Findings Of Fact Petitioner herein is the State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales Condominiums and Mobile Homes. One Respondent in this matter is Tanwin Corporation (hereinafter "Tanwin") the developer of two residential condominiums known as Vista Del Lago Condominium I and Vista Del Lago Condominium II, located in West Palm Beach, Florida. The other Respondent is Vista Del Lago Condominium Association, Inc. (hereinafter "Association"), the condominium association for Vista Del Lago Condominiums I and II. Transition from developer control of the Association has not occurred, and at all times pertinent hereto, Respondent Tanwin has in fact controlled the operation of the Respondent Association. The Declaration of Condominium for Vista Del Lago Condominium I (hereinafter "Condo I") was recorded in the public records on December 12, 1980. The Declaration of Condominium for Vista Del Lago Condominium II (hereinafter "Condo II") was recorded in the public records on March 11, 1982. Condo I contains 16 units; and Condo II contains 18 units. Herbert and Judith Tannenbaum are the President and Secretary, respectively, of both Tanwin and the Association and are members of the Association's Board of Directors. The developer-controlled Association failed to provide a proposed budget of common expenses for Condo I for the fiscal year 1982. The developer-controlled Association failed to provide a proposed budget of common expenses for Condo I and Condo II for 1983 until the unit owner meeting in March or April of 1983. The budget provided at that time contained no provision for reserves. Although the document alleged to be the 1983 proposed budget admitted in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 17 does contain an allocation for reserves, Petitioner's Exhibits numbered 17 is not the 1983 budget disseminated to unit owners at the annual meeting in 1983. In addition, the 1983 budget was received by the unit owners at the meeting at which the proposed budget was to be considered and not prior to the budget meeting. Statutory reserves were not waived during the period December, 1980 through December, 1983. The "start-up" budgets contained as exhibits to the Declarations of Condominium indicate that reserves were to be collected from unit owners at the rate of $15 per month per unit at least during the first year commencing December of 1980 with the first closing. Hence, reserves were not waived December, 1980 through December, 1981. From November, 1981 through December, 1983, no vote to waive reserves was taken by the unit owners. Although reserves were discussed at the 1983 meeting, no vote was taken during the period in question including 1983, to waive reserves. The developer as owner of unsold units; has failed to pay to the Association monthly maintenance for common expenses during the period December, 1980 through December, 1983. The developer Tanwin has, in the nature of an affirmative defense, alleged the existence of a guarantee of common expenses pursuant to Section 718.116(8), Florida Statutes, which purportedly ran from the inception of the condominiums to date. Accordingly, the initial issue for resolution is whether the developer pursuant to statute guaranteed common expenses. Section 718.116(8)(b) provides that a developer may be excused from payment of common expenses pertaining to developer-owned units for that period of time during which he has guaranteed to each purchaser in the declaration of condominium, purchase contract or prospectus, or by an agreement between the developer and a majority of unit owners other than the developer, that their assessments for common expenses would not increase over a stated dollar amount during the guarantee period and the developer agrees to pay any amount necessary for common expenses not produced by the assessments at the guaranteed level receivable from other unit owners, or "shortfall". Actual purchase agreements were admitted in evidence. Respondents seek to label certain unambiguous language in the purchase contracts as a guarantee. This language, uniform throughout all those contracts as well as the form purchase contract filed with Petitioner except that of Phillip May, provides as follows: 9. UNIT ASSESSMENTS. The Budget included in the Offering Circular sets forth Seller's best estimation of the contemplated expenses for operating and maintaining the Condominium during its initial year. Purchaser's monthly assessment under the aforementioned Budget is in the amount of $109.00. Until Closing of Title, Seller has the right (without affecting Purchaser's obligation to purchase in accordance with the provisions hereof, to modify the estimated Budget and assessments periodically if then current cost figures indicate that an updating of estimates is appropriate). [Emphasis added]. That portion of the purchase agreement set forth above does not constitute a guarantee. Instead, the purchase agreement simply includes a best estimation of expenses for the initial year. It does not govern assessments after the expiration of one year, and even as to the initial year, the language in the contract sets forth only a "best estimation" and not a guarantee that the assessments would not increase during the "guarantee period." Phillip May's purchase agreement reflects that he purchased his unit in August of 1983; after condominium complaints had been filed by the unit owners with the Florida Division of Land Sales Condominiums and Mobile Homes. His purchase agreement has been altered from the purchase agreement of earlier purchasers in that his purchase agreement expressly, by footnote contains a one- year guarantee running from closing. The guarantee contained in his purchase agreement was presented by the developer without any request from Mr. May for the inclusion of a guarantee in his purchase agreement. The guarantee language in this purchase agreement is useful for the purpose of comparing the language with those portions of the pre-complaint contracts which Respondents assert contain or constitute a guarantee. Similarly it is determined that no guarantee of common expenses exists in the Declarations of Condominium for Condo I and II or in the prospectus for Condo II. While Respondents seek to assert the existence of a guarantee in those documents, the portions of those unambiguous documents which according to Respondents contain a guarantee, have no relation to a guarantee or do not guarantee that the assessments for common expenses would not increase. Respondent Tanwin also seeks to prove the existence of an oral guarantee which was allegedly communicated to purchasers at the closing of their particular condominium units. However, purchasers were told by Herbert or Judith Tannenbaum only that assessments should remain in the amount of $109 per month per unit unless there existed insufficient funds in the Association to pay bills. This is the antithesis of a guarantee. During a guarantee period the developer in exchange for an exemption from payment of assessments on developer- owned units agrees to pay any deficits incurred by the condominium association. Accordingly, no guarantee was conveyed at the closing of condominium units. Further Respondent Tanwin's additional contention that an oral guarantee arose when the condominiums came into existence is plainly contradicted by the express language throughout the condominium documents and purchase agreements that there exist no oral representations and that no reliance can be placed on any oral representations outside the written agreements. Further, prior to December, 1983, no reference was ever made by the developer either inside or outside of unit owner meetings as to the existence of the alleged guarantee. Moreover, a comparison between on the one hand, the 1981 and 1982 financial statements prepared in March of 1983, and on the other hand, the 1983 financial statements, clearly reveals that even the accountant for Tanwin was unaware of the existence of a guarantee during the period in question. While the 1983 statements, prepared in 1984 after unit owners filed complaints with Petitioner contain references to a developer guarantee, the 1981 and 1982 statements fail to mention a guarantee. Instead, included in the 1981 and 1982 statements of the Association are references under the current liabilities portion of the balance sheets for those years, to a "Due to Tanwin Corporation" liability in the amounts of $2,138 for 1981 and $2,006 for 1982. Petitioner through Ronald DiCrescenzo, the C.P.A. for Tanwin, established that at a minimum, the $2,006 figure reflected in the 1982 balance sheet was in fact reimbursed to Tanwin. Section 7D-18.05(1),(c), Florida Administrative Code, entitled "Budgets" and effective on July 22, 1980, was officially recognized prior to the final hearing in this cause. That section requires each condominium filing to include an estimated operating budget which contains "[a] statement of any guarantee of assessments or other election and obligation of the developer pursuant to Section 718.116(8); Florida Statutes." The estimated operating budgets for Condo I and Condo II do not include a statement of any guarantee of assessments or other election or obligation of the developer. The testimony of Herbert Tannenbaum with regard to an oral (or written) guarantee is not credible. He first testified that an oral guarantee was communicated to purchasers at the closing of each unit. In contrast, Tannenbaum also testified that the first discussion he had regarding a guarantee occurred with his attorney after the filing of the Notice to Show Cause in this action. Tannenbaum further testified that he did not understand what a guarantee was until after this case had begun and was unaware of the existence of any guarantee prior to consulting with his attorney in regard to this case. Moreover, Ronald DiCrescenzo, the C.P.A. for Tanwin testified that it was Tannenbaum who informed DiCrescenzo of the existence of a guarantee but DiCrescenzo was unable or unwilling to specify the date on which this communication occurred. Respondent Tanwin also seeks to establish the existence of a guarantee through Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 5 which is a document signed by less than the majority of unit owners even including Tannenbaum and his son, and signed on an unknown date during 1984. The document provides: The undersigned Unit Owners at the Vista Del Lago Condominium do not wish to give up the benefits of the developer's continuing guarantee which has been in effect since the inception of the condominium and agreed to by a majority of unit owners and whereby the developer has continuously guaranteed a maintenance level of no more than $109.00 per month per unit, until control of the condominium affairs is turned over to the unit owners in accordance with Florida's Condominium law. According to Respondent Tanwin, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 5 constitutes a memorandum signed by unit owners evidencing their belief that a continuous guarantee of the developer has been in effect. First, however, this document was never admitted into evidence for that purpose; rather the document was admitted only to establish the fact that a unit owner had signed the document. Second, this document, unlike the purchase agreements or other condominium documents is ambiguous and is not probative of the existence of a guarantee. Instead, the evidence is overwhelming that the document was prepared by the developer in the course of this litigation for use in this litigation. Moreover, unit owner testimony is clear regarding what Mr. and Mrs. Tannenbaum disclosed to unit owners as the purpose for the document when soliciting their signatures, to- wit: that the document was a petition evidencing the unit owners' desire that their monthly maintenance payments not be increased and that prior confusion as to whether reserves had been waived needed resolution. Respondent Tanwin did pay assessments on some developer-owned units during the period December, 1980 through December, 1983, a fact which is inconsistent with its position that a guarantee existed. Noteworthy is the statement by Ronald DiCrescenzo, the C.P.A. for Tanwin, in his August 16, 1983, letter to Herbert Tannenbaum wherein it is stated: "It is my understanding that you are doing the following: . . .[Playing maintenance assessments on units completed but not sold." It is inconceivable that a developer during a "guarantee period" would pay assessments on some developer units as the purpose of the statutory guarantee is to exempt the developer from such assessments. The assessments for common expenses of unit owners other than the developer have increased during the purported guarantee period. At least some, if not all, unit owners paid monthly assessments of $128 - $130 for at least half of 1984. This fact is probative of the issue of whether a guarantee existed because unit owner assessments must remain constant during a guarantee period. At the Spring 1984 meeting chaired by Mr. Tannenbaum a vote was taken for the first time as to whether reserves should be waived. Although only 21 owners were present in person or by proxy; the vote was tabulated as 12 in favor and 12 opposed. Mr. Tannenbaum, therefore, announced an increase in monthly maintenance payments to fund reserves. Thereafter owners began paying an increased assessment. The fact that the developer-controlled Association collected increased assessments from unit owners during 1984, and had up to the time of the final hearing in this cause made no effort to redistribute those funds suggests that the developer-controlled Association and the developer considered themselves to be under no obligation to keep maintenance assessments at a constant level. There was no guarantee of assessments for common expenses by Tanwin from December, 1980, through at least December, 1983. Since there was no guarantee during the time period in question, Respondent Tanwin is liable to the Respondent Association for the amount of monthly assessments for common expenses on all developer-owned units for which monthly assessments have not been paid. In conjunction with the determination that Tanwin owes money to the Association (and not vice versa), Respondent Tanwin attempted to obtain an offset by claiming the benefit of a management contract between either Tannenbaum or Tanwin and the Association. No such management contract exists, either written or oral. Although a management contract is mentioned in one of the condominium documents there is no indication that one ever came into being, and no written contract was even offered in evidence. Likewise, no evidence was offered to show the terms of any oral contract; rather, Tannenbaum admitted that he may never have told any of the unit owners that there was a management contract. Tannenbaum's testimony is consistent with the fact that no budget or financial statement reflects any expense to the Association for a management contract with anyone. Likewise, the "budget" contained within Condo II's documents recorded on March 11, 1982, specifically states that any management fee expense was not applicable. Lastly, Tannenbaum's testimony regarding the existence of a management contract is contrary to the statement signed by him on February 10, 1981, which specifically advised Petitioner that the Association did not employ professional management. To the extent that Respondent Tanwin attempted to establish some quantum meruit basis for its claim of an offset, it is specifically found that no basis for any payment has been proven for the following reasons: Tannenbaum had no prior experience in managing a condominium, which is buttressed by the number of violations of the condominium laws determined herein; Tannenbaum does not know what condominium managers earn; no delineation was made as to specific duties performed by Tannenbaum on behalf of the Association as opposed to those duties performed by Tannenbaum on behalf of Respondent Tanwin; since there was no testimony as to duties performed for the Association, there was necessarily no testimony as to what duties were performed on behalf of the Association in Tannenbaum's capacity as President of the Association and member of the Association's Board of Directors as opposed to duties allegedly performed as a "manager." Tannenbaum's testimony as to the value of his "services" ranged from $10,000 to $15,000 a year to a lump sum of $60,000; it is interesting to note that the value of his services alone some years exceeded the Association's annual budget. Respondent Tanwin has failed to prove entitlement to an offset amount, either pursuant to contract or based upon quantum meruit. The financial statements of the Association--including balance sheets, statements of position, and statements of receipts and expenditures--for 1980-81 and for 1982 reveal consolidation of the records for Condo I and Condo II in these statements. Additionally, DiCrescenzo admitted that separate accounting records were not maintained for each condominium and Herbert Tannenbaum also admitted to maintaining consolidated records. Accordingly, the developer- controlled Association failed to maintain separate accounting records for each condominium it manages. The By-Laws of the Association provide: SECTION. 7. Annual Audit. An audit of the accounts of the Corporation shall be made annually by a Certified Public Accountant - and a copy of the Report shall be furnished to each member not later than April 1st of the year following the year in which the Report was made. The financial statement for 1981 bears the completion date of February 9, 1983. The 1982 financial statement contains a completion date of March 1, 1983. Both the 1981 and the 1982 statements were delivered to the unit owners in March or April, 1983. Accordingly, Respondents failed to provide the 1981 financial report of actual receipts and expenditures in compliance with the Association's By-Laws. As set forth hereinabove, statutory reserves were not waived during the period of December, 1980 through December, 1983. Being a common expense, reserves must be fully funded unless waived annually. In the instant case, Respondents, rather than arguing that reserves had in fact been fully funded, sought to prove that reserves had been waived during the years in question. The fact that reserves were not fully funded is established by reviewing the financial statements. In accordance with the start-up budgets, reserves were initially established at the level of $15.00 per unit per month. Therefore, during 1981, for Condo I containing sixteen units, the Association's reserve account should contain 16 multiplied by $15.00 per month multiplied by 12 months, or $2,880. Since the Declaration of Condominium for Condo II was not recorded until March 11, 1982, assessments for common expenses including allocations to reserves, were not collected from Condo II during 1981. Therefore, the balance in the reserve account as reflected in the balance sheet for the year 1981 should be no less than $2,880. The actual balance reflected in this account is $2,445. Both Tannenbaum and DiCrescenzo testified that most of the balance in that account was composed of purchaser contributions from the closing of each condominium unit "equivalent to 2 months maintenance to be placed in a special reserve fund" as called for in the purchase contracts. Tannenbaum further admitted that instead of collecting $15.00 per month per unit for reserves, the money that would have gone into the reserve account was used "to run the condominium." Similarly, for the year ending 1982, the balance in the reserve account also reflects that reserves were not being funded. First, the amount of reserves which should have been set aside in 1981 of $2,880 is added to the total amount of reserves which should have been collected for 1982 for Condo I ($2880), giving a total figure of $5,760. To this figure should be added the reserves which should have been collected from units in Condo II during 1982. This figure is derived by multiplying the total number of units in Condo II, 18 units, by $15.00 per unit multiplied by 8 months (since Condo II was recorded in March of 1982) to yield a figure for Condo II of $2,160. Adding total reserve assessments for Condo I and II, $2,160 plus $5,760 equals $7,920 the correct reserve balance at the close of 1982. The actual balance for the period ended December 31, 1982, is reflected to be $4,138. Similarly, the amount of reserves required for Condos I and II as of December 31, 1983, can be calculated using the same formula. Although the 1983 financial statement prepared in 1984 reflects the existence of a funded reserve account, both DiCrescenzo and Tannenbaum admitted there was no separate reserves account set up during the time period involved herein. Statutory reserves were not waived and were not fully funded for the period of December, 1980 through December, 1983. All parties hereto presented much evidence, unsupported by the books and records of the corporations, for the determination herein of the amounts of money owed by Respondent Tanwin to the Association to bring current the total amount which Tanwin should have been paying to the Association from the inception of each condominium for monthly maintenance on condominium units not yet sold by the developer, together with the amount owed by Tanwin to the Association so that a separate reserve account can be established and fully funded for all years in which the majority of unit owners including the developer have not waived reserves. No findings of fact determining the exact amount Tanwin owes to the Association will be made for several reasons: first, the determination of that amount requires an accounting between the two Respondents herein which is a matter that can only be litigated, if litigation is necessary, in the circuit courts of this state; second, the determination of the amount due between the private parties hereto is not necessary for the determination by Petitioner of the statutory violations charged in the Amended Notice to Show Cause; and third, where books and records exist; one witness on each side testifying as to conclusions reached from review of those records, even though the witnesses be expert, does not present either the quantity or the quality of evidence necessary to trace the income and outgo of specific moneys through different corporate accounts over a period of time, especially where each expert opinion is based upon questionable assumptions. It is, however, clear from the record in this cause that Respondent Tanwin owes money to the Respondent Association and further owes to the Respondent Association an accounting of all moneys on a specific item by item basis.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered: Finding Respondent Tanwin Corporation guilty of the allegations contained in Counts 1-7 of the Amended Notice to Show Cause; Dismissing with prejudice Count 8 of the Amended Notice to Show Cause; Assessing against Respondent Tanwin Corporation a civil penalty in the amount of $17,000 to be paid by certified check made payable to the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes within 45 days from entry of the Final Order herein; Ordering Respondents to forthwith comply with all provisions of the Condominium Act and the rules promulgated thereunder; And requiring Tanwin Corporation to provide and pay for an accounting by an independent certified public accountant of all funds owed by the developer as its share of common expenses on unsold units and the amount for which Tanwin is liable in order that the reserve account be fully funded, with a copy of that accounting to be filed with Petitioner within 90 days of the date of the Final Order. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 9th day of August, 1985, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of August, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Karl M. Scheuerman, Esquire Thomas A. Bell, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Joseph S. Paglino, Esquire 88 Northeast 79th Street Miami, Florida 33138 E. James Kearney, Director Department of Business Regulation Division of Florida Land Sales Condominiums and Mobile Homes 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard B. Burroughs, Jr., Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL CONSENT ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION DIVISION OF FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS AND MOBILE HOMES DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION, DIVISION OF FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS AND MOBILE HOMES, Petitioner, CASE NO. 84-0437 DOCKET NO. 84001MVC TANWIN CORPORATION and VISTA DEL LAGO CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC. Respondents. / FINAL CONSENT ORDER The Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, (hereinafter the Division), Vista Del Lago Condominium Inc., (hereinafter the Association), and Tanwin Corporation, (hereinafter Tanwin), hereby stipulate and agree to the terms and issuance of this Final Consent Order as follows: WHEREAS, the Division issued a Notice to Show Cause directed to Respondents and, WHEREAS, after issuance of the Recommended Order in this cause, the parties amicably conferred for the purpose of achieving a settlement of the case, and WHEREAS, Tanwin is desirous of resolving the matters alleged in the Notice to Show Cause without engaging in further administrative proceedings or judicial review thereof, NOW, THEREFORE, it is stipulated and agreed as follows:
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent Alexander J. Milanick should be required to pay attorney fees and costs in the amount of $4,976.00 to Petitioner Charles Osborne to compensate Petitioner for his defense of an ethics complaint filed with the Florida Commission on Ethics.
Findings Of Fact The Town of Beverly Beach, Florida has a population of about 600 located in Flagler County, Florida. It is about one mile from north to south, and occupies about .4 square miles. It is bounded on the west by the Intracoastal Waterway and on the east by the Atlantic Ocean. U.S. Highway A1A is the main north-south route through the town. Mr. Osborne is an aerospace engineer who served on the Beverly Beach Town Commission from 1997 through March 1999. He was mayor from March 1999 until 2001. He has lived at 2641 Osprey Circle, in Beverly Beach, in a home constructed at that location, since 1995. This residence is closer to the southern boundary of Beverly Beach than to the northern boundary. Dr. Milanick is a dentist who, along with his brother John, and a person named McGee, during times pertinent, owned land immediately north of Beverly Beach. On the property then and currently owned by Dr. Milanick, and east of A1A, is a restaurant named the Shark House. The premises has also been known as Crabby Joe's. In 1995, Dr. Milanick applied to the Town Commission to have his property, and that of his brother, and that of McGee, annexed into the town limits of Beverly Beach. He did this by asking a Mr. Taylor to do what was necessary to cause the annexation to occur. Mr. Taylor thereafter filed a petition with the Town Commission. By Ordinance 95-9-4, the Town Commission, in 1995, assented to the request and it was made effective November 15, 1995. The Ordinance purported to annex the Milanick property into the Town of Beverly Beach and to zone it general commercial. Mr. Osborne was not a member of the Town Commission and was not mayor during this time. The Ordinance, however, was defective in four ways. The Ordinance purported to annex the property into Bunnell, Florida; it was not properly signed by all commissioners; it was not publicly noticed; and it did not provide a legal description of the property. It was not filed with either the Flagler County Clerk of the Court or the Florida Secretary of State. The matter languished until 1997 when Dr. Milanick determined that his property had not in fact been moved within the boundaries of Beverly Beach. Dr. Milanick brought this to the attention of the Town Commission in October 1997. At a Town Commission meeting on December 3, 1997, the Town Attorney stated that he had not had a chance to look into the Milanick and Shark House issue. At a Town Commission meeting on February 4, 1998, Dr. Milanick inquired as to the progress being made on the annexation of his property and was told that the Town Attorney would get with him and discuss the procedure. Subsequently, the Town Attorney, Pat McCormick, suggested that it would be necessary to start the process from the beginning if the land was to be annexed. At a Town Commission meeting on March 4, 1998, Mayor Osborne stated that there was no benefit to the annexation of the Shark House. One member of the Town Commission suggested that they honor past commitments. Dr. Milanick was in attendance at this meeting. At a Town Commission meeting on May 5, 1999, Dr. Milanick and his brother again attended the Town Commission meeting and requested the annexation of their property and discussed the procedure that would be necessary. At a Town Commission meeting on June 2, 1999, a motion was made to go forward with Ordinance 95-9-4 and to amend the official city map and legal description to include the Shark House property. The motion passed but Mayor Osborne vetoed it. During a regular monthly meeting of the Town Commission on July 7, 1999, James Kearn, an attorney retained by Dr. Milanick, who was authorized to act for Dr. Milanick, appeared and requested that the Commission direct the Town Clerk to sign Ordinance 95-9-4 and to forward it to the county and the state in order to determine if the Ordinance was valid. This request was approved by the Town Commission. Mayor Osborne, vetoed the measure. Thereafter, the veto was over-ridden by the Commission. At a Town Commission workshop on July 21, 1999, there was additional discussion regarding the annexation of the Shark House. Mr. Kearn accused Mayor Osborne of discussing the Milanick annexation matter with Sid Crosby, Clerk of the Court of Flagler County. Mayor Osborne denied the charge. The discussion became heated and accusatory and Mayor Osborne threatened to have the sheriff eject Mr. Kearn from the meeting. Subsequent to the action of the Town Commission of July 7, 1999, the Town Clerk, Douglas Courtney, took Ordinance 95-9-4 to Syd Crosby, Clerk of the Court for Flagler County. In a memorandum dated July 26, 1999, Mr. Courtney reported to the Town Commission that Mr. Crosby would not file Ordinance 95-9-4 because it was defective. One of the defects cited was that the instrument purported to annex the land into the City of Bunnell, Florida. No creditable evidence was adduced which indicated that Mayor Osborne visited Syd Crosby for the purpose of preventing the recording of the annexation of Dr. Milanick's property. Mr. Crosby concluded from the beginning that Ordinance 95-9-4 was not recordable. Mayor Osborne suggested some solutions which would permit the annexation, including, re-submission of a proper application. Over a period of time some "glitch" bills were considered which would annex the land. However, none passed. Mr. Kearn attended the Town Commission meeting on February 2, 2000, and the minutes of the meeting noted that he was accompanied by "a person taking notes." Following this meeting, in a February 16, 2000, letter to Dennis Knox Bayer, Town Attorney, Mr. Kearn claimed that Mayor Osborne had a personal vendetta against Dr. Milanick, and that he was exercising dictatorial efforts to prevent citizens to speak at town meetings. He further demanded that ". . . all Town officials, including you as their representative, refrain from saying things that are simply and blatantly false, which only serve to incite Mr. Milanick." At a town meeting on March 1, 2000, Mr. Kearn complained about the annexation not being on the agenda and Mayor Osborne stated that a request for inclusion on the agenda had not been made in writing. Mr. Kearn was permitted to speak for three minutes, he spoke for three minutes, and immediately thereafter Mayor Osborne adjourned the meeting. On or about April 25, 2000, Dr. Milanick and his brother John, filed suit against the Town of Beverly Beach and Mayor Osborne personally, in the Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit in and for Flagler County. The suit alleged that the Town of Beverly Beach and Mayor Osborne violated the civil rights of the Milanicks. The suit alleged that Mayor Osborne had a vendetta against Dr. Milanick and should be held personally liable to Dr. Milanick. The Circuit Court dismissed the civil rights count against Mayor Osborne and the town, and this dismissal was affirmed by the Fifth District Court of Appeal. The Circuit Court also dismissed the mandamus action, finding that the 30- day limitations' period for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari applied and that a prima facie case for mandamus had not been established. The Fifth District Court of Appeal, on October 19, 2001, remanded that count to the Circuit Court with directions to grant the petition for mandamus, but upheld the dismissal of the civil rights counts. On January 23, 2003, the Circuit Court entered its Alternative Writ of Mandamus. The Writ incorporated the allegations of Plaintiff's Complaint by reference and ordered that the Defendants take whatever steps necessary to sign and record Ordinance 95-9-4. When this occurred, Mr. Osborne was no longer an elected official of Beverly Beach. The Circuit Court complaint filed by Dr. Milanick recited that the recording of the ordinance did not occur because Mayor Osborne conferred with the Clerk of the Court to block recording of the ordinance. The adoption of the matters recited in the complaint as true, by the appellate court, does not make them proven facts because no evidence was taken in the case. The complaint, moreover, alleges actions, such as being tyrannical and peevish, which could not in any event constitute a violation of a person's civil rights. The complaint does not allege that Mr. Osborne took any action, as mayor, because he wished to obtain a personal advantage and does not allege that the annexation of Dr. Milanick's real property would affect Mr. Osborne's real property in terms of value or otherwise. As of the date of the hearing, Dr. Milanick's property had not been annexed into the corporate limits of Beverly Beach. Mr. Osborne, while serving as mayor, was not helpful in causing the annexation to occur and it is apparent that his relations with Mr. Kearn were not amicable. Mr. Osborne, while serving as mayor was irascible, intimidating, and controlling. Mr. Osborne believed that the annexation would bring no benefit to Beverly Beach and believed it would, "change the town's character." Mr. Osborne gained nothing directly or personally by preventing, or making difficult, the annexation of Dr. Milanick's land. As an elected official, he was permitted to advance his own ideas with regard to what he believed would be best for Beverly Beach and for himself as a citizen and property owner of Beverly Beach. He could act in this regard so long as he did not secure a special privilege, benefit, or exemption for himself, as opposed to a general benefit. A letter signed by Mr. Kearn dated July 18, 2003, accompanied by an affidavit signed by Dr. Milanick, requested that the Commission conduct an investigation into the activities of Mr. Osborne during the period when he was the mayor of Beverly Beach. For reasons which become apparent hereafter, this letter, which had the words "Via Airborne Overnight Mail" stamped on its face, will be hereinafter referred to as the "Airborne" letter. The following statements were contained in the "Airborne" letter: Specifically, while Mayor, Charles Osborne simply refused to sign and record the ordinance duly adopted by the Town, which annexed land into the Town as a general commercial, simply because he personally did not want anymore general commercial land in the Town, which could jeopardize his personal investment in the Town. He also met with the former Clerk of Court for Flagler County, Mr. Syd Crosby, to persuade the Clerk to not record anything regarding the annexation of such land, in order to prevent the completion of the annexation. He thus plainly put his purely personal concerns, ahead of his duties as mayor, and fiduciary duty to the citizens of Beverly Beach. The mayor still refused to oblige the Town's request, or to honor the duly adopted resolution, for his own personal reasons, irrespective of his duties as mayor to the citizens of Beverly Beach.... Even worse, he met with the former Clerk of Circuit Court of Flagler County, Mr. Syd Crosby, to attempt to persuade Mr. Crosby to not record any ordinance presented by the Town, annexing the Milanicks' property. Mayor Osborne repeatedly ignored and defied the will of the Town to complete the annexation, to pursue his own personal agenda, i.e., stopping annexation of land as general commercial. The "Airborne" letter then parroted items that indicated that the Circuit Court had found to be true, as follows: Additionally, Mr. Osborne simply does not allow anyone to speak with whom he disagrees, or to address matter that he does not want addressed. Mayor Osborne has... refused to put the Milanicks' matters or requests on the Town Council agenda; taken action regarding the Milanicks' properties, without any notice to the Milanicks, or without knowledge by the Milanicks that such action was being taken against their property, as required by the Town's own law; refused to allow the Milanicks to speak to matters that affect their personal and property interests, once the Town Council had opened discussion regarding the annexation and zoning of the Milanicks' properties; blatantly and willfully misrepresented the Milanicks' positions, actions, and statements at Town meetings, beyond the scope of the privilege normally attendant to a politician's statements at such meeting, in order to defeat the Milanicks' requests, and to harm the Milanicks; refused to honor Ordinances passed by previous Town councils, as detailed above; refused to follow through with completing the annexation approved by previous council members of the Town; worked to undercut the recording of the completion of the signing of the ordinance, and the recording of the ordinance, to complete the annexation, all as detailed above. The matters in paragraph 25, are misleading because they indicate that the Circuit Court found these items to be true when in fact no evidentiary proceedings with regard to these items occurred in the Circuit Court. Moreover, the Complaint alleged several matters which Dr. Milanick either knew to be untrue, or should have known that it was untrue. Specifically, the Complaint alleged that Mayor Osborne "did not want anymore general commercial land in the Town, which could jeopardize his personal investment in the Town." This allegation implies that he was acting for some personal and specific reason financial reason, as opposed to a general opposition to development. This allegation, had it been true, would have been actionable pursuant to Section 112.313(6) The Complaint also alleged that Mayor Osborne met with Syd Crosby in order to prevent the annexation of the Milanicks' property. This allegation, coupled with the allegation as to a financial interest, bolsters the asserted improper purpose. Based on this Complaint, the Executive Director of the Commission issued a Determination of Investigative Jurisdiction and Order to Investigate, which was filed with the Commission on September 26, 2003, and assigned Complaint Number 03-091. Investigator Travis Wade of the Commission was directed to conduct a preliminary investigation into whether or not there was probable cause to believe a violation of Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, had occurred. That section reads as follows: (6) Misuse of public position.--No public officer, employee of an agency, or local government attorney shall corruptly use or attempt to use his or her official position or any property or resource which may be within his or her trust, or perform his or her official duties, to secure a special privilege, benefit, or exemption for himself, herself, or others. This section shall not be construed to conflict with s. 104.31. Mr. Osborne learned of the Determination of Investigative Jurisdiction and Order to Investigate and thereafter retained Robert J. Riggio, of the firm of Riggio & Mitchell, P.A., located in Daytona Beach, as his attorney. Mr. Riggio worked on the case from October 24, 2003, until September 29, 2004. He charged $150 per hour, which is below the customary charge in the Daytona Beach area, and the hourly rate therefore, is reasonable. He expended 33 hours which is reasonable. He expended $180 in costs. These expenditures totaled $4,976 which was billed to Mr. Osborne. He paid the bill. On April 6, 2004, a second letter dated July 18, 2003, was sent to the Commission by Mr. Kearn by facsimile. This will be referred to as the "Fax" letter. This was precipitated by a request to Mr. Kearn from Investigator Wade that he provide a copy of the original letter. The "Fax" letter differed from the "Airborne" letter. In the second paragraph of the "Fax" letter the following sentence appears: "Specifically, while Mayor, Charles Osborne simply refused to sign and record the ordinance duly adopted by the Town, which annexed land just north of Mr. Osborne's manufactured home . . . ." And in the fourth paragraph of the "Fax" letter, the following sentence appears: "The Mayor objected, because it would serve to annex land as general commercial, just north of his own manufactured home." It further stated that his motivation was ". . . stopping land as commercial near him." Mr. Kearn testified under oath that when Investigator Wade was discussing the case with him, that he, Mr. Kearn, realized the "Fax" letter was a draft that had been sent to Investigator Wade in error. Mr. Kearn said that the "Fax" letter was a draft that had subsequently been edited by Dr. Milanick who knew, July 18, 2003, that Mr. Osborne did not live in a manufactured home located immediately south of the property which was sought to be annexed. Mr. Kearn said that it the "Airborne" letter was supposed to be the operative document. He said that he realized that the "Fax" letter was being used by Investigator Wade when he was talking to him on the telephone on June 8, 2004, and that he advised Investigator Wade of the error. He testified that he made it perfectly clear to Investigator Wade that the "Airborne" letter was the operative document. Investigator Wade's Report of Investigation, however, recites that during the telephone interview of Mr. Kearn, that Mr. Kearn advised him that Mr. Osborne resided in a mobile home community immediately south of the Milanick property, while he served as mayor and that Mr. Osborne's interest in stopping the annexation was to use his position for his personal benefit. At the hearing, Investigator Wade stated under oath that Mr. Kearn advised him during their telephone conversation that Mr. Osborne resided in a mobile home community immediately south of the Milanick property while he was serving as mayor. Investigator Wade stated that the issue of whether or not Mr. Osborne lived in the immediate vicinity of the Milanick property was the key element in his investigation because if that were true, stopping the annexation could be a personal benefit to Mr. Osborne. Mr. Wade was a disinterested and credible investigator and witness and his testimony is taken as true and accurate. Mr. Osborne did not live in either a manufactured or mobile home. The type of home he lived in is irrelevant. What is relevant is that Mr. Osborne did not live adjacent to, or in the vicinity of, the Milanick property. In fact, Mr. Osborne did not live near the north side of town. He lived closer to the south side of town and it is unlikely that the annexation of the Milanick property would have an economic effect on Mr. Osborne's property. Mr. Kearn was aware of Mr. Osborne's resident address because he had him served with a civil suit at his residence in 2000. Mr. Kearn knew that Mr. Osborne did not live in a mobile home community, or in a manufactured home near the Milanick property, or anywhere near it. Nevertheless, he asserted that to be true when he talked to Investigator Wade. Mr. Kearn is the attorney and agent of Dr. Milanick. Mr. Kearn is, therefore, the alter ego of Dr. Milanick so that the actions of Mr. Kearn, are the actions of Dr. Milanick. The Commission, found in their Public Report, dated September 8, 2004, that Mr. Osborne's opposition to the annexation was not connected to any desire to secure a benefit for himself. The Commission dismissed the Milanick complaint on a finding of "no probable cause."
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Ethics enter an order requiring Dr. Milanick to pay Mr. Osborne $4,976.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of July, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of July, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Kaye Starling, Agency Clerk Commission on Ethics 3600 Maclay Boulevard, South, Suite 201 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 James J. Kearn, Esquire James J. Kearn, P.A. 138 Live Oak Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32114-4912 Gary S. Edinger, Esquire 305 Northeast First Street Gainesville, Florida 32601 Martin A. Pedata, Esquire Martin Pedata, P.A. 505 East New York Avenue, Suite 8 DeLand, Florida 32724 Robert J. Riggio, Esquire Riggio & Mitchell, P.A. 400 South Palmetto Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Bonnie J. Williams, Executive Director Commission on Ethics 3600 Maclay Boulevard, South, Suite 201 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phillip C. Claypool, General Counsel Commission on Ethics 3600 Maclay Boulevard, South, Suite 201 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Virlindia Doss, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice contrary to Section 760.10, Florida Statutes, by discriminating against Petitioner based on his gender.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a staffing company that provides temporary employees to a variety of customers/employers. Respondent performs workforce management for its customers, including hiring personnel, providing new-employee orientation, and conducting ongoing training after the initial hire. Respondent provides its employees with harassment-free workplace training as part of the initial orientation. Thereafter, Respondent provides the harassment-free workplace training on an annual basis and more frequently at the request of its customers. Petitioner is a white male who worked as a temporary employee for Respondent on two occasions: from May 17, 1993, through July 27, 1996, and from June 30, 1997, through July 28, 2003. On both occasions, Respondent assigned Petitioner to perform maintenance work at the Island House Hotel in Orange Beach, Alabama. Petitioner was a maintenance technician at the Island House Hotel until Respondent promoted him to the position of Assistant Supervisor of Maintenance in 1998. Respondent promoted Petitioner to the management position of Chief Engineer in 1999. As Chief Engineer, Petitioner supervised five or six maintenance technicians. Petitioner received a salary but often worked more than a 40-hour week. For instance, Petitioner would stay at the hotel during hurricanes instead of going home to be with his family. At all times relevant here, Petitioner was aware of Respondent's written "Harassment-Free Workplace Policy." The policy defines sexual harassment as "unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature where an employee feels compelled to comply with the harassment as part of job betterment, or where the harassment interferes with an employee's work creating an intimidating or hostile work environment." The policy lists examples of sexual harassment, including unwelcome physical contact, request for sexual favors, and/or displays of a sexual nature. Respondent's Harassment-Free Workplace Policy goes on to discuss other types of discriminatory conduct. Specifically, the policy prohibits discrimination, such as intimidation or ridicule based on gender, race, color, national origin, sexual orientation, pregnancy, age, religion, disability, veteran status, or any other basis that creates an offensive work environment, or which results in an unfavorable job action. The policy lists verbal or written jokes or offensive comments based on race, sex, etc., as examples of discriminatory conduct. Respondent's Harassment-Free Workplace Policy advises employees, whether a victim or a witness, to report all incidents of discrimination or harassment. Respondent instructs its employees to report such complaints to their manager, their local office staffing specialist, and/or Respondent's corporate office, using a toll-free employee hot line. Petitioner had a good professional and personal relationship with Respondent's employees who were assigned management positions at the Island House Hotel. Specifically, Petitioner was friends with the following employees: (a) Barbara Walters, General Manager; (b) Glenn Johnson, Director of Operations; and (c) Margaret Lathan, Director of Housekeeping. Petitioner and Ms. Walters occasionally shared off- color jokes with each other. Sometimes they laughed about jokes with sexual connotations that one of them had copied from the Internet. On at least one occasion, Ms. Walters and Petitioner discussed hotel guests who were wearing bathing suits at the pool. There is no evidence that Petitioner was ever offended by the jokes; he never complained to Respondent about the jokes. Ms. Walters personally was not offended by the jokes. In time, however, she became concerned that Petitioner's jokes and comments to employees other than herself were no longer appropriate in the workplace. Eventually, Ms. Walters began to verbally counsel Petitioner to clean up his language and to be careful of his remarks to other employees because they might consider them offensive. Petitioner and Ms. Latham also enjoyed sharing jokes of a sexual nature with each other. On one occasion, Ms. Latham gave Petitioner a T-shirt when she returned from vacation. The back of the shirt had pictures of ladies’ butts wearing bikinis. There is no evidence that Petitioner found the shirt offensive; he never complained to Respondent or anyone else about the T-shirt. On or about June 23, 2001, Ms. Walters wrote a note to Petitioner. Ms. Walters requested that Ms. McDowell place the note in Petitioner's personnel file. The note stated as follows: After our conversation on Wednesday, I thought we had cleared up my concerns with you. Today I discover that your "blond" lady that does awnings was in your office yesterday and that you allowed her to accompany you to repair the washer in the laundry. This is totally unacceptable and violates Hotel policy and safety issues. I do not expect you as a manager to have outside vendors in areas that they are not here to inspect, study, or to prepare estimates for. I will not discuss this any further with you. Ms. Walters would have written the above-referenced note if Petitioner had invited an unauthorized male to accompany him into a secure area. However, Ms. Walters was especially concerned because the incident involved a female. On at least two occasions, Ms. Walters made special requests for Respondent to conduct a class to review Respondent's harassment policy with her management team. She made these requests because her management team consisted of members who were of various ages. Ms. Walters wanted to make sure that the management team was aware that times had changed, and that conduct, which had been acceptable years ago, was no longer acceptable in today's workplace. At the request of Ms. Walters, Respondent's staffing specialist, Martina McDowell, conducted a class on Respondent's harassment policy at the Island House Hotel on January 31, 2002. Petitioner, Ms. Walters, and Ms. Latham attended the class. During the January 2003 class, Petitioner received a copy of Respondent's Harassment-Free Workplace Policy. He signed a statement acknowledging that he had read and understood the policy, including the procedure to report violations. On February 14, 2002, Petitioner signed a copy of Respondent's "New Employee Orientation Guidelines: Policy & Procedures." This document includes Respondent's discrimination and harassment policies, which Petitioner initialed. Ms. McDowell signed the document under Petitioner's signature. In the last year of Petitioner's employment at the Island House Hotel, Ms. Walters realized Petitioner was under stress in his personal life. She also noticed a change in his behavior at work. Ms. Walters felt that Petitioner's jokes and other attempts to be humorous became more intense. Ms. Walters was so concerned that she requested Ms. McDowell to counsel Petitioner on more than one occasion. During the counseling sessions, Ms. McDowell advised Petitioner that off-color jokes were not accepted in the workplace. Ms. McDowell also told Petitioner that flirting with female co-workers was inappropriate and would be considered as sexual harassment under Respondent's policy. Respondent does not provide the Island House Hotel with employees to perform housekeeping duties. Island House Hotel contracts with a company by the name of TIDY for housekeeping services. Ms. Latham, as Director of Housekeeping, does not supervise TIDY's housekeepers directly. Instead, she interacts with TIDY's supervisors to ensure that the housekeeping duties are performed. One of TIDY's housekeepers was a young female named April. She began working at Island House Hotel on or about July 23, 2003. On Friday, July 25, 2003, Petitioner grabbed and jiggled his private parts as he walked down the hall to the elevator at the Island House Hotel. April, Ms. Latham, and a porter named Alan Hoffman, were standing at the elevator. Ms. Latham observed Petitioner's conduct and considered it offensive. Ms. Latham could tell that Petitioner's inappropriate behavior embarrassed April. On Saturday, July 26, 2003, Ms. Walters was working at the Island House Hotel when she learned that a young man was at the front desk. The young man wanted to speak to Ms. Walters privately. Therefore, Ms. Walters invited the young man to go with her to the sales office. During the conversation, the young man complained to Ms. Walters that an older gentleman named Ben, who worked at the hotel, had made inappropriate gestures to his fianceé, April. Specifically, the young man alleged that Ben had grabbed his private parts and jiggled them in front of April, who was offended by such behavior. Ms. Walters talked to Ms. Latham after the young man left the hotel. Ms. Latham confirmed that she had witnessed Petitioner grabbing his private parts in front of April. Immediately after talking to Ms. Latham, Ms. Walters called Respondent's branch manager, Sherry Moore. Ms. Walters told Ms. Moore that Respondent needed to release Petitioner from his assignment at Island House Hotel. Ms. Moore contacted Ms. McDowell by telephone. Ms. Moore instructed Ms. McDowell to contact Petitioner and instruct him to report to Respondent's office in Gulfport, Florida, on July 28, 2003. On Sunday, July 27, 2003, Ms. McDowell contacted Petitioner. Ms. McDowell told Petitioner to report to her office the next day instead of returning to work at Island House Hotel. On Monday, July 28, 2003, Petitioner met Ms McDowell at her office. Ms. McDowell explained that Respondent had received a sexual harassment complaint involving his behavior. Petitioner's initial reaction was to state that he had talked to the little girl and that she was okay with his apology. The little girl that Petitioner referred to was not April. Petitioner's initial statement in Ms. McDowell's office related to an incident involving a female employee of the hotel's beach service. Ms. McDowell informed Petitioner that the complaint involved a housekeeper. After explaining the allegations against him, Ms. McDowell relieved Petitioner of his work assignment at Island House Hotel. Petitioner became angry, stating as follows: "Well, if Ms. Walters was going down the hallway and her ass was itching and she scratched it, would you fire her too?" Ms. McDowell responded that she was dealing only with a complaint brought against him, where another employee had witnessed his conduct. Ms. McDowell did not tell Petitioner that he was terminated as one of Respondent's temporary employees. Respondent's policy requires employees to make themselves available for work assignments. Employees are supposed to contact Respondent within 48 hours of the time that a work assignment ends if they are available for another job. Thereafter, employees are required to contact Respondent on a weekly basis. Petitioner did not follow Respondent's policy in this regard. In any event, Ms. McDowell conducted a follow-up investigation. The investigation included interviews with Ms. Walters, Ms. Latham, and Mr. Hoffman. Ms. McDowell was unable to talk to April who never returned to work. After completing her investigation, Ms. McDowell considered Petitioner's employment terminated. On or about November 21, 2003, Ms. McDowell requested that Ms. Latham make a written statement regarding the July 25, 2003, incident. Ms. Latham made the following statement: April (housekeeper), Alan (porter) and myself were standing by the elevator when Ben Torres came down the hall and grabbed his privates. Ben might not have realized April was standing there, he made these gestures all the time and I told him many times, that one of these days he will do it in front of the wrong person and get in trouble. Most of the housekeepers knew how he was and just ignored his behavior. Respondent did not hire another Chief Engineer to replace Petitioner. Instead, Respondent assigned the duties of Chief Engineer to Glenn Johnson, the Director of Operations at the Island House Hotel. Mr. Johnson is a white male.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of June, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Debra Dawn Cooper, Esquire Debra D. Cooper, Attorney 309 West Gregory Street Pensacola, Florida 32502 Jane M. Rolling, Esquire 5301 North Ironwood Road Post Office Box 2053 Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53217 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Florida Housing Finance Corporation’s (“Florida Housing”) preliminary award of funding to University Station I, LLC (“University Station”), was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary or capricious, or contrary to Florida Housing’s governing statutes, rules, policies, or RFA specifications.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at the final hearing, the record as a whole, the stipulated facts, and matters subject to official recognition, the following Findings of Fact are made: Findings on Florida Housing and the RFA Florida Housing is a public corporation created pursuant to section 420.504, Florida Statutes, and promotes public welfare by administering the financing of affordable housing in Florida. Section 420.5099 designates Florida Housing as the State of Florida’s housing credit agency within the meaning of section 42(h)(7)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code. Accordingly, Florida Housing is responsible for establishing procedures for allocating and distributing low income housing tax credits. Florida Housing allocates housing credits and other funding via requests for proposals or other competitive solicitation methods identified in section 420.507(48). Florida Housing initiated the instant competitive solicitation by issuing the RFA on October 15, 2020, and anticipates awarding up to an estimated $88,959,045.00 in State Apartment Incentive Loan (“SAIL”)2 financing. The RFA set forth a process by which applications would be scored based, in part, on eligibility items. Only applications satisfying all of the eligibility items were eligible for funding and considered for selection. 2 Marissa Button, the Director of Multifamily Programs at Florida Housing, testified that the SAIL program finances the development of multifamily, affordable rental housing. The Florida Legislature traditionally appropriates money for the SAIL program via the State Housing Trust Fund. Site Control was an eligibility item because Florida Housing wants assurances that applicants selected for funding will be able to actually use the development sites.3 Applicants satisfy the Site Control requirement by providing a properly completed and executed Florida Housing Site Control Certification Form (“the Site Control Form”). In order for the Site Control Form to be considered complete, an applicant had to attach documentation demonstrating that it: (a) was a party to an eligible contract or lease; or (b) owned the property in question. The RFA set forth specific requirements for contracts and leases used for demonstrating site control. For example, a contract had to satisfy all of the following conditions: It must have a term that does not expire before May 31, 2021 or that contains extension options exercisable by the purchaser and conditioned solely upon payment of additional monies which, if exercised, would extend the term to a date that is not earlier than May 31, 2021. It must specifically state that the buyer’s remedy for default on the part of the seller includes or is specific performance; The Applicant must be the buyer unless there is an assignment of the eligible contract, signed by the assignor and the assignee, which assigns all of the buyer’s rights, title and interests in the eligible contract to the Applicant; and The owner of the subject property must be the seller, or is a party to one or more intermediate contracts, agreements, assignments, options, or 3 Ms. Button explained that Site Control “is a component of how the applicant demonstrates its ability to proceed with the proposed development. And essentially it is the – the way that we require them to demonstrate they have control over the proposed development site.” As for why Site Control is important, Ms. Button testified that Florida Housing wants “to be assured if the – the applicant is successful in its request for funding, that the – they will be able to actually use the development site.” conveyances between or among the owner, the Applicant, or other parties, that have the effect of assigning the owner’s right to sell the property to the seller. Any intermediate contract must meet the criteria for an eligible contract in (a) and (b) above. The language quoted above indicates that the RFA was referring to a sales contract when it used the term “contract.” If an applicant used a lease to satisfy the Site Control requirement, then the RFA provided the following: (3) Lease – The lease must have an unexpired term of at least 50 years after the Application Deadline and the lessee must be the Applicant. The owner of the subject property must be a party to the lease, or a party to one or more intermediate leases, subleases, agreements, or assignments, between or among the owner, the Applicant, or other parties, that have the effect of assigning the owner’s right to lease the property for at least 50 years to the lessee. Marissa Button, Florida Housing’s Director of Multifamily Programs, testified that the RFA did not require a lease to have a commencement date. The RFA required that Site Control documentation for leases “include all relevant intermediate contracts, agreements, assignments, options, conveyances, intermediate leases, and subleases. If the proposed Development consists of Scattered Sites, site control must be demonstrated for all of the Scattered Sites.” Ms. Button provided the following testimony about this requirement: A: Florida Housing includes the requirements for that documentation to – to essentially acknowledge that there are circumstances where there may be an intermediate contract or agreement that would demonstrate one of the criteria for those different types of site control and the requirements that we want to see that -- that chain back to the requirement itself. * * * Q: So Florida Housing considers this term to broadly include all different types of potential contract agreements, et cetera; correct? A: Yes. Q: Could you give me an example of an intermediate contract or agreement? A: Yes. An intermediate contract or agreement may be where – with regard to the [ ] contract, the terms require an owner of the subject property to be a seller of the subject property. And so there may be an applicant that has a contract with the seller of the property. And that seller might not be the actual owner; so there may be an intermediate contract that we need to see between the seller to the buyer and the actual owner of the subject property. Q: And that situation that you just described, that happened in the past few years; correct? A: I can think of one example where that happened, yes. Q: Okay. And in that case Florida Housing agreed that the intermediate agreement was necessary to include with the site documentation; correct? A: Florida Housing reviewed – yes. That – Florida Housing’s position was there was an intermediate agreement necessary because the site control documentation provided did not include the owner of the subject property. As for Florida Housing’s review of Site Control documentation, the RFA provided as follows: Note: [Florida Housing] will not review the site control documentation that is submitted with the Site Control Certification form during the scoring process unless there is a reason to believe that the form has been improperly executed, nor will it in any case evaluate the validity or enforceability of any such documentation. During scoring, [Florida Housing] will rely on the properly executed Site Control Certification form to determine whether an Applicant has met the requirement of this RFA to demonstrate site control. [Florida Housing] has no authority to, and will not, evaluate the validity or enforceability of any eligible site control documentation that is attached to the Site Control Certification form during the scoring process. During credit underwriting, if it is determined that the site control documents do not meet the above requirements, [Florida Housing] may rescind the award. When questioned about Florida Housing’s review of Site Control documentation, Ms. Button offered the following testimony: Q: If you look at the next page, Page 48, at the end of Subsection A there’s a note. It says Florida Housing will not review the site control during the scoring process. It will not evaluate the authority or enforceability of such documentation; correct? A: Yes. Q: But even though Florida Housing does not review the site documentation during scoring, it will review the documentation during the bid protest; correct? A: Yes as it relates to the RFA requirements. * * * Q: If the documents attached to a site control documentation [do] not meet the RFA criteria, then that site control certification form would be incorrect; right? A: Yes. Q: And the applicant would be found ineligible; correct? A: Yes. The RFA and Ms. Button’s testimony indicate that Florida Housing intended, under most circumstances, to accept the representations set forth in an applicant’s Site Control documentation during the scoring process. In other words, Florida Housing did not go behind the Site Control documentation to verify the representations therein. The terms of the RFA were not challenged. Stipulated Facts Pertaining to Certain Parties Douglas Gardens and Florida Housing agree that Douglas Gardens’ application is ineligible for funding via the RFA. Quiet Meadows and Florida Housing agree that Quiet Meadows’ application is ineligible for funding via the RFA. MHP and Florida Housing agree that MHP’s Application is ineligible for funding via the RFA.4 MHP, Quiet Meadows, and Douglas Gardens agree that Fulham Terrace’s application remains eligible for funding via the RFA. The Willows and Florida Housing agree that the Willows Application is ineligible for funding via the RFA. The Willows agrees that the HTG Astoria Application is eligible for funding via the RFA. 4 MHP, Florida Housing, Quiet Meadows, Douglas Gardens, and Fulham Terrace entered into a Settlement Agreement and Stipulation on March 26, 2021, that was entered into evidence as Fern Grove Exhibit 1. SoMi Parc, Vista, and Florida Housing agree that the SoMi Parc Application is ineligible for funding via the RFA. SoMi Parc has accepted an invitation to enter credit underwriting for the same Development in RFA 2020-203 and thus cannot be funding via the RFA. Findings Regarding the Applications of University Station and Vista Florida Housing received 90 applications in response to the RFA. Those applications were processed, deemed eligible or ineligible, scored, and ranked pursuant to the terms of the RFA. On January 22, 2021, Florida Housing announced its intention to award funding to 17 applicants, subject to satisfactory completion of the credit underwriting process. University Station was one of the 17 successful applicants, and University Station’s Site Control documentation included: (a) a Ground Lease Agreement between the City of Hollywood, Florida (“the City”), and University Station (“the University Station I Lease”); (b) a Ground Lease Agreement between the City and University Station II, LTD (“the University Station II Lease”); and (c) an Assignment of Ground Lease Agreement assigning University Station II, LTD’s interests in the Ground Lease Agreement between the City and University Station II, LTD to University Station.5 The University Station I Lease described its terms as follows: This lease shall be effective as of the Effective Date, but the term shall commence on the Commencement Date and expire at 11:59 p.m. on the seventy-fifth (75th) anniversary of the Commencement Date (the “Term”), unless this lease is terminated earlier pursuant to the provisions contained herein. For purposes of this lease, the “Commencement Date” shall be the closing date of Tenant’s construction financing for the development of the Phase I Project (the “Construction Financing”), but in no event later 5 The Assignment of Ground Lease Agreement between University Station and University Station II was a relevant intermediate document for demonstrating Site Control. than June 30, 2022. Tenant’s right to take physical possession of the Leased Premises shall begin on the Commencement Date. The University Station II Lease between the City and University Station II described its terms as follows: This lease shall be effective as of the Effective Date, but the term shall commence on the Commencement Date and expire at 11:59 p.m. on the seventy-fifth (75th) anniversary of the Commencement Date (the “Term”), unless this lease is terminated earlier pursuant to the provisions contained herein. For purposes of this Lease, the “Commencement Date” shall be the later of the closing date of Tenant’s construction loan for the development of the Project (the “Construction Loan”) and the termination of the lease of the premises to Barry University, but in no event later than June 30, 2023. Tenant’s right to take physical possession of the Leased Premises shall begin on the Commencement Date. Landlord and Tenant acknowledge that the leased premises are currently improved with an educational facility and adjacent ground parking that is leased to Barry University through November 23, 2021 and the Landlord may enter into an additional one-year extension of the lease to Barry University at Landlord’s sole discretion. Until the Commencement Date, Landlord, or its tenant, shall be solely responsible for the operation and maintenance of the leased premises and any uses on the Leased Premises. University Station’s proposed Development site consists of five Scattered Sites. Barry University currently leases a building and parking spaces located on the Scattered Site described as latitude and longitude coordinates of 26.014703, -80.148572 in Question 5.d.2 of the University Station Application. This is the site described in the University Station II Lease. The City and Barry University, Inc., are the parties to the Barry University Lease (“the Barry University Lease”). The Barry University Lease was executed on May 23, 2011, with a term of 10 and one-half years, which would expire on approximately November 23, 2021. With regard to its term, the Barry University Lease states that “[t]he term of this lease shall be for ten and one-half (10 ½) years commencing upon the execution of this lease. The parties will have the mutual option to renew this lease subject to City Commission and the Lessee’s Board of Directors approval.” A copy of the Barry University Lease was not included in University Station’s application. In contrast to the statement in the University Station II Lease that the Barry University Lease could be extended by “an additional one-year extension” at the City’s “sole discretion,” the Barry University Lease simply says that the parties have a “mutual option to renew” with no mention of a particular term. Ms. Button provided the following testimony regarding the Barry University Lease: Q: And you are aware that University Station did not submit the Barry University lease as part of its site control documentation; correct? A: Yes. Q: And does the existence of that Barry University lease change your position on whether University Station met the requirements in the RFA for a lease? A: No. Q: And why not? A: Because the documents submitted with the application meet the terms of the RFA for a lease site control documentation. Q: Did the existence of the Barry University lease impact whether or not the University Station site control documentation met the requirements for a lease? A: No. Q: As Florida Housing’s corporate representative, what is your position regarding University Station’s application? A: It is eligible for funding. Vista also applied for funding from the RFA. Florida Housing determined that Vista was eligible for funding, but Florida Housing did not preliminarily select Vista for funding. If University Station is deemed ineligible for funding, then Vista will be selected for funding subject to the successful completion of credit underwriting. Ultimate Findings Vista has failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that Florida Housing’s proposed award to University Station was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. Also, the greater weight of the evidence demonstrates that: (a) Florida Housing’s proposed action is not contrary to the RFA’s terms; and that (b) University Station will have control over the site in question. The greater weight of the evidence demonstrates that the University Station Lease I Lease, the University Stations II Lease, and the assignment of University Station II’s interest to University Station collectively satisfied the RFA’s requirements because: (a) there is unexpired term of at least 50 years after the application deadline; (b) University Station, i.e., the lessee, was the applicant for funding; and (c) the City, as the owner of the subject property, was a party to the lease. Upon considering Florida Housing’s preliminary approval of University Station’s application without the benefit of reviewing the Barry University Lease, the greater weight of the evidence demonstrates that Florida Housing was not clearly erroneous when it determined that the Barry University Lease was not a relevant intermediate lease within the meaning of the RFA. The University Station II Lease between the City and University Station II requires the lease to begin no later than June 30, 2023. Also, the City and University Station II acknowledge that Barry University’s Lease runs through November 23, 2021, and they agree that the City may extend Barry University’s lease by “an additional one-year.” Accordingly, the Barry University Lease will end prior to June 30, 2023, and University Station will have site control no later than that date. In other words, the greater weight of the evidence demonstrates that University Station has control over the site in question. The analysis set forth above does not change if one considers the Barry University Lease.6 Even though the Barry University Lease does not limit a renewal to one year, the lease cannot be renewed without the City’s assent, and the City agreed in the University Station II Lease that any renewal would not exceed one year. Therefore, even if one considers the terms of the Barry University Lease, the greater weight of the evidence does not demonstrate that it is a relevant intermediate document that was required to be included with University Station’s application. Again, the greater weight of the evidence demonstrates that University Station has control over the site in question. 6 As will be explained in more detail in the Conclusions of Law below, “[n]ew evidence cannot be offered to amend or supplement a party’s response or application. § 120.57(3)(f), Fla. Stat. However, new evidence may be offered in a competitive protest proceeding to prove that there was an error in another party’s application. Intercontinental Props., supra.” Heritage at Pompano Housing Partners, Ltd. v. Fla. Housing Fin. Corp., Case No. 14-1361BID, ¶ 116 (Fla. DOAH June 10, 2014; Fla. Hous. Fin. Corp. June 13, 2014).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Housing Finance Corporation enter a final order: awarding funding to University Station I, LLC, via Request for Application 2020-205 subject to credit underwriting; and (b) finding that the applications submitted by Douglas Gardens IV, Ltd., MHP FL VIII, LLLP, Quiet Meadows, Ltd, RST The Willows, LP, and Residences at SoMi Parc, LLC are ineligible for funding via Request for Application 2020-205. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Betty Zachem, Esquire Florida Housing Finance Corporation Suite 5000 227 North Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Marc Ito, Esquire Parker Hudson Rainer & Dobbs, LLP Suite 750 215 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Seann M. Frazier, Esquire Parker, Hudson, Rainer & Dobbs, LLP Suite 750 215 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 2021. Maureen McCarthy Daughton, Esquire Maureen McCarthy Daughton, LLC Suite 3-231 1400 Village Square Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32312 Christopher Dale McGuire, Esquire Florida Housing Finance Corporation Suite 5000 227 North Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Michael P. Donaldson, Esquire Carlton Fields P.A. Suite 500 215 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael J. Glazer, Esquire Ausley McMullen 123 South Calhoun Street Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 William D. Hall, Esquire Dean Mead Suite 1200 106 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John L. Wharton, Esquire Dean Mead and Dunbar Suite 1200 106 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Corporation Clerk Florida Housing Finance Corporation Suite 5000 227 North Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 Hugh R. Brown, General Counsel Florida Housing Finance Corporation Suite 5000 227 North Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 Brittany Adams Long, Esquire Radey Law Firm, P.A. Suite 200 301 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Craig D. Varn, Esquire Manson Bolves Donaldson Varn, P.A. Suite 820 106 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Daniel Ryan Russell, Esquire Dean Mead Suite 1200 106 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Amy Wells Brennan, Esquire Manson Bolves Donaldson Varn, P.A. Suite 300 109 North Brush Street Tampa, Florida 33602
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Florida Clearwater Beach Hotel, Inc., is the owner of Lots 1-5 and 49-52 at 490 North Gulfview Boulevard, Clearwater Beach, Florida. Lots 1-5 are located on the southwest corner of Baymont Street and Gulfview Boulevard and front directly on Clearwater Beach. They measure approximately one hundred feet in depth and one hundred forty-one feet at their widest point. Lots 49-52 lie immediately across the street from Lots 1-5 and are approximately one hundred feet south of Baymont Street. They form a square and measure one hundred feet on each side. Petitioner purchased the property in question in 1978. Prior to that time the two parcels of land enjoyed common ownership and a common development pattern for at least forty years. A twenty-two room facility presently sits on Lots 1-5 and is rented out as ten units. Lots 49-52 are used as a parking lot for the tenants and guests of the facility. The property is presently zoned CTF-28 (High Density Commercial Tourist Facilities), which provides for a complete range of motel/hotel developments. The major emphasis of the district is tourist oriented with a permitted maximum density of forty-two hotel or motel units per acre. Petitioner wishes to destroy the existing structure and replace it with a new rectangular-shaped facility containing approximately twenty-two motel or hotel units. Because of the need to comply with flood ordinances, it must be built on pilings or piers. The proposed new structure will consist of four living levels over grade level parking. Petitioner's property measures less than two hundred feet in depth; therefore, the maximum height of its proposed facility cannot exceed forty feet under existing zoning requirements. Other property owners whose lots exceed two hundred feet in depth may construct buildings not to exceed eighty feet in height. Under present plans, the proposed hotel will have a forty-four foot height, which will require a four-foot variance. Petitioner contends that the hotel cannot be built with smaller dimensions. It also contends that a vista or side setback on the northwest corner of the building is required since present plans call for a small portion of the building to project into the vista area. This is due to the north property line running at an angle to the south property line and the proposed building being rectangular in shape. This variance will be contingent upon the City vacating a right-of-way adjacent to Baymont Street, thereby giving Petitioner an additional twenty feet in which to build its new facility. The City opposes the application on the ground that all criteria necessary to grant a variance have not been met. It specifically points out that the problems encountered by Petitioner are not unique to Petitioner alone, but are hardships common to all area owners.
