The Issue The ultimate issue to be resolved in this proceeding is whether the Petitioner should be awarded a doctor of education degree by Florida State University. Petitioner contends that he properly completed the requirements for the degree, that a valid offer of the degree was made to him, that he accepted the offer, and that the degree was then wrongfully withheld. The university contends that Petitioner did not meet the requirements for the degree and that no valid, enforceable offer of it was made to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact In 1976, Petitioner was admitted into the doctoral program in biology at Florida State University. He applied to transfer to the science education program and was admitted to the doctoral program in science education within the College of Education at Florida State University on June 24, 1977. He was pursuing a doctor of philosophy (Ph.D.) degree. Among the requirements that Petitioner needed to meet in order to receive the degree were successful completion of a diagnostic examination, completion of thirty-six resident hours of course work, course work in the field of statistics, a preliminary examination, approval of a prospectus for a doctoral dissertation, and presentation of an acceptable dissertation and a successful dissertation defense. Following his admission into the Ph.D. program in science education, a supervisory committee was established for the Petitioner, and a major professor was appointed. It was the major professor's and supervisory committee's function to monitor Petitioner's progress and ultimately to make a recommendation as to whether petitioner should be awarded a degree. By November 7, 1980, Petitioner had completed all of the requirements for a Ph.D. degree except for the presentation of his dissertation and the dissertation defense. These were scheduled to be conducted by the supervisory committee on November 7, 1980. Petitioner had been advised by at least two members of the committee that he might not be ready to present and defend his dissertation. Petitioner felt that he was. On November 7, 1980, Petitioner met with his supervisory committee and presented and defended his dissertation. After his presentation, Petitioner left the room, and the committee evaluated the dissertation and defense. The committee unanimously concluded that the dissertation and defense were inadequate. The dissertation was not marginally inadequate. It was grossly below standards. The committee unanimously and appropriately concluded that the dissertation and defense were not acceptable, and that Petitioner had not met the requirements for a Ph.D. degree. Petitioner's major professor felt that the Petitioner had devoted considerable time, energy, and hard work to the degree program. He was concerned that the effort not be totally wasted. He requested that the committee consider accepting the dissertation as adequate for the award of a doctor of education (Ed.D.) degree or a "master's specialist" degree, and that the committee recommend that Petitioner be awarded one of those degrees or that he be allowed to continue working toward a Ph.D. degree. None of the members of the supervisory committee had had experience with the Ed.D. degree. They all considered it an inferior degree and felt that awarding it to Petitioner would constitute something of a "consolation prize." In fact, an Ed.D. degree from Florida State University is not intended to be an inferior degree. Its focus is somewhat different, but the requirements for obtaining the degree are basically the same. The committee was mistaken in considering the offer of such a degree to Petitioner. Indeed, the requirements for an Ed.D. degree being similar, and in some cases identical to those for the Ph.D. degree, Petitioner had not qualified for the award of an Ed.D. degree. After the committee adjourned its proceedings on November 7, Petitioner's major professor discussed the committee's actions with Petitioner. He told Petitioner that pending proper approval, Petitioner would have the options of continuing to work toward a Ph.D. degree, or receiving an Ed.D. or master's specialist degree. It appears that the major professor was overly sensitive about the Petitioner's feelings, and he may not have bluntly advised Petitioner that he failed his dissertation, presentation, and defense. Petitioner considered his options and told his major professor that if it was possible, he would be amenable to accepting an Ed.D. degree. The major professor contacted administrative officials and was advised that the award of an Ed.D. degree would be possible. The major professor advised the Petitioner of that and told him that pending approval from the department chairman who had charge of the science education program, Petitioner could receive the Ed.D. degree. The major professor also advised Petitioner that some revisions would need to be made in the dissertation and that the title page would need to be retyped in order to reflect that it was being submitted in support of an Ed.D. degree. Petitioner complied with the direction to retype the first page, but made only minor revisions in the dissertation. Members of the supervisory committee signed off on the dissertation as being acceptable in support of an Ed.D. degree. The matter was submitted to the department chairman. The department chairman read the dissertation and concluded that it was grossly inadequate. He determined that he would not authorize the award of an Ed.D. degree because Petitioner would need to be properly accepted into an Ed.D. program before he could be awarded such a degree, and additionally because he considered the dissertation inadequate to support an Ed.D. degree. This action was communicated to the supervisory committee. The committee met again and determined that since the Ed.D. degree could not be awarded, that Petitioner should be given failing grades for the dissertation, presentation, and defense. Prior to the department chairman's review of the dissertation, Petitioner had paid his fees and was anticipating being awarded an Ed.D. degree. Since it was not approved by the department chairman, the degree was not awarded. Thereafter, the Petitioner opted not to apply to have his work considered in support of an Ed.D. degree or master's specialist degree. He continued working toward a Ph.D. degree for approximately six months. Ultimately, he decided to drop out of the program, and he initiated this proceeding.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by Florida State University denying Petitioner's application for award of an Ed.D. degree and dismissing the Petition for Administrative Hearing. RECOMMENDED this 24th day of January, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of January, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: John D. Carlson, Esquire Woods, Johnston & Carlson 1030 East Lafayette Street Suite 112 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Patricia A. Draper, Esquire Charles S. Ruberg, Esquire Florida State University Suite 311, Hecht House Tallahassee, Florida 32306 Dr. Bernard F. Sliger President Florida State University 211 Westcott Tallahassee, Florida 32306
Findings Of Fact George Jenkins filed an application for licensure with the Department of State for a Class "A" private investigative agency license. Jenkins is qualified in every respect with the exception of his experience, which is at issue and concerning which further findings are made below. Jenkins served in the Air Police of the United States Air Force from 1953 until 1957. He performed those duties generally performed by military policemen from November 17, 1953, until February of 1957. These duties are generally patrol and guard functions as opposed to criminal investigation. Jenkins worked for Montgomery Ward in Lakeland, Florida, for 1.5 weeks; Wooco in Lakeland, Florida, for 11 weeks; and Imperial Bank in Lakeland, Florida, for 12 weeks. His duties were those of a security guard. Jenkins worked in Florida for Wheeler and Associates from June 30, 1975, until June 30, 1976, repossessing cars. He then worked for Frontier International Investigations in Florida from July 1, 1977, until December 15, 1977, repossessing automobiles. Jenkins also repossessed cars for American Bank of Lakeland from 1973 to January of 1980; Barnett Bank of Lakeland from 1975 until 1979; Mid-Florida Schools Federal Credit Union from 1975 until February of 1980; First District DOT Employees Credit Union from February, 1975, until February, 1980; and Publix Employees Credit Federal Credit Union from July, 1974, until January of 1980. All these businesses are located in Florida. Jenkins seeks to obtain the Class "A" license to continue his business repossessing cars. The record reflects that he has been self-employed and employed by other Class "A" licensees to perform the business since 1973. While Jenkins is a full-time employee of the United State Post Office, there is no question that this has been a major part-time occupation. Jenkins' service with the United State Air Force together with his approximately six months' experience as a security guard and his part-time self- employment and employment with others repossessing cars would meet the total experience requirement of three years, and clearly well over one year of that experience has been in Florida.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Department of State grant the application of George Jenkins for licensure as a class "A" private investigative agency. DONE and ORDERED this 13th day of February, 1980, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: W. J. Gladwin, Jr., Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jonnie M. Hutchison, Esquire 145 East Haines Boulevard Post Office Box AL Lake Alfred, Florida 33850
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Criminal Justice Standards And Training Commission enter a final order: Dismissing, as moot, the petition of Margherita Renzi insofar as it seeks a determination of prospective eligibility for salary incentive monies under Section 943.22, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1984); and Dismissing, as having no merit, the petition of Margherita Renzi insofar as it seeks a determination of retroactive entitlement to salary incentive payments before October 1, 1984, under Section 943.22, Florida Statutes (1983). RECOMMENDED this 2nd day of April, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of April, 1985.
The Issue Respondent's alleged immorality and misconduct in office on March 29, April 5, 6, 8 & 13, 1976, under Section 231.36(6), Florida Statutes, as set forth in letter to Respondent from James E. Maurer, dated June 18, 1976.
Findings Of Fact During the academic year 1975-1976, Respondent was a classroom instructor in science at the Coconut Creek High School, Broward County, Florida. In the fall of 1975, Marcia Vulpis, a 14 year-old student at the school, was assigned to his class. He noticed during the ensuing months that she stared at him frequently which made him somewhat uncomfortable. About December, he spoke to Pamela Quianthy, Attendance Clerk at the school, about Marcia's behavior. Quianthy, who had observed Marcia on several occasions because of her presence in the office as a student aide, agreed that she was a rather strange girl and that she, Quianthy, also felt uncomfortable in her presence. In March, 1976, Marcia came into another class that Respondent was teaching and somewhat hysterically told him that she needed to see him right away. Respondent sensed the urgency in her request and was pleased that she had sought him out since she had seemed somewhat hostile during prior months. They thereafter had a long discussion at his office during which she informed him that a young man who lived next door to her had raped her and that she was bleeding inside. At this time, she also expressed past and present suicidal ideations and thoughts of murdering certain persons. She said that she had not told her mother or the police about the rape and did not wish to do so. He urged her to see a physician about her condition and determined that she was willing to have her 21 year-old aunt take her for such purpose. Respondent asked Quianthy to talk to her concerning the matter and she did so. During this conversation, Marcia told her that she had been raped and had not told anyone about it. Quianthy recommended that she inform her parents and also advised her to see a doctor. The next day the aunt came to the school to take Marcia to a doctor and Respondent sent them to the school dean for necessary permission to leave the grounds. (Testimony of Respondent, Quianthy) During the third week of March, 1976, Marcia, who sat at a desk directly in front of Respondent in his classroom, began writing notes to him during class in which she expressed love for him. On one occasion, after class, she told him that she wanted to go to bed with him. He reprimanded her for her statement. She pursued her request by subsequent notes and he penned some responses thereon advising her to come to his office to talk about it or to call him at home. He was concerned for her welfare and wished to help her. He did not refer her to the school counselor because she refused to talk to anyone else about her problems and he felt capable of providing necessary counseling because of his past experience as a Baptist minister and handling work experience programs in the school system. He made arrangements with Quianthy for her to phone him at his office during Marcia's visits in order that he would have an excuse to leave if necessary because he feared what the student might do on these occasions and wanted some means of leaving gracefully. The meetings in his office were held usually before afternoon classes commenced, and were at the request of Marcia. At one of these meetings, she told him that he was "driving her crazy" and attempted to kiss him. He pushed her away and cautioned her against such demonstrations. On another occasion, she remained after class and kissed him on the cheek, telling him that she loved him. He also admonished her at that time for her conduct. The above-mentioned incidents were the only times when there was physical contact between Respondent and the student. (Testimony of Respondent, Quianthy Petitioner's Exhibits 3-8) Respondent showed Marcia's notes to his wife and they discussed them a number of times. He also showed the notes to Quianthy and Regina Howard, a friend. Mrs. Howard had previously sought out Respohdent to assist her daughter with adolescence problems because she knew of his background as a minister and youth counselor. He discussed Marcia's situation with her and was serious about his concern for the girl. He requested that Howard get in touch with Marcia. She tried to do so several times, but was unable to contact her. (Testimony of Respondent, Ruth Barnett, Howard) During the school Easter vacation in April of 1976, Marcia called Respondent's home and his wife answered the telephone. Marcia asked to speak to "Ronnie" and during a subsequent conversation with Mrs. Barnett, learned that Respondent had shown her notes to his wife. Marcia was quite upset at learning this fact and said, "I'll show him." She also acknowledged to Mrs. Barnett that she had kissed the Respondent in his office and that she would assume the blame for that incident. Respondent attempted to speak with her at this time but she was too upset. The next day her aunt called him and said that Marcia had told her of certain sexual advances that had been made by Respondent. He informed her that this was not true and asked her to have Marcia call him. She did so and they agreed to meet at Fort Lauderdale Beach because she was staying with her father there. They subsequently met at a prearranged place where Respondent picked her up in his car and, after driving around a few minutes looking for a parking space, parked in a vacant motel parking lot. Respondent explained to her that he had retained her notes against her wishes and shown them to others because he did not feel confident to counsel her concerning female problems. There was no physical contact during this meeting. (Testimony of Respondent, Mrs. Barnett) After Easter vacation was concluded, Marcia informed Respondent that her mother had found her diary and that he would have to be careful or she (Marcia) would "put a noose over his head." Her mother, after discovering the "diary" (consisting of several sheets of notebook paper) that contained matters concerning Respondent, took Marcia to their church, Jehovah's Witnesses, where she told the elders of the church about her association with Respondent. Her father, who was divorced from Marcia's mother, was present and heard Marcia relate her alleged experiences with Respondent. He thereafter reported the matter to the authorities at Coconut Creek High School, taking with him one or two pages of Marcia's diary which contained entries for the last week of March. These included references to several of her visits to Respondent's office during which he had purportedly kissed her and fondled her breasts. (Testimony of Respondent, John Vulpis, Petitioner's Exhibit 11) A school investigation ensued during which Marcia initially declined to cooperate, but eventually made a written statement in which she,stated generally that she trusted and respected Respondent, that he was a good man and she did not wish anything to happen to him. Respondent was questioned by school security personnel and he related the two incidents when Marcia had kissed him on one occasion and had attempted to do so on the other. He also told them about the incident at the beach which had not been known to the investigators at the time, and he turned over Marcia's notes to them. Later, Marcia made another written statement in which she said that she and the Respondent had kissed each other three different times in his office and that on at least two occasions, he had put his hands on her breasts inside her blouse and kissed her breasts. Her statement also related that they had kissed one another during the beach incident and that he had kissed her breasts and had put his hands down her pants and that she had touched his "privates." In this statement she also said that he had made certain suggestive statements to her during classes earlier in the school year and that, although she had informed him of a sex experience with a "guy I loved," she had not told him she was raped. (Testimony of Respondent, Stearns, Patterson, Petitioner's Exhibits 9 & 10) Marcia Vulpis testified at the hearing and her version of the relationship with Respondent and their meetings differs in material respects from that of Respondent which is set forth in the foregoing Findings of Fact. She testified that Respondent made several suggestive remarks to her during the school year. She admitted seeking him out to discuss the incident with the boy next door and that he had advised her to see a doctor. She stated that, although she had disliked Respondent at first, she later changed her views and began writing notes to him. She admitted asking him to go to bed with her, but testified that while discussing this request in his office on March 29, 1976, Respondent pulled her in the corner and kissed her. She also testified that during other visits to his office on April 5, 6 & 8, they kissed one another, and Respondent kissed her breasts and touched her on the vagina, and that she touched him on the penis through his trousers. She stated that similar acts occurred during their meeting on the beach in mid-April. After her mother discovered the diary and her father had reported the relationship with Respondent to school authorities, she asked the Respondent what they were going to do and he replied that they were in a lot of trouble. Although conceding that she was upset after discovering that Respondent had showed her notes to his wife and others, she said that she did not tell anyone she would seek revenge for his disclosure. She also conceded that she had taken LSD and "pills" from nine to eleven years of age and had had a few "trips". She testified that she attempted to kill herself when she was ten years old with a needle when she was "freaked out." She further stated that she had thought about suicide a lot of times and that the last time she harbored these thoughts was in early March and that they were prompted by her failure to get along with her mother. Although she had loved Respondent, she decided after the investigation that she loved him no more. (Testimony of Marcia Vulpis) School policy at Coconut Creek High School which is announced to all teachers at the beginning of each school year, is that an upset or disturbed child should be referred by an instructor to the school guidance staff, that included a full-time psychologist. This policy was also contained in a handbook issued to instructional personnel. (Testimony of Weatherred, Roesch, Larson) Respondent is 45 years old and posseses a bachelor of arts degree in theology and linguistics and a masters degree in elementary education. He additionally has completed approximately 90 hours of post-graduate study. He served as a Baptist minister for five years in Lowell, Massachusetts and three years in another pastorate in Newton, New Hampshire. His prior experience includes service as an elementary school principal at Turner Falls, Massachusetts. He entered the teaching profession because of family obligations that required greater remuneration than received in the ministry. He has four children. He entered the Broward County school system in 1970 working with low- achievers at the Pines Middle School in a work experience program for two years. He served one year at Plantation doing the same type of work and in 1974 was transferred to the Coconut Creek High School where he set up a work experience program. He has done extensive work in counseling young people with their problems both as a minister and teacher. Respondent admitted that he had had marital conflicts with his wife in the past and that he had lived alone in Florida for a period of time, but that their marriage relationship was good at the present time. (Testimony of Respondent, Respondent's Exhibits 2, 3) Although denied by Respondent on cross-examination, evidence was received that he had patted two female office employees of the Coconut Creek High School on their posteriors in a "friendly" manner while walking by them in the office, and that he had also ran his finger down the back of their dresses. (Testimony of Ivell, Herter) Respondent was suspended without pay by Petitioner on June 18, 1976 pending final action on the charges involving Marcia Vulpis. (Exhibit l)
Recommendation That the School Board of Broward County, Florida reinstate Ronald R. Barnett as an instructor and restore all back pay and other benefits that have been withheld during the period of his suspension. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of August, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of August, 1976.
Findings Of Fact THIS CAUSE comes on for consideration based upon the Petition for Determination of the Invalidity of the existing Rules 6A-14.416 and 6A-14.417, Florida Administrative Code, for allegedly being in violation of the provisions of Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. The Petition was filed on September 22, 1978 and the hearing was conducted on October 20, 1978. The hearing rises out of the collateral Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes hearing in which an administrative complaint had been filed under the guise of Rule 6A-14.416, Florida Administrative Code, (in addition to certain statutory authority) against the current Petitioner, Gregory Bruce Nelson. During the course of that hearing it developed that Gregory Bruce Nelson, through his affirmative defenses to the Complaint, wished to challenge Rule 6A-14.416, Florida Administrative Code for alleged violation of Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. In response to that challenge, the Section 120.57(1) hearing, (which is reported as Lee G. Henderson, as Director of the Division of Community Colleges, Petitioner, vs. Gregory Bruce Nelson, Respondent, DOAH Case Number 78-283), has been stayed pending the outcome of the case sub judice. An order was entered by the undersigned allowing for sufficient time to file the Section 120.56, Florida Statutes challenge to Rule 6A-14.416, Florida Administrative Code and Mr. Nelson has complied with the terms and conditions of that order as to timeliness of the Petition for review pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. Concurrently, Mr. Nelson has availed himself of the opportunity to submit a challenge to Rule 6A-14.417, Florida Administrative Code. The issue of consideration of the validity of Rules 6A-14.416 and 6A- 14.417, Florida Administrative Code, is properly joined and will be determined. Respondents moved to strike certain portions of the Petition at the commencement of the hearing and the motion was granted as to paragraphs 3(f), (g) and paragraph 4(d) and a portion of paragraph 5, beginning with the words ".... deprivation to Nelson of due process of law..." to the conclusion of said paragraph 5. In addition, the clause containing the Petitioner's prayer for relief was stricken in its language, "and directing Respondents to dismiss Case No. 78-283 with prejudice." An additional motion was made to strike the name of Lee G. Henderson, as Director of the Division of Community Colleges as a named Respondent. In view of the fact that the Director of the Division of Community Colleges is not responsible for the promulgation of rules and regulations of the State Board of Education, he is hereby deleted and stricken as a party Respondent. The Petitioner, Gregory Bruce Nelson, is an employee of the Florida Junior College, an institution governed by Chapter 230, Florida Statutes. Nelson holds a certificate issued under the terms and conditions of Rule 6A- 14.415, Florida Administrative Code. The pending Amended Petition for Revocation of Mr. Nelson's teaching certificate makes reference to the substantive basis for action as being found in Rule 6A-14.416, Florida Administrative Code, and the due process requirements for such revocation or suspension of the Petitioner's teaching certificate are ostensibly found in Rule 6A-14.417, Florida Administrative Code. The Petitioner's attack on the rules in question falls into two broad categories. The first category concerns the procedural requirements for the adoption of the rules and the second category is a contention on the part of the petitioner that the rules, as adopted, constitute invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority. The rules were adopted under the requirements of the then Administrative Procedures Act, Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. The adoption took place on December 3, 1974 and the rules became effective and operative on December 19, 1974. The controlling requirements for such adoption and effect and operation may be found in the former Administrative Procedures Act in operation in December 1974. Specifically, those provisions were Section 120.031 and Section 120.041,Florida Statutes. The Respondent in this cause met all conditions for the adoption of rules in terms of procedural requirements set forth in the aforementioned sections of the former Administrative Procedures Act. This can be determined by an examination of the Respondent's Exhibit #1, admitted into evidence which is a certified copy from the State of Florida, Department of State, of the promulgation and adoption of the rules in question on December 3, 1974, and of the filing of the rules with the Department of State on December 10, 1974, to become effective on the next day, December 19, 1974. Moreover, the rules were adopted by a public hearing which was noticed through publication in four newspapers of general circulation in the State of Florida on dates 10 to 30 days before the public hearing of December 3, 1974. Copies of the advertisements used in giving the notice may be found as the Respondent's Composite Exhibit #2, admitted into evidence. In view of the fact that the rules were adopted in accordance with the procedures set forth in the former Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, and were adopted by a public hearing properly noticed, it was not necessary to comply with the conditions of the new Administrative Procedures Act, Laws of Florida 1974, Chapter 74-310, which became effective January 1, 1975. In particular, this refers to the requirements set forth in Section 120.54, Florida Statutes, and Section 120.72, Florida Statutes, pertaining to Laws of Florida 1974, Chapter 74-310, effective January 1, 1975. Therefore, the Petitioner's claim of procedural violations as a basis for overturning Rules 6A-14.416 and 6A-14.417, Florida Administrative Code, is not well founded. The remaining question is whether or not the rules on their face constitute invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority within the meaning of the current Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. Turning to a consideration of the Respondent's Exhibit 41, it can be seen that in adopting and promulgating 6A-14.416, Florida Administrative Code, the State Board of Education made reference to Section 230.755, Florida Statutes as their general statement of authority and to the fact that the law being implemented was Section 230.759, Florida Statutes. Those provisions use the following language: "Section 230.755, Minimum standards for community colleges.-- The state board shall prescribe minimum standards which must be met before a community college is organized, acquired or operated, and which will assure that the purposes of the community college are attained. * * * Section 230.759 Employment of community college personnel.-- Employment of all personnel in each community college shall be upon recommendation of the president, subject to rejection for cause by the board of trustees and subject to the rules and regulations of the state board relative to certification, tenure, leaves of absence of all types, including sabbaticals, remuneration, and such other conditions of employment as the division of community colleges deems necessary and proper; and to policies of the board of trustees not incon- sistent with law." Section 230.755, Florida Statutes, is a general statement establishing minimum standards for the organization, acquisition or operation of the various community colleges in the state. it does not create legislative authority for the relocation or suspension of the teaching certificates of those individuals who are employed in the community college system In the State of Florida. Section 230.759, Florida Statutes prescribes the method by which individuals may be hired by the community college. However, that provision is not sufficiently broad enough in its language to authorize procedures for the revocation or suspension of the teaching certificates of those personnel employed by the community college in the State of Florida. One other background item should be examined in discussing the authority for promulgating Rule 6A-14.416, Florida Administrative Code. As was noted in the course of the hearing, the published accounts of Rule 6A-14.416, Florida Administrative Code contains a reference to Section 229,053(1), Florida Statutes, which was not found in the rule as originally filed with the State of Florida, Department of State. Consequently, it may be argued that Section 229.053(1), Florida Statutes, may not be utilized in supporting the promulgation and adoption of rules 6A-14.416, Florida Statutes, because it was left out of the official Rule 6A-14.416, Florida Administrative Code, filed with the Department of State. That provision, Section 229.053, Florida Statutes, reads as follows: Section 229.053 General powers of state board.-- The state board of education is the chief policy-making and coordinating body of public education in Florida. It has the general powers to determine, adopt or prescribe such policies, rules, regulations, or standards as are required by law or as it may find necessary for the improvement of the state system of public education. Except as otherwise provided herein it may, as it shall find appropriate, delegate its general powers to the commissioner of education or the directors of the divisions of the department. " Assuming for purposes of argument that Section 229.053(1), Florida Statutes may be properly attributed to Rule 6A-14.416, Florida Administrative Code, as an attempted statement of authority for the exercise of the powers found in the subject rule, the provision Section 229.053(1), Florida Statutes, could not authorize the exercise of the powers found in that rule; which rule attempts to allow for the revocation or suspension of a teaching certificate held by a member of a staff of the community college in the State of Florida. Section 229.053(1), Florida Statutes is a general statement of the powers of the state board of education, only. No other provisions of Chapter 230, Florida Statutes, were offered in support of Rule 6A-14.416, Florida Administrative Code. Nonetheless, a review of Part II of Chapter 230, Florida Statutes, dealing with community colleges, in existance at the time that the rule was adopted and promulgated, does not reveal any provision of that Part which would allow for the adoption of rules pertaining to penalties against the holders of certificates to teach in the community colleges of the State of Florida. Consequently, Rule 6A-14.416, Florida Administrative Code is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority within the meaning of Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, and is invalid in its entirety. Rule 6A-14.417, Florida Administrative Code, is a due process statement of procedure to implement the provisions of Rule 6A-14.416, Florida Administrative Code. Again, it has as its statement of authority found in the Respondent's Exhibit #1, admitted into evidence, the then existing provisions of Sections 230.755 and 230.759, Florida Statutes. That statement of authority is also found in the published compilation of rules made by the Department of State. For the reason that there exists no statement in Chapter 230, Florida Statutes, as it existed at the time that the Rule 6A-14.416, Florida Administrative Code was promulgated, that allows penalties to be placed against the certificate held by the community college teachers, there is likewise no authority to establish procedures for undertaking a consideration of probable cause to revoke or suspend and the subsequent hearing on revocation or suspension. The rationale in reaching this opinion is the same as was utilized in the consideration of Rule 6A-14.416, Florida Administrative Code. Therefore, Rule 6A-14.417, Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority within the meaning of Section 120.56, Florida Statutes and the entire language of Rule 6A-14.417, Florida Administrative Code is invalid.
