The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Petitioner should receive additional credit for his answers to questions 121 and/or 222 on the civil/sanitary engineer examination administered on April 18 and 19, 1997.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Board of Professional Engineers was the state agency in Florida responsible for the licensing of professional engineers in this state and for the regulation of the engineering profession. Petitioner graduated from the University of South Florida in December 1990, with a degree in geo-technical engineering, a sub-specialty of civil engineering. He is not, nor does he claim to be, a structural engineer. He has practiced in the field of geo-technical engineering since his graduation and has taught soil mechanics at the master’s level at the university. He sat for the professional engineer’s examination administered by the Respondent in April 1997. Thereafter, by grade report dated July 29, 1997, the Department’s Bureau of Testing notified Petitioner that he had earned a score of 69.00 on the examination he had taken. Since a passing score for the examination which Petitioner took is 70.00, Petitioner failed the examination. Petitioner requested a formal hearing to challenge the grading of examination questions numbers 121 and 222, on each of which he earned a score of four. The maximum obtainable score on each question is ten. On question 121, the candidate is given a situation involving a sheet-pile wall section, and is asked to (a) sketch and dimension the earth pressure diagram acting on the wall after the proposed dredging has been completed; and (b) determine the factor of safety against the kick-out after the dredging. Scoring of the Petitioner’s examination was done by the National Council of Examiners for Engineering and Surveying (Council). The Council determined that, with regard to requirement (a), Petitioner’s pressure distribution was of the correct form, but the labeling of the distribution had a major error. Petitioner assumed an incorrect factor which was deemed to be a major error calling for, under the approved scoring plan, a minimum four-point deduction. With regard to requirement (b), Petitioner chose not to solve for the factor of safety as he was required to do. This resulted in a minimum reduction of two additional points. This evaluation was concurred by Mr. Adams, the Board’s expert witness, in his testimony at hearing. Mr. Adams noted that where, as here, the engineer is dealing with soil mechanics, the at-rest conditions are one thing. The active and passive (A and P) conditions are the more dynamic, and here, where the problem calls for removal of soil from in front of a retaining wall, A and P pressures should have been used instead of at-rest pressures. Adams also concluded that Petitioner’s cited authority was not valid in this case. This authority used the at-rest pressure coefficient when all the authorities Mr. Adams could find used the A and P pressure coefficient. Petitioner admits that the coefficients utilized in determining earth pressures are A, P and at-rest (O). In this case, the whole problem must be considered. A tie-back system is presented, and in that case the sheet pile and the tie-back are assumed to hold the soil behind the wall in an at-rest condition so long as the sheet-pile wall does not move or deflect. Petitioner contends that Mr. Adams’ determination that removing the soil would destroy stasis and cause the wall to move is erroneous. In fact, he contends, the sheet-pile wall and the anchor system must move before the Board’s argument holds. He cites an authority in support of his position which was also cited to the Council scorer who, at Petitioner’s request, rescored his answer. The Council official who rescored Petitioner’s answer did not have access to Petitioner’s cited authority but rejected the citation as either incorrectly cited or incorrect in itself. Petitioner’s error called for a four-point reduction in score as to (a). Further, as to requirement (b), Petitioner, though asked to solve for the factor of safety against rotation, chose not to do so. This calls for an additional two-point reduction. Independent review of Petitioner’s answer, including an evaluation of his cited authority, and consideration of the other evidence pertinent to this issue, including his testimony, that of his witness, and the rescoring results by the Council, does not satisfy the undersigned that Petitioner’s answer merits additional credit. The score of four, as awarded, is appropriate. Question 222 deals with a cantilevered retaining wall with a wide foundation and piling in two rows, some in front and some in back, to support it. The candidate is required to determine the total lateral thrust per linear foot acting on the wall in issue; to determine the vertical load on a front row pile; and to explain possible ways that the pile foundation can resist the lateral thrust. According to Mr. Adams, Petitioner incorrectly calculated the lateral load by omitting the proper depth of the wall. With regard to the vertical loading, the Petitioner did not get to the proper vertical load on the front pile but received partial credit for other calculations he performed. As for the last requirement, one part of Petitioner’s answer was incorrect in that he did not explain passive pressures properly. What Petitioner mentioned was incorrect, and he did not mention battering of the piles, which was expected to be noted. According to Mr. Adams, Petitioner got two parts of the question correct, each of which is worth two points. Therefore, he received a score of four points. Petitioner contends that the Board and the Council are being too restrictive in their approach to the problem and not taking into account the whole problem. He claims that though he arrived at the wrong figure in calculating the lateral load, that does not justify his receiving no credit for that segment since the method he used for calculating the thrust was correct. He admits to having erroneously neglected the weight of the soil, but contends that his method of determining the solutions to resist lateral thrust is as good as that of the Board and the Council. Petitioner was given only partial credit for his use of the correct equation to calculate the lateral thrust because he used the wrong depth. His answer to the second part was wrong in that he completely neglected the weight of the soil and calculating the pile load, even though he used the correct figure to multiply the load per foot of the wall. His answer to the third requirement, dealing with lateral resistance of the pile, was insufficient to warrant a full award. Taken together, his answer, in the opinion of the Council’s scorer, merited only an award of four points. Petitioner did not show sufficient basis for increasing this award. The evidence presented by the Board clearly established that both questions in issue provided enough information to allow the candidate to answer them correctly, and both are questions that a candidate for licensure should be able to answer. The scoring plan for these questions was not shown to be inappropriate, and there is no evidence that it was not properly utilized.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Board of Professional Engineers enter a Final Order in this matter denying Petitioner additional credit for his answers to Questions 121 and 222 on the April 1997 Civil Engineer Examination. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of April, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Henri V. Jean 3273 Tanglewood Trail Palm Harbor, Florida 34685 R. Beth Atchison, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Lynda L. Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Angel Gonzalez Executive Director Board of Professional Engineers Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Petitioner should have received a passing score on the SCBA (Self Contained Breathing Apparatus) section of the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training's Minimum Standards Practical Examination re-test administered on March 1, 2001.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: On November 15, 2000, after completing a training course at the Broward Fire Academy (where Lawrence Burns was his lead instructor), Petitioner took the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training's Minimum Standards Written and Practical Examinations. He received a passing score on the Written Examination and all sections of the Practical Examination, except for the SCBA section. On March 1, 2001, Petitioner re-took the SCBA section of the Practical Examination. The re-test was administered at the State Fire College in Ocala, Florida. Ralph Chase, a field representative with the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training, was Petitioner's examiner. Mr. Chase has been employed as a field representative with the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training for five years. Prior to coming to work for the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training, he was a firefighter with the City of Titusville for 21 years. He was a suppression lieutenant at the time he left the city's employ. Petitioner borrowed from the Broward Fire Academy the equipment that he needed for the re-test: two air tanks, a regulator, a harness, and a PASS device. A PASS device is a safety device worn by firefighters entering a hostile environment. When the device is activated in the automatic mode, it will emit a continuous, piercing sound if the firefighter is immobilized for longer than 30 seconds. To place the device in the automatic mode, a plastic switch must be moved into the appropriate position. When properly positioned in the automatic mode, the device makes a brief, chirping sound. It was emphasized to Petitioner during his training at the Broward Fire Academy that it was the responsibility of the student, before leaving the Academy with borrowed equipment, to inspect the equipment to make sure that the equipment was in good working order. Before leaving the Academy with the equipment that he borrowed for the re-test, Petitioner twice inspected the equipment and ascertained that it was in good working order. At the re-testing site, he re-inspected the borrowed equipment. The re-inspection revealed that all of the equipment was in good working order, except for the regulator. Petitioner obtained another regulator, along with a harness, at the re-testing site. He attached the PASS device that he had borrowed from the Broward Fire Academy to the harness and ascertained that "[e]verything was working properly." Before the re-test began, Mr. Chase advised Petitioner that "exceeding the maximum allotted time and/or failure to wear and activate the PASS device in the automatic mode w[ould] constitute an automatic failure for the SCBA evaluation." He further advised Petitioner to "speak loudly and clearly" if Petitioner wanted to tell Mr. Chase "anything during the testing." After Petitioner indicated that he was ready, the re- test began. Throughout the re-test, Mr. Chase stood "only a few feet" in front of Petitioner and watched him intently, focusing upon his hands. Petitioner signaled that he was "done" by clapping his hand. He finished the re-test in one minute and 16 seconds, well within the allotted time. At no time during the re-test, however, did Petitioner make an effort to place the PASS device in the automatic mode. Because he had neither seen Petitioner make such an effort, nor heard the chirping sound that is made when a PASS device is activated in the automatic mode, Mr. Chase walked up to Petitioner after Petitioner had signaled that he was "done" and confirmed that the PASS device switch was in the "off" position. Mr. Chase did not say anything to Petitioner about it. He simply told Petitioner to take off his mask. Shortly thereafter, Petitioner walked up to Mr. Chase and stated, "You know I turned my alert, my PASS alert off." Mr. Chase responded that he did not know what Petitioner meant, to which Petitioner replied, "I wanted you to know that I turned it . . . on and then I turned it off again." After telling Petitioner that he could not discuss the matter with him, Mr. Chase walked away. Petitioner did not at any time during the re-test tell Mr. Chase that he had placed the PASS device in the automatic mode. At no time at the re-testing site, either before, during, or after the re-test, did Petitioner tell Mr. Chase that there was any problem with the PASS device. Petitioner justifiably received a failing score of zero on the re-test because he had not make any effort to place the PASS device in the automatic mode. Petitioner did not report that there was any problem with the PASS device when he returned it to the Broward Fire Academy.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered rejecting Petitioner's challenge to the failing score he received on the SCBA (Self Contained Breathing Apparatus) section of the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training's Minimum Standards Practical Examination re-test he took on March 1, 2001. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of September, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of September, 2001.
The Issue The issue to be resolved is whether Petitioner is entitled to additional credit for her response to question nos. 122 and 222 of the civil engineering examination administered on October 31, 1997.
Findings Of Fact On October 31, 1997, Petitioner took the civil professional engineering licensing examination. A score of 70 is required to pass the test. Petitioner obtained a score of 69. Petitioner challenged the scoring of question nos. 122 and 222. As part of the examination challenge process, Petitioner's examination was returned to the National Council of Examiners for Engineering and Surveying where it was re-scored. In the re-score process, the grader deducted points from Petitioner's original score. Petitioner was given the same raw score of 6 on question number 122; however, on question number 222 her raw score of 4 was reduced to a 2. Petitioner needed a raw score of 48 in order to achieve a passing score of 70; she needed at least three additional raw score points to obtain a passing raw score of 48. Petitioner is entitled to a score of 6 on problem number 122. The solution and scoring plan for that problem required the candidate to obtain a culvert size in the range of 21-36 inches. The Petitioner incorrectly answered 3.1 feet or 37.2 inches. She is not entitled to additional credit for problem number 122 because she answered the question with the wrong size culvert. Problem number 122 required the candidate to use a predevelopment peak flow of 40 cubic feet per second (cfs). Petitioner used 58.33 cfs. She chose the maximum flow rather than the predevelopment peak flow. In solving problem number 122, Petitioner chose a design headwater depth of 4.8 feet. The correct solution required a design headwater depth of 5.7 feet. Petitioner made another mistake in problem number 122; she failed to check the water depth in the downstream swale. Petitioner concedes she was given sufficient information to solve problem number 122. She understood what the question was asking of her. She admits that she did not compute the critical depth of the water and that she did not complete the solution. Question number 222 had three parts. The candidate was required to determine the footing size, to select the reinforcing steel, and to provide a sketch for a concrete column located along the edge of a building. Petitioner understood the question and was provided enough information to solve the problem. Petitioner correctly checked the footing size as required by the first part; however, she did not select the reinforcing steel or show the required sketch. Therefore, Petitioner did not complete enough of the problem to qualify for a score of 4 points. She is entitled to a score of 2 points. The examination questions at issue here were properly designed to test the candidate's competency in solving typical problems in real life. The grader (re-scorer) utilized the scoring plan correctly. Petitioner has been in the United States for approximately eleven years. She lived in Romania before she came to the United States. In Romania, Petitioner used only the metric system in her professional work. While she has used the English system since moving to the United States, Petitioner is more familiar with the metric system. The Principles and Practice examination is an open-book examination. Petitioner took a book entitled the Fundamentals of Engineering Reference Handbook to the examination. When the proctor examined her books, she told the Petitioner she was not permitted to keep the handbook. The proctor took the handbook from the Petitioner. Petitioner protested the confiscation of her reference book because she had used the same book in two previous tests. About ten minutes later, the proctor's supervisor returned the book to Petitioner. Petitioner's book was returned at least ten minutes before the test began. She was permitted to use the book during the test. There is no persuasive evidence that the proctor's mistake in temporarily removing Petitioner's reference book caused her to be so upset that she failed the test. Candidates were not permitted to study their books prior to the beginning of the examination. Petitioner may have been nervous when the test began. However, Petitioner received a perfect score of ten points on the first problem she worked, problem number 121.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Professional Engineers enter a Final Order confirming Petitioner's score on the examination and dismissing the Petitioner's challenge. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of January, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of January, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Natalie A. Lowe, Esquire Board of Professional Engineers 1208 Hays Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William Bruce Muench, Esquire 438 East Monroe Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Dennis Bartin, President Florida Engineers Management Corporation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Luis A. Gonzalez earned a passing grade on the Professional Engineer Examination of April 14-15, 1988?
Findings Of Fact Luis A. Gonzalez took the Professional Engineer Examination administered by the Department of professional Regulation on April 14-15, 1988. By notice dated July 22, 1988, Mr. Gonzalez was informed by the Respondent's Office of Examination Services that he had failed the Professional Engineer Examination. Question 122 on the Principles & Practices of Engineering Examination, Form 8804, involving Civil/Sanitary/Structural engineering, provided the following: SITUATION: An old, large, retirement community apartment complex has reported sewer overflow and plumbing discharge problems. You are an engineer assigned to review the flow and sizing of the one main sanitary sewer exiting and carrying the total flow of the complex, with the objective of correcting the problem. Review with the manager, and inspection of the plans, reveal there are 490 residential units with an estimated continuing residence population of 1,475. Water bills are paid individually. REQUIREMENTS: NOTE: Use and-show equations for calculations. Do not use a nomograph or hydraulic slide rule. Citing your assumptions and sources, calculate the average, maximum, and minimum sanitary wastewater flows expected, in gallons per day, from the total complex. You measure the main sewer from the project and examine the plans and find it is 10" round ID, VCP, with a slope of 0.0045. Inspection leads to an estimate of n 0/015 (fair) because of age. Calculate theoretical full flow capacity and velocity with no surcharge. Calculate depth and velocity of flow for your estimated maximum flow rate, if you can conclude the sewer is not overloaded. Mr. Gonzalez was instructed to include assumptions and citations in support of his answer to Question 122. The citations included by Mr. Gonzalez in answering part (a) of Question 122, although questioned by the grader of Question 122, were adequate. Mr. Gonzalez failed to list assumptions which he should have taken into account in answering part (a) of Question 122, concerning inflow, infiltration or exfiltration. In answering part (a) of Question 122, Mr. Gonzalez determined "estimated flow." In calculating estimated flow, Mr. Gonzalez multiplied the population of the complex (1,475) times an estimated water use per person of 100 gallons per day. In support of Mr. Gonzalez's use of 100 gallons per person water use, Mr. Gonzalez cited the Civil Engineering Reference Manual, Fourth Edition, and the ASCE Manual on Engineering Practice No. 36. Mr. Gonzalez also provided other references at the formal hearing to support his use of 100 gallons per day. The use of 100 gallons a day per person in answering part (a) of Question 122 by Mr. Gonzalez would be correct only if the problem involved a residential community. The citations used by Mr. Gonzalez indicate that 100 gallons per day is generally acceptable for residential communities or "[i]n the absence of any better basis . . . ." Question 122, however, involves an apartment complex and not a residential community. The weight of the evidence presented at the formal hearing indicates that for an apartment complex an estimated water use of 60 to 80 gallons per day per person should be used. Even some of the references provided by Mr. Gonzalez at the formal hearing support this conclusion. For example, Petitioner's exhibit 5 indicates that a wastewater flow of 67 to 79 gallons per person per day should be used for "[m]ultiple-family dwellings (apartments)." Mr. Gonzalez's use of 100 gallons per day in answering part (a) of Question 122 was incorrect. Mr. Gonzalez failed to demonstrate an adequate understanding of flow in answering Question 122. Although Mr. Gonzalez demonstrated an understanding of full flow, he failed to demonstrate an understanding of partial flow. Mr. Gonzalez's answer to part (b) of Question 122 was adequate. Mr. Gonzalez's answer to part (c) of Question 122 was incorrect. Mr. Gonzalez did not dispute this conclusion at the forma1 hearing. Mr. Gonzalez was awarded a score of 4 for his solution of Question 122. Question 122 was graded pursuant to the National Council of Engineering Examiners Standard Scoring Plan Outline (DPR Exhibit #4). This Outling provides that a grade of 4 is to be awarded under the following circumstances: UNQUALIFIED: Applicant has failed to demonstrate adequate knowledge in more than one ASPECT of one CATEGORY. BU. Fails to demonstrate an understanding of flow and velocity calculations for pipes flowing full or partially full; or contains multiple errors; or one part is missing or wrong with other gross or multiple errors; or the record is deficient; or in combination. A grade of 5 was to awarded under circumstances similar to the circumstances for awarding a score of 4, except that a score of 5 is appropriate only if an "[a]pplicant has failed to demonstrate adequate knowledge in [only] one ASPECT of one CATEGORY." The Respondent properly concluded that Mr. Gonzalez is entitled to a score of 4 for his answer to Question 122 and not a score of 5. Mr. Gonzalez failed to "demonstrate an understanding of flow . . . calculations for pipes flowing . . . partially full . . . ." His answer also "contains multiple errors" and at least "one part is . . . wrong." Finally, Mr. Gonzalez's answer to Question 122 "failed to demonstrate adequate knowledge in more than one ASPECT of one CATEGORY" as opposed to "[only] one ASPECT of one CATEGORY." [Emphasis added]. Question 123 of the Principles & Practice of Engineering Examination, Form 8804, involving Civil/Sanitary/Structural engineering, includes parts (a) through (j). Mr. Gonzalez questioned parts (b), (d) and (e) of Question 123. In pertinent part, Question 123 provides the following: SITUATION: In a detailed study of traffic flow on one lane of a 2-lane urban freeway, the following data were collected: Average Distance between the front bumper of successive vehicles 75 feet Space Mean Speed = 33 mph Time Mean Speed = 32 mph REQUIREMENTS: (b) Determine the traffic density. Assuming that the 30th highest hourly volume is to be used for design purposes on this highway, what is a reasonable estimate of the 30th highest hourly volume in one direction on this facility? Briefly justify any assumptions made. Determine the most widely accepted value of the capacity of a freeway lane operating under ideal conditions of uninterrupted flow. Mr. Gonzalez was instructed to include assumptions and citations in support of his answer to Question 123. Mr. Gonzalez answered part (b) of Question 123 by calculating a density of 70.40. The grader of Question 123 circled this answer and wrote "DECIMAL." The Respondent agreed at the formal hearing that the use of decimals by Mr. Gonzalez was insignificant. In answering part (d) of Question 123 Mr. Gonzalez failed to include adequate assumptions. Although the statements made by Mr. Gonzalez in answering part (d) of Question 123 are correct, his equation is wrong. Mr. Gonzalez did not offer adequate proof at the formal hearing that his response to part (d) of Question 123 was correct. In answering part (e) of Question 123 Mr. Gonzalez assumed a capacity of 2,000 cars per hour. The grader of Question 123 indicated that this capacity is an "obsolete value." The Solutions to be used in grading the Professional Engineer Examination and, in particular, Question 123, indicates the following: Based on the 1985 Highway Capacity Manual or other similar sources, the capacity of a multi-lane freeway lane operating under ideal conditions is 2,000 vehicles per hour. ANSWER Although Mr. Gonzalez's answer to part (e) of Question 123 is consistent with this solution, the capacity of a multi-lane freeway lane operating under ideal conditions, based on the 1985 Highway Capacity Manual is actually 2,800 vehicles per hour and not 2,000 vehicles per hour. The answer to part (e) of Question 123 provided in the Solutions used by graders of the Professional Engineer Examination and Mr. Gonzalez's answer are therefore incorrect. The Solutions provided to graders are to be used only to assist graders and are not binding on them. Although Mr. Gonzalez's answer to part (e) of Question 123 is consistent with the Solutions provided, the answer is incorrect. Therefore, the grader properly took into account Mr. Gonzalez's incorrect solution to part (e) of Question 123. Even if Mr. Gonzalez is given credit for his response to part (e) of Question 123, his grade for Question 123 will not change. Mr. Gonzalez correctly answered parts (a)-(c) and (f)-(j) of Question 123. Mr. Gonzalez was awarded a score of 8 points for his answer to Question 123. Question 123 was graded pursuant to a Six Level Item Specific Scoring Plan (155P). The Plan provides that a grade of 8 is to be awarded under the following circumstances: CLEARLY QUALIFIED: All categories satisfied with at least one at a higher than minimum level. Correct approach but a solution with math errors or answers outside allowable tolerances for parts (d), (e), and (h) or An [sic] slightly incomplete solution. The next highest grade which can be awarded for Question 123 is 10 points, the maximum award possible for Question 123. Ten points are to be awarded under the following circumstances: HIGHLY QUALIFIED: All categories satisfied. -Presentation -may lack in completeness or equations, diagrams, orderly steps in solution, etc. Results within allowable tolerance. Correct approach and correct solution within allowable tolerances for parts (d), (e), and (h) and correct interpretation of results. All parts complete. The Respondent properly concluded that Mr. Gonzalez is entitled to a score of 8 for his answer to Question 123 and not a score of 10. Mr. Gonzalez did not satisfy all categories and he failed to arrive at the "correct solution within allowable tolerances for parts (d), [and] (e) . . . " in answering Question 123. Mr. Gonzalez failed to prove that he should have been awarded a score of 10 for Question 123. Mr. Gonzalez failed to prove that he should be awarded an additional point on the Professional Engineer Examination of April 14-15, 1988.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Engineers issue a final order concluding that Luis A. Gonzalez's grade on the Professional Engineer Examination of April 14- 15, 1988, was a failing grade. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of April, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 1989. APPENDIX Case Number 88-6056 Mr. Gonzalez has submitted a letter dated March 21, 1989, containing proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Respondent did not file a proposed recommended order. Mr. Gonzalez's Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection Paragraphs 1-2, 6 Not proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 3 The first sentence is a statement of the issue concerning Question 122. The second and third sentences are not supported by the weight of the evidence. The Florida Department of Environmental Regulation established water per day usage is for regulatory purposes and not necessarily consistent with the engineering principles to be used in answering questions on the Professional Engineer Examination. References which should have been used in answering Question 122 indicate that a water use rate of 67 to 79 gallons per day should have been used for apartments. The letter referred to was not accepted into evidence and can not form any basis for a finding of fact. Paragraph 4 The first and fifth sentences are accepted in findings of fact 20 and 21. The second and fourth sentences are not relevant to this proceeding. The third sentence is based upon a letter apparently received after the formal hearing. It cannot be taken into account in this proceeding. The sixth sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. The grader used the correct information and not "personal conviction." Although it is true that Mr. Gonzalez used the most recent data he was aware of concerning vehicles per hour, the fact remains that the value he used at the time of the examination was incorrect. Paragraph 5 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Mr. Gonzalez included two references with his letter of March 21, 1989, which were not offered at the formal hearing. Those references cannot be relied upon in this case and have played no part in making the findings of fact and conclusions of law in this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: H. Reynolds Sampson Deputy General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Luis A Gonzalez 7419 Sandy Bluff Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32211 Kenneth Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Allen R. Smith, Jr. Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner, Gary Cook, should have received a passing score on the Barber Practical Examination taken by him in November 1996.
Findings Of Fact On or about November 25, 1996, Petitioner, Gary Cook, took the Barber Practical Examination (hereinafter referred to as the "Exam"). The Exam was scored by two examiners: Geri Scott and Don Gibson. The Bureau of Testing of Respondent, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (hereinafter referred to as the "Department") subsequently notified Mr. Cook that he had earned a total score of 70 on the Exam. A score of 75 is considered a passing grade. Mr. Cook was notified by the Department that he earned a total score of 14.00 points on the sanitation portion of the Exam. The maximum score which may be earned for the sanitation portion of the Exam is 25.00. On or about December 30, 1996, Mr. Cook requested a formal administrative hearing to contest the determination of his score on the Exam. Mr. Cook challenged his score on the sanitation portion of the Exam. The sanitation portion of the Exam consists of ten criteria for which points may be earned: Criteria Maximum Score Used proper linen setup for the shampoo 2 Properly stored clean and dirty linen during the shampoo 3 Washed hands before beginning the haircut 2 Used the proper linen setup for the haircut 3 During the haircut tools were replaced in sanitizer after each use 3 Properly stored clan and dirty linen during the haircut 2 Washed hands before beginning the permanent wave 2 Used the proper linen/cottonwrap setup for the permanent wave 3 Kept tools sanitized during the permanent wave 3 Properly stored clean and dirty linen during the permanent wave 2 TOTAL POSSIBLE POINTS 25 The criteria of the sanitation portion of the Exam are designated as "procedures" which candidates are required to meet during the Exam. If both examiners determine that a candidate carried out a procedure, the candidate is awarded the total available points for the procedure. If both examiners determine that a candidate did not carry out the procedure, the candidate is awarded no points for the procedure. Finally, if one examiner determines that a candidate carried out the procedure and the other examiner disagrees, the candidate is awarded half of the available points for the procedure. On the sanitation portion of the Exam Mr. Cook received no points for procedures B-2, C-2, and C-3. Mr. Cook received half the points available for procedures B-4 and C-4. Mr. Cook specifically alleged that he should have been awarded the maximum points for procedures B-2, B-4, C-2, C-3, and C-4. For procedure B-2, the examiners were to determine whether "[t]he candidate used the proper linen setup for the haircut." This procedure was worth a total of 3 points. Both examiners determined that Mr. Cook had not used the proper linen setup. For purposes of procedure B-2, the haircut includes shaving around the outline of the hair. Therefore, proper linen setup for the shave is a part of the haircut. Mr. Cook did not dispute the fact that he had not used the proper linen setup for the shave portion of the haircut. Mr. Cook suggested that the haircut portion of the Exam did not include the shave. The evidence failed to support this assertion. Rule 61GK3-16.001(7)(a)8., Florida Administrative Code, provides that a "haircut" for purposes of barber examinations includes a determination that "[s]ideburns, outline and neckline are clean shaven." See also, Page 7 of the Candidate Information Booklet, Respondent's Exhibit 3. Mr. Cook failed to prove that he fulfilled the requirements of procedure B-2. For procedure B-4, the examiners were to determine whether "[t]he candidate properly stored clean and dirty linen during the haircut." [Emphasis added] This procedure was worth a total of 2 points. One examiner determined that Mr. Cook had not met this criterion. Mr. Cook, therefore, was awarded 1 point for this procedure. The examiner that found that Mr. Cook had not performed procedure B-4 properly determined that Mr. Cook had placed a box of rubber gloves on a bar behind the area in which he was working. The Department has cited no authority which defines the term "linens" as including rubber gloves. The common definition of the term "linens" does not suggest that rubber gloves constitute linens. The term "linen" is defined as follows: 1 a : cloth made of flax and noted for its strength, coolness, and luster b : thread or yarn spun from flax 2 : clothing or household articles made of linen cloth or similar fabric3 : paper made from linen fibers or with a linen finish Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1984. Mr. Cook should have received full credit for procedure B-4. Therefore, Mr. Cook should have received one additional point on procedure B-4. For procedure C-2, the examiners were to determine whether "[t]he candidate used the proper linen/cotton wrap setup for the permanent wave." This procedure was worth a total of 3 points. Both examiners determined that Mr. Cook had not met this criterion. Both examiners determined that Mr. Cook had failed to use a proper cotton-wrap setup. Mr. Cook failed to explain what steps he undertook in setting up for the permanent wave. Mr. Cook, therefore, failed to prove that he fulfilled the requirements of procedure C-2. For procedure C-3, the examiners were to determine whether "[t]he candidate kept tools sanitized during the permanent wave." This procedure was worth a total of 3 points. Both examiners determined that Mr. Cook had not met this criterion. Both examiners determined that Mr. Cook had placed rods used for the permanent on the back bar. Mr. Cook failed to prove that the did not leave rods on the back bar while performing the permanent wave. Mr. Cook, therefore, failed to prove that he fulfilled the requirements of procedure C-3. For procedure C-4, the examiners were to determine whether "[t]he candidate properly stored clean and dirty linen during the permanent wave." This procedure was worth a total of 2 points. One examiner determined that Mr. Cook had not met this criterion. The examiner who found that Mr. Cook had not met this criterion determined that Mr. Cook had left end-wraps on the back bar. Mr. Cook failed to prove that he did not leave end- wraps on the back bar. Mr. Cook, therefore, failed to prove that he fulfilled the requirement of procedure C-4. All of the criteria for the sanitation portion of the Exam are listed in a Candidate Information Booklet for the Barber Examination. See page 6 of Respondent's Exhibit 3. The booklet also explains the scoring procedure. Mr. Cook proved that he should have been awarded one additional point on the sanitation portion of the Exam. Therefore, Mr. Cook earned a total score of 71 on the Exam. Mr. Cook's score is below a passing score of 75.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Barbers Board, finding that Gary Cook should have received a total score of 71 on the Barbers Practical Examination of November 1996. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of September, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of September, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Gary Cook 202 Mulberry Circle Crawfordville, Florida 32327 R. Beth Atchison, Assistant General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Joe Baker Department of Business and Professional Regulation Board of Barbers 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Petitioner began employment with Respondent in November 1983. He was assigned to the Water and Sewer Department as a laborer. In 1986, Petitioner was transferred by the Respondent to the Water and Sewer Department water meter shop to be a water meter repairman. Petitioner continued his employment in that section until the spring of 1993. At that time, Petitioner accepted status under the Respondent's Disability Income Replacement policy. This arrangement is for an employee who is absent due to disability for more than 60 days. He then becomes eligible to receive payment of 60 percent of the employee's regular earnings. From the years 1986 into 1990, Petitioner enjoyed good health. During that period his employee work evaluations ranged from satisfactory to above satisfactory. In 1990, Petitioner developed psoriasis. In the beginning, the condition was controlled through medical treatment. However, in 1991, Petitioner was diagnosed with bladder cancer. As a result, while being treated for the bladder cancer in 1991 and 1992, to include two surgeries, Petitioner was unable to receive medical treatment for his psoriasis. Consequently the psoriasis became more severe. There was a change in supervisory personnel on April 4, 1991, which affected Petitioner's employment status together with that of other employees within the Water and Sewer Department. The change came about when Richard Davis, who headed the Water and Sewer Department was replaced by Henry Hicks. Respondent had found it necessary to replace Davis, because in Respondent's view Davis was not satisfactorily addressing the personnel issues within the Water and Sewer Department. When hired, one of the issues which Hicks felt he needed to address was a morale problem caused by employee perceptions that the Department of Water and Sewer employee rules were not being enforced in a consistent manner. Hicks was of the opinion that this perception existed, in part, because supervisors maintained a casual approach to employee counseling and discipline. Hicks, in his tenure, reminded the supervisors to formalize their procedures in dealing with employee counseling and disciplining. He required the supervisor provide documentation of any disciplinary action whether verbally given or by a written reprimand. This change in direction tended to increase the number of documented incidences of imposition of employee discipline within the Water and Sewer Department. The first employee evaluation which Petitioner received after Hicks' assumption of his position of director of the Water and Sewer Department was in 1991. The 1991 evaluation which Petitioner was given contained positive and negative remarks about Petitioner's work performance. In the spring of 1991, the Water and Sewer Department held a picnic, an activity in which the employees were encouraged to participate. As in prior years the Petitioner volunteered to be a member of the food committee for the picnic and was appointed to that committee. Members of the food committee would serve food at the picnic. At that time, the Petitioner's psoriasis was such that he was noticeably peeling and flaking. Howard Johnson, a supervisor with Respondent approached Hicks and told Hicks that several employees had stated that they, the employees, would not go to the picnic if Petitioner served food because they were afraid that Petitioner's skin would flake into the food. Having been apprised of this situation, upon a date prior to the picnic, Hicks met with Petitioner and told Petitioner what had been reported to Hicks and asked Petitioner to serve the needs of the picnic activity in some other manner than food service. Specifically, the Petitioner was offered the opportunity to help "set up" the picnic area. Petitioner did not accept the alternative offer to assist in the outing. Instead, Petitioner was offended and felt that he was unreasonably singled out due to his psoriasis. Nonetheless, the reaction by other employees to having Petitioner serve food and the response by Hicks to offer an alternative opportunity to assist in the activity did not constitute harassment or unreasonable conduct toward Petitioner. In association with the picnic for the spring of 1991, Bobby Thigpen, a supervisor with Respondent, made a comment to Petitioner about Petitioner's psoriasis and Petitioner's participation on the food committee at the picnic. Although Petitioner was mindful of Thigpen's candor about the subject, Thigpen's remarks contributed to Petitioner's hurt feelings concerning other employees not wishing Petitioner to serve food at the picnic. The remarks by Thigpen were not designed to harass Petitioner based upon Petitioner's physical condition. In addition, Petitioner did not report Thigpen's remarks to his supervisor pursuant to Respondent's "No times relevant to the inquiry, prohibited harassment on the basis of handicap status as well as other protected categories. The policy instructed the employee who believed that he had been harassed to bring the matter to the supervisor or to the Human Resource Department within the organization if the employee did not feel that he could discuss the matter with his supervisor. Respondent's employees are required to attend an annual meeting to review this policy. Petitioner did not complain to the Human Resource Department that he had been harassed by Thigpen through Thigpen's remarks regarding Petitioner's service on the food committee. No other competent proof was offered to the effect that Respondent's employees had made derogatory comments about Petitioner's physical disabilities. Because Petitioner's psoriasis was in a more severe condition, Petitioner would leave flakes of skin on chairs in the Water and Sewer Department break-room. When the Petitioner's co residue they would switch chairs rather than sit in the chair on which Petitioner had left flakes of skin. Although Petitioner found out that the other employees were switching chairs due to the flakes of Petitioner's skin being found on the initial chair, there is no competent proof that any employee ever commented to the Petitioner that the employee would be opposed to the Petitioner eating in the break-room due to his physical condition. Petitioner, together with other employees who were supervised by Dan Miller, had been harassed by Miller at times relevant to the inquiry. In Petitioner's instance, Miller's harassment was not directed to Petitioner's physical disabilities. Some of the remarks made by Miller to Petitioner were that Petitioner was short and fat and further derogatory comments about Petitioner's haircut and clothes. Miller had also called the Petitioner dumb or stupid because Petitioner asked Miller to repeat instructions over the radio that was used for communicating between the supervisor and his respective employees. Notwithstanding Petitioner's contention that he had told Miller that he was having trouble hearing because of psoriasis that had spread to Petitioner's ears, Miller denies that Petitioner had told Miller that psoriasis was affecting Petitioner's hearing, and Miller's testimony is credited. On the contrary, without knowledge of any physical disability concerning hearing which Petitioner had, and without regard for the reaction any other employees which Miller supervised might have, Miller made insulting comments to employees which he supervised when talking to them on the radio. Employees other than Petitioner to whom the insulting comments were directed had no known physical disabilities. James Scarberry, a co-employee who worked for Miller, overheard Miller yell at Petitioner on occasion having to do with Petitioner's job performance, not Petitioner's physical disability related to hearing. Petitioner asked Miller and a co-worker not to smoke in his presence because he had recently had bladder cancer surgery. Petitioner contends that this request was met with laughter and jokes. Miller testified that the request was not met with jokes or laughter. Instead, Miller recalls, and his testimony is credited, that Petitioner complained that Al Nichols, a co-worker, had smoked excessively in Petitioner's presence. The subject of Nichols' and Miller's smoking in Petitioner's presence was discussed among Miller, Nichols and Respondent, and it was agreed that Nichols and Miller would try not to smoke excessively in Petitioner's presence. No medical evidence was presented which tended to identify the necessity for Petitioner to be afforded a smoke environment due to his medical condition or that Petitioner had ever made requests other than that directed to Miller and Nichols regarding not smoking in his presence at work. Petitioner had made requests that he be provided light duty because of the problems he experienced with his knees due to psoriasis. These requests were directed to Miller, Petitioner's immediate supervisor. The requests were not always granted. When Petitioner was turned down for light duty it was based upon the fact that light duty was generally not available in the Water and Sewer Department for any employee. Moreover, at that time, employees in Petitioner's work assignment usually worked alone and it would adversely affect the production of the unit if two repairmen were dispatched to do a job which would ordinarily take only one repairman to complete. Petitioner presented no proof concerning denial of light duty at a time when a physician may have specifically recommended light duty for Petitioner. Concerning discipline directed to the Petitioner, on March 18, 1982, Petitioner stopped at a job site to which he had not been assigned. There he engaged David Lipps, an employee of Respondent, in a conversation. Lipps was a supervisor at the site and the conversation had to do with the meal policy which had been applied at the site. Eventually the conversation became an argument, at which point Lipps told Petitioner that he did not belong at the job site and asked him to leave. Lipps then reported the incident to his supervisor, Rodney Thompson and the matter eventually came to the attention of Hicks. Hicks discussed the matter with the Petitioner and Lipps and concluded that Petitioner had no business purpose for being at the Lipps' job site and that Petitioner was responsible for causing the argument with Lipps. Petitioner was issued a written warning on March 26, 1992. The disciplinary reprimand was not related to Petitioner's physical disabilities. On May 18, 1992, Petitioner received a written reprimand. The reprimand was based upon the Petitioner's conduct while on weekend standby duty. This assignment was in keeping with the periodic requirement to serve on weekend standby. On May 16, 1992, Petitioner was on a standby status with Lipps. Lipps was referred to as the "A" worker and Petitioner was the "B" worker. The "A" worker was in charge of the work team. Petitioner arrived at the first job site 34 minutes before Lipps. When Lipps arrived, Petitioner complained that Lipps was an hour late. Petitioner then told Lipps that he had somewhere else to go that day. Lipps and Petitioner went to a second job and by that time Lipps told Petitioner that he was tired of Petitioner's complaining about having to work that day and concluded that Lipps did not have Petitioner's full cooperation. As a result, Lipps determined to leave the completion of the second job until the following Monday. Lipps reported the incident to his supervisor, Rodney Thompson. Petitioner had been previously counseled about his attitude concerning standby duty. Hicks reviewed the facts surrounding Lipps' complaint and decided to issue a written reprimand to Petitioner for making negative verbal remarks about Petitioner's duties and for failing to cooperate with his supervisor on standby duty. The disciplinary action was not for purposes of discriminating against Petitioner because of Petitioner's physical disabilities. Moreover, Hicks had reprimanded two other employees, Ed Swift and Bob Buckley for making negative verbal comments about job duties. Hicks did not know these other individuals to be suffering from any form of physical disability. In June of 1992, Petitioner applied for and was granted a leave of absence for an unspecified period. By June 2, 1992, Petitioner knew that he would need to go on extended leave beginning June 8, 1992. He failed to inform any of his supervisors that he was going on this medical leave. He did not show up for work on June 8, 1992. Hicks inquired of Petitioner on June 8, 1992, about not telling his supervisor that he was going to be on medical leave. Petitioner responded to the inquiry by indicating that he had told Scarberry, Petitioner's co-worker, of his intention to go on medical leave and that he had told a city clinic nurse that he was going on leave of absence. Hicks pointed out, correctly, that telling the nurse and Scarberry of Petitioner's intentions to take medical leave did not relieve Petitioner of the duty to directly inform a supervisor of that intention. Moreover, Scarberry had told the Petitioner that he, Scarberry, would not be at work the first day of Petitioner's medical leave, making it questionable that Scarberry would have advised a supervisor that Petitioner was hoping to be absent from work that day. Scarberry made Hicks aware that Scarberry had pointed out to Petitioner that he would not be at work on June 8, 1992. Petitioner's assertion that he wrote a note to his immediate supervisor, Miller, regarding the plan to be out on June 8, 1992, if true, is of no utility because the note was not given directly to Miller and was never indirectly received by Miller. Miller had not been at work June 5, 1992, the friday before Petitioner was missing from his job duty on June 8, 1992. Petitioner knew that Miller was not at work on June 5, 1992. As a consequence of not informing a supervisor that he was going to be on extended medical leave, Petitioner was disciplined. The action by Respondent on which Petitioner was given a written reprimand for failure to inform a supervisor that Petitioner was going to take extended medical leave did not constitute discrimination against Petitioner based upon his physical disabilities. Petitioner was allowed to take the extended medical leave. Noel Werner, a secretary in the Water and Sewer Department had also been reprimanded by Hicks for failing to follow proper procedures for obtaining authorization to take medical leave. Hicks is unaware of any physical disability that Ms. Werner may have. When Petitioner took leave in June of 1992, he believed that he would be eligible for Disability Income Replacement. However, in August 1992, Petitioner was informed that the Respondent's Risk Management Department had determined that he was ineligible because he was under the care of a licensed health counselor as opposed to an M.D. or a Ph.D. Carol Ingham, Respondent's Human Resource Director, learned of this circumstance and contacted the Assistant City Manager, Dick Lewis, and requested that Petitioner be granted an exception to the policy of not being eligible for Disability Income Replacement when using a licensed health counselor. As a result, Petitioner's request was reevaluated and he was ruled eligible for Disability Income Replacement through the policy pertaining to that status for the period August 4 through 30, 1992. Concerning his physical condition, in the spring of 1992, Petitioner was diagnosed with osteoarthritis in his knees. This meant he was disabled to do any persistent bending or kneeling, which was a requirement of his employment in the Water and Sewer Department. His condition also disabled him from doing his assigned work because his work as a water meter repairman involved walking distances of a 100 feet or more on a persistent basis and standing all day. Concerning the medical leave of absence which Petitioner took in the summer of 1992, this subject was discussed by Ingham in conversation with the city clinic nurse, Holly McLaughlin. They talked about the stress which Petitioner seemed to be experiencing and the failure to follow the policy of informing his supervisor of his intention to take medical leave. On June 15, 1992, Ms. Ingham met with Petitioner and his wife to discuss Petitioner's stress. At that time, Petitioner reported to Ms. Ingham that Petitioner's supervisor Miller had treated him badly and that Miller had also treated other employees badly. Petitioner told Ingham that Miller had called Petitioner stupid and had been abusive in conversation over the radio. No claim was made by Petitioner that Miller had made comments directed to Petitioner's physical disabilities. As a follow Ingham discussed Petitioner's remarks about Miller's conduct with a number of the Petitioner's co-workers. Ingham decided that Miller had, in fact, yelled and cursed at a number of employees he supervised, to include Petitioner. No other employee reported to Ingham that Miller had made derogatory comments in their presence concerning Petitioner's physical disabilities. Based upon Ingham's findings, Hicks determined to discipline Miller for his conduct directed toward employees whom Miller supervised. Miller received a written reprimand and was given the option of being demoted or seeking counseling through an employee assistance program. Miller opted to go to the employee assistance program. Moreover, Miller was told that if conduct toward subordinates continued that he would be subject to more severe discipline to include discharge. Miller's treatment of the employees he supervises has improved since the imposition of discipline. Petitioner returned to work in August 1992, following his leave of absence for medical purposes. At that time, he was issued a service truck which another employee had been using. Petitioner felt that he should have been issued a new truck which the Water and Sewer Department operated. The truck that Petitioner had been issued was dirty and smelly. Miller told Petitioner that the newer truck was assigned to an employee who needed the larger truck because that employee would be performing heavier work than Petitioner would be called upon to perform. Miller offered to have the truck which Petitioner had been issued cleaned up or detailed. Petitioner declined that offer. Petitioner complained about the truck that he had been assigned to a co-worker, Fred Sauls. He told Sauls that he was going to take the truck he was issued and drive it to city hall to show Ingham, the Human Resource Director. In fact, Petitioner reported the incident to Ms. Ingham. The Petitioner received a letter of reprimand on September 4, 1992, for complaining to a co-worker and Ms. Ingham about an everyday work related problem rather than following the chain of command. Prior to receiving that written reprimand, Petitioner had been specifically counseled by Hicks concerning handling everyday work related problems through Petitioner's supervisor. Those specific instructions on everyday work related problems were not countermanded by the general opportunity which Hicks had described for employees to go outside the chain of command when they did not feel that they would get satisfaction from an immediate supervisor, and the open door opportunity to consult with the Human Resource Director. In this instance, the response from Miller was adequate to meet Petitioner's needs in confronting an everyday work related problem and Petitioner had no reason to complain to Sauls or to complain to Ingham. The written reprimand given to Petitioner was not designed to discriminate against Petitioner based upon his physical disabilities. Hicks and Ingham became aware of the Petitioner's inability to perform his assigned job duties due to his physical disabilities and they looked for other duties that the Respondent might be able to perform in view of his physical disabilities. The only positions that were found for which Petitioner was otherwise qualified and physically able to perform were part-time positions that did not offer medical benefits. Upon further reflection, Ingham and Hicks offered to combine these two positions in the Respondent's Recreation Department into a single job which would allow Petitioner to continue working and to receive benefits. The combined position was at a lesser pay than the present position which he held. Petitioner decided that he would prefer to be placed in the status of Disability Income Replacement in lieu of the combined jobs. In April 1993, Petitioner accepted the status of Disability Income Replacement and has not returned to work.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations which dismisses the Petitioner's claims. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of June, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of June, 1994. APPENDIX The following discussion is given concerning the Proposed Findings of Fact of the parties: Petitioner's Facts: Paragraphs 1 through 6 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 7 through 14 are contrary to facts found. Respondent's Facts: Paragraphs 1 through 26 are subordinate to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: William A. Ramputi, Esquire Scott, Gleason & Pope, P.A. 409 Southeast Fourteenth Street Ocala, Florida 34471 David H. Spalter, Esquire Fisher & Phillips 2310 One Financial Plaza Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33394 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee FL 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Human Relations Commission Building F Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee FL 32303-4149
