The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the Department of Environmental Regulation (Department) should grant a dredge and fill permit which has been requested by the Respondent, William R. Cullen (Applicant). That proposed permit has been opposed by the Petitioners (who will be referred to collectively as Petitioners for convenience sake).
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency authorized to issue permits pursuant to Chapter 403, Florida Statutes. The Respondent, William R. Cullen, filed an application for a dredge and fill permit to construct a slip marina on June 4, 1985. The original request was subsequently amended to seek approval for a forty-two slip commercial marina. The project site for the Applicant's marina is located at Key Largo, Monroe County, Florida. The site is within Buttonwood Sound, Florida Bay. The property is owned by Mr. Cullen and his family. All of the proposed improvements will be constructed on submerged lands or uplands owned or controlled by the Cullen family. The project site is located within a commercial area of Key Largo and contains frontage on both the water, Buttonwood Sound, and the highway, U.S. Highway 1. The project site has a basin which was created by the excavation of materials used for road construction from the shoreline and the installation of an L-shaped rock jetty which runs roughly perpendicular and then parallel to the shoreline. This jetty was installed during the late 1960s. The water depths within the basin range from 3 feet to approximately 14 feet. The water within the basin is subject to the same tidal considerations as the waters within Buttonwood Sound. There is no interruption of the flow of water in and out of the basin from those waters of the Sound. The water within this basin is within an Outstanding Florida Water as defined in Rule 17-3.041, Florida Administrative Code. The Applicant's plan calls for the excavation of appproximately 30,170 square feet of upland area and the dredging of the existing basin for approximately 18,460 dredged square feet. During the construction phases, the Applicant proposes to install turbidity curtains to limit the adverse effects expected during that time. The improvements are intended to be a permanent alteration to the basin design and will permanently modify the marine life habitat within that basin. The Applicant proposes to remove portions of the existing jetty to allow additional water to flow through the basin unimpeded by the jetty walls. The removal of the jetty walls will expedite the dilution and flushing of potential pollutants from the basin on a tidal frequency. That flushing is purported to assure that the water quality within the basin will not be diminished. However, such pollutants will be flushed into Buttonwood Sound. Stormwater accumulating on the upland project is to flow toward a lower upland area and should not to be dumped into the basin. The proposed marina is to have fueling facilities and the Applicant has agreed to design that system to limit inadvertent spillage. Further, as a condition of the permit, the Applicant has agreed to abide by the Department of Natural Resources' spill contingency plan requirements. The proposed marina is designed to provide portable sewage pumpout facilities for each slip. A permanent pumpout facilities will also be available. The Applicant seeks to attract boats in the range of 30 to 50 feet in length at this facility. While there are a number of other marinas in other areas of Key Largo which might accomodate that size boat, the marinas in the immediate vicinity of this project site are designed for smaller craft. The area within the basin consists of unvegetated bottom, submerged rip-rap, sea grasses, and hardbottom/algae communities--the predominant classifications being the latter two. The deeper hardbottom areas are to be filled and portions of the sea grasses will be dredged in order to configure the proposed docks. Additionally, other sea grass areas will be shaded, and thereby disturbed, by the construction of the docks. There are no historical or archaeological features relevant to the proposed site. The area has not been designated as a critical manatee area, however, manatees do frequent the project vicinity and have been observed feeding immediately adjacent to the basin. The permit proposed for this project requires a water quality monitoring plan. In addition to sampling for coliform, diesel by-products, oils, greases, detergents, oxygen, copper, lead and zinc, the plan requires sampling for aluminum, cadmium, and chromium. The monitoring stations are to be located both within the basin (2 stations) and outside the basin (2 stations). Liveaboards or others continuously docked at the marina will create additional shading which will disrupt and adversely affect the sea grass system. In order to provide access to the marina, the Applicant intends to dredge a channel in an area containing sea grass which is undisputedly within the Outstanding Florida Waters. The Department deemed the subject application was complete on February 23, 1988. The Department did not apply the Keys Rule found in Rule 17-312.400, Florida Administrative Code, to this project. The Department also did not apply the Mitigation Rule found in Rule 17-312.300, Florida Administrative Code, to this project. Michael Dentzau has personally reviewed and processed 250-300 dredge and fill permits during his tenure with the Department. Of those projects he has reviewed, he has not recommended that dense sea grass beds of the type located within this project site be dredged in order to construct a commercial marina. Phillip Edwards was responsible for executing the Intent to Issue in this case. In determining that this project had provided reasonable assurances that water quality standards will not be violated, Mr. Edwards weighed the public interests criteria set forth in Section 403.918, Florida Statutes. Because he received letters purportedly from elected officials, Mr. Edwards presumed that the project was in the public interest. That assumption of fact has not been established by this record. According to Mr. Edwards, the adverse effects expected by this project could be adequately addressed by the permit conditions when weighed against the public interest in favor of the project. Since Mr. Edwards' assumptions as to the public interest in this project have not been established, his conclusion regarding the weight that interest should receive can be given little consideration. The project as proposed by the Applicant will not adversely affect navigation or cause harmful erosion or shoaling. The project as proposed by the Applicant will adversely affect fishing or marine productivity within the basin since it will permanently alter the basin biologically by destroying sea grass. The increased boat traffic within the Sound will also detract from the present recreational uses enjoyed by area residents. According to Mr. Edwards, it is very unusual for the Department to issue a permit when sea grasses will be adversely affected. In the 17 years in which he has reviewed permits, only two occasions merited approval when the destruction of sea grasses to the extent in this case would result. Neither of those cases were factually similar to the case at issue. In those cases, however, elected officials advised Mr. Edwards, as he presumed they had here, that there was a public need for the permit. Increased boat traffic will result in increased manatee mortality due to collisions. In order to assure water quality will not be degraded within a marina, the project should have a short flushing time comparable to healthy natural embayments. In this case, the flushing proposed by the Applicant is dependent, in part, on winds which may be inconsistent or relatively minimal during the summer months.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Environmental Regulation enter a final order denying the permit requested by the Applicant. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 1990. APPENDIX TO CASE NOS. 89-3779 et seq. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY PETITIONERS: The first three sentences of paragraph 1 are accepted; the remainder is rejected as argument or irrelevant. Paragraph 2 is accepted. Paragraph 3 is accepted. With regard to paragraph 4, it is accepted that the Department deemed the application complete on February 23, 1988; otherwise, the paragraph is rejected as argument. With regard to paragraph 5, it is accepted that the habitat within the basin is the same as the habitat throughout Florida Bay and that the basin is not "enclosed" hydrologically; otherwise, the paragraph is rejected as argument or comment. Paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 are rejected as argument, conclusions of law, or comment. The paragraphs do not recite facts pertinent to this case. Paragraphs 13, 14, and the first two sentences of paragraph 15 are accepted. The remainder of paragraph IS is rejected as argument. The first two sentences of paragraph 16 are accepted. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as comment or argument. Paragraph 17 is accepted. Paragraph 18 is rejected as argument. To the extent that paragraph 19 accurately describes Van de Kreeke's assessment of the report it is accepted; otherwise rejected as irrelevant, comment, argument, recitation of testimony or unsupported by the record. The report upon which comment is directed was not offered in this cause to prove its truth/accuracy. Paragraphs 20 through 22 are rejected as comment, argument, recitation of testimony or unsupported by the record-- see comment to paragraph 19 above. Paragraphs 23 through 26 are accepted. Paragraphs 27 and 28 are rejected as argument, comment, or contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 29 and 30 are accepted. Paragraph 31 is rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 32 and 33 are accepted. Paragraph 34 is rejected as hearsay, irrelevant, or argument. Paragraph 35 is rejected as comment or argument. Paragraph 36 is accepted. Paragraphs 37 through 40 are rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 41 through 43 are accepted. Paragraph 44 is rejected as contrary to the record. Paragraph 45 is rejected as argument. Paragraph 46 is rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 47 is accepted but is comment. Paragraphs 48 and 49 are accepted. Paragraph 50 is rejected as repetitive. Paragraph 51 is rejected as argument or conclusions of law. The first three sentences of paragraph 52 are accepted. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as argument. The first sentence and that portion of the second sentence of paragraph 53 that ends with the word "authenticity" is accepted. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as argument or conclusions of law. Paragraphs 54 and 55 are accepted. Paragraph 56 is rejected as irrelevant or hearsay. Paragraph 57 is rejected as hearsay. Paragraph 58 is rejected as argument, comment, or irrelevant. Paragraphs 59 through 66 are accepted. Paragraph 67 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 68 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 69 and 70 are accepted. Paragraph 71 is rejected as repetitive. Paragraph 72 is rejected as argument. The first sentence of paragraph 73 is accepted; the remainder is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 74 is accepted. Paragraphs 75 through 77 are rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 78 and 79 are accepted. Paragraph 80 is rejected as repetitive. With the inclusion of the words "and hardbottom and algae" paragraph 81 is accepted. Paragraph 82 is accepted. Paragraph 83 is accepted. Paragraph 84 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. 5l. Paragraphs 85 through 89 are accepted. With the substitution of the word "not" for the word "ever" in the last sentence of paragraph 90, it is accepted. Paragraphs 91 through 94 are accepted. Paragraph 95 is rejected as not supported by the record or contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 96 through 100 are accepted. Paragraph 101 is rejected as repetitive. Paragraphs 102 through 106 are rejected as argument, comment, or irrelevant. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE DEPARTMENT: Paragraph 1 is accepted. Paragraph 2 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. The waters within the basin are of the same origin as they were prior to the creation of the jetty; no artificial body of water was created. With regard to paragraph 3 it is accepted that the jetty was constructed in the late 1960s. Paragraph 4 is accepted. With regard to paragraph 5 it is accepted that that is the applicants proposal no conclusion as to the likelihood of that is reached. Paragraph 5 is accepted. Paragraph 6 is accepted. Inevitably, however, spills will occur and must be considered as an adverse affect of the project. Paragraph 7 is accepted. Paragraph 8 is rejected as unsupported by competent evidence or contrary to the weight of the evidence presented. Paragraph 9 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 10 is accepted. Paragraph 11 is accepted but is inadequate to offset the adverse affects to manatees. Paragraph 12 is accepted but is inadequate to limit the adverse affects to sea grass. Paragraph 13 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 14 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 15 is accepted. Paragraph 16 is accepted. Paragraphs 17 and 18 are accepted. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE APPLICANT: Paragraphs 1 through the first sentence of paragraph 6 are accepted. The second sentence of paragraph 6 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 7 through Il are accepted. Paragraph 12 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 13 through the first sentence of paragraph 17 are accepted. The remainder of paragraph 17 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 18 is accepted. Paragraph 19 is rejected as unsupported by the record or contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 20 is accepted. Paragraphs 21 through 26 are rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 27 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence or unsupported by competent evidence. The first sentence of paragraph 28 is accepted, the remainder rejected as speculative, comment, or unsupported by the record. The first sentence of paragraph 29 is accepted, the remainder rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 30 is accepted. Paragraph 31 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 32 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 33 is accepted but is irrelevant. Paragraph 34 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 35 is accepted; however, sea grasses not disturbed by dredging will still suffer adverse affects from shading and silting. Paragraph 36 is accepted but see comment to paragraph 35 above. Paragraph 37 is accepted. Paragraph 38 is accepted. Paragraph 39 is accepted but is irrelevant. Paragraph 40 is accepted. Paragraph 41 is accepted. Paragraph 42 is accepted. Paragraph 43 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 44 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 45 is accepted but it should be noted that is not the extent of the proposal. Paragraph 46 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 47 is accepted. Paragraph 48 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 49 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Pamela Presnell Garvin Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Charles Lee Florida Audubon Society 1101 Audubon Way Maitland, Florida 32751 Robert Routa P.O. Box 6506 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6506 Linda McMullen McFARLAIN, STERNSTEIN, WILEY & CASSEDY, P.A. 600 First Florida Bank Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dale H. Twachtmann, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 =================================================================
The Issue The issue to be decided in these cases is whether Petitioner, A. Wayne Lujan (Petitioner), was entitled to issuance of five environmental resource permits (ERPs) that Respondent, Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), intended to deny as stated in notices of denial dated October 25, 2019.
Findings Of Fact The following Findings of Fact are based on the stipulations of the parties and the evidence adduced at the final hearing. Parties and Background Petitioner Lujan is the president and a director of Kay Haven Associated Enterprises, Inc. (Key Haven), that owns the five parcels, which are the subject matter of this hearing. Although Key Haven owns numerous lots, it chose to submit ERP applications for the Subject Lots within the Key Haven Tenth Addition plat dated September 1966 (Plat). See Joint Exhibit 84. Joint Exhibit 84 The Subject Lots are located in an unincorporated part of the County on the northwestern edge of a body of land lying north of State Road A1A, identified on the Plat as Raccoon Key. The Subject Lots are approximately half a mile east of the city limits of Key West, Florida. The Subject Lots are all characterized by a small upland portion adjacent to Floral Avenue. The majority of the Subject Lots transition into a mangrove fringe of varying depth and submerged lands containing marine seagrasses and sponges. See Joint Exhibits 81 and 82. Joint Exhibit 81 Joint Exhibit 82 DEP is the administrative agency of the state having the power and duty to protect Florida's air and water resources, and to administer and enforce the provisions of part II of chapter 380, part IV of chapter 373, and chapter 403, Florida Statutes. DEP also administers the provisions of Florida Administrative Code chapters 62-312 and 62-330 regarding activities in wetlands and other surface waters of the state. DEO is the state land planning agency and reviews certain permit applications for consistency with its statutory responsibilities under the Florida Coastal Management Program (FCMP), which includes part II of chapter 163, and part I of chapter 380, Florida Statutes. Relevant to this proceeding, DEO exercises authority over the ACSC program. See § 380.05, Fla. Stat. On July 26, 2018, Petitioner filed five applications for ERPs with DEP. Although certain details within each application differed, the applications all sought to authorize construction of a seawall in the waters of the Gulf of Mexico and in unnamed wetlands within the landward extent of the Gulf of Mexico, a Class III OFW, to remove the entirety of the existing mangrove fringe, and to place fill within wetlands and other surface waters for the construction of single-family residences (Project). The minor differences in each application relate to the length of the seawall and the amount of fill necessary for each lot. Although some testimony was provided concerning the differences, no party argued that the differences were material to the determinations necessary in this proceeding. Accordingly, the factual and legal analysis for the Subject Lots and ERP applications were addressed without distinction herein. DEP forwarded a copy of the applications to DEO for its recommendation. On August 24, 2018, DEO issued objections to approval of the permits citing inconsistency with the Florida Keys ACSC Principles for Guiding Development (PGDs) in section 380.0552(7). DEO also objected based on inconsistencies between the Project and the Monroe County Comprehensive Plan (Comp Plan) and Land Development Code (LDC), which implement the PGDs. DEP's first RAI dated August 24, 2018, included DEO's objections. The first RAI notified Petitioner that DEP had concerns with the Project that included: (1) installation of the vertical seawall; (2) placement of fill within an OFW; (3) direct impacts to marine seagrass bed community without adequate mitigation; and (4) failure to provide stormwater management plans since the Project was a common plan of development. The first RAI contained 19 specific requests for additional information. On October 23, 2018, Petitioner responded to DEP's first RAI by submitting slightly revised plans. The revised Project proposed less of a vertical seawall footprint by adding rip-rap to the side seawalls as a means of containing fill. Petitioner's responses to the 19 specific requests for information can generally be categorized as follows: (1) elimination of some vertical seawalls, but not the ones on the waterward edge of the Subject Lots; (2) no change in the placement of fill; (3) Petitioner would attempt to find appropriate compensatory mitigation for the seagrass impacts; and (4) Petitioner did not consider the Project to be a common plan of development. Regarding DEO's objections, Petitioner stated that "[w]e acknowledge that the project has been forwarded to FWC [Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission] and DEO and that additional comments and information may be requested by those agencies in order to fully evaluate the application." Petitioner did not substantively address DEO's objections. DEP issued a second RAI on November 21, 2018. DEO again objected in a letter dated November 26, 2018. DEP's second RAI raised the same concerns as the first RAI and acknowledged that four of the 19 specific items were adequately addressed. On January 11, 2019, Petitioner responded to DEP's second RAI by again submitting slightly revised site plans. However, the Project remained generally unchanged, with a proposed vertical seawall on the waterward edge of the lots, rip-rap along the sides, removal of the entire mangrove fringe, and fill of the entire lots eliminating the existing marine seagrasses. DEP issued a third RAI to Petitioner on February 8, 2019. DEO reiterated its objections by letter dated February 8, 2019. The third RAI raised the same concerns as the first and second RAIs, although DEP acknowledged that six of the 19 specific items were adequately addressed. By letter dated April 8, 2019, Petitioner responded to DEP's third RAI. The response again proposed slightly altered site plans from the January 2019 submissions. Petitioner essentially stated that mitigation opportunities were scarce, but had contacted the County and was looking into derelict vessel removal. However, the proposed Project remained generally unchanged, with a proposed vertical seawall on the waterward edge of the lots, rip-rap along the sides, removal of the entire mangrove fringe, and fill of the entire lots eliminating the existing marine seagrasses. As it relates to DEO's objections, Petitioner responded that "[a]fter review of the comments outlined in the [DEO] revised letter, it seems that the DEO objections are related to compliance with the provision[s] of the [Monroe] County [Comp Plan]. We will deal with those issues at the time of local permitting." Petitioner again failed to substantively address DEO's objections. DEP issued its final RAI on May 8, 2019. DEO again objected by letter dated May 6, 2019. This final RAI raised the same concerns as the first, second, and third RAIs. DEP stated that seven of the 19 specific items were not addressed by Petitioner, and that failure to provide a complete response to the prior RAI may result in denial of the ERP applications. On August 29, 2019, Petitioner responded to DEP's final RAI by once again submitting slightly revised plans, and additional information concerning mitigation proposals. However, the Project did not change and Petitioner again failed to substantively address DEO's objections. DEO’s objection letter identified that the ERP applications were inconsistent with the Florida Keys ACSC PGDs, seven Comp Plan policies, and six regulatory provisions of the County's LDC. DEP denied the ERP applications on October 25, 2019. The grounds for denial reiterated the issues not addressed by Petitioner's RAI responses. Specifically: (1) the failure of the Project to provide reasonable assurances concerning direct, secondary, and cumulative impacts to the marine seagrass bed community; (2) continued reliance upon construction of a vertical seawall; (3) failure to provide stormwater management information necessary given the determination that the Project constituted a common plan of development; (4) inconsistency with the FCMP as identified by DEO in its objection letters; and (5) failure to provide reasonable assurances that the Project was clearly in the public interest. Direct Impacts The Project proposed to entirely fill the Subject Lots, contain the fill with vertical seawalls and rip-rap, and construct pile-supported single-family residences. The Project would remove the entire mangrove fringe that aerials and site inspections show is a healthy mix of red, black, and white mangroves along with some green buttonwood. The shallow, open surface waters are dominated by marine seagrasses that vary in density. Petitioner did not make any design modifications to the Project that sought to reduce or eliminate direct impacts to the mangrove fringe and marine seagrasses. Petitioner's resource inventory was done using GIS aerial photography so that the aerial benthic resource surveys submitted to DEP were not ground- truthed. DEP staff conducted physical site inspections and ground-truthing inspections that included swimming in the open surface waters. DEP staff found significant marine seagrasses and sponges that were not mentioned in Petitioner's resource surveys. Depending on the lot, the Project would fill approximately 6,000 square feet of wetlands and other surface waters, i.e., 900 to 2,500 square feet of mangrove habitat and 4,000 to 4,800 square feet of marine seagrass bed habitat. The seawalls depicted in the final version of Petitioner's site plans were "vertical seawalls" because the rip-rap would not face the seawalls to the mean high water line (MHWL). The rip-rap would be placed on submerged resources inside the property lines of the Subject Lots. Also, Petitioner's final plans did not include the mooring of vessels. Vertical seawalls are prohibited in the OFW of the County. Petitioner did not affirmatively demonstrate that fill or shoreline stabilization could be accomplished by using native vegetation instead of vertical seawalls. Secondary Impacts DEP's expert witness, Ms. Mills, testified that Petitioner's ERP applications did not identify any potential secondary impacts. Ms. Mills testified that the expected secondary impacts from the Project included stormwater runoff, shading, and erosion or shoaling. Although the Project plans showed that stormwater would be collected and directed to Floral Avenue, DEP's investigation established that there is no stormwater management system on the side of Floral Avenue abutting the Subject Lots. Thus, the collected and directed stormwater would end up flowing back into the mangrove fringe and surface waters at the lot locations that were not proposed for development, e.g., Lots 36 and 38. The proposed single-family homes are piling-supported structures. Ms. Mills testified that the piling-supported structure would cause shading of the immediate adjacent resources on either side. She identified potential shading impacts to the resources of the undeveloped Lots 36 and 38. In addition, Ms. Mills identified potential erosion or shoaling impacts to the undeveloped Lots 36, 38, and unnamed lots to the left of Lot 40 since they would be surrounded by developed fill on either side. Although Mr. Swakon testified that tidal velocity is low in this area, other aspects, such as effects from wind-driven circulation, were not adequately addressed. Mitigation Petitioner was required to propose mitigation to offset remaining direct and secondary impacts after going through a reduction and elimination exercise. However, Petitioner did not propose any revisions to the Project to reduce or eliminate the direct and secondary impacts identified above. Ms. Mills explained that appropriate mitigation usually provides benefits to the same type of ecological community as the one being impacted. Petitioner's ultimate mitigation proposal was to purchase saltwater credit at a mitigation bank, the Florida Power and Light Everglades Mitigation Bank (FPL EMB). The FPL EMB is located on the mainland of Florida approximately a hundred miles away from the Subject Lots. Ms. Mills testified that saltwater credit would be appropriate to offset and replace the same ecological function of mangroves, but not to offset the submerged benthic communities that would be impacted by the Project. Mr. Swakon testified that calculation of the amount of mitigation credits included a multiplier to address secondary and cumulative impacts, the out-of-kind mitigation, and the dissimilarities in the communities. However, Ms. Mills persuasively testified that the proposed multiplier was not sufficient to justify the three aspects of impact that needed to be offset. Whether to justify dissimilarities between the ecological communities, secondary and cumulative impacts, or the distance of the mitigation site from the Project, the multiplier was not sufficient. Cumulative Impacts The Project is not within a recognized cumulative impact basin of the South Florida Water Management District (SFWMD) for mitigation of impacts purposes. Accordingly, Ms. Mills testified that the plain language of a cumulative impacts analysis is considered. Contiguous lots to the Subject Lots owned by Petitioner could be developed through similar requests in the future. Also, each ERP application's cumulative impact analysis would consider the other four ERP applications as in-house examples of potential future projects. Common Plan of Development Petitioner contested DEP's conclusion that the Project was a common plan of development subject to section 2.0 of the Applicant's Handbook Volume 1 and associated stormwater management requirements. The Project would facilitate the advancement of land uses such as multiple residences, a residential subdivision, or phased site development. The Project comprised a total land area divided into multiple lots or parcels that are under common ownership or control. In total, Petitioner owns 648 lots under common ownership within the Key Haven Tenth and Eleventh Addition. The Subject Lots are all part of a residential subdivision. Thus, the preponderance of the evidence demonstrated that the Project was a common plan of development. For this common plan of development, Petitioner's proposed stormwater management consisted of a cap on the proposed seawalls directing stormwater to swales on each lot. The swales would then direct stormwater to Floral Avenue with no additional treatment or management. During site inspections, DEP staff did not find any evidence of stormwater management along Floral Avenue. Seawalls and Rip-rap The seawalls depicted in the final version of Petitioner's ERP applications would be vertical seawalls because the rip-rap facing the seawall did not come above the MHWL. In addition, the final plans did not include the mooring of vessels. As found above, the Project would place fill, seawalls, and rip-rap on marine seagrasses and sponges. Petitioner failed to affirmatively demonstrate that native vegetation was not sufficient to prevent erosion. The evidence established that Petitioner did not apply for any waiver or variance of applicable ERP rule criteria. FCMP Consistency The evidence demonstrated that Petitioner refused to address DEO's objections based on a mistaken view of the criteria governing ERP applications in the County and the Florida Keys ACSC. Relevant to this proceeding, DEO exercises authority over the ACSC program. See § 380.05, Fla. Stat.; see also § 380.23(6), Fla. Stat. (Each agency charged with implementing statutes and rules that are part of the FCMP, shall be afforded an opportunity to provide DEP with its comments and determination regarding consistency of the activity with those statutes and rules.). Section 380.05(16) prohibits persons from undertaking any development within the Florida Keys ACSC, except in accordance with the PGDs. Thus DEO, as the administrator of the ACSC program, reviewed the ERP applications for consistency with applicable regulatory requirements. DEO issued objections to approval of the permits citing inconsistency with the Florida Keys ACSC PGDs; and inconsistencies between the Project and the County's Comp Plan and LDC which implement the PGDs. DEO identified that the Project would be inconsistent with four PGDs. DEO's expert witness, Ms. Powell, testified that the Project was inconsistent with the PGD, which provides for strengthening local government capabilities for managing land use and development so that the local government is able to achieve these objectives without continuing the ACSC designation. See § 380.0552(7)(a), Fla. Stat. Ms. Powell persuasively testified that the ERP applications were inconsistent with this PGD because the Project would impair the local government's ability to have the ACSC designation removed. Allowing development inconsistent with its regulations would hurt the local government's ability to pursue de-designation. No evidence was presented by Petitioner that the Project would be consistent with this PGD. The second PGD cited by DEO provides for protecting shoreline and marine resources, including mangroves, coral reef formations, seagrass beds, wetlands, fish and wildlife, and their habitat. See § 380.0552(7)(b), Fla. Stat. It was undisputed that the Project would result in total removal of the mangrove and buttonwood fringe on each lot and 100% destruction of existing submerged marine resources. No evidence was presented by Petitioner that the Project would be consistent with this PGD. The third PGD cited by DEO provides for limiting the adverse impacts of development on the quality of water throughout the Florida Keys. See § 380.0552(7)(e), Fla. Stat. Ms. Powell testified that degradation to nearshore water quality from prior dredge and fill activity was one of the reasons for the designation of the Florida Keys as an ACSC. Additionally, as further discussed below, the Project would be inconsistent with the County's Comp Plan policies and LDC regulations that further the goal of protecting the quality of water throughout the Florida Keys ACSC. No evidence was presented by Petitioner that the Project would be consistent with this PGD. The fourth PGD cited by DEO provides for protecting the public health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of the Florida Keys, and maintaining the Florida Keys as a unique Florida resource. See § 380.0552(7)(n), Fla. Stat. As further discussed below, the Project would be inconsistent with the County's Comp Plan and LDC regulations that prohibit the use of structural fill within velocity zones. No evidence was presented by Petitioner that the Project would be consistent with this PGD. Ms. Powell testified that DEO considered the remaining statutory PGDs, and determined they were not particularly applicable to these ERP applications. In accordance with its duties, DEO had also reviewed and approved the County's Comp Plan and LDC as consistent with the statutory PGDs. DEO identified that the Project would be inconsistent with seven Comp Plan policies. They are Policies 102.1.1, 101.5.25, 203.1.1, 204.2.2, 204.2.3, 204.2.4, and 212.5.3. Policy 102.1.1 provides: The County shall protect submerged lands and wetlands. The open space requirement shall be one hundred (100) percent of the following types of wetlands: submerged lands mangroves salt ponds fresh water wetlands fresh water ponds undisturbed salt marsh and buttonwood wetlands Allocated density (dwelling units per acre) shall be assigned to freshwater wetlands and undisturbed salt marsh and buttonwood wetlands only for use as transferable development rights (TDRs) away from these habitats. Submerged lands, salt ponds, freshwater ponds, and mangroves shall not be assigned any density or intensity. Policy 101.5.25 provides that "[t]he allocated densities for submerged lands, salt ponds, freshwater ponds, and mangroves shall be 0 and the maximum net density bonuses shall not be available." Policy 203.1.1 provides that "[t]he open space requirement for mangrove wetlands shall be one hundred (100) percent. No fill or structures shall be permitted in mangrove wetlands except for elevated, pile-supported walkways, docks, piers and utility pilings." Policy 204.2.2 provides: To protect submerged lands and wetlands, the open space requirement shall be 100 percent of the following types of wetlands: submerged lands; mangroves; salt ponds; freshwater wetlands; freshwater ponds; and undisturbed salt marsh and buttonwood wetlands. Allocated density (dwelling units per acre) shall be assigned to freshwater wetlands and undisturbed salt marsh and buttonwood wetland only for use as transferable development rights away from these habitats. Submerged lands, salt ponds, freshwater ponds and mangroves shall not be assigned any density or intensity. Within one (1) year after the adoption of the 2030 Comprehensive Plan, the County shall revise the LDC to include a prohibition of development in salt ponds. Policy 204.2.3 provides: No structures shall be permitted in submerged lands, mangroves, salt ponds, or wetlands, except for elevated, pile-supported walkways, docks, piers, and utility pilings. No fill shall be permitted in submerged lands, mangroves, salt ponds, or wetlands except: as specifically allowed by Objective 212.5 and subsequent Policies; to fill a manmade excavated water body, such as a canal, boat ramp, or swimming pool if the Director of Environmental Resources determines that such filling will not have a significant adverse impact on marine or wetland communities; or as needed for shoreline stabilization or beach renourishment projects with a valid public purpose that furthers the goals of the Monroe County Comprehensive Plan, as determined by the County. Policy 204.2.4 provides: No fill or structures shall be permitted in mangroves or wetlands except as allowed by Policy 204.2.3 (as amended) and for bridges extending over mangroves or wetlands that are required to provide automobile or pedestrian access to dwelling units located on upland areas within the same property for which there is no alternative means of access. Such bridges shall be elevated on pilings such that the natural movement of water, including volume, rate, and direction of flow shall not be disrupted or altered. Upland areas shall include disturbed wetlands that have been lawfully converted into uplands through filling. Policy 212.5.3 provides: Bulkheads, seawalls or other hardened vertical shoreline structures shall be permitted on residential canals and altered shorelines only in the following situations: to replace an existing deteriorated bulkhead or seawall; or to stabilize a severely eroding shoreline area. DEO's expert witness, Ms. Powell, persuasively testified that the Project was inconsistent with all seven policies, because it did not protect the submerged lands and wetlands, did not provide for 100% open space within the submerged lands and wetlands, and provided for the construction of a seawall not excepted from the general prohibition. Petitioner did not present any evidence that the Project was consistent with the cited policies. Instead, Petitioner's witness, Mr. Nelson, testified that he felt certain County regulations would militate in favor of allowing the development. The main factor cited by Mr. Nelson was that the Subject Lots were designated as Tier III parcels under the County's LDC. However, designation of a parcel as Tier III did not conflict with the policies cited by DEO. The more credible and persuasive evidence concerning the Project's compliance with the Comp Plan policies was provided by Ms. Powell, who concluded that the Project was not consistent with those policies. DEO identified that the Project would be inconsistent with six sections of the County's LDC regulations. Those are sections 118-4, 118-10(e), 118-12(k)(2), 122-4(b)(5), 130-157, and 130-162. The LDC regulations are more specific methods for implementing the Comp Plan policies outlined above. Section 118-4 provides: No development activities, except as provided for in this chapter, are permitted in submerged lands, mangroves, salt ponds, freshwater wetlands, freshwater ponds, or in undisturbed salt marsh and buttonwood wetlands; the open space requirement is 100 percent. Allocated density (dwelling units per acre) shall be assigned to freshwater wetlands and undisturbed salt marsh and buttonwood wetlands only for use as transferable development rights away from these habitats. Submerged lands, salt ponds, freshwater ponds and mangroves shall not be assigned any density or intensity. Section 118-10(e), in relevant part, provides: Mangroves, wetlands, and submerged lands. All structures developed, used or occupied on land classified as mangroves, wetlands or submerged lands (all types and all levels of quality) shall be designed, located and constructed such that: Generally. Only docks and docking facilities, boat ramps, walkways, water access walkways, water observation platforms, boat shelters, nonenclosed gazebos, riprap, seawalls, bulkheads, and utility pilings shall be permitted on or over mangroves, wetlands, and submerged lands, subject to the specific restrictions of this subsection. Trimming and/or removal of mangroves shall meet Florida Department of Environmental Protection requirements. * * * (4) Placement of fill. No fill shall be permitted in any mangroves, wetlands, or submerged lands except: As specifically allowed by this Section or by Section 118- 12(k) (Bulkheads, Seawalls, Riprap) and 118-12(l) (Boat Ramps); To fill a manmade, excavated water body such as a canal, boat ramp, boat slip, boat basin or swimming pool if the County Biologist determines that such filling will not have a significant adverse impact on marine or wetland communities; As needed for shoreline stabilization or beach renourishment projects with a valid public purpose that furthers the goals of the Monroe County Comprehensive Plan, as determined by the County Biologist; For bridges extending over salt marsh and/or buttonwood association wetlands that are required to provide automobile or pedestrian access to lawfully established dwelling units located on upland areas within the same property for which there is no alternate means of access. Such bridges shall be elevated on pilings so that the natural movement of water, including volume, rate and direction of flow shall not be disrupted or altered; or As approved for Disturbed Salt Marsh and Buttonwood Association Wetlands with appropriate mitigation as defined by the wetland regulations of subsection (e)(6) of this Section. Section 118-12(k)(2) provides: (2) Vertical type seawalls or bulkheads shall be permitted only to stabilize severely eroding shorelines and only on manmade canals, channels, or basins. Such seawalls or bulkheads shall be permitted only if native vegetation and/or riprap and filter cloth is not a feasible means to control erosion. No new seawalls, bulkheads, or other hardened vertical structures shall be permitted on open water. Section 122-4(b)(5), in relevant part, provides: Coastal high-hazard areas (V zones). Within the areas of special flood hazard are areas designated as coastal high- hazard areas, which have special flood hazards associated with wave wash. The following provisions shall apply in these areas: * * * e. There shall be no fill used as structural support. Section 130-157, Maximum Permanent Residential Density and Minimum Required Open Space, provides at note (a): (a) The allocated densities for submerged lands, salt ponds, freshwater ponds, and mangroves shall be 0 and the maximum net density bonuses shall not be available. Section 130-162, Maximum Densities for Hotel/Motel, Campground, Recreational Vehicle, Seasonal and Institutional Residential Uses, and Minimum Open Space, proves at note (a): (a) The allocated densities for submerged lands, salt ponds, freshwater ponds, and mangroves shall be 0 and the maximum net density bonuses shall not be available. Ms. Powell persuasively testified that the Project was not consistent with the County's LDC regulations in sections 118-4, 118-10(e), 118-12(k)(2), 122- 4(b)(5), 130-157, and 130-162. The Project was inconsistent with the cited LDC regulations because it sought to construct seawall in submerged land, fill portions of the lots subject to a 100% open space requirement, remove the entirety of the existing mangrove fringe, impair 100% of the marine seagrass resources within the Subject Lots, and utilize structural fill within a Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) designated Velocity Zone. The preponderance of the evidence demonstrated that the Project did not meet the criteria of part IV of chapter 62-312 and section 380.0552. The testimony also demonstrated that Petitioner did not apply for a variance or waiver of the County's LDC regulations. Conditions for Issuance Petitioner generally argued that the five applications provided reasonable assurance for issuance of individual ERPs. However, the persuasive and credible evidence established that the Project did not satisfy a majority of the conditions for issuance under rule 62-330.301. Petitioner failed to provide adequate information regarding stormwater management, the impacts of runoff to Floral Avenue, and runoff flowing back into the Gulf of Mexico OFW. This failure resulted in a lack of reasonable assurance that the Project would not cause adverse flooding to on-site or off-site property; would not cause adverse water quantity impacts to receiving waters and adjacent lands; and would not adversely affect the quality of receiving waters. The preponderance of the evidence demonstrated that the Project would adversely impact the value of functions provided to fish and wildlife and listed species by wetlands and other surface waters. Those functions would be 100% impacted and the impacts would not be adequately offset by appropriate mitigation. As found above, the Project would cause adverse secondary impacts to the water resources, adverse impacts to surface water conveyance, and the adverse impacts would not be adequately offset by appropriate mitigation. Additional Conditions for Issuance Petitioner generally contended that the five applications provided reasonable assurance that the Project was clearly in the public interest under rule 62-330.302. However, the persuasive and credible evidence established that the Project did not satisfy a majority of the applicable additional conditions for issuance. The Project would adversely affect the public health, safety, or welfare or the property of others because Petitioner failed to provide adequate information regarding stormwater management. DEP's site inspection found no stormwater management or treatment system on the side of Floral Avenue adjacent to the Subject Lots. Thus, the collected and directed stormwater would end up flowing back into the mangrove fringe and the OFW. The preponderance of the evidence demonstrated that the Project would adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife, or their habitat, as a result of the 100% impact to benthic communities, which would not be adequately offset by appropriate mitigation. The preponderance of the evidence demonstrated that the Project would adversely affect marine productivity, the current condition, and the relative value of functions being performed by the impacted areas. Also, the Project would be permanent in nature. The preponderance of the evidence demonstrated that Petitioner failed to provide reasonable assurance that there would not be harmful erosion or shoaling. The Project would not adversely affect or enhance any significant historical and archaeological resources. The Project would not be within a recognized cumulative impact basin of the SFWMD for mitigation of impacts purposes. Contiguous lots to the Subject Lots owned by Petitioner could be developed through similar requests in the future. Each ERP application's cumulative impact analysis would consider the other four ERP applications as in-house examples of potential future projects. Thus, Petitioner did not provide reasonable assurance that each ERP application would not cause unacceptable cumulative impacts upon wetlands and other surface waters.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that DEP enter a final order denying Petitioner's five ERP applications. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of April, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRANCINE M. FFOLKES Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathryn E.D. Lewis, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Jay Patrick Reynolds, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399 William Moore, Esquire Moore Bowman & Reese, P.A. Suite 100 551 North Cattlemen Road Sarasota, Florida 34232 Justin G. Wolfe, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Legal Department, Suite 1051-J Mail Station 35 Douglas Building 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Jon F. Morris, Esquire Brandon W. White, Esquire Department of Economic Opportunity 107 East Madison Street, Mail Station 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Lea Crandall, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Noah Valenstein, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Valerie A. Wright, Esquire Department of Economic Opportunity 107 East Madison Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399
The Issue Whether Petitioner should be granted the relief requested in his petition challenging the Department of Environmental Protection's Consolidated Notice of Denial [of] Environmental Resource Permit and Consent of Use to Use Sovereign Submerged Lands.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a collector and wholesaler of various "saltwater products," as defined in Chapter 370, Florida Statutes.1 He possess a saltwater products license (issued pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 370, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 46-42, Florida Administrative Code), with a restricted species and marine life endorsement, which allows him to engage in these activities. Petitioner collects and sells, among other things, what is referred to as "live sand," a calcium carbonate sediment used in public and home aquaria as a decorative detoxifying agent. "Live sand" is found on offshore water bottoms in the Florida Keys (where Petitioner engages in his collection activities) and other areas in Florida. "Live sand" consists primarily of the calcified (dead) remains of Halimeda plants. Halimeda plants (generally on a seasonal basis) produce plates, which they ultimately shed. These plates, through various physical and biological processes, are broken down over time into smaller and smaller granules. Halimeda plants are very productive (in terms of the number of plates they produce), but they are found only in certain (not all) offshore areas in the Florida Keys. While the granules that make up the "live sand" Petitioner collects and sells consist of dead plant matter, thousands of micro and macroorganisms (in a cubic foot area), representing numerous species, live amongst these granules and therefore are also removed from the water as a result of Petitioner's collection activities. The microorganisms living in "live sand" include nitrosomous bacteria. The presence of nitrosomous bacteria enables "live sand" to neutralize the ammonia waste products of fish in public and home aquaria. Among the macroorganisms living in "live sand" are mollusks, worms, arthropods, and echinoderms. These organisms are an important part of the diet of other species, including protected species such as the spiny lobster (Panulirus argus), which itself is part of the food supply for fish in the area. Petitioner collects "live sand" by diving underwater and using his hands to scoop up and place in buckets the top layers of the bottom ("live sand") substrate. Such collection activities have negative environmental consequences that are not insignificant. They adversely impact water quality in the waters in which they occur and in adjacent waters inasmuch as they increase turbidity and reduce biological diversity. Excavation of the top layer of bottom substrate exposes the siltier sediment below, which, when disturbed, reduces water clarity and therefore also the amount of sunlight that penetrates the water. Furthermore, this newly exposed substrate, because of its anaerobic nature, is unable to attract a significant benthic community comparable to that found in the "live sand" that previously covered it. In addition, because these collection activities result in the removal of organisms that are important components of the aquatic food chain and in loss of their habitats, these activities have an adverse effect on marine productivity and, resultantly, on fishing and recreational values. The "live sand" that is the subject of the instant controversy is located in Monroe County within the boundaries of the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary in state waters designated Class III, Outstanding Florida Waters (OFW).2 Petitioner first contacted the Department in writing regarding the removal of this "live sand" in May of 1997, when he sent the Department a letter which read, in pertinent part, as follows: REF: Collection of Sand for Use in Aquari[a] Pursuant to our recent telephone conversation, I respectfully request that I receive a letter of de minimis for the aforementioned activity. The sand is collected by hand using five gallon buckets. The collection occurs under water [at] a depth of approximately 20 feet. The sand occurs in an area devoid of marine grasses, plants and corals. No sand is taken from or near shorelines and no sedimentary resultant is produced. I intend to collect four five gallon buckets each of which contains 50 pounds of sand. This collection is to occur once a month. . . . By letter dated June 2, 1997, the Department acknowledged receipt of Petitioner's letter and requested that he provide "additional information" to enable the Department to determine whether it should grant him "an exemption from the need for an Environmental Resource Permit pursuant to Part IV, Chapter 373, Florida Statutes (F.S.), and an authorization to use state- owned submerged lands, pursuant to Chapters 253 and 258, F.S., to collect sand, by hand, from underwater." On August 28, 1997, Petitioner supplied the Department with an "addendum to [his] original request for consideration" in which he specified the location of his "proposed collection" of "live sand" as "Lat. N 24.31.29 - Lon. W 081.34.40. The Department deemed Petitioner's "addendum" insufficient to render his paperwork "complete." By letter dated September 23, 1997, the Department so advised Petitioner. Along with letter, the Department provided Petitioner with the following "revised request for additional information identifying the remaining items necessary to complete [his] application": Part I REVISED COMPLETENESS SUMMARY FOR SAND COLLECTION The proposed project will require an Environmental Resource Permit. The correct processing fee for this project is $500.00. Provide a $500 processing fee payable to the Department of Environmental Protection. In your letter received May 6, 1997, requesting a De Minimis exemption you state you intend to collect four (4), five (5) gallon buckets of sand each of which contains fifty (50) pounds of sand per month. A letter you submitted to the Department from the Army Corps of Engineers (dated May 9, 1997) states you will collect four (4) or five (5), five (5) gallon buckets three (3) times per month. Please indicate the quantity of sand you propose[] to collect per month. Part II CONSENT OF USE (Chapters 18-18, 18-20 and 18-21, Florida Administrative Code) For your information If the project develops to the point where proposed dredging will be recommended for authorization, payment for the removal of sovereign submerged land will be required at $3.25 per cubic yard, or a minimum payment of $50.00 prior to issuance of the authorization. Do not provide payment until requested by Department staff. [See 18- 21.011(3)(a), F.A.C.] Petitioner timely responded to the Department's "revised request for additional information" by letter dated October 10, 1997, to which he attached the requested "processing fee." In his letter, Petitioner advised the Department that it was his "intent to collect approximately 600 (six hundred) pounds of material each month." Following its receipt of Petitioner's letter and accompanying "processing fee," the Department sent letters to potentially affected parties advising them of Petitioner's "proposed [sand collection] activit[ies]" and soliciting their comments concerning these activities. The Florida Department of Community Affairs responded to the Department's request by indicating, in written correspondence it sent to the Department, that it had "no objection to the proposed project." The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) also provided written comments to the Department. It did so by letter dated November 21, 1997, which read as follows: The following are comments from the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary (FKNMS) concerning the application from Jeff Frankel to collect live sand, File No 44-0128760-001. These comments reflect the consensus of both NOAA and FDEP Sanctuary staff. The harvest of live sand is viewed by the Sanctuary as dredging. This activity is considered neither fishing nor traditional fishing activity. Therefore, "harvesting of live sand" is within the prohibition against dredging, or otherwise altering the seabed of the Sanctuary and does not fall within the exception for "traditional fishing activities" as Mr. Frankel asserts. As such this activity should not be conducted in the Sanctuary without a Federal or State permit. The Sanctuary is opposed to permitting this activity in Federal or State waters for the following reasons: As stated above, it is a dredging activity which is prohibited.3 The Sanctuary exists because of the unique and nationally significant resources found here. These resources exist due to the dynamic ecosystem of which sand, and the meiofaunal communities found therein, is a major component. The Sanctuary is opposed to unnecessary alteration of the ecosystem particularly when viable alternatives exist such as harvesting outside the FKNMS in Gulf waters and aquaculture. Sixty-five percent of the Sanctuary seabottom is State sovereign lands. Removal of the quantities of substrate for commercial purposes does not appear to be in the public interest. Pursuant to the intragency compact agreement between the State of Florida and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration dated May 19, 1997, NOAA will not permit a prohibited activity in federal waters in the Sanctuary that is not allowed in the State waters of the Sanctuary. We appreciate the opportunity to comment on this application. On January 8, 1998, the Department issued its Consolidated Notice of Denial [of] Environmental Resource Permit and Consent of Use to Use Sovereign Submerged Lands. In its Consolidated Notice, the Department gave the following reasons for its action: The Department hereby denies the permit for the following reason: The proposed project will directly impact water quality by removal of approximately 660 pounds of "live sand" from state-owned sovereign submerged land each month. The material collected consists of dead calcareous green algae (Halimeda spp.) and calcium carbonate grains. This substrate is important habitat for grazers and detritivores and it contains an extensive and diverse invertebrate community. . . . The project as proposed does not comply with the specific criteria within; Chapter 373, F.S., F.A.C. Rule 62-300, and Section 4.2 of the Basis of Review for Environmental Resource Permit Applications within the South Florida Water Management District. The above impacts are expected to adversely affect marine productivity, fisheries, wildlife habitat, and water quality. The applicant has not provided reasonable assurance that the immediate and long-term impacts of the project will not result in the violation of water quality standards pursuant to F.A.C. Rule 62-312.150(3) and 62-312.070. Specific State Water Quality Standards in F.A.C. Rules 62-302.500, 62-302.510, 62- 302.560 and 62-4.242 that will be affected by the completion of the project include the following: Biological Integrity- . . . . This project will also result in the following matter which are not clearly in the public interest pursuant to Section 373.414(1)(a), F.S.: adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife, including endangered species, or their habitats; diminish the current condition and relative value of functions being performed by areas affected by the proposed activity; adversely affect the fishing or recreational values or marine productivity in the vicinity of the activity; the activity will be permanent in nature; adversely affect the functions and relative value of the habitat within the area of the proposed project. Therefore, the Applicant has not provided reasonable assurance that the project is clearly in the public interest pursuant to Section 373.414(1)(a), F.S. The request for authorization to use sovereign submerged lands is denied because the Applicant has not met all applicable requirements for proprietary authorizations to use sovereign submerged lands, pursuant to Article X, Section 11 of the Florida Constitution, Chapter 253 F,S., associated Chapter 18-21, F.A.C., and the policies of the Board of Trustees. Specifically, operation of the activity is inconsistent with management policies, standards and criteria of F.A.C. Rule 18- 21.00401(2) and 18-21.004. The Applicant has not provided reasonable assurance that the activity will be clearly "in the public interest," will maintain essentially natural conditions, will not cause adverse impacts to fish and wildlife resources or public recreation or navigation, and will not interfere with the riparian rights of adjacent property owners. In addition, the project is inconsistent with the goals and objectives of the "Conceptual State Lands Management Plan," adopted by the Board of Trustees on March 17, 1981. The . . . activity is inconsistent with Section 18-21.00401(2), F.A.C., the authorization to use sovereign submerged lands cannot be approved, in accordance with Sections 18-21.00401 and 62-343.075, F.A.C., because the activity does not meet the conditions for issuance of a standard general of individual permit under Part IV of Chapter 373, F.S., as described above. The Consolidated Notice accurately describes the adverse impacts of the "project" which is subject of the instant case (Project). Petitioner has not proposed any measures to mitigate these adverse impacts. If the Department authorizes the Project, it is reasonable to anticipate that other collectors of "live sand" would seek the Department's approval to engage in similar activity in the area. If these other projects were also approved, there would be additional adverse environmental consequences. As the Consolidated Notice alleges, Petitioner has failed to provide reasonable assurance that the Project would not degrade the ambient water quality of the OFW in which the Project would be undertaken, nor has he provided reasonable assurance that the Project is clearly in the public interest.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order denying Petitioners' application for an environmental resource permit and for a lease to use sovereign submerged lands. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of January, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of January, 1999.
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether the applicants, William Guererro and Christina Bang, a/k/a Christina Guerrero (Applicants), are entitled to issuance of a Consolidated Environmental Resource Permit and State Lands Approvals for various structures on the Applicants’ property at 58458 Overseas Highway, Marathon, Florida.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioners Bernard Spinrad and Marian Spinrad are the owners of adjoining parcels of property with the addresses of 58418 and 58420 Overseas Highway, Marathon, Florida. They acquired the property in December 2001. They recently completed construction of two residential structures on the properties. The structure at 58418 Overseas Highway is currently listed for sale. The structure at 58420 Overseas Highway is a vacation rental property. Neither structure is Petitioners’ permanent residence. The DEP is the state agency with the power and duty to regulate activities in waters of the state pursuant to chapter 373, Florida Statutes. The DEP also serves as staff to the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (“Board of Trustees”) to review and act on activities on state sovereignty submerged lands under chapter 253. The Applicants, are the owners of adjoining parcels of property with the address of 58478 Overseas Highway, Marathon, Florida (the Property). They purchased the Property in June 2010. The structures that are the subject of the Permit are to be constructed near or waterward of the shoreline of the Property. The Property The Property is located on Grassy Key, an island in the middle Florida Keys, within limits of the city of Marathon, Monroe County, Florida. U.S. Highway 1 passes through Grassy Key. The Property -- as is that of Petitioners -- is situated between U.S. Highway 1 and the open waters of the Atlantic Ocean. In the early part of the 20th century, a portion of Grassy Key was platted as the Crains Subdivision. The properties owned by Applicants and Petitioners are within the Crains Subdivision. During the periods of time directly relevant hereto, the Property has been owned by Burgess Levine, who owned the property during the period prior to the October 2006, landfall of Hurricane Wilma until June 2010, and by Applicants, who have owned the Property since June, 2010. Grassy Key Grassy Key is three-miles long, and has 6800 feet of beaches, none of which are designated as critically eroded. The island fronts the Atlantic Ocean to the east, and the more protected waters of Florida Bay to the west. The waters along the Atlantic Ocean shoreline of Grassy Key in the area at issue are shallow, with an extremely flat bottom having a very gradual slope of approximately 1 to 30, meaning there is a one foot vertical change over 30 horizontal feet. The mean tide range at the Property is about 1.7 feet. Under normal conditions, the stretch of Grassy Key at issue is fairly characterized as a zero-wave energy shoreline. Waves break well offshore and there is negligible wave energy propagating beyond that point. What shoreline energy exists is produced by small tide currents and wind-shear on the water surface that moves water along the shoreline. The direction of the water movement is dependent on tides and wind direction, with the predominant direction being from north to south. Erosive and other significant changes to the shoreline of Grassy Key, including that stretch fronting the Property, are event driven, meaning when there is a coastal storm that causes a rise in the water level, substantially higher than the astronomical tide, waves can propagate onto the shoreline of Grassy Key. The wind and waves can come from virtually any direction depending on the storm. A storm of greater intensity will create higher energy-wave conditions. Although storm conditions may only occur over 1 to 3 percent of a given year, with the rest of the year having zero-wave energy, on average the coastline may be considered to be of moderate-wave energy. The beach sediment along the Grassy Key shoreline in all areas pertinent hereto consists of calcareous material, made up of the breakdown of corals and coralling algae, with a significant fraction of other detrital marine material. The upper beaches of Grassy Key, including that on the Property, generally consist of coarse, calcareous sand with a small fraction of calcareous silt-size particles. The inter-tidal areas along Grassy Key consist of predominantly fine calcareous sand, with a greater fraction of calcareous silt. Extending out into the nearshore area all along Grassy Key, including that fronting the properties owned by Petitioners and Applicants, the sediment becomes a very fine calcareous sand, with a greater fraction of the material being calcareous silts and clays, and with a substantial amount of organic mud of a marine origin, classified as Islamorada muck. Since at least the 1970s, one wading in the nearshore waters along Grassy Key could expect to sink into the surface muck to a depth of anywhere from six inches to two feet. The depth of muck becomes less as one moves further out and approaches the offshore Thalassia beds. Although some areas offer more resistance than others, it is routine to experience difficulty in walking and wading along the coast of Grassy Key because of the high percentage of clays and silts in the substrate. The band of muck narrows as one proceeds towards the northern stretches of Grassy Key, until one reaches the furthest areas to the northeast where the nearshore transitions to exposed rock and hard bottom. The surface muck that exists in the nearshore waters of Grassy Key, having a sizable component of decaying organic material, gives off an odor of hydrogen sulfide when disturbed that some find to be unpleasant. The odor is a naturally- occurring condition of the sediment, and is common in mucky areas all around the southern coasts of Florida. The suggestion that the shoreline in the vicinity of the Petitioners’ property, and that of Applicants, was a naturally occurring white, sandy beach is contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. To the extent the shoreline at Petitioners’ property may have been temporarily altered by the overwash from Hurricane Wilma as discussed herein, Petitioners’ own post-Wilma man-made efforts at beach stabilization, or the redistribution of sediments occasioned by Hurricanes Isaac and Sandy in 2012, the evidence demonstrates the “mucky” condition described herein to be more consistent with the natural and long-standing conditions of Grassy Key. Thus, as Grassy Key exists in the present time, one may expect to encounter six inches to two feet of loose muck anywhere along the nearshore area. Close to shore of Grassy Key are scattered beds of Halodule, a species of seagrass that tends to emerge and grow in shallow waters. The growth of Halodule is influenced by the nature of the sediments, the salinity temperature, and clarity of the water. Storm events have a significant effect on its growth. Given its transient nature, Halodule may vary in any given area from nonexistent, to spotty, to well-established beds. As one moves further offshore, the Halodule transitions to large, continuous beds of Thalassia. Thalassia grows in deeper water, and is common to a depth of about 12 feet. Being deeper and less affected by storm energy, the line of the Thalassia beds off of Grassy Key has not substantially changed over time. As wind and waves come across the grass beds, and as tides ebb and flow, grass blades are cropped. The amount of grass varies seasonally to a degree. The cropped and dislodged seagrasses, along with other organic material entrained therein, are naturally carried by the tides and wind and stranded along the shoreline. The stranded material is known as wrack, and the line of stranded material is known as the wrack line. Grassy Key is well known for the large seagrass wracks that pile up on the shoreline. A wrack line is a normal and natural occurrence in marine environments like that of Grassy Key, and can be a good indicator of the upper edge of the water action at a particular time. The cropping and dislodging of seagrass is accentuated during major or minor storm events. During Hurricane Rita in 2005, a very large seagrass wrack was blown onto the shoreline of Grassy Key. It was subsequently blown back out to sea by the overwash from Hurricane Wilma. The decomposition of the seagrass and other organic materials creates a significant odor that is not uncommon. That odor of decomposing material is well-recognized as being associated with Grassy Key. Areas along the shoreline of Grassy Key have been used by sea turtles for nesting. However, the nature of the substrate in the area of the Property is not optimal for nesting. Generally, sea turtles require a nesting site with 15 to 20 inches of sand above the water table so as to allow them to dig a suitably deep and dry cavity for their eggs. The natural substrate along the section of Grassy Key at issue is coarser and more difficult to dig into, and does not have the depth of sand for the best chance of a successful nest. Despite the nature of the substrate, Petitioner testified as to her observation of turtle nests along her property in each year from 2006 through 2010. Since the SW Groin, the Mid-bulkhead, and the NE Groin were all in existence and functioning during that period, with work to the SW Groin having been completed by 2008, the preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that those structures have no effect on the success or failure of sea turtles to nest along the property. To the extent nesting has been disrupted since 2011, the most logical inference that can be drawn from the evidence is that such disruption is the result of the Mid-Jetty Extension, which is slated for removal under the terms of the Permit. The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that the structures and activities authorized by the Permit will have no adverse effect on sea turtles. Hurricane Wilma In October, 2005, Grassy Key was pounded by Hurricane Wilma. The storm passed to the north, and created a substantial storm surge that moved from west to east across Grassy Key. The storm surge created a “ridge and runnel” effect on the Atlantic facing shoreline, with the channelization of the storm tide flow creating erosion and gullies on upland shore-adjacent properties. The storm surge and flooding across Grassy Key caused substantial wash-outs of sand; transported a large volume of sandy, upland sediments into the nearshore waters of the Atlantic Ocean; and created washover “fans” of material along the shoreline of Grassy Key. The effects of the Hurricane Wilma storm surge manifested just north of the Property, became substantial at the Property, and continued south down the shoreline for a considerable distance. At the Property, sand was pushed from 50 to 100 feet waterward from the existing shoreline, and a substantial runout was created running parallel and north of the SW Jetty. The sand pushed into the water buried everything in its path, including seagrasses. In short, the post-Wilma shoreline from the Property south along Grassy Key was left in a completely disrupted state. The nearshore waters fronting the properties owned by Petitioners and Applicants were affected by the deposition of sandy, upland sediments, which temporarily created areas of substantially harder-packed sediment. Over time, as the shoreline equilibrated and the sandy sediment distributed through a broader area, more typical shoreline conditions returned. The photographic evidence demonstrates that the Mid- bulkhead and the SW jetty structures were impacted by the Hurricane Wilma storm surge. In addition, the sandy area between the mid-bulkhead and the SW jetty was pushed seaward from its previous location. The scars from Hurricane Wilma remain evident through the most recent aerial photographs received in evidence. It is visually apparent that seagrass, though reappearing in patches, has not reestablished in the nearshore areas along the affected shoreline of Grassy Key -- including the areas in front of the Property and the property owned by Petitioners -- to the extent that it existed prior to the storm. Post-Wilma Activities When Hurricane Wilma hit, the Property was owned by Burgess Lea Levine. Not long after Hurricane Wilma, Ms. Levine shored up the SW Jetty, and performed work in the “beach” area between the mid-bulkhead and the SW jetty. The photographic evidence also supports a finding that the rock outline of the Mid-jetty was reestablished to its pre-Wilma configuration. The repairs to the SW Jetty resulted in a structure that is virtually indistinguishable in size and shape to the SW Jetty as it presently exists. The wrack line at the beach area after it was “worked” following the passage of Wilma, shows the area in which work was done to be generally consistent with -- though slightly seaward of -- the 2005 post-Wilma shoreline. In 2008, Ms. Levine applied for a series of exemptions and for consent of use for state-owned lands for “shoreline repair, replace earthen ramp with a concrete ramp, repair wood deck, replace mooring piles & maintenance dredge existing channel w/in Atlantic Ocean.” On September 19, 2008, the DEP issued a regulatory authorization and proprietary submerged land approval. The Rights of Affected Parties that accompanied the September 19, 2008, notice provided that “[t]his letter acknowledges that the proposed activity is exempt from ERP permitting requirements” and that “this determination shall expire after one year.” The notice of Rights of Affected Parties did not apply to the proprietary authorization. At some time after issuance of the regulatory authorization, Ms. Burgess initiated additional work to repair the SW Jetty. The photographic evidence, which is persuasive, indicates that the work on the SW Jetty, including the concrete cap, was complete by the end of 2008. When Applicants purchased the Property, the determination of exemption issued in 2008 had, by application of the notice of Rights of Affected Parties, expired. Shortly after the Applicants purchased the property, they had the existing family home demolished. Applicants intend to construct a winter vacation home for their personal use on the property. 2012 Storms In August and October 2012, Grassy Key was subject to event-driven conditions as a result of the passage of Hurricanes Isaac and Sandy. Those storms redistributed large areas of sediments that had been moved offshore by the effects of Hurricane Wilma. The Proposed Permit The February 20, 2013, Permit provides that the structures described herein do not require the issuance of an Environmental Resource Permit, subject to the criteria and conditions in Florida Administrative Code Rule 40E-4.051. The Permit provides that the boat ramp is eligible to use the general permit in Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-330.417, the repair and replacement of the dock is exempt pursuant to section 403.813(1)(b), Florida Statutes, the maintenance dredging of the Channel is exempt pursuant to section 403.813(1)(f), and that the repair and replacement of the NW Jetty, the SW Jetty, and the Mid-bulkhead are exempt because the structures are “historic in nature and pre-dates Department regulations.” In addition to the regulatory authorizations, the Permit granted proprietary authorization by Letter of Consent for the dock pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 18- 21.005(1)(c)4., and for the Channel, the NW Jetty, the SW Jetty, and the Mid-bulkhead pursuant to rule 18-21.005(1)(c)7. The Permit established the mean high-water line as that existing in 1974 and depicted on the “Richmond Survey.” Proprietary authorization for the boat ramp was determined to be unnecessary due to its location above the mean high-water line. Finally, proprietary authorization for the “Sandy Area” or beach between the Mid-bulkhead and SW Jetty was granted by Letter of Consent pursuant to rule 18-21.005(1). On September 20, 2013, the DEP filed a Notice of Additional Grounds for Exemption Determination, in which it found each of the structures subject to the regulatory review to “have only minimal or insignificant individual or cumulative adverse impacts on water resources” and to thus be exempt from the need to obtain an Environmental Resource Permit pursuant to section 373.406(6), Florida Statutes. On December 12, 2013, Applicants filed a Notice of Filing Proposed Changes to the Pending Agency Action in which they agreed to certain additional conditions, and which referenced the October 1, 2013, repeal of rule 40E-4.051, and its replacement by the “Statewide ERP rules.” For purposes of this de novo proceeding, the proposed Permit at issue includes the February 20, 2013, Permit; the September 20, 2013, Notice of Additional Grounds for Exemption Determination; and the December 12, 2013, Notice of Filing Proposed Changes to the Pending Agency Action. The Proposed Structures Groins There has been some confusion relating to the names of the structures that are subject to the proposed Permit. Two of the structures are referred to as jetties, the NE Jetty and the SW Jetty, and the middle structure is referred to as the Mid- bulkhead. A jetty is a navigation structure that is constructed at a barrier inlet. Its purpose is to stabilize the inlet and prevent shoaling by “jetting” current and wave-driven sand further offshore, such that the offshore bar is moved into deep enough water to allow navigation in and out of the tidal inlet, and allowing the tidal current between the ocean and the receiving body of water to keep the inlet scoured and open. There are 48 jetties on the open coast of Florida, none of which are in the Florida Keys. A groin is a structure designed for shore protection purposes. A groin is typically aligned perpendicular to the shoreline, or “shore normal.” The structures identified in the Permit as the NE Jetty and the SW Jetty are clearly groins, and not jetties. The mid-bulkhead is a groin, generally for shore confinement, with a channel-facing bulkhead. For purposes of continuity, the structures will be identified by the names given them in the Permit. Since there is negligible wave energy along the shoreline normal conditions, the groins have little or no day- to-day effect on longshore transport. Under storm conditions, the structures affect longshore transport, as evidenced by accretional “fillets,” and function as shoreline protection and confinement structures. The rock groins provide shelter, habitat and structure for corals, sponges, lobster, and fish in the area. The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that the groins authorized by the Permit will have no adverse effect on fish and wildlife resources. NE Jetty The NE Jetty was originally constructed in the early 1960s, likely concurrent with the dredging of the navigational channel. The quality of the aerial photographs of the period make it difficult to tell if the NE Jetty was a loosely-placed rock embankment or a more well-designed and constructed structure. However, the fillet of sand accreted to the north of the Channel demonstrates that the jetty was in existence and functioning as a shore-protection structure. By the 1970s, the NE Jetty had become overwhelmed by longshore sediment transport from the northeast. Sediment overtopped the NE Jetty and filled in the landward reaches of the Channel. At that point, ability of the NE Jetty to perform as a shore protection structure was compromised to the point that it could no longer hold the shoreline out of the basin or the landward portion of the Channel. The Mid-bulkhead became the dominant structural control over the shoreline and started to accrete the shoreline to the northeast. At some time between 1977 and 1981, the Channel was maintenance dredged pursuant to a permit issued by the Department of Environmental Regulation, DEP’s predecessor agency. The NE Jetty appeared on the plans for the maintenance dredging. Thus, the most reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidence is that the NE Jetty was repaired and restored in conjunction with the approved maintenance dredging. By 1981, the NE Jetty had been restored as the dominant shore protection structure north of the Channel, and a fillet of accreted material had been reestablished. The aerial photographs from that period are not sufficiently distinct to determine the precise size, shape, and configuration of the NE Jetty at that time. However, there is no evidence of additional work having been performed on the NE Jetty between 1981 and 1985. By 1985, the NE Jetty existed in substantially the size, shape, and configuration as it existed at the time of Hurricane Wilma. Between 1981 and the 2005 arrival of Hurricane Wilma, the evidence is convincing that the NE Jetty was holding up the shoreline to the northeast and preventing sediment from filling in the upper reaches of the Channel. Although the evidence suggests that the NE Jetty had, by 2005, begun to show its age, the continuous presence of an accretional fillet demonstrates that it continued to serve its function as a shore-protection structure. Although the NE Jetty suffered damage from Hurricane Wilma, it continued to perform its shoreline protection function. Aerial photographs taken in 2009 and 2011 show a relatively distinct structure with a well-defined accretional fillet. Thus, the greater weight of the evidence demonstrates that, at the time of its repair in May 2011, the NE Jetty was a functional groin. The NE Jetty, as repaired in 2011, is of substantially the same size, shape, and location as the structure depicted in aerial photographs taken in 1985, 2009, and early 2011. Although the elevation of the structure was increased over its pre-repair elevation, the increase was that reasonably necessary to prevent the function of the structure from being compromised by the effects of age and weather. The work performed on the NE Jetty, consisting of new rock laid on top of the existing rock, constituted repair and maintenance of the existing structure. Since 2005, and at the present time, the shoreline north of the NE Jetty has reached a state of equilibrium and stability, and is not expected to change significantly from its current condition. The preponderance of the competent, substantial evidence demonstrates that the effect of the NE Jetty on the shoreline and water resources of Grassy Key in the vicinity of the properties owned by Applicants and Petitioners is minimal and insignificant. The sand and sediment accreted to the north of the NE Jetty since 1981 is in the range of 250 square feet. SW Jetty The aerial photographs from 19647/ demonstrate that some form of structure then existed at the location of the current SW Jetty. The structure is indistinct due to what appears to be sidecast material from a small channel in front of the property to the immediate south of the Property. By 1971, the SW Jetty had become more distinct. From that time forward, the SW Jetty, and its accompanying fillet of accreted material, appears in roughly the size and shape of the structure as it appeared immediately prior to the arrival of Hurricane Wilma. The SW Jetty was heavily impacted by Hurricane Wilma. The overwash from the storm created a substantial runout alongside the SW Jetty, and the post-storm aerials suggest that the jetty boulders were undermined and shifted from their more uniform 2003 appearance. Immediately after Hurricane Wilma, the owner of the Property commenced restoration and repair activities. As part of the activities, the SW Jetty was repaired with the addition of boulders, which were often three feet and every now and then as much as four feet across. The boulders, being irregularly shaped, could not be stacked like Legos®, so the repairs were not neatly within the precise pre-Wilma footprint. However, the repaired SW Jetty was substantially in the length and location as existed prior to Hurricane Wilma, though it may have had a slightly wider cross-section. By 2007, the work on the SW Jetty was complete, and it had assumed its present appearance with the addition of a concrete cap. Its appearance -- i.e. length, width, and location -- in 2007 and 2008 was not dissimilar from its appearance in 2003. As repaired, the SW Jetty effectively constitutes the same structure that it has been since its initial construction. From a coastal engineering perspective, the work that was performed on the SW Jetty, consisting generally of new rock laid on top of the existing rock, constituted repair and maintenance of the existing structure. Dr. Lin testified that between 1974 and 2011, the area to the southwest of the southwest jetty was “about equalized,” though it was “accreting a little bit.” Thus, the effect of the SW Jetty on the shoreline of Grassy Key in the vicinity of the properties owned by Applicants and Petitioners from 1974 to 2011 was minimal and insignificant. Dr. Lin testified that, since 2011, the same area had eroded. The only substantive shoreline change that logically accounts for that subsequent erosion is the Mid-bulkhead extension, which is slated for removal under the terms of the proposed Permit. Petitioner testified that she observed no adverse effects from activities on the Property until after February 2011.8/ Since work on the SW Jetty was complete by no later than 2008, Petitioner’s testimony supports a finding that the SW Jetty has had no measurable effect on the water resources in the vicinity of the properties owned by Applicants and Petitioners. The preponderance of the competent, substantial evidence demonstrates that the effect of the SW Jetty on the shoreline and water resources of Grassy Key in the vicinity of the properties owned by Applicants and Petitioners is minimal and insignificant. Mid-bulkhead The structure of the Mid-bulkhead first appeared as part of the sidecast material from the excavation of the navigation channel in 1964. It coalesced into a defined but smaller and more rudimentary structure in the 1971-1972 time period. At that time, it was acting as the predominant shore protection structure due to the overtopping of the NE Jetty with sediment, which also filled in the landward reaches of the Channel. By 1981, after the maintenance dredging of the Channel, the Mid-bulkhead had assumed substantially the size, shape, and location that it has currently. The Mid-bulkhead has a navigation function of protecting the landward extent of the Channel from the collapse of adjacent sand and sediment, and a shore protection and compartmentalization function. Those functions have been consistent since 1981. The Mid-bulkhead appears to have been subjected to the overwash of sand and sediment from Hurricane Wilma, though it maintained its shape and form. The outline of the Mid-bulkhead appears to be more well-defined after the initial post-Wilma repairs. In any event, the configuration and size of the Mid-bulkhead is substantially the same as it had been since 1981. At some point, the interior section of the Mid- bulkhead was topped with soil that is inconsistent with that naturally occurring in the area. That fill was confined, and brought the Mid-bulkhead to a more even grade with the rock outline, but could have had no measurable effect on the shoreline and water resources of Grassy Key in the vicinity of the properties owned by Applicants and Petitioners. The preponderance of the competent, substantial evidence demonstrates that the effect of the Mid-bulkhead is minimal and insignificant. Channel In 1961, the Department of the Army authorized dredging of a navigation channel at the Property. The approved channel was to be 700 feet long, 30 feet wide, and to a depth of five feet below mean low water. The Florida Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund issued a letter of no objection. By 1964, the Channel that is the subject of this proceeding had been dredged, though not to the 700-foot length approved. Rather, the Channel was dredged to a length of approximately 290 feet. Much, if not all of the dredge spoil was sidecast, creating a rock structure alongside the Channel. Measurements taken during the course of this proceeding demonstrate that the initial dredging resulted in near vertical side slopes, which shows that the bailing of the bedrock was accomplished to the limits. The width of the Channel is from 28 feet to 32 feet wide, which is within an acceptable tolerance of the 30-foot approved width. In 1976, the then-owner of the Property sought a permit from the DEP’s predecessor, the Department of Environmental Regulation, to maintenance dredge the Channel to a dimension of 290 feet long and 30 feet wide, to a depth of minus 8-feet mean high water, and to construct a new rock jetty to extend 230 feet waterward from the existing terminus of the NE Jetty. Given the mean tide range of 1.7 feet at the Property, the depth of the proposed dredging would have been minus 6.3 feet mean low water, or 1.3 feet deeper than originally approved. The permit drawings depict the existing NE Jetty, the Channel boundary, the outline of the Mid-bulkhead, and the sidecast rock structure alongside the southern side of the Channel. The permit was denied. In 1977, the owner of the property reapplied for a permit to maintenance dredge the Channel to a dimension of 290 feet long and 30 feet wide, and to a depth of minus 4.0 feet below mean low water nearshore to minus 6 feet below mean low water at the waterward end. The proposal to construct an extension of the NE Jetty was deleted. The permit was issued, and a severance fee for the dredged material was paid based on a projected 700 cubic yards of material removed. The permit drawings and photographs depict the existing NE Jetty, the nearshore Channel boundary, and the general outline of the Mid- bulkhead. By 1981, aerial photographs demonstrate that the maintenance dredging of the Channel was complete, the NE Jetty was in place and functioning to protect the shoreline as evidenced by the accretional fillet, and the Mid-bulkhead had assumed its approximate current shape and configuration. Although the Channel has varied in depth over the years since the maintenance dredging and Hurricane Wilma, the greater weight of the evidence, including photographic evidence, indicates that the Channel was well-defined and remained navigable during that period. The Channel is an open-water exposed channel. Water in the Channel mixes due to direct tidal flow and the sheet flow of water due to shear wind stress. As water passes over the Channel, it sets up gyre, which is a mixing process. The open- water exposed Channel is subject to a high degree of mixing, even on normal waveless conditions, because of the wind transport of water and the tidal transport of water. The Channel is not a semi-enclosed basin. A semi- enclosed basin does not receive the direct forcing functions that an open-water channel receives. A semi-enclosed basin has no direct connection to open waters, but is connected to open waters by a narrower opening. Although a semi-enclosed basin exchanges water via every tidal cycle, the flushing process is one of slow mixing, in which a little bit of water is added to and withdrawn from the larger basin through the narrow opening during each tidal cycle. In such a case, a flushing analysis may be necessary to determine how much time and how many tidal cycles it may take to effect a complete exchange of the water in the semi-enclosed basin, and thus, for example, to dilute a pollutant to an acceptable level. A flushing analysis is not needed in this case because the Channel is an open-water, openly-exposed location subject to a high degree of mixing under normal day-to-day tidal processes. There is no greater basin connected by a restricting connection as with a semi-enclosed basin. Rather, the Channel has direct exposure to the tides, along with wind shear stress moving the water. The evidence in this case is substantial and persuasive, because the Channel is highly exposed to the open water and the tides, and a well-mixed and well-flushed aquatic system, that a flushing analysis is neither required nor necessary. Dock The dock made its first obvious appearance in 1981. It appears in a consistent shape and appearance through 2011. Aerial photographs taken in 2012, after the maintenance dredging of the Channel was conducted, show the dock had been removed. At the time of the hearing, the Applicants had installed new pilings and vent boards for the replacement dock, but the decking had not been installed. Work to complete the replacement of the dock was halted due to the pendency of the litigation challenging the structures. The proposed dock is less than 500 square feet. It is proposed for non-commercial, recreational activities. It is the sole dock proposed on the Property. The proposed dock will not impede the flow of water or create a navigational hazard. Boat Ramp Since the issuance of the 2008 approval, the boat ramp site was graded and stabilized in limerock material. The concrete ramp was not completed due to the pendency of the litigation challenging the structures. However, Applicants propose to pave the ramp with concrete. Based on Mr. Clark’s observations during his site visits, the boat ramp is landward of the mean high waterline depicted on the survey. The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that the proposed boat ramp will provide access to the Channel, which provides a minimum navigational access of two feet below mean low water to the ramp. Applicants have agreed to install depth indicators at the ramp to identify the controlling depths of the navigational access. The work on the ramp involves no seagrass beds or coral communities. The ramp as proposed will require no more than 100 cubic yards of dredging. The total width of the ramp is to be 20 feet and the ramp surface will be no wider than 12 feet. Beach Area The area between the SW Jetty and the Mid-bulkhead is an accreted beach-type area that has been confined and protected by the Mid-bulkhead and the SW Jetty. The shoreline landward of the mean high water line, from the dry beach and to the upland, is somewhat steeper than adjacent unprotected shorelines, which is indicative of the grooming of the upper beach sediment and the stability of the shoreline between the Mid-bulkhead and the SW Jetty. As a result of the Hurricane Wilma storm surge, a substantial amount of sediment was swept across the Property and into the Atlantic waters. The beach area was inundated with sand and sediment from the overwash, which appears to have moved the shoreline well waterward of its previous position. Along the northern side of the SW Jetty, a substantial channelized gully was created. The configuration of the shoreline post-Wilma suggests that efforts were made by the then-owner of the Property to fill in the gully on the northern side of the SW Jetty, and to groom and restore the shoreline by redistributing sand and sediment on the Property. It is typical, and allowable under DEP emergency final orders, for affected property owners to redistribute overwashed deposits and place them back within the beach system. In that regard, the DEP encourages the redistribution of clean beach sand back onto the beach. The then-owners of the Property were not alone in taking steps to address the effects of Hurricane Wilma on their adjacent shorelines. The photographic evidence demonstrates that Petitioners engaged in similar restorative activities, which included bringing in material purchased from a contractor to fill in a gully created on their property by the overwash. Observation of representative soil samples from the beach area demonstrate that the soils are consistent with those in the upper beach areas found throughout the area. The only areas of inconsistent soils were found in the interior of the rock structure of the Mid-bulkhead, which contained a four to six-inch layer of soil with a different consistency and darker brown color, and small area of similar soil directly adjacent thereto and well above the mean high water line. The greater weight of the competent, substantial, and credible evidence demonstrates that there was no substantial amount of “fill” from off-site placed on or adjacent to the beach area. Rather, the nature, appearance, and composition of the soils suggests that the temporary increase in the size of the beach area after Hurricane Wilma was the result of grooming and redistribution of sand and sediment pushed onto the Property and into the nearshore waters by the Hurricane Wilma storm surge. In the years since Hurricane Wilma, the influence of normal tidal and weather-driven events has returned the beach area between the mid-bulkhead and the SW jetty to roughly the configuration that existed prior to the passage of Wilma, though it remains somewhat waterward of its pre-Wilma location.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order approving the February 20, 2013, proposed Permit, as conditioned by Applicants’ December 12, 2013, Proposed Changes to the Pending Agency Action. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of July, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of July, 2014.
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Petitioner Cargor Partners VIII – Long Bar Pointe, LLLP (“Cargor”) is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2017).
Findings Of Fact Notice On February 17, 2017, the attorney for Cargor sent Joseph McClash a letter on law firm stationary. In the first paragraph of the letter it states, “Please allow this letter to serve as notice of Cargor’s intent to seek relief pursuant to Section 57.105, Florida Statutes (the “Statute”) against you, individually as qualified representative, and the named Petitioner.” Cargor sent an email to McClash on February 28, 2017, reminding McClash that “the 57.105 deadline is March 10, 2017.” McClash referred to a motion for attorney’s fees that he received on or about March 13, 2017, but the motion was not shown to the Administrative Law Judge nor introduced into evidence. On April 5, 2017, the same day that McClash voluntarily dismissed the petition for hearing in DOAH Case No. 17-0655, Cargor filed with DOAH its motion for attorney’s fees under section 57.105. Contested Claims The renewal of a FDOW is governed by section 373.421(2), Florida Statutes, which states in relevant part that the FDOW shall be renewed “as long as physical conditions on the property have not changed, other than changes which have been authorized by a permit pursuant to this part, so as to alter the boundaries of surface waters or wetlands.” If the boundaries of wetlands or other surface waters have been altered without a permit, the FDOW cannot be renewed and an application for a new FDOW is required. The SWFWMD reviewer explained in a letter requesting additional information from Cargor: Please be advised that letters of exemption do not qualify as permits issued under Part IV of chapter 373, F.S. and therefore if work has been done on the site that has altered the wetlands or other surface water boundaries in association with a letter of exemption, a new formal determination application will be required. McClash claims Cargor did not qualify for the renewal of its FDOW because Cargor altered the boundaries of surface waters or wetlands on its property after the 2011 FDOW was issued and the some of the alterations were made pursuant to letter of exemption. In its February 17, 2017, letter to McClash, Cargor set forth six grounds for Cargor’s contention that McClash’s petition for hearing should be withdrawn. The first three grounds were described in Cargor’s letter as follows: The Formal Determination of Wetlands and Other Surface Waters, dated December 28, 2016, which is the subject of this Proceeding, does not authorize any construction activity. Consequently, no standing to challenge is or could be properly presented. There is no injury in fact and no one is in immediate danger of a direct injury from the issuance of the Formal Determination of Wetlands and Other Surface Waters, dated December 28, 2016, as of the date and time of filing the Petition in this Proceeding. Consequently, no standing to challenge is or could be properly presented. The Formal Determination of Wetlands and Other Surface Waters, dated December 28, 2016, is not a permit, license, or authorization. Consequently, no standing to challenge is or could be properly presented by an association. These were issues of law and they were decided against Cargor in an Order dated February 28, 2017. The fourth and fifth grounds described in Cargor’s letter involve the central issue in the case: Changes in the land have been previously authorized by the Southwest Florida Water Management District (“SWFWMD”) pursuant to existing and final permits including (i) SWFWMD ERP No. 43040157.001, dated August 6, 2014, (ii) SWFWMD CONCEPTUAL ERP No. 49040157.002, dated September 4, 2015, (iii) SWFWMD ERP No. 4304157.003, dated March 31, 2016, and (iv) SWFWMD Notice of Qualification for Permanent Farming Exemption, dated August 30, 2016. Changes in the land are authorized by the identified permits and authorizations. All changes in the land have occurred pursuant to the identified permits and authorizations. Allegations to the contrary are simply false and are not supported by material facts. In 2015, Cargor was issued a “Conceptual ERP” permit, which describes, among other things, planned modifications to some agricultural ditches. However, the conceptual permit does not allow the commencement of construction activities. On August 30, 2016, SWFWMD issued to Cargo a Permanent Farming Exemption, pursuant to section 373.406(13), which authorized Cargor to excavate three agricultural ponds in uplands. In its application for the exemption, Cargor also proposed to modify some agricultural ditches. On March 31, 2017, SWFWMD issued Cargor an ERP Individual Construction Major Modification, which, among other things, authorized work in ditches. This permit was issued just before McClash’s voluntary dismissal and, therefore, could not have authorized the changes on Cargor’s property that McClash described in the petition for hearing. Before filing his petition, McClash consulted with a wetland scientist, Clark Hull, about the merits of McClash’s proposed challenge to the FDOW renewal. Hull gave McClash an affirmative response, but his input was speculative because it was based on assumptions and representations that Hull had not investigated. McClash consulted with another wetland scientist, Pamela Fetterman, who conducted an “aerial, desktop review of publically available Geographic Information Systems (GIS) data.” Fetterman described her initial review as an evaluation of potential undelineated wetlands and other surface waters. The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the delineation approved by the 2011 FDOW became final and could not be challenged by McClash. McClash then asked Fetterman to review changes in physical conditions on the property that occurred after the FDOW was issued. Fetterman produced a report (McClash Exhibit R-6), in which she opined that the changes to physical conditions on Cargor’s property “have a high likelihood of affecting the previously delineated landward extent of wetlands and other surface waters.” She stated further: [C]hanges in physical conditions of the property took place prior to issuance of the [FDOW renewal] as purported “exempt agricultural activities”, and include ditch dredging alterations to delineated other surface waters. . . . A Permanent Farming Request for Exemption Confirmation letter was applied for on August 23, 2016 for construction of these ponds and modification of existing ditches, some of which were determined to be jurisdictional other surface waters by the subsequently re-issued [FDOW]. At the final hearing on fees, neither McClash nor Cargor made clear to the Administrative Law Judge: (1) the physical changes to the property that were alleged to be authorized by permit, (2) the physical changes that were alleged to be authorized by exemption, or (3) any physical changes that were alleged to be unauthorized. The sixth ground described in Cargor’s letter is as follows: The picture attached to the Petition as set forth in Paragraph 9, and the stop work allegation set forth in Paragraph 10 are irrelevant and have no factual relationship to any issue in the proceeding. Since any changes in the land have occurred pursuant to identified permits and authorizations, the allegations are simply false and/or intentionally misleading. It is not a basis for an award of attorney’s fees under section 57.105 that an irrelevant photograph was included in a petition for hearing. Moreover, the aerial photograph in McClash’s petition was relevant in this case because it showed the physical conditions of Cargor’s property. In the petition, McClash states that Manatee County issued a stop work order on November 16, 2016, for construction activities commenced on Cargor’s property without a County- approved erosion control plan. This allegation also pertained to physical changes to the property. All evidence about physical changes was relevant in determining whether Cargor was entitled to renewal of the FDOW. Fees Cargor claims fees based on 48.4 hours of attorney time (Edward Vogler) at an hourly rate of $410, and 3.6 hours of attorney time (Kimberly Ashton) at an hourly rate of $385, for a total of $21,230.00. The fees Cargor is seeking include the hours spent on legal issues raised by Cargor that were rejected by the Administrative Law Judge. These fees amount to at least $1,025. See Cargor Exhibit 1, Invoice entries for February 20, 2017. Cargor’s attorney testified that the fees are reasonable. Cargor did not call an expert witness to corroborate the reasonableness of the hourly rate and the reasonableness of the hours expended.
The Issue The St. Johns River Water Management District (the "District") alleges in Case Number 97-4389 that Respondent, Modern, Inc. ("Modern"), excavated two ditches in wetlands without a permit, that the excavation was not exempt from a permit, and that Modern committed related acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint. The District proposes alternative plans for corrective action. Modern and its co-respondents ("Respondents") contend that the excavation was not required to have a permit because either it was not an activity covered by the permitting statutes or it was exempt. In addition, Respondents charge that the proposed agency action is based on an unadopted rule that does not satisfy the requirements of Section 120.57(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1997). (All chapter and section references are to Florida Statutes (1997) unless otherwise stated.) In Case Numbers 97-4390, 97-4391, 97-4392, and 97-4393, Respondents challenge an Emergency Order issued by the District to stop the drainage of wetlands. Respondents contend that the Emergency Order is facially insufficient, that there was no emergency, and that the corrective action has worsened conditions. The issue in each of the rule challenge cases is whether an existing rule or an agency statement is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority within the meaning of Sections 120.52(8) and 120.56(1). Case Numbers 98-0426RX and 98-1180RX challenge Rule 40C-4.041 pursuant to Section 120.56(3). Case Number 98-1182RX challenges Rule 40C-4.051 pursuant to Section 120.56(3). Case Numbers 98-0427RU and 98-1181RU challenge an agency statement pursuant to Section 120.56(1) and (4). (Unless otherwise stated, all references to rules are to rules published in the Florida Administrative Code as of the date of this Recommended Order.) The parties identify approximately 57 issues in their respective Proposed Recommended Orders and Proposed Final Orders ("PROs" and "PFOs", respectively). Those issues relevant to the proceeding conducted pursuant to Section 120.57(1), including Section 120.57(1)(e), are addressed in this Recommended Order. The remaining issues are addressed in the Final Order issued on the same date as the date of this Recommended Order.
Findings Of Fact This proceeding arises from the excavation of two intersecting canals, or ditches, in January 1997 in Brevard County, Florida. One conveyance runs north and south and is identified by the parties as "NS1." The other conveyance runs east and west and is identified by the parties as "EW1." Part of the excavation occurred inside the St. Johns National Wildlife Refuge (the "Refuge"). The Refuge is owned and managed by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (the "Wildlife Service"). All of the excavation occurred on property within the jurisdiction of the District and contiguous to property owned by Modern. On May 14, 1997, the District issued an Emergency Order authorizing the Wildlife Service to construct temporary weirs in NS1 and in EW1. The District intended the weirs to restore the bottoms of NS1 and EW1 to elevations which the District claims to have existed in NS1 and EW1 prior to the excavation. The Wildlife Service completed construction of the weirs on May 27, 1997. Excavation Site NS1 runs parallel to Interstate 95 ("I-95"). EW1 runs parallel to SR 50 and lies approximately 25 feet inside the southern boundary of the Refuge. The point where NS1 and EW1 intersect is west of I-95 by approximately .25 miles, or about 1100 feet, and north of SR 50 by approximately one-half mile plus 25 feet, or 2,665 feet. NS1 and EW1 intersect at a point that is approximately 2,903 feet northwest of the intersection of I-95 and SR 50. NS1 bisects a marsh ("Marsh-1") approximately 800 feet south of EW1. EW1 bisects a pond ("Pond-1") approximately 300 feet east of NS1. Pond-1 spans north and south of both EW1 and the southern boundary of the Refuge. Marsh-1 is south of the Refuge boundary and spans east and west of NS1. NS1 continues south of Marsh-1 and intersects SR 50 and an adjacent east-west canal immediately north of and parallel to SR 50 known as the Indian River City Canal ("IRCC"). NS1 proceeds south of the IRCC approximately 1.5 miles to a larger east-west canal, identified as both the Addison Canal and the Ellis Canal (the "Addison Canal"). The Addison Canal flows west from that point approximately four miles into the St. Johns River. NS1 runs north across EW1 approximately 1.5 miles from SR 50 to an east-west road known as Satterfield Road. An adjacent, parallel canal immediately south of Satterfield Road is identified as the Satterfield Road Canal. EW1 continues west from I-95 approximately 2.75 miles until it intersects Hacienda Road. EW1 runs east of I-95 for some distance. The excavation in January 1997 included both NS1 and EW1. NS1 was excavated from its intersection with SR 50 north approximately 2,687 feet to a point approximately 22 feet north of EW1. EW1 was excavated approximately 30 feet east of NS1. Contested Area The excavation site is in the southeast corner of a "rectangular tract" of land west of I-95 and north of SR 50 which comprises approximately 4.13 square miles. The rectangular tract and a "smaller parcel" east of I-95 make up the "contested area" in this proceeding. Rectangular Tract The rectangular tract measures approximately 2.75 miles from I-95 west to Hacienda Road and approximately 1.5 miles, from SR 50 north to Satterfield Road. The intersection of I-95 and SR 50 forms the southeast corner of the rectangular tract. The rectangular tract is bounded on the east by I-95; on the south by SR 50; on the west by Hacienda Road, which is about a mile or so east of the St. Johns River; and on the north by Satterfield Road. Satterfield Road is approximately three miles south of the boundary between Brevard and Volusia counties (the "county line"). Smaller Parcel A substantially smaller parcel abuts the east side of I-95. The smaller parcel is bounded on the west by I-95; on the south by SR 50; on the east by State Road 405 ("SR 405"); and on the north by the Satterfield Road Canal and what would be Satterfield Road if Satterfield Road extended east of I-95. SR 405 runs north and south parallel to and approximately .25 miles east of I-95 and approximately 2.7 miles west of the Indian River. Tribulation Harbor In this proceeding, legal interests from five separate sources flow into the contested area like separate rivers flowing into an inland harbor. The confluence of divergent legal interests results in a turbulent mix of the statutory responsibilities of state and federal agencies and the constitutional rights and business interests of private property owners. Respondents own over 4,500 acres of land in and around the contested area and have legitimate business or personal interests in the development or other use of their property. The District is statutorily charged with responsibility for the hydrologic basin of the St. Johns River (the "River Basin"), including the contested area. The contested area is circumscribed by a five-mile by four-mile area platted in 1911 as the Titusville Fruit and Farm Subdivision ("Titusville Farm"). The recorded plat of Titusville Farm established a drainage system of intersecting east-west and north-south canals. Some of the conveyances, including NS1 and EW1, run through the contested area. Federal law charges the Wildlife Service with responsibility for managing the Refuge. A substantial portion of the Refuge lies in that part of the contested area west of I-95. The contested area also includes portions of the Hacienda Road project. Private Property Modern is a Florida corporation owned principally by Mr. Charles Moehle who is also the president of the company and the father of Mr. Michael Moehle. Omni is a Florida corporation wholly owned by the younger Moehle. Modern owns two parcels of land in the contested area ("Modern-1" and "Modern-2"). The northern boundary of Modern-1 is just south of EW1 and the Refuge boundary. Modern-1 is bounded on the west by NS1, on the south by SR 50, and on the east by I-95. Modern-2 is inside the contested area in the smaller parcel east of I-95. Modern-2 comprises a substantial portion of the smaller parcel. Modern owns a third tract of land comprising approximately 4,500 acres west and south of Fox Lake ("Modern-3"). Modern-3 is within the District's jurisdiction and includes approximately three miles of land from Satterfield Road north to the county line, including one mile in Titusville Farm immediately north of Satterfield Road. 22. Modern-3 is bounded on the south by Satterfield Road; on the north by the county line; on the east by a north-south section line parallel to and approximately .75 miles west of I-95; and on the west by a section line that is approximately one mile west of what would be Hacienda Road if Hacienda Road extended north of Satterfield Road. A square mile section is carved out of the western half of Modern 3 in Section 10, Township 22 South, Range 34 East. Omni, Mr. Hart, and Mr. Nelson own separate parcels of land outside the contested area but proximate to the contested area. They claim that their property is directly impacted by the action taken in the Emergency Order and by the action proposed in the Administrative Complaint. Omni owns property on the east side of SR 405. Although the Omni parcel is outside of the contested area, it is adjacent to the smaller parcel and within both the River Basin and Titusville Farm. Mr. Hart owns property which is south of SR 50 approximately one mile west of the intersection of SR 50 and I-95. Although the Hart property is outside of the contested area, it abuts the southern boundary of the rectangular tract and is within the River Basin and Titusville Farm. Mr. Nelson owns property located a little more than a half-mile southeast of the intersection of SR 405 and SR 50. Although the Nelson property is outside of and not adjacent to the contested area, the property is within the River Basin and Titusville Farm. The District The District was created in 1972 as the state agency responsible for carrying out the provisions of Chapter 373 and for implementing the programs delegated in Chapter 403. Section 373.069(1)(c) describes the geographical jurisdiction of the District. The jurisdiction of the District includes all of the contested area. The River Basin includes all or part of 19 counties from south of Vero Beach to the border between Florida and Georgia. The counties entirely within the River Basin include Brevard, Clay, Duval, Flagler, Indian River, Nassau, Seminole, St. Johns, and Volusia counties. The counties partially within the River Basin are Alachua, Baker, Bradford, Lake, Marion, Okeechobee, Orange, Osceola, Polk, and Putnam. Titusville Farm Titusville Farm contains approximately 20 sections of land, plus an out-parcel to the southeast which has relatively little materiality to the issues in this proceeding (the "out- parcel"). Each of the 20 sections of land contains approximately 640 acres and, together, total approximately 12,800 acres. The exact dimensions of Titusville Farm are recorded in Plat Book 2, page 29 of the Public Records of Brevard County, Florida. With the exception of the out-parcel, Titusville Farm is bounded on the east by a section line approximately 1.25 miles east of I-95 and approximately 1.7 miles west of the Indian River; on the south by a section line approximately 1.5 miles south of SR 50 at what is now the Addison Canal; on the north by a section line approximately one mile north of what are now Satterfield Road and the Satterfield Road Canal; and on the west by the St. Johns River, which flows north at a point about a mile or so west of and parallel to what is now Hacienda Road. 3.3(a) History Titusville Farm was originally designed so that each quarter section of 160 acres was surrounded by intersecting east- west and north-south drainage canals intended to drain water westerly toward the St. Johns River and southerly toward what is now the Addison Canal. The original designers intended to create a dry and fertile land for farming and fruit groves. The original design for Titusville Farm called for a series of parallel east-west canals approximately .25 miles apart on quarter section lines. The canals ran parallel to the north and south boundaries of Titusville Farm from the east boundary approximately five miles to the St. Johns River to the west. The parties use the label EW1 in this proceeding to designate the first east-west canal north of SR 50. EW1.5 refers to the second east-west canal north of SR 50. EW2 refers to the Satterfield Road Canal in some exhibits and to an intervening canal in others. The original design for Titusville Farm also called for a series of parallel north-south manifold canals, approximately .25 miles apart on quarter section lines. Each canal ran parallel with the east and west boundaries of Titusville Farm from the north boundary approximately four miles to the Addison Canal at the south boundary. The parties use NS1 in this proceeding to designate the first north-south canal approximately .25 miles west of I-95. NS2 identifies the next north-south canal west of NS1. The numbering identification continues west in this proceeding to Hacienda Road. From 1911 through 1916, the original developers of Titusville Farm constructed some of the canals and farmed the area, predominantly with fruit groves. Sometime after 1916, the developers began selling off land to third-party purchasers. Subsequent purchasers altered, expanded, or abandoned the canals in and around their property. By 1943, the canals originally constructed in Titusville Farm remained in place but only one orange grove remained in the southeast corner of Titusville Farm near what is now the excavation site. Other farming within the contested area was sparse. The canals actually constructed by the developers of Titusville Farm continue to be depicted as existing systems on several current maps. They are also evidenced in drainage easements of record. 3.3(b) Drainage Easements The chain of title from Titusville Farm shows that purchasers took title subject to existing easements for "canals and/or ditches, if any." In 1971, when the United States Government established the Refuge, it took fee simple title to approximately 4,163 acres of former Titusville Farm land subject to: . . . permanent easement granted to Florida Power and Light Company . . . and subject to other rights outstanding for existing roads, lines, pipe lines, canals, and/or ditches, if any. (emphasis supplied) OR Book 1580, page 810, Brevard County. The Refuge The Refuge is located within the River Basin and within Titusville Farm. The vast majority of the Refuge is located inside the rectangular tract in the contested area. However, the Refuge also extends west of Hacienda Road to the St. Johns River and contains a small "out-parcel" north of Hacienda Road. Except for the out-parcel, the Refuge is more or less rectangular, bounded on the east by I-95, on the south by SR 50, on the north by Satterfield Road, and on the west by the St. Johns River. The distance between the east and west boundaries of the Refuge is approximately 3.75 miles. The distance between the north and south boundaries is approximately 1.5 miles. The Refuge contains approximately 4,163 acres and includes much of the area from I-95 west to Hacienda Road and from Satterfield Road south to SR 50. The federal government established the Refuge in 1971 to protect the endangered dusky seaside sparrow. The sparrow became extinct in 1990. After 1971, the Refuge became part of a national system for the conservation, management, and restoration of lands for fish, wildlife, plants, and their habitats. The federal government manages the Refuge under the Emergency Wetlands Restoration Act of 1986, which Congress reaffirmed in 1997, as a wetland to provide habitat protection for threatened and endangered species of special concern. The authorized methods for protecting wetlands include a National Wetlands Inventory that identifies wetlands nationally. The Refuge is a particularly important wetland in the sense that it is a high floodplain. A high floodplain is a type of wetland that is diminishing, especially in Florida. The federal government manages the Refuge as an ecosystem. The government attempts to mimic what happens naturally in the area with fire and water. It attempts to restore and maintain the sheet flow of water across natural marshes and to use fire as a means of maintaining marshes in their natural state. 3.4(a) Species of Special Concern The Refuge provides a habitat for species of special concern to both state and federal governments. The Refuge is one of the most important breeding areas in the country for the black rail. The black rail is a migratory species that uses the Refuge for nesting during the summer and for a winter habitat during the fall and winter. Several species use portions of the Refuge near the excavation site. The least bittern uses the area for feeding and nesting. The northern harrier is a migratory species that uses the area for feeding during the fall, winter, and early spring. The Refuge provides habitat for bald eagles, wood storks, otters, and alligators. It also provides habitat for: long-legged wading birds, such as great blue herons and great egrets; shorter-legged wading birds, such as little blue herons, snowy egrets, and little green herons; aerial diving species, such as terns and seagulls; submergent diving species, such as pie billed grebes, mergansers, and cormorants; and red-winged blackbirds and wrens that nest in emergent vegetation. 3.4(b) Wetland Communities The majority of the contested area contains five different wetland community types. There are open-water areas, such as Pond-1; shallow marsh, such as Marsh-1; wet prairies; hydric hammocks; and transitional shrub systems. Shallow marsh contains shallow water and emergent wetland vegetation. Water levels fluctuate throughout the year. The predominant vegetation is cattail and sawgrass. Wet prairie is slightly higher in elevation and somewhat drier than shallow marsh. The primary vegetation found in wet prairie is cord grass. Transitional shrub systems are areas in transition from uplands to wetlands or from wetlands to uplands. The vegetation in these areas typically is wax myrtle. 3.4(c) Pre-Excavation Site In January 1996, Mr. Charles Moehle complained to the District that the Hacienda Road project caused flooding on his property. District staff investigated the matter and concluded that the Hacienda Road project was not the cause of the flooding. The investigation included physical inspection and elevation readings for what became the excavation site in 1997. 3.4(c)(1) Physical Inspection Before the excavation in January 1997, there was no water connection from EW1 to NS1. NS1 and EW1 had been filled-in at various junctures with sediment and wash-outs from rain. Vegetation growth and aquatic vegetation further occluded NS1 and EW1. The east and west banks of NS1 from SR 50 north to Marsh-1 were similar and appeared undisturbed. The west bank of NS1 disappeared at the point where NS1 intersected Marsh-1. Both banks of NS1 were very low through Marsh-1. Marsh-1 had standing water in it. The predominant vegetation was spartina baderi, a marsh grass found in wetland areas ("spartina"). Approximately 500 feet of NS1 between Marsh-1 and EW1 was dry and shallow. This portion of NS1 was only one-half to one-foot deep. It was more characteristic of a swale than a ditch and was heavily vegetated with spartina. The bottom elevation of a portion of NS1 between EW1 and Marsh-1 was approximately 2.5 feet higher than the remainder of NS1. This high spot functioned as an elevation control within NS1. EW1 east of NS1 appeared very similar to that portion of NS1 north of Marsh-1. It was dry and vegetated with spartina. There was no water connection between NS1 and EW1 so that Pond-1 did not routinely drain west through EW1. EW1 also contained a high spot just west of NS1. Pond-1 was a healthy open-water community surrounded by green cattails. Pond-1 was deeper than five feet in some areas. A berm on the west side of NS1 north of Marsh-1 was one to two feet high and three to five feet wide. It served as a fire-break trail and resembled a road. The berm was slightly higher south of Marsh-1 and heavily vegetated with cabbage palms and other vegetation near the intersection of NS1 and SR 50. 3.4(c)(2) Elevations On February 28, 1996, in response to complaints from Modern, District staff took spot readings of bottom elevations within NS1 from Marsh-1 north to EW1 and within EW1 east of NS1. They also took water elevation readings in Pond-1 and at the intersection of NS1 and SR 50. The elevation readings revealed respective control elevations in NS1 and EW1 of 12.9 and 12.79 feet. Other elevations in NS1 were 12.26 feet at a point just north of Marsh-1, 12.9 and 12.7 feet at two points south of EW1, and 12.9 feet at the intersection of NS1 and EW1. The bottom elevation in EW1 varied from 12.4 to 12.79 feet. District staff also reviewed bottom elevation readings in various pre-excavation surveys made between 1995 and January 1997 and referred to by the parties as the Lowe's Report, the Cracker-Barrel survey, the McCrone survey, and the Titusville survey. The McCrone survey recorded bottom elevations for NS1 which were consistent with those taken by District staff. However, elevations varied by as much as a foot for EW1. Water elevation readings varied with seasonal water conditions and other factors. The McCrone survey found respective control elevations in NS1 and EW1 of 12.7 and 11.7 feet. The bottom elevation for NS1 was 12.7 feet at a point just south of EW1. Bottom elevations for EW1 ranged from 10.5 to 11.7 feet. The investigation by the District established respective high spots in NS1 and EW1 at 12.9 and 12.79 feet. The Titusville survey recorded a water elevation of 10.54 feet in NS1 at SR 50. The water elevation in EW1 east and west of the I-95 culvert was 12.55 feet. The variation in water elevations of 12.55 feet in EW1 at I-95 and 10.54 feet in NS1 at SR 50 suggest high spots in EW1 or NS1. The high spots prevent water from flowing from the culvert at I-95 west through EW1 to NS1 and south through NS1 to SR 50. 3.4(c)(3) Topography A slight ridge exists south of EW1 and supports a more shrubby type of vegetation consistent with transitional wetlands. The topography north of EW1 is lower and characteristic of a deep marsh system. The bottom elevations in NS1 north of EW1 are lower than bottom elevations elsewhere in NS1 and are consistent with surrounding topography. The topography surrounding NS1 south of EW1 is higher and provides a greater source of sediment than does the lower topography north of EW1. More sediment erodes into NS1 south of EW1 because there is more sediment south of EW1. The portion of NS1 north of EW1 is in a marsh and under water most of the year. The submerged topography north of EW1 provides less opportunity for material to erode into NS1 north of EW1. 3.5 Hacienda Road Project The Department widened SR 50 between 1988 and 1991 by adding two east-bound lanes on the south side of SR 50. The District required the Department to obtain a permit for the widening of SR 50 and to offset the adverse impacts to wetlands through a plan of mitigation. The Wildlife Service actually performed the mitigation work for the Department and completed the mitigation plan in 1991. West of Hacienda Road, the Wildlife Service placed fill from adjacent berms in the IRCC, EW1, and EW1.5, which had pre- mitigation depths at that location ranging from 1.5 to 2.0 feet. The Wildlife Service planted spartina on the fill. The Wildlife Service also replaced six 30-inch culverts under Hacienda Road with nine 36-inch culverts. The new culverts were located at the same elevation as the elevation of the pre-mitigation culverts. The Wildlife Service placed riser boards in the new culverts under Hacienda Road. Riser boards are used to facilitate the cleaning of culverts. However, they can also raise the water level above which water must rise before it can pass through the culverts. Respondents contend that the fill west of Hacienda Road eliminated floodplain storage. They also claim the riser boards in the new culverts under Hacienda Road cause water to back-up in the contested area by preventing flow from the contested area through the new culverts into the marsh west of Hacienda Road. 3.5(a) Floodplain Storage The Hacienda Road project did not decrease floodplain storage capacity west of Hacienda Road. The project used only fill from existing berms and did not bring in additional fill from outside the marsh. The fill did not reduce floodwater capacity of the IRCC, EW1, and EW1.5. Their capacity before the mitigation had already been reduced by groundwater from the high groundwater table close to the St. Johns River. The fill displaced high groundwater in the IRCC, EW1, and EW1.5, rather than floodwater capacity. The fill taken from existing berms reduced the size of the berms that had previously displaced floodwater capacity. 3.5(b) Water-flow Neither the mitigation west of Hacienda Road, the new culverts under Hacienda Road, nor the riser boards in the new culverts caused water to back-up and flood Respondents' property. The Hacienda Road project does not prevent water-flow during either low-flow or high-flow conditions. 3.5(b)(1) Low-flow A low-flow condition occurs when water rises above the control elevation that is impeding its flow. The water stages-up in lower areas until it flows over the high spot that operates as a control elevation. During low-flow conditions, neither the mitigation west of Hacienda Road, the culverts, nor the riser boards in the culverts control the flow of water from I-95 west to Hacienda Road. Rather, bottom elevations in the canals, or ditches, east of Hacienda Road ("upstream") control the flow of water from I-95 west to Hacienda Road. Water that does not exceed the control elevations will pond in the adjacent wetlands and not reach Hacienda Road. Water that ponds behind control elevations during low- flow conditions is also influenced by two basins and a ridge in the contested area. One basin is north of SR 50 and south of EW1, and the other basin is north of EW1. Water from the former basin flows south while water from the latter basin flows toward Hacienda Road. The water elevation at Hacienda Road is approximately 11.0 feet. High spots in the canals, or ditches, upstream from Hacienda Road range from 12.1 feet to 13.3 feet. A control elevation of 12.6 feet exists in EW1 east of Hacienda Road. Water stands behind the high spot at 12.3 feet. Closer to I-95, the bottom elevation in EW1 ranges from 12.1 to 12.6 feet and effectively controls water elevation at 12.0 feet. Water in EW1 west of I-95 and east of Hacienda Road must rise to an elevation of 12.6 feet before it can flow west toward Hacienda Road. Water in EW1.5 near I-95 has an elevation of 13.3 feet. Water in EW1.5 must rise above that elevation before it can flow west toward Hacienda Road. Water in EW-2 at I-95 is above 13.0 feet. The bottom elevations and water elevations measured by District staff in the contested area between Hacienda Road and I- 95 are consistent with the I-95 construction plans and the Lowe's Drainage Report used for the construction of the Lowe's store at the intersection of SR 50 and SR 405. The I-95 plans show a design high-water elevation of 14.0 feet for the culvert where EW1 crosses I-95. The Lowe's Drainage Report shows that the 100- year, 24-hour storm event flood elevation east of I-95 is 14.0 feet. In addition, a pre-construction survey for the Lowe's store shows elevations in the wetlands north of EW1 to be approximately 13.0 feet. 3.5(b)(2) High-flow A high-flow condition occurs when there is a storm event that creates significant run-off. The run-off overwhelms the high spots that operate as control elevations during low-flow conditions. Run-off is controlled by other factors including culverts such as those at Hacienda Road. During high-flow conditions, the culverts at Hacienda Road are the controlling factors for the flow of water in the contested area from I-95 west to Hacienda Road. The high-flow conveyance capacity for the new culverts is equal to or greater than that of the old culverts. The replacement culverts do not cause water to back-up in the contested area during high-flow conditions. Riser boards in the new culverts under Hacienda Road do not raise elevation levels to a point that causes water to flood Respondents' property during high-flow conditions. 3.5(c) Collateral Improvements During either low-flow or high-flow conditions, the possibility that the Hacienda Road project could cause water to back-up in the contested area has been significantly reduced by improvements in drainage capacity to nearby canals, or ditches. The Department improved several north-south canals, or ditches. Brevard County improved the capacity of the IRCC. When the Department widened SR 50, the Department increased the capacity of NS3 and NS4, where each crosses under SR 50, by replacing old culverts with new culverts at the same invert elevation. The Department replaced one 24-inch culvert in NS3 with an elliptical pipe with the effective capacity of a 36-inch pipe. The Department replaced one 24-inch culvert in NS4 with two 18-inch culverts. The Department also replaced the box culvert in NS1 with a culvert of the same size and invert elevation. Brevard County improved the capacity of the IRCC in several ways. The county cleaned out the canal, installed a 36-inch elliptical culvert under Hacienda Road, and replaced a driveway that had previously blocked the canal with a 36-inch culvert. The Excavation Modern, through its President, Mr. Charles Moehle, caused and directed the excavation of NS1 and EW1. In December 1996, Mr. Charles Moehle contracted with Total Site Development, Inc. ("Total Site") to perform the excavation. Modern also supervised the excavation. Total Site is a Florida corporation wholly owned by Mr. Daniel McConnell and Mr. Randy McConnell, his brother. Both men, through their attorney, obtained immunity from criminal prosecution and testified at the administrative hearing. In 1996, Total Site was a subcontractor in the construction of the Cracker Barrel near the intersection of I-95 and SR 50. The superintendent for the Cracker Barrel project gave Mr. Daniel McConnell the telephone number of Mr. Charles Moehle. After several telephone conversations, Mr. McConnell met with Mr. Moehle. The two men walked the length of NS1 from SR 50 north just past EW1. Mr. Moehle directed Mr. McConnell where to excavate NS1 and EW1, how wide and deep to excavate each, and where to place the spoil material. Mr. Moehle showed Mr. McConnell a paper which Mr. Moehle represented to be a permit to perform the excavation. However, neither Mr. Moehle nor Modern ever applied for or obtained a permit to perform the excavation. The District never received an application or issued a permit for the excavation. On January 10, 1997, Mr. McConnell began excavating NS1 and EW1 and completed the excavation in 2.5 days. Mr. McConnell began work on a Friday, worked Saturday, and completed the work on Monday, January 13, 1997. Mr. McConnell excavated NS1 and EW1 in accordance with the instructions of Mr. Moehle. Mr. McConnell began the excavation at SR 50 and worked north in NS1 approximately 2,687 feet to a point about 22 feet north of EW1. Mr. McConnell also excavated EW1 approximately 30 feet east of NS1. Mr. McConnell placed the spoil material on the west bank of NS1 and did not move the spoil material thereafter. When Mr. McConnell reached the intersection of NS1 and EW1, he excavated EW1 sufficiently to complete a water connection from EW1 to NS1. He placed the spoil material on the banks surrounding the intersection of EW1 and NS1 and did not move the spoil material thereafter. During the excavation, Mr. Moehle frequently visited the excavation site, observed the work, and provided instructions to Mr. McConnell. Mr. Moehle visited the site approximately once or twice a day during the excavation to check on the progress of the work. On a few occasions, Mr. Moehle instructed Mr. McConnell to dig deeper. Mr. Moehle paid Total Site $2,500 when Mr. McConnell completed the excavation on January 13, 1997. Mr. Moehle paid in cash. Post-excavation Site After the excavation, water flowed from EW1 to NS1. NS1 was approximately 10 feet wider and approximately 3-4 feet deeper. NS1 was open with water flowing through it from EW1 south through Marsh-1 to SR 50. The bottom elevation for NS1 was 7.5 and 9.5 feet at points where District staff and the McCrone survey previously found bottom elevations of 12.7 and 12.9 feet. After the excavation, the water elevation at the intersection of NS1 and SR 50 was 12.09 feet. The pre-excavation water level had been 10.54 feet. After the excavation, a large spoil pile existed on the west bank of NS1. The spoil pile filled approximately one- half acre of wetlands. The height of the spoil pile ranged from three to eight feet, with the highest points at the intersection of NS1 and EW1. The spoil pile just north of EW1 had been flattened by the weight of equipment used for the excavation. The width of the spoil pile at its base ranged from 20 to 35 feet for the entire length of NS1. The spoil material was primarily white, sandy material without much vegetation in it. The lack of organic material in the spoil pile indicates that the excavation extended beyond the depth necessary to remove surface vegetation. Emergency The excavation of NS1 and EW1 by Modern in January 1997 created an emergency within the meaning of Section 373.119(2). The excavation created short-term effects that adversely impacted adjacent wetlands and required immediate action to protect the health of animals, fish, or aquatic life; and recreational or other reasonable uses. If left uncorrected, the excavation would have created long-term effects that would have had additional adverse impacts. Short-Term Effect The excavation created numerous short-term effects that adversely impacted wetlands. Short-term effects included a reduction in the water level of approximately 600 to 800 acres of wetlands, a vegetation and fish kill, an alteration of the existing hydroperiod for the affected area, and an increase in the water level south of the intersection of NS1 and SR 50. 6.1(a) Water Levels The excavation lowered the water level in approximately 600 to 800 acres of wetlands. The reduction in the control elevation in NS1 from 12.9 feet to 10.5 feet increased water flow capacity in NS1 and EW1 by 15 to 25 cubic feet per second. The increased water flow lowered water levels in the surrounding wetland from one to two feet. When the excavation was completed, Mr. Randy McConnell was standing on the head-wall at SR 50. He saw a three or four- foot wave flow south down NS1 toward him and hit the head-wall before passing through the culvert south to the Addison Canal. Sometime after the excavation, a substantial water flow out of NS1 caused water levels to drop in the adjacent area, including the Refuge. Pond-1 drained one to two feet. 6.1(b) Vegetation and Fish The excavation killed vegetation in the affected area. The cattail marsh adjacent to Pond-1 became stressed, turned brown, and began dying. The dying cattails consumed oxygen in the open water in Pond-1. The excavation killed fish in the affected area. In March 1997, a fish kill occurred in Pond-1. Wildlife Service personnel observed approximately 75 to 100 dead fish. Other dead fish were likely consumed by other species. The fish kill resulted from oxygen depletion caused by the drainage of Pond-1, dying vegetation, and the concentration of animal populations in the Pond-1 community. 6.1(c) Hydroperiod The excavation altered the natural hydroperiod for the affected area. The hydroperiod for a wetland is the natural fluctuation in water levels that result from dry periods followed by periods of recovery. Water levels drop and are replenished by rain. Precipitation in the Titusville area averages approximately 54 inches in a normal year. Evaporation in Florida for a wetland such as the Refuge is about 48 to 50 inches a year. In a normal year, rainfall and evapo-transpiration would be approximately equal. There are wet and dry seasons for a wetland within a normal year. Approximately 60 percent, or more, of the annual rainfall in a normal year in peninsular Florida occurs in the months of June through October. There are also wet and dry years within longer periods. In the Titusville area, annual rainfall ranges from 35 inches to 80 inches. The adverse impact of any excavation is least during wet months in a normal year and during wet years. During wet conditions, when rainfall generally exceeds evapo-transpiration, the drainage effect of excavation is overwhelmed by rainfall. The adverse impact of any excavation is greatest during dry months in a normal year and during dry years. During dry conditions, the drainage effect of excavation lowers water levels lower than they otherwise would be by lowering elevation controls. The excavation of NS1 and EW1 occurred during dry months in a normal hydroperiod in January 1997. 6.1(d) Stop-loss Ancillaries The adverse impact caused by the excavation was limited by two ancillary factors. One factor was the reduced function of the IRCC, which runs parallel to SR 50, at the time of the excavation. The other factor was the limitation placed on the drainage capacity of NS1 by two culverts through which NS1 must flow south of SR 50. At the time of the excavation, the IRCC was not functioning to full capacity. Plugs in a driveway crossing SR 50 and fill from the Hacienda Road project contributed to the dysfunction. The capacity of NS1 to drain water approximately 1.5 miles south to the Addison Canal was limited by two 18-inch culverts located approximately 2,000 feet south of SR 50. The flow rates for the two culverts are approximately 15 to 25 cubic feet per second, depending on the difference in water levels across the culverts. The dysfunction of the IRCC and the limit imposed by the two culverts combined to prevent more egregious impacts from the excavation of NS1. However, the same limitations increased water in the area south of SR 50 and north of the two culverts. After the excavation, the water level at the intersection of NS1 and SR 50 increased by approximately two feet. The increased water level exacerbated flooding problems in the retention ponds and parking lot of the Cracker Barrel. Long-Term Effect The short-term adverse impacts of the excavation, if left uncorrected, would have had a cumulative effect over several years and would have caused separate long-term adverse impacts. Drainage caused by the excavation differs from natural fluctuations in the hydroperiod. An uncorrected excavation becomes a permanent feature that continues to alter the hydroperiod by permanently lowering water levels and shortening the time that water stands on the surface and saturates the soil. Once the hydroperiod is changed, the change affects the structural integrity of the entire system. Changes to the hydroperiod result in adverse impacts to vegetation, predator- prey relationships, and the suitability of the habitat for a large number of species. Changes in the hydroperiod caused by reduced water levels can change wet prairie area to a shrubby type vegetation dominated by wax myrtle. Wax myrtle can affect the amount and rate of run-off of water and further dry-out the area over time. It can reduce emergent vegetation used as nesting sites for species like red-winged blackbirds and wrens. A reduction in open water area can reduce the habitat for fish and the type of invertebrates that provide food sources for fish. It can also reduce the suitability of the habitat for other species dependent on fish as a food source. A change in the hydroperiod caused by a draw-down of one to two feet can adversely impact various types of wading birds including little blue herons, snowy egrets, little green herons, great blue herons, and great egrets. It can adversely impact other birds such as bald eagles, wood storks, black rails, least bitterns, terns, seagulls, pie billed grebes, mergansers, cormorants, red winged blackbirds, and wrens. An altered hydroperiod can also adversely impact larger animals such as otters and alligators. It is possible to restore habitat after a draw-down. However, such a restoration does not prevent adverse impacts on the health of fish and wildlife during the hiatus that precedes the restoration. District Investigation On March 31, 1997, the District received a letter from the Wildlife Service dated March 27, 1997. The Wildlife Service expressed concern that rapid daily drainage caused by the excavation of NS1 and EW1 was creating adverse impacts on fish and wildlife in the Refuge. The District conducted a sufficient and appropriate investigation. District staff investigated the extent of the excavation and its impact on surrounding wetlands. Neither the investigation nor the Emergency Order was rendered insufficient or inappropriate by the refusal of the District: to wait until 1998 when it could more fully ascertain the effects of the excavation based on whether annual rainfall made 1997 a dry, normal, or wet year; or to re-investigate the effects of the Hacienda Road project on Respondents' properties. The excavation occurred during the dry season of the normal hydroperiod in January 1997. The District reasonably assumed that 1997 was going to be a normal year and could not delay appropriate action until 1998 to see if 1997 turned out to be a wet year. Sometime in 1998, the District determined that 1997 was an extremely wet year. However, the subsequent rainfall in 1997 could not have been reasonably anticipated by District staff and did not eviscerate a reasonable basis for either the Emergency Order on May 14, 1997, or the corrective action taken. An uncorrected excavation would have had long-term cumulative impacts on wetlands irrespective of annual rainfall in 1997. The District investigation leading up to the Emergency Order properly excluded another investigation of the effects of the Hacienda Road project. Such an investigation would have duplicated the investigation conducted in the preceding year. Even if the District had conducted another investigation, the weight of the evidence shows that the results of such an investigation would not have altered the reasonableness of the Emergency Order or the corrective action that ensued. At the time of the Emergency Order, the District reasonably concluded that the excavation caused immediate short- term effects that had significant adverse impacts on water levels in approximately 300 acres of wetlands, on fish and vegetation, and on wildlife in the refuge. Later, the District found that the excavation actually affected 600 to 800 acres of wetlands. Emergency Order Pursuant to Section 373.119(2), the District issued an Emergency Order on May 14, 1997. The Emergency Order authorized the Wildlife Service to construct earthen weirs in NS1 and EW1 to prevent further drainage in the River Basin and the Refuge. The findings and conclusions in the Emergency Order are sufficient and correct. The weirs are reasonably necessary to protect the health of fish, animals, and aquatic life in the River Basin, management objectives and reasonable uses of property in the River Basin, and other reasonable uses of property within the River Basin. Pursuant to the Emergency Order, the Wildlife Service constructed two earthen weirs in NS1 and EW1. The Wildlife Service constructed: an earthen weir in NS1 at a crest elevation of 12.7 feet; and an earthen weir in EW1 at a crest elevation of 11.7 feet. The weir in NS1 is located at the southernmost end of NS1 inside the Refuge. The weir in EW1 is inside the Refuge at the west end of EW1 just east of the eastern edge of NS1. The Wildlife Service used spoil material from NS1 and EW1 to construct the weirs. The weirs in NS1 and EW1 span the width of NS1 and EW1 and are approximately five feet from front to back at the height of each weir. The north-south sides of the weir in NS1 and the east-west sides of the weir in EW1 have a 4:1 slope. The top sides of each weir are stabilized with concrete bags. Neither of the weirs caused flooding or other adverse impacts on nearby property. Both weirs in NS1 and EW1 have the same effect on water levels, up and downstream, as the high- elevation areas had in NS1 and EW1 prior to the excavation. The weir in NS1 re-creates the two-foot head difference in NS1 that existed prior to excavation. No county rights-of-way exist in the location of NS1 and EW1. Brevard County never accepted the right-of-way adjacent to NS1 and EW1. Permitting Requirements Pursuant to Sections 373.413 and 373.416, the District requires an environmental resource permit (a "permit") to assure that activities such as construction, alteration, maintenance, or operation, will not be harmful to the water resources of the state and will be consistent with the overall objectives of the District. A permit is required for such activities unless a particular activity qualifies for an exemption authorized by applicable statutes and rules. Stormwater Management System or Works The permitting provisions in Sections 373.413 and 373.416, in relevant part, apply to the excavation of NS1, EW1, and the larger system of which each is a part (the "larger system") only if NS1, EW1, and the larger system satisfy the definitions of either a "stormwater management system," "works," or a "surface water management system." Each term is defined by statute or rule. The definitions of a "stormwater management system" in Section 373.403(10) and in Rule 40C-4.021(25) are substantially the same. NS1, EW1, and the larger system are each: . . . designed and constructed or implemented to control discharges . . . necessitated by rainfall events, incorporating methods to collect, convey, store, absorb, [or] inhibit . . . water to prevent or reduce flooding, overdrainage, environmental degradation . . . or otherwise affect the quantity and quality of discharges from the system. Section 373.403(10). NS1, EW1, and the larger system are "works" within the meaning of Section 373.403(5) and Rule 40C-4.021(31). NS1 and EW1, and the larger system, are each: . . . artificial structures, including . . . ditches, canals, conduits, channels . . . and other construction that connects to, draws water from, drains water into . . . waters in the state. Section 373.403(5). NS1, EW1, and the larger system are each a "surface water management system" defined in Rule 40C-4.021(26). Each is a system which, in relevant part, is: . . . a stormwater management system . . . or works, or any combination thereof. . . . [and] include areas of dredging or filling . . . . Rule 40C-4.021(26). The definition of a "surface water management system" includes elements not found in the definition of either a "stormwater management system" or "works." The broader scope of a surface water management system creates the potential that the permit requirement in Rule 40C-4.041(2)(b) may require a permit for elements not subject to Sections 373.413 and 373.416. As applied to the facts in this proceeding, the permit requirement in Rule 40C-4.041(2)(b) for the construction, alteration, maintenance, or operation of a "surface water management system" or "works" does not exceed the statutory authority in Sections 373.413 and 373.416. NS1 and EW1, and the larger system fall within the definition of a stormwater management system in Section 473.403(10) and Rule 40C-4.021(25) and within the definition of "works" in Section 373.403(5) and Rule 40C-4.021(31). Thresholds The requirement for a permit in Rule 40C-4.041(2)(b) does not apply if the construction, alteration, maintenance, or operation of a surface water management system does not meet one or more threshold requirements. NS1 and EW1 meet two threshold requirements found in Rule 40C-4.041(2)(b) 2 and 8. Rule 40C-4.041(2)(b) 2 and 8 require a permit for the construction, alteration, maintenance, or operation of a "surface water management system" if the system either: 2. Serves a project with a total land area equal to or exceeding forty acres; or * * * Is wholly or partially located in, on, or over any wetland or other surface water. NS1 and EW1 each serve a project with a total land area equal to or exceeding forty acres. NS1 and EW1 each are located wholly or partially in "wetlands" or other "surface water" defined, respectively, in Rule 40C-4.021(30) and Section 373.019(16). The excavation work placed spoil material in wetlands. The larger system also exceeds each of the threshold requirements in Rule 40C-4.041(2)(b) 2 and 8. Maintenance None of the parties claim that the excavation of NS1 and EW1 in 1997 was "construction" for which a permit is required in Section 373.413. The District alleges in paragraphs 24-25 and 31-33 of the Administrative Complaint that the excavation satisfies the definitions of maintenance, alteration, or operation. The term "maintenance" is defined in Section 373.403(8) and Rule 40C-4.041(20), in relevant part, to mean: . . . remedial work of a nature as may affect the safety of any . . . works . . . but excludes routine custodial maintenance. (emphasis supplied) Section 373.403(8). In order for the excavation of NS1 and EW1 to be maintenance, it had to be, inter alia, "remedial work" that was not "routine custodial maintenance." 8.3(a) Remedial Work The term "remedial" is not defined by applicable statutes or rules. The term must be defined by its common and ordinary meaning. Work is "remedial" if it rectifies or corrects a fault or error. The excavation of NS1 and EW1 was remedial. It rectified and corrected a fault or error caused by occlusions from high spots, or elevation controls, vegetation, and other causes. The high spots, in particular, reduced flow capacity in low-flow conditions. There is no evidence that the excavation of NS1 and EW1 in January 1997 was of a nature that affected the safety of NS1 and EW1. The lack of such evidence, however, does not preclude a finding that the excavation was remedial work. Section 373.403(8) and Rule 40C-4.021(20) provide that work is remedial if it is of a nature that "may" affect the safety of works such as NS1 and EW1. The statute and rule do not define remedial work to require that work "shall" affect the safety of NS1 and EW1 in order for the work to be remedial. Thus, work is remedial if it is of a nature that affects either the function or safety of NS1 and EW1. 8.3(b) Routine Custodial Maintenance If the excavation of NS1 and EW1 was routine custodial maintenance, it was excluded from the definition of "maintenance" in Section 373.403(8) and Rule 40C-4.021(20). If the excavation was not defined as "maintenance," it was neither "maintenance" that is subject to the maintenance permitting requirements nor "maintenance" that must satisfy the requirements for a "maintenance" exemption. The terms "routine" and "custodial" are not defined by applicable statutes or rules. They must be defined by their common and ordinary meanings. 8.3(b)(1) Routine The excavation of NS1 and EW1 was not routine. The excavation was not incident to work performed on a regular basis, according to a prescribed and detailed course of action, a standard procedure, or a set of customary activities. The excavation was not part of a course of action performed on a continuous or periodic basis. Any excavation that occurred prior to 1997 occurred only sporadically or episodically and not pursuant to any discernible interval or course of action. No excavation in prior years occurred at the level or to the extent of the excavation in 1997. From 1951 through 1996, neither NS1 nor EW1 were excavated in and around the excavation site. Experts examined aerial photographs taken between 1943 and 1997 for evidence of changes in water flow, vegetation, canal definition, and new spoil material that would indicate the occurrence of maintenance in and around the excavation site. Experts examined aerial photographs taken in 1958, 1969, 1972, 1975, 1979, 1980, 1984, 1986, 1989, 1994, and 1995. In 1943, there was a small interruption of water flow in NS1. The width of NS1 ranged from 10 to 14 feet. In 1951, the width of NS1 ranged from 16 to 20 feet. In 1958, there was some water in NS1 south of EW1. However, the same area in NS1 was predominantly covered with dirt and free-floating wetland vegetation. In 1979, intermittent water appeared in NS1 south of EW1. In 1980, water flowed freely in NS1 north of EW1, but no water flowed in NS1 south of EW1. In 1983, much of the definition of NS1 was lost north of Marsh-1. Water was intermittent. In 1984, the same area was seriously occluded. About 75-80 percent of the capacity of NS1 had been lost. In 1986, NS1 south of EW1 and north of Marsh-1 was losing definition. Sometime before 1993, some of the vegetation was cleaned out of NS1 south of Marsh-1. In 1986, a ditch appears next to EW1 from NS1 east to Pond-1. The ditch is not man-made because it is irregular and does not flow in a straight line. The ditch leading out of Pond-1 next to EW1 appears in the 1986 aerial photographs because a controlled fire in 1984 burned much of the free-floating vegetation. In 1989, the ditch next to EW1 was still present but was starting to become overgrown with vegetation. The vegetation included cattails west of Pond-1. In 1994, vegetation had been cleaned out of NS1 from a point approximately 400 feet south of EW1 to SR 50, but no water was present in that part of NS1. In 1994, the ditch next to EW1 contained cattails and some shallow marsh species. 8.3(b)(2) Custodial The excavation of NS1 and EW1 in January 1997 was not custodial. The excavation exceeded the level of work that was reasonably necessary to preserve, or care for, the condition or status of NS1 and EW1 immediately before the excavation. The spoil material next to NS1 and EW1 after the excavation in January 1997 was not consistent with custodial care. The spoil material differed in quantity and content from that which would evidence custodial care. The large quantity of spoil material produced by the excavation in 1997 far exceeded any reasonable amount that would evidence custodial care. The spoil material consisted primarily of sandy soil. The spoil material from custodial care would have consisted primarily of vegetation and possibly some organic soils that would have accumulated at or just beneath the bottom of NS1 and EW1. Alteration The term "alter" is defined in Section 373.403(7) and Rule 40C-4.041(2), in relevant part, as meaning: . . . to extend . . . works beyond maintenance in its original condition, including changes which may increase . . . the flow or storage of surface water which may affect the safety of . . . such . . . works. Section 373.403(7); 40C-4.021(2). 8.4(a) Original Condition Respondents contend that the term "original condition" means the condition prescribed in the original design specifications for NS1 and EW1 before 1916. If the excavation in 1997 was not so extensive that it exceeded the original design specifications for NS1 and EW1, Respondents argue that the excavation was not an "alteration" of NS1 and EW1. Respondents are correct. The common and ordinary meaning of the term "original" means first in time. The legislature and the District consistently use the term "original design specifications" as a requirement in Section 403.813(2)(f) and (g) and Rules 40C-4.051(11)(b) and 40C-4.051(11)(c). Original design specifications offer the most reliable standard for defining the "original condition" of NS1 and EW1 and should be used for that purpose whenever the original design specifications are established by the evidence of record. If the evidence is insufficient to establish the original design specifications, however, it does not follow that Respondents are free to excavate NS1 and EW2 to any extent. An "alteration" of NS1 and EW1 occurs in the absence of original design specifications if the excavation exceeds the "original condition" of the NS1 and EW1 defined by the weight of the evidence. The literal meaning of the terms "original design specifications" and "original condition" are not coterminous. The former term conveys a relatively specific connotation. The latter term is broad enough to be defined by means other than evidence of the "original design specifications" whenever the "original design specifications" cannot be established. The District must show that the excavation in 1997 satisfied the essential requirements of an "alteration" in Section 373.403(7) and Rule 40C-4.021(2). The District must prove the "original condition" of NS1 and EW1 by evidence of the "original design specifications" or, in the absence of such evidence, by evidence of "original condition" before the excavation. 8.4(a)(1) Original Design Specifications The parties submitted considerable evidence in an attempt to show that the "original condition" of NS1 and EW1 was evidenced, alternatively, by original design specifications or by other evidence, including evidence of the condition of NS1 and EW1 immediately before the excavation in January 1997. The evidence included data and other information from: approximately 78 aerial photographs taken in 1943, 1951, 1958, 1969, 1972, 1979, 1980, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1989, 1993-1995, and 1997; construction plans for I-95, from the 1960s, and for the widening of SR 50 by the Department; various reports and surveys, including those identified in this proceeding as the Cofield, Powell, McCrone, and Titusville surveys or reports; the results of investigations or surveys conducted by the District in 1996 and 1997; official maps, including the recorded plat of Titusville Farm, the U.S. geologic survey quadrangle map, the map used by the Wildlife Service, the Department's drainage basin map, and the District's basin map; the record chain of title that includes recorded drainage easements; approximately 51 pages of local newspaper articles from the early 1900s describing the work at Titusville Farm; and expert testimony based on the examination of the evidence of record. The evidence does not establish the original design specifications for NS1 and EW1 or the larger system. The evidence does not establish invert elevation; bottom width; side slopes; top width; ditch bottom profile or slope; hydraulic capacity; or hydrologic function. From the early 1900s through the 1970s, various plans proposed the construction of ditches that would discharge water into the Indian River approximately three miles east of I-95. The lower elevation of the River presented an efficient outfall for drainage. However, neither NS1, EW1, nor the larger system contains an outfall to the Indian River. Survey information is not available for the original construction of NS1, EW1, and the larger system. Information contained in more recent surveys does not show that NS1 and EW1 were originally designed to a depth of five to seven feet as Respondents contend. Newspaper articles from the early 1900s do not provide sufficient detail to establish the original design specifications for NS1, EW1, and the larger system. Most of the articles refer to a system constructed to the southeast of what is now the intersection of I-95 and SR 50. A few references describe canals that are four to five feet deep. Old newspaper articles show photographs of dredging equipment constructing a canal from Bird Lake to the Indian River. Bird Lake is southeast of I-95 and SR 50. The only evidence of the "original condition" of NS1 and EW1 before the excavation is evidence of the condition of each on the date of a particular piece of evidence. The evidence shows that the "original condition" of NS1 and EW1 between 1951 and the date of excavation was seriously degraded from the condition to which they were restored after the excavation. 8.4(a)(2) Condition Before Alteration After 1951, the canals constructed within that portion of Titusville Farm that is in the contested area lost their original design function. Due to a lack of maintenance and to occlusions through vegetation growth, aquatic vegetation, and sediment, the canals deteriorated over time. Since 1966, the canals have exhibited only sporadic signs of maintenance. Little, if any, new spoil material has been present. Water flow has been intermittent and insignificant. The increased growth in vegetation is consistent with decreased water flow and itself further impedes water flow. Since 1951, the canals in the rectangular parcel have filled with sediment in random locations, producing irregular ditch bottom elevations. High spots in bottom depths create control elevations that impede the flow of water during low-flow conditions west toward the St. Johns River and south toward the Addison Canal. Numerous high spots in bottom elevations create control elevations that impede water flow. The construction plans for I-95 reveal bottom depths in the rectangular parcel that vary from one to two feet. The construction plans for Hacienda Road show bottom depths ranging from 1.5 to 2.0 feet. Other surveys show natural ground elevations of 11.0 to 11.1 feet and bottom elevations of 8.5 to 9.8 feet resulting in bottom depths ranging from 1.3 to 2.5 feet. A survey conducted by the District in 1997 of high spots in bottom elevations between Hacienda Road and I-95 is consistent with the findings of previous surveys. Large sections of east-west ditches are high and reduce the flow of water west to the St. Johns River. Those canals constructed in Titusville Farm which are located in the smaller parcel east of I-95 have experienced a degradation in function similar to that experienced by the canals in the rectangular parcel. In addition, many of the existing drainage ditches discharge into swamps instead of their intended drainage outlets. During periods of high water, the canals constructed in Titusville Farm and now located in the contested area overflow and flood. During such periods, the natural sheet flow of water occurs from east to west and from north to south. 8.4(b) Safety Section 373.403(7) and Rule 40C-4.021(2) provide that work is an alteration if it includes changes which "may" affect the safety of works such as NS1 and EW1. The statute and rule do not say that work "shall" affect the safety of NS1 and EW1 before the work can be considered to be an alteration. Thus, work can be an alteration if it includes changes which affect either the function or safety of NS1 and EW1. The excavation of NS1 and EW1 affected their function. Operation The term "operation" is not defined in applicable statutes or rules and must be defined by its common and ordinary meaning. The term "operation" has two meanings. One meaning for an "operation" is a process or series of acts performed to effect a certain purpose or result, such as a surgical procedure. This definition creates the potential that the excavation of NS1 and EW1 will qualify simultaneously as an operation, maintenance, and an alteration. An "operation" would be neither maintenance nor an alteration only if: the operation was a process or series of acts, other than remedial work; was performed to effect a purpose or result other than the extension of works beyond maintenance in their original condition; and was not routine custodial maintenance. The second definition of "operation" is more easily distinguished from a single event that may also qualify as "maintenance" or "alteration." Under the second definition, an "operation" means an "act," process, or "way of operating" over time. Under this definition, a person can engage in the operation of a stormwater management system, or works, after completing a single event that is defined as either "maintenance" or "alteration." NS1 and EW1 were operating at some level of function and capacity before their excavation in 1997. Section 373.416 could not reasonably be construed as requiring Modern to obtain a permit for allowing NS1 and EW1 to continue their existing operation when Modern became the owner of the property. Modern would have committed no "act" which brought about a "way of operating" NS1 and EW1 that did not already exist at the time of acquisition. The excavation of NS1 and EW1 was an "act" by Modern that brought about a new and different "way of operating" NS1 and EW1. The new "way of operating" would not have occurred but for the act of Modern. After the excavation, Modern operated NS1 and EW1, albeit passively, in a way that Modern did not operate NS1 and EW1 before the excavation. Under either definition, the excavation in January 1997 involved the operation of NS1 and EW1. Pursuant to Section 373.416, the District requires a permit for either type of operation. Integrated Transaction The excavation of NS1 and EW1 in January 1997 consisted of three separate steps integrated into a single transaction referred to by the parties as excavation. The first step was maintenance; the second step was alteration; and the third step involved a new operation. In the first step, maintenance removed vegetation and minor occlusions; restored NS1 and EW1 to their original condition immediately before the excavation; and was neither routine nor custodial. In the second step, alteration extended the excavation beyond maintenance of NS1 and EW1 in their original condition; increased the flow of water in each; increased the depth and width of each; and increased the function and capacity of each. The third step in the transaction involved a new way of operating NS1 and EW1 after the first two steps. Even if the new operation were not a step within the excavation, because it arguably did not occur until after the excavation was completed, the transaction consisted of the two steps in the excavation and a third step after the excavation. In either case, the new operation of NS1 and EW1 is a separate activity for which a permit is required pursuant to Section 373.416. The separate permitting requirements in Sections 373.413 and 373.416 apply to each separate step in the transaction. If excavation had ceased after the maintenance step, no alteration or new operation of NS1 and EW1 would have occurred. Nevertheless, permitting requirements would have required a permit for the maintenance performed in the completed step unless that step qualified for a maintenance exemption. Once the excavation progressed beyond maintenance, it involved the additional, but separate, steps of "alteration" and "operation" for which a permit is required and for which no exemption is claimed by Respondents. If each separate step were separated in time, separate permitting requirements would have applied to each step. Modern does not avoid the separate permitting requirements in Sections 373.413 and 373.416 by integrating three separate steps into a single transaction. Estoppel 204. The weight of the evidence does not show that the District is estopped from enforcing applicable permitting and exemption requirements. The evidence does not show that the District represented to Respondents that the excavation of NS1 and EW1 did not require a permit or qualified for an exemption. Factual Representations Prior to the excavation of NS1 and EW1, District staff met with Mr. Charles Moehle, Mr. Michael Moehle, Mr. Nelson, and a number of others. The meeting was held to discuss the proposed cleaning of the IRCC. A number of issues were discussed at the meeting. One issue involved a driveway that had been constructed in the IRCC without culverts. The District determined that the driveway did not create a substantial adverse impact on area property owners because the IRCC did not carry enough water. Most of the water draining south out of the contested area drained south of the IRCC to the Addison Canal. The District told attendees at the meeting that the District would clean out most of the vegetation in the IRCC. Brevard County subsequently installed culverts in the IRCC where the driveway had been constructed originally without culverts. At the southeast corner of the smaller parcel east of I-95, the IRCC turns obliquely northeast for about a half mile and then resumes its eastward direction toward Indian River City. Respondents claim the IRCC turns north at NS1, at a right angle, and then turns east at EW1, at another right angle, and resumes its eastward direction to Indian River City. The District did not represent to Respondents that the IRCC follows NS1 and EW1 and flows under I-95 to Indian River City. The District never indicated that NS1 and EW1 could be cleaned out under a maintenance exemption as part of the IRCC or otherwise. Mr. Frank Meeker, the Ombudsman for the District, met with Mr. Michael Moehle at least three times between February 14 and April 22, 1996, to discuss the problems of high water on Modern property. Mr. Meeker indicated that a culvert needed to be placed under the driveway in the IRCC, which was later done by Brevard County, and that NS1 needed to be cleaned out to eliminate the blockage south of SR 50 in the vicinity of the Titusville Waste Water Treatment Plant. NS1 was cleaned out south of SR 50. Mr. Meeker reviewed the work and indicated to Mr. Michael Moehle that the work constituted borderline maintenance. Mr. Meeker never indicated that the excavation of NS1 and EW1 north of SR 50 would be exempt from statutory permitting requirements. Mr. Meeker has neither the actual nor apparent authority to rule on permit requirements. Mr. Meeker sent a letter to Mr. Charles Moehle in April 1996. Nothing in that letter suggests that the excavation of NS1 and EW1 would be exempt from statutory permitting requirements. Disparate Treatment Respondents claim that the District treated them unfairly. The weight of the evidence shows that the action taken by the District did not result in disparate treatment. 9.2(a) Cracker Barrel-1, Cracker Barrel-2, and Lowe's Since 1996, the District has issued three permits for construction of different projects on property owned by Modern or Omni in the area of NS1 and EW1. The three projects involved significant impacts to wetlands. The three projects are referred to in this proceeding as Cracker Barrel-1, Cracker Barrel-2, and Lowe's. In determining whether a particular piece of property contains wetlands, the District relies on a statewide wetland delineation rule described in Section 373.421 and Rule 62.340. The District considers vegetation, soils, and hydrology to delineate wetlands. The District utilized this delineation rule when it issued permits for Cracker Barrel-1, Cracker Barrel-2, and Lowe's. The District determines a mitigation ratio for construction on wetlands through a balancing process. The District weighs the quality of the wetlands on a particular construction site against the quality of the mitigation plan. The District relied on this same process when it issued permits for Cracker Barrel-1, Cracker Barrel-2, and Lowe's. Cracker Barrel-1 involved approximately 4.5 acres of wetlands on a 5-acre site just south of Modern-1. The District issued a permit for the construction of Cracker Barrel-1 approximately two months after receipt of the application. Cracker Barrel-2 involved approximately 11 acres of wetlands on a 15-acre site. The District issued a permit for the construction of Cracker Barrel-2 approximately two months after receipt of the application. Lowe's is located east of I-95, north of SR 50, west of SR 405, outside the contested area, but adjacent to the contested area. Lowe's involved approximately 22 acres of wetlands on a 25-acre site. Lowe's was not an easy project to permit due to the extensive acreage and wetlands impacts. The District issued a permit for the construction of Lowe's approximately four months after receipt of the application. 9.2(b) Unnecessary Delay and Expense Respondents complain that the District unfairly increases the time and expense associated with permit applications through pre-application negotiations intended to resolve issues that typically arise when formulating a mitigation plan for construction on wetlands. Respondents contend that the delay before an application can be submitted is unreasonable. Respondents point to a delay of almost a year between the time Modern first complained in 1996 of flooding and the refusal of the District to approve any corrective action. Respondents also cite delays in pre-application negotiations for Cracker Barrel-1, Cracker Barrel-2, and Lowe's. The District did not delay its investigation of the flooding allegedly caused by the Hacienda Road project. The District conducted an appropriate investigation and reasonably determined that the flooding was not attributable to the Hacienda Road project. The delays complained of by Respondents are reasonable incidents of good faith attempts by the District to effectuate its statutory responsibilities through mutual agreement. The weight of the evidence does not show that the delays complained of by Respondents constitute disparate treatment. The delays were not de jure delays that resulted from a design or intent on the part of the District to delay Modern and Omni in their construction and development ventures. The weight of the evidence shows that the delays were reasonably necessary to formulate mitigation plans for each construction project and to carry out the statutory obligations of the District prescribed in Sections 373.413 and 373.416. 9.2(c) Selective Exemption Respondents claim that the District is unfairly applying certain maintenance exemptions to the excavation carried out by Modern. Respondents complain that the District previously granted maintenance exemptions for projects carried out by entities unrelated to Respondents but denied any maintenance exemption for the excavation of NS1 and EW1. Activities covered by applicable permitting requirements either do or do not qualify for a maintenance exemption. No separate application is required for such an exemption. A person who performs work based on the assumption that the work qualifies for an exemption assumes the risk that the work does not qualify for the exemption. If the work is performed in violation of applicable permitting requirements, it may qualify for an after-the-fact permit or corrective action may be required. The District has previously granted relevant maintenance exemptions for a number of different projects carried out by entities unrelated to Respondents and has also denied maintenance exemptions in other instances including the excavation of NS1 and EW1. The weight of the evidence shows that the District is not applying maintenance exemptions to the excavation of NS1 and EW1 in a manner that results in disparate treatment of Modern or its co-respondents. Brevard County cleaned out a portion of NS1 south of SR 50 based on the mistaken conclusion that the work qualified for a maintenance exemption. After the District began this enforcement action against Modern, the District determined that the work did not qualify for a maintenance exemption and required Brevard County to apply for a permit. Brevard County applied for a permit, albeit belatedly. The District granted the permit because the work complied with applicable criteria and did not result in adverse impacts to wetlands or the Refuge. In another instance, the District discovered some ditch plugs in ditches adjacent to property owned by a person named "Dr. Broussard." The District requested Dr. Broussard to remove the plugs, and Dr. Broussard complied. 9.2(d) Selective Enforcement Respondents allege disparate treatment from the District on the ground that the District did not file an administrative complaint in the foregoing instances but filed such an action against Modern. However, the weight of the evidence shows that enforcement action was not reasonable in other instances because the District reached mutually agreeable resolutions with the regulated parties. The evidence shows that enforcement action was reasonably necessary in this proceeding. The District first became aware of the significance of the impacts of the excavation of NS1 and EW1 when the District received a letter from the Wildlife Service in March 1997. The District brought the matter to the attention of Modern. The District informed Modern of the seriousness of the situation, notified Modern that the excavation required a permit, and made Modern aware of the need to correct the situation by restoring the wetlands to their original condition. The District and Modern discussed various options for constructing weirs without reaching any agreement. Time was of the essence. When the District concluded that the parties were not going to reach agreement, the District undertook emergency action in May 1997 and filed the Administrative Complaint later in August 1997. The action taken by the District in this proceeding is consistent with the District's historical practice. When the District becomes aware of a potential violation, the District does not immediately file an administrative complaint. The District investigates the matter to confirm the existence and extent of a violation, if any, and makes reasonable efforts to resolve the matter informally. The District has not issued an emergency order prior to the excavation of NS1 and EW1 because an emergency order was not the most appropriate solution in other cases. However, the District has sought injunctions in circuit court against persons unrelated to Respondents. In this proceeding, an emergency order better served applicable statutory mandates to the District because the Wildlife Service was willing to perform the work needed to rectify the condition that existed within the Refuge. This combination of factors made an emergency order particularly well suited and practicable for carrying out the statutory responsibilities of the District. The weight of the evidence does not show that the District threatened criminal prosecution against Modern or its individual shareholders. The District has not referred this matter for criminal prosecution. However, the issue of whether a threat of criminal sanctions occurred is fairly debatable, even if it is immaterial to estoppel, the permitting requirements, and the exemption requirements. Paragraph 27 in the Administrative Complaint does put Modern on notice that Sections 373.129(5) and 373.136 authorize the District to file a cause of action in circuit court in which the District may seek civil penalties up to $10,000. Section 373.430(3)-(5) puts Modern on notice of the potential for criminal penalties in circuit court. In any event, Modern failed to prove that the District is estopped from requiring a permit or applying applicable exemption requirements to the excavation of NS1 and EW1. Modern neither applied for nor obtained a permit for the excavation of NS1 and EW1. Unless Modern qualifies for one of the exemptions authorized by statute or rule, Modern violated Section 373.430(1)(b) and is subject to the actions and penalties authorized in Sections 373.119 and 373.129(1), (3), (6), and (7). Exemptions Modern claims it is entitled to six exemptions from the permitting requirements in Sections 373.413 and 373.416. Four of the exemptions are found in Rules 40C-4.051(2)(a)1, 40C- 4.051(2)(a)3, 40C-4.051(11)(b), and 40C-4.051(11)(c). The other two exemptions are found in Section 403.813(2)(f) and (g). Two Grandfather Exemptions Rule 40C-4.051(2)(a) 1 and 3, in relevant part, authorizes exemptions for systems such as NS1, EW1, and the larger system, if they are: located in prescribed areas; and were constructed and operating prior to December 7, 1987, and March 2, 1974, respectively. NS1, EW1, and the larger system are located in the areas described in each rule. On the requisite dates, however, they were not constructed and operating. Rule 40C-4.051(2)(c), in relevant part, provides that the exemptions in Rule 40C-4.051(2)(a) apply only to those systems set forth in plans, specifications, and performance criteria existing on or before December 7, 1983, or March 2, 1974, as the case may be, and then only to the extent: 2. Such system is maintained and operated in a manner consistent with such plans, specifications and performance criteria. Rule 40C-4.051(2)(c) 2. Rule 40C-4.051(3), in relevant part, provides that the exemptions listed in Rule 40C-4.051(2) "shall not apply" to those systems which on either December 7, 1983, or March 2, 1974, as the case may be: . . . have ceased to operate as set forth in such system's plans, specifications and performance criteria. Modern does not qualify for either of the exemptions in Rule 40C-4.051(2)(a) 2 or 3. As a threshold matter, the weight of the evidence does not establish plans, specifications, or performance criteria (the "original criteria") for NS1, EW1, or the larger system on either December 7, 1983, or March 2, 1974. Even if the evidence did establish the original criteria and if the excavation merely restored NS1 and EW1 to the original criteria, the evidence clearly shows that neither NS1, EW1, nor the larger system were constructed and operating in accordance with the original criteria on the prescribed dates. Rather, the evidence shows that NS1, EW1, and the larger system had become seriously degraded and no longer operated at their post- excavation levels. Two Maintenance Dredging Exemptions Modern claims that it qualifies for the exemption in Rule 40C-4.051(11)(b). That rule, in relevant part, exempts from the permitting requirements in Sections 373.413 and 373.416: The . . . maintenance dredging of existing manmade canals [and] channels . . . where the spoil material is . . . removed and deposited on a self-contained, upland spoil site which will prevent the escape of the spoil material and return water from the spoil site into wetlands or other surface waters, provided no more dredging is performed than is necessary to restore the canal [and] channels . . . to original design specifications and provided that control devices are used at the dredge site to prevent . . . deleterious substances from discharging into adjacent waters during maintenance dredging. . . . This exemption shall not apply to the removal of a natural . . . barrier separating a canal . . . or system from adjacent wetlands or other surface waters. Prior to the amendment of Section 403.813(2)(f) in October 1997, the maintenance exemption in the statute was substantially similar to that in the quoted rule. The two exemptions are first discussed together as they existed prior to the statutory amendment in 1997. The exemption requirements created by the 1997 amendments are discussed separately. 10.2(a) Requirements Before 1997 The excavation of NS1 and EW1 in January 1997 was "dredging" within the meaning of Section 373.403(13). It was excavation by any means in surface waters defined in Section 373.019(16) or wetlands delineated in Section 373.421(1). The excavation also connected Pond-1, a water body, to surface waters or wetlands. 10.2(a)(1) Canals, Channels, or Ditches The maintenance dredging exemptions authorized in Section 403.813(2)(f) and Rule 40C-4.051(11)(b) apply only to canals or channels. The exemptions do not apply to drainage ditches. Neither Section 373.403 nor Rule 40C-4.021 define the terms "canals, channels, or ditches." However, the terms are defined in Section 403.803(2),(3), and (7). The definitions in Section 403.803 may be used to define the terms of the exemptions in Rule 40C-4.051(11)(b). In October 1995, the legislature consolidated the dredge and fill permitting provisions in Chapter 403 with the permitting provisions for the management and storage of surface waters in Chapter 373, Part IV. Section 403.813(2) expressly provides that the exemptions authorized in Section 403.813(2) apply to the permit requirements in Chapter 373. Section 373.413(9) directs water management districts in the state to incorporate the provisions of Rule 62-312.050 into the rules of the districts and to rely on the existing provisions governing the dredge and fill program when implementing the rules of the districts. Neither NS1 nor EW1 is a canal within the meaning of Section 403.803(2). Although each is a manmade trench, the bottom of neither NS1 nor EW1 is normally covered by water within the meaning of Section 403.803(2). Portions of NS1 and EW1 which are upstream from high spots or elevation controls are "normally" covered by water. However, portions which are downstream of high spots are "normally" not covered by water during low-flow conditions and dry conditions in a normal or wet year, and during dry years. Neither NS1 nor EW1 is a channel as defined in Section 403.813(3). Although each is a trench, the length of NS1 and EW1 are not "normally" covered "entirely" with water during low-flow conditions and dry conditions in a normal year or wet year, and during dry years. Neither is the bed of a stream or river. NS1 and EW1 are each a drainage ditch or irrigation ditch within the meaning of Section 403.803(7). Each is a man- made trench created to drain water from the land or to transport water for use on the land, and neither is built for navigational purposes. NS1 and EW1 satisfy the definition of a drainage ditch or irrigation ditch irrespective of the degree to which the bottom of each is "normally" covered by water: upstream or downstream of high spots or control elevations; during low-flow conditions and dry conditions in normal or wet years; and during dry years. 10.2(a)(2) Additional Requirements Even if NS1 and EW1 were canals or channels, their excavation in 1997 does not qualify for the exemption in Rule 40C-4.051(11)(b). The excavation fails to satisfy several additional requirements for the exemption. The spoil material from the excavation was not placed on an upland spoil site which prevented the escape of spoil material and return water into wetlands and surface waters within the meaning of Section 373.019(16). Rather, Modern placed the spoil material in wetlands. Modern placed approximately 1.5 acres of fill in wetlands in the form of spoil material from the excavation. Modern placed approximately .75 acres of such fill in the wetlands and surface waters north of Marsh-1. 10.2(a)(3) Original Design Specifications More dredging was done than was necessary to restore NS1 and EW1 to their original design specifications. The weight of the evidence does not show the original design specifications for NS1 and EW1, including the bottom elevations, widths, slopes, and other pertinent specifications typically prescribed in original designs. However, the evidence does show the original condition of NS1 and EW1 immediately before their excavation. More dredging was done than was necessary to restore NS1 and EW1 to their original condition before the excavation. 10.2(a)(4) Natural Barrier The exemptions in Section 403.813(2)(f) and Rule 40C- 4.051(11)(b) do not apply to the removal of a natural barrier separating a canal from adjacent wetlands or other surface waters. The term "barrier" is not defined in Sections 373.403 or 403.803; or in Rule 40C-4.021. The term must be defined by its common and ordinary meaning. A barrier is something that acts to hinder or restrict. The high spots that existed in NS1 and EW1 before their excavation functioned as control elevations. The high spots were natural barriers during low-flow conditions, during dry conditions in normal and wet years, and during dry years. They acted to hinder or restrict the flow of water through EW1 and NS1 into adjacent wetlands and eventually to other surface water through the Addison Canal west toward the St. Johns River. The 3-4 foot wall of water that flowed down NS1 to SR 50 immediately after the excavation in 1997 provided vivid evidence of the effectiveness of the high spots that formed two-foot barriers before the excavation. The excavation did not use control devices which prevented deleterious substances from discharging into adjacent waters during maintenance dredging. The term "waters" is defined in Section 403.031(13) to include wetlands. The term is also defined in Section 373.016(17) and Rule 40C-4.021(29) in a manner that includes wetlands. Spoil material was placed in adjacent waters and not contained by adequate control devices. 10.2(b) Requirements After 1997 Additional provisions not found in Rule 40C- 4.051(11)(b) were added to Section 403.813(2)(f) in October 1997. In relevant part, the additional provisions extend the exemption in Section 403.813(2)(f) beyond canals and channels to include: . . . previously dredged portions of natural water bodies within drainage rights-of-way or drainage easements which have been recorded in the public records of the county . . . provided that no significant impacts occur to previously undisturbed natural areas, and provided that . . . best management practices for erosion and sediment control are utilized to prevent . . . dredged material . . . and deleterious substances from discharging into adjacent waters during maintenance dredging . . . . (emphasis supplied) 10.2(b)(1) Retroactivity As a threshold matter, the additional provisions in Section 403.813(2)(f) did not take effect until October 1997. The excavation of NS1 and EW1 occurred in January 1997. 10.2(b)(2) Drainage Easements Modern claims that it was not required to obtain a permit to excavate NS1 and EW1 because Modern possesses drainage easements for NS1 and EW1 which are recorded in the public records of Brevard County, in accordance with the requirements of Section 404.813(2)(f). Modern claims that it is entitled to maintain its drainage easements. Assuming arguendo that Respondents possess drainage easements and that the drainage easements are included in the exemption, the owner of drainage easements is no less subject to statutory permitting and exemption provisions than is the owner of the fee simple estate in land through which an easement runs. The existence of drainage easements is only one of the requirements in Section 403.813(2)(f) for an exemption from a permit. Modern must also show that it satisfies the other exemption requirements in Section 403.813(2)(f). 10.2(b)(3) Other Requirements The excavation of NS1 and EW1 resulted in significant impacts to previously undisturbed natural areas. The area subject to significant impacts was not limited to the excavation site but included 600-800 acres inside the Refuge. Modern failed to utilize best management practices to prevent dredged material and deleterious substances from discharging into adjacent waters during dredging. Dredged material and deleterious substances were deposited into adjacent wetlands. Two Maintenance Exemptions Rule 40C-4.051(11)(c), in relevant part, provides that no permit is required for the maintenance of "functioning . . . drainage ditches . . ." if: The spoil material is deposited on a self-contained upland spoil site which will prevent the escape of the spoil material and return water into wetlands or other surface waters. [and] * * * 3. . . . no more dredging is . . . performed than is necessary to restore the . . . drainage ditch to its original design specifications. The quoted requirements for the exemption in Rule 40C- 4.051(11)(c) are substantially identical to the requirements for the exemption in Section 403.813(2)(g). However, the exemption in Rule 40C-4.051(11)(c) applies to "functioning" ditches while the exemption in Section 403.813(2)(g) authorizes an exemption for "existing" ditches. 10.3(a) Functioning or Existing The terms "functioning" and "existing" are not defined in Sections 373.403, 403.803, or in Rule 40C-4.021. Each term must be defined by its common and ordinary meaning. The terms "functioning" and "existing" are not equivalent terms. The statutory provision authorizing maintenance exemptions for "existing" ditches precludes a maintenance exemption for initial "construction" of ditches. Existing ditches do not function if they are totally occluded by debris, silt, or vegetation that prevent any conveyance of water. Alternatively, a ditch that is dammed by a man-made device would not function but would exist. Before the excavation in January 1997, NS1 and EW1 each functioned to the extent that it performed the action for which it was particularly fitted or employed, albeit at a degraded capacity. Each existed irrespective of its level of function. The culverts for NS1 under SR 50 and south of SR 50 and those for EW1 under I-95 belie the District's contention that NS1 and EW1 neither functioned nor existed before the excavation. If the contention were correct, it would mean the construction of the culverts under SR 50 and south of SR 50 was a meaningless expenditure of taxpayer dollars. The District's contention suffers another internal inconsistency. If NS1, EW1, and the larger system were not functioning before the excavation, they may have failed one or more of the threshold requirements in Rule 40C-4.041(2)(b)2 because they did not "serve" 40 acres or any other area. NS1 and EW1 functioned and existed before the excavation. NS1 and EW1 each conveyed water when water exceeded high spots during dry and wet conditions in dry, normal, and wet years. EW1 conveyed water into NS1. NS1 conveyed water south through several culverts into the Addison Canal and west toward the St. Johns River. The bottom line is, the works worked. Even though NS1 and EW1 were "functioning" and "existing" before the excavation in January 1997, the excavation did not qualify for the exemptions in Section 403.813(2)(g) and Rule 40C-4.051(11)(c). The excavation failed to satisfy additional requirements in the statute and rule. 10.3(b) Additional Requirements The excavation did not deposit spoil material on a self-contained upland spoil site which prevented the spoil material and return water from escaping into wetlands and other surface waters. The dredging was more than was necessary to restore NS1 and EW1 to their original design specifications. Unadopted Rule Respondents claim that the District's proposed agency action is based on a policy which satisfies the definition of a rule in Section 120.52(15) but which has not been promulgated in accordance with the rulemaking procedures prescribed in Section 120.54 (an "unadopted rule"). Respondents claim the unadopted rule restricts "maintenance" exemptions in Section 403.813(2)(g) and Rule 40C-4.051(11)(c) to routine custodial maintenance; and to existing ditches that also function. Section 120.57(1)(e), in relevant part, provides: . . . Any agency action that determines the substantial interests of a party and that is based on an unadopted rule is subject to de novo review by an administrative law judge . . . . . . . The agency must demonstrate that the unadopted rule . . . [satisfies the requirements of Sections 120.57(1)(e)2a-g] . . . . (emphasis supplied) If Respondents show that the District's proposed agency action is based on an unadopted rule and that the District has relied on the rule to determine the substantial interests of Respondents, then the agency must prove-up its unadopted rule by demonstrating in a de novo review that the unadopted rule satisfies the requirements of Section 120.57(1)(e). 11.1 Rule Defined Section 120.52(15), in relevant part, defines a rule to mean: . . . each agency statement of general applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy or describes the procedure or practice requirements of an agency and . . . includes the amendment or repeal of a rule. The term does not include: Internal management memoranda which do not affect either the private interests of any person or plan or procedure important to the public and which have no application outside the agency issuing the memorandum . . . . Section 120.52(15) establishes two conjunctive requirements as a threshold test for a rule. There must be a statement; and the statement must be one that is of general applicability. A statement of general applicability must also satisfy one or more disjunctive requirements. The statement must either implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy; describe the practice requirements of an agency; amend or repeal a rule; or impose any requirement or solicit any information not required by statute or rule. 11.1(a) Statement The District published a working definition of routine custodial maintenance in a memorandum dated November 20, 1989 (the "Memorandum"). The Memorandum was authored by the District's Chief Engineer and approved by the Director of the Department of Resource Management (the "Director"). The Memorandum directs field office directors and compliance coordinators in regard to ditch work and routine custodial maintenance. In relevant part, the statement expressed in the Memorandum provides: This memorandum serves to clarify the District policy on: 1) the type of ditch maintenance work which qualifies for exemption from . . . permitting as specified in rule section 40C-4.051(2)(a)2.a . . . and, 2) procedures for verification that the work qualifies for this exemption. (emphasis supplied) This discussion only applies to work in ditches which trips . . . [a] permit threshold. . . . In many cases, none of these thresholds would be exceeded. Section 40C-4.051(2)(a)2.1. . . . specifically exempts the "maintenance" of "systems" in existence prior to December 7, 1983. Section 403.813(2)(f) and (g) also exempts the "maintenance dredging of canals and ditches. [sic] These exemptions, however, only apply to what is defined as "routine custodial maintenance." Work that results in the alteration of the system is not exempt and requires a permit from the District if a threshold is exceeded. Section 3.2.1 of the . . . Applicant's Handbook defines "alter" as "works beyond maintenance in its original condition." (emphasis supplied) Working Definition of "Routine Custodial Maintenance" (emphasis not supplied) Two basic criteria: The proposed maintenance work must be for the purpose of restoring the ditch system to its original design specifications. Such specifications would normally include: invert elevation, bottom width, side slopes, top width, ditch lining, ditch bottom profile (slope). In addition, such specifications may include culvert structures, including culvert type, size, invert elevation, length, slope and endwall detail. Maintenance work conducted under this exemption must not alter the hydraulic capacity or hydrologic functions of the ditch from that provided by the original design. The maintenance work must occur on a regular basis. The frequency of maintenance will be variable and dependent on site specific conditions and the level of service provided by the particular ditch system. However, for maintenance work to be exempt, the ditch should have been maintained to prevent deterioration to such a degree that it no longer functions as intended. In other words, routine custodial maintenance is limited to maintaining the ditch rather than re-building the ditch. As a rule of thumb, most ditch systems require maintenance at least once every ten to fifteen years. In some cases, more frequent maintenance is required to prevent a ditch form becoming non-functional. Examples of work which meet the test of "routine custodial maintenance" (provided that the ditch has been periodically maintained): Removal of accumulated silt and debris. Clearing of vegetation from the ditch. Clearing of culverts blocked by sediment or debris. Replacement of damaged culvert structures with same size culverts. Regarding and revegetating ditch side slopes. Examples of work which do not meet the test include: increasing the hydraulic capacity by deepening the ditch bottom and/or increasing the ditch cross section; lining an existing ditch with concrete or other material to improve hydraulic capacity; replacing existing culvert structures with different culvert sizes or placement of new culverts at different invert elevations; any maintenance dredging where spoil material is placed in wetlands; dredging or other maintenance work in natural system. Procedures for conducting maintenance work according to the . . . exemption (Section 40C-4.051(2)9a)2.a. . . . [sic] (emphasis not supplied) If the work is not routine custodial maintenance, the entity performing the work is responsible for obtaining the required permits prior to starting work. (emphasis supplied) Routine custodial maintenance may be conducted without contacting the District. However, upon request, the district will provide written verification that the work is exempt after receiving sufficient information to determine that the work is routing custodial maintenance. This information must include . . . evidence of the original design specifications as described below: * * * Case 2. No Design Specifications (Plans) Exist (emphasis not supplied) this will be the case for many ditch systems prior to . . . effective date . . . or not subject to permitting. . . . In this case, it is much more difficult to determine if the work qualifies for the exemption. The following may be used by the applicant to verify that the work qualifies for an exemption: Work will be limited to one or more of the maintenance activities listed above . . . . Other evidence as to the original specifications of the ditch system, such as: historical and current photographs and aerial photographs; contracts, bid documents, etc.; specifications for typical ditch sections; individuals attesting to the original ditch dimensions (such as contractors, former or current government employees); information on the soils and vegetation in the ditch. . . . Memorandum at unnumbered pages 1-3. The Memorandum is published evidence of the agency statement. However, the statement expressed in the Memorandum exists and is applied by the District independently of the Memorandum. The District expresses and applies the statement each time the District enforces agency action based on the statement and not just when the agency publishes a particular document that captures the statement in writing. The existence, terms, and scope of the statement are measured on a de facto basis by the effect of the statement. That effect emerges from all of the evidence of record including, but not limited to, the publication of the statement in various documents such as the Memorandum. The District illustrates in its PRO and PFO how easily an agency statement can elude the four corners of a particular document on which it is written and emerge from the evidence as an unwritten statement with broader applicability than that stated in a particular document. In relevant part, the District states: 9. The 1989 memorandum was not written to explain the maintenance exemption for . . . drainage ditches in 40C-4.051(11)(c) . . . because this rule did not exist when the memorandum was written. It was written to explain the grandfathering exemption at 40C- 4.051(2)(a) . . . which exempts the "maintenance" of "systems" in existence prior to December 7, 1983 from the permitting requirements of Chapter 40C-4. . . . (emphasis supplied) * * * Modern claims that the ditch excavation is exempt under the ditch maintenance exemption in 40C-4.051(11)(c). . . . (emphasis supplied) Not all ditch excavation is exempt under this exemption, just routine custodial maintenance . . . having a minor environmental impact. "Routine" indicates something that is done on a regular basis. (emphasis supplied) The maintenance exemption for ditches in paragraph 40C-4.051(11)(c) . . . is based on the exemption in paragraph 403.813(2)(g) . . . . 13. . . . the ditches that are subject to the grandfathering exemptions under 40C- 4.051(2) . . . are the same ditches that may also be exempt under the statute. . . . PFO at 7; PRO at 28. Although the Memorandum purports to limit the statement to the "grandfathering exemption" in Rule 4.051(2)(a), District practice relies on the statement to apply the exemptions in Section 403.813(2)(g) and Rule 40C-4.051(11)(c). The District has applied the statement consistently since at least 1984. 11.1(b) General Applicability The statement expressed in the Memorandum is a statement of general applicability within the meaning of Section 120.52(15). In effect, the statement creates rights, requires compliance, or otherwise has the direct and consistent effect of law. The District submitted evidence intended to refute the general applicability of the agency statement by showing that the District does not rely on the Memorandum. The District contends that it has never relied on the Memorandum separate and apart from the statutes and rules interpreted by the Memorandum; that it has never initiated an enforcement action that relies on the Memorandum; that the Director forgot about the Memorandum after signing it; and that District staff do not utilize the Memorandum on a regular basis. The District misses the point. The general applicability of a statement is not determined by the applicability of a particular document in which the statement is expressed. The general applicability of a statement is determined by the effect of the statement evidenced by all of its applications irrespective of the label assigned by the agency to each application. The Director may have forgotten that he signed the Memorandum, but the record shows that neither he nor his staff forgot about the statement expressed in the Memorandum that maintenance exemptions apply only to "routine custodial maintenance." The record is replete with examples of how the District applies the statement with general applicability whenever the District construes the term "maintenance" in Section 403.813(2)(f) and (g); in Rule 40C-4.051(2)(a) 2 and 3; and in Rule 40C-4.051(11)(b) and (c). The District illustrates in its PRO how the statement is applied with the direct and consistent effect of law. In relevant part, the District states: Florida Courts and agencies have consistently interpreted and applied the maintenance exemption to include the requirement that dredging must be . . . part of routine custodial maintenance (emphasis supplied) District PRO at 83. The statement expressed in the Memorandum is generally applicable within the meaning of Section 120.52(15). The statement defines the scope of the permit requirement in Section 373.416 and the scope of the exemption in Section 403.813(2)(g). The District consistently applies the statement to create rights, to require compliance, or to otherwise have the direct and consistent effect of law. 11.1(c) Law and Policy Although the statement implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy, it does not do so by defining routine custodial maintenance as work which restores a ditch to its original design specifications. The requirement that maintenance must be no more than is necessary to restore a ditch to its original design specifications is present in each of the "maintenance" exemptions authorized in Section 403.813(2)(f) and (g) and in Rules 40C-4.051(2), 40C-4.051(11)(b), and 40C- 4.051(11)(c). The statement implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy by applying maintenance exemptions only to routine custodial maintenance. The restricted application of maintenance exemptions effectively amends the definitions of "maintenance" in Section 373.403(8) and Rule 40C-4.021(20). The statement expressed in the Memorandum first refers to the exemptions in Section 403.813(2)(f) and (g). The statement then declares that "these exemptions . . . only apply to what is defined as 'routine custodial maintenance.'" Unlike the agency statement, Section 373.403(8) and Rule 40C-4.021(20) define "maintenance" to exclude "routine custodial maintenance." Because routine custodial maintenance is "not maintenance," routine custodial maintenance is neither subject to the maintenance permitting requirements in Section 373.416 nor required to satisfy the maintenance exemption requirements in Section 403.813(2)(f) and (g). Maintenance has only one definition. That single definition defines "maintenance" to exclude routine custodial maintenance from maintenance that is subject to the exemption requirements in Section 403.813(2)(f) and (g). There is not another definition that includes routine custodial maintenance in maintenance that must satisfy maintenance exemption requirements. Routine custodial maintenance is the definitional complement to maintenance. Remedial work that is routine custodial maintenance is "not maintenance." Remedial work that is not routine custodial maintenance is maintenance that must either obtain a maintenance permit or satisfy applicable "maintenance" exemption requirements. The terms "exclude" and "exempt" are not synonymous. Routine custodial maintenance that is excluded from the definition of maintenance is "not maintenance" and need not qualify as exempt maintenance. Maintenance that is not routine custodial maintenance is not excluded from the definition of maintenance. Included maintenance is subject to the maintenance permitting provisions but may qualify for a maintenance exemption if the maintenance satisfies the requirements prescribed for maintenance exemptions. 11.1(d) Practice and Procedure Even if the District statement did not amend existing statutes and rules, the statement describes the practice requirements for the District. It prescribes the criteria to be used in applying the ". . . working definition of 'Routine Custodial Maintenance.'" The statement prescribes information that normally should be included in original design specifications. It prescribes mandatory practice requirements including prohibitions against: any alteration of hydraulic capacity or hydrologic function beyond original design; and maintenance at less than regular intervals. The statement describes eligibility requirements used by the District. The statement provides that a permit is required, "If the work is not routine custodial maintenance . . . ." The statement describes information that must be provided in any request for verification that work is exempt. Such information must include ". . . evidence of original design specifications. . . ." Finally, the statement describes the type of evidence that will be considered by the District when original design specifications are not available. 11.1(e) Internal Management Memorandum The Memorandum is not an internal management memorandum that is excluded from the definition of a rule pursuant to Section 120.52(15)(a). The Memorandum has application outside of the agency. It affects the private interests of Respondents. It also affects a plan or procedure important to the public. Even if the Memorandum were an internal management memorandum, the agency statement exists and is applied by the agency independently of the Memorandum. 11.2 Prove-up Requirements: Section 120.57(1)(e) The statement evidenced in the Memorandum and elsewhere in the record is an unadopted rule within the meaning of Section 120.57(1)(e). The statement is defined as a rule in Section 120.52(15) but is not adopted as a rule in accordance with the rulemaking procedures prescribed in Section 120.54. The District relied on the unadopted rule to determine the substantial interests of Respondents. The District must show that the unadopted rule satisfies the requirements of Section 120.57(1)(e)2a-g. The unadopted rule satisfies the requirements of Section 120.57(1)(e)2a, part of c, and d. However, the rule does not meet the requirements of Section 120.57(1)(e)2b, the remainder of c, e, f, and g. 11.2(a) Powers, Functions, and Duties The unadopted rule is within the range of powers, functions, and duties delegated by the legislature within the meaning of Section 120.57(1)(e)2a. Section 373.416, in relevant part, delegates authority to the District to require permits and too impose conditions that are reasonably necessary to assure that the "maintenance" of any stormwater system, or works, complies with the provisions of Chapter 373, Part IV, and applicable rules promulgated pursuant to Chapter 373. Interpretation and application of the maintenance exemption authorized in Section 403.813(2)(g) and Rule 40C-4.051(11)(c) are within the range of powers delegated in Section 373.416. 11.2(b) Bridled Discretion The unadopted rule does not vest unbridled discretion in the District within the meaning of Section 120.57(1)(e)2c. The definition of routine custodial maintenance is bounded by numerous examples that do and do not qualify as routine custodial maintenance. The definition identifies the technical criteria to be used in the working definition of routine custodial maintenance. The definition prescribes reasonable procedures for conducting maintenance under an exemption, and formulates objective requirements for determining the sufficiency of original design specifications. 11.2(c) Arbitrary or Capricious The unadopted rule is not arbitrary or capricious within the meaning of Section 120.57(1)(e)2d. The rule has a rational basis and a legitimate purpose. It is based on fact and logic and seeks to prevent harm to the water resources of the District by requiring permits to review non-exempt maintenance activities which may have the potential for adverse environmental impacts. The definition of routine custodial maintenance is based on a fundamental engineering reality. If a ditch is not maintained, it will, as a general rule, fill-in and diminish in function and capacity. Ditches fill-in at different rates, depending on site- specific conditions, the level of service provided by the ditch, and the level of work performed during each maintenance interval. Ditches with high water-velocity may not require maintenance as frequently in order for the maintenance to satisfy the requirement that it be performed regularly. NS1 and EW1 must be maintained relatively frequently in order for maintenance to qualify as routine maintenance. The water velocity in these ditches is low because the surrounding area is flat and because water velocity is controlled by culverts and water levels south of SR 50. The low water velocities contribute to the filling of NS1 and EW1 with sediment. The high sediment content in the surrounding native lands also contributes to the filling of NS1 and EW1. The Crane Creek ditch in Brevard County illustrates the relativity of the frequency standard. In that case, the District determined that maintenance of the Crane Creek ditch qualified for a maintenance exemption approximately 20 years before when the ditch had last been maintained. There was considerable slope in the ditch. High water velocities in the ditch kept the ditch well scoured. In addition, the surrounding area was highly developed and covered with either pavement or lawns which provided little sediment material. It is theoretically possible for maintenance to be routine even though the interval of maintenance is 50 years. As a practical matter, however, a maintenance interval of 20 years represents the upper limit for maintenance in the general region of NS1 and EW1. Time is not the only factor in determining whether maintenance is routine. The frequency with which work must be performed to be routine depends on site-specific conditions as well as the level of service provided both by the particular ditch and by the particular work performed at each maintenance interval. The bottom line in determining if maintenance is routine custodial maintenance is whether the maintenance is regular enough to maintain continuity of function. Continuity of function is important to persons upstream and downstream of a ditch. Once a ditch has become nonfunctional, other property uses may occur upstream or downstream of the ditch in reliance upon the fact that the ditch is no longer functional. 11.2(d) Modifies or Contravenes The unadopted rule modifies or contravenes the specific law implemented in violation of Section 120.57(1)(e)2b. For reasons stated in earlier findings and incorporated here by this reference, the unadopted rule modifies and contravenes Sections 373.403(8), 373.416, and 403.813(2)(g). The unadopted rule also modifies and contravenes Rules 40C-4.021(20), 40C- 4.051(2)(a) 2 and 3, and 40C-4.051(11)(c). The term "maintenance" is defined in Section 373.403(8) to exclude routine custodial maintenance. By limiting maintenance exemptions to routine custodial maintenance, the unadopted rule transforms the statutory exclusion of routine custodial maintenance into a statutory inclusion. The unadopted rule modifies and contravenes the specific law implemented in another way. The unadopted rule exempts only the maintenance of "systems." In the statement of criteria, the Memorandum states that work must be done to restore the "ditch system." However, statutory maintenance exemptions are not limited to systems. They apply to individual canals, channels, and drainage ditches. Similarly, Sections 373.413 and 373.416 require permits for works such as individual ditches as well as systems. By limiting the maintenance exemptions to systems, the unadopted rule modifies and contravenes the specific law implemented. 11.2(e) Vague and Inadequate Standards The limits on discretion in the unadopted rule do not grant unbridled discretion to the District. However, some of the standards imposed in the rule are vague and inadequate in violation of Section 120.57(1)(e) 2c. The unadopted rule states two sets of criteria for a working definition of routine custodial maintenance. The first set of criteria address the purpose of the work performed. The second set of criteria address the interval or regularity of the work performed. The unadopted rule states that the purpose of routine custodial maintenance must be to restore the ditch to its "original design specifications." During testimony at the hearing, however, the District explained that the purpose of routine custodial maintenance could be to restore the ditch to its "existing function." A discussion in the proposed findings of the District's PRO illustrates the ambiguity: 64. If a ditch has filled in over a number of years so that it no longer retains its original function but does convey some water during high rain events, the ditch could not be cleaned out to its original design under the maintenance exemption. . . . To the extent that it still had some function that was usable for the surrounding area, it could be maintained to maintain that existing level of function. . . . (emphasis supplied) District PRO at 31. The interval at which work must be performed to satisfy the definition of routine custodial maintenance is vague and inadequate in the unadopted rule. In the Memorandum, the unadopted rule states that most ditch systems in Florida require maintenance once every 10 to 15 years. At the hearing, however, District witnesses who were asked to explain the District policy stated that ditches in Florida typically lose their function if not maintained every five to ten years. A range of 5 to 15 years is too vague to provide an adequate standard by which regulated parties are able to ascertain whether they are in compliance with the rule. The definition of routine custodial maintenance will necessarily vary with site-specific conditions of the ditch. However, it is clear from the evidence that the unadopted rule defines the purpose and interval of routine custodial maintenance by vague standards that can vary substantially with the person who is interpreting the unadopted rule. Standards prescribed in the unadopted rule are vague and inadequate in another aspect. Time is not the only factor considered in the unadopted rule to determine whether work is routine and custodial. Maintenance must be frequent enough to maintain a continuity of function for a particular ditch. Continuity of function suggests that function may be measured over a continuum of time. However, the unadopted rule does not quantify the continuum and does not identify the site- specific conditions that will be considered in assessing continuity of function during any particular continuum. The unadopted rule does not state whether the site-specific conditions will be assessed during low-flow conditions in dry years, normal years, or wet years; or whether alternating dry and wet conditions within each type of year also factor into the formula for continuity of function. The unadopted rule does not identify the relative weight, if any, assigned by the agency to these and other site specific-conditions used in the formula for determining continuity of function. 11.2(f) Due Notice The unadopted rule is being applied to Respondents without due notice in violation of Section 120.57(1)(e)2e. An agency cannot provide adequate notice of vague and inadequate standards contained in the unadopted rule; notice of vague and inadequate standards is inherently vague and inadequate. Such notice does not provide regulated parties with due notice of the standards by which they can judge their compliance with the rule. 11.2(g) Evidence of Support The unadopted rule is not supported by competent and substantial evidence within the meaning of Section 120.57(1)(f). Although the technical standards used to define routine custodial maintenance in the unadopted rule are supported by competent and substantial evidence, the basis for the application of that definition is unsupported. The technical standards used to define routine custodial maintenance in the unadopted rule are matters infused with agency expertise and should not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. The technical standards are not clearly erroneous and are supported by competent and substantial evidence. The standards used by the District to apply the definition of routine custodial maintenance are not infused with agency expertise. They are infused with the District's legal interpretation of relevant case law and, in particular, one circuit court case in 1984. Evidence submitted by the District does not support the standards used by the District to apply the unadopted rule. The District contends that the limitation of maintenance exemptions to routine custodial maintenance in the unadopted rule implements and reiterates principles developed in St. Johns River Water Management District v. Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 7 Fla.Supp. 2d 61 (9th Judicial Circuit of Florida, October 29, 1984), affirmed, Corporation of President of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 489 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), rev. denied, 496 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1986). As the trial court did, the parties in this proceeding refer to the decision in Latter-Day Saints as the "Deseret" case ("Deseret"). The District asserts that the unadopted rule is intended to ". . . reiterate the Deseret holding regarding 'routine custodial maintenance' . . .". The District also claims that it: . . . relied on the lower court Deseret decision, as well as the common meaning of the terms and the common things that you look for in what is an original design specification. The District's policy [is] to require compliance with the Deseret holding. District PFO at paragraph 13, page 9. A determination of whether the unadopted rule is supported by competent and substantial evidence of the principles and holdings in Deseret requires a two-step factual examination. Factual findings must first identify the principles developed in Deseret and then elucidate whether the unadopted rule actually implements or reiterates those principles and holdings. In October 1982, the landowner in Deseret increased, by one foot, the height of a perimeter dike system originally constructed between 32 and 42 years earlier to prevent water from either getting into or out of the area protected by the dike. No work had been performed on the dike for approximately 25 years, and portions of the dike had failed or declined in the interim. The landowner claimed the work was exempt pursuant to the maintenance exemption authorized in Section 403.813(2)(g). The trial court entered three holdings in Deseret which are relevant to the authority relied on by the District for its unadopted rule. In relevant part, the trial court held in paragraphs 10 and 12 of its Conclusions of Law: 10. . . . The legislature excluded only routine custodial maintenance from the permitting requirements of Chapter 373. (emphasis supplied) 10. . . . the exemption applies only to routine custodial maintenance having a minimal adverse environmental effect. (emphasis supplied) 12. . . . Deseret has failed to meet the burden of proving entitlement to the maintenance exemption under Section 403.813(2)(g). . . . Deseret, 7 Fla.Supp. 2d at 66-67. The district court did not expressly rule on the trial court's holding that the maintenance "exemption" applies only to routine custodial maintenance. The district court expressly approved only the trial court holding that the legislature "excluded" routine custodial maintenance and the trial court holding that the evidence failed to show entitlement to the maintenance exemption. In relevant part, the district court said: We agree with the trial court's conclusion that the legislature intended to exclude only routine custodial maintenance . . . from permit requirements. We also agree that the Church was not entitled to a maintenance exemption because it failed to meet its burden of proving the original design specifications for the dike system. (emphasis supplied) Deseret, 489 So. 2d at 60-61. The unadopted rule imposes requirements supported by the only ruling in the circuit court decision that was not expressly approved by the district court in Deseret. The unadopted rule reiterates and implements a holding that appears only in the trial court decision. Any reasonable doubt as to the basis for the holding in Deseret was removed in 1993 by the First District Court of Appeal in SAVE the St. Johns River v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 623 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). In SAVE, the Sportsmen Against Violating the Environment contended, as the District does in this proceeding, that the maintenance exemption applies only to routine custodial maintenance. In rejecting that contention, the court explained the basis for the earlier decision in Deseret. The court stated: . . . the [Deseret] court held that the applicant seeking to rebuild dikes on ranch land was not entitled to a subsection 403.813(2)(g) maintenance exemption for two reasons: (1) the church had failed to carry its burden of proving the original specifications . . . , and (2) the rebuilding would require extensive work since the dikes had not been maintained for over 25 years, the dike system had subsided, and the dike failed to keep water off the ranch during that period. SAVE, 623 So. 2d at 1203. In SAVE, the court explicitly rejected the contention that the maintenance exemption applied only to routine custodial maintenance. The court entered the following ruling: This brings us to SAVE's third contention, that Smith wholly failed to qualify for an exemption under subsection 403.813(2)(g). This is a multifaceted argument that we reject in all respects. SAVE cites no . . . authority to support its contention that the exemption under this subsection is limited to "routine" or "custodial" maintenance that conceptually excludes refilling the breaks from the scope of the exemption. Subsection 403.813(2)(g) requires only that the dike be restored to "its original design specifications." (emphasis supplied) SAVE, 623 So. 2d at 1202. The District argues that the court in SAVE did not reject the contention that the exemption applies only to routine custodial maintenance but merely held that there was nothing in routine custodial maintenance that conceptually excludes the refilling of the breaks. The court goes beyond the "conceptual" realm in the next sentence when the court expressly states that Section 403.813(2)(g) requires "only" that works be restored to their original design specifications. The District cannot read the decision in SAVE in isolation from the plain language of Section 373.403(8). Section 373.403(8) provides more than a "conceptual" reason why the exemption in Section 403.813(2)(g) does not apply to routine custodial maintenance. Section 373.403(8) expressly states that maintenance "excludes routine custodial maintenance." The exemption authorized in Section 403.813(2)(g) applies only to maintenance defined in Section 373.403(8) to exclude routine custodial maintenance. Only maintenance that is not routine custodial maintenance must satisfy the requirements in Section 403.813(2)(g) for an exemption. Routine custodial maintenance is "not maintenance" and is not required to either obtain a maintenance permit or qualify for a maintenance exemption. 11.2(h) Regulatory Costs The District failed to show that the unadopted rule does not impose excessive regulatory costs on Respondents within the meaning of Section 120.57(1)(e)2g. It is true, as far as it goes, that regulatory costs incurred by a proposed activity are not excessive once a determination is made that the activity either is or is not routine custodial maintenance. As this proceeding illustrates, however, the regulatory expense that must be incurred to show that excavation is routine custodial maintenance can be substantial. Any such expense is excessive when it is incurred to satisfy a requirement that is not found in applicable statutes or rules. Effect of Unadopted Rule The District may not rely on the unadopted rule to affect the substantial interests of Respondents. The District failed to "prove-up" the requirements of Sections 120.57(1)(e)2b, c, e, f, and g. The proposed agency action is supported by the evidence-of-record in this proceeding without relying on the unadopted rule. For reasons stated in earlier findings and incorporated here by this reference, the District action taken in the Emergency Order and the action proposed in the Administrative Complaint are supported by the weight of the evidence after the unadopted rule is excluded from consideration. The excavation of NS1 and EW1 in January 1997 was not "routine custodial maintenance" based on the common and ordinary meaning of the term, rather than the unadopted rule. Part of the excavation of NS1, EW1, and the larger system was "maintenance," which must satisfy the requirements of any claimed exemptions in order to avoid applicable permitting requirements. That part of the excavation which was maintenance did not satisfy essential requirements for any of the "maintenance" exemptions in Section 403.813(2)(f) and (g) and Rules 40C- 4.051(2)(a), 40C-4.051(11)(b), and 40C-4.051(11)(c). The weight of the evidence did not show that: the "maintenance" consisted of only that "remedial work" which was necessary to return NS1 and EW1 to their original design specifications within the meaning of Section 403.813(2)(f) and (g) and Rule 40C- 4.051(11)(b) and (c) 3; spoil material was deposited on an upland soil site that prevented the escape of spoil material or return water, or both, into wetlands, other surface waters, or waters of the state within the meaning of Section 403.813(2)(f) and (g); and Rule 40C- 4.051(11)(b) and (c) 1; the excavation was performed in such a way that prevented deleterious dredged material or other deleterious substances from discharging into adjacent waters during maintenance within the meaning of Section 403.813(2)(f) and Rule 40C-4.051(11)(b); the excavation resulted in no significant impacts to previously undisturbed natural areas within the meaning of Section 403.813(2)(f); no natural barrier was removed which separated NS1 and EW1 from adjacent waters, adjacent wetlands, or other surface waters within the meaning of Section 403.813(2)(f) and Rule 40C-4.051(11)(b); and the excavation performed maintenance dredging on canals or channels within the meaning of Section 403.813(2)(f) and Rule 40C-4.051(11)(b). That part of the excavation defined as an alteration of NS1, EW1, and the larger system is not entitled to the "maintenance" exemptions claimed by Respondents. Similarly, that part of the excavation defined as an operation of the ditches is not entitled to the "maintenance" exemptions claimed by Respondents. Pursuant to Sections 373.413 and 373.416, Modern was required to obtain a permit for the excavation of NS1, EW1, and the larger system in January 1997. Modern neither applied for nor obtained a permit for the excavation. Modern violated the permitting requirements authorized in Sections 373.413 and 373.416. Modern is subject to the proposed agency action in the Administrative Complaint.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order upholding the Emergency Order and directing Modern to undertake and complete, in a reasonable time and manner, the corrective actions described in the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of June, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of June, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Carroll Webb, Executive Director Administrative Procedures Committee 120 Holland Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300 Liz Cloud, Chief Bureau of Administrative Code The Elliott Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Henry Dean, Executive Director St. Johns River Water Management District Highway 100, west Post Office Box 1429 Palatka, Florida 32178-1429 Marianne Trussell, Esquire Murray M. Wadsworth, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 William H. Congdon, Esquire Mary Jane Angelo, Esquire Stanley J. Niego, Esquire St. Johns River Water Management District Post Office Box 1429 Palatka, Florida 32178-1429 Allan P. Whitehead, Esquire Moseley, Wallis and Whitehead, P.A. 1221 East New Haven Avenue Post Office Box 1210 Melbourne, Florida 32902-1210
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state land planning agency charged with the responsibility to administer the provisions of Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Petitioner has the authority to appeal to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission any development order issued in an area of critical state concern. Monroe County is a political subdivision of the State of Florida, and is responsible for issuing development orders for development in Monroe County. Monroe County issued the development order that is the subject of this appeal. Respondent, Bruce Schmitt, is the owner of real property known as Section 15, Township 66, Range 32, Sombrero Beach Road and Tingler Lane - 88 Tingler Lane, Vaca Key Bright, Florida. Most of Monroe County, including the subject property, is within the Florida Keys Area of Critical State Concern, as designated under Sections 380.05 and 380.0552, Florida Statutes. On May 25, 1993, Monroe County issued building permit number 9320003962 to Bruce A. Schmitt, Owner, and Marathon Woodworking, General Contractor, authorizing the construction of a 4 feet X 140 feet wooden dock with a 4 feet x 40 feet terminus. The site of the permitted dock is on an open water shoreline. Running parallel to this shoreline is a channel that is greater than four feet in depth at mean low tide and is greater than twenty feet in width. The permitted dock will terminate at the edge of that channel in an area that is at least four feet deep at mean low tide and more than 20 feet in width. There are no hard coral bottoms found in the area where the dock will terminate. In the vicinity where Mr. Schmitt proposes to construct his dock, there is a channel that is perpendicular to the shoreline that intersects with the channel that is parallel to the shoreline. This perpendicular channel leads out to deep water. The channel providing access to deep water crosses an area of shallow water, which is an area of flats that is referred to by the Department as a shoal. The water depth of this area at mean low tide ranges between 3.0 and 3.5 feet. The channel running parallel to the shoreline and the channel leading out to deep water are not marked. Boats that use this area traditionally have used the channel that is parallel to the shoreline to access the channel in front of Mr. Schmitt's property that leads to deep water. These boats thereafter access deep water by crossing the area of flats that is referred to by the Department as a shoal. While it was established that boats cannot navigate around the shoal, the dimensions of the shoal were not established. Natural shallow water marine communities, such as seagrasses, exist in the waters in the navigation route for boats that will use the permitted dock. Sea grass beds play an important role in water quality maintenance in the Keys through filtration and nutrient uptake and serve as nursery habitats for fisheries. The cumulative impact of the operation of propeller- driven boats in the Keys results in damage and destruction to shallow water marine communities, such as sea grass beds, through prop dredging. There is evidence of considerable prop dredging of the sea grass beds in the shallow waters offshore of the subject property. Boats have been known to run aground in the flats off Mr. Schmitt's property. Any boat using the permitted dock will have to cross shallow waters with seagrass with water depths of less than four feet at mean low tide. Pursuant to the provisions of Sections 380.05 and 380.0552, Florida Statutes, Monroe County has adopted a comprehensive plan which complies with the Principles for Guiding Development found at Section 380.0552(7), Florida Statutes. Section 380.0552(7), Florida Statutes, requires Monroe County land development regulations to comply with certain principles for guiding development, including the following: (b) to protect shoreline and marine resources, including mangroves, coral reef formations, wetlands, fish and wildlife and their habitat. * * * (e) to limit the adverse impacts of development on the quality of water throughout the Florida Keys . . . Monroe County's Comprehensive Plan, which has been approved by the Department and by the Administration Commission, is implemented, in part, through its adopted land development regulations, codified in Chapters 6 and 9.5, Monroe County Code. Section 9.5-345(m) (2), Monroe County Code, provides as follows: (2) All structures on any submerged lands and mangroves shall be designed, located, and con- structed such that: * * * No structure shall be located on submerged land which is vegetated with seagrasses except as is necessary to reach waters at least four (4) feet below mean low levels for docking facilities; No docking facilities shall be developed at any site unless a minimum channel of twenty (20) feet in width where a mean low water depth of at least minus four (4) feet exists. Section 9.5-4(W-1), Monroe County Code, provides as follows: (W-1) "water at least four (4) feet below mean sea level at mean low tide" means locations that will not have a significant adverse impact on off- shore resources of particular importance. For the purposes of this definition, "off-shore resources of particular importance" shall mean hard coral bottoms, habitat of state or federal threatened and endangered species, shallow water areas with natural marine communities with depths at mean low tide of less than four (4) feet, and all designated aquatic preserves under Florida Statutes, Section 258.39 et seq. Section 2.104, Nearshore Waters, Monroe County Comprehensive Plan, Volume II, Future Land Use Element, provides as follows: The Florida Keys are dependent on nearshore water quality for their environmental and economic integrity. The heart of the Florida Keys economy, the means by which Monroe County exists as a civil and social institution, is based on its unique oceanic character. If nearshore water quality is not maintained, then quality of life and the economy of Monroe County will be directly and immediately impacted. OBJECTIVES 1. To protect, maintain, and where appropriate, to improve the quality of nearshore waters in Monroe County. POLICIES 1. To prohibit land use that directly or indirectly degrades nearshore water quality. * * * To prohibit the development of water dependent facilities, including marinas, at locations that would involve significant degradation of the biological character of submerged lands. To limit the locations of water-dependent facilities at locations that will not have a significant adverse impact on off-shore resources of particular importance. For the purposes of this policy, off-shore resources of particular importance shall mean hard coral bottoms, habitat of state or federal threatened or endangered species, shallow water areas with natural marine communities with depths at mean low tide of less than four (4) feet, and all designated aquatic preserves under Florida Statutes, section 258.39 et seq. There are no channel markers to deep water in the area of the permitted dock that have been approved by the Department of Environmental Protection. There was a dispute in the evidence as to whether marking the channel that has served this area as the access route to deep waters would be appropriate and whether such marking would create a navigational hazard. The conflict in the evidence presented is resolved by concluding that the marking of the channel that serves as the navigation access route for boats that will use the permitted dock is appropriate, will aid navigation, and will not create a navigation hazard. This conclusion is reached, in part, because the channel is well defined by its long-term use and connects with the channel that is parallel to the shoreline at a known point.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission enter a final order which conditionally denies Building Permit Number 9320003962, but which authorizes Monroe County to issue that permit once the access channel to deep water has been properly marked and approved by the Department of Environmental Protection. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of October, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 1994.
Findings Of Fact Jack E. Moore is the owner of real property in Fort Myers Beach known as Lot 9 of Indian Bayou, a subdivision in Section 33, Township 46 South, Range 24 East, Lee County, Florida. Moore's property is bordered on the north by the waters of Indian Bayou and Estero Bay. The northern portions of Moore's property are vegetated by juvenile and mature red and black mangroves. Red and black mangrove are the dominant species of vegetation on the northernmost portions of the property, waterward of the fill pad on which Moore's house is built. Sometimes during July, 1982, Moore used a shovel to excavate a channel from the open waters of Estero Bay to a dock existing at the edge of the fill pad. Approximately 48 cubic yards of excavated material was piled up along the banks of the channel. The channel measured approximately 1.5 feet deep (at low tide) by 9 feet wide by 70 feet long. The channel was dug so that Moore could got his boat in and out from the dock at medium tide. The passage to the deck was already possible at high tide, as Moore had a shallow draft pontoon boat. In July, 1981, Moore constructed a rip-rap revetment with backfill the northern side of his house fill pad. The back fill area contains approximately 160 cubic yards of fill, and is approximately 10 feet wide by 110 feet long. Red mangrove and black mangrove are and were the dominant vegetational species in the area where the channel was dug, where the excavated material was placed, and where the revetment and fill was constructed. The area of dominant mangrove vegetation extends from the work areas to the open waters of Estero Bay. Moore did not apply for or receive a permit from DER prior to undertaking the work referenced above. Upon discovery of the work in September, 1982, DER notified Moore that a permit was needed for the excavation and filling he conducted. In October, 1982, Moore agreed to fill in the channel and remove all unauthorized fill by January 19, 1983. Inspection by DER on January 26, 1983, showed that restoration had not been started, and in fact more work had been done on the channel. DER issued a Notice of Violation and Orders for Corrective Action (NOV) to Respondent on March 29, 1003, alleging violations of Chapter 403, Florida Statute's, and DER rules and requiring restoration of the areas dredged and filled. Upon service of the Notice of Violation by the Sheriff, Respondent petitioned for this hearing. DER incurred costs of 5101.88 in investigating the violations alleged in the NOV. As of the date of the hearing, restoration work still had not been performed. Although the spoil piles alongside the channel are now diminished, the channel itself was deep as it previously had been and the rip-rap revetment and backfill had not been removed.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), should grant the application of Respondent, Leland Egland, for an Environmental Resource Permit (ERP), Number 44-01700257-001-ES, to fill an illegally-dredged trench or channel in mangrove wetlands between Florida Bay and what was a land-locked lake, to restore preexisting conditions.
Findings Of Fact Since 1988, Applicant, Leland Egland, has resided in a home built on property he purchased in Buccaneer Point Estates in Key Largo, Florida, in 1986--namely, Lots 14 and 15, Block 2, plus the "southerly contiguous 50 feet." A 1975 plat of Buccaneer Point shows this "southerly contiguous 50 feet" as a channel between Florida Bay to the west and a lake or pond to the east; it also shows a 800-foot linear canal extending from the lake or pond to the north. Egland's Lot 14 borders Florida Bay to the west; his lot 15 borders the lake or pond to the east; the "southerly contiguous 50 feet" is between Egland's lots 14 and 15 and property farther south owned by another developer. See Finding 10, infra. Buccaneer Point lots in Blocks 1 (to the east) and 2 (to the west) surround the lake or pond and canal. The developer of Buccaneer Point applied to the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation (DER) in 1977 for a permit to dredge a channel, characterized as a flushing channel for the lake or pond, which was characterized as a tidal pond with replanted red mangroves. (There was no evidence as to the character of this pond before the 1977 permit application or if it even existed.) DER denied the permit application because the: proposal . . . to open a pond to Florida Bay . . . will connect an 800 linear foot dead-end canal. The pond and canal will act as a sink for marl and organic debris which will increase Biological Oxygen Demand and lower Dissolved Oxygen. The project is expected to result in substances which settle to form putrescent or otherwise objectionable sludge deposits and floating debris, oil scum, and other materials, in amounts sufficient to be deleterious. Based on the above, degradation of local water quality is expected. * * * Furthermore, your project will result in the following effects to such an extent as to be contrary to the public interest and the provisions of Chapter 253, Florida Statutes: Interference with the conservation of fish, marine life and wildlife, and other natural resources. Destruction of natural marine habitats, grass flats suitable as nursery or feeding grounds for marine life, including established marine soils suitable for producing plant growth of a type useful as nursery or feeding grounds for marine life. Reduction in the capability of habitat to support a well-balanced fish and wildlife population. Impairment of the management or feasibility of management of fish and wildlife resources. As a result, the proposed channel to Florida Bay was not dredged (although some of the lake side of the proposed channel apparently was dredged before the project was abandoned); the building lots surrounding the lake or pond (now known as South Lake) and canal were sold as waterfront lots on a land-locked lake without access to Florida Bay; and the "southerly contiguous 50 feet" was included with the conveyance to Egland, along with the Lots 14 and 15 of Block 2. The evidence was not clear as to the characteristics of the "southerly contiguous 50 feet" in 1977, or earlier. When Egland purchased his property in 1986, it was a mature mangrove slough with some tidal exchange between the lake and Florida Bay, especially during high tides and stormy weather. Some witnesses characterized the area of mangroves as a shallow creek in that general time frame (from about 1984 through 1988). According to Vince Easevoli, at least under certain conditions, a rowboat could be maneuvered between the lake and Florida Bay using a pole "like a gondola effect." But Egland testified to seeing Easevoli drag a shallow-draft boat through this area in this general time frame, and the greater weight of the evidence was that the mangrove slough was not regularly navigable channel at the time. During this general time frame (the mid-to-late 1980's) several Petitioners (namely, Stanley Dominick, John and Katherine Easevoli, and their son, Vince Easevoli) purchased property on South Lake. All but Vince built homes and resided there; Vince did not reside there until after Hurricane Andrew in 1992, but he sometimes stayed at the residence on his parents' property during this general time frame. In the early 1990's, the slough or creek became somewhat deeper, making it increasingly more easily passable by boat. Large storms such as Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and the "storm of the century" in 1993 may have contributed to these changes, but human intervention seems to have been primarily responsible. In 1994, Egland added a swimming pool south of the residence on his lots. During construction, some illegal filling took place. Several witnesses testified that the illegal fill occurred to the north of the creek, which was not affected. Vince Easevoli's lay interpretation of several surveys in evidence led him to maintain that illegal fill was placed in the mangrove slough and that the creek became narrower by approximately four feet and, eventually, deeper. But no surveyor testified to explain the surveys in evidence, which do not seem to clearly support Easevoli's position, and the greater weight of the evidence was that illegal fill was not added to the creek in Egland's "southerly contiguous 50 feet." At some point in time, hand tools were used to deepen the slough or creek and trim mangroves without a permit to enable a small boat to get through more easily. As boats were maneuvered through, the creek got deeper. Eventually, propeller-driven boats of increasing size were used to "prop- dredge" the creek even deeper. According to Petitioner, Tom Hodges, when he and his wife purchased their lot on the lake in 1994, it was possible to navigate the creek in a 22-foot Mako boat (at least under certain conditions), and their lot was sold to them as having limited access to Florida Bay. (There was evidence that access to Florida Bay could increase the price of these lots by a factor of three.) Petitioners Martha Scott and Marianne Delfino also purchased their property on the lake in 1994. Tom Hodges claimed to have seen manatees in the lake as early as 1994, but no other witnesses claimed sightings earlier than 1997, and the accuracy of this estimate is questionable. Even if manatees were in the lake during this time frame or earlier, it is possible that they used an access point other than the creek. At the southeast corner of South Lake in Buccaneer Point, there is a possible connection to a body of water farther south, which is part of a condominium development called Landings of Largo and leads still farther south to access to Florida Bay near a dock owned by Landings of Largo. While this connection is shallow, it may have been deep enough under certain conditions to allow manatees to pass through. Apparently not with manatees but rather with boaters from the lake in Buccaneer Point in mind, Landings of Largo has attempted to close this access point by placement of rebar; Landings of Largo also has placed rip-rap under its dock farther south to prevent boats from passing under the dock. However, there are gaps in the rip-rap, some possibly large enough for manatees to pass. In approximately 1995 or 1996, Egland observed Vince Easevoli and his father, John Easevoli, digging a trench through the mangrove slough with a shovel and cutting mangrove trees with a saw in Egland's "southerly contiguous 50 feet." Others were standing by, watching. Egland told them to stop and leave.6 These actions made the creek even deeper and more easily navigable by boat, which continued to further excavate the trench by such methods as "prop dredging." In 1997 Hany Haroun purchased property adjacent to South Lake where he lives with his wife, Christine. By this time, Florida Bay was easily accessible by boat from the lake, and Haroun paid $260,000 for the property. He estimated that his property would be worth about $150,000 less without boat access to Florida Bay. In approximately 1997, manatees began to appear in South Lake year round from time to time, especially in the winter months. In 1997, the Hodgeses saw one they thought may have been in distress and telephoned the Save Our Manatee Club and Dolphin Research for advice. Following the advice given, they used lettuce to coax the manatee over to their dock to check its condition and videotape the event. The manatee appeared healthy and eventually departed the lake. On subsequent visits, manatees have been seen and videotaped resting and cavorting with and without calves and possibly mating in the lake. Groups of as many as seven to eight manatees have been seen at one time in the lake. Tom Hodges, Vince Easevoli, and Hany Haroun testified that they have enjoyed watching manatees in the lake since 1997. It can be inferred from the evidence that Elaine Hodges also has enjoyed watching manatees in the lake. There was no evidence as to the extent to which other Petitioners enjoy watching manatees in the lake. In 1997, the ACOE began an investigation of the illegal dredging of Egland's "southerly contiguous 50 feet." According to Egland, he was in communication with ACOE; presumably, he told ACOE what he knew about the illegal dredging on his property. According to Egland, ACOE advised him to place posts in the dredged channel to keep boats out. When he did so, Tom Hodges removed the posts. Egland replaced the posts, and Hodges removed them again. When Egland told ACOE what was happening, ACOE asked him to try reinstalling the posts and screwing plywood to the posts to achieve a stronger, fence-like barrier. Hodges also removed these barriers, and Egland did not replace the posts or plywood barrier again. In 1998, ACOE mailed Egland a Cease and Desist Order accusing him of illegal dredging in his "southerly contiguous 50 feet" and demanding that he restore the mangrove slough to its previous conditions. Egland was angry at being blamed for the dredging and initially disputed ACOE's charges and demands. But ACOE and the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which accepted the role of lead federal enforcement agency on December 18, 1998, was seeking monetary civil penalties. In addition, Egland received legal advice that, if restoration were delayed, he could be sued for damages by someone purchasing property on the lake or canal in the meantime upon the mistaken belief that there was boat access to Florida Bay. For these reasons, Egland agreed to comply with the Cease and Desist Order. However, ACOE and EPA informed Egland that he might have to obtain a permit from DEP to fill the dredged channel in compliance with the Cease and Desist Order. On May 22, 2000, Egland applied to DEP for an ERP to restore a trench about 100 feet long varying from seven to ten feet in width that was illegally dredged on his property. He estimated that a total of 160 cubic yards of fill would be required, to be spread over approximately 900 square feet. He assured DEP that rip-rap would be used to contain the fill and that turbidity screens would be used during construction. During processing of Egland's application, DEP requested additional information, which Egland provided, and DEP's Environmental Manager, Edward Barham, visited the project site in October 2000. Based on all the evidence available to him at that point in time, Barham viewed Egland's proposed fill project as a simple restoration project to correct illegal dredging and return the mangrove slough to its preexisting condition. For that reason, Barham recommended that DEP process the application as a de minimis exemption and not charge a permit application fee. Subsequently, some Petitioners brought it to DEP's attention that manatees were accessing South Lake through the channel Egland wanted to fill. DEP saw no need to verify the accuracy of Petitioners' information or obtain additional information about the manatees use of the lake because DEP still viewed it as a restoration project. However, DEP decided that it would be necessary to include specific conditions in any ERP issued to Egland to ensure that no manatees would be trapped in the lake or otherwise injured as a result of filling the channel. Primarily due to the need for these conditions, and also because of anticipated opposition from Petitioners, DEP decided to charge Egland a permit application fee and not process the application as a de minimis exemption. DEP staff visited the mangrove slough on numerous occasions between October 2000, and final hearing and observed that the trench continued to get deeper over time as a result of continued prop-dredging and digging. In early August 2001, Tom Hodges observed a man walking back and forth with a wheel barrow between a storage shed on Egland's property and the channel. (Hodges was on his property across South Lake but use of binoculars enabled him to see this.) The next day, Hany Haroun discovered a poured- concrete slab forming a plug or dam in the channel on the lake side. Haroun reported his discovery to Tom Hodges, who investigated with his wife, who took photographs of the structure. At some point, the Hodgeses realized that a manatee was trapped in the lake. The manatee did not, and appeared unable to, use the other possible access point towards Landings of Largo to escape. See Finding 10, supra. The Hodgeses telephoned Barham at DEP to report the situation and complain. Tom Hodges then proceeded to break up the concrete, remove the resulting rubble, and place it on the path to the storage shed, freeing the manatee. The incident was reported in the newspaper the next day and prompted Petitioners to file their Motion to Dismiss and for Other Relief on August 9, 2001. See Preliminary Statement. The evidence was inconclusive as to who poured the concrete, or had it poured, and why. Egland testified that he was in Egypt on an extended trip at the time and denied any knowledge of the concrete plug until he saw the rubble on his property upon his return from Egypt. Egland testified that he saw no "aggregate" in the concrete, which would make it relatively easy to break up, and he suspected that Petitioners were responsible for pouring the concrete in order to publicly make false accusations against Egland. Petitioners denied Egland's accusation. Vince testified that the concrete contained rebar for strength. The evidence was inconclusive as to who was responsible for this incident. As pointed out by Petitioners, DEP did not investigate and does not know whether there is any freshwater upwelling in the lake, whether manatees have mated in the lake, or whether calves have been birthed in the lake. DEP also did not investigate and does not know whether South Lake is unlike other manatee habitat in the area. DEP did not investigate or obtain any information as to how many manatees use the lake, or what manatees use the lake for, in addition to the information provided by Petitioners. Carol Knox, an Environmental Specialist III with the Florida Fish and Wildlife Commission, testified as a manatee expert based on her knowledge of manatees and manatee habitat in the area, as well as the information known to DEP. It was her opinion that, regardless what South Lake might offer manatees in the way of habitat, closing the channel (with the specific conditions required by DEP to protect manatees during the filling itself) would have no adverse impact on manatees because it did not appear that manatees made use of the lake before the channel was dug in 1996 or 1997, and ample other manatee habitat of various kinds continued to be available in the area.7 Based on the testimony of Knox and Barham, and the totality of the evidence in this case, it is found that Egland provided reasonable assurance that his proposed restoration project will not harm or adversely affect manatees or their habitats. Petitioners also questioned Egland's assurances as to water quality. Vince Easevoli, Stanley Dominick, and Hany Haroun testified to their concerns that water quality in the lake will decline if the channel is closed. As Petitioners point out, DEP did not require Egland to provide any water quality measurements. This was because the proposal is reasonably expected to reverse the effects of the illegal dredging on water quality and to return both the water in the lake and canal and the water in Florida Bay to the quality that existed prior to the illegal dredging. Without requiring any water quality measurements, it is reasonably expected that the water quality in Florida Bay would not decline in any respect; to the contrary, if anything, Florida Bay's water quality would be expected to improve by reduction of contributions from the lake and canal. Conversely, water quality in the lake and canal would be expected to decline but not below what it was before the illegal dredging. Petitioners also question DEP's failure to require Egland to provide a survey or stake the area to be filled, so as to ensure against filling too much of the mangrove slough. But the proposed ERP contains a specific condition: "The final fill elevation of the fill shall be at the elevation of the substrate within the adjacent mangrove wetlands." Barham testified persuasively that this specific condition is adequate to provide reasonable assurance. Compliance can be ascertained by simply viewing the site after completion of the restoration project, and compliance can be enforced by requiring removal of excess fill as necessary. The proposed ERP also contains a general condition that the permit does not convey or create any property right, or any interest in real property, or authorize any entrances upon or activities on property which is not owned or controlled by Egland.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent, the Department of Environmental Protection, enter a final order granting the application of Leland Egland and issuing ERP Number 44- 01700257-001-ES. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of November, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of November, 2002.
