The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR), should pay Petitioners' attorney's fees and costs under section 57.111, Florida Statutes (2013),1/ the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act, for initiating DOAH Case No. 12-2074.
Findings Of Fact On August 15, 2011, John and Kimberly Whitt (Whitts) filed a complaint of housing discrimination with the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development alleging disability discrimination. FCHR conducted an investigation of the complaint. During the investigation, the investigator obtained statements and documents from both parties. The investigator's final investigative report (Determination, found within Respondent's Exhibit 1) detailed the investigation. The Determination dated December 21, 2011, concluded that "there [was] reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory housing practice occurred in violation of 804(f)(3)(A) of the Fair Housing Act, as amended." On March 2, 2012, FCHR issued a Legal Concurrence: Cause. The Legal Concurrence, drafted by FCHR's senior attorney, concluded that "there [was] reasonable cause to believe that Respondents [Association] discriminated against Complainants [the Whitts] in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(b) and (f)(2)(A) and section 760.23(2) and (8)(a), Florida Statutes." On March 5, 2012, FCHR's executive director executed the Notice of Determination (Cause), charging that there was reasonable cause to believe that the Association had engaged in a discriminatory housing practice. The Whitts elected to have FCHR represent them to seek relief in an administrative proceeding against the Association. On June 14, 2012, FCHR filed a Petition for Relief (Relief Petition) with DOAH seeking an order prohibiting the Association from engaging in any unlawful housing practices, and granting damages. The final hearing in the underlying case was held before the undersigned on December 12, 2012. The undersigned entered a Recommended Order on February 15, 2013, recommending the dismissal of the Relief Petition filed on behalf of the Whitts. On May 2, 2013, FCHR entered a Final Order dismissing the petition for relief filed on behalf of the Whitts. The Association was the prevailing party in the underlying case. The Association is a not-for-profit corporation that does not have any employees. The Association relies solely on volunteers to run its operations. It has never had a net worth of two million dollars or more. The Association was represented by counsel and co- counsel in both proceedings. In the Fees Petition, the Association alleged it had incurred $75,657.00 in legal fees. At hearing, the Association provided a document which reflected that $5,945.00 in fees should not have been attributed to the instant case, thus setting the amount the Association was seeking at $69,712.00. However, the Association acknowledged that section 57.111(4)(d) 2., Florida Statutes, limited the recovery of attorney's fees and costs to $50,000. FCHR is a "state agency" for the purposes of this proceeding. See §§ 120.57(1) and 57.111(3)(f), Fla. Stat.
The Issue Whether it is in the public interest to place Petitioners, Booz-Allen and Hamilton, Inc., on the State of Florida Convicted Vendor List maintained by Respondent, State of Florida Department of Management Services (the Department) Section 287.133, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996).
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated to the facts, as follows: On August 19, 1993, Petitioner was convicted of the commission of a public entity crime as defined within subsection 287.133(1)(g), Florida Statutes. Petitioner pled guilty in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina to two counts of filing false claims in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 287. The conviction related to time charging irregularities on two subcontracts to the United States Environmental Protection Agency. On February 25, 1994, Petitioner properly reported this conviction in its proposal to the Lee County Board of Commissioners. At the time the plea was entered, Petitioner paid to the United States $1,638,000. This included a $1,000,000 criminal fine, and $488,000 in civil damages, and $150,000 to reimburse EPA’s Office of the Inspector General for the costs of the investigation. The government estimated that the amount of improper charges was approximately $200,000. Petitioner’s cooperation with the EPA included voluntarily providing a wide array of information to EPA. Employees from Petitioner’s Finance and Contracts Department met with EPA investigators and auditors to explain Petitioner’s accounting system. Petitioner assisted EPA by making employees available for interviews. Petitioner voluntarily provided documents and other information to EPA. Petitioner fully cooperated with the Department of Management Services in connection with its investigation initiated pursuant to Section 287.133, Florida Statutes. Petitioner provided information as requested. No other persons or affiliates were charged with public entity crimes in relation to these matters. As a responsible government contractor, Petitioner has taken steps to prevent actions like those that formed the basis for its guilty plea from recurring. These steps and the ethical history of the company are listed in the stipulation and settlement agreement attached as Appendix A and are incorporated herein. Petitioner properly reported its plea to the Lee County Board of Commissioners and provided additional, extensive information concerning its guilty plea and related matters to the Respondent on April 5, 1994 and June 23, 1995. Petitioner’s presence in the market adds to competition in Florida markets for the transportation and consulting in solving state/public sector problems and in implementing their solutions. Petitioner’s commercial freight practice is the foremost management consultant to port authorities in the United States. Petitioner’s depth of knowledge and understanding of port operations, management, and planning have made Petitioner the consultant of choice to port authorities throughout the country. Specific projects are outlined in the stipulation and settlement agreement and are incorporated herein. In addition, Petitioner, due to its over 80 years of experience in both public and private sector (including Florida), can provide a broad perspective on solving state/public sector problems and in implementing their solutions in areas including law enforcement, systems integration and health care. Petitioner has a long history of providing service to the communities in which it works. Again specific instances of community service are referenced in the stipulation and settlement agreement and are incorporated herein.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Alton Lynn Gillen, Jr., is a licensed Surety Agent doing business in the State of Florida. Respondent was charged by information, on or about December 23, 1980, in the Circuit Court of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida, with a violation of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act and with conspiracy to traffic in cannabis. On February 5, 1981, Respondent pled nolo contendere to the charges contained in the information. On May 13, 1981, an Order was entered in the Circuit Court of the Twelfth Judicial Circuit in and for Lee County, Florida, adjudicating Respondent guilty of a violation of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act and of conspiracy to traffic in cannabis. Respondent was sentenced by the same order to state prison for a period or term of ten years. Respondent, having reserved his right to appeal as a condition of the nolo contendere plea, thereafter appealed this conviction and is currently awaiting its determination. Respondent, through his attorney, contacted Petitioner to ascertain whether or not he would be permitted to continue operating under his license after adjudication of guilt and while his appeal was pending. In a telephone conversation between Respondent's attorney and Onez O'Neill, Chief of Bureau of Licensing, on February 20, 1981, Respondent was advised that once the Department received formal notice of the convictions, a revocation proceeding would probably be instituted, but that his license would be reinstated upon receipt by the Department of certified copies of the information, judgment and sentence, and notice of appeal. Within a few days after being adjudicated guilty (May 13, 1981), Respondent obtained certified copies of those documents, as well as certified copies of notice of appearance by the appellate attorney, motion for supersedeas bond, and the supersedeas bond. On or about May 20, 1981, Respondent personally delivered those documents to O'Neill's office with a cover letter from his attorney (R-Ex 1). Since O'Neill was not in her office that day, Respondent gave the documents to the assistant chief, Joe Crutchfield. Respondent explained the nature of the problem and the reason for the delivery of the documents. Crutchfield assured him that everything appeared to be satisfactory and that he would personally discuss the matter with O'Neill the next day. On or about June 1, 1981, Petitioner caused a letter to be sent to Respondent by John Rich, a licensing specialist employed by Petitioner (R-Ex 2). This letter advised that Respondent could "continue operating as a bondsman under his current license until such time as the legal appeal process has been finalized...", subject to approval by the surety company underwriting Respondent. Based on the affirmative representations of Petitioner, by telephone and by its letter of June 1, Respondent continued to write bonds and incur financial obligations as a result thereof. Respondent also continued making contributions to a "build-up fund" held in trust for his underwriter. The buildup fund is money generated out of bond premiums which is held in an escrow account for the underwriter if it becomes legally liable for an estreature of a bond written by Respondent. On September 30, 1981, Petitioner renewed Respondent's license with full knowledge of his convictions (P-Ex 3). On April 5, 1982, Petitioner filed its Administrative Complaint seeking to revoke Respondent's license based on his adjudication of guilt of the two criminal charges to which he pleaded on February 5, 1981.
Recommendation From the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint, subject to refiling if Respondent's appeal is denied. DONE and ORDERED 30th day of August, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of August, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: David A. Yon, Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasurer 428-A Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Burton C. Conner, Esquire 207 N.W. Second Street Okeechobee, Florida 33472 The Honorable Bill Gunter Insurance Commissioner & Treasurer Department of Insurance The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact The facts stated in the Joint Stipulation of the parties to the extent set forth below are hereby adopted as findings of fact: On December 21, 1990, Petitioners, each of which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Dean Foods Company ("Dean"), were each convicted of a one-count felony charge brought under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. On January 7, 1992, Respondent filed and Petitioners received notices of intent to each Petitioner pursuant to Section 287.133(3)(e)1, F.S. On January 28, 1992, Petitioners, pursuant to Section 287.133(3)(e)2, F.S., filed a petition, pursuant to Section 120.57(1), F.S., requesting an order determining that it is not in the public interest for Petitioners to be placed on the State of Florida Convicted Vendor List. Petitioners' convictions arose out of an investigation initiated by the Florida Attorney General into possible bid-rigging of school milk requirements contracts in Florida by dairies and distributors. In 1988, the Attorney General filed a civil action against these dairies and distributors, including Petitioners. Section 287.133(3)(e)3.c, F.S., establishes "[t]he degree of culpability of the person or affiliate proposed to be placed on the convicted vendor list" as a factor to be considered in the decision whether to place such person or affiliate on such list. The State of Florida's complaint alleged that the bid-rigging and contract allocation scheme began at least as early as 1978. According to the State's attorneys, the illegal activities actually started as early as the 1960's in southeastern Florida (McArthur Dairy's principal market area) and the 1970's in central and southwestern Florida (T.G. Lee Foods' principal market area). Dean purchased Petitioners in 1980. According to the State's attorneys, Jack Wells and James Clark, former sales managers at McArthur Dairy and T.G. Lee Foods, respectively, participated in such conspiracies during the 1960's and 1970's and fraudulently concealed their efforts from the former owners of T.G. Lee Foods and McArthur Dairy, from Dean and from the school boards. Thus, Dean unknowingly bought into these on-going conspiracies. While the fact that Dean bought into these preexisting schemes was not a legal defense, it is relevant to the issue of culpability. This fact and Dean's early settlement offer were given favorable consideration by the State of Florida during settlement discussions. Section 287.133(3)(e)3.d, F.S., establishes "[p]rompt or voluntary payment of any damages or penalty as a result of the conviction" as a factor mitigating against placement on the convicted vendor list. Dean promptly paid on behalf of Petitioners all civil damages owed the State arising out of such activities. In a press release dated August 1, 1988, the Attorney General confirmed Dean's payment in full settlement of the charges brought by the State of Florida against Petitioners. A federal grand jury sitting in Tampa, Florida also investigated this matter. Dean and Petitioners cooperated fully with that investigation. Pursuant to plea and settlement agreements dated September 12, 1990, entered into by each of Petitioners with the United States Department of Justice, Dean and Petitioners agreed to a comprehensive settlement. Said settlement required that Petitioner plead guilty to a one-count criminal information and pay $1 million each in criminal penalties and $175,000 each in civil damages to the federal government. Such civil liabilities and criminal penalties were paid to the federal government, as reflected in a letter from the federal prosecutor to officials of the United States Defense Logistics Agency dated February 21, 1991, which letter appears as Exhibit A to the Memorandum submitted by Dean to the Defense Logistics Agency. Section 287.133(3)(e)3.e, F.S., establishes "[c]ooperation with state or federal investigation or prosecution of any public entity crime" as a mitigating factor. Petitioners agreed to and did cooperate fully with the State of Florida in connection with its investigation. Petitioners also cooperated fully with the federal grand jury investigation. This cooperation was confirmed in the letter from the federal prosecutor referred to above, which states: We have found McArthur & T.G. Lee and their attorneys to have been most cooperative in this matter. We believe both the companies and their attorneys have shown a high degree of responsibility by agreeing to settle this matter in an expeditious manner. The negotiated settlement with these defendants resolves all matters relating to their operations in Florida. As a final point, we believe the early agreement by these companies and their counsel to settle this matter for a substantial sum gave the incentive for other corporate defendants to come forward and also offer substantial criminal and civil settlements. Several of those cases have now been favorably concluded. Section 287.133(3)(e)3.f., F.S., establishes "[d]isassociation from any other person or affiliate convicted of the public entity crime" as a mitigating factor. Jack Wells and James Clark, the only individuals at McArthur Dairy and T.G. Lee Foods implicated in the wrongdoing that give rise to the convictions in question, were terminated. The investigations conducted by the State of Florida and the Department of Justice disclosed no involvement or knowledge on the part of any other employee of Petitioners, Dean or any of Dean's other subsidiaries, as reflected in a letter form attorneys representing the State of Florida to Dean's attorney dated June 29, 1988. Section 287.133(3)(e)3.g, F.S., establishes "[p]rior or future self- policing by the person or affiliate to prevent public entity crimes' as a mitigating factor. All of Dean's subsidiaries, including Petitioners, have an active antitrust compliance program. Section 287.133(3)(e)3.k, F.S., establishes "demonstration of good citizenship" as a mitigating factor. Petitioners have been involved in civic and philanthropic affairs throughout the years. For example, T.G. Lee Foods and McArthur Dairy have spearheaded fundraising events for Edgewood Children's Ranch, a non-sectarian foundation for the support of under-privileged and abused children. T.G. Lee Foods and McArthur Dairy have also donated milk to the Ranch for a number of years. McArthur Dairy has made substantial contributions to organizations such as the University of Miami, and Miami Dade Junior College.
The Issue Whether the Motions for Rule Challenge Proceedings (referred to as Petition(s)) filed in each of the above-cited cases meet the requirements both in form and substance, pursuant to Subsection 120.56(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2004).
The Issue The issues in this case involve the type of contract (an annual contract versus professional services contract) Petitioner had with Respondent, how that contract was terminated, and when that contract was terminated.
Findings Of Fact The Division has jurisdiction to make findings of fact to determine subject matter jurisdiction. On September 26, 2013, the parties submitted a Joint Pre-Hearing Stipulation in this matter that detailed their respective positions. In the Pre-Hearing Stipulation, Ms. Hernandez asserts that she was offered and accepted a professional service contract (PSC) to teach, effective at the beginning of the 1996/97 school year. She taught under the PSC for three years. At the beginning of the 1999/2000 school year, Ms. Hernandez became an assistant principal;2/ however, she resigned that position in October 2000. Ms. Hernandez returned to work as a teacher under an annual contract for the 2004/05 school year. After again working as an assistant principal for several years, Ms. Hernandez transferred to a teaching position before she requested and was approved to take a leave of absence for both the 2009/10 and 2010/11 school years. In March 2011, Ms. Hernandez notified the School Board of her intent to return to work for the 2011/12 school year. In April 2011, the School Board notified Ms. Hernandez that it was not renewing her employment contract. Ms. Hernandez contends that she was working under a PSC and there was not just cause for her termination or non-renewal of her contract. The School Board's contention is that Ms. Hernandez was on an annual contract, and thus it could terminate or non-renew her contract in 2011.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's request for an administrative hearing be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of October, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of October, 2013.
Findings Of Fact By agreement with the prosecution Dr. Brown had sought to delay consideration of his procedural motion to dismiss DPR Case No. 91-06883/DOAH Case No. 92-1076, pertaining to the patients J.C., D.R., T.E. and K.J. The parties to that action anticipated considering the motion at the final hearing as part of the case on the merits. The hearing officer was persuaded that the procedural motion to dismiss had to be examined separate and apart from the consideration of the case on the merits as to those four patients. Consequently the motion to dismiss was entertained concerning its evidential and legal basis prior to a hearing on the merits. This led to the decision on June 9, 1992, to dismiss the action pertaining to treatment of the patients J.C., D.R., and T.E., with leave to refile at some future date. The decision to dismiss was based upon the pertinent facts and law when examined in accordance with Section 455.255(1), Florida Statutes. The motion to dismiss the action concerning treatment of the patient K.J. was denied. The reason for the dismissal was announced in the record on June 9, 1992, and memorialized in the transcript of the proceedings. It was concluded that there was not an adequate basis to institute an investigation concerning the patients J.C., D.R., and T.E.; that the Department of Professional Regulation, now the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, did not furnish Dr. Brown or his attorney with a copy of the complaint or the document that resulted in the initiation of the investigation pertaining to the three patients; and, that Dr. Brown did not have the statutorily mandated opportunity to respond to the accusations made against him related to the care that he provided those three patients. Therefore, the procedural requirements under Section 455.225(1), Florida Statutes, had not been met and the case as it pertained to the three patients was dismissed with leave to refile. The procedural requirements related to the patient K.J. had been met and it was appropriate to present the K.J. case to the Probable Cause Panel for its deliberation, unlike the circumstance with the other three patients. It was determined that the quality of consideration by the Probable Cause Panel when voting to prosecute Dr. Brown for his treatment of K.J. was adequate. Based upon the ruling directed to the treatment of patients J.C., D.R., and T.E. the Department of Professional Regulation was not allowed to proceed against Dr. Brown for the care rendered those patients. A subsequent recommended order addressed in substance the prosecutions associated with DPR Case No. 91-06883/DOAH Case No. 92-1076 pertaining to the patient K.J.; DPR Case Nos. 011343 and 011344/DOAH Case No. 91-5325 and DPR Case Nos. 8901804, 0111385 and 0111353/DOAH Case No. 91-6358, traced the history of those cases in the preliminary statement to the recommended order and identified the prior ruling dismissing the actions pertaining to the patients J.C., D.R., and T.E. That recommended order was not an invitation to the Board of Medicine to respond to a recommendation of dismissal. The recommended order in the cases pertaining to patients other than J.C., D.R., and T.E. was entered on December 30, 1992, based upon the formal hearing conducted pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, on various dates in June and July, 1992, and concluded on July 10, 1992, before the present hearing officer. On February 26, 1993, the Board entered its final order in the above- referenced cases and commented to the effect that it had approved the recommended dismissal by the hearing officer concerning the patients J.C., D.R., and T.E. with leave to refile. Neither party appealed the hearing officer's decision dismissing those counts within DPR Case No. 91-06883/DOAH Case No. 92-1076 directed to the patients J.C., D.R., and T.E. On March 8, 1993, Dr. Brown took an appeal from the final order of the Board of Medicine entered on February 26, 1993, which included the comment approving the actions by the hearing officer in dismissing the counts pertaining to the patients J.C., D.R., and T.E., but without prejudice to bring those actions again following compliance with Section 455.225, Florida Statutes. Robert C. Brown, Jr., M.D., is a licensed physician practicing in the state of Florida. He has held a license entitling him to practice in that state at all times relevant to the inquiry. At relevant times Dr. Brown has practiced medicine at 4519 Brentwood Avenue, Jacksonville, Florida, 32206. He is the sole medical practitioner of an incorporated professional practice. He has had less than 25 employees and his net worth has been not more than 2 million dollars. Dr. Brown is the only share holder in his incorporated professional association. No one else has ownership interest in the incorporated professional association. At times Dr. Brown has drawn a salary from the professional association as an employee of the professional association. His request for attorney's fees and costs are directed to the actions of the Department of Professional Regulation for its procedural noncompliance with Section 455.225, Florida Statutes, and the subsequent decision of the Board of Medicine to find probable cause and to have the Department of Professional Regulation proceed against Dr. Brown for care rendered the patients J.C., D.R., and T.E. The action to recover attorney's fees and costs not to exceed $15,000 was filed on April 27, 1993. The petition for attorney's fees and costs of April 27, 1993, was amended on July 15, 1993. Dr. Brown retained the law firm of Stowell, Anton and Kraemer to represent him in the aforementioned cases pertaining to the administrative prosecutions. His present attorney, Julie Gallagher, was principal counsel in those cases. No issue has been taken with the notion that $165.00 is a reasonable hourly rate for her services in defending Dr. Brown in the administrative prosecutions. Dr. Brown has paid all fees and costs charged by his lawyer in preparation for and participating in the proceedings related to the administrative prosecutions. To challenge the alleged procedural infirmities associated with the right to investigate, notice to the accused, opportunity for the accused to respond to the accusations and deliberations by the Probable Cause Panel contemplated by Section 455.225, Florida Statutes, it was not necessary for Dr. Brown to fully develop his defense on the merits of the accusations pertaining to patients J.C., D.R., and T.E. Dr. Brown's counsel in the exhibit associated with claims for attorney's fees and costs has highlighted the exhibit through color-codes in an attempt to assist the hearing officer in understanding the meaning of that exhibit. This color-code system attempts to identify those instances in which Dr. Brown claims that the work done on his behalf is associated only with patients with J.C., D.R. and T.E. and other occasions where a percentage is set forth in relation to work done in the entire DPR Case No. 91-06883/DOAH Case No. 92-1076, to include K.J. and in the other cases referenced before. The code is described in the August 16, 1993 cover letter from counsel for Dr. Brown. No attempt is made through the coding system to differentiate between those actions taken in moving to dismiss DPR Case No. 91-06883/DOAH Case No. 92-1076 pertaining to the patients J.C., D.R. and T.E. from other activities related to defending the accusations about those patients on the merits. The right to recover, if at all, is limited to those attorney's fees and costs associated with the motion to dismiss counts pertaining to the patients J.C., D.R., and T.E., together with the attorney's fees and costs associated with the present case. No other efforts by Dr. Brown's attorneys may be the proper subject for recovery. Not only was it not necessary to know information concerning the merits of the administrative complaint pertaining to patients J.C., D.R., and T.E. to pursue the motion to dismiss on procedural grounds, the decision that was made did not resolve the merits set forth in the administrative complaints directed to Dr. Brown's treatment of J.C., D.R., and T.E. The possibility exists that Dr. Brown could be called upon to defend against similar accusations to those set forth in the DPR Case No. 91-06883/DOAH Case No. 92-1076 at which time he could prepare himself to defend the merits and if successful that would be the appropriate moment to seek attorney's fees and costs for that aspect of the case. The arrangement by stipulation between the parties in the prior prosecution to delay consideration of the motion to dismiss until the place at which prosecution of the cases involving J.C., D.R., and T.E. were being examined on their merits was not appropriate. Consequently, Dr. Brown may not assert that he was required to prepare his motion to dismiss on procedural grounds simultaneously with his defense on the merits of the administrative complaint directed to the patients J.C., D.R., and T.E. Within this context, taking into account a lack of opposition to the $165.00 hourly rate charged by Dr. Brown's counsel, the following amounts are found to be associated with the pursuit of the motion to dismiss those counts related to patients J.C., D.R., and T.E. and claims under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, to recover attorney's fees and costs: 3/11/92-$165.00; 3/14/92-$165.00; 3/16/92-$125.00; 3/31/92-$100.00; 4/2/92-$247.50; 4/6/92- $62.50; 4/6/92-$198.00; 4/10/92-$50.00; 4/16/92-$10.00; 4/17/92-$50.00; related to the motion to dismiss and 4/27/93-$165.00; 5/3/93-$33.00; 5/12/93-$15.00; 5/17/93-$82.50; 6/14/93-$165.00; related to the prosecution of the petition for attorney's fees and costs. No proof was offered concerning any special circumstances that point to any injustice in awarding attorney's fees and costs in the amount identified.
Findings Of Fact Respondent holds a Class "C" Private Investigator License, license number C86-00509. The Respondent has held that license at all times material to this proceeding. On July 4, 1994, the Respondent intentionally struck N.S. (a minor) with a flashlight. The striking of N.S. took place immediately after, and was in response to, N.S.'s act of kicking the Respondent while the Respondent was on a stairway landing and was in reasonable fear that his attacker (N.S.) might push him down the stairs. Under the circumstances, the Respondent's act of striking N.S. was a reasonable act of self-defense in the lawful protection of himself from physical harm.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing it is recommended that a Final Order be issued in this proceeding dismissing all charges against the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of February, 1996 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. 1550 _ MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399- (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-5321 The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on all proposed findings of fact submitted by all parties. Proposed findings submitted by Petitioner: Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraphs 2, 3, and 4: Rejected as irrelevant or as subordinate and unnecessary details. (For reasons discussed in the Conclusions of Law, the details regarding the criminal prosecution of the Respondent are not competent substantial evidence of the facts alleged in the Administrative Complaint.) Proposed findings submitted by Respondent: The Respondent's proposed recommended order does not contain any specific portion designated as "findings of fact." Rather, the Respondent has intertwined his proposed findings, his proposed conclusions, and his arguments throughout his proposal. It appears to be sufficient to note that the findings of fact in this recommended order are generally consistent with the substance of the Respondent's version of the facts. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas D. Sunshine Assistant General Counsel Department of State, Division of Licensing The Capitol, Mail Station Number 4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Mr. Stephen A. Shields 9441 Southwest 4th Street, Number 311 Miami, Florida 33174 Honorable Sandra B. Mortham Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Don Bell General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
