The Issue The issue is whether Respondent assessed Petitioner for secure juvenile detention care for the 2007-2008 fiscal year in a manner that implements Section 985.686, Florida Statutes (2007), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 63G-1.1
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for administering the cost sharing requirements in Section 985.686 for juvenile detention care. Petitioner is a non-fiscally constrained county2 subject to the cost sharing requirements. The relevant statutory backdrop affects the findings in this proceeding. Subsection 985.686(1) requires Petitioner and Respondent to share the costs of "financial support" for "detention care" for juveniles who reside in Hillsborough County, Florida (the County), and are held in detention centers operated by Respondent. Subsection 985.686(3) requires Petitioner to pay the costs of detention care "for the period of time" prior to final court disposition (predisposition care). Respondent must pay the costs of detention care on or after final court disposition (post-disposition care). Detention care is defined in Subsection 985.686(2)(a) to mean secure detention. Secure detention is defined in Subsection 985.03(18)(a), for the purposes of Chapter 985, to include custody "prior to" adjudication or disposition as well as custody "prior to" placement.3 Detention centers are legally unavailable to circuit courts for post-disposition placement (residential placement). Post-disposition care of juveniles in detention centers is limited to juveniles who are waiting for residential placement. The statutory reference in Subsection 985.03(18)(a) to placement is construed in this proceeding to mean residential placement. Thus, secure detention means custody in a detention center for both predisposition care prior to adjudication or final court disposition, and post-disposition care after adjudication or disposition but prior to residential placement. A literal reading of Subsections 985.03(18)(a), 985.686(1), and 985.686(2)(a) may foster ambiguity, at least for a stranger to the workings of juvenile detention. If Subsection 985.686(1) requires Petitioner and Respondent to share the costs of secure detention and secure detention includes custody prior to adjudication or disposition, a literal interpretation arguably could require Respondent to share the costs of secure detention prior to adjudication or final disposition. Factual findings in this proceeding are not based on a literal interpretation of the definition of secure detention in Subsections 985.686(2)(a) and 985.03(18)(a). Rather, the findings are based on an interpretation of secure detention that is consistent with the statutory requirement in Subsection 985.686(3) for Petitioner to pay the costs of secure detention during predisposition care and for Respondent to pay the costs of secure detention during post-disposition care. The annual legislative "appropriation" for the counties' share of detention care is actually an account payable by the counties rather than an appropriation of funds. For the 2007- 2008 fiscal year,4 the legislature "appropriated" a total of $125,327,667.00 for detention care. However, only $30,860,924.00 of the total amount was actually appropriated from general revenue. The general revenue funds are appropriated for costs that Respondent must pay, including amounts for fiscally constrained counties. The Legislature identified $101,628,064.00 of the total appropriation as the counties' aggregate share of detention costs. Negative entries in the appropriation reduce the total amount to $125,327,667.00 The practical realities of juvenile detention care complicate the allocation of costs between predisposition and post-disposition care. Juveniles are not supposed to remain in detention centers very long while they wait for residential placement. However, juveniles with exceptional needs, such as mental health needs, may remain in detention centers for a longer period of time due to the limited availability of appropriate residential placement facilities. A room in a detention facility may be occupied simultaneously by juveniles in predisposition care and juveniles in post-disposition care waiting for residential placement (dual- use occupancy). Dual-use occupancy complicates the calculation of shared costs between the counties and the state. Subsection 985.686(3) requires Respondent to develop an accounts payable system to allocate the costs of secure detention for predisposition care. Respondent administers the statutory cost sharing requirements through a prospective assessment and retroactive reconciliation system. Prospective assessments for each fiscal year are based on actual costs during the previous year. Petitioner pays the prospective assessment monthly, and, at the end of each fiscal year, Respondent performs an annual reconciliation to determine whether actual costs during the current fiscal year were more or less than the prospective assessment at the beginning of the fiscal year. Sometime after the end of each fiscal year, Respondent either credits or debits Petitioner for any differences between the prospective assessment and actual costs determined in the annual reconciliation. Subsection 985.686(3) requires Petitioner to pay for the costs of secure detention in the County for the "period of time" juveniles are in predisposition care. No statute defines the phrase "period of time." Subsection 985.686(10) authorizes Respondent to adopt rules to administer Section 985.686. Rule 63G-1.004(1)(c) implicitly defines the statutory reference to a "period of time" in predisposition care to mean "service days." Rule 63G-1.004 also prescribes the methodology to be used in calculating Petitioner's share of the costs for secure detention during the period of time required for predisposition care in the County. Respondent must first identify all juveniles in predisposition care based upon usage during the preceding fiscal year. Second, Respondent must match each placement record with the corresponding identification code. Third, Respondent must calculate the "service days" in predisposition care. Finally, Respondent must divide the number of "service days" Petitioner used for predisposition care in the County by the service days used by all counties to determine the percentage of the counties' costs for predisposition care that Petitioner owes. The term "service days" is not defined by statute or rule. Respondent defines service days to mean "utilization" days. If, for example, 10 individuals occupy one detention room in a facility during any part of a day, 10 utilization days have occurred during one calendar day. Respondent uses utilization days to calculate the statutory period of time for predisposition care and post-disposition care. If the 10 utilization days in the preceding example were to include equal dual-use occupancy, Respondent would count five utilization days for predisposition care and five utilization days for post-disposition care. Petitioner disputes the utilization days that Respondent calculated. However, that dispute is the subject of a companion case identified by DOAH Case No. 07-4432 and is beyond the scope of this proceeding. Respondent determined there were 709,251 utilization days for pre and post-disposition care. The total consisted of 579,409 utilization days for the counties' predisposition care and 129,842 utilization days for post-disposition care. Respondent allocated 47,714 utilization days to Petitioner. Rule 63G-1.004(2) requires Respondent to divide the 47,714 utilization days allocated to Petitioner by the 579,409 utilization days allocated to all counties. The mathematical quotient of that calculation is .08234. The rule requires Respondent to multiply the cost of detention by 8.234 percent. The "cost of detention" means the counties' cost of detention in the amount of $101,628,064.00. The mathematical product of multiplying $101,628,064.00, by .08234 is $8,368,054.79. Respondent exercised discretion to adopt a methodology that is inconsistent with the methodology prescribed by rule, in violation of Subsection 120.68(7)(e)2. Respondent defined the cost of detention to include the total appropriation of $125,327,667.00. Respondent is legally required to pay $30,860,924.00 of the $125,327,667.00, including $6,329,328.00 allocable to fiscally constrained counties. Respondent divided the total appropriation of $125,327,667.00 by 709,251 utilization days to arrive at a per diem rate of $176.70 for all detention care. Respondent then multiplied the per diem rate by Petitioner's 47,714 utilization days and proposed a gross assessment in the amount of $8,400,165.73.5 Respondent reduced the gross assessment after adjustments and proposed a net assessment in the amount of $8,320,440.73, which Petitioner paid.6 The actual gross assessment of $8,400,165.73 exceeded the authorized gross assessment of $8,368,054.79 by $32,110.94. Any adjustments required to determine a net assessment should be made to the authorized gross assessment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order assessing Petitioner for the costs of predisposition care in the County using the methodology prescribed by rule, including costs of detention in the aggregate amount of $101,628,064.00, and crediting Petitioner for the amount of any overpayment. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of March, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of March, 2008.
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether Petitioner abandoned his position and thereby resigned his career service at the Broward Regional Juvenile Detention Center.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact: Oscar T. Brown was a career service employee at the Broward Regional Juvenile Detention Center. Mr. Brown was a DCWI and was assigned to the C- shift. On May 4, 1987, Petitioner requested annual leave for the period from June 30, 1987, through July 8, 1987. The purpose of this request was to afford Petitioner with time off. Petitioner's immediate supervisor, Margaret Ann Wilks, approved the leave request. However, the assistant superintendent, Ron Fryer, disapproved the leave request. Petitioner was notified that the leave had been disapproved prior to June 26, 1987. On June 26, 1987, Ms. Wilks asked Mr. Fryer to reconsider his decision to disapprove Petitioner's leave request. Mr. Fryer did not approve the leave request and did not advise Ms. Wilks that the leave could be taken. Petitioner elected to take leave solely on the approval offered by Ms. Wilks. Petitioner did not report to work, as scheduled, for the period he had requested leave. Petitioner did not call in during the time he had requested leave. Neither a DCS III or DCS I approved Petitioner's leave request. Such approval is required prior to annual leave being taken. The Broward Regional Juvenile Detention Center houses minors in a totally supervised environment including lockups and hourly review of detainees' security. During the period Petitioner requested leave, the facility held from 140 to 180 minors. Mr. Fryer denied Petitioner's leave request because the facility was overcrowded and due to manpower and staffing problems.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a Final Order affirming the decision that Petitioner had abandoned his position and thereby resigned from the Career Service. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 13th day of November, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of November, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Harvey Swickle, Esquire 1031 North Miami Beach Boulevard North Miami Beach, Florida 33162 Larry Kranert, Esquire District Legal Counsel 201 West Broward Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Christopher Knowles, was employed at the Broward Regional Juvenile Detention Center in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, during the period of time prior to July 19, 1981, up until February 4, 1983. On July 19, 1981, the Respondent was injured during the course of his employment when he tripped over one of the center's detainees while on the athletic field attempting to break up a fight between detainees. The Respondent received medical treatment and was placed on disability leave until August 10, 1981, when he returned to work and was given a light-duty assignment. On August 17, 1981, the Respondent was returned to a full-duty status, but he was still being treated by a physician, and until November 22, 1982, he worked irregularly and took sick leave when not working. On November 22, 1982, the Respondent told his supervisor that he had been released by his doctor to return to work, but that he did not feel that he was yet able to return to work. The Respondent at this time was required to obtain a physician's authorization for continued sick leave, or else return to work. When the Respondent did not return to work, he was advised on December 3, 1982, that he must contact his supervisor by December 10 or report to work by this date, or a recommendation would be made for termination of his employment. When the Respondent did not respond, he was sent a letter on December 21, 1982, directed to the address which had been furnished by the Respondent to the personnel office, repeating the requirement that he contact his supervisor or report to work. As a result of this letter, the Respondent went to the detention center on December 30, 1982, and repeated his contention that he was not yet able to return to work. In January of 1983 the personnel office of the detention center secured a statement dated January 17, 1983, from the Respondent's physician advising that the Respondent was able to return to work on November 22, 1982. On January 18, 1983, the Respondent was again told by letter sent certified mail, return receipt requested, that he must return to work, and he was given until January 24, 1983, to do so or, he was informed, that he would be terminated. This letter also advised the Respondent that his physician's statement had been secured stating that he had been fit for duty since November 22, 1982. The Respondent did not respond to this letter. On February 2, 1983, the Respondent was advised by letter that his employment was terminated as of February 4, 1983, due to abandonment by the Respondent. On February 4, 1983, the Respondent went to the office of his supervisor at the detention center, complaining that he did not abandon his job, and asking that his termination be reversed. This request was declined. The detention center needed an employee in the Respondent's position and could not hire someone as long as the Respondent was employed in this position. The Respondent contends that he fears that he might become reinjured if he should return to work, although he admits that his physician released him from further treatment and advised him to return to work on November 22, 1982. The Respondent also admits that he is not now under the care of a physician, and has not been examined by a doctor since November of 1982.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter an Order finding that the Respondent, Christopher Knowles abandoned his position of employment at the Broward Regional Juvenile Detention Center, and that he be discharged effective February 4, 1983. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 14 day of June, 1983 in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14 day of June, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Harold L. Braynon, Esquire 201 West Broward Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Mr. Christopher Knowles 3530 North West 18th Place Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33311 David Pingree, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Nevin Smith, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact On February 6, 1992, Respondent received Petitioner's application for a Class "D" Security Officer License. In processing the application, Respondent conducted a criminal background check on Petitioner and received his criminal history as compiled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). By letter dated July 24, 1992, Respondent informed Petitioner of its intent to deny his application for licensure based upon grounds cited in the letter. On August 17, 1992, Respondent received Petitioner's request for a formal hearing and his explanation for the various arrests cited in the denial letter. On August 14, 1992, Respondent mailed Petitioner an amended denial letter citing additional grounds for the denial of his application. Respondent asserts that it is within its discretion to deny Petitioner's application because his criminal history reflects a lack of good moral character. All other grounds for denial of licensure of Petitioner were abandoned by Respondent at the formal hearing. The following arrests are cited by Respondent as justifying its denial of licensure to Petitioner. CHARGE ONE On August 21, 1968, Petitioner was arrested on charges of aggravated assault and forgery in Dyersburg, Tennessee. In 1968, Petitioner was discharged from the Army after having served in Viet Nam. He accompanied a friend he had met in the Army to Dyersburg, Tennessee, where he became involved in an altercation with someone who tried to run him off the road while he was riding his motorcycle. The person who tried to run Petitioner off the road stopped and attempted, without success, to hit Petitioner with a tire iron. Petitioner took the tire iron away from this person and hit the person on the head with the tire iron. Petitioner was arrested for aggravated assault and placed in the county jail. At the same time, he and two companions were charged with forgery for purchasing beer with worthless bank checks. Petitioner was told that he would not be tried until after the grand jury convened, and that he would have to wait in the county jail in the interim, a period of four months. Petitioner escaped from the county jail with the help of two other inmates and made his way to Chicago, Illinois. He was subsequently arrested and returned to Tennessee after he waived extradition. Petitioner was thereafter tried and convicted of aggravated assault, forgery, and grand theft and sentenced to three years imprisonment. On January 30, 1970, Petitioner's grand larceny conviction was reduced to a misdemeanor charge of attempt to commit a felony. His three year sentence was commuted and he was granted parole and immediately released after having served eighteen months in jail. Petitioner received a pardon from the governor of Tennessee for the felony convictions resulting from the 1968 arrests. CHARGE TWO In 1973, Petitioner was arrested and convicted of drunk driving in California and placed on probation. On August 2, 1974, in Palm Springs, California, Petitioner was arrested and charged with suspicion of burglary, a violation of California Penal Code 459. His probation from the 1973 conviction was violated, and he was sentenced to sixty days in jail and given two years of probation. The charge of suspicion of burglary was reduced to trespassing. Petitioner was intoxicated and was trespassing when arrested in August 1974. Petitioner testified without contradiction that he was not attempting to steal anything. CHARGE THREE In September 1980 in Riverside, California, Petitioner was arrested and charged with possession of a device for arson. Petitioner had been threatened by a gang after he identified a gang member as having stabbed a member of another gang. When three carloads of gang members came to his place of residence to threaten him, Petitioner made a Molotov cocktail and threw it in the street to disperse the gang members and to get the attention of the police. This charge was subsequently dismissed. CHARGES FOUR AND FIVE On May 13, 1988, Petitioner was arrested in Chicago, Illinois, and charged with unlawful use of a weapon and aggravated assault. On July 26, 1988, he was charged with aggravated assault; unlawful use of a weapon/gun; unlawful use of a weapon/tear gas; unlawful use of a weapon/blackjack; and failure to register a firearm. These arrests resulted from Petitioner's attempts to reduce drugs and prostitution in his neighborhood as a pro-active vigilante. On May 13, he fired two warning shots from a .25 caliber pistol into the ground to discourage three would-be attackers. Though the assailants left, an eyewitness filed a complaint with the police which resulted in Petitioner's arrest. On July 26, 1988, Petitioner was arrested while again acting as a vigilante by the same officer who had arrested him on May 13. He had on his person at the time of his arrest an unregistered firearm, a blackjack, and mace. These charges were dismissed when the arresting officer failed to appear in court. CHARGE SIX Petitioner heard threats against himself and his family because of his efforts to cleanup his neighborhood. On February 3, 1989, Petitioner went to a bar which the people who had been threatening him frequented. He confronted these persons and fired four shots from a .357 firearm into the ceiling. Petitioner was charged with criminal damage to property, reckless conduct, and unlawful use of a weapon. The charge of criminal damage to property was dismissed, but he was found guilty on the other two charges. Petitioner was given a conditional discharge and ordered to pay $264.00. The conditional discharge was revoked in June 1990. CHARGE SEVEN On May 18, 1989, Petitioner was arrested in Chicago on a traffic violation and charged with resisting or eluding an officer. Petitioner was intoxicated and was driving around setting off firecrackers in the street when the police attempted to pull him over. Because he could not find a place to stop, he circled the block a few times before stopping the car. He was adjudicated guilty and had his driver's license revoked for three years. REHABILITATION Petitioner is an alcoholic, and his arrests can be attributable, in part, to the influence of alcohol. Petitioner has been an active participant in the Miami, Florida, Veterans Affairs (VA) Medical Center Substance Abuse Clinic since October 11, 1989, and has consistently abstained from alcohol since September 7, 1989. Since 1989, Petitioner has lived and worked in Florida. Petitioner has no criminal record since moving to Florida in 1989 and enrolling in the VA substance abuse program. Petitioner has worked for Kent Security since January of 1991, and his employer considers Petitioner to be an outstanding employee.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which grants Petitioner's application for licensure as a Class D Security Officer. DONE AND ORDERED this 3rd day of February, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of February, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Henri C. Cawthon, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Division of Licensing The Capitol MS 4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Mr. James J. Killacky #206 1660 Northeast 150th Street North Miami, Florida 33181 Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater, General Counsel The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated Sections 943.1395(6) and (7), Florida Statutes (1995), 1/ and Florida Administrative Code Rules 11B-27.0011(4)(a) and (b), 2/ by failing to maintain the qualifications established in Sections 943.13(4) or (7); and, if so, what, if any, penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for certifying and regulating law enforcement officers. Respondent is certified as a law enforcement officer pursuant to Correctional Certificate 92776 and is employed as a correctional officer by the Florida Department of Corrections. Respondent married Ms. Minnie Williams on May 6, 1988, in Lake City, Florida. They had one child, Blake, in 1990. They separated in September, 1993, and were divorced in November, 1994. The court awarded custody of the child to Respondent. In 1988, Respondent was in the Navy, stationed aboard the USS Saratoga, and based in Virginia. After Respondent and Ms. Williams were married, Respondent returned to Virginia. Ms. Williams remained in Lake City for several months before moving to Virginia to live with Respondent. Approximately one year after the marriage, problems developed in the marriage. Ms. Williams did not assist in the daily needs of the household, was unable to stay in school, and was not able to keep a job. Respondent's efforts to solve the marital problems were unsuccessful. His attempts at counseling failed to improve communications between the couple. In late 1989, Respondent informed Ms. Williams that the marriage was not going to work. He told Ms. Williams that he thought they should divorce. Ms. Williams returned to her mother's home in Lake City. Respondent's ship was transferred to Mayport, Florida in 1990. Ms. Williams did not want a divorce and did not want to separate from Respondent. Sometime in 1990, Respondent left the Navy and obtained employment with the Department of Corrections. Between 1990 and 1993, the couple maintained the marriage in an effort to provide a home for their child. Whenever Respondent attempted to discuss divorce, it resulted in a heated argument. Ms. Williams frequently threatened to "ruin" Respondent. The Wrench On March 9, 1993, Respondent counseled a co-worker who was distraught over her husband's affair. Respondent learned that the woman with whom the husband was having an affair was Respondent's wife. Respondent went home to pack his clothes and leave home. An argument ensued regarding Ms. William's infidelity. Respondent packed some of his personal belongings and left home. At approximately 11:00 p.m. on the same day, Respondent returned home for more of his personal belongings. Respondent was still very angry. Respondent and Ms. Williams became involved in another argument. During the argument, Respondent continued to pack his things. He retrieved a large wrench from his closet. Respondent was walking down the hallway leading from the bedroom to the front door. Respondent had the wrench in one hand and other personal belongings in the other hand. Respondent told Ms. Williams that this time he was leaving for good. It was approximately 12:10 a.m. on March 10. Ms. Williams told Respondent that she would get him fired and get custody of their child. Respondent turned abruptly around to face Ms. Williams. Ms. Williams was startled and frightened. She ran into the bedroom from the hallway where she scraped her leg on a jagged corner of the bed, fell, and struck her right hand on the open sliding glass door of the bedroom. Respondent never struck Ms. Williams in any way, with his hands, the wrench, or otherwise. The injuries to Ms. Williams were minor. Respondent left. Ms. Williams spent the night in her car. The next day she reported the incident to the Columbia County Sheriff's Office (the "Sheriff"). Ms. Williams reported to the investigating officer that Respondent beat her with his hands and a wrench for about 15 minutes. The injuries observed by the investigating officer were not consistent with such a beating. The injuries to Ms. Williams were consistent with a trip and fall. Ms. Williams had a three inch cut on her left leg at approximately the height of the corner of the bed. She also had a bruise on her right hand and some swelling. Ms. Williams did not seek medical treatment for her injuries. On March 16, 1993, the state attorney charged Respondent with misdemeanor battery. On April 5, 1993, Respondent entered into a Misdemeanor Intervention Agreement scheduled for six months. The agreement was terminated early on September 3, 1993. Respondent established a separate residence. Respondent had no further relations with Ms. Williams except those necessary for the care of their child. The Lip Respondent resided with his girlfriend and shared her car. Ms. Williams used Respondent's truck to commute to work. On March 27, 1994, Respondent went to Ms. Williams house to pick up clothes and diapers for his son. Ms. Williams routinely failed to deliver those items when she dropped off their child to Respondent. Ms. Williams was not home, and Respondent waited for her. When Ms. Williams arrived in Respondent's truck, the truck was driven by Ms. Williams' boyfriend. Respondent was angered that Ms. Williams' boyfriend was driving Respondent's truck. Ms. Williams and her boyfriend attempted to turn the truck around and leave. Respondent ran behind the truck so that the vehicle could not be turned around. Ms. Williams and her boyfriend were angry that Respondent blocked their exit. Ms. Williams and her boyfriend got out of the truck. The boyfriend and Respondent engaged in a physical altercation. During the altercation, Ms. Williams attacked Respondent. She hit and kicked him and jumped on his back. Either Respondent or the boyfriend inadvertently struck Ms. Williams in her lip. She went to the Lake City Medical Center for medical treatment. At the Medical Center, Ms. Williams reported the incident to the Sheriff. Her injuries were minor. On April 6, 1994, the state attorney charged Respondent with misdemeanor battery. He entered a plea of nolo contendere. The court withheld adjudication and placed Respondent on supervised probation for one year. On May 27, 1994, the supervised probation was converted to unsupervised probation with the provision that Respondent was not to contact Ms. Williams. The Window On April 4, 1994, Ms. Williams drove to Respondent's house to pick up their child. Respondent's girlfriend and mother were inside the house with him. Respondent went outside the house to the car. Ms. Williams got out of the car. She became belligerent and verbally abusive toward Respondent. Respondent told Ms. Williams to leave. Ms. Williams backed away from Respondent, struck the car window with her posterior, and the window broke. Ms. Williams became angrier. She threatened to have Respondent "messed up." Ms. Williams left with her child and went to her aunt's house. She telephoned the Sheriff and filed a complaint. On April 25, 1994, the state attorney charged Respondent with criminal mischief. Respondent determined that the criminal charges would be dropped if he paid for the window. Respondent gave Ms. Williams a money order for $159. On May 25, 1994, the state attorney filed a nolle prosequi declining to prosecute Respondent. In November, 1994, Respondent obtained custody of the only child of the marriage with Ms. Williams. Respondent has retained custody of the child. The Knife On February 1, 1995, Ms. Williams went to Respondent's house to deliver some clothes for their son. They went into the kitchen. Ms. Williams asked about reconciliation. Respondent stated that he wanted nothing to do with Ms. Williams. She became angry. She told him that she was going to "fix him." Respondent told Ms. Williams to leave, and she did. On February 2, 1995, Ms. Williams telephoned the Sheriff. She claimed Respondent had threatened her with a knife and beaten her for 15 to 30 minutes when she was at his home the previous day. Respondent did not batter Ms. Williams. He did not threaten her with a dangerous weapon. The investigating officer observed no injuries on Ms. Williams. She did not seek medical treatment for the alleged injuries even though she knew she was pregnant at the time with her boyfriend's child. A neighbor observed Ms. Williams leaving Respondent's home on February 1, 1995. She had no observable injuries and was gesturing to Respondent as she left. The state attorney charged Respondent with two misdemeanors, battery and exhibiting a dangerous weapon. The court found respondent not guilty of the latter offense but guilty of the former. The court sentenced Respondent to one year of unsupervised probation with the special condition that there be no contact with Ms. Williams. The Handgun On February 10, 1995, Respondent and Ms. Williams were driving in separate cars near the Gateway Plaza. Ms. Williams filed a complaint with the Sheriff's Office. She alleged that Respondent drove beside her and pointed a handgun at her. The state attorney charged Respondent with improper exhibition of a dangerous weapon. On October 3, 1995, the court found Respondent not guilty of the offense. Respondent did not exhibit a dangerous weapon. Paternity In 1995, Ms. Williams became pregnant with the child of her boyfriend. Ms. Williams charged Respondent with paternity. Paternity tests proved that Respondent was not the father of the child. Respondent had not had sex with Ms. Williams since 1993. Other Matters After their divorce, Ms. Williams repeatedly threatened Respondent by stating that she would get him fired and get custody of their child. She filed approximately 20 complaints against Respondent with the Sheriff's Office. She also contacted the former Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services to report Respondent for child abuse. Respondent did not report the criminal actions filed by Ms. Williams to his employer and received a written reprimand for not reporting the criminal matters. Respondent is still employed by the Department of Corrections.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent not guilty of violating Sections 943.1395(6) and (7) and Rules 11B-27.0011(4)(a) and (b) and dismissing the Administrative Complaint. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of June, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 1997.
The Issue Should Petitioner impose discipline on Respondent in association with his correctional certificate?
Findings Of Fact Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on October 29, 1997, and was issued correctional certificate No. 175702. At times relevant to the inquiry Respondent was employed at the Gadsden Correctional Facility as a Senior Correctional Officer. Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) ran Gadsden Correctional Facility during the period in question. On February 26, 20004, on a medical enrollment worksheet for insurance provided by CCA, Respondent wrote in the name Tamara S. Ross and identified Tamara Ross as his wife. Similarly, on a dental/disability worksheet for insurance executed on the same date, Respondent wrote the name Tamara S. Ross, in a block within the form which was intended for use in identifying the applicant's spouse. In both insurance plans Respondent, by executing the applications, had added Tamara S. Ross to the coverage. When placing his signature on the application forms to add Tamara S. Ross to the coverage he confirmed, consistent with each form, "I am also certifying that all of the information, including dependent information, that I have provided on this form is accurate." At the time the applications were made requesting that Tamara S. Ross be added for medical and dental/disability coverage as Respondent's wife, the person identified as Tamara S. Ross was not the wife of Respondent. At an earlier time she had identified herself as Tamara Moore. In a document found within Respondent's personnel file maintained by his employer CCA, a reference is made to "Tamara" who is described as "my fiancée." On November 11, 2004, Respondent resigned his position as Senior Correctional Officer at the Gadsden Correctional Facility.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered finding violations pertaining to Sections 838.022 and 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes (2003), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(a), while dismissing the part of the case referring to Section 943.1395(6), Florida Statutes (2003), and suspending the correctional certificate held by Respondent for 30 days. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of August, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of August, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Linton B. Eason, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Joe L. Ross, III Michael Crews, Program Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Teresa D. Mejico, was certified as a correctional officer by petitioner, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, on February 17, 1988, and issued certificate number 03-87-502-02. At approximately 2:45 a.m., on October 3, 1988, respondent, while employed as a correctional officer at the Broward Correctional Institute, was observed by her supervisor leaning on her desk in the officer's station at Dormitory H-4. Sitting in a chair at respondent's side was Inmate Deronda Lemmonds, who was observed holding respondent's right arm, and kissing, licking and nuzzling it, while her right hand was between respondent's legs in the area of her crotch. Respondent was immediately relieved of duty, and later that day was discharged from her employment at Broward Correctional Institute for her failure to comply with Florida Department of Corrections Rule 33-4.002(28), Florida Administrative Code. That rule provides: Employees shall maintain a professional relationship with all persons in the custody or under supervision of the Department, and their immediate family or visitors. No personal or business relationships are permitted. Marriage between employees and inmates is prohibited. That respondent was fully aware of the foregoing rule, and the standard of conduct it established, cannot be gainsaid for she acknowledged such at hearing. Notwithstanding such knowledge, however, respondent persisted in fostering the personal relationship which existed between her and Inmate Lemmonds despite denials to her superintendent that any such relationship existed and counseling from her superintendent to avoid any such relationships. Following the termination of her employment at Broward Correctional Institute, respondent maintained contact with Inmate Lemmonds through the mail and by telephone, and variously expressed her affection and love for the inmate. On one occasion, she mailed the inmate 20-25 photographs of herself, including some photographs that captured respondent in partially nude and suggestive poses. In all, the proof demonstrated that respondent was romantically involved with Inmate Lemmonds while she was employed at Broward Correctional Institute, and continued to be so involved as of the date of hearing. It further demonstrated that she was untruthful with her superintendent, failed to abide the rules of conduct for correctional officers, and neglected her duty to guard Dormitory H-4 while engaged in a liaison with an inmate under her charge.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered revoking respondent' s certification. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 24th day of May 1990. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 1990. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-6410 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: 1. Adopted in paragraph 1. 2-4. Adopted in paragraph 4. 5-9. Not material or not necessary to result reached. 10-14. Adopted in paragraph 5. Adopted in paragraph 2. Adopted in paragraph 3. COPIES FURNISHED: Elsa Lopez Whitehurst Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Teresa D. Mejico 7502 S.W. 5th Street North Lauderdale, Florida 33068 Jeffrey Long, Director Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James T. Moore Commissioner Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Department of Juvenile Justice (Respondent) properly assessed secure juvenile detention center costs charged to Hillsborough County, Florida (Petitioner), pursuant to Section 985.686, Florida Statutes (2009).
Findings Of Fact This dispute involves costs charged to the Petitioner for juveniles residing in Hillsborough County and detained in centers operated by the Respondent during the 2007-2008 fiscal year. The Petitioner is required by statute to pay the cost of "pre-disposition" secure detention for such juveniles. The Respondent is required by statute to pay the cost of "post- disposition" secure detention for such juveniles. The significance of "disposition" is not relevant to this proceeding. The Respondent also pays the cost for secure detention for juveniles residing in "fiscally constrained counties" and for juveniles with residence addresses outside the State of Florida. Responsible counties are prospectively assessed for projected costs in advance of each fiscal year, based on actual experience in the preceding fiscal year. By statute, the Respondent is required to determine on a quarterly basis whether the funds being remitted by counties are sufficient to meet their obligations under the statute. Counties may raise objections to the quarterly report, but the statute prohibits any adjustments on the basis of the quarterly report. The Respondent is also required by statute to reconcile differences between estimated costs and actual costs at the end of the state fiscal year. The statute provides that adjustments cannot be made until the annual reconciliation occurs. By administrative rule, an annual reconciliation statement must be issued on or before January 31 of each year reflecting the estimated and actual costs applicable for the preceding fiscal year. On January 30, 2009, the Respondent issued an annual reconciliation to the Petitioner that assigned 37,528 pre- disposition utilization days to the Petitioner and stated that the Petitioner was due a credit of $460,039.83. The Respondent issued an invoice reflecting the stated credit. On February 24, 2009, the Respondent issued a second annual reconciliation to the Petitioner that increased the Petitioner's assigned pre-disposition utilization days to 37,549 and decreased the credit to $455,579.28. The Respondent issued an invoice reflecting the revised credit. On March 18, 2009, the Petitioner directed a letter to the Respondent requesting that the two reconciliations be clarified. The Respondent did not respond to the request. On May 1, 2009, the Petitioner directed a letter to the Respondent disputing a portion of the assigned utilization days. The Respondent did not respond at that time, but on May 14, 2009, the Respondent issued a third annual reconciliation to the Petitioner that increased the Petitioner's assigned pre-disposition utilization days to 37,661 and decreased the credit to $431,789.64. On June 4, 2009, the Respondent issued a fourth annual reconciliation to the Petitioner that decreased the Petitioner's assigned pre-disposition utilization days to 34,163 and decreased the credit to $321,677.91. On July 17, 2009, the Respondent replied to the Petitioner's letter of May 1, 2009 (wherein the Petitioner disputed a portion of the assigned utilization days), by advising the Petitioner to file an administrative challenge to the allocation. On August 7, 2009, the Petitioner issued a letter to the Respondent objecting to the assigned pre-disposition utilization days, as well as the calculation of the per diem rate. The Respondent did not respond to the letter. Neither party offered evidence at the hearing related to the accuracy of allocated utilization days or the per diem rate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent issue a final order adopting the annual reconciliation dated January 30, 2009. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of December, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of December, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen M. Todd, Esquire Hillsborough County Attorney’s Office Post Office Box 1110 Tampa, Florida 33601 Brian Berkowitz, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building, Room 312V 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Frank Peterman, Jr., Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Jennifer Parker, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Petitioner Ronald Winkfield was employed as a detention care worker with the Hillsborough Regional Juvenile Detention Center in February of 1982, and was assigned to work the midnight to 8:00 A.M. shift. On or about June 8, 1981, Mr. Winkfield was involved in an automobile accident, received injuries and returned to work on or about August 17, 1981. He claims that he still suffers severe headaches as a result of the accident and that his work with delinquents caused him mental strain. The logs of the Detention Center illustrate that Mr. Winkfield missed four days of work during the first week of February, and called in sick on the first two of those four days. On February 7, 8, 9 and 10, 1982, Mr. Winkfield again did not appear for duty and did not call in sick on any of those days. Employees of the Detention Center working the midnight to 8:00 A.M. shift were instructed to call in before 6:00 P.M. if they were not going to report for work that night. Petitioner admits that he did not report for work on February 7, 8, 9 or 10, 1982, and that he did not call in on those dates to report his absence. He explains that he did not call in because an employee told him during the first week of February that she would not accept his calls unless he brought in a doctor's certificate stating that he was unable to work. About 11:45 P.M. on February 10, 1982, Mr. Winkfield was seen at a doughnut shop getting out of a Tampa Tribune truck. Petitioner was employed by the Tampa Tribune to deliver papers in February of 1982. A week or two before February 7, 1982, a personnel officer discussed with Mr. Winkfield the procedure for obtaining time off without pay. Mr. Winkfield never formally applied for leave without pay. By letter dated February 12, 1982, the Assistant Supervisor of the Hillsborough Regional Juvenile Detention Center advised Mr. Winkfield that he was deemed to have abandoned his position and to have resigned from the Career Service because of his failure to report to work for four consecutive workdays without authorized leave.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered concluding that petitioner Ronald Winkfield has abandoned his position of employment and resigned from the Career Service. Respectfully submitted and entered this 7th day of October, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of October, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Ronald Winkfield 5914 82nd Street Tampa, Florida 33619 Amelia M. Park, Esquire District VI Legal Counsel Department of HRS 4000 West Buffalo Avenue Tampa, Florida 33614 David Pingree, Secretary Department of HRS 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Nevin G. Smith, Secretary Department of Administration Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent's certification should be revoked because he possessed cannabis?
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the holder of certificate number 14-84-502-09, issued by Petitioner on November , 1984. In September, 1984, Respondent, Mr. Reames, Mr. Eadie and Ms. Debbie Rutledge were enrolled in a correctional officer training class offered by the Florida Department of Corrections at the Correctional Training Institute. One late afternoon in September, 1984, the training class took a break and some of the members of the class walked outside. During the break, Mr. Reames and Mr. Eadie were standing with a group of other class members. Mr. Frasier and Ms. Rutledge were standing facing each other 20 to 30 yards from the group. Mr. Reames and Mr. Eadie saw Ms. Rutledge hand Mr. Frasier a clear plastic "baggie" of indeterminate size containing an indeterminate amount of a brown-green or dark substance. Mr. Frasier held the baggie up, placed a lit lighter behind the bag, and examined the bag's contents. Mr. Frasier placed the lighter in his pocket and stuffed the baggie inside the front of his shirt and pants. Mr. Frasier then handed Ms. Rutledge a roll of bill(s). The number of bills or the denomination of the bill(s) is unknown. At the conclusion of this exchange, Mr. Frasier and Ms. Rutledge walked away from each other.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner issue a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Respondent. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of May, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. JOSE A. DIEZ-ARGUELLES Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of May, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-3963 The Petitioner submitted proposed findings of fact which are addressed below. Paragraph numbers in the Recommended Order are referred to as "RO ." Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Petitioner's Paragraph Ruling and Recommended Order Paragraph Number Accepted. RO1 Accepted. RO2 Irrelevant Accepted. RO2 Accepted. RO3 Accepted. RO3 Accepted. RO3 First sentence, Accepted. RO4. Second sentence, Rejected. The exact size of the bag cannot be determined from the evidence presented in this case. Rejected. The exact color of the substance and the amount of the substance cannot be determined from the evidence presented in this case. 1O. First two sentences Accepted. RO4. Rest of paragraph is supported by the weight of the evidence, but do not serve to establish what the substance was. This behavior could also help identify other substances. Accepted. RO4 Accepted. RO4 13-16 Rejected as Recitation of Testimony 17-19 Irrelevant 20 Supported by the weight of the evidence, but Mr. Ball also testified that, given the facts of this case, the substance could be anything. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Rodney W. Smith, Esquire Post Office Box 628 Alachua, Florida 32615 Rod Caswell, Director Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Robert R. Dempsey Executive Director Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Janet E. Ferris General Counsel Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
