work, at least by outward appearances. For example, Maloy frequently gave Bradley (and other co-workers) the complimentary tickets to events such as hockey games and concerts that he, as a County Commissioner, routinely received but could not always use himself. Bradley genuinely appreciated this token of Maloy’s generosity. She thought Maloy was a very friendly person, and she was friendly toward him. The two, in Bradley’s words, “got along fine.” At the final hearing, however, Bradley testified about other acts and practices of Maloy’s that she considered decidedly unfriendly. According to Bradley, Maloy touched her inappropriately on a number of occasions, as follows: Hugs. Bradley alleged that Maloy hugged her——from the side, around the waist——many times, and that after awhile this began to bother her. Shoulder rubs. Bradley alleged that “fairly often” Maloy stood behind her and rubbed her shoulders without ever being invited or encouraged to do so. Kisses. Bradley alleged that in or around February 1996, Maloy kissed her on the cheek. Bradley also claimed that a few weeks later, Maloy kissed her on the mouth, while the two were alone together in an elevator going down at the end of a workday. Caresses. Bradley asserted that on one occasion in May 1996, within hours, ironically, after they had received sexual harassment training, Maloy taunted her by stroking her arm and asking if such behavior constituted sexual harassment. Bradley further averred that Maloy expressed his opinion that if one person is bothered by another’s conduct in the workplace, then the two should resolve the problem privately, rather than reporting it to management. Finally, Bradley alleged that, as part of this episode of teasing, as she perceived it, Maloy stated that he might be able to get her a job with the county having a higher salary than her present position.1 Maloy testified that he never touched Bradley inappropriately, and he specifically denied her allegations to the contrary. Thus, the evidence is irreconcilably in conflict as to whether Maloy sexually harassed Bradley. It is significant, therefore, that not a single witness who testified at the final hearing had actually seen Maloy touch Bradley improperly or in an unwelcome manner. In contrast, one disinterested witness testified credibly that she observed Bradley hug Maloy once or twice as a friendly gesture of thanks for receiving tickets to a hockey game; this testimony is accepted as true. Several witnesses who lacked personal knowledge of any misconduct on Maloy’s part were called to establish that Bradley told others in confidence——at or near the time of the events in question——that Maloy was allegedly harassing her. There is no doubt that Bradley did share such information with others. In fact, her contemporaneous accusations were soon reported to persons in DOT’s management, who understandably insisted that an investigation be conducted. Consequently, Bradley submitted a formal written complaint about Maloy to her employer, and DOT investigated the matter.2 That Bradley complained to others about Maloy in 1996 is circumstantial evidence from which one might infer that the alleged sexual harassment occurred.3 It is relatively weak circumstantial evidence, however, because it ultimately rests largely, if not entirely, on the credibility of the very same person——Bradley——whose testimony it was offered to corroborate. Indeed, drawing the inference largely would beg the question of Bradley’s veracity, for doing so would require that her veracity (which Maloy disputes) be assumed.4 Having carefully weighed and evaluated all of the relevant, persuasive evidence, the undersigned is unable to find, without hesitancy, that Maloy engaged in the conduct of which Bradley has accused him. This determination, it should be stressed, reflects the fact-finder’s judgment concerning the weight of the evidence and nothing more; it is purposefully not a finding regarding what occurred or did not occur between Bradley and Maloy.5 The undersigned affirmatively finds that whatever transpired between them, Maloy did not intentionally use or attempt to use his official positions to secure a benefit for himself through the alleged harassment of Bradley.6 Likewise, it is found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there was no understanding between Maloy and Bradley that Maloy’s votes, official actions, or judgment would be influenced by any thing of value that Maloy solicited or accepted from Bradley——assuming he requested or received any such thing, which was not clearly and convincingly proved. Ophelia Morris In December 1996, Ophelia Morris (“Morris”) replaced Bradley as the director’s administrative assistant in the Turnpike District Planning Office. As had Bradley, Morris served as a secretary to a number of managerial employees, including Maloy. She was a career service employee. Maloy could assign work to Morris, but he lacked the power to promote or fire her. Maloy and Morris became friends, and their friendship deepened over time. By 1999, the two were sufficiently close that Morris routinely confided in Maloy, sharing private information with him concerning the personal problems she was having with her then-fiancé, whom she planned to (and did) marry in May of that year. In June 1999, soon after Morris got married, Morris and Maloy began a mutually consensual sexual affair. While there are some conflicts in the evidence regarding certain immaterial details of their relationship,7 the fact-finder is convinced that neither party entered into this adulterous affair as the result of coercion, bribery, intimidation, harassment, or any type of untoward pressure, either express or implied; rather, each wanted to have an extramarital sexual relationship with the other. Some time in the autumn of 1999, Maloy offered Morris a job as his aide at the County Commission.8 The undersigned is not convinced that Morris had attempted, in any serious way, to break away from the ongoing affair with Maloy before he made this offer of employment. To the contrary, it is found that, more likely than not, Morris remained satisfied with——and had no present intention to end——the affair at the time Maloy proposed to hire her as his aide.9 Morris testified that, after initially demurring, she finally agreed to accept the at-will position as Maloy’s aide, wherein she would serve at his pleasure, but only on the condition that she and Maloy must cease having sex once she was on the county’s payroll. Morris claimed that Maloy reluctantly assented to this condition. Morris started working for Leon County as Maloy’s aide on Monday, December 20, 1999. At a Christmas luncheon that week, Morris met Denise Williams, a one-time aide to County Commissioner Cliff Thaell who was then employed in the county’s Public Works office. The two women quickly became friends and—— within a matter of days——lovers, commencing their own affair shortly after the start of the new year. In January 2000, some secrets were revealed. Denise Williams divulged to Morris that she, Denise, had slept with Maloy and asked whether Morris had done the same. Morris lied to Denise Williams and denied that she had slept with Maloy. Shortly thereafter Morris confronted Maloy with Denise Williams’s disclosure, and he admitted that the two had indeed had sex with one another. That same month, Denise Williams separately told Maloy about the affair she and Morris were having. Maloy was upset, angry, and hurt that Morris had been seeing Denise Williams. He urged her to end the affair with Denise Williams, but Morris did not immediately follow Maloy’s counsel. By February 2000, Maloy’s ongoing interest in Morris’s sexual relationship with Denise Williams was starting to cause Morris to become concerned that she would be fired because of that affair. Consequently, Morris stopped talking to Denise Williams, effectively suspending their relationship, and informed Maloy about the apparent breakup. In the meantime, Morris and Maloy continued their liaison, contrary to the supposed understanding that the sex would stop. At hearing, Morris claimed that she continued to participate in the affair with Maloy only because she feared he would fire her if she refused. However, while Maloy clearly had the power summarily to dismiss Morris, there is no convincing evidence that he ever expressly or impliedly threatened——or even intended——to take such action if she declined to have sex with him. In June 2000, unbeknownst to Maloy, Morris resumed her relationship with Denise Williams. Then, in July or August 2000, Denise Williams left a sexually explicit message for Morris on the county’s voice mail system, in a voice mailbox that Maloy checked on a routine basis. Maloy happened to hear this message before Morris did, and he was not pleased. The voice message incident was the beginning of the end of Morris’s employment as Maloy’s aide. Before long——and for a variety of reasons that are not relevant to this case—— Morris resigned, effective September 8, 2000. Two findings about Morris’s separation are made based on a preponderance of the evidence. First, Maloy did not fire Morris or force her to resign. Second, Morris did not leave because of her sexual relationship with Maloy.10 The purported understanding, mentioned above, that the affair between Maloy and Morris would terminate upon Morris’s becoming Maloy’s aide is the factual linchpin of the Commission’s case as it relates to Morris. The reason for this is that Morris clearly and candidly testified (and the undersigned has found) that her relationship with Maloy was mutually consensual and not the product of sexual harassment during the entire period she was employed with DOT. Thus, to establish that Maloy either intentionally misused his public positions to sexually harass Morris or, by sleeping with her, improperly accepted sexual favors as consideration for some official action, the Commission needed convincingly to distinguish and separate the mutually consensual “DOT phase” of the affair (which did not violate the ethics laws11) from the allegedly coercive “County Commission phase.” The undersigned is not convinced, however, that the subject affair comprised two such distinct phases. The evidence is too much in conflict regarding whether Maloy and Morris had an understanding about——or even discussed——ending their affair effective the date Morris started working as Maloy’s aide for the undersigned to find without hesitancy that such occurred.12 As a result, and in any event, it is not clear to the undersigned fact-finder that the affair between Maloy and Morris was coercive during the time she worked as his aide. The evidence in this regard, as the undersigned has evaluated and weighed it, is much too ambiguous to produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction that, beginning in January 2000, Maloy was explicitly or implicitly forcing Morris to have sex with him——especially given the undisputed fact that Morris freely and voluntarily had been sleeping with Maloy for the previous six months because she wanted to.13 Additionally, the undersigned affirmatively finds, based on the greater weight of the evidence, that whatever transpired between them, Maloy did not intentionally use or attempt to use his official positions to secure a benefit for himself through the alleged harassment of Morris. Finally, it is found, also by a preponderance of the evidence, that there was no understanding between Maloy and Morris that Maloy’s votes, official actions, or judgment would be influenced by any thing of value that Maloy solicited or accepted from Morris. Denise Williams Denise Williams, introduced above, was an aide to Commissioner Thaell from October 1997 through November 1999. At hearing, Denise Williams testified that, in June 1998, Maloy——whom she had known since the mid-1980’s——began to “prey” on her after learning that she was separated from her husband. She alleged that Maloy frequently came into her office, uninvited, to look at her legs, rub her shoulders, or give her a hug. She asserted that this attention was unwanted but admitted that she never told Maloy to stop. To discourage Maloy, she claimed, she tried to dress in a less feminine way. At the same time, she acknowledged, she sometimes hugged Maloy back.14 The picture of Maloy that Denise Williams’s testimony ultimately paints——for which, it must be said, there is no independent, eyewitness corroboration——is that of a man pursuing her with dogged persistence, ignoring her constant attempts to turn him off.15 Maloy, in contrast, suggested that Denise Williams had taken the initiative, signaling her availability by often making mildly suggestive comments to him such as, “You could have been my husband.” It is not surprising, then, that while there is no dispute that the two had casual sex at Denise Williams’s apartment in February 1999, the evidence regarding how this came about is very much in conflict. Denise Williams testified that, despite having no desire whatsoever for Maloy, she finally gave in to his repeated requests for sex in order to “let him satisfy his curiosity” in the hope that he then would quit “bugging” her.16 For his part, Maloy depicted Denise Williams as the initiator who, one Tuesday or Wednesday, unexpectedly told him that her kids would be gone the next weekend and asked him to come over for a “visit” on Saturday, which invitation he accepted. It is undisputed that Maloy and Denise Williams had casual sex a second time, in July 1999, again at her place.17 Given the conflicts and ambiguities in the evidence, the fact-finder is not convinced, without hesitancy, that the events unfolded precisely as Denise Williams has described them. Yet, he is not able to find, by the greater weight of the evidence, that Maloy’s testimony is entirely accurate, either. Thus, there can be no affirmative findings, one way or the other, on the broad question whether Maloy sexually harassed Denise Williams. Concerning the particular charges, the fact-finder is not convinced that Maloy intentionally used or attempted to use his official position to secure a benefit for himself through the alleged harassment or “pursuit” of Denise Williams. Nor is he convinced that there was an understanding between Maloy and Denise Williams that Maloy’s votes, official actions, or judgment would be influenced by any thing of value that Maloy solicited or accepted from her. These determinations, it should be clear, reflect the fact-finder’s assessment of the quality and weight of the evidence; although properly made by the undersigned in his role as the trier of fact, they are not affirmative findings concerning what occurred or did not occur during the relevant timeframe.18 Tina Williams Tina Williams (no relation to Denise) was Maloy’s aide at the County Commission for about six months, from July 15, 1999, through the end of that year. Before coming to work for Maloy, she had worked as an accountant at the Florida Commission on Human Relations (“FCHR”), the state agency where persons who believe they have been discriminated against can file charges as a first step towards redress. Tina Williams had been introduced to Maloy in late 1998 by a mutual acquaintance, Edward Dixon, who at the time was not only a Gadsden County Commissioner but also was associated with the FCHR in some way. A few months later, Tina Williams had bumped into Maloy again at a local function, and he had asked her to apply for the position as his aide, which she later did. After having received favorable recommendations from Commissioner Dixon and from Ron McElrath, a fraternity brother of Maloy’s who was then the Executive Director of the FCHR, Maloy had hired Tina Williams. Tina Williams claims that Maloy sexually harassed her on numerous occasions, in various ways, starting before she was hired and continuing into September 1999. She testified, for example, that he frequently put his hand on her lap or attempted to do so, hugged and attempted to kiss her, talked dirty on the telephone, and made suggestive comments, including, once when they were on an out-of-town business trip together, “this is so soft” in reference to the bed in her hotel room. Tina Williams testified that the harassment stopped in September 1999, at which point, she asserted, Maloy became increasingly critical of her work and avoided her. Their relationship, she testified, seemed to improve in November 1999, but then in December Maloy asked for her resignation, which she tendered.19 Maloy testified that he hired Tina Williams to be his aide with high expectations concerning her abilities but soon became disappointed in her failure, as he saw it, to measure up. At hearing, Maloy asserted that Tina Williams had simply not worked out in the position for a number of reasons that need not be recounted here. Suffice it to say that Maloy testified he asked Tina Williams to leave in December 1999 because he was generally dissatisfied with her performance on the job. Maloy flatly denies that he ever said or did anything to Tina Williams that could be considered improper or untoward, including touching, kissing, hugging, shoulder-rubbing, suggestive comments, or like conduct. The conflicts in the evidence concerning Tina Williams’s allegations of harassment clearly cannot be attributed to individuals’ unique perspectives or differences of opinion. This is not a situation where two people have described the same historical event in different but reconcilable terms; instead, the testimony has produced two mutually exclusive versions of history. Determining which of the protagonists is telling the purest truth is a difficult task made tougher by several factors. First, there is no independent corroboration of either his testimony or her testimony by a witness having personal, firsthand knowledge of the facts. This is a greater problem for the Commission, of course, because Maloy did not have the burden to prove his innocence. Absent independent corroboration, the conflicting testimony presents a classic “he said-she said” dilemma whose resolution, if one must choose between the competing narratives,20 depends on whether “he” or “she” is deemed to be the more credible witness. In this particular case, because the Commission bears the burden of proving its case by clear and convincing evidence, Tina Williams must be judged not just credible, but considerably more credible than Maloy to sustain a finding of guilt.21 Herein, then, lies the second factor (or interrelated pair of factors) that complicates the fact-finding function: Neither participant’s testimony is inherently incredible;22 and conversely, neither one’s testimony is inherently more credible than the other’s. Tina Williams’s saga of sexual harassment cannot be rejected out of hand as a fabrication; it is obviously not fantastic. Upon hearing her story, one does not think, “That could not possibly have happened.” To the contrary, Tina Williams’s testimony is very believable. And yet, Maloy’s testimony, too, is eminently believable. He has not presented some half-baked alibi that tests credulity but rather has said exactly what one would expect an innocent man, falsely accused of sexual harassment, to say: “I did not do it.” What more, indeed, could he say, if in fact he were innocent? There was, really, no way for Maloy affirmatively to disprove the particular allegations that Tina Williams made. Third, having closely observed both Tina Williams and Maloy on the witness stand, the undersigned is unable to state with assurance, based on their respective demeanors, which of the two was probably telling the truth——or who was not. Both appeared to be sincere in recounting what had happened (or not happened) as they recalled the events in question. Neither appeared to the fact-finder to be lying. After carefully weighing all of the evidence with the foregoing factors in mind, the undersigned is not so convinced by either side’s proof as to conclude with confidence that any particular version of history advanced at hearing is highly verisimilar relative to the competing alternative. To the point, the evidence at bottom does not produce in the mind of this fact-finder a firm belief or conviction, without hesitancy, as to the truth of Tina Williams’s allegations.23 Thus, the fact-finder is not convinced that Maloy intentionally used or attempted to use his official position to secure a benefit for himself through the alleged harassment of Tina Williams. Based on a preponderance of the evidence, however, the undersigned finds that there was no understanding between Maloy and Tina Williams that Maloy’s votes, official actions, or judgment would be influenced by any thing of value that Maloy solicited or accepted from her——assuming he requested or received any such thing, which was not clearly and convincingly proved. Ultimate Factual Determinations24 The undersigned determines as a matter of ultimate fact that the Commission has failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that Maloy violated either Section 112.313(2) or Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, as charged, in relation to his respective associations with Laurie Bradley, Ophelia Morris, Denise Williams, and Tina Williams. It is therefore determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Maloy is not guilty of the ethics violations with which he has been charged.
Recommendation The fact-finder having determined that the evidence fails clearly and convincingly to establish a factual basis for culpability on any ground charged, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order declaring Maloy not guilty of violating Sections 112.313(2) and 112.313(6), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of April, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of April, 2003.
The Issue Should Respondent's Law Enforcement Certificate be revoked, suspended, or otherwise disciplined?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings are made: Respondent was certified by the Commission on June 10, 1977, and was issued Law Enforcement Certificate Number 41580. The Administrative Complaint alleges that: (a) On or between January 1, 1973, and December 31, 1974, Respondent did unlawfully handle, fondle, or make an assault in a lewd, lascivious, or indecent manner upon Deborah Brice, a child under sixteen years of age, by fondling her breasts and kissing her neck; (b) On or between January l, 1976, and December 31, 1979, Respondent did unlawfully handle, fondle, or make an assault in a lewd, lascivious, or indecent manner upon Dorothy Spickard, a child under sixteen years of age, by putting her on his lap and tickling her near her vaginal area; (c) On or between January 1, 1976, and December 31, 1979, Respondent did unlawfully handle, fondle, or make an assault in a lewd, lascivious, or indecent manner upon Dawn Whitehead, a child under sixteen years of age, by digitally penetrating her vagina areas and placing her hands on his penis; and (d) On or between June 1, 1969, and December 31, 1971, Respondent did unlawfully handle, fondle, or make an assault in a lewd, lascivious, or indecent manner upon Susan Kleine, a child under sixteen years of age, by kissing her on the neck, French-kissing her, and forcing her on a bed and getting on top of her, simulating sexual intercourse. Debra Brice, Dorothy A. Spickard, Dawn Allison Steward (f/n/a Dawn Allison Whitehead), and Susan Kleine testified that Respondent touched them inappropriately during the middle 1970's while they were under the age of 18 years. Debra Brice, Dorothy Spickard, and Susan Kleine were around the age of 14 to 15 years at the time the inappropriate touching was alleged to have occurred. Dawn Steward was around the age of 8 to 9 years at the time the inappropriate touching was alleged to have occurred. Debra Brice, Dorothy Spickard, and Dawn Steward are nieces of Respondent's ex-wife, Carol, who was married to Respondent during the time that the alleged incidents were supposed to have occurred. Susan Kleine is a sister of Respondent's ex-wife, Carol. Respondent and Carol were married in 1966, and were divorced sometime around 1978-79. It was not until the latter part of 1993, approximately 20 years later, that Debra Brice, Dorothy Spickard, Dawn Steward, and Susan Kleine told anyone of this alleged inappropriate touching. Sometime around the latter part of 1993, Carol discussed this inappropriate touching with Debra Brice, Dorothy Spickard, Dawn Steward, and Susan Kleine. Sometime around the latter part of 1993, this alleged inappropriate touching was discussed in the presence of Debra Brice or Dorothy Spickard or Dawn Steward or Susan Kleine during therapy sessions involving Carol's and Respondent's child. While Debra Brice, Dorothy Spickard, Dawn Steward, and Susan Kleine appeared to be relatively clear on the facts concerning the alleged inappropriate touching, they were not clear on all the facts surrounding the alleged incidents. There was no evidence presented to corroborate the testimony of Debra Brice, Dorothy Spickard, Dawn Steward, or Susan Kleine. Respondent denies any inappropriate touching of Debra Brice, Dorothy Spickard, Dawn Steward, and Susan Kleine. Respondent admits tickling and wrestling with Debra Brice, Dorothy Spickard, Dawn Steward, and Susan Kleine in a playful manner but denies touching any of them in an inappropriate manner, specifically in an inappropriate sexual manner. There is insufficient evidence to establish facts to show that Respondent touched Debra Brice, Dorothy Spickard, Dawn Steward, and Susan Kleine in an inappropriate manner, sexually or otherwise, notwithstanding the testimony of Debra Brice, Dorothy Spickard, Dawn Steward, and Susan Kleine to the contrary which I find lacks credibility due to the reasons set forth in Findings of Fact 5 through 9.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is, accordingly, Recommended that the Administrative Complaint filed against the Respondent be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of June, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of June, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard D. Courtemanche, Jr., Esquire Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Thomas M. Lindsey 21367 Anderson Road Brooksville, Florida 34601 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issues in this case are whether, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act, Respondent terminated Petitioner on the basis of her sex or age, or in retaliation for engaging in protected activity; and whether Respondent subjected Petitioner to a hostile work environment based on her sex or age.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Frito-Lay, Inc. ("Frito-Lay"), makes and sells snack foods, including many familiar brands of chips. Petitioner Frances G. Danelli ("Danelli") is a former employee of Frito-Lay. Frito-Lay initially hired Danelli in or around 1998 as a packer for its West Valley, Utah, plant. When Danelli's husband was transferred to Florida, she took a job for Frito-Lay in Pompano Beach, Florida, and later moved to the company's West Palm Beach Distribution Center as a route sales representative ("RSR"). Danelli worked in Florida as a Frito-Lay RSR for more than 15 years, and her routes eventually included such large stores as Publix, Walmart, Winn-Dixie, and Target.1/ RSRs sell and deliver Frito-Lay products to retail stores, and these stores, in turn, sell the products to consumers. RSRs are responsible, as well, for presenting the company's products to shoppers in the best way possible to increase sales. So, RSRs not only sell and deliver products to stores, but they also unload the products, stock the shelves, set up displays, and remove unsold items whose sell-by dates have expired. RSRs are paid an hourly wage plus commissions. RSRs are required to compete for sales against other companies' vendors, who (like Frito-Lay's personnel) are trying to place as many of their products as possible onto the shelves of the snack food aisle. Shelf space is essential for growing sales, and competition for product placement can be fierce. There is no dispute that Danelli's performance as an RSR was fine, perhaps even exemplary. Frito-Lay considered her to be a good employee. Danelli went to work early each morning, usually arriving at the warehouse by 4:00 a.m. so that she could get to her first store by 5:00 a.m., which would give her a head start on other vendors. When Danelli got to the warehouse, she would clock in on her handheld computer, which she also used to track the goods she delivered to each store. Upon returning to the warehouse, she had paperwork to complete and print from the handheld computer. In 2013, Frito-Lay started requiring drivers of delivery trucks over a certain size, including RSRs such as Danelli, to comply with U.S. Department of Transportation ("DOT") regulations. As relevant, these regulations require an RSR to take at least a ten-hour break before driving a commercial vehicle, and they prohibit an RSR from driving a commercial vehicle after 14 consecutive hours on duty. Frito-Lay programmed its employees' handheld computers so that an employee subject to the DOT regulations would receive a conspicuous warning if he or she attempted to clock in to work less than ten hours after last going off duty. As Danelli testified at hearing, if the computer told her to wait, she would go to the warehouse, pick up some product, fix her truck, and then sign in when the handheld said she could go. Evidently, however, to get the warning, an employee needed to log on as a "regulated" employee; if, by mistake, a "regulated" employee logged on as "non-regulated," she would not get the warning. Danelli found it difficult to comply with the DOT regulations, which led to Frito-Lay's imposing discipline against her in accordance with the company's Corrective Action Process set forth in its Sales National RSR Handbook, which governed Petitioner's employment. The handbook prescribes a process of progressive discipline that begins with "coaching," which is a form of pre- discipline. As the name suggests, a "coaching" is, essentially, a nondisciplinary intervention whose purpose is to correct an issue before the employee's conduct warrants stronger measures. If coaching is ineffective, the Corrective Action Process calls for increasingly severe steps of discipline. The steps of discipline consist of a Step 1 Written Reminder, a Step 2 Written Warning, a Step 3 Final Written Warning, and a Step 4 Termination. The particular discipline to be imposed depends upon the severity of the infraction and the step of discipline, if any, the employee happens to be on when the infraction is committed. Steps of discipline remain "active" for six to nine months, depending on the step. If the employee does not commit any further disciplinary infractions during the active period, the step "falls off." If the employee commits another disciplinary infraction within the "active" period, however, he or she moves to the next disciplinary step in the Corrective Action Process. On June 5, 2014, after having previously been coached to maintain compliance with the DOT regulations, Danelli received a Step 1 Written Reminder for four violations of the 10-hour rule. She did not appeal this discipline. On July 25, 2014, Danelli received a Step 2 Written Warning for a new violation of the 10-hour rule. Once again, Danelli did not appeal the discipline. On October 7, 2014, Danelli was given another coaching, during which she was informed that (i) an investigation into her DOT hours was in process, and (ii) the company was concerned that she might be getting assistance on her route from her husband in violation of the RSR Performance Standards. On January 27, 2015, Danelli received a Step 3 Final Written Warning for violating the 14-hour rule. She did not appeal this discipline. Under the Corrective Action Process, a Step 3 Final Written Warning remains "active" for nine months and is the final step prior to a Step 4 Termination. On May 2, 2015, Danelli committed another DOT violation. Because she was already on a Step 3 Final Written Warning, she was suspended pending further investigation. Danelli maintains that this violation, and others, resulted from her making a simple mistake with the handheld computer, namely failing to log on as a "regulated" employee, which cost her the electronic warning she otherwise would have received. She points out, too, that in this instance, the violation was minor, merely clocking in ten minutes early. These arguments are not wholly without merit, and if Frito-Lay had fired Danelli for a single, ten-minute violation of the DOT regulations, the undersigned would question the company's motivation. But that is not what happened. Danelli did not just violate the ten-hour rule once or twice, but many times, after multiple warnings, and in the face of increasingly serious disciplinary steps. Further, Frito-Lay did not terminate Danelli's employment over this latest violation of the ten-hour rule, even though it would have been justified in doing so within the parameters of the Corrective Action Process. Instead, the company placed Danelli on a Last Chance Agreement. Last Chance Agreements are not specifically provided for in the Corrective Action Process but are used, at the company's discretion, as a safety valve to avoid the occasional unfortunate termination that might result from strict adherence to rigid rules. In this regard, the agreement given to Danelli, dated May 15, 2015, stated as follows: We strongly considered [terminating your employment]. However, due to the unique facts and circumstances involved here, as well as your 15 years of service with the Company, the Company is willing to issue this Last Chance Warning. This step is over and above our normal progressive disciplinary process, and is being issued on a one-time, non-precedent setting basis. . . . [A]ny subsequent violations by you may result in discipline up to and including immediate termination. More specifically, any future violations [of the DOT regulations] will result in your immediate termination. As Danelli put it, the Last Change Agreement was a "sign of grace" from Frito-Lay. By its terms, it was intended to be "active and in effect for a period of 12 months." The undersigned pauses here to let the Last Chance Agreement sink in, because the fact that Frito-Lay did not fire Danelli in May 2015 when——for objective, easy-to-prove reasons, after a by-the-book application of progressive discipline——it clearly could have, is compelling evidence that the company was not harboring discriminatory animus against Danelli. After all, if Frito-Lay had wanted Danelli gone because of her age or her gender, why in the world would the company not have jumped at this golden opportunity, which Danelli had given it, to fire her with practically no exposure to liability for unlawful discrimination? The irony is that by showing mercy, Frito-Lay set in motion the chain of events that led to this proceeding. In or around November of 2015, Danelli underwent surgery, which required her to take some time off of work. For several years before this leave, Danelli's route had consisted of a Super Walmart and two Publix stores. When she returned, the Super Walmart had been assigned to another RSR, and to make up for its loss, Danelli's supervisor, Stanley Gamble, put a third Publix grocery on Danelli's route, i.e., Publix #1049 located in Tequesta, Florida. Danelli was acquainted with one of the managers at the Tequesta Publix, a Mr. Morgan. On her first day back, Danelli and Mr. Gamble went to that store, where Mr. Morgan told Mr. Gamble that he was "glad Frances is here." Mr. Morgan had complained to Mr. Gamble about the previous RSR, who left the store "all messed up," according to Mr. Gamble. Danelli also met Sarah Oblaczynski, the store's "backdoor receiver," which is the Publix employee who checks in merchandise. On her new route, Danelli usually went to the Tequesta store first, early in the morning. She soon ran into a vendor named Tony who worked for Snyder's of Hanover ("Snyder's"), a snack food company that competes with Frito-Lay. From the start, Tony was nasty to Danelli and aggressive, telling her that "there is no space" for two vendors. Tony was possessive about shelf space within the store, as well as the parking space close to the store's loading dock. Danelli thought, because of Tony's behavior, that he might be using drugs. On Tuesday, April 6, 2016, Petitioner had an argument with Tony over the shelf space that the store manager previously had awarded to her for the display of Frito-Lay products. Tony asserted that he had been promised the same space and said to Danelli, "You're going to take that stuff out of the shelf." Danelli told him, "No, Morgan said that's still my space." At this, Tony began cursing and pushed Danelli's cart into her, yelling, "That fucking Morgan!" Danelli later spoke to Mr. Morgan, who assured Danelli that the shelf space in question was hers and said he would leave a note to that effect for Ms. Oblaczynski. There is a dispute as to when Danelli reported the forgoing incident to Frito-Lay. She claims that, before the end of the day on April 6, she told Mr. Gamble, her supervisor, all about the matter, in detail, and requested that someone be assigned to accompany her on her route the next day because Tony planned on taking her shelf space. According to Danelli, Mr. Gamble just laughed and said he did not have anybody to help her. Mr. Gamble testified, to the contrary, that Danelli had neither reported the April 6, 2016, incident to him nor asked for any assistance. (Danelli admits that she did not report the incident to Mr. Canizares, sales zone director, or to Human Resources ("HR")). Without written documentation regarding this alleged discussion, it is hard to say what, if anything, Danelli reported on April 6, 2016. It is likely that Danelli did complain to Mr. Gamble about Tony on some occasion(s), and might well have done so on April 6. What is unlikely, however, is that Danelli notified Mr. Gamble that she felt she was being sexually harassed by Tony. Tony's boorish and bullying behavior, to the extent directed at Danelli, seems to have been directed to her qua competitor, not as a woman. At the very least, the incident is ambiguous in this regard, and one could reasonably conclude, upon hearing about it, that Tony was simply a jerk who resorted to juvenile antics in attempting to gain the upper hand against a rival vendor. The undersigned finds that if Danelli did speak to Mr. Gamble about Tony on April 6, he—— not unreasonably——did not view the incident as one involving sexual harassment. As far as Mr. Gamble's declining to provide Danelli with an escort, assuming she requested one, his response is reasonable if (as found) Mr. Gamble was not clearly on notice that Danelli believed she was being sexually harassed. Danelli, after all, was by this time an experienced and successful RSR who undoubtedly had encountered other difficult vendors during her career. Indeed, as things stood on April 6, a person could reasonably conclude that Danelli in fact had the situation under control, inasmuch as Mr. Morgan had clearly taken Danelli's side and intervened on her behalf. What could a Frito-Lay "bodyguard" reasonably be expected to accomplish, which would justify the risk of escalating the tension between Tony and Danelli into a hostile confrontation? During the evening of April 6, 2016, Danelli talked to her husband about the problem at Publix #1049, and they decided that he would accompany her to the store the next morning before reporting to his own work, to assist if Tony caused a scene. On April 7, 2016, Danelli's husband drove to Publix #1049 in his own vehicle. Although no longer an employee of the company, Danelli's husband entered the store wearing a Frito-Lay hat, and he stayed in the snack aisle while Danelli went to the back to bring the order in. Ms. Oblaczynski, the receiver, presented Tony with a note from Mr. Morgan stating that Danelli's products and sales items were assigned to aisle one. In response, Tony started swearing about Mr. Morgan and the denial of shelf space, made a hand gesture indicative of a man pleasing himself, and told Ms. Oblaczynski that "they can take a fly[ing] F'n leap." Tony had made this particular hand gesture about Mr. Morgan on a number of previous occasions, in front of both men and women. Mr. Danelli left to go to work once Danelli's product was placed, and she left to go to the next store on her route. When Danelli returned to the warehouse, she went to Mr. Gamble's office and told him about the April 7, 2016, incident. According to Danelli, Mr. Gamble laughed in response. Danelli asked Mr. Gamble if the company would conduct an investigation, and he said yes. She recalls that every day thereafter, she asked Mr. Gamble if he had heard anything because she thought "we [Frito-Lay] were investigating" and that HR was on top of it. Danelli admits, however, that she "intentionally" did not tell Mr. Gamble that her husband had accompanied her to Publix #1049 to assist her in the store that morning. She did not report this detail because she knew it was "bad." In conflict with Danelli's account, Mr. Gamble testified that Danelli did not report that Tony made a sexual gesture in front of her or used coarse or profane language in her presence on April 7, 2016. The undersigned finds that Mr. Gamble most likely did not laugh at Danelli or otherwise treat her dismissively upon hearing her report of the incident. If Mr. Gamble had believed the matter were so trivial or amusing, he would not likely have agreed to investigate. The undersigned finds, further, that however Danelli described the incident, she did not make it clear to Mr. Gamble that she perceived Tony's behavior as a form of sexual harassment. Danelli did not make a formal written complaint to that effect at the time, and the situation at Publix #1049 was, at the very least, ambiguous. More likely than not, Mr. Gamble viewed the troublesome vendor from Snyder's as an unwelcome business problem to be dealt with, not as a perpetrator of unlawful, gender-based discrimination. To elaborate, putting Tony's "sexual gesture" to one side momentarily, the rest of his conduct, even the cursing, while certainly objectionable, is not suggestive of sexual harassment; it is just bad behavior. Tony's temper tantrums and outbursts no doubt upset Danelli and others, but that does not turn them into gender discrimination. Further, Danelli seems to have handled the situation well until she resorted to self-help on April 7, 2016. The responsible Publix employees were already aware of the problem, and in due course, they complained to Snyder's, which unsurprisingly removed Tony from that store. Meantime, had Danelli felt physically threatened or afraid as a result of Tony's more aggressive antics, she (or Publix) could have called the police; this, indeed, would have been a safer and more reasonable alternative to bringing along her husband or another civilian for protection, which as mentioned above posed the risk of provoking a fight, given Tony's volatility. Ultimately, it is Tony's "sexual gesture" that provides a colorable basis for Danelli's sexual harassment complaint. But even this gives little grounds for a claim of discrimination, without more context than is present here. To be sure, the "jerk off gesture" or "air jerk" is obscene, and one would not expect to see it in polite company or in the workplace. Yet, although it clearly mimics a sexual practice, the air jerk is generally not understood as being a literal reference to masturbation. That is, the gesture is not typically used to convey a present intention to engage in masturbation or as an invitation to perform the act on the gesturer. Rather, the jerk off gesture usually signifies annoyance, disgust, disinterest, or disbelief. As with its cousin, the "finger" (or bird) gesture, the sexual connotations of the air jerk are (usually) subliminal. Here, there is no allegation or evidence that Tony's jerk off gesture was undertaken in pursuit of sexual gratification or was intended or perceived as a sexual advance on Danelli (or someone else)——or even as being overtly sexual in nature. (Obviously, if the evidence showed that, under the circumstances, Tony was, e.g., inviting Danelli to participate in sexual activity, this would be a different case. The undersigned is not suggesting, just to be clear, that the air jerk gesture is inconsistent with or could never amount to sexual harassment, but only that it is not unequivocally a sign of such harassment, given its commonly understood meanings.) To the contrary, it is clear from the surrounding circumstances that Tony made the gesture to indicate that he regarded Mr. Morgan's note as pointless and annoying. It was roughly the equivalent of giving them the bird, albeit arguably less contemptuous than that. For these reasons, the undersigned finds it unlikely that, assuming Danelli described the gesture (which is in dispute), Mr. Gamble thought Danelli was complaining about sexual harassment, as opposed to a very difficult vendor. On April 13, 2016, Mr. Gamble visited Publix #1049 and spoke to Ms. Oblaczynski about the situation. During this conversation, Ms. Oblaczynski stated that the "Frito-Lay people" did nothing wrong. She further specified that "the person [Danelli] had with her did nothing wrong." After speaking with Ms. Oblaczynski, Mr. Gamble met with Danelli while she was servicing her second account. Right off the bat, Mr. Gamble asked Danelli who was with her at Publix #1049 on April 7, 2016. She eventually admitted that her husband was with her in the store that day. Aware of the seriousness of her offense and the active Last Chance Agreement, Danelli asked Mr. Gamble, several times, if she would be fired. That same day, Mr. Gamble called Carlos Canizares to tell him what he had learned. Mr. Canizares instructed Mr. Gamble to stay with Danelli while she finished servicing her accounts and then to obtain a written statement from her about the incident. Later on April 13, 2016, Danelli provided a written statement in which she confirmed that her husband had been working with her at Publix #1049 the previous week. Danelli has since described this statement as a "full written account of the harassment [and] rude sexual gestures." Danelli knew, of course, that HR would review her statement, and yet she said nothing therein about having complained to Mr. Gamble or any supervisor about harassment generally or Tony in particular; about Tony's use of course or improper language; or about having requested an escort to help keep Tony in line. On the instructions of the company's HR department, Mr. Gamble conducted an investigation into the "rude sexual gesture" about which Danelli had complained. Specifically, he called Mr. Morgan, the Publix manager, and asked him about the incident. Mr. Gamble also requested that he be allowed to review any videotapes and documents concerning the incident. Mr. Morgan informed Mr. Gamble that Publix was investigating the matter. Mr. Gamble's request to allow Frito-Lay access to Publix videotapes and documents was, however, turned down. Tony's boorish behavior aside, the fact remained that Danelli, without prior approval, had allowed a non-employee to perform work or services for Frito-Lay at one of the stores on her route, which the RSR Performance Standards specifically prohibit without express authorization. RSRs who are found to have permitted non-employees to accompany them on their routes are either discharged or issued multiple steps of discipline, as Danelli knew. Because Danelli violated this rule while on an active Last Chance Agreement, Frito-Lay decided to terminate her employment. On April 26, 2016, Mr. Canizares met with Danelli to inform her that she was fired. Danelli timely appealed her termination pursuant to the company's Complaint and Appeal Procedure, electing to have her appeal decided by a neutral, third-party arbitrator. The arbitration hearing took place in January 2017. Three months later, the arbitrator ruled that Danelli's termination had been proper and carried out in accordance with Frito-Lay's employment policies. Danelli does not presently deny that she violated the DOT regulations and the company policy forbidding the use of non-employees as helpers while on duty, nor does she dispute that Frito-Lay had sufficient grounds for imposing the disciplinary steps leading to the Last Chance Agreement. Indeed, she does not contend that it would have been wrongful for Frito-Lay to have fired her in May 2015 instead of offering the Last Chance Agreement. Her position boils down to the argument that because Frito-Lay could have exercised leniency and not fired her for bringing her husband to work at Publix #1049 (which is probably true2/), its failure to do so can only be attributable to gender or age discrimination. Put another way, Danelli claims that but for her being a woman in her 50s, Frito-Lay would have given her another "last chance." This is a heavy lift. As circumstantial evidence of discrimination, Danelli points to the company's treatment of another RSR, a younger man named Ryan McCreath. Like Danelli, Mr. McCreath was caught with a non-employee assisting him on his route. Unlike Danelli, however, Mr. McCreath was not on any active steps of discipline at the time of the incident, much less a Last Chance Agreement. Although Mr. McCreath's disciplinary record was not unblemished, Frito-Lay did not terminate his employment for this violation of the RSR Performance Standards. Instead, he received three steps of discipline and was issued a Final Written Warning. Mr. McCreath's situation is distinguishable because he was not under a Last Chance Agreement at the time of the violation. Moreover, it is not as though Mr. McCreath got off scot-free. He received a serious punishment. Danelli could not have received a comparable punishment for the same offense because she was already beyond Step 3; her record, unlike his, did not have room for the imposition of three steps of discipline at once. The McCreath incident does not give rise to a reasonable inference that Frito-Lay unlawfully discriminated against Danelli when it terminated her employment for committing a "three-step violation" while on an active Last Chance Agreement. There is simply no reason to suppose that if Danelli, like Mr. McCreath, had not had any active steps of discipline when she violated the rule against having non- employees provide on-the-job assistance, Frito-Lay would have terminated her employment for the April 7, 2016, infraction; or that if Mr. McCreath, like Danelli, had been on a Last Chance Agreement when he violated the rule, Frito-Lay would have issued him a Final Written Warning in lieu of termination. Ultimate Factual Determinations There is no persuasive evidence that any of Frito- Lay's decisions concerning, or actions affecting, Danelli, directly or indirectly, were motivated in any way by age- or gender-based discriminatory animus. Indeed, there is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of unlawful age or gender discrimination could be made. There is no persuasive evidence that Frito-Lay took any retaliatory action against Danelli for having opposed or sought redress for an unlawful employment practice. There is no persuasive evidence that Frito-Lay committed or permitted sexual harassment of Danelli or otherwise exposed her to a hostile work environment. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that Frito-Lay did not discriminate unlawfully against Danelli on any basis.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Frito-Lay not liable for gender or age discrimination, retaliation, or creating a hostile work environment. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of July, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of July, 2018.
